Wanda's Eldercare v. Margie R. Coplan

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

KAREN R. BAKER, JUDGE

DIVISION II

WANDA'S ELDERCARE

APPELLANT

V.

MARGIE R. COPLAN

APPELLEE

CA01-160

SEPTEMBER 19, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E910697]

AFFIRMED

The employer, Wanda's Eldercare, appeals the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that awarded compensation to Margie R. Coplan. We find that substantial evidence supports the Commission's conclusion and affirm.

Appellee suffered a work-related back injury on August 2, 1998. It is undisputed that this injury is compensable. At issue is the extent of the injury and the relationship between appellee's injury and her course of treatment.

At the time of the hearing, appellee was sixty-two years old, had a tenth-grade education, and the ability to read and write. Her work history included working as a waitress, working in a jean factory and managing a trailer park, which involved raking the yard, burning, cleaning, and lifting. She also managed a motel, which included moving furniture, vacuuming, mopping, and cleaning. Although she had no vocational training, she had on-the-job training in care giving and had worked for appellant two different times and in a nursing home.

She acknowledged that she had back problems prior to the August 2, 1998, work-related back injury, but that she had "never experienced before" the pain like that in her lower back and described her previous pain as spasms more in her upper back. Medical records dating from July 29, 1994, set out several medical conditions, including bowel problems. There is a notation of some history of prior low-back pain noted in December 1994. Notations of various ailments through the years prior to the work -related injury appear in the medical records, including that appellee admitted herself to a hospital in September of 1995 for opiate dependence. The records themselves contain no objective medical finding of muscle spasms before the work-related injury.

Appellee's work-related back injury occurred while helping a partially paralyzed patient into position on her bed. Appellee testified that after her injury, she called her supervisor between twelve and twelve-thirty a.m. to report the injury, but that her supervisor stated that there was no one who could relieve her and she would have to stay. When the appellee said that her supervisor could relieve her, the supervisor responded that she was in bed and did not want to relieve the appellee.

When the morning relief arrived, appellee's daughter picked her up and took her home, and then appellee's husband took her to the emergency room. Although pain relief was prescribed, the pain continued to be severe and pervasive over the next few months. On November 2, 1998, appellee was examined by Dr. Valentine, and she returned to Dr. Valentine on December 10, 1998, for a discogram. Dr. Valentine's interpretation of the results of that test was that the pain was significantly regenerated at L3-4,L4-5, and L5-S1. "There appeared to a posterior tear at L4-5 with escape of contrast into the epidural space. This was also notably the most painful level at which pain was produced at the lowest pressure." Medical records also contained objective medical findings of muscle spasms after the injury.

When testifying to the administrative law judge (ALJ) about the effects appellee sufferedfrom the injury, she stated that she was totally disabled from working: "Judge, there's a lot of times I can't even bend over to make up my own bed. There's times I can't bend over the sink to wash my dishes, and I don't dare just bend over to pick up anything off the floor." She also stated that she cannot sit still over about thirty minutes, and can stand about ten to fifteen minutes. She can walk about two blocks, if she is "lucky" without hurting. She further testified that she did not know what work she could do, "being as I have no diploma, high school education." She continued that before the injury she could do anything she wanted, but afterwards, Dr. Valentine medically restricted her to lifting no more than ten pounds. Neither could she bend, tuck, nor mop.

In making its decision, the Commission noted that the ALJ who presided over the hearing and observed the demeanor of the witnesses indicated that he was aware of appellee's physical and psychological problems which pre-existed her August 2, 1998, injury. The Commission also noted that he further considered appellee to be a poor historian and that she may still be addicted to narcotic medication. With these considerations, he still found that the medical records sufficiently corroborated appellee's account as to the injury to establish entitlement to medical treatment and temporary disability compensation by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Commission then further refuted appellant's contention that appellee's current "problems" were the result of pre-existing, chronic problems with back pain, or in the alternative, that it was a minor aggravation. It emphasized that the argument was inconsistent with the fact that objective medical findings of muscle spasms were present in the record after the injury and that there was a complete lack of objective medical findings of muscles spasms in the record before the injury. The Commission also emphasized that appellant's position was inconsistent with Dr. Valentine's diagnosis of an annular tear injury currently causing appellee's low-back pain, based on discogram and post-discogram CT testing, and with his opinion that the annular tear injury wascaused by appellee's work-related injury.

We review the evidence and all inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Patterson v. Arkansas Dep't of Health, 70 Ark.App. 182, 15 S.W.3d 701 (2000). Our standard of review on appeal is whether the decision of the Commission is supported by substantial evidence. Buford v. Standard Gravel Co., 68 Ark.App. 162, 5 S.W.3d 478 (1999). The substantial evidence standard of review requires us to affirm if the Commission's opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Moser v. Arkansas Lime Co., 40 Ark.App. 108, 842 S.W.2d 456 (1992).

Consistent with this standard, we hold that the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence and affirm.

Jennings and Crabtree, JJ., agree.