MELLISSE WELDON BRYDGES v. DAVID LANFOR
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IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO MELLISSE WELDON BRYDGES, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. DAVID LANFOR, Defendant/Appellant. No. 2 CA-CV 2017-0085 Filed October 11, 2017 THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. NOT FOR PUBLICATION See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. C20170957 The Honorable Sarah R. Simmons, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL Stephen J. Gonzalez, Tucson Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee David Lanfor, Tucson In Propria Persona BRYDGES v. LANFOR Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Eppich concurred. E C K E R S T R O M, Chief Judge: ¶1 David Lanfor appeals from the trial court’s grant of an injunction against harassment in favor of Melisse Brydges. For the following reasons, we affirm. Injunction Against Harassment ¶2 We review a trial court’s grant of an injunction against harassment for an abuse of discretion. See LaFaro v. Cahill, 203 Ariz. 482, ¶ 10, 56 P.3d 56, 59 (App. 2002). Lanfor claims the trial court abused its discretion because it erred in finding that his actions constituted harassment. He claims the grounds were insufficient because he only sent “a few emails . . . months before the filing of the Petition for the [injunction].” ¶3 Section 12-1809, A.R.S., defines “harassment” as “a series of acts over any period of time.” This court has concluded that a “series” may constitute as few as two acts. LaFaro, 203 Ariz. 482, ¶ 14, 56 P.3d at 60. As to Lanfor’s contention that the messages were too remote, the only time limit placed by the statute is that the harassment must have occurred “during the year preceding the filing of the petition.” A.R.S. § 12-1809(E). Lanfor has not demonstrated that the court abused its discretion in granting the injunction against harassment. Attorney Fees ¶4 Brydges has requested her costs and attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-1809(O), 12-341, and 12-349. In our discretion, we award her costs and attorney fees, pending compliance with Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 2 BRYDGES v. LANFOR Decision of the Court Disposition ¶5 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of the injunction against harassment, and we grant Brydges’s costs and attorney fees on appeal. 3
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