Randy Rumbaugh v. Director, Employment Security Department and Office Max

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JUDGE KAREN R. BAKER

DIVISION II

RANDY RUMBAUGH

APPELLANT

V.

DIRECTOR, Arkansas Employment Security Department; and OFFICE MAX

APPELLEES

E01-75

OCTOBER 24, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW

[NO. 2000-AT-09363]

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Randy Rumbaugh appeals a decision of the Arkansas Board of Review (Board) that reversed the Appeal Tribunal's award of unemployment insurance benefits. The Board concluded that Mr. Rumbaugh was disqualified from receiving those benefits because he had not availed himself of all the steps in the employer's policy in pursuing redress of his complaints.

We recently handed down the opinion of Magee v. Director, 75 Ark. App., __S.W.3d__ (September 26, 2001). We reversed the Board explaining that "the Board simply relied on one factor in their denial of benefits and excluded consideration of the remaining factors. Specifically, the Board merely stated that it found `that even if it determined that [appellant] had good cause to quit, [appellant] did not make reasonable efforts to resolve the situations prior to quitting.'"

The opinion explains how a determination of whether good cause existed requires a consideration of all of the facts and circumstances in each case. The opinion emphasized that "while

we agree that under the right circumstances an employee's failure to comply with an employer'sestablished grievance procedure could be evidence of a lack of good faith, we hold that such a finding alone does not trump all other considerations when considering whether an employee had good cause to quit his employment."

In the case before us, the Board similarly denied benefits based on its finding that Mr. Rumbaugh "did not follow the `open door policy' through its conclusion before quitting." The Board in this case excluded consideration of necessary factors and relied on a single factor in denying benefits.

While we could analyze the appropriateness of the Board's one finding, that one finding would only constitute one factor in reaching the determination of whether the appellant had good cause to leave his employment. In this case it is more appropriate to remand the matter to the Board for findings of fact. As the court in Magee explained, the Board's failure to make essential findings of fact makes it necessary to remand the case to the Board to decide such fact questions in the first instance. See also Lawrence v. Everett, 9 Ark. App. 138, 653 S.W.2d 140 (1983); Reddick v. Scott, 217 Ark. 38, 41, 228 S.W.2d 1008, 1010 (1950).

Reversed and remanded.

Jennings, J., and Hays, S.J., agree