Garrett v. Director

Charles GARRETT v. DIRECTOR, Employment
Security Department, and Borden, Inc.

E 96-46                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                  Court of Appeals of Arkansas
                           Division I
                 Opinion delivered June 4, 1997


1.   Unemployment compensation -- good cause defined -- what
     constitutes good cause ordinarily question of fact for Board
     to determine. -- Good cause is a cause that would reasonably
     impel an average able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his
     or her employment; it is dependent not only on the good faith
     of the employee involved, which includes the presence of a
     genuine desire to work and to be self-supporting, but also on
     the reaction of the average employee; another element of good
     cause is whether the employee took appropriate steps to
     rectify the problem; what constitutes good cause is ordinarily
     a question of fact for the Board to determine from the
     particular circumstances of each case.

2.   Unemployment compensation -- review of Board's decision --
     substantial evidence defined. -- The appellate court does not
     conduct a de novo review of the evidence in an appeal from a
     decision of the Board of Review; the Board's findings of fact
     are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence;
     substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
     mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; the
     appellate court reviews the evidence and all reasonable
     inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to
     the Board's findings; even when there is evidence upon which
     the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope
     of judicial review is limited to a determination of whether
     the Board could reasonably reach its decision upon the
     evidence before it.  

3.   Unemployment compensation -- finding of Board not supported by
     substantial evidence -- appellant left job for good cause --
     case reversed and remanded. -- Where appellant had worked in
     an admittedly stressful environment for four years while the
     company was reorganizing and restructuring, had worked fifteen
     to eighteen hours per day, with no overtime pay, and had made
     several attempts to discuss his concerns with his supervisors,
     but those concerns were never addressed, the evidence, when
     viewed in the light most favorable to the Board's finding, did
     not support the conclusion that appellant left his job
     voluntarily and without good cause; the case was reversed and
     remanded to the Board of Review to award appellant his
     unemployment benefits.


     Appeal from the Arkansas Board of Review; reversed and
remanded.
     Appellant, pro se.
     Phyllis Edwards, for appellees.
     John F. Stroud, Jr., Judge.
     This is an employment security case.  Appellant, Charles
Garrett, appeals from a decision of the Arkansas Board of Review
that found that he left his work voluntarily and without good cause
connected with the work.  The Boardþs decision reversed the Appeal
Tribunalþs finding that appellant had good cause for quitting his
job.  The appellant is not represented by an attorney, and neither
party has filed a brief.  We reverse and remand to the Board of
Review to award appellantþs benefits.
     Appellant worked for the employer approximately fifteen years. 
He left his supervisor position because of problems on the job. 
Specifically, appellantþs own supervisor was not able to hire
enough employees to perform all the work.  Consequently, appellant
was required to work long hours.  He worked fifteen to eighteen
hours per day.  As a salaried management employee, he was not paid
overtime.  His employees, who did receive overtime pay, earned more
than he did.  A former plant manager had promised him a five
percent raise and back pay.  He admitted that he had received a
raise in 1995, but it was not a five percent raise and he did not
receive back pay.  Company reorganization and restructuring had
been taking place for approximately four years prior to appellantþs
departure from the company.  Management changes had resulted in an
unstable work environment that was stressful.  He complained to his
supervisor, but nothing was done.  He complained to the plant
manager and plant superintendent on September 11, 1995.  He said
that they also promised changes, but that he believed that changes
needed to be made immediately. 
     The human resources representative testified that appellantþs
exit statement indicated that he quit because of dissatisfaction
with pay, long hours of work, and poor management attitude.  He
testified that appellant did not have a formal contract, but as a
management employee he was exempt under federal law from being paid
overtime.  He acknowledged that appellant and other supervisors
complained about the companyþs management and that the other
supervisors had many of the same complaints voiced by appellant. 
He stated, however, that the other supervisors did not quit.
     þGood causeþ is a cause that would reasonably impel an average
able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his or her employment. 
Perdrix-Wang v. Director, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993). 
It is dependent not only on the good faith of the employee
involved, which includes the presence of a genuine desire to work
and to be self-supporting, but also on the reaction of the average
employee.  Id.  Another element of good cause is whether the
employee took appropriate steps to rectify the problem.  Claflin v.
Director, 53 Ark. App. 126, 920 S.W.2d 20 (1996).  What constitutes
good cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the Board to
determine from the particular circumstances of each case.  Perdrix-
Wang, supra.  
     We do not conduct a de novo review of the evidence in an
appeal from a decision of the Board of Review.  Cowan v. Director,
56 Ark. App. 17, 936 S.W.2d 766 (1997).  The Boardþs findings of
fact are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. 
Id.  Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Rucker v.
Director, 52 Ark. App. 126, 915 S.W.2d 315 (1996).  We review the
evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the
light most favorable to the Boardþs findings.  Cowan, supra.  Even
when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a
different decision, the scope of judicial review is limited to a
determination of whether the Board could reasonably reach its
decision upon the evidence before it.  Id.
     Here, appellant had worked in an admittedly stressful
environment for four years while the company was reorganizing and
restructuring.  He worked fifteen to eighteen hours per day, with
no overtime pay.  He had made several attempts to discuss his
concerns with his supervisors, but those concerns were never
addressed.  Viewing the evidence in this case in the light most
favorable to the Boardþs finding, we conclude that the finding is
not supported by substantial evidence.  We determine that the Board
could not reasonably reach its decision that appellant left his job
voluntarily and without good cause.  We therefore reverse and
remand the case to the Board of Review to award appellant his
unemployment benefits.
     Reversed and remanded.
     Neal and Meads, JJ., agree.