Chambers v. International Paper Co.
Annotate this Case
Booker T. CHAMBERS v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER
COMPANY
CA 96-409 ___ S.W.2d ___
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Division IV
Opinion delivered February 19, 1997
1. Workers' compensation -- asbestosis claim -- limitations exception
inapplicable -- case turned on failure to timely file claim. -- The
statutory exception to the three-year limitations on
asbestosis claims, Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-701 (Repl. 1996), was
inapplicable to appellant's case in part because his case did
not turn on the failure to notify appellee employer of his
injury but rather on the failure to timely file his claim.
2. Workers' compensation -- asbestosis claim -- limitations exception
inapplicable -- based on faulty premise contrary to findings of fact. --
Appellantþs argument that he was entitled to the statutory
exception to the three-year limitations on asbestosis claims
was also inapplicable because it was based on the faulty
premise that appellee employer had certain knowledge of a
compensable injury or that appellant had no knowledge that his
condition arose out of and in the course of his employment;
this contention was contrary to the findings of fact by the
administrative law judge, who found that appellant, who filed
his asbestosis claim in 1993, had picked up a copy of his 1989
pulmonary-function test and that he accordingly had knowledge
of his condition by 1989; appellant also testified that he
took the test report to his family physician and discussed
with her the fact that he had pain in his chest.
3. Workers' compensation -- standard of review. -- The appellate court
views the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible
therefrom in a light most favorable to the findings of the
Workers' Compensation Commission and affirms that decision if
it is supported by substantial evidence; the court will
reverse the Commission's decisions only when convinced that
fair-minded persons, with the same facts before them, could
not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission;
if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion,
the appellate court must affirm the decision.
4. Workers' compensation -- Commission's finding that appellant knew or should
have known of his condition supported by substantial evidence. -- Where
it was obvious from the record that both appellee employer and
appellant had the 1989 medical information prior to
appellant's 1990 heart problem that ended his employment and
that, subsequently, appellant had several medical evaluations
that further documented his condition, the appellate court
held that the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that
appellant knew or should have known of his condition was
clearly supported by substantial evidence in the record and
was correctly found to be the basis for applying the statute
of limitations to his claim; because it was uncontroverted
that appellant did not return to work after May 16, 1990, that
day had to be his last possible injurious exposure to
asbestos, and the three-year limitation logically began to run
no later than that date; it was also uncontroverted that
appellant did not file his claim until June 28, 1993, nearly
six weeks after the three-year statute of limitations had
expired.
5. Workers' compensation -- Commission's decision that asbestosis claim was
barred by statute of limitations supported by substantial evidence. -- An
employer's knowledge that certain facts may exist that might
or might not result in a claim does not require the employer
to recognize a claim before it is filed with the Workers'
Compensation Commission; the appellate court held that the
Commission's decision that appellant's asbestosis claim was
barred by the three-year statute of limitations was supported
by substantial evidence.
6. Appeal & error -- appellate court will not go to record for reversible
error. -- The appellate court will not go to the record to
determine whether reversible error occurred.
Appeal from Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission;
affirmed.
Edward O. Moody, P.A., for appellant.
Bridges, Young, Matthews & Drake, PLC, by: Michael J. Dennis,
fpr appellee.
Andree Layton Roaf, Judge.
Appellant Booker T. Chambers appeals from a ruling by the
Workersþ Compensation Commission that his asbestosis claim, filed
more than three years after his retirement on permanent disability
due to other causes, was barred by the three-year statute of
limitations applicable to asbestosis and silicosis claims. We
affirm the Commissionþs ruling.
Chambers was employed by the appellee, International Paper
Company (þIPþ), for thirteen years. During this employment, he
suffered from high blood pressure, a heart condition, arthritis,
and diabetes. The record reflects that Chambers was or may have
been exposed to asbestos during his employment with IP and that he
was also a smoker. On May 16, 1990, Chambers became ill at work
and was hospitalized with congestive heart failure. As a result,
he never returned to work and ended his employment with IP in July
1990. Chambers applied for long-term disability benefits in
January 1991 and was retired on permanent disability in July 1991.
The pertinent facts that gave rise to Chambersþs workersþ
compensation claim for asbestosis are as follows. During his
employment, certain pulmonary screening examinations were performed
on Chambers by IP in 1985 and 1989. The 1985 examination indicated
a finding of pleural abnormalities consistent with pneumoconiosis
(lung disease caused by the inhalation of irritants), and diffuse
pleural thickening. There is no evidence that the results of this
medical exam were disclosed to Chambers at that time and he
continued to work at IP. A second pulmonary-function examination
was performed in March 1989 and indicated that Chambersþs lung
function was so low that he could not use a respirator except in
emergency situations. The evidence reflects that the 1989 exam
report was either picked up by Chambers or mailed to his personal
physician, and that Chambers discussed this report with his
physician.
In April 1991, after Chambers had applied for disability
retirement, he was examined by a Little Rock physician, who noted
þdiffuse pulmonary infiltrates, [questionable] cause, with
consideration to be asbestosis.þ Finally, Chambers consulted with
another physician between February and August of 1993, and was
diagnosed with moderate to severe restrictive lung disease caused
by asbestos. Chambers last saw this physician in August 1993.
After receiving the diagnosis of asbestosis, Chambers filed a
þnotice of injuryþ on June 28, 1993, more than three years after he
last worked at IP on May 16, 1990.
IP timely asserted the three-year statute of limitations for
asbestosis claims as a defense; the administrative law judge
(þALJþ) agreed that the three-year statute found in Ark. Code Ann.
11-9-702(a)(2)(A) (Repl. 1996) barred Chambersþs claim, but also
found that Chambers had suffered an "occupational injury" in May
1990. Chambers appealed to the full Commission, which affirmed and
adopted the decision of the ALJ.
On appeal, Chambers makes two arguments: 1) based on the facts
of his case, the ruling of the Commission is contrary to the
Arkansas workersþ compensation law; and 2) the ruling of the
Commission violates state and federal due process, equal
protection, and the American with Disabilities Act of 1990.
1. Arkansas Workersþ Compensation Laws
For his first point, Chambers argues that the statute of
limitations in a latent disease case involving the exposure to
asbestos begins to run from the date of an informed diagnosis of an
asbestos-related disease, and the Commissionþs failure to apply
this standard violates Arkansas law. The ALJ found that Chambersþs
claim for asbestosis was barred by the three-year statute of
limitations found in Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-702(a)(2)(A) (Repl.
1996), which states in pertinent part:
[a] claim for compensation for disability on account of
silicosis or asbestosis must be filed with the Commission
within one (1) year after the time of disablement, and
the disablement must occur within three (3) years from
the date of the last injurious exposure to the hazard of
silicosis or asbestosis.
(Emphasis provided.)
As Chambers last worked for IP on May 16, 1990, and his notice
of injury was filed on June 28, 1993, his claim was clearly filed
more than three years after the date of his last possible injurious
exposure. Moreover, the ALJ found that Chambers suffered an
þoccupational injuryþ in May 1990, and Chambers retired on full
permanent disability no later than July 1991; Chambers does not
assert that he suffered any disablement within the year prior to
filing his asbestosis claim in 1993, and within three years of his
last injurious exposure in May 1990, as required by the statute of
limitations. Chambers instead argues that the Commission
misapplied the three-year statute of limitations in his case
because he should be excepted from the requirement that his claim
be timely filed, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-701 (Repl.
1996). Section 11-9-701, entitled þNotice of Injury or Death,þ
provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) Unless an injury either renders the employee
physically or mentally unable to do so, or is made known
to the employer immediately after it occurs, the employee
shall report the injury to the employer....
. . . .
(b)(1) Failure to give the notice shall not bar any
claim:
(A) If the employer had knowledge of the injury or death;
(B) If the employee had no knowledge that the condition
or disease arose out of and in the course of the
employment; or
(C) If the commission excuses the failure on the grounds
that for some satisfactory reason the notice could not be
given.
(Emphasis provided.)
However, this statutory exception is inapplicable to
Chambers's case for two reasons. The statute requires that an
employee immediately give notice of an injury to the employer and
the exception provided serves only to excuse the employeeþs failure
to notify the employer of an injury. Chambers's case does not turn
on the failure to notify IP of his injury but rather the failure to
timely file his claim, and the statutory exception relied upon by
Chambers thus has no direct application to the facts of his case.
Although Chambers also relies upon Gunn Distrib. Co. v. Talbert,
230 Ark. 442, 323 S.W.2d 434 (1959), for the proposition that his
failure to give timely notice of injury does not bar his claim
because IP did not plead or prove prejudice, Talbert is also
inapplicable to this case. Unlike IP, the employer in Talbert
failed to timely raise the statute of limitations as a defense and
had actual knowledge of the injury, a heart attack, because of a
medical claim filed by Talbert. The court reasoned in Talbert that
the employer and his insurer thus had not been prejudiced by the
failure to give timely notice of the injury.
Chambersþs argument that he is entitled to an exception lacks
merit for a second reason -- it is based on a faulty premise: that
IP had certain knowledge of a compensable injury, or that Chambers
had no knowledge that his condition arose out of and in the course
of his employment. This contention is contrary to the findings of
fact by the ALJ, who found that Chambers picked up a copy of his
1989 pulmonary-function test and that he accordingly had knowledge
of his condition at least by 1989. Chambers also testified that he
took the test report to his family physician and discussed with her
the fact that he had pain in his chest. Consequently, Chambersþs
argument that, under the facts of his case, he should be excused
from the requirement that he timely file his claim is without
merit.
With regard to the finding by the Commission that Chambers's
claim was barred by the statute of limitations, this court views
the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in
a light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and
affirms that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.
Arkansas Dep't of Health v. Williams, 43 Ark. App. 169, 863 S.W.2d 583 (1993). We will reverse the Commission's decisions only when
convinced that fair-minded persons, with the same facts before
them, could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the
Commission. Patrick v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 39 Ark. App. 34,
833 S.W.2d 790 (1992). If reasonable minds could reach the
Commission's conclusion, we must affirm the decision. Arkansas
Dep't of Health v. Williams, supra.
Here, Chambers has not shown that the Commission's ruling was
not supported by substantial evidence. It is obvious from the
record that both IP and Chambers had the 1989 medical information
prior to Chambers's May 16, 1990, heart problem which ended his
employment. Subsequently, Chambers had several medical evaluations
that further documented his condition. Consequently, the
Commission's finding that Chambers knew or should have known of his
condition is clearly supported by substantial evidence in the
record and was correctly found to be the basis for applying the
statute of limitations to his claim. Because it is uncontroverted
that Chambers did not return to work after May 16, 1990, that day
had to be his last possible injurious exposure to asbestos, and the
three-year limitation logically began to run no later than that
date. It is also uncontroverted that Chambers did not file his
claim until June 28, 1993, nearly six weeks after the three-year
statute of limitations had expired.
Finally, Chambers contends that Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-529
(Repl. 1996), which requires employers to file a report within 10
days of receipt of notice or of knowledge of injury to the Workers'
Compensation Commission, was violated by IP in this case, and as a
result, the Commission's decision was erroneous as a matter of law.
Chambers cites no authority for this contention, and although he
fails to explain how this alleged violation is applicable in his
case, this argument apparently has reference to IP's knowledge of
the 1985 and 1989 examination results. However, the law in
Arkansas is well settled that an employer's knowledge that certain
facts may exist that might or might not result in a claim does not
require the employer to recognize a claim before it is filed with
the Commission. See Garrett v. Sears, 43 Ark. App. 37, 858 S.W.2d 146 (1993). We thus hold that the Commission's decision is
supported by substantial evidence.
2. Constitutional Claims
Chambers also argues that the ruling of the Arkansas
Workers' Compensation Commission violates state and federal due
process, equal protection, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.
We do not reach these points because Chambers has failed to
include any portion of the arguments made on these issues before
the Commission or any portion of the Commission's order dealing
with these issues. In fact, there is no indication in Chambersþs
abstract that these issues were even raised to the Commission,
and we will not go to the record to determine whether reversible
error occurred. See Death & Perm. Total Disab. Fund v.
Whirlpool, 39 Ark. App. 62, 837 S.W.2d 293 (1992).
Affirmed.
Robbins, C.J., and Neal, J., agree.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
