Joseph Sherif Presley v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION I

JOSEPH SHERIF PRESLEY

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 00-114

NOVEMBER 8, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NOS. CR 96-1351, CR 96-2252, CR 98-3835]

HONORABLE DAVID BOGARD,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

The Pulaski County Circuit Court found the appellant, Joseph Presley, guilty of criminal attempt to commit rape. In addition, the circuit court revoked appellant's two prior suspended sentences and sentenced him to a total of twelve years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant claims that sufficient evidence does not support his conviction for attempt to commit rape, and he also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit evidence of the victim's prior rape allegations. We affirm.

First, we must address appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to his conviction for attempted rape. See Jones v. State, 336 Ark. 191, 984 S.W.2d 432 (1999). The test for determining sufficient proof is whether there is substantial evidence, direct or

circumstantial, to support the verdict. Johnson v. State, 337 Ark. 196, 987 S.W.2d 694(1999). On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and sustain the conviction if there is any substantial evidence to support it. Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 889 S.W.2d 760 (1994). Evidence is substantial if it is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. In determining whether there is substantial evidence, we consider only that evidence tending to support the verdict. Johnson, supra. We do not weigh the evidence presented at trial, as that is a matter for the fact finder. Freeman v. State, 331 Ark. 130, 959 S.W.2d 400 (1998). Where, as here, the trial is before the bench, the trial judge sits as fact finder. See State v. Watson, 307 Ark. 333, 820 S.W.2d 59 (1991).

The victim, L.M., testified that on July 29, 1998, appellant entered her residence uninvited and began arguing with her. During the course of the argument, appellant grabbed L.M. and took her to her bedroom, where he threw her to the floor, held her hands, and pulled her pants down. Appellant then exposed his penis and attempted to penetrate L.M.. L.M. thwarted appellant's attempt by repeatedly striking him in the head with a coffee can. L.M. and appellant continued to argue and returned to the living room of the residence. Appellant eventually left when L.M. threatened to strike him with a monkey wrench.

Appellant argues that L.M. was not a credible witness and that the trial court erred in relying on her testimony to convict him of attempted rape. However, the uncorroborated testimony of one State's witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction. McCullough v. State, 44 Ark. App. 99, 866 S.W.2d 845 (1993). Here, the trial court found L.M.'s testimony credible without further corroboration. In addition to appellant's testimony, evidence at trialrevealed that when the police responded to L.M.'s residence, they discovered that L.M.'s bedroom furniture was in disarray with the bed moved approximately two feet, picture frames had been broken, and items had been knocked from a night stand. We hold that the foregoing is substantial evidence that appellant attempted to rape L.M..

For appellant's second point on appeal, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of appellant's prior rape allegations. A ruling of admissibility under the rape-shield statute will not be overturned absent clear error or a manifest abuse of discretion. Sera v. State, 314 Ark. 415, 17 S.W.3d 61 (2000). The purpose of the rape-shield statute is to shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the public when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. State v. Babbs, 334 Ark. 105, 971 S.W.2d 774 (1998). In any prosecution for criminal attempt to commit rape, evidence of a victim's prior allegations of sexual conduct that the victim asserts to be true is inadmissible to attack the credibility of the victim. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-42-101(b) (Repl. 1999). If the victim asserts that the prior allegations were true, the allegations may still be admissible only if the defendant proves that they were false. See West v. State, 290 Ark. 329, 722 S.W.2d 284 (1998).

At a rape-shield hearing, L.M. testified that in addition to the current allegation against appellant, she had made two other rape allegations in the past. Appellant maintains that the allegations should have been admitted into evidence because, although L.M. asserted that they were true, they were proven to be false by the State's unwillingness to prosecutethose named as the perpetrators. However, neither of the witnesses called by appellant at trial could testify that L.M.'s allegations were false. We do not believe that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of these allegations.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Roaf, JJ., agree.