Jacquelyne Velcoff v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE
DIVISION II
CACR05-950
November 8, 2006
JACQUELYNE VELCOFF
APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM CLARK COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-2003-187]
V.
HON. JOHN A. THOMAS, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
On February 25, 2005, a Clark County jury found Jacquelyne Velcoff guilty of twenty
counts of rape, for which she received twenty concurrent fourteen-year terms in the Arkansas
Department of Correction. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
convictions. She also argues that the trial court allowed unfairly prejudicial testimony in
violation of Ark. R. Evid. 403. We affirm.
The State charged appellant with twenty separate counts of raping her daughter, N.V.1
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The criminal information, filed October 2, 2003, charged in pertinent part as follows:
Counts 1 through 20: RAPE ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103. The said defendant
in the Ninth East District of the Criminal Division of CLARK COUNTY, acting alone
or with Wayne Poland, did unlawfully and feloniously on or about the period of 2000
through 9/2003 engaged in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with a minor
On September 19, 2003, N.V. went to school counselor William Bell and explained that
appellant was taking her to Wayne Poland’s house and forcing her to have sex with him. Bell
reported N.V.’s statement to DHS and to school resource officer Steve Escalante. When
Escalante asked N.V. how often she had been forced to have sex with Poland, N.V. replied,
“More than once, but more like a hundred.”
Escalante turned the investigation over to Investigator Roy Bethell of the Arkadelphia
Police Department and Chief Deputy Wes Sossamon of the Clark County Sheriff’s
Department. Bethell and Sossamon interviewed N.V., who told them that the sexual abuse
began when she was ten or eleven and that she had just turned fourteen. N.V. told them that
Poland took pictures of her in various states of undress and that he videotaped him having
sex with her on a couple of occasions. She also described in graphic detail the sexual acts
that occurred, stating that it happened more than twenty times. Police later executed a search
warrant at Poland’s residence, where they took two computers, data storage discs, a camera
with film, a video camera, photographs, and a personal safe containing sexually related items.
Ninety percent of the pictures on the computer were pornographic.
They found no
videotapes of children engaged in sexual activity.
Police also took a statement from N.V.’s brother, D.V., who told police that he had
been sexually assaulted as well and that the sexual assaults had been going on for years. He
female, who was less than fourteen (14) years of age, by forcible compulsion on
twenty (20) separate occasions in violation of A.C.A. 5-14-103 against the peace and
dignity of the State of Arkansas.
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told police that he was first molested when Poland lived in Caddo Valley at Storm Creek
Apartments and that it happened after appellant suggested that he spend the night with
Poland. Bethell also interviewed appellant. During the interview, Bethell asked her if she
had called Poland since her children were taken into DHS’s custody. Appellant initially
denied it, but after Bethell told her that the police could check her caller ID, she told him that
she did have a conversation with him.
At trial, D.V. testified that his family lived next to Poland when they lived in Caddo
Valley and that appellant encouraged him to spend the night with Poland because Poland was
an old man and alone. Over appellant’s objection, D.V. stated that he visited Poland every
weekend or every other weekend, that he and Poland would sleep in the same bed, and that
Poland would wake him up in the middle of the night and molest him. He also stated that
Poland would show him pictures and videos of naked women and men and that he saw N.V.
in one video. He testified that he would tell appellant that he did not want to visit Poland and
that appellant would get impatient if he told her that he did not want to go. D.V. also
testified that appellant encouraged him to change his story to keep Poland out of jail.
N.V. testified that she was fifteen and at one time lived in an apartment in Caddo
Valley next door to Poland. She stated that the first time she was alone with Poland, he told
her to take off her clothes because appellant needed money. During this time, Poland would
touch her outside of her clothes. She noted that this happened at his house on the hill and
that Poland started touching her on her buttocks and vagina. Poland was planning to take her
to his house so that he could have sex with her again on the day she told her counselor about
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the rapes. N.V. testified that the abuse occurred “well over twenty times”; that Poland would
penetrate her with his penis; and that she told appellant about the rapes, to which appellant
replied that it was her imagination. N.V. also testified that she saw Poland give appellant
money and that Poland would give her money to give to appellant. She stated that appellant
would sometimes be in the room while Poland was having sex with her and that Poland
would want to have sex with her after he had sex with appellant. On one occasion, N.V. told
appellant that she did not want to have sex with Poland, after which appellant held her down
while Poland got on top of her. She stated that appellant told her that she needed the money.
Appellant moved for directed verdict at the close of the State’s case, contending that
the information did not specifically allege that the twenty counts occurred at a particular
time. The court denied her motion. Appellant testified in her defense and denied that Poland
paid her in exchange for sex. She also denied holding N.V. down while Poland took
advantage of her. The jury later found appellant guilty of twenty counts of rape and
sentenced her to twenty concurrent fourteen-year terms in the Arkansas Department of
Correction.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the State presented
insufficient evidence that she committed twenty counts of rape. The State contends that
appellant’s sufficiency challenge is not preserved for appellate review. It notes that appellant
only objected once during the testimony about the number of times Poland had sex with
N.V.; that the objection only concerned the witness’s memory, recollection of the statements,
and the need for a proper foundation; and that the court made no ruling on the objection.
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However, we are aware of no authority that requires a defendant to cite offending testimony
as a prerequisite to preserving a sufficiency challenge on appellate review. The record
shows that she made a specific directed-verdict motion at the close of the State’s evidence
and renewed that motion at the close of all evidence.2 This is all that is necessary to preserve
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1.
A motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Hunt
v. State, 354 Ark. 682, 128 S.W.3d 820 (2003). We review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State. Baughman v. State, 353 Ark. 1, 110 S.W.3d 740 (2003). The test for
determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to
compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. Only evidence
2
Appellant argued at trial:
[W]e would make a Motion for Directed Verdict and as a basis for that motion,
we would state that, number 1, the defendant is charged by way of a general
information which alleges specifically 20 counts in a general manner. It does not
specifically allege that a count occurred at a particular time.
....
There [sic] has not been demonstrated that there was actually any credible
evidence, when you take into consideration that [D.V.] basically stated that he could
not testify that the mother was present at any given time when these alleged acts could
of occurred. That’s not to say that there were times when he would not have been
present. When you take the testimony of [N.V.], and you size up her testimony, her
testimony is incredible to a point where a reasonable juror should not be required to
sit and make a decision as to whether or not my client is, in fact, guilty of the
commission of the 20 counts as alleged in the information.
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supporting the verdict will be considered. Id.
Appellant argues, “The complaining witness, more likely than not, pulled a number
‘out of thin air’ during her interview with the police, and this became a basis for a criminal
information.” She further contends, without much argument, that the information did not
allege that a count occurred at a particular time.
Regarding appellant’s argument that N.V. pulled the number twenty “out of thin air,”
it is the job of the jury, as fact finder, to weigh inconsistent evidence and determine issues
of credibility. Brown v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d — (June 14, 2006). It was within
the jury’s power to either reject as speculative or accept as the truth N.V.’s testimony that she
was raped on at least twenty occasions. Further, the testimony of a rape victim, standing by
itself, is sufficient to support a conviction. Gillard v. State, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d — (Apr.
27, 2006). N.V. testified that Poland would penetrate her with his penis when he would
abuse her and that this occurred more than twenty times.
As for appellant’s argument that the information did not allege that a count occurred
at a particular time, it is well-settled that precise time is not an essential element to the crime
of rape. See Williams v. State, 331 Ark. 263, 962 S.W.2d 329 (1998). Youthful victims of
sexual abuse can rarely provide exactness as to the time an offense occurred, and any
discrepancies in the testimony concerning the date of the offense are for the jury to resolve.
Rains v. State, 329 Ark. 607, 953 S.W.2d 48 (1997).
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Appellant also argues that D.V.’s testimony was unfairly prejudicial.3 Appellant
contends that even if D.V.’s testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas
Rules of Evidence, it was inadmissible under Rule 403. We apply an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review to rulings under Rule 403. Morris v. State, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —
(Oct. 5, 2006). Evidence offered by the State will usually be prejudicial to the accused;
otherwise, the State would not introduce it. Id. However, that evidence should not be
excluded under Rule 403 absent a showing that the evidence lacks probative value in light
of the risk of unfair prejudice to the accused. Id.
Appellant cites Smith v. State, 19 Ark. App. 188, 718 S.W.2d 475 (1986), for the
proposition that the probative value of evidence correlates inversely to the availability of
other means of proving the issue for which the prejudicial evidence is offered. However, the
supreme court overruled the rule stated in Smith in Bledsoe v. State, 344 Ark. 86, 39 S.W.3d
760 (2001) (overruling Golden v. State, 10 Ark. App. 362, 664 S.W.2d 496 (1984)), and
expressly overruled Smith in Bullock v. State, 353 Ark. 577, 111 S.W.2d 380 (2003). Today,
Arkansas appellate courts often state that the State is entitled to prove its case as conclusively
as possible. Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801 (2003); Bledsoe v. State, supra.
Here, D.V. testified, among other things, that appellant would encourage him to spend
the night at Poland’s residence and that Poland would abuse him. He also testified that
appellant would get impatient if he stated that he did not want to visit Poland. D.V.’s
3
At trial, appellant argued that D.V.’s testimony was “irrelevant, prejudicial,
inflammatory, and unrelated to the charges.”
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testimony established that appellant encouraged him to visit Poland, who committed horrible
acts of abuse. While this testimony is prejudicial, it does not rise to the level of prejudice
that would warrant exclusion. We hold that the trial court did not err in allowing D.V.’s
testimony to be entered into evidence.
Affirmed.
P ITTMAN, C.J., and G LOVER, J., agree.
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