ARIANA R. v. DCS and A.H.
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IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO ARIANA R., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY AND A.H., Appellees. No. 2 CA-JV 2021-0097 Filed April 1, 2022 THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. NOT FOR PUBLICATION See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County No. S1100JD201800161 The Honorable DeLana J. Fuller, Judge Pro Tempore AFFIRMED COUNSEL Katherine A. Winkley, Maricopa Counsel for Appellant Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By Autumn Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety Hill Law AZ PLLC, Mesa By Jennifer D. Hill Counsel for Minor ARIANA R. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Vice Chief Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Judge Brearcliffe concurred. S T A R I N G, Vice Chief Judge: ¶1 Ariana R. appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, A.H., born June 2018, on the ground of time in care under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). We affirm. ¶2 To sever a parent’s rights, the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence establishing at least one statutory ground for termination and a preponderance of the evidence that terminating the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶¶ 32, 41 (2005); see also A.R.S. § 8-863(B). We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal; rather, we defer to the juvenile court with respect to its factual findings because it “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶¶ 4, 14 (App. 2004). We will affirm the order if the findings upon which it is based are supported by reasonable evidence. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We view that evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, ¶ 12 (App. 2007). ¶3 A.H. was removed from Ariana’s care shortly after her birth and found dependent as to Ariana and A.H.’s father, C.H., primarily due to issues stemming from C.H.’s schizoaffective disorder, for which he has refused necessary medication. Unmedicated, C.H. could experience serious symptoms, which could include delusional beliefs with a risk of harming others. The primary issue throughout the dependency was Ariana’s unwillingness to accept C.H.’s diagnosis and treatment needs or to take steps to protect A.H. Ariana instead believed C.H. suffered from substance-induced psychosis and did not need medication. ¶4 The Department of Child Safety (DCS) moved to terminate Ariana’s and C.H.’s parental rights in December 2020. It alleged as to C.H. that termination was warranted on mental health and time-in-care grounds, and as to Ariana that termination was warranted based on time in care 2 ARIANA R. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Decision of the Court under § 8-533(B)(8)(c). After a contested hearing, the juvenile court terminated both parents’ rights, finding that DCS had proven all grounds alleged and that termination was in A.H.’s best interests. This appeal followed.1 ¶5 Ariana first challenges the juvenile court’s finding that termination was warranted on the ground of time in care. To show severance was warranted under § 8-533(B)(8)(c), DCS was required to show A.H. had been in court-ordered, out-of-home placement for at least fifteen months and “the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.” ¶6 Ariana recognizes that termination of her rights centered on C.H.’s mental illness. She asserts, however, that her rejection of his diagnosis—and her related failure to take steps DCS believed necessary to protect her child—is “understandable” because she had “researched the diagnosis on her own” and believed he had been “function[ing] normally . . . without medication,” and she claims “[n]o one else observed any symptoms either.” She further asserts that the evidence shows she “understood her additional responsibilities in insuring that [A.H.] would be safe at all times and she developed a safety plan with her counselor.”2 ¶7 But Ariana’s argument ignores contrary evidence in the record and disregards the juvenile court’s authority to weigh that evidence. See Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4. The court could conclude that her failure to accept C.H.’s diagnosis illustrates that she neither understood the risks of C.H.’s condition nor how to protect A.H. from those risks. Additionally, there was evidence that C.H. continued to show symptoms and that his 1C.H. is not a party to this appeal. Ariana also asserts DCS refused to transition A.H. “into reunification” and “created the circumstances” leading to A.H. being in care longer than fifteen months because it did not monitor the case properly or provide adequate visitation. Insofar as Ariana suggests DCS therefore failed to provide sufficient reunification services, she does not develop this argument and we thus decline to address it. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, n.6 (App. 2011) (failure to develop argument on appeal results in abandonment and waiver of issue). 2 3 ARIANA R. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Decision of the Court condition could remain relatively minor, even asymptomatic, for long periods. ¶8 Ariana’s conduct reflects her lack of understanding of the risks posed by C.H.’s condition. For example, her “safety plan” consisted only of waiting until C.H.’s symptoms became severe and then “probably” seeking emergency assistance. Ariana disregarded her counselor’s advice that, to adequately protect A.H., she should keep the child away from C.H. if he was not going take his medication. She believed C.H. was not a danger to her. Additionally, she purchased a pistol for C.H. to carry despite him being prohibited from possessing a firearm. And, although Ariana claimed she had separated from C.H., the evidence suggests she did not do so, and she testified at the hearing that she and C.H. had conceived another child. She further testified that additional counseling would not change her views about C.H.’s condition or the risks involved. The record amply supports the court’s conclusion that termination was warranted under § 8-533(B)(8)(c). ¶9 Ariana next asserts that the juvenile court erred by concluding termination is in A.H.’s best interests. Termination “is in the child’s best interests if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, ¶ 13 (2018). The primary consideration is the child’s stability and security. Id. ¶ 12. ¶10 Ariana argues the juvenile court ignored her “good parenting skills” and asserts termination is not in A.H.’s best interests because it will prevent her from knowing her sibling, with whom Ariana was pregnant at the time of the hearing. But Ariana has not identified any authority suggesting those factors preclude a finding that termination is in A.H.’s best interests. A.H. is bonded with her foster family,3 which intends to adopt her and wants to help A.H. retain a relationship with her parents. This is adequate to support the court’s finding that termination is in A.H.’s best interests. See Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, ¶ 1 (2016) (“[A] proposed adoption benefits the child and supports a finding that severance is in the child’s best interests.”). 3Ariana complains that A.H.’s close bond with her foster family “is not [her] fault.” Even were that true, she has not explained why it is relevant to a best-interests finding. 4 ARIANA R. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Decision of the Court ¶11 We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Ariana’s parental rights to A.H. 5
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