Doyle Green, Sr. v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE

DIVISION I

CACR01-628

January 30, 2002

DOYLE GREEN, SR. AN APPEAL FROM PULASKI

APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

SEVENTH DIVISION [CR00-2272]

V. HON. JOHN B. PLEGGE, JUDGE

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

Following a bench trial, Doyle Green, Sr., was convicted of two counts of terroristic threatening and sentenced to a fine and five years' probation. As his sole point on appeal, Green contends that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove he made threats with the purpose of terrorizing another person. We disagree and hold that the record reveals substantial evidence to support appellant's conviction.

Appellant worked for the Department of Human Services for roughly twenty years. On April 25, 2000, appellant was sitting in his locked office when a co-worker, Melinda Coleman, knocked on the door and told appellant that she was collecting money in connection with Secretaries' Day. Ms. Coleman testified that after appellant let her in and gave her $5.00, the following conversation took place:

And he said, "Is she over there?" And I said, "Who?" And he said, "Verma." And I said "Yes, she's in her office. . . ." And then what he said was "I'm going to kill her." He said, "I'm going to kill her." And I said, "I beg your pardon?" And he said, "I'm going to kill her and that fat tub of lard, Charles Moore." He said, "If you see me come in in cammies, go in your office, close the door and lock it and stay out of the way. I'm going to kill everything in between." And then he said he was going over there and pointed toward the south building and that's where Kurt Knickeram and the directors are. And I said, "Oh, you don't want to do that." And he just looked. His whole demeanor was serious. And I started trembling. And I said, "You don't want to do that. Think of your family, you know, you could get disability at Fort Roots and your kids could go to college free." And he said, "If I can spend a year in Vietnam, I spend five years at Fort Roots and they'd turn me loose." And I said, "Well, thanks for the money," and got out of there as fast as I could.

Ms. Coleman explained that Verma Simmons was her boss, and that Simmons's office was the first office on the floor and that Moore's office was the last office on the floor. She testified that after she left appellant's office, she immediately went to Simmons's office. Because Simmons was not in, Coleman returned to her office, sat down and wrote verbatim her conversation with appellant.1 Once Coleman heard Simmons moving about in her office, Coleman went into Simmons's office and stated, "Miss Verma, you are in danger." When Simmons asked Coleman to explain, Coleman stated, "Doyle said he's going to kill you and Charles."

The State also presented the testimony of Simmons and Moore. Simmons testified that she supervised appellant, Coleman, and Moore. She testified that she had previously experienced problems with appellant not being cooperative with other employees and not performing certain job tasks. As a result, appellant received two disciplinary actions. Simmons testified that she was surprised to hear that appellant threatened to kill her, and thatas a result of the threat, she changed the manner in which she arrived to and left from work. During the year before the incident, Simmons received a memorandum from appellant expressing that he would feel safer performing his job in certain parts of the state if he were allowed to carry a gun. She acknowledged that appellant previously told her that he served in Vietnam.

Charles Moore testified that after he read Coleman's statement, he immediately began shaking and was very upset. He testified that before April 25, 2000, he and appellant had experienced several work-related disagreements. Moore testified that he believed that appellant would do what he said, that appellant had the potential of violence, that he was aware appellant served in Vietnam, and that he was afraid.

The State rested, and appellant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State failed to show that he purposely tried to terrorize another person. The court denied the motion, and the defense rested. Appellant then renewed his motion, arguing that the State failed to present proof that appellant, with the purpose of terrorizing another individual, terrorized Verma Simmons or Charles Moore, or that he threatened the others with serious physical injury. The court denied appellant's motion and found appellant guilty of terroristic threatening. It then sentenced him to pay a fine of $500 plus court costs, and serve a term of five years' probation on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.

Analysis

We treat motions for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the State's evidence. See Windsor v. State, 338 Ark. 649, 1 S.W.3d 20 (1999). On appeal, the issue is whether there is substantial evidence to sustain a verdict. See id. Substantial evidence isevidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that will support a conviction, without a trier of fact being required to resort to mere speculation. See id. Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and only evidence that supports a verdict is considered. See id. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-301 (a)(1) (Repl. 1997) defines first-degree terroristic threatening as occurring when a person, with the purpose of terrorizing another person, threatens to cause death or serious physical injury to another person. There is no requirement that the threat be communicated directly to the person threatened; nor is there a requirement that the person threatened experience terror. See Smith v. State, 296 Ark. 451, 757 S.W.2d 554 (1988); Richards v. State, 266 Ark. 733, 585 S.W.2d 375 (Ark. App. 1979). The statute includes future as well as present threats, and the purpose element of the offense is satisfied when the State demonstrates that it was the accused's conscious object to cause fright. See Knight v. State, 25 Ark. App. 353, 758 S.W.2d 12 (1988); Walker v. State, 13 Ark. App. 124, 680 S.W.2d 915 (1984).

In Richards v. State, supra, the appellant was convicted of terroristic threatening after he loaded a rifle and told a co-worker, "you'd better get that s.o.b. out of here or I'm going to shoot him," in reference to another worker. We affirmed the appellant's conviction after determining that the threat was promptly communicated to the threatened worker, the worker was frightened, and the worker left work as a result of threat. See Richards, supra.

Likewise, in Knight v. State, supra, the appellant was convicted of first-degree terroristic threatening when a deputy sheriff heard him say through the intercom system, "don't worry about it man. You'll read about some of those [deputies] in the obituary and they won't die of natural causes because I'll be out of this pen someday." Knight, 25 Ark. App. at 355, 758 S.W.2d at 13. Upon reversing the trial court, we held that although theState demonstrated that the appellant made a threatening statement, the State did not establish "that appellant made the statement with the conscious object of terrorizing [the deputy], even if he were aware that he might be overheard." Id. at 357, 758 S.W.2d at 14. In the present case, appellant concedes that he made the death-threat statements to Ms. Coleman; however, he strenuously argues that the State failed to prove he had the conscious object to fill Mr. Moore or Ms. Simmons with intense fright. We hold that substantial evidence supports the bench ruling to the contrary. Given appellant's inquiry as to whether Simmons was in her office before he made his threat, the trial court, as trier of fact, could reasonably infer that appellant made his statements with the conscious object for Coleman to communicate the threat to Simmons. Because Simmons served as the supervisor for appellant, Coleman, and Moore, it was also reasonable for the trier of fact to conclude that appellant had the conscious object to fill Moore with fright as one would logically expect Simmons to communicate the threat to Moore. As a result of appellant's threats, Simmons was escorted to her car and altered her work schedule. Moore testified that he was filled with fright, and that as a result of the threat, he requested a no-contact order that appellant stay away from him.

Appellant argues that the same facts that would allow one to reasonably infer that appellant had the conscious object to bring about the intense fright of Simmons and Moore, would also allow a trier of fact to reasonably infer that appellant was simply aware of the certainty that his threats would cause Simmons and Moore to be terrorized. He seems to suggest that because the statements that he made to Coleman were circumstantial evidence that he had the conscious object to terrorize Simmons and Moore, the State failed to disprovean hypothesis that his communication was made recklessly and not purposely. We do not weigh credibility issues or evidence. Instead, we simply determine whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trial court. The record before us contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding of appellant's guilt. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

Hart and Vaught, JJ., agree.

1 Coleman testified that she subsequently typed the statement and threw away her handwritten notes.