Harold Walls v. Director, Arkansas Employment Security Department

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, JUDGE

DIVISION I

HAROLD WALLS

APPELLANT

V.

DIRECTOR, Arkansas Employment Security Department

APPELLEE

E01-06

October 31, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW

[NO. 2000-BR-01578 TRA]

AFFIRMED

Harold Walls appeals a decision of the Arkansas Board of Review ("Board") that affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's determination that the appellant was ineligible for Trade Readjustment Act benefits. The Board disqualified appellant because he failed to take the requisite credit hours to qualify as a full-time student. For reversal, appellant first argues that the Board erred by failing to liberally construe the federal statute in order to qualify appellant for continued benefits. Second, appellant asserts that the Board "erred in failing to recognize that the State, or its delegates, holds some level of responsibility for errors." We disagree and affirm.

Appellant's employer, Siemens, relocated from Arkansas to Mexico, which qualified him for Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) benefits pursuant to statute, 20 C.F.R. § 617.1 to Appendix A to Section 617, Part 5002. In January 2000, appellant enrolled in Pulaski Technical College to obtain an associate's degree in computer networking. During the

summer semester of 2000, appellant enrolled in both summer sessions and completed ten credit hours of classes. Thereafter, the Employment Security Department withdrew the TAA benefits appellant was receiving because the credit hours earned during the summer term had fallen below the requisite twelve hours of classes required by the college to maintain full-time status.

Our scope of appellate review involving cases of state review boards is well-settled:

On appeal, the findings of the Board of Review are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board's findings. Even when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision upon the evidence before it.

See, e.g., Fleming v. Director, 73 Ark. App. 86, 88, 40 S.W.3d 820, 822 (2001).

However, in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Welborn, 66 Ark. App. 122, 987 S.W.2d 768 (1999), this court stated that a state agency's interpretation of federal law, as opposed to its findings of fact, is not entitled to deference. When reviewing questions of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. Id.

Appellant first asserts that a liberal construction of the federal statute, 20 C.F.R.

§ 617.1 to Appendix A to Section 617, Part 5002, brought him within the scope of the Act and entitled him to the benefits available under the Act. Liberal construction of a statute, as defined by Black's Law Dictionary, 313 (6th ed. 1990), is the expansion of the meaning of the statute to meet cases which are within the statute's reason and spirit. The pertinentlanguage of 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(f)(4) provides that "individuals in TAA approved training shall attend training full time...." Pulaski Technical College required that appellant enroll in and complete a course load of six hours for each of the two summer terms for a total of twelve hours to be considered a full-time student. Appellant enrolled in only ten hours during the two summer terms under a mistaken belief that he only needed six hours to be considered a full-time student for both summer sessions.

Even though appellant's intentions were good and his failure to enroll in twelve hours for the summer was based on his misunderstanding of the requirements, we cannot construe the statute to read that ten hours is the equivalent of twelve hours. The statute unambiguously states that an individual must be in training full-time. A counselor for Pulaski Technical College testified that "full time over the entire summer" required a student to complete twelve credit hours. It is undisputed that appellant was enrolled in and completed only ten hours during the summer of 2000. The two-hour deficit disqualified appellant from receiving benefits provided by 20 C.F.R. § 617.1 to Appendix A to Section 617, Part 5002. After a de novo review, we agree with the Board's determination that appellant no longer qualified for TAA benefits because he was not participating in full-time training.

Appellant also argues the Board "erred in failing to recognize that the State, or its delegates, holds some level of responsibility for errors." To support his contention, appellant relies on the language contained in 20 C.F.R. § 617.4, 20 C.F.R. § 617.20, 20 C.F.R.

§ 617.23, and Appendix A to Section 617, Part 5002. Appellant correctly states that thelanguage in these statutes expresses that the true intent is for the State to "provide certain information, assistance, and continuing contact." However, nothing in the Act requires the State or the delegates of the State to personally advise displaced workers of the training institution's requirements for participation as a full-time student either prior to or after the worker enrolled in the program.

The language in 20 C.F.R. § 617.4, states in relevant part that a) state agencies shall provide full information to workers about benefit allowances, training...; b) state agencies shall provide whatever assistance is necessary to enable groups of workers...to prepare petitions or applications for program benefit; c) state agencies shall inform the State Board of Vocational Education. This section of the statute requires state agencies to provide displaced workers with the information on the benefits. However, it does not require them to ensure that an employee is taking advantage of such benefits.

Section 617.20 of 20 C.F.R. also provides that state agencies shall be responsible for advising the worker to apply for training, providing counseling, testing, placement, and supportive services, developing a training plan with the worker, and developing and periodically reviewing the reemployment plans. Again, this section requires that the State assist the displaced worker. Appellant admitted that he was not only aware of the program but had signed a document acknowledging that he was aware of the benefits.

As appellant points out, section 617.23(a) places a responsibility on state agencies "to explore, identify, develop, and secure training opportunities and to establish linkages with other public and private agencies...." No evidence was given by appellant that the State orits delegates failed to identify and provide opportunities for displaced workers such as appellant. In fact, the State did identify, develop, and secure training opportunities for the appellant, and beginning in January of 2000, appellant took advantage of the opportunities provided by the Trade Readjustment Act by enrolling in Pulaski Technical College. Therefore, the State and its delegates should not be faulted for the appellant's failure to fulfill the requirements of the educational institution, which were prerequisites for entitlement to the benefits provided by the TAA.

Lastly, appellant cites to Appendix A to Part 617, Part 5002, which states in part that

claims personnel are required to assure that each claimant is doing what a reasonable individual...would do to obtain suitable work and ...such personnel...required to so arrange and coordinate the contact required of a claimant as not to place an unreasonable burden on him or unreasonably limit his opportunity.

Again, the evidence presented clearly shows that appellant was aware of the benefits and the programs provided for displaced workers. In fact, he signed a document stating that he understood the benefits provided by TAA, and, further, that he had received advice concerning those benefits. Nothing in this statute indicates that it is the State's responsibility or duty to ensure that appellant is properly enrolled in every session of training. The Board's determination that appellant was ineligible for benefits was not clearly erroneous and we affirm.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Jennings, J., agree.