Robert W. Franklin v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION II  CACR05­925  MARCH 15, 2006  ROBERT W. FRANKLIN  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL FROM THE LOGAN COUNTY  CIRCUIT  COURT,  SOUTHERN  DISTRICT,  [NO. CR­2003­110],  HON. PAUL E. DANIELSON,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED SAM BIRD, Judge  Appellant  Robert  W.  Franklin  was  convicted  by  a  jury  of  possession  of  methamphetamine  with  intent  to  deliver,  possession  of  drug  paraphernalia,  and  use  of  a  communication facility. He was sentenced to a total of thirty years’ imprisonment, including  a  ten­year  sentence  enhancement  under  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  5­64­411  with  respect  to  his  conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. On appeal, Franklin  argues  (1)  that  the  trial  court  erred  when  it  allowed  the  State  to  introduce  testimony  concerning controlled drug buys within his home, and (2) that the evidence was insufficient  for the jury to find that Franklin possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. We  affirm.  At trial, Officer Larry Garner testified that he  was  involved in the execution of a  search warrant at Franklin’s residence on November 28, 2003. Garner said that the residence  had been under surveillance and that police found the following items during the search of  the  residence:  a  mirror  with  a  white  line  of  powder  substance  that  appeared  to  be  methamphetamine; a square box containing baggies with a white substance and small empty bags;  a  Ziploc  bag  containing  “corner  bags”;  round  tubes,  baggies,  and  items  of  drug  paraphernalia used to crush the powder substance; a set of digital scales; a “PVC cylinder  taped on both ends”; two smoking devices with burned residue; two Ziploc baggies with a  white powder residue left inside each bag; a night­vision scope; and $172 in U.S. currency.  Garner  also  said  that,  among  the  $172,  there  were  two  five­dollar  bills  that  he  had  “photographed two or three days earlier” and that had been used to buy drugs.  Garner explained that he had conducted a “controlled buy” at Franklin’s residence  with the photographed money. He said that he searched the confidential informant, observed  the informant going “to and from the residence,” and recovered drugs from him. He also said  that  he  used  the  photographed  bills  in  the  buy  and  that  the  serial  numbers  on  the  bills  matched those recovered during the search of Franklin’s residence. Garner said that he had  worked “between 150 and 200” drug cases and that he had conducted “probably 200 or 300  controlled buys.”  Steve Reid of the Booneville Police Department testified that he also participated in  the execution of the search warrant at Franklin’s residence. He said that he “helped secure  the residence and Mr. Franklin” and that he asked Franklin’s wife, Doris Franklin, to “empty  her pockets.” According to Reid, Mrs. Franklin’s pockets contained $172 in cash and two  small packages of a “white powder substance,” which tested positive for methamphetamine.  Reid also said that police found “four [or] five cameras … outside the house.” He explained  that “the significance of the surveillance equipment would be [that] you could see who is  coming and going from your residence while you’re not at home” and that it could be “used  to  protect  especially  from  law  enforcement.”  Reid  stated  that  Franklin’s  residence  was  located approximately seven hundred thirty­nine feet from a church. ­2­  CACR05­925  Cindy  Moran,  a  forensic  chemist  at  the  Arkansas  State  Crime  Laboratory,  also  testified for the State. She said that she had analyzed suspected controlled substances in over  four thousand cases and that the substances seized from Franklin’s residence tested positive  for “methamphetamine hydrochloride, nicotinamide” with a total weight of 6.6613 grams.  After the close of the State’s case, Franklin’s counsel moved for a directed verdict,  stating in part as follows:  At this time the Defense moves for a directed verdict of acquittal on possession  of  [methamphetamine  with]  intent  to  deliver.  Looks  to  me  like  the  evidence  is  indicative of possession with intent to use. And the jury would have to be guessing  as to the evidence on intent to distribute or [deliver]. … So also just for purposes of  protecting ourselves we move for a directed verdict on what is in essence a sentencing  question on the house being within a thousand feet of the Assembly of God Church.  The trial court denied the motions. Franklin’s counsel renewed the motions at the close of  all of the evidence, and the court again denied them.  While Franklin raises it as his second point  on  appeal, preservation of Franklin’s  freedom  from  double  jeopardy  requires  us  to  examine  his  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  argument before addressing trial errors. Nelson v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___S.W.3d ___ (Feb.  16, 2006). A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.  Id.  When  a  defendant  makes  a  challenge  to  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  on  appeal,  the  appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. The test for  determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial  evidence, direct or circumstantial; substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel  a  conclusion  one  way  or  the  other  beyond  suspicion  or  conjecture.  Id.  Only  evidence  supporting the verdict will be considered, and the conviction will be affirmed if there is  substantial evidence to support it. Id.  Arkansas  Code  Annotated  section  5­64­401(a)  (Supp.  2003)  provides  that,  with  certain  exceptions,  it  is  unlawful  to  manufacture,  deliver,  or  possess  with  intent  to ­3­  CACR05­925  manufacture or deliver a controlled substance. In this case, Franklin claims that the evidence  was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to  deliver  because  “the  testimony  of  Larry  Garner  and  Steve  Reid  showed  that  the  drug  paraphernalia found in Franklin’s home was consistent with possession with intent to use,  not  intent  to  deliver.”  However,  police  seized  6.6613  grams  of  methamphetamine  from  Franklin’s residence while Franklin was there. This is more than thirty times the presumptive  amount for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. See Rabb v. State, 72 Ark.  App.  396,  39  S.W.3d  11  (2001)  (stating  that,  under  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  5­64­401(d),  possession  of  more  than  two  hundred  milligrams  of  methamphetamine  gives  rise  to  a  presumption of intent to deliver). Furthermore, the serial numbers on the photographed bills  used  in  the  controlled  buy  matched  those  on  the  bills  recovered  during  the  search  of  Franklin’s residence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we are  required  to  do,  we  find  that  substantial  evidence  supports  Franklin’s  conviction  for  possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Although Franklin additionally claims  that the majority of the methamphetamine was recovered from his wife and was “not tied”  to him, he failed to raise this argument in his directed­verdict motion below and is therefore  precluded from raising it on appeal.  See Woolbright v. State, 357 Ark. 63, 160 S.W.3d 315  (2003) (recognizing that an appellant is bound by the scope and nature of the arguments  made at trial).  Franklin also contends that the trial court erred by allowing testimony concerning a  controlled drug buy within his home before police executed the search warrant there. We  review allegations of evidentiary errors under the abuse­of­discretion standard. Threadgill  v. State, 347 Ark. 986, 69 S.W.3d 423 (2002). The trial court has broad discretion in its ­4­  CACR05­925  evidentiary rulings; hence, the trial court’s findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless  there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Id.  In this case, defense counsel  made a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the  controlled buy, which the trial court denied. Immediately after Officer Garner testified that  he conducted a controlled buy, and as he was about to specifically discuss how he did so, the  1  following colloquy occurred:  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  I don’t know how many times we’re going to have to do this.  This is exactly what I moved in my motion in limine. We can’t  cross  examine  his  confidential  informant.  But  they  get  an  opportunity to get all this stuff in. If that’s not prejudicial.  THE COURT:  This witness can testify about what he personally did. He  can’t testify about [what] anybody said or anything like  that. But he can testify to the extent of what he did, what  his personal knowledge.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your  honor,  here’s  the  problem  with  that,  it  prejudices the  Defendant’s  case  because  the  State  gets  to  hide  the  lying,  cheating confidential informant that they used. We can’t cross­  examine the confidential informant. We don’t know what Larry  Garner did with the confidential informant. We have no way for  us to ever know. And that’s the [prejudice] is that he’s going to ­  ­  PROSECUTOR:  Technically that’s not correct. You can cross examine a  confidential informant and the burden is on the Defense  to request ... the disclosure of the confidential informant  and that has not been done in this case. There’s been no  request for an informant and we’re not obligated unless  it’s requested to disclose it.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your Honor ­ ­  PROSECUTOR:  I mean, it’s the law. 1  We note that Franklin failed to abstract this colloquy in his brief on appeal. Although  failure to abstract those portions of the record relevant to the points on appeal may  preclude this court from considering those issues, we may go the record to affirm. See  Robinson v. State, 49 Ark. App. 58, 896 S.W.2d 442 (1995).  ­5­  CACR05­925  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Judge, if that’s the way the State’s going to rest, if that’s the  way they’re going to be that’s fine. But he’s not charged with  possessing  it  and  charged  him  delivery  [sic]  of  a  controlled  substance  and  this  is  irrelevant.  If  he  were  charged  with  possession  it  would  be  relevant.  It’s  irrelevant  and  it’s  prejudicial. There’s no way for us to defeat it or even attempt to.  PROSECUTOR:  I think the Court of Appeals has held that this is relevant  evidence to be offered in regard to possession with intent  to deliver.  THE COURT:  He can testify about this own personal knowledge. He  can’t testify on anything the confidential informant said,  obviously that would be hearsay and he couldn’t be cross  examined  on  it.  But  he  can  testify  about  what  he  personally did and that’s subject to cross examination.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Very well.  THE COURT:  Objection overruled.  Franklin first claims that the trial court erred in allowing Garner’s testimony as to the  controlled drug buy because it was hearsay. Hearsay is a “statement, other than the one made  by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth  of  the  matter  asserted.”  Ark.  R.  Evid.  801(c).  According  to  Ark.  R.  Evid.  801(a),  a  “statement” is an “oral or written assertion” or “[n]onverbal conduct of a person, if it is  intended by him as an assertion.”  During his testimony about the controlled buy at Franklin’s residence, Garner said  that he searched the confidential informant, that he observed the informant going “to and  from the residence,” and that he recovered drugs from him. Garner also said that he used  photographed  bills  in  the  buy  and  that  the  serial  numbers  on  the  bills  matched  those  recovered during the search of Franklin’s residence. Garner did not testify as to anything that  the informant said or wrote, nor did he testify as to any nonverbal conduct by the informant  that could be intended as an assertion. We fail to see how Garner’s testimony about how he ­6­  CACR05­925  conducted the controlled buy in this case concerned a “statement” as defined in Ark. R. Evid.  801; thus, we hold that the testimony is not hearsay.  In addition, citing Ark. R. Evid. 403, Franklin asserts that “[t]he State’s allegation of  controlled drug buys prior to [his] arrest prejudiced [him] unfairly because the allegation was  factually insufficient to sustain a charge of delivery and because [he] had no way of rebutting  the allegation.” However, Franklin offers no convincing authority to support these claims,  and he fails to explain how the cases he cites (i.e, Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d  429  (1991),  and  Haynes  v.  State,  309  Ark.  583,  832  S.W.2d  479  (1992))  support  his  assertions. As our supreme court has stated many times, arguments that are unsupported by  convincing argument or authority will not be considered on appeal, unless it is apparent  without further research that the arguments are well­taken. Webb v. Bouton, 350 Ark. 254,  85 S.W.3d 885 (2002).  For the reasons stated above, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion  in allowing Garner’s testimony concerning the controlled drug buys at Franklin’s residence;  thus, we affirm.  Affirmed.  GLOVER  and CRABTREE, JJ., agree. ­7­  CACR05­925 

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