Amy Williams v. State of Arkansas

Annotate this Case
ca04-675

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION IV

AMY WILLIAMS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CA 04-675

February 2, 2005

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SALINE COUNTY

[NO. CR2003-483-2

HONORABLE GARY M. ARNOLD,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Terry Crabtree, Judge

Sixteen-year-old Amy Williams, appellant, was charged by felony information in the Circuit Court of Saline County with the offenses of capital murder and theft of property, a class C felony. She appeals from an order denying her motion to transfer the charges to the juvenile division of circuit court, arguing that the trial court's decision is clearly erroneous. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant stands accused of killing her father, James Craig Williams, on July 30, 2003. Appellant's parents had divorced almost a year before, and at the time of the incident she was staying with her father in a rural mobile home. In her statement to law enforcement officials, appellant described the events of July 30 as follows. She awoke at about 12:30 p.m. and shortly thereafter spoke on the phone with her father. At some point, she formed a plan to kill her father if he "came home upset" because "I knew that I wasn't gonna take it." She explained that, although her father had never hit her, he yelled at her and constantly told her that she was a bad kid because of her problems with drugs. At around 1:30 p.m., she took a deer rifle from her father's closet, loaded it, donned ear muffs for hearing protection, and fired one round in the back yard for practice. Afterwards, she reloaded the rifle and returned it to the closet. She said that her father "pissed me off" when he got home from work. As he was sitting in a chair watching television, appellant retrieved the loaded rifle and the ear muffs and placed them in her bedroom. She then asked her father to stand with his back toward her room. He complied, and she put on the ear muffs, got the rifle, and shot him. She grabbed her purse and her father's keys and wallet and drove away in his vehicle. She used his ATM card to withdraw $150 from his account. She was located sometime later by her mother in Bryant.

A prosecuting attorney may charge a juvenile in either the juvenile or criminal division of circuit court when a case involves a juvenile at least sixteen years old who she engages in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be any felony. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(c)(1) (Supp. 2003). In deciding whether to retain jurisdiction or transfer the case, the judge must consider all of the following factors:

(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of society requires prosecution in the criminal division of circuit court;

(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner;

(3) Whether the offense was against a person or property, with greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;

(4) The culpability of the juvenile, including the level of planning and participation in the alleged offense;

(5) The previous history of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile had been adjudicated a juvenile offender and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons or property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical violence;

(6) The sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by the consideration of the juvenile's home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living, or desire to be treated as an adult;

(7) Whether there are facilities or programs available to the judge of the juvenile division of circuit court that are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile before the expiration of the juvenile's twenty-first birthday;

(8) Whether the juvenile acted alone or was part of a group in the commission of the alleged offense;

(9) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile's mental, physical, educational, and social history;

(10) Any other factors deemed relevant by the judge.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g) (Supp. 2003). Evidence need not be introduced with regard to each factor, and the trial court is not required to set out findings with respect to each and every factor. See Otis v. State, 355 Ark. 590, 142 S.W.3d 615 (2004). In addition, the trial court is not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory factors. Id.

A trial court's decision that a juvenile should be tried as an adult must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(h)(2). The circuit court's decision to retain jurisdiction will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. Witherspoon v. State, 74 Ark. App. 151, 46 S.W.3d 549 (2001).

Considering the factors in relation to the evidence presented in this case, we observe that capital murder is a most serious offense, and appellant does not argue otherwise. Appellant also does not dispute that this crime was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, and willful manner. It has been held that a juvenile may be tried as an adult based solely on the serious and violent nature of the offense. Otis v. State, supra. The offense committed in this case was against a person and resulted in death. Thus, this factor weighs against transfer to juvenile court. Additionally, there was evidence forcefully demonstrating that appellant planned the attack and that she was the only participant.

Appellant argues that her previous history weighs in her favor. Noting that she had not previously been adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent, she contends that the evidence showed only her prior need for treatment for drugs and emotional instability but not a history of antisocial behavior and incidences of physical violence. With respect to this factor, it was disclosed at the hearing that appellant had been placed in a program at Baptist Recover Teen in January 2002. In October 2002 her parents filed a FINS petition alleging that she was out of control and habitually disobedient as she was truant, smoked marijuana, and displayed anger toward her parents. The petition was granted, and appellant was admitted to Pinnacle Pointe where she remained until February 24, 2003. Afterwards, she received out-patient treatment through Arkansas Psychiatric which was ongoing at the time of the murder. Appellant's mother, Gwen Williams, testified that appellant's behavior had included yelling, slamming doors, swearing, not coming home at curfew, and being argumentative and angry. Ms. Williams said that appellant had been in fights at school and that she had sent her to live with her father because she could not control appellant's behavior. On this record, we cannot agree with appellant's assessment that there was no evidentiary support for the trial court's finding that she had a history of antisocial behavior that included incidences of physical violence.

Appellant also questions the trial court's finding that the available services were not likely to result in rehabilitation. There was testimony, however, that appellant had been receiving rehabilitative services and treatment since January 2002 and that she was participating in out-patient therapy when the murder occurred. Carol Childs, who worked for the Saline County Juvenile Court, testified that the services appellant had received did not appear to have worked. Scott Tanner, who coordinates the ombudsman division that monitors the Division of Youth Services, did know of one female who had murdered her father and who had been successfully rehabilitated, but he testified that he could not assure the court that services would rehabilitate the appellant. We cannot disagree with the trial court's finding with regard to this factor.

Appellant further argues that consideration of her unstable home environment and her history of emotional instability for which she had been described Prozac weigh heavily in her favor. Appellant also asserts that the trial court did not give proper attention to reports relating to her mental, physical, educational, and emotional history. However, in its written findings, the court stated that there was minimal evidence offered with regard to the level of appellant's sophistication and maturity and that it had thoroughly reviewed the reports admitted into evidence. As noted earlier, there is no requirement that evidence be offered regarding each factor, and the court is not required to give the factors equal weight.

From our review of the record, we are unable to say that the trial court's decision to retain jurisdiction is clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm.

Affirmed.

Griffen and Vaught, JJ., agree.

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