Gwendolyn Hill v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JUDGE MAX KOONCE

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION IV

GWENDOLYN HILL

APPELLANT

V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

APPELLEE

CA 00-29

September 20, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE BOONE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

J-96-76

HON. GARY ISBELL,

CHANCERY JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant is appealing from an order of the Boone County Chancery Court terminating her parental rights. For reversal, appellant argues that the chancellor erred in failing to set out in the final order the specific findings of fact and determinations of credibility, and that the findings supporting the chancellor's order terminating parental rights were not based on clear and convincing evidence. We find no error, and affirm.

Appellant and her former husband, Steve Hill, were married in 1984. They divorced in 1991 but remarried in December 1992. During the course of their two marriages, they had nine children, the youngest is in appellant's custody and not part of this case. Appellant was severely abused by Steve Hill. The older children were also subjected to terrible physical and sexual abuse by their father.1 Appellant permitted and sometimes passively participated in the abuse. Appellant's parental rights were terminated as to the eight older children. However, she is only appealing the termination of her rights to the two youngest of these children, D.H. and D.H., a girl born on July 31, 1994, and a boy born on August 8, 1995.

Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Crawford v. Dep't. of Human Serv., 330 Ark. 152, 951 S.W.2d 310 (1997). Nevertheless, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well being of the child. Id. The facts warranting termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In reviewing the trial court's evaluation of the evidence, this Court will not reverse unless the court's finding of clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Clear and convincing evidence is the degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established. Anderson v. Douglas, 310 Ark. 633, 839 S.W.2d 196 (1992). Furthermore, we will defer to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. Crawford v. Dep't. of Human Serv., supra.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(Supp. 1999) provides in pertinent part:

(3) An order forever terminating parental rights shall be based upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence:

(A) That it is in the best interest of the juvenile, including consideration of the following factors:

(i) The likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and

(ii) The potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by continuing contact with the parent, parents, or putative parent or parents;

(B) Of one (1) or more of the following grounds:

(i)(a) That a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has continued out of the home for twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions which caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent.

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) initially investigated the family in September 1996, while they lived in Bergman, Arkansas, because the children were not enrolled in school. During a follow-up investigation in October 1996, ADHS found the Hills' home to be in a very unsafe and unsanitary condition. ADHS had also been informed that the Missouri Department of Human Services had substantiated sexual abuse of the three oldest girls by Mr. Hill, prior to their disappearance from that area. The children were taken into emergency custody in November 1996, and placed in foster care. The children subsequently admitted the physical and sexual abuse to caseworkers.

Regular review hearings were held in 1997, with the goal being reunification with appellant. D.H. and D.H. began to have regular visits in appellant's home in October 1998, with some overnight visitation. A trial placement was ordered in November 1998, tocommence as soon as the criminal charges against appellant were resolved. Appellant subsequently entered a guilty plea to three counts of permitting abuse. She took physical custody of D.H. and D.H. on December 30, 1998, subject to close monitoring by ADHS and weekly sibling visitation.

A petition to terminate parental rights to all eight children was filed on March 1, 1999, and a motion to terminate the trial placement was filed April 19, 1999. ADHS recommended termination due to appellant's untrustworthy character, her lack of judgment, her refusal to accept responsibility for not protecting her children from the prolonged abuse, her excuse of her behavior based on her own victimization, and her inability to comprehend the children's feelings regarding their abuse and her part in it. ADHS concluded that the problems initially identified in the case had not been remedied. ADHS indicated that they had no reason to believe that appellant was capable of meeting her children's emotional needs or even recognizing them; nurturing their growth and recovery; or protecting them in the future from the results of her passive dependence, lack of reasonable judgment, poor decisions, and destructive choices. ADHS noted the D.H. and D.H. had not been as severely victimized as the older six children, but they were severely neglected and only escaped severe abuse by virtue of their age. After a two-day hearing on June 24 and 25, 1999, the chancellor terminated appellant's rights to all eight children on the ground that appellant had failed to remedy the conditions that caused their removal. At the time of the termination, D.H. and D.H. had been living with appellant one week short of seven months.

Appellant testified at the termination hearing that the abuse began three months after she married Steve Hill. She divorced him after seven years of marriage; however, she subsequently reunited with him because she believed he would kill her if she did not return. They then moved to Arkansas, where the abuse continued for another five years.

Appellant testified that she attended three parenting classes, received counseling for almost two years, and had taken various courses at the local women's shelter. She also admitted that a man she met on the internet, Mr. David Peters of California, showed up on her doorstep in November 1998. He arrived without a vehicle and with his belongings in a trash bag. She stated that she believed that he was going to help her with her criminal trial. He stayed in her home for approximately one week. She also admitted that she did not inform ADHS of his presence for fear that she would not be allowed to see her children. Appellant did go to a shelter and eventually have Mr. Peters removed from her home. Appellant testified that she did not reveal the abuse by Mr. Hill because she was waiting until the children had the ability to tell what had happened to them. There was testimony that appellant suffered from battered women's syndrome and that the psychological evaluations indicated that she has a personality disorder that is not amenable to therapy.

Caryl Thompson, a caseworker and supervisor at ADHS, testified regarding appellant's compliance with her case plan. Appellant had complied with the plan by maintaining a stable home and employment. However, Ms. Thompson explained that there was not a significant improvement as to the assertive discipline requirement, and that appellant had problems overall with interaction and discipline of her children. Ms.Thompson noted that appellant had not been honest with ADHS, and had encouraged her children not to be honest with ADHS - she had one of the younger children sneak notes to the older children with instructions not to tell. Appellant did not complete the non-offending parenting classes. Appellant also did not take responsibility for her role in the sexual and physical abuse of the children, and had not shown empathy for the children and the abuse they suffered. Appellant's extensive support group, including advocate workers, helped appellant parent the children, and in fact did the parenting when they were around instead of appellant. There were several times while visiting appellant's home that a caseworker had to intervene to remove dangerous or sharp items from the children. Also, when D.H. and D.H. were delivered to appellant, the boy huddled in the corner of the house in a fetal position, and appellant did not seek to comfort him even after a worker suggested that he needed attention.

Ms. Thompson further testified that appellant was not cooperative with the foster parents. She stated that appellant exhibited no concerns for having lied to the social worker about the presence of Mr. Peters nor the jeopardy she had been willing to place D.H. and D.H. in if the visits had not been canceled by ADHS after they found out that Mr. Peters was staying in her home. It was further pointed out that appellant did not acknowledge the sexual abuse until the children informed ADHS. There was also testimony that D.H. and D.H. exhibited regressive behavior after earlier visitation with appellant.

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the chancellor noted that the decision to terminate appellant's parental rights to D.H. and D.H. was not as simple as terminatingher rights to the older children, who actually suffered the sexual and physical abuse. He stated that appellant had not made sufficient progress even though she had thirty-three months to develop as a parent. The chancellor noted that appellant required an extensive support group in order to parent the children. The chancellor also stated that he could not excuse the length of time the children were abused and that appellant had not taken advantage of opportunities to get help. The chancellor further found he could not have confidence that the children would remain free from risk if appellant were allowed to have them. In the order, the chancellor found that the children had a substantial likelihood of being adopted, that it was in the best interest of the children to have appellant's parental rights terminated, that the children had resided outside the parental home in excess of one year, that ADHS had made reasonable efforts to deliver services, and that despite a meaningful effort to rehabilitate the home, appellant had not remedied the conditions that caused the removal of the children.

Appellant first argues that the chancellor erred in failing to set out his credibility determinations and specific findings of fact in the final order. Appellant has not cited any authority in support of her argument that a chancellor must specifically state in his order how much credibility was assigned to each witness. We have long held that we do not consider arguments without convincing argument or citation to authority in support, where it is not apparent without further research that these arguments are well-taken. See Perryman v. Hackler, 323 Ark. 500, 916 S.W.2d 105 (1996). Moreover, in his ruling from the bench, thechancellor gave a detailed and thoughtful analysis of the case in which he explained his findings and ruling in support of the decision to terminate parental rights.

Appellant also argues that the chancellor was required to set out his specific factual findings regarding the potential harm to D.H. and D.H. caused by continuing contact with her. The chancellor did find that it was contrary to their best interest and welfare to return them to appellant. He explained in his ruling from the bench that so long as the ADHS was involved and appellant's support group was functioning, he was able to feel satisfied that D.H. and D.H. were no longer at risk. However, the chancellor concluded that he could not feel confident that the children would remain free from risk if appellant were not monitored and given continuous outside support.

For her final argument, appellant contends that the findings supporting termination were not based on clear and convincing evidence. Appellant concedes that D.H. and D.H. were adjudicated dependent-neglected, that they continued out of the home for twelve months, and that ADHS made a meaningful effort to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions that caused removal. She also does not argue that the termination was not in the children's best interest. Her sole contention is that there is not clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the chancellor's finding that the conditions that caused removal had not been remedied.

Appellant's children were removed because they were in danger of environmental neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and domestic violence. Some of those conditions had been remedied, but the evidence supports the finding that appellant did not have adequateparenting skills to protect the children from future harm or neglect. Appellant failed to recognize the significance of her contribution to the abuse of the older children. Appellant did not seek help for herself or the children during the horrible ordeal even though she had a telephone and nearby neighbors. There was also great concern that appellant would not be able to meet their emotional needs nor parent D.H. and D.H. once they were older. Appellant remained a passive parent that depended on an active support group to help her with her children. Thus, appellant had not demonstrated that she could alone be responsible for them and meet their needs. Although appellant had improved since the case was initiated, her passive parenting and inability to appreciate her children's needs were conditions that had not been remedied since their removal. We cannot say that the chancellor's finding that the facts supporting termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence was clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

Roaf and Bird, JJ., agree.

1 Steve Hill is currently incarcerated. See Hill v. State, 337 Ark. 219, 988 S.W.2d 487 (1999).