University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences and Public Employee Claims Division v. Kathy M. Mize

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION II

UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS FOR MEDICAL SCIENCES and PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CLAIMS DIVISION

APPELLANTS

V.

KATHY M. MIZE

APPELLEE

CA 01-690

FEBRUARY 6, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION [NO. E 804727]

AFFIRMED

The appellants, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS) and Public Employee Claims Division, appeal from an order of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that found the appellee, Kathie Mize, sustained a compensable injury on January 29, 1998. On appeal, appellants argue that the Commission erred in finding appellee's injury compensable as appellee did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her injury arose out of and in the course of employment. We find no error and affirm.

Appellee is employed by appellant, UAMS, as a clinical manager and staff nurse, who has responsibilities for pre-operation and recovery-room patients. On January 28, 1998, claimant left a patient to walk over to a computer to check on laboratory data. As she was walking down the hallway, another nurse called her name. Appellee turned to respond, her

right foot moved, but her left foot remained planted. Her left knee popped and hyper-extended. Appellee is not sure why her left foot remained planted as she attempted to turn around. Appellee was diagnosed with a medial meniscus tear in her left knee. This damage to her knee was secondary to the traumatic incident at work. Appellee underwent surgery on February 6, 1998, for her medial meniscal tear. After recovery from surgery, appellee received a fifteen-percent impairment rating.

Appellants controverted appellee's claim for benefits for the injury and contended that the injury was not shown to be work-related, but was idiopathic in nature; i.e. it arose out of an internal condition personal to appellee. On November 18, 1999, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an opinion denying appellee's claim. The Commission, by opinion dated May 12, 2000, remanded the case to the ALJ for further review. On September 26, 2000, the ALJ issued an opinion again finding that appellee had failed to prove a compensable injury. On May 17, 2001, the Commission entered an order reversing the ALJ and finding that appellee had met her burden of proving a work-related injury. From that order, appellants bring this appeal.

When reviewing a decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Crossett Sch. Dist. v. Fulton, 65 Ark. App. 63, 984 S.W.2d 833 (1999). Theissue is not whether this court might have reached a different result from the Commission. Malone v. Texarkana Pub. Schs., 333 Ark. 343, 969 S.W.2d 644 (1998). If reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, we must affirm the decision. Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark. App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995).

Appellants argue that there was insufficient evidence to prove that appellee's injuries were compensable. A "compensable injury" is one "arising out of and in the course of employment . . . ." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2001). "Arising out of the employment" refers to the origin of the accident, while "in the course of employment" refers to the time, place, and circumstances. Little Rock Conv. and Visitors Bureau v. Pack, 60 Ark. App. 82, 959 S.W.2d 415 (1997). Thus, in order to prove a compensable injury appellee must prove, among other things, a causal relationship between the injury and the employment. McMillan v. U.S. Motors, 59 Ark. App. 85, 953 S.W.2d 907 (1997).

Appellants argue that there was insufficient evidence to prove that appellee's injuries "arose out of and in the course of employment" and that appellee suffered a non-compensable idiopathic injury, rather than a compensable unexplained injury. "Arkansas courts have said that where a claimant suffers an `unexplained injury' at work, it is compensable." Little Rock Conv. and Visitors Bureau, supra, at 87, 959 S.W.2d at 418. In contrast, when a claimant suffers an idiopathic injury, it is not compensable, as such an injury is personal in origin, and thus would not arise out of and in the course of employment. Id. When a truly unexplained fall occurs while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment, the injury resulting therefrom is compensable. Id. at 88, 959 S.W.2d at 419.

In this case, the Commission found that appellee's injury was a natural and probable consequence of her employment services. The Commission found that there was a causal connection in appellee's injury and her employment duties because appellee was in the process of turning to respond to a co-worker's call at the time that she hyper-extended her knee, sustained trauma to the knee, and tore her left medial meniscus. We cannot say the Commission erred in its decision. We note that Dr. J.L. Vander Schilden, appellee's operating surgeon and Professor and Head of the Section of Sports Medicine in the Department of Orthopedic Surgery at UAMS, provided a medical opinion on causation of appellee's injury stating that appellee had some underlying degenerative changes in her knee, yet the defect in her "medial femoral condyle and the tear of her medial meniscus were both secondary to her traumatic injury in the recovery room. She was totally asymptomatic prior to the incident and, therefore, one can only surmise that the trauma was the etiologic agent for her severe symptomatology."

Appellants argue that, given appellee's long history of degenerative disease in her knees, the weight of the evidence suggests that the hyper-extension in her knee was idiopathic in origin. We disagree. Appellee was injured while turning to respond to a co-worker who called her name. The Commission found that this physical activity (attempting to respond to a co-worker) and the occurrence of appellee's knee injury established the requisite causal connection between appellee's performance of employment-related duties and the injury that resulted. We hold that there is substantial evidence to support theCommission's finding that appellee suffered a compensable injury.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Jennings, J., agree.