STATE OF ARIZONA v ANN MAVINEE LEENHOUTS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA En Banc STATE OF ARIZONA, ) ) Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) ANN MAVINEE LEENHOUTS, ) ) Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) __________________________________) Arizona Supreme Court No. CR-07-0319-PR Court of Appeals Division Two No. 2 CA-CR 06-0280 Pima County Superior Court No. CR20043719 O P I N I O N Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County The Honorable Charles S. Sabalos, Judge REVERSED ________________________________________________________________ Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Division Two Filed Sept. 6, 2007 VACATED ________________________________________________________________ TERRY GODDARD, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL By Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section Joseph L. Parkhurst, Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for State of Arizona Phoenix Tucson Peter A. Kelly Palominas Attorney for Ann M. Leenhouts ________________________________________________________________ M c G R E G O R, Chief Justice ¶1 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.1 requires that a defendant not in custody be arraigned within 30 days after 1 the filing of thereafter. an indictment or as soon Ariz. R. Crim. P. 14.1(a), (b). as possible We must decide whether the superior court erred in ordering a trial to proceed on a supervening indictment on the same day that the defendant learned of the supervening indictment. We hold that the superior court erred in requiring the trial to proceed. I. ¶2 In 2003, Ann against her then-husband. Leenhouts began divorce proceedings In August 2004, the superior court granted the husband full custody of the couple s three children, but Leenhouts did not return the children to him. 2004, a Deputy United States Marshal located In September her children in Maryland and took Leenhouts into custody. and the Maryland authorities then released the children to the husband. ¶3 In October 2004, a grand jury indicted Leenhouts for custodial interference in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 13-1302.A.3 (2001) (subsection A.3), a class 6 felony. In December 2004, Leenhouts and released her the on her superior own court arraigned recognizance. The following October, the State obtained a supervening indictment charging Leenhouts with custodial interference in violation of both A.R.S. § 13-1302.A.1 (subsection A.1) and subsection A.3. Leenhouts was never arraigned on the supervening indictment. ¶4 Leenhouts and her counsel first saw the supervening 2 indictment on May 23, 2006, the first day set for trial. Leenhouts objected to proceeding on the supervening indictment, arguing that she had received insufficient notice of the new charge based on subsection A.1. Leenhouts also argued that the supervening indictment prejudiced her by depriving her of an absolute defense to the original charge based on subsection A.3. The court overruled Leenhouts s objection, and the proceeded on the charges in the supervening indictment. trial A jury ultimately found Leenhouts guilty. ¶5 Leenhouts appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering the trial to continue in violation of Rule 14.1. a memorandum decision, the court of appeals affirmed. concluded that the Leenhouts had relied detriment. record on was the devoid initial of any indictment In The court suggestion to her The court noted that because Leenhouts filed an extensive pretrial disclosure statement and prepared a necessity defense, the record indicated that she did not rely solely on her absolute defense to the charge of custodial interference under subsection A.3. Moreover, the court stated, Leenhouts failed to request a continuance.1 1 Leenhouts also made an argument based on the Sixth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. VI, which the court of appeals declined to address because she did not raise that argument until oral argument. Because we resolve this case on the basis of Rule 14.1, we do not address the Sixth Amendment argument. 3 ¶6 We granted Leenhouts s petition for review because it raises an issue of statewide importance. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5.3, of the Arizona Constitution and Rule 23(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. II. A. ¶7 was The State necessarily concedes that because Leenhouts never arraigned on the supervening indictment, proceedings did not comply with Rule 14.1. these The purpose of an arraignment under Rule 14 is formally to advise the defendant of [her] legal rights and of the charges against [her] and to begin the proceedings by assuring that counsel is provided and the date of trial set. State obtained the Ariz. R. Crim. P. 14 cmt. supervening indictment in Although the October 2005, Leenhouts was not served with the indictment or arraigned before the date set for trial the following May. ¶8 As the State recognized during oral argument, the record does not demonstrate any attempt by the State to fulfill its obligation indictment. demonstrate to The its serve State s attempts to Leenhouts failure serve with to her, the serve for supervening Leenhouts more than or seven months after it filed the supervening indictment, violated Rule 14.1. 4 B. ¶9 Rule 14.1 does not define the sanction to be imposed in the absence of a timely arraignment. See State v. Vassar, 111 Ariz. 487, 489, 533 P.2d 544, 546 (1975). There is nothing in be the rules which requires that failure to comply with [Rule 14.1]. the case dismissed for Absent such a sanction, it is necessary that actual prejudice be shown. Id. Prejudice exists if the failure to arraign a defendant deprives him or her of notice of the charges and thereby deprives the defendant of the opportunity to defend against those charges. See State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 631, 931 P.2d 1133, 1141 (App. 1996); State v. Dungan, 149 Ariz. 357, 362, 718 P.2d 1010, 1015 (App. 1985) ( [T]here is no prejudice if the defendant had full and fair notice of the crime charged, is not surprised, confused or prejudiced in his defense, and is afforded a full and fair opportunity to defend the charge against him. ). ¶10 The original indictment charged Leenhouts only with custodial interference in violation of subsection A.3, which applies when a person who is one of two persons who have joint legal custody of a child takes, entices or withholds from physical custody the child from the other custodian, knowing or having reason to know that the person has no legal right to do so. interference A.R.S. in § 13-1302.A.3. violation of To subsection 5 establish A.3, custodial therefore, the State needed to show that Leenhouts was one of two persons who had joint legal custody of the children. But because the court had granted the husband full custody of the children, Leenhouts did not share joint legal custody, and the State simply could not establish the charge s joint legal custody requirement. ¶11 Perhaps aware of its inability to prove the original charge, the State obtained a supervening indictment. The indictment added a charge of custodial interference in violation of subsection A.1. A person violates subsection A.1 when the person, knowing or having reason to know that the person has no legal right to do so . . . [t]akes, entices or keeps from lawful custody any child, or any person who is incompetent, and who is entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution. A.R.S. § 13-1302.A.1. Leenhouts s argument before the trial judge on the first day of trial makes clear that she and her counsel lacked notice of the supervening indictment s new custodial interference charge, alleged under subsection A.1. ¶12 to There can be little question that the State s failure provide notice of the new charge indictment prejudiced Leenhouts s defense. in the supervening She and her counsel arrived for trial knowing that the State could not show the joint legal subsection custody A.3. required The new to obtain charge, in a conviction contrast, under alleged a violation to which Leenhouts s absolute defense did not apply. 6 The lack of notice clearly prejudiced Leenhouts. ¶13 The State argues that the Rule 14.1 violation did not deprive Leenhouts of notice of the charges against her because the supervening indictment did not change the nature of the charge in the original indictment. Cf. State v. Van Vliet, 108 Ariz. 162, 164, 494 P.2d 34, 36 (1972) (stating that a new arraignment is generally unnecessary if an amended indictment does not change the nature of the offense). Subsections A.1 and A.3, however, define distinct statutory offenses with distinct elements. The State itself apparently regarded the charges as sufficiently different to require that it obtain a superseding indictment rather than merely amend the original indictment pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5. Because the elements required to prove a violation of subsection A.1 differ from those required to prove a violation of subsection A.3, the original and supervening indictments do not allege the same charge. ¶14 The legislative history of A.R.S. § 13-1302 buttresses our conclusion. Pursuant to a statutory amendment in 1997, the legislature adopted a new version of A.R.S. § 13-1302.A. Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 270, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.). The previous version simply stated: A person commits custodial interference if, knowing or having reason to know that he has no legal right to do so, such person knowingly takes, entices or keeps from 7 1997 lawful custody any child who is less than eighteen years of age or incompetent and who is entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution. 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 364, § 1 (2d Reg. Sess.). The previous version did not clearly encompass situations in which one custodial parent deprived physical custody of a child. 2248, 43d Leg. legislative (Sen.), amendment another custodial parent of Final Revised Fact Sheet for H.B. 1st Reg. sought to Sess. (1997). rectify these The types 1997 of situations by increasing the scope of actions which come under custodial interference, and redefined custodial interference to include situations involving joint legal custodians. Id. The 1997 amendment renumbered A.R.S. § 13-1302.A as subsection A.1 and added subsection A.3. ¶15 This history indicates that the legislature, in creating subsections A.1 and A.3, intended to define distinct custodial interference violations. as the decline State to urges treat renders the 1997 Viewing the two subsections subsection amendment A.3 as superfluous. an We inconsequential legislative act and conclude that the State s addition of a subsection A.1 charge changed the nature of the charges against Leenhouts. III. ¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of 8 the court of appeals. We reverse the conviction and remand the matter to the superior court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. _______________________________________ Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice CONCURRING: _______________________________________ Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice _______________________________________ Michael D. Ryan, Justice _______________________________________ Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice _______________________________________ W. Scott Bales, Justice 9
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
