Thomas L. Ford v. Dependable Air and State Farm Insurance

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

KAREN R. BAKER, JUDGE

DIVISION III

THOMAS L. FORD

APPELLANT

V.

DEPENDABLE AIR and STATE FARM INSURANCE

APPELLEES

CA01-685

DECEMBER 12, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E804697]

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Appellant, Thomas L. Ford, appeals the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission finding that he had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to surgery performed March 29, 1999, and that he was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits from February 23, 1999, through August 2, 1999. It was undisputed that appellant sustained compensable injuries on April 15, 1998, while he was driving a van for his employer and was struck from the rear in an automobile accident. However, the Commission denied benefits based on its finding that appellant suffered from stenosis, a degenerative condition which pre-existed the automobile accident. The Commission stated that while the automobile accident may have exacerbated the pain associated with the stenosis, the accident was not responsible for the stenosis itself, and therefore was not compensable. Because the Commission applied the incorrect legal standard, we reverse and remand.

A pre-existing disease or infirmity does not disqualify a claim if the employment aggravated,

accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the disability for which compensation is sought. St. Vincent Medical Ctr. v. Brown, 53 Ark. App. 30, 917 S.W.2d 550 (1996); see also Nashville Livestock Comm. v. Cox, 302 Ark. 69, 787 S.W.2d 64 (1990). In workers' compensation law, the employer takes the employee as he finds him, and employment circumstances that aggravate pre-existing conditions are compensable. See Nashville Livestock, supra; Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Scroggins, 230 Ark. 936, 328 S.W.2d 97 (1959). As a matter of law, the Commission incorrectly denied benefits based upon the existence of a pre-existing, degenerative condition. Therefore, we must reverse the Commission's decision.

However, under the facts of this case it is appropriate to remand the entire matter back to the Commission for findings of fact. Specifically, findings of fact are required related to whether the April 15, 1998, automobile accident aggravated the pre-existing degenerative condition. The opinion merely states that the accident "may have exacerbated the pain associated with the stenosis." Because the statutory obligation to make specific findings of fact lies with the Commission, we also must remand for those findings of fact. Wilson v. Cargill, Inc., 45 Ark. App. 174, 873 S.W.2d 171 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-207 (Repl. 1996 & Supp. 2001).

Reversed and remanded.

Bird and Crabtree, JJ., agree.