Timothy D. Rankins v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

SAM BIRD, JUDGE

DIVISION II

TIMOTHY D. RANKINS,

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,

APPELLEE

CACR02-596

FEBRUARY 19, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT SMITH DISTRICT,

NO. CR99-372, CR97-362, CR95-835, & CR95-231

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Timothy Rankins, was released from the Arkansas Regional Punishment Facility on October 30, 2000. At the time of his release, Rankins was still on a suspended sentence for a period of between two and eight years for prior convictions in four separate felony cases. A condition of his suspended sentences was that he not violate any state laws. While out on parole and still on the suspended sentences, Rankins was arrested for two separate charges: (1) Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Deliver on November 16, 2001; and (2) Manufacturing Methamphetamine on January 16, 2002. Based on these charges, the State filed a petition to revoke his suspended sentences.

After a hearing on the petition to revoke, the trial court revoked Rankins' suspended sentences and sentenced him to between two and eight years on his four previous felony convictions. The court ordered these sentences to run concurrently, for a total of eight years.

Finding that the trial court's order is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, we affirm.

On November 16, 2001, members of the 12th Judicial Drug Task Force executed a search warrant on Rankins' Upholstery Shop, located at 1512 Towson Avenue in Fort Smith. The shop belonged to Raymond Rankins, the appellant's father. Investigator Larry Croom obtained the search warrant based on an undercover narcotics buy conducted in the shop. The search warrant specifically stated that the area to be searched was the shop. As one of the officers pulled up to the shop to execute the search warrant, he observed appellant Rankins sitting in the passenger seat of a van. Rankins had been seen coming in and out the shop earlier in the day. The officer arrested Rankins and found two coffee filters that contained a white, powdery substance in Rankins' front pants pocket. The white substance was tested and proved to be approximately 3.4 grams of methamphetamine. Rankins was charged with Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Deliver.

To revoke a suspended sentence, the trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant failed to comply with the conditions of his suspension. Bradley v. State, 347 Ark. 518, 65 S.W.3d 874 (2002). On appeal, the trial court's decision that the defendant failed to comply with a condition of his suspended sentence will not be reversed unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. For a defendant's suspended sentence to be revoked, the State need only prove that the defendant committed one violation of the conditions and terms of his suspension. Rudd v. State, 76 Ark. App. 121, 61 S.W.3d 885 (2001).

Rankins asserts as his point on appeal that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated a condition of his suspended sentences. However, with regard to the charge of Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Deliver, Rankins specifically argues that his seizure while sitting in the van was not authorized by the search warrant and, thus, the methamphetamine found should be suppressed.

It has long been the law in this state that the exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation hearings. Robinson v. State, 29 Ark. App. 17, 775 S.W.2d 916 (1989). In previous opinions, we have suggested, but have stopped short of holding, that the exclusionary rule should be applied in revocation hearings where the police act in bad faith. Id.; McGhee v. State, 25 Ark. App. 132, 752 S.W.2d 303 (1988). There is no allegation in the instant case that the police officers acted in bad faith. Accordingly, even if the bad faith exception was cognizable, and we do not hold today that it is, the exclusionary rule would not apply here. It was the appellant's burden to show bad faith in the revocation proceeding below. McGhee, supra. We need not reach the merits of the argument about whether the arrest was lawful because the only possible obstacle to admitting the evidence, bad faith, is not raised.

The evidence that Rankins was in possession of methamphetamine was not in dispute. Therefore, we hold that the trial court's revocation of Rankins' suspended sentence was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; and furthermore, that, even if there was a violation of defendant's rights that warrants suppression of evidence, the exclusionary rule does not apply in this case. We need not address the other potentialviolation of state law, namely manufacturing methamphetamine, because, as stated above, the State need only prove a single violation to support the revocation.

Affirmed.

Robbins and Griffen, JJ, agree.