Kay Jarrell v. Stant Manufacturing, Inc. and AIG Claim Service, Inc.

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION III

KAY JARRELL

APPELLANT

v.

STANT MANUFACTURING, INC. and AIG CLAIM SERVICE, INC.

APPELLEES

CA04-708

FEBRUARY 16, 2005

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. F002116]

AFFIRMED

Andree Layton Roaf, Judge

Appellant Kay Jarrell appeals the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission that denied her additional medical treatment. In an opinion filed August 27, 2003, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Jarrell failed to establish her burden of proof to show that she was entitled to additional medical treatment. The Commission upheld the ALJ's decision. We affirm the decision of the Commission.

The well-settled standard of review for workers' compensation cases is as follows:

This court reviews decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission to see if they are supported by substantial evidence. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 39 Ark. App. 24, 832 S.W.2d 869 (1992). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and we will affirm if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The determination of the credibility and weight to be given a witness's testimony is within the sole province of the Commission. The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Farmers Coop. v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 4-5, 69 S.W.3d 899, 902 (2002). Further, the Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinions, and its resolution of the medical evidence has the force and effect of a jury verdict. Estridge v. Waste Mgmt., 343 Ark. 276, 33 S.W.3d 167 (2000).Poulan Weed Eater v. Marshall, 79 Ark. App. 129, 133-34, 84 S.W.3d 878, 882 (2002).

With this standard of review in mind, we examine the evidence presented to the Commission. Appellant Kay Jarrell slipped and fell on her buttocks on a concrete floor on February 23, 2000, while working for appellee Stant Manufacturing Company. Since the fall, she has had persistent pain in her lower back and buttocks region as well as vaginal numbness. Jarrell came under the care of Dr. Alexander on February 23, 2000. He diagnosed contusions of the buttocks and left wrist with a thoracic and lumbar strain. He prescribed medication and rest. Dr. Wilson then saw Jarrell on March 22, 2000. He diagnosed sciatica and prescribed medication and physical therapy. Dr. Wilson released Jarrell on April 24, 2000, after a normal MRI scan.

Jarrell saw Dr. Clark on March 3, 2000, and he diagnosed her with musculoskeletal low back pain and prescribed injections. Jarrell then saw Dr. Lytle on June 12, 2000, and he described normal x-ray results. Dr. Lytle diagnosed a hip contusion and possible contusion of the sciatic nerve. He prescribed exercises and medication. On August 10, 2000, Dr. Lytle saw Jarrell again for pain and he prescribed physical therapy, medication, and work restrictions. Dr. Lytle saw Jarrell again on September 5, 2000, and he referred her to Dr. Simpson.

On September 11, 2000, Dr. Simpson ordered additional diagnostic testing that included a repeat MRI scan, myelogram, CT scan, bone scan, and EMG study. The tests came back normal. Dr. Simpson released Jarrell after an invalid functional capacity evaluation was conducted on October 30, 2000.

Dr. Lytle saw Jarrell again on September 18, 2001, at the request of appellee AIG Claim Service (AIG). Dr. Lytle noted that she was not a surgical candidate, and he commented that "she will have to live with this" problem. He assessed no work restrictions or permanent impairment.

Dr. Reddy saw Jarrell on December 1, 2000, and he diagnosed her with sacroiliac joint dysfunction. Jarrell did not respond to the treatment of injections, and Dr. Reddy returned her to light work with no impairment rating. He commented that she might have to learn to live with her pain. He offered chronic pain management using anti-depressant medication, and Jarrell refused.

The Commission authorized a change of physician for Jarrell pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.§ 11-9-514 (Repl. 2002). Jarrell saw Dr. Burba on January 27, 2003. He ordered x-rays and an MRI of her pelvis. Dr. Burba found that "there is a moderately severe axonal sensory and motor polyneuropathy on the lower extremities." Dr. Burba referred Jarrell to Dr. Covey for possible trigger point injections, but these injections were never carried out.

The only medical bill that Stant Manufacturing and AIG paid after the change of physician was the bill for the first office visit to Dr. Burba. Stant and AIG contended that any further medical treatment was unreasonable and unnecessary. The employer is only required to provide medical services that are reasonably necessary in treatment of the compensable injury. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 2002). What constitutes reasonably necessary medical treatment is a question to be determined by the Commission. Gansky v. Hi-Tech Eng'g, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790 (1996).

Before she changed physicians, Jarrell had received numerous MRIs, CT scans, bone scans, myelograms, examinations, and consultations from several doctors, and none of these doctors could pinpoint the exact cause of Jarrell's pain. Jarrell is not a candidate for surgery, and she has no work restrictions or permanent impairment. Dr. Burba conducted the same diagnostic testing that Jarrell's previous doctors had performed after her accident. Dr. Burba has never indicated that Jarrell's past medical treatment was inadequate or inappropriate.

Jarrell relies on Stephenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 265, 19 S.W.3d 36 (2000), for her argument that further treatment is reasonable and necessary. In Tyson, the claimant sustained a neck, shoulder, and back injury, which were never properly diagnosed by her treating physician. The claimant then went to her family physician, who ordered more testing that showed a spine fracture. The Commission characterized the claimant's treatment as adequate, but this Court disagreed, stating that the claimant's care was "almost non-existent." Id. at 273, 19 S.W.3d at 41. In Jarrell's case, she cannot argue that her care was "almost non-existent" as in Tyson. Following Jarrell's injury, her employer provided her with adequate medical care that included, but was not limited to, access to diagnostic testing as well as consultations with orthopedic and neurology specialists. Neither Jarrell nor her present treating physician, Dr. Burba, has called into question the adequacy of Jarrell's past medical treatment in her case.

She argues that a new treating physician should be allowed a reasonable time to perform tests and multiple examinations in order to rule out certain problems and focus on a diagnosis before the Commission can determine that such treatment is not reasonable or necessary. Jarrell, however, has not demonstrated why she believes the same diagnostic tests as performed by another doctor will bring her any closer to ascertaining the cause of her pain. Jarrell received adequate care, and reasonable minds could conclude that additional medical treatment is unnecessary and unreasonable. Substantial evidence, therefore, supports the Commission's decision.

Affirmed.

Robbins and Griffen, JJ., agree.