Samuel Watson v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION II

SAMUEL WATSON

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 00-680

MARCH 7, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR 96-240]

HONORABLE MARK HEWETT,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

This is a revocation case involving consecutive sentencing. On October 9, 1996, the appellant, Samuel Watson, pled guilty to overdraft and was sentenced to imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction for ten years with eight years suspended. He was also ordered to pay restitution. On July 15, 1998, appellant pled nolo contendere to second-degree domestic battery, and the trial court suspended the imposition of his sentence for five years. He was also fined $150. The State subsequently sought revocation of appellant's probation in both cases, alleging that appellant failed to pay his restitution and fine as ordered and committed the offenses of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, aggravated assault on a family member, second-degree mischief, residential burglary, fleeing apprehension, and resisting arrest in violation of the terms of his suspended sentences. A revocation hearing was held on November 3, 1999, and the circuit court revoked appellant's suspended sentences and sentenced him to imprisonment for five years and eight months for the overdraft

conviction and six years for the domestic battery conviction. Over appellant's objection, the circuitcourt ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court was without authority to order the sentences in the cases to be served consecutively. We affirm.

Appellant specifically argues that the trial court erred by running his sentences consecutively because the 1998 judgment did not provide for the sentences to run consecutively. We find that the trial court had the authority to order appellant's sentences to run consecutively. In doing so, we look to a series of citations in our criminal code. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-307(b) (Repl. 1997), appellant's 1996 and 1998 suspended sentences automatically ran concurrently. Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-4-307(b) (Repl. 1997) provides: "Multiple periods of suspension or probation, whether imposed at the same or different times, shall run concurrently. The period of a suspension or probation shall also run concurrently with any federal or state term of imprisonment or parole to which the defendant is or becomes subject during the period." In the case at bar, appellant's 1996 and 1998 suspended sentences ran concurrently until those suspended sentences were revoked in 1999.

If a court revokes a suspension or probation, it may enter a judgment of conviction and may impose any sentence on the defendant that might have been imposed originally for the offense for which he was found guilty. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(f)(1)(A) (Supp. 1999). Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-4-309(f)(1)(A) allowed the circuit court to sentence appellant to any sentence that may have been imposed originally, and upon the revocation of a suspended sentence, Ark. Code Ann. §5-4-403(a) gave the court the discretion to run the sentences either concurrently or consecutively. Here, the trial court used its discretion to run appellant's sentences consecutively. See Teague v. State, 328 Ark. 724, 946 S.W.2d 670 (1997).

In Webb v. State, 66 Ark. App. 367, 990 S.W.2d 591 (1999), the appellant pled guilty in twocases on the same day. In both cases, the trial court sentenced Webb to five years' probation and ordered Webb to pay a fine. The order for the second conviction was silent as to whether the sentence was to be served concurrently or consecutively to the first conviction. Subsequently, when Webb's probationary sentences were revoked, he was sentenced to imprisonment for six years in the first case and ten years in the second case, with the two sentences to be served consecutively. In Webb, we relied on Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-307(b) and § 5-4-309(f) in holding that the trial court was within its authority to run the sentences consecutively, and we do the same here.

Affirmed.

Griffen and Baker, JJ., agree.