Margie Lineberry v. Riley Farms Property Owners Association

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CA05­399  Margie LINEBERRY v. RILEY FARMS PROPERTY OWNERS  ASS’N  __ S. W.3d ___  Court of Appeals of Arkansas  Opinion delivered May 24, 2006  1.  APPEAL & ERROR – JURY INSTRUCTIONS – APPELLANT’S INSTRUCTION WAS NOT SUPPORTED  BY THE LAW OR EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL.– Where the trial court was presented with  two  proposed  jury  instructions  regarding  the  definition  of  wild  and  domestic  animals,  appellant’s proposed instructions, which set out a test for determining whether an animal  should be considered wild, and an instruction offered by the appellee that was based on the  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 506 (1977), and where the appellee’s expert testified that  a bobcat is a wild animal, even if raised in captivity, and there was no evidence contradicting  the  expert’s  assessment,  the  trial court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  its  failure  to  give  appellant’s instruction because she failed to prove that her instruction was supported by the  law or evidence presented at trial.  2.  APPEAL & ERROR – COSTS AND FEES – TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEYS’ FEES  AND  COSTS  TO  APPELLEE  AS  THE  PREVAILING  PARTY.– Based  on the  trial court’s  specific  reference to the Chrisco opinion and its consideration of the guiding factors cited in the case,  its reliance on Ark. Rule Civ. P. 54 as the basis for its costs award, and the high degree of  deference  afforded  the  trial court  in the  determination  of  reasonable  attorneys’  fees,  the ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  LINEBERRY v. RILEY FARMS PROP. OWNERS ASS’N  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 2  appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees and  costs to appellee as the prevailing party in this matter and this case did not present a scenario  of the trial court abdicating its responsibility and mechanically awarding fees to the prevailing  party.  Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court; J. Michael Fitzhugh, Judge; affirmed.  Terrence Cain, for appellees.  McCracken Law Firm, by:  JoAnne M. McCracken, for appellant.  LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge.  Margie Lineberry appeals from a jury verdict finding that  she  violated  two  restrictive  covenants  contained  in  her  residential  subdivision’s  bill  of  assurance.  She  also  appeals  the  trial  court’s  award  of  $22,989.70  in  attorneys’  fees  and  $382.75 in costs to appellee Riley Farm Property Owners Association. We affirm.  In April 2004, Lineberry purchased property in the Riley Farm subdivision in Fort  Smith,  Sebastian  County,  Arkansas.  Prior  to  Lineberry  moving into  the  subdivision,  the  developer of Riley Farm filed a bill of assurance with the office of the recorder of Sebastian  County. The bill of assurance contained a number of restrictive covenants, two of which are  relevant to the instant case. The first covenant prohibited any resident of Riley Farm from  keeping “cattle, swine, poultry, fowl, wild animals[,] or exotic animals in the Addition.” The  second required that “[p]lans for all fencing, whether on lot lines or surrounding patios,  pools,  barns[,]  or  other  areas  of  the  lot  must  be  submitted  to,  and  approved  by,  the  Architectural Control Committee prior to the construction thereof.” This covenant further  provided that if the Committee did not approve or disapprove a fence plan within fourteen  days of its submission, the plan was deemed approved, and the Association’s resolution of  the dispute “shall be binding” unless its resolution was arbitrary and capricious.  Shortly  after  Lineberry  moved  into  the  subdivision,  members  of  the  Association  discovered that she kept a bobcat at her residence in the subdivision. On May 27, 2004, the  Association  sent  Lineberry  a  certified  letter  informing  her  that  keeping  a  bobcat  at  her  residence violated the restrictive covenant’s prohibition on wild or exotic animals and that ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  LINEBERRY v. RILEY FARMS PROP. OWNERS ASS’N  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 3  she needed to remove it. Lineberry never retrieved the letter from the post office.  On May  21, 2004, Lineberry faxed a letter and a drawing to Lucy Wilkes, office  manager for the Association, requesting approval of a plan to erect a fence around her home.  After receiving the fax, Wilkes placed a stamp on Lineberry’s letter that read “APPROVED,”  with two blank lines underneath the word. The blank lines were provided for the approving  signatures of two Commission members, which were required for fence construction in the  subdivision. In response to the request, on June 1, 2004, Patrick Mickle, the Commission’s  chairman, made notations on the drawing submitted by Lineberry highlighting aspects of her  fence  construction plan that did not comply with the Riley Farm covenants. Lineberry’s  faxed notice never received the requisite signatures.  On June 3, 2004, Wilkes spoke with Lineberry by telephone and informed her that her  fence application had not been approved and that Association members wanted her to remove  the bobcat from the subdivision. The following day, Wilkes and Lineberry met in person to  discuss the fence and the bobcat. During this meeting, Wilkes retrieved a copy of the May  27, 2004, certified letter the Association sent Lineberry, read it to her, and encouraged her  to pick up the copy waiting for her at the post office. Lineberry never picked up the letter,  continued to house the bobcat, and began building her fence.  On June 15, 2004, Roy Vanderpool, a member of the Committee, visited Lineberry’s  home  and  told  her  that  the  fence  she  was  building  violated  the  subdivision’s  restrictive  covenants. Lineberry responded that she believed her construction plan had been approved.  Vanderpool then contacted Wilkes to clarify the situation. Wilkes confirmed that Lineberry’s  plan  had  not  been  approved.  Lineberry  indicated  that  she  was  willing  to  work  with  the  Committee  to  bring  her  fence  into  compliance.  Vanderpool  and  another  member  of  the  Committee, John Callaher, drafted an agreement stating that Lineberry could build a fence  but  that  the  fence  had  to  comply  with  the  “set­back  line”  provision  of  the  covenants.  Vanderpool and Callaher signed off on the agreement, and Lineberry committed to comply  with  the  agreement,  but  instead,  continued  to  build  her  fence  according  to  her  original  construction plan.  On  July  23,  2004,  the  Association  filed  a  complaint  in  Sebastian  County  Circuit  Court. The complaint sought to have Lineberry remove her bobcat from the subdivision and  either remove the fence she had built or bring it into compliance with the covenant. The case  was tried before a jury on December 20 and 21, 2004. The jury returned a unanimous verdict  in favor of the Association on the question of whether Lineberry’s keeping of a bobcat in the  subdivision violated the terms of the covenant. By a vote of eleven­to­one, the jury returned  a verdict in favor of the Association on the question of whether Lineberry’s fence violated ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  LINEBERRY v. RILEY FARMS PROP. OWNERS ASS’N  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 4  the covenants. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Riley Farm on January 3, 2005.  On January 6, 2005, the Association filed a motion requesting that Lineberry pay the costs  and  attorneys’  fees  it  incurred  litigating  the  case  in  accordance  with  the  fee  provision  contained in its bill of assurance. On January 20, 2005, the trial court ordered Lineberry to  pay $22,989.70 in attorneys’ fees and $382.75 in costs. It is from this judgment and order  that Lineberry appeals.  However, after her appeal was lodged with our court, on February 18, 2005, Lineberry  sold her home in Riley Farm. At this time Lineberry  had not paid the judgment entered  against her; therefore, the Association initiated a garnishment proceeding. On April 22, 2005,  Lineberry paid the $23,372.45 in fees and costs that the court had ordered her to pay. On  April 28, 2005, the Association filed a motion to dismiss Lineberry’s appeal claiming that  because Lineberry no longer lived in Riley  Farm  and had voluntarily paid the judgment  against her, the issue on appeal was moot. On May 25, 2005, in an 8­4 decision, our court  voted to deny the Association’s motion to dismiss the appeal. We are mindful of this decision  and reach the same conclusion.  If an appellant voluntarily pays a judgment, the appeal from that judgment would be  moot, but if the payment is involuntary, an appeal would not be precluded. DeHaven v. T&D  Dev. Inc., 50 Ark. App. 193, 901 S.W.2d 30 (1995). We are satisfied that once the writ of  garnishment  was  filed,  Lineberry  did  not  “voluntarily”  pay  the  attorneys’  fees.  Further,  because Lineberry’s economic interests were impaired, she has standing to pursue the appeal.  Forrest Constr., Inc. v. Milam, 345 Ark. 1, 43 S.W.3d 140 (2001).  Turning to the merits of appeal, we consider Lineberry’s argument that the trial court  erred by refusing to give jury instructions that she had proposed, which set out a test for  determining whether an animal should be considered wild. The proffered instructions stated:  An  individual  animal  may  be  domesticated  even  where  the  species  of  animal  is  commonly wild. The test to determine whether an individual animal of a species is  domesticated is whether:  1) The individual animal has become personal property, with someone who  claims title and full ownership rights.  2) The owner or keeper has exercised such training and control over the animal  that it may be considered tame. * * * ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  LINEBERRY v. RILEY FARMS PROP. OWNERS ASS’N  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 5  An  individual  animal  may  be  domesticated  even  where  the  species  of  animal  is  commonly wild. A wild animal is one of an untamed disposition; living in a state of  nature.  A domesticated animal is one which is tamed and is habituated to live in or about the  habitations of men, or such as to contribute to the support of a family.  Lineberry argued below, as she does on appeal, that the jury should have been instructed that  animals  normally  living  in  the  wild  could  be  domesticated  and  wildness  should  be  determined on an individual basis. Lineberry also contends that when the trial court denied  the Association’s partial­summary­judgment motion, wherein it sought a ruling that a bobcat  is a wild animal, the court obligated itself to her individual wildness theory—and the jury  instructions she had proffered—because the ruling was in effect a rule of law.  At  the outset, we note that the trial court’s denial of the Association’s summary­  judgment motion is not the same as a ruling on the wildness issue. In its consideration of the  Association’s motion, the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law. The  order simply stated that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists. The trial court could,  therefore, consider any proposed instructions on the issue. The trial court was presented with  two proposed jury instructions regarding the definition of wild and domestic animals—the  one outlined  above, and an instruction offered by the Association that was based on the  1  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 506 (1977)  that read:  Ladies and gentlemen, you are instructed that a wild animal is an animal that is not  by custom devoted to the service of mankind at the time and the place in which it is  kept. A domestic  animal  is an animal that is by custom devoted to the service of  mankind at the time and in the place in which it is kept.  As a matter  of  law,  litigants are entitled to a jury instruction when it is a correct 1  The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 506 (1977) defines a wild animal as  follows:  (1) A wild animal as the term is used in this Restatement is an animal that is not by  custom to the service of mankind at the time and in the place in which it is kept.  (2) A domestic animal as that term is used in this Restatement is an animal that is  by custom devoted to the service of mankind at the time and in the place in which  it is kept.  ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  LINEBERRY v. RILEY FARMS PROP. OWNERS ASS’N  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 6  statement of the law and there is some basis in the evidence to support it. Barnes v. Everett,  351 Ark. 479, 95 S.W.3d 740 (2003). However, a trial court’s refusal to give a proffered  instruction will not be reversed unless there was an abuse of discretion. Barker v. Clark, 343  Ark. 8, 33 S.W.3d 476 (2000).  Here, the restatement­based instruction given by the court is supported in the law and  the evidence presented at trial. See Cavaliere v. Skelton, 73 Ark. App. 188, 40 S.W.3d 844  (2001) (holding that a couple keeping Bengal tigers at their residence violated a restrictive  covenant that only allowed the keeping of household pets). The Association’s expert, Dr.  Gwen Reeder (a Fort Smith veterinarian), testified that a bobcat is a wild animal—even if  raised in captivity. She further noted that the United States Department of Agriculture, the  Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, the American Veterinary Association, dictionaries,  and legal scholars all define a bobcat as a wild animal. There was no evidence contradicting  Dr.  Reeder’s  assessment.  Because  Lineberry  failed  to  prove  that  her  instruction  was  supported by the law or evidence presented at trial, it cannot  be  said that the trial court  abused its discretion in its failure to give the instruction.  Next, Lineberry argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that  the  Commission  disapproved  her  request  to  erect  a  fence  around  the  front  of  her  home.  However, this argument is not preserved for review because Lineberry failed to move for a  directed verdict on this issue at the close of all evidence. Ark. R. Civ. P. 50(e). In jury trials,  if a party fails to move for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence because of  insufficiency of the evidence, that party waives any question pertaining to the sufficiency of  the evidence to support the jury verdict. Id. Here, not only did Lineberry fail to move for a  directed verdict, she affirmatively stated that she believed that “there was enough of a factual  dispute for the fence issue to get to the jury.”  Finally, Lineberry argues that the trial court erred in its award of attorneys’ fees and  costs to the Association as the prevailing party in this matter. An award of attorneys’ fees  will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Ouachita Trek & Dev.  Co. v. Rowe, 341 Ark. 456, 17 S.W.3d 491 (2000). When reviewing a trial court’s decision  to award fees, due regard shall be given to the trial court’s intimate acquaintance with the  record and the quality of service rendered. Id.  In  its  order,  the  trial  court  noted  that  it  had  considered  the  fee­award  guidance  enunciated in Chrisco v. Sun Industries, 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990), and had  based  its  decision  on  the  factors  outlined  in  the  case,  which  include  the  experience  and  ability of the attorney, the time and labor required to properly perform the legal service, the  novelty and difficulty of the issue involved, the time involved in the case and the obtained ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  LINEBERRY v. RILEY FARMS PROP. OWNERS ASS’N  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 7  result, the customary fee charged in the locality for similar services, and the time limitation  imposed by the client or the circumstances. After considering the so­called “Chrisco factors,”  the trial court awarded a total sum of $22,989.70 in attorneys’ fees. The court went on to  note that, although the Association asked for costs in the amount of $6,195.16, only $382.75  worth were authorized by Rule 54 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure—a $100 filing  fee, a $50 service fee, $72.75 for subpoena service witness fee  and mileage, and $60 in  witness fees for two other witnesses.  Here,  based  on  the  trial  court’s  specific  reference  to  the  Chrisco  opinion  and  its  consideration of the guiding factors cited in the case, its reliance on Ark. Rule Civ. P. 54 as  the basis for its costs award, and the high degree of deference we afford the trial court in the  determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees, we find no abuse of discretion. We are further  satisfied  that  this  case  does  not  present  a  scenario  of  the  trial  court  abdicating  its  responsibility and mechanically awarding fees to the prevailing party.  Affirmed.  HART  and ROAF, JJ., agree ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9 

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