Dorothy A. Peevy v. Director et al.

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION II

DOROTHY A. PEEVY

APPELLANT

V.

DIRECTOR, ET AL.

APPELLEES

E01-149

April 17, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE BOARD OF REVIEW

[NO. 2001-BR-656]

AFFIRMED

This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Review denying appellant's claim for unemployment compensation benefits on the strength of a finding that she voluntarily left her last work without good cause connected with the work. Appellant contends that the Board erred in finding that she voluntarily left her last work without good cause connected with the work. We affirm.

The Board's decision in this case was based on Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513(a)(1) (Supp. 1999), which provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he, voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work, left his last work. Good cause had been defined as a cause that would reasonably impel the average, able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his or her employment; thus, it is dependent not only on the good faith of

the employee involved, which includes the presence of a genuine desire to work and to be self-supporting, but also on the reaction of the average employee. Anderson v. Director, 59 Ark. App. 266, 957 S.W.2d 712 (1997). The question of what constitutes good cause is a question of fact for the Board to determine from the particular circumstances of each case. Id.

On review of unemployment compensation cases, the findings of the Board of Review are reviewed in the light most favorable to the successful party, and they are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Boothe v. Director, 59 Ark. App. 169, 954 S.W.2d 946 (1997). The credibility of witnesses and the drawing of inferences from the testimony is for the Board of Review, not this court. Khan v. Director, 48 Ark. App. 64, 892 S.W.2d 513 (1994).

In the present case, appellant testified that she resigned from her position because her workload was so great as to adversely affect her health, and because she had been subjected to sexual harassment. The Board did not accept this testimony as credible. With regard to the allegations of sexual harassment, the Board noted that appellant testified that she would have remained on the job if her workload had been reduced, and inferred from this that the alleged harassment was not so severe as to impel appellant to quit her employment. With regard to appellant's workload, although it is clear that appellant was unhappy with the amount of work assigned to her, there was no evidence that her assignments were disproportionate or unfair. Furthermore, while appellant stated that job stress from overworkwas adversely affecting her health, she did not specify how her health was affected, and admitted that she had neither requested a leave of absence nor been advised by any physician to quit her employment. Under these circumstances, the issue resolves to a question of credibility, and we cannot say that the Board's findings in this regard are not supported by substantial evidence. See Anderson v. Director, supra.

Affirmed.

Neal and Crabtree, JJ., agree.