Linda Speck v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.

CHIEF JUDGE JOHN F. STROUD, JR.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION II

LINDA SPECK

APPELLANT

V.

WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC.

APPELLEE

CA 01-706

January 23, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

COMMISSION, [F001508]

AFFIRMED

This is a workers' compensation case in which appellant, Linda Speck, had worked for appellee, Wal-Mart, for approximately ten years at the time she began experiencing pain in her left hand. At the time her symptoms appeared, she worked as a "utility person" on the trash line. Her work involved the use of her hands and wrists, tying trash bags and bales, throwing boxes into a bailer, and taking trash off the line. Her initial diagnosis was that of de Quervain's tenosynovitis, for which surgery was performed on April 6, 1999. Appellee accepted the injury as compensable and paid benefits associated with it. Appellant, however, continued to experience symptoms that lasted longer than the expected recovery rate for the deQuervain's tenosynovitis. Further studies revealed that she also had bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Appellee disputed the compensability of appellant's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The ALJ found in favor of appellee, determining that appellant had failed to

prove that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related. The Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision and adopted its findings of fact. For her sole point of appeal, appellant contends that the Commission erred in finding that she had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related. We disagree and affirm.

The standard of review for appeals from the Workers' Compensation Commission is well-settled. On appeal, this court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision and affirm when that decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hill v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 74 Ark. App. 250, 48 S.W.3d 544 (2001). Where the Commission denies benefits because the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires us to affirm if the Commission's decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Id. A substantial basis exists if fair-minded persons could reach the same conclusion when considering the same facts. Id. The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, then we must affirm. Id. The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, and it may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief. Id. The Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinion and the authority to determine its medical soundness and probative force. Id. The Commission has the duty to use its expertise intranslating evidence of medical experts into findings of fact. Id. Moreover, the Commission is entitled to review the basis for a doctor's opinion in deciding the weight and credibility of the opinion and medical evidence. Maverick Transp. v. Buzzard, 69 Ark. App. 128, 10 S.W.3d 467 (2000).

Here, the diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was not reached without dispute among the physicians who examined appellant. With regard to the issue before us, however, the primary area of disputed medical evidence pertained to whether appellant's carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related. Dr. Reginald Rutherford and Dr. Peter Heinzelmann offered conflicting opinions in that regard.

In an EMG report dated September 2, 1999, Dr. Rutherford noted that appellant's nerve conduction study was abnormal and that the pattern as identified was best explained by idiopathic carpal tunnel syndrome. In his clinic notes of the same date, Dr. Rutherford stated that the abnormality was moderate on the right and mild on the left and that there were no clinical symptoms regarding the right, so the changes noted on the nerve conduction study were felt to be representative of incidental asymptomatic idiopathic carpal tunnel syndrome. In his clinic notes of November 3, 1999, Dr. Rutherford stated that appellant had reached maximum medical improvement "referable to her industrial injury" and assigned an impairment rating of ten percent on the left and twenty percent on the right. In a letter to appellee's representatives dated November 18, 1999, Dr. Rutherford clarified his November 3, 1999, opinion, explaining that his impairment rating was based on the electrodiagnostic findings only and that the changes noted on the electrodiagnostic testing referable to the rightmedian nerve would have no correlation whatsoever with any type of injury involving the left upper extremity. He further explained that with respect to the changes noted for the left median nerve, they would be considered representative of idiopathic carpal tunnel syndrome, which is secondary to non-specific tenosynovitis. He further opined that he did not consider the abnormality noted on the test to be representative of a work injury but rather considered it to be an incidental finding without specific clinical significance. In summary, he opined that he did not believe that the changes noted on the test were specifically related to a work injury.

Dr. Heinzelmann, on the other hand, saw appellant in late December 1999 and expressed a different opinion. Dr. Heinzelmann was hired by appellant, and he saw her on only one occasion. In his clinic notes, Dr. Heinzelmann recounted appellant's medical history, giving appellant's account of symptoms, when they started, and how they progressed; explaining that she had surgery to release the de Quervain's tenosynovitis of her left wrist; and restating the results of the nerve conduction test performed by Dr. David Davis on July 27, 1999, and appellant's account of the bilateral nerve conduction test performed by Dr. Rutherford. He stated his impression as, "Bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome which is significantly more symptomatic on the left side and which I feel is related to her work activities." It is noteworthy in this regard that in an August 18, 1999, letter to Dr. Michael Moore, Dr. Rutherford stated that the electrodiagnostic study performed by Dr. Davis, and relied upon by Dr. Heinzelmann, was limited in degree and of limited diagnostic value.

The ALJ credited Dr. Rutherford's opinion and rejected that of Dr. Heinzelmann, as she was entitled to do, and concluded that appellant had failed to prove that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related. The ALJ's findings and conclusions were affirmed and adopted by the Commission. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision, it displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief, and therefore we cannot say that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, we affirm the Commission's decision and its finding that appellant failed to prove that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Crabtree, JJ., agree.