Lynda Rudd v. A.L. Tenney Trustee, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, and Death and Permanent Disability Trust Fund

 Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION II  CA 05­1038  LYNDA RUDD  March 15, 2006  APPELLANT  V. A.L. TENNEY TRUSTEE, STATE  FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,  a n d   D E AT H  AND  PE R M ANE N T  DISABILITY TRUST FUND  APPELLEES  APPEAL  FROM  T HE  WORKERS’  COMPENSATION COMMISSION  E508014  AFFIRMED TERRY CRABTREE, Judge  By decision entered September 20, 2004, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found  that appellant Lynda Rudd failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she is  totally and permanently disabled as a result of her compensable injury of 1991, but found  that due to her injury she sustained a fifty percent wage loss.  The ALJ further held that  appellee State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) was not entitled to an offset  for the benefits received by appellant under a long­term disability insurance policy.  Both  Rudd and State Farm appealed to the Full Commission.  The  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  affirmed  the  decision  of  the  ALJ  with  regard to appellant’s contention that she is totally and permanently disabled, finding that she  failed to meet her burden of proof.  The Commission modified the decision of the ALJ on  the issue of wage­loss benefits.  It held that appellant was entitled to a five percent wage­loss  benefit  rather  than  the  fifty  percent  wage  loss  benefit  granted  by  the  ALJ.    Further,  the  Commission agreed with and affirmed the ALJ’s decision that State Farm did not prove  entitlement  to  an  offset  for  benefits  received  by  appellant  under  a  long  term  disability  insurance policy. On  appeal,  appellant  challenges  the  decision  of  the  Workers’  Compensation  Commission to deny her claim for total and permanent disability benefits.  She asserts that  under the odd­lot doctrine in effect at the time of her injury, the evidence supports a finding  that she is permanently and totally disabled.  She also maintains that it was error for the  Commission  to  reduce  her  wage  loss  disability  from fifty  percent  to  five  percent.      We  disagree and affirm.  Appellant began working for appellee, A.L. Tenney Trustee, in 1980, and she was  working for appellee as a claims supervisor when she was injured in November 1991.  She  sustained an admittedly compensable injury to her neck and back when she fell from a ladder  into some shelving.  As a result, she required surgery on May 15, 1995.  Dr. Richard Jordan  performed  an  anterior  cervical  diskectomy  with  fusion  at  C5­6  and  C6­7.    He  released  appellant to return to work full­time on September 26, 1995.  Because appellant continued to experience pain in the lumbar region of her back, she  received epidural steroid injections.  Ultimately she required another surgery, and on June  12,  1996,  Dr.  Jordan  performed  a  right  hemilaminectomy  and  diskectomy  at  L4­5.    Dr.  Jordan performed a third surgery on December 19, 1997, when appellant had a right anterior  scalenotomy and a lumbar epidural steriod injection.  Appellant returned to work after each  of these surgeries.  Appellant had surgery on the cervical area of her spine again on March 6, 1998.  At  that time she had an anterior cervical diskectomy with fusion at C4­5 with anterior plating.  Following her healing period she returned to work, although she continued to complain of  pain.  Her  fifth  and  final  surgery  was  performed  on  September  7,  2000.    Dr.  Jordan  performed an anterior cervical diskectomy and fusion at C3­4 with anterior synthes plating.  After  this  final  surgery,  appellant’s  healing  period  extended  beyond  the  twelve  months  covered by company policy, so her employment with appellee was terminated. ­2­  CA 05­1038  Appellant began seeing Dr. Thomas Kiser at the University of Arkansas for Medical  Sciences, Department of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation (UAMS) on May 24, 2001. Dr.  Kiser did a thorough evaluation of appellant’s condition and reported a recommended plan  for her rehabilitation.  In addition to physical therapy and medications, Dr. Kiser indicated  he would see appellant in two months to evaluate her progress and hopefully put a return­to  work program in place.  Dr. Kiser’s next report, dated August 17, 2001, notes that he spoke  with appellant about returning to work.  It was his opinion that she would need to start back  slowly  with  half  days  three  times  per  week,  working  up  to  a  five­day  work  week.    In  a  subsequent report dated September 20, 2001, Dr. Kiser recommends that appellant continue  aquatic therapy.  He noted that appellant expressed interest in volunteer work at Children’s  Hospital, and he agreed that it would be a good idea.    He  further  opined that “as far as  working in the future, I think she has good upper and lower extremity strength.  Functionally,  she could do the activity.”  It was Dr. Kiser’s opinion that “once she has successfully done  some volunteer work, looking at paid employment would be the next step.”  On May 15, 2003, appellant and her attorney met with Chelle Williams, a vocational  case manager with Corvel.  Subsequent to this meeting, Ms. Williams prepared a vocational  assessment  report  that  outlined  appellant’s  personal,  educational,  medical,  and  work  background.  Ms. Williams’ recommendation was that she would complete a transferable  skills analysis to identify appropriate vocational goals for appellant, and she would begin a  survey of the labor market to determine the availability of employment opportunities.  In the  transferable skills report dated June 16, 2003, Ms. Williams outlined appellant’s work history  and noted that appellant was a high school graduate with one year of college and one year  of business school.  She also listed the restrictions given by Dr. Kiser, more specifically, that  appellant had a ten­pound lifting restriction that placed her work capability as sedentary.  Ms. Williams also prepared a labor market survey report dated July 29, 2003, that listed nine ­3­  CA 05­1038  job leads.  Under the summary section of this report, Ms. Williams noted that appellant  expressed the belief that she would not be able to return to work.  In  addition  to  being evaluated  by  Dr.  Kiser,  appellant  was  also  evaluated  by  Dr.  William Ackerman.  She reported to Dr. Ackerman that she was the sole caretaker of her six­  year­old granddaughter, and that she had a surveillance video on her when she was taking  care  of  her  grandchild.  During  the  examination  she  complained  of  pain  and  sleep  deprivation.  Dr. Ackerman’s opinion was that his findings would substantiate the presence  of moderate but not severe pain, and he made several recommendations regarding changes  in  medication.  His  report  indicates  that  appellant  was  concerned  with  increasing  her  functionality so she could be more involved with her granddaughter.  Dr. Ackerman opined  that appellant “will not be able to resume gainful employment.”  At the hearing of this matter, appellant testified that she is in too much pain to work.  She further testified that she has had sole custody of her hearing­impaired granddaughter  since May 2000.  The child attends a private school in Jacksonville, and appellant drives her  to school, and she also takes her to Children’s Hospital in Little Rock once a week for speech  therapy.  Appellant testified that when she was living in Vilonia she was driving sixty miles  in the morning and sixty miles in the afternoon to take her granddaughter back and forth to  school.  She subsequently moved to Jacksonville, so her commute is now a short distance.  Appellant  testified  that  she  is  not  doing  water  therapy  as  recommended  by  her  doctors  because she does not feel it is helping her.  She said she classifies herself as a homemaker  not working outside the home.  She testified that she considers herself disabled and has not  made any effort to return to work; however, she stated she filled out applications for the jobs  sent to her by Chelle Williams.  Chelle Williams testified at the hearing that to her knowledge appellant did not follow  up on any of the jobs.  She said she followed up with several of the employers and they did ­4­  CA 05­1038  not have active applications for appellant.  Ms. Williams testified that when people do not  have a financial incentive, they usually do not return to work.  She said that appellant told  her that her financial needs were being met.  Ms. Williams also indicated that appellant  seemed intent on staying home to care for her granddaughter.  According to Ms. Williams,  the  United  States  Department  of  Labor’s  Dictionary  of  Occupational  Titles  classifies  homemaker as a medium­duty job.  The job leads provided by Ms. Williams to appellant  were classified as light to sedentary.  Appellees  provided  a  video  surveillance  tape  of  appellant  that  was  introduced  as  evidence  and  shown  at  the  hearing.    The  tape  showed  appellant  entering  Wal­Mart  and  leaving Wal­Mart with a shopping cart.  The cart contained several large, plastic storage  containers and a large bag of dog food.  The tape showed appellant loading the items into the  trunk of her car.  Another segment of the tape showed appellant in the parking lot in front  of her granddaughter’s school, walking her into school, going to the post office, and other  activities indicative of a normal homemaker’s life.  Taking  into  consideration  appellant’s  age,  mental  capacity,  training,  and  work  experience, the Commission agreed with the ALJ that appellant was precluded from falling  within  the  odd­lot  category  for  permanent  and  total  disability.    The  Commission  noted  appellant’s vast clerical experience, and that she attended college, business school, and had  completed a computer class.  While the Commission considered the opinion of Dr. William  Ackerman,  it  gave  more  weight  to  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Thomas  Kiser,  who  opined  that  appellant should be able to return to employment.  The Commission also gave weight to the  fact that appellant is a full­time caretaker for her granddaughter.  In further support of the  position that appellant is at least capable of light to sedentary work, the Commission cited  its reliance on the video surveillance tape and still pictures depicting appellant engaging in  normal daily activities. ­5­  CA 05­1038  When a claim is denied because the claimant has failed to show an entitlement to  compensation  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  the  substantial­evidence  standard  of  review requires us to affirm if the Commission’s opinion displays a substantial basis for the  denial of relief.  Clardy v. Medi­Homes LTC Serv. LLC, 75 Ark. App. 156, 55 S.W.3d 791  (2001).  Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept  as adequate to support a conclusion.  Patterson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Health, 70 Ark. App.  182, 15 S.W.3d 701 (2000).  The court will not reverse the Commission’s decision unless  it is convinced that fair­minded persons with the same facts before them could not have  reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission.  Searcy Indus. Laundry v. Ferren, 82  Ark. App. 69, 110 S.W.3d 306 (2003).  It is the function of the Commission to determine the  credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.  Id.  Furthermore, the  Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence and, if the evidence is conflicting,  its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission.  Id.  The odd­lot doctrine provides benefits for an employee who is injured to the extent  that the only services he can perform are so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that  a  reasonably  stable  market  for  them  does  not  exist  and  he  may  be  classified  as  totally  disabled.  Patterson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Health, supra.  Appellant asserts that she falls  under this doctrine; however, we disagree.  Appellant has the burden of making a prima facie  showing that she falls in this category based upon the factors of permanent impairment, age,  mental capacity, education, and training.  Only after she makes this showing does the burden  shift to the employer to show that some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously  available to her.  Ellison v. Therma Tru, 71 Ark. App. 410, 30 S.W.3d 769 (2000) (citing  Patterson v. Arkansas Dep’t. of Health, supra).  The court may also consider the appellant’s  motivation  to  return  to  work,  since  a  lack  of  interest  or  a  negative  attitude  impedes  our  assessment of the appellant’s loss of earning capacity.  Ellison, supra. ­6­  CA 05­1038  Appellant has a twenty­six percent impairment rating.  By all accounts she is a bright,  relatively young person who attended college and business school.  She possesses extensive  clerical experience and was working as a supervisor earning over $53,000 per year at the  time of her injury.  The vocational consultant identified several jobs for which appellant was  amply qualified; however, appellant did not pursue these opportunities.  It was the opinion  of the consultant that, because appellant’s needs were being met, she might not have the  incentive  to  return  to  work.  In  fact,  the  combined  total  of  appellant’s  workers’  compensation,  long  term  disability  and  social  security  disability,  along  with  her  granddaughter’s  disability  benefits  is  over  $65,000  per  year,  a  sum  greater  than  what  appellant earned while she was employed.  These factors, along with the photographs and  video  supporting  the  fact  that  appellant  is  capable  of  performing  light  work,  were  appropriately considered and  weighed  by the Commission.   Because the Commission’s  decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief, we affirm on this point.  Appellant argues it was error for the Commission to reduce her wage loss from fifty  percent  to  five  percent.    Pursuant  to  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­522(b)(1)(Repl.  2002),  the  percentage of permanent physical impairment along with a person’s age, education, work  experience, and other factors reasonably expected to affect his or her future earning capacity  are to be considered by the Commission in evaluating permanent partial disability benefits  in  excess  of  the  permanent  physical  impairment.  The  Commission  may  also  consider  a  person’s motivation to return to work.  Ellison, supra.  The Commission held that “claimant has failed by her own actions to prove that she  is entitled to fifty percent wage loss benefits.”  After recounting appellant’s education and  work  experience,  the  Commission  reasoned  that  appellant’s  current  financial  situation  combined with her full­time responsibility of caring for her granddaughter served to dissuade  her  from  seeking  employment.  We  cannot  say  that  the  Commission’s  decision  is  not ­7­  CA 05­1038  supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm on this point as well.  Affirmed.  BIRD and GLOVER, JJ., agree. ­8­  CA 05­1038 

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.