Susan Rouner v. Sparks Regional Medical Center

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION I

SUSAN ROUNER

APPELLANT

V.

SPARKS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

APPELLEE

CA 99-1478

NOVEMBER1, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E 813578]

AFFIRMED

This case involves a finding by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that the appellant, Susan Rouner, was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Appellant works for the appellee, Sparks Regional Medical Center, as a registered nurse. On March 31, 1998, while working for appellee, appellant mentioned to two co-workers that she was having pain in her shoulder. Appellant left work early that day, but did not fill out an accident report. On April 1, 1998, appellant went to Dr. Robert Bishop complaining about the pain. Appellant did not fill out an accident report until on or about May 26, 1988, an which time appellee denied her claim.

A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on February 8, 1999, at which time appellant asserted alternative theories of recovery. Appellant contendedthat

she sustained a specific-incident injury to her cervical spine on March 31, 1998, or in the alternative, she contended that she sustained a gradual-onset type injury as a result of lifting and pulling on patients over the course of several weeks. The ALJ determined that appellant failed to prove she was entitled to benefits under either theory. The ALJ's opinion was affirmed and adopted by the Commission. Appellant appeals the Commission's finding that she was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits under either theory. We find no error, and thus affirm.

This court reviews decisions of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission to see if they are supported by substantial evidence. Crossett Sch. Dist. v. Fulton, 65 Ark. App. 63, 984 S.W.2d 833 (1999). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue is not whether this court might have reached a different result from the Commission. Malone v. Texarkana Pub. Schs., 333 Ark. 343, 969 S.W.2d 644 (1998). If reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, we must affirm the decision. Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark. App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995).

The ALJ found, and the Commission adopted the following findings: that appellant did not give any doctor a history of a specific incident; that appellant did not know whether her pain first began at home or at work; and that appellant only indicated to her co-workers that she was experiencing pain, not that the pain was caused by a specific work incident. As such the Commission found appellant not to have a compensable injury defined by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) as:

An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances . . . arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results in disability and death. An injury is "accidental" only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence.

We find that the Commission's holding that appellant was not entitled to benefits under a specific-incident theory was supported by substantial evidence.

The ALJ also determined, and the Commission adopted, the finding that appellant did not prove a gradual-onset injury. The ALJ found that appellant had not proven that her job duties included rapid and repetitive motion. The ALJ also stated that even if appellant was not required to prove that her job required repetitive motion, he would still find that appellant has not proven a gradual-onset injury. The ALJ based this decision on the following: that she did not recall whether the pain first started at home or at work; that appellant did not file a workers' compensation claim until May 1998; and that appellant filed for and received group health insurance.

Appellant argues that she should not have been required to prove that her job duties included rapid and repetitive motion as she could prove a gradual-onset injury under the back injuries exception. The gradual-onset exception for back injuries is set forth in section 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii)(b). Under this provision, "compensable injury" means:

(ii) An injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body and arising out of and in the course of employment if it is not caused by a specific incident or is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence, if the injury is:

...

(b) A back injury which is not caused by a specific incident or which is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence[.]

In reviewing the above section, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated "we emphasize the obvious . . . [that] section 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii)(b) provides that a worker sustains a compensable gradual-onset injury if the injury is a back injury; the statute makes no mention of `spine' or `neck.'" Hapney v. Rheem Mfg. Co. 342 Ark. 11, S.W.3d (2000). "[R]ecognized medical definitions have very clearly defined the term `back' as being below the neck or from the neck to the pelvis." Id.

Appellant has an alleged injury to her cervical spine. Hapney states that an injury to the cervical spine is not within the gradual-onset exception for back injuries set out in § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii)(b). Thus, appellant does not qualify under § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii)(b). We find that the Commission's decision to deny appellant benefits because she did not prove her job duties required rapid and repetitive motion is supported by substantial evidence.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Roaf, JJ., agree.