Martha Belle Gosa v. Nu-Way Products Company and Zenith Insurance Company

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION IV

MARTHA BELLE GOSA

APPELLANT

V.

NU-WAY PRODUCTS CO. and

ZENITH INSURANCE CO.

APPELLEES

CA04-547

February 9, 2005

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. F114315]

AFFIRMED

Larry D. Vaught, Judge

Appellant, Martha Belle Gosa, appeals the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision to reverse the ruling of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and deny appellant additional medical benefits. We affirm.

Appellant worked for Nu-Way Products on January 29, 2001, when she fell and injured her back and shoulders while pulling inventory. Appellant was treated by Dr. Pierce, a general practitioner, but after two weeks, appellant was unhappy with her progress and sought treatment for her back injury with Dr. Brophy, a neurosurgeon. Appellant also saw Dr. Manugian, an orthopedic surgeon, regarding the injury to her shoulders. She eventually underwent surgery on both shoulders. Appellees accepted the injury and paid medical and indemnity benefits. Appellant was assigned a twelve-percent impairment rating to the body as a whole in connection with the injury and surgeries.

Appellant continued to see Dr. Brophy to treat her low-back pain, and he conducted tests on appellant but could not explain her pain, despite her continued complaints of severe pain. He noted on March 21, 2002, that "[f]rom a neurosurgical standpoint, I'm unable to identify an etiology of her pain syndrome. I have therefore suggested further evaluation by Dr. Manugian through her regular insurance to evaluate the significance of the bony spurring in the acetabulum. If this evaluation is negative, I would suggest follow-up with her rheumatologist." Based on this, appellees cut off appellant's benefits and refused to pay her additional medical bills.

Appellant also saw Dr. Pratt, who disagreed with Dr. Brophy and determined that appellant's primary problem was a mechanical dysfunction of the low back and that the treatment was compensable under workers' compensation. Dr. Pratt recommended that appellant undergo a spinal block, but fearing the procedure, appellant refused the treatment. In September 2001, appellant also began seeing Dr. Schnapp to receive pain management for peripheral neuropathy unrelated to her injury. Dr. Pratt discontinued appellant's treatment after she had a permanent spinal stimulator implanted by Dr. Feler on January 6, 2003, to help treat her peripheral neuropathy. At the time the briefs were filed, appellant testified that she continued to see Dr. Schnapp for the peripheral neuropathy and that the condition caused her much pain.

Appellant testified at the hearing that she was taking approximately twenty-one different medications, at least seven of which were designed to treat pain. Appellant testified that she was experiencing symptoms of several ailments unrelated to her compensable injuries. She also testified that she had been diagnosed with recurrent carpal-tunnel syndrome within the previous five years, had developed a heart condition that required angioplasties in 1995 and 1999, had a light heart attack in 1999 and congestive heart failure in 2002, had been diagnosed with arthritis, and had been diagnosed with tarsal-tunnel syndrome. Appellant also testified that she had sustained a prior injury to her right hip in early 1998 while employed at Hancock Fabrics. She was treated by Dr. Shrader for this injury. Appellant maintained that this prior injury involved her right hip, not her low back. Appellees, however, pointed out that Dr. Shrader's notes from the period disclosed that appellant complained of pain in her low back.

After appellees cut off appellant's benefits, she filed an additional claim to receive medical benefits, and a hearing before the designated ALJ was held on March 28, 2003. On May 21, 2003, the ALJ filed an opinion finding additional medical treatment for appellant's low back was reasonably necessary. The ALJ additionally found that appellant was not entitled to receive treatment for her low back from Dr. Schnapp because his treatment of her peripheral neuropathy was unrelated to her compensable injury. Appellees appealed this decision to the full Commission. In its reversal of the ALJ's opinion, the Commission found that appellant was not entitled to additional benefits in connection with her low-back injury. The Commission also concluded that Dr. Brophy's statements were substantial proof that he believed appellant had reached the end of her healing period in March 2002. The Commission noted that appellant had also seen Dr. Pratt, who indicated that appellant's pain was the result of the compensable injury. However, the Commission found that Dr. Pratt had discontinued his treatment of appellant, and appellant did not indicate at the hearing that she wanted to return to Dr. Pratt, but rather Dr. Schnapp. The Commission noted that the ALJ had specifically determined that appellant was not entitled to treatment with Dr. Schnapp, and she had not appealed that determination.

In workers' compensation cases, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and affirm if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. K II Constr. Co. v. Crabtree, 78 Ark. App. 222, 79 S.W.3d 414 (2002). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. at 225, 79 S.W.3d at 416. If reasonable minds could reach the conclusion of the Commission, its decision must be affirmed. Id., 79 S.W.3d at 416. We cannot undertake a de novo review of the evidence and are limited by the standard of review in these cases. Id., 79 S.W.3d at 416.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-508(a) (Supp. 2003) states "[t]he employer shall promptly provide an injured employee such medical, surgical, hospital, chiropractic, optometric, podiatric, and nursing services and medicine ... and other apparatus as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee." What constitutes "reasonably necessary" is a question of fact for the Commission. Gansky v. Hi-Tech Eng'g, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790 (1996). The Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence, and if the evidence is in conflict, determining its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission. Whaley v. Hardee's, 51 Ark. App. 166, 912 S.W.2d 14 (1995).

In this case, the Commission was presented with conflicting evidence regarding treatment for appellant's low-back injury. Although Dr. Brophy concluded that he was unable to explain her alleged symptoms, Dr. Pratt disagreed and decided he could treat appellant. However, appellant refused to undergo the procedure that Dr. Pratt recommended, and he eventually discontinued his treatment of appellant after she had surgery for an unrelated condition. Additionally, appellant suffers from several ailments, unrelated to her compensable injury, that cause her pain and complicate her situation, including a prior work-related injury. Because it is the duty of the Commission to weigh and resolve conflicting evidence and reasonable minds could similarly conclude, the decision of the Commission to deny appellant additional medical benefits is supported by substantial evidence and must be affirmed.

Affirmed.

Griffen and Crabtree, JJ., agree.