Douglas Crawford v. State of Arkansas

Annotate this Case
ar01-634

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JUDGE JOSEPHINE LINKER HART

DIVISION III

DOUGLAS CRAWFORD

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR01-634

February 27, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR 2000-148]

HONORABLE JOHN B. PLEGGE,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Douglas Crawford, appellant, was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of Eddie Higgins and sentenced to sixty years' imprisonment. Citing Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior bad act by him because the improperly admitted evidence was not probative of any issue in the case and was admitted to show he was of bad character. Further, citing Rule 403, he argues that any probative value of the testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We affirm.

A jury convicted appellant of first-degree murder in the death of Eddie Higgins, a taxi cab driver. On November 29, 1999, at approximately 5:00 a.m., Higgins's body was found lying face down on the ground near his taxicab on Doyle Springs Drive in southwest Little Rock. A forensic pathologist at the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory testified that Higginsdied from a "sharp force injury of the neck." Also, a supervisor for the forensic biology

section of the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory testified that DNA, identified as appellant's, was found on a piece of glass taken from the windshield, on the top left rear passenger seat, and on the top frame of the left rear passenger door of the taxicab. The State also introduced statements of the appellant in which he admitted to being in Higgins's taxicab and to slashing the victim's throat. The State, seeking to prove that appellant's motive for murdering Higgins was robbery, established that Higgins only accepted cash as payment for fares and presented evidence that taxicab drivers make between $150 to $200 in one day. Further, the State established that when the victim was found, his pants pockets were turned inside out and his empty wallet was found between his arms.

Over appellant's objections based on Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, the State also presented testimony from a passenger who shared a taxicab ride with appellant just hours before Higgins's death. Carlton Autrey was accompanying his girlfriend, Kim McCullough, a taxicab driver, on the night of November 29, 1999. According to him, between midnight and 1:00 a.m., he and McCullough drove appellant and a woman on a round trip from 4211 Arehart Drive to an ATM, where the woman obtained some cash that she gave to appellant. According to Autrey, appellant was "bouncing off the wall" during the fifteen to twenty minute taxicab ride. Upon returning to Arehart Drive, the woman went into the house while appellant flagged down the driver of a pickup truck. After speaking to someone in the truck, appellant returned to the taxicab and gave McCullough a $10 bill and McCullough gave him $5 as change. According to Autrey, the appellantargued with McCullough about the fare, stating, "I want $6," and that he needed to get "hooked up." Autrey interpreted appellant's statement of needing to get "hooked up" as wanting to buy drugs.

Appellant argued at trial that this testimony was introduced only for the purpose of showing that appellant was a drug user and that presenting evidence of this prior bad act violated the dictates of Rule 404(b). He further asserted that the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect of showing that he was a drug user. He raises these same arguments on appeal.

The trial court's ruling in matters relating to admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is given great weight and will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Dyer v. State, 343 Ark. 422, 36 S.W.3d 724 (2001). Rule 404(b) provides as follows:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

The test for admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) is whether the prior act has independent relevance, and tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 108, 8 S.W.3d 547, 553 (2000); See also McGehee v. State, 338 Ark. 152, 992 S.W.2d 110 (1999). Evidence is undeniably relevant if it proves a material point and is not introduced for the sole purpose of proving that the defendant is a bad person. Dyer v. State, supra at 434, 36 S.W.3d at 731-32 (2001). The State is entitledto produce evidence elucidating circumstances which show a defendant's motive for murder. Lee v. State, 327 Ark. 692, 702, 942 S.W.2d 231, 235-36. (1997). "When the purpose of the evidence is to show motive, anything and everything that might have influenced the commission of the act may" be shown. Id.

The State's theory at trial was that robbery was appellant's motive for murdering Higgins. The broad rule regarding motive evidence declares that "anything and everything that might have influenced the commission of the act" may be shown. Lee, supra, at 702, 942 S.W.2d at 235. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing into evidence testimony that tended to prove appellant's motive for murder was robbery.

This case is analogous to Lee v. State, supra, where a defendant was charged with murder. A witness testified that she saw defendant shortly after the murder, and during their conversation, the defendant said, "Yes. It [cocaine] is running all through me," and "I'm going to get some [cocaine] now." The supreme court held as follows:

The State's theory at trial was that Lee murdered the victim for pecuniary gain, which was supported by evidence that money was missing from the victim's wallet. The State was able to produce evidence tying only one of the three missing one hundred dollar bills to Lee. Thus, the State's evidence that Lee was on his way to obtain drugs shortly after the time of the murder was relevant to explain a possible motive for the killing-that he planned to use part of the money he took from the victim to purchase drugs-and to illustrate his state of mind. As we afford great deference to a trial court's ruling on relevancy and prejudicial impact, we cannot say that the trial court in this case abused its discretion in allowing the State to elicit evidence regarding Pruitt's conversation with Lee.

Lee, supra at 702, 942 S.W.2d 236.

We note that appellant's statement to the witness was made before the murder,whereas in Lee, the conversation took place after the crime. However, we are not disposed to place significance on the fact that the comment preceded or followed the crime. Consider, for instance, Gaines, supra, where the supreme court permitted the State to introduce evidence of motive that preceded the crime. In Gaines, our supreme court held that the defendant's statement to a former girlfriend that an earlier fire on June 9, 1996, should have reached her apartment was admissible to disclose a motive for a fire that occurred on June 22, 1996, killing three children at the same complex. Additionally, we note that only four to five hours passed between the appellant's statement to McCullough and the death of Higgins. We contrast this short period of time with the facts of Gaines, where several days passed between the defendant's statement and the crime.

Appellant also asserts that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 although it was deemed admissible under Rule 404(b). Evidence may be excluded under Rule 403, although it is relevant under Rule 404(b), if its probative value is substantially outweighed by potential unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. Jones v. State, 340 Ark. 390, 10 S.W.3d 449 (2000).

Based on Hammons v. State, 338 Ark. 733, 739, 2 S.W.3d 50, 54 (1999), the State argues that it has a right to prove a crime as conclusively as it can, introducing all the admissible relevant evidence at its disposal, and the appellant's statements stand as the only evidence for motive; therefore, the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Because the trial court is given great deference on issues of relevancy and prejudicial impact of evidence and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion, we cannot say the trial courtabused its discretion under Rule 403 by allowing the testimony of Autrey concerning the taxicab ride with appellant earlier in the evening. Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt, including his confession and the presence of appellant's blood in the taxicab. Thus, we conclude that even if the testimony was more prejudicial than probative, the error committed was harmless. See Kidd v. State, 330 Ark. 479, 955 S.W.2d 505 (1997).

Affirmed.

Jennings and Neal, JJ., agree.

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