Ricky Justus v. State of Arkansas

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Ricky JUSTUS v. STATE of Arkansas  CACR05­878  __ S. W.3d ___  Court of Appeals of Arkansas  Opinion delivered June 28, 2006  APPEAL & ERROR – MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL – LACK OF SUPPORTING CASE LAW DID  NOT RENDER APPELLANT’S ISSUE WHOLLY FRIVOLOUS.–In his motion to withdraw as counsel,  appellant’s  attorney claimed  that  because  he  was  unable  to  find  any case  law  to  support  appellant’s argument on appeal, the argument had no merit; the test is not whether there is  case law supporting  appellant’s argument, but whether there is case law disposing of his  argument; the fact that appellant’s counsel was unable to find authority supporting appellant’s  sentencing  claim  did  not  render  the  issue  wholly  frivolous  and  the  appellate  court  was  obligated  to  consider  the  issue  on  the  merits;  accordingly,  the  appellate  court  directed  appellant’s  attorney  to  file  a  brief  developing  an  adversarial  presentation  relating  to  appellant’s argument and any others that counsel deemed appropriate.  Appeal from Garland Circuit Court; Edward T. Smitherman, Jr., Judge; motion to withdraw  denied; rebriefing ordered.  Patrick J. Benca, for appellant.  No response.  Appellant  Ricky  Justus  was  charged  with  false  imprisonment, theft of property, and domestic battery. On March 31, 2004, Justus entered  a plea of guilty as to all charges alleged. Included in his plea was an admission that the LARRY  D.  VAUGHT,  Judge.  ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  JUSTUS v. STATE  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 2  domestic battery occurred in the presence of his six­year­old daughter. As a result of his plea  and admission, along with the fact that Justus had four or more prior felony convictions, he  faced a potential term of 130 years’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction.  On April 6, 2005, a jury trial was held on the issue of sentencing. After hearing the evidence,  the jury imposed the maximum sentence. Judgment was entered on April 22, 2005, and a  timely notice of appeal was filed on May 17, 2005.  Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Rule 4­3(j) of the Rules  of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, Justus’s counsel filed a motion to  withdraw  as  counsel because “[t]here are no non­frivolous issues that would support an  appeal in this case.” Counsel’s motion was accompanied by an abstract and brief purportedly  referring to everything in the record that might arguably support an appeal, a record of all  motions and requests made by Justus and denied by the court, and a statement of the reasons  why counsel considers none of these adverse rulings to be a meritorious ground for reversal.  The clerk of this court furnished Justus with a copy of his counsel’s brief and notified him  of his right to file a pro se brief. However, Justus did not file a brief. The State filed a letter  with the Court stating that it has no adversarial interest in this matter because Justus did not  file a pro se brief.  From our review of the record and the brief presented to us, we find  compliance with Rule 4­3(j), but we cannot say that the appeal is wholly without merit.  Our concern centers on an argument that Justus made prior to the sentencing trial.  In  relation  to  his  status  as  a  habitual  offender,  he  argued  that  although  he  had  three  prior  convictions for breaking or entering (he consecutively broke into three automobiles in a Wal­  Mart parking lot), the convictions should be consolidated because they all arose from the  same incident. In support of his position, Justus relied on Tackett v. State, 298 Ark. 20, 766  S.W.2d 410 (1989).  In Tackett, the appellant was involved in a motor­vehicle accident that resulted in the  death of a passenger on the scene. Id. Another victim at the scene was injured and went into  a coma. Id. Appellant was charged with manslaughter as to the death of the passenger at the  scene and ultimately convicted. Id. His conviction was affirmed in Tackett v. State, 12 Ark.  App. 57, 670 S.W.2d 824 (1984). Almost four years later, the comatosed victim died from  her injuries. Her death resulted in a second charge of manslaughter. Tackett, 298 Ark. at 26,  766 S.W.2d at 413. At the second manslaughter trial, the court allowed introduction of the  first manslaughter charge to support a habitual­offender sentence enhancement. On appeal,  our supreme court found that this decision by the trial court was contrary to due process and  fundamental fairness and was not within the spirit of the Habitual Offender Act. Id.  In support of his motion to be relieved as counsel, Justus’s attorney distinguishes the ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  JUSTUS v. STATE  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 3  Tackett case, pointing out that Justus’s acts were not the result of a single impulse—that each  act was a “separate incident with separate victims.” He then noted that he was “unable to  locate any case law that supports [Justus’s] position before the trial court that several felonies  arising  out  of  the  same  incident  cannot  be  counted  individually  to  support  a  habitual  allegation,” and “[f]or the foregoing reasons, this argument has no merit.”  Based on these statements we believe that a fundamental misunderstanding exists as  to what constitutes a meritless appeal. If indeed there is no case law that supports Justus’s  position—and  we,  like  counsel,  have  found  none—that  does  not  render  Justus’s  appeal  “wholly without merit” or “wholly frivolous,” which are the standards we apply in no­merit  cases. Ofochebe v. State, 40 Ark. App. 92, 93, 844 S.W.2d 373, 374 (1992). Indeed, without  clear  case  law  addressing  Justus’s  claim,  it  is  impossible  to  meet  the  rigid  Anders  requirements. The test is not whether there is case law supporting Justus’s argument, but  whether there is case law disposing of his argument.  The  fact  that  Justus’s  counsel  was  unable  to  find  authority  supporting  Justus’s  sentencing claim does not render the issue wholly frivolous, and we are obligated to consider  the issue on its merits. Accordingly, we direct Justus’s attorney to file a brief developing an  adversarial presentation relating to Justus’s habitual­offender argument and any others that  counsel may deem appropriate.  Motion to Withdraw as Counsel is denied.  Rebriefing Ordered.  CRABTREE and BAKER, JJ., agree. ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9 

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