State v. Estrada

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appellee, v. NATALIE VELARDE ESTRADA, Appellant. 1 CA-CR 09-0688 DIVISION ONE FILED: 10-14-2010 RUTH WILLINGHAM, ACTING CLERK BY: GH DEPARTMENT A MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication Rule 111, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CR2008-006642-004 DT The Honorable Paul J. McMurdie, Judge AFFIRMED Terry Goddard, Attorney General by Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section and Craig W. Soland, Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for Appellee Phoenix The Law Offices of Mark L. Williams by Mark L. Williams Attorneys for Appellant Nogales K E S S L E R, Presiding Judge ¶1 conspiracy Natalie Velarde Estrada appeals her convictions for to commit possession of marijuana for sale, transportation of marijuana, and possession of marijuana for sale. ¶2 A grand jury indicted Estrada and nine others on the charges arising from their various roles between December 8 and 12, 2008 in a conspiracy to transport several hundred pounds of marijuana from Organ Pipe National Park near the Mexican border to Maricopa County for sale. The evidence at the joint trial of Estrada with co-defendant Judith Rodriguez, viewed in the light most favourable to sustaining the convictions, 1 showed that on December 12, 2008, marijuana in bales trailers the two police in discovered secret hundreds compartments defendants, their of of boyfriends, pounds of white cargo and their children had hauled behind two separate recreational vehicles ( RVs ) rented from Cruise America. more pounds of marijuana in bales Police discovered hundreds in an identical secret compartment of a white cargo trailer hauled by another defendant and his family in a privately-owned RV from Organ Pipe on the same date. ¶3 An inoperable off-road vehicle occupied each of the non-secret compartments of the white cargo trailers. The trailers reeked of gasoline, which police believed was designed to disguise the smell of marijuana. 1 The five hundred twenty- State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 435 n.1, 94 P.3d 1119, 1130 n.1 (2004) (citation omitted). 2 eight pounds of marijuana found in the trailer Estrada s family was valued at about $260,000. thirty pounds Rodriguez s of family marijuana was found valued at in the about hauled by The four hundred trailer $215,000. hauled The by four hundred sixty-seven pounds of marijuana found in the trailer hauled behind the privately-owned RV was valued at about $230,000. ¶4 Police had attached a GPS tracker to an RV rented at Cruise America s Surprise location by two suspected traffickers on December 8, 2008, and another GPS tracker on a privately owned RV that police also suspected was used in this drug trafficking conspiracy. They also conducted surveillance on the RV rented at Cruise America s Tucson location by Maria Velarde, for which Estrada agreed per the rental agreement to be the authorized driver. ¶5 Police concluded that the RVs made two trips to Organ Pipe near the Mexican border and then back to Maricopa County twice in three days. The RVs changed white cargo trailers before and after the trips in parking lots of local businesses. A blue Dodge pickup truck transported the white cargo trailers from the parking lots to houses that police believed were used to unload and store the marijuana bales prior to distribution. The same truck transported empty trailers to where the RVs were parked to hook them up for the return trips to Organ Pipe. 3 Estrada sat inside the RV when unidentified persons hooked the white cargo trailer to the RV occupied by her family before it left for Organ Pipe on December 11, 2008. ¶6 Estrada told police after she was arrested that she figured they were transporting something illegal, because they would just go to . . . the locations they were going to, sleep, and then immediately come back, but she did not know that it was marijuana. She said she did not leave the RV when they arrived at their destination, but heard other people outside. She said her role was to rent the RV, because she was the one who had the driver s license. She told the officer that other people paid the bill for the credit card she used to pay to rent the RV, as well as several personal bills of hers. She told the officer she did not know the identity of the persons who paid her bills. ¶7 The jury convicted Estrada of conspiracy to commit possession of marijuana for sale, sale or transportation of more than two pounds of marijuana, and possession of more than four pounds of marijuana for sale. The judge imposed concurrent terms of four years on each count. Estrada timely appealed. Denial of Motion for New Trial ¶8 Estrada contends that the judge erroneously denied her motion for new trial. The motion contended that the judge erred in his response to a jury question on whether Estrada had to 4 know that the substance in the trailer was marijuana for a conviction of the crime of sale or transportation of marijuana. She argued this error improperly coerced the jury into convicting her. ¶9 the During deliberations, the jury forwarded to the judge following questions regarding Count Two, sale or transportation of more than two pounds of marijuana: Did the defendants have to know they were, in fact, transporting marijuana [] in order to convict on Count 2, not just transporting something illegal? * * * In Count No. 2, can the defendants be considered either defendants or accomplices, i.e., could Judith and Natalie be guilty if their boyfriends knew, but they did not know? Count No. 2, bottom of. [sic] Estrada asked the judge to respond to the first question by simply saying yes, or instructions as a whole. by referring the jurors to the Over Estrada s objection, the judge determined to respond to the first question by referring the jurors to the standard instructions he had already given on the elements of the offense of transportation or sale of marijuana and the effect of ignorance or mistake on criminal liability. With respect to the second question, Estrada again asked the judge to refer the jury to the instructions as a whole rather than singling out any instruction. 5 Over Estrada s objection, the judge referring determined the to jurors respond to the to the standard instruction that he had already given. second question accomplice by liability The judge provided the responses to the jury in the absence of the attorneys. The record does not contain an instrument memorializing the judge s response to the jury. The judge informed counsel during the argument on Estrada s motion for new trial, however, that he had done exactly what he had told them he would do, which was to refer the jurors to the instructions he had singled out as the direct response to their questions. ¶10 Within an hour, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. Estrada subsequently filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the judge had improperly responded to the juror questions by singling out these instructions and failing to also refer the jury to the final instructions on knowingly, mere presence, and reasonable doubt. She argued that the judge should conduct an evidentiary hearing and grant a new trial because a post-verdict interview revealed that one juror had been a hold out and had changed his mind only after misunderstanding the governing law from the judge s response to the jury s question. ¶11 The judge denied the motion for new trial. We review a trial court s decision denying a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. State v. Melcher, 15 Ariz. App. 157, 158 n.1, 487 P.2d 3, 4 n.1 (1971) (citation 6 omitted). We review a trial court s response to a jury question for abuse of discretion. State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 126, 871 P.2d 237, 247 (1994) (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 22.3). review the legal adequacy of an instruction de novo. We State v. Martinez, 218 Ariz. 421, 432, ¶ 49, 189 P.3d 348, 359 (2008) (citation omitted). We will not reverse unless we can reasonably find that the instructions, when taken as a whole, would mislead the jurors. ¶ 33, 66 P.3d 59, 69 State v. Sucharew, 205 Ariz. 16, 26, (App. 2003) (citation and internal quotations omitted). ¶12 We find no abuse of discretion either in the judge s responses to the jury questions or his denial of a motion for new trial. The instructions that the judge singled out were responsive to the jury s questions. The jury asked whether the State must prove that the defendants knew the substance being transported was marijuana and whether it was sufficient for the defendants boyfriends to know that the substance was marijuana. The judge referred the jury to the standard instructions he had already given on the elements of the offense, mistake of fact, and accomplice liability. The judge did not abuse discretion in referring the jury to these instructions. his See Ramirez, 178 Ariz. at 126, 871 P.2d at 247 ( Thus, [w]hen a jury asks a judge about a matter on which it has received adequate instruction, the judge may in his or her discretion 7 refuse to answer or may refer the jury to the earlier elements of the offense instruction. ) (citation omitted). ¶13 The instruction on the included the mens rea that the defendant or an accomplice had knowingly transported marijuana. Had the jury not understood what knowingly meant, it could have specifically asked that question. meaning It did not. of questions, If the jury became uncertain about the knowingly it could defining knowingly . after also the have judge referred responded to the to its instruction The mistake of fact instruction tracked the language of the statute and specifically instructed the jury that ignorance of fact does not relieve a person of criminal liability unless it negates the culpable mental state. A.R.S. § 13-204(A)(1) and (B) (2010). See The accomplice liability instruction accurately incorporated the language of A.R.S. § 13301 (2010). Neither the mere presence instruction nor the reasonable doubt instruction was responsive to the questions asked. ¶14 We also reject Estrada s argument that the judge s reference to these specific instructions coerced the jury in a manner more extreme than the overt pressuring of the holdout jurors in Huerstel and Lautzenheiser. when the totality trial of court s the actions circumstances, 8 or Jury coercion exists remarks, displaced viewed the in the independent judgment of the jurors, or when the trial judge encourages a deadlocked jury to reach a verdict. State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 213, ¶ 94, 84 P.3d 456, 478 (2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The judge did not impermissibly single out a lone hold out juror and suggest he reconsider his position to allow the jury to reach a verdict, conduct that our supreme court cited as reversible error in State v. Huerstel, 206 Ariz. 93, 101, ¶ 25, 75 P.3d 698, 706 (2003), and in State v. Lautzenheiser, 180 Ariz. 7, 8-11, 881 P.2d 339, 340-43 (1994). Estrada interviewed the jurors after they reached a verdict and concluded from one juror s comments that this juror had been a hold out juror and had changed his mind only after misunderstanding the governing law from the judge s response to the jury s question. ¶15 The judge appropriately denied Estrada an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the juror had in fact changed his mind based on a misunderstanding of the judge s instruction and denied Estrada s motion for new trial on this basis. A court may not inquire into the deliberative processes of a juror. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(d) ( No testimony or affidavit shall be received which inquires into the subjective motives or mental processes which verdict. ). Nor led has a juror to or dissent persuaded Estrada assent us that from the the judge s reference to specific instructions he had previously given that 9 were specifically responsive to the jury s questions displaced the independent judgment of the jurors. at 213, ¶ 94, 84 P.3d at 478. Estrada s argument that the See Davolt, 207 Ariz. We accordingly find no merit in judge s responses to the jury questions coerced the jury. ¶16 We similarly reject Estrada s argument for the first time on appeal that, in the absence of any record of precisely what the judge told the jury, he might have coerced the jury by the manner in which he conveyed to them the responses to their questions. 2 A trial judge may not communicate with a deliberating jury unless the parties have been notified and have an opportunity to be present. State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 368, ¶ 86, 207 P.3d 604, 621 (2009); State v. Shumway, 137 Ariz. 585, 587, 672 P.2d 929, 931 (1983). In this case, however, the parties were notified of the jury question, were present in court to discuss the appropriate response, and, insofar as the record reveals, were not expressly denied an opportunity to be present when the judge gave the response. ¶17 We decline to reverse on this basis because the record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the absence of counsel during the judge s repetition of a prior instruction was not prejudicial. See State v. Freeney, 223 Ariz. 110, 114, ¶ 26, 2 Although it is not reversible in this case, the better practice is to include the court s response to the jury question in the record to facilitate appellate review. 10 219 P.3d 1039, 1043 (App. 2009); Dann, 220 Ariz. at 368, ¶ 86, 207 P.3d at 621. The judge told the attorneys that he would simply jurors refer the to the instructions that he had determined were appropriate responses to their questions and he reiterated that he had done exactly that at the hearing on Estrada s motion for new trial. the instructions questions. were an As we have concluded, supra, appropriate response to the jury s The instructions were legally correct, and Estrada has not argued otherwise. On this record, the judge s failure to provide the response in the presence of Estrada and the attorneys was not reversible error. See Dann, 220 Ariz. at 368, ¶ Dann 87, 207 P.3d at 621 ( Because and counsel were not notified of the jurors' request, the judge's communication was error. The communication did not cause Dann prejudice, however, because the court's answer to the jury question was legally correct and appropriate. ). inserted inappropriate Estrada s argument that the judge comments in his response to the jury relies on sheer speculation, contrary to what the judge informed the parties he did. Speculation is insufficient to establish the requisite prejudice. See State v. Munninger, 213 Ariz. 393, 397, ¶ 14, 142 P.3d 701, 705 (App. 2006). on this basis. 11 We decline to reverse Sufficiency of Evidence ¶18 Estrada also argues that the judge abused his discretion by denying her a directed verdict. Estrada contended the to admissible evidence was insufficient support her convictions because it failed to demonstrate that she knew that there was marijuana in the trailer, had agreed to assist in its transport by renting the RV, or possessed the marijuana. specifically argues that the judge abused his She discretion in admitting a late-disclosed copy of the Cruise America rental agreement signed by Estrada and including a copy of her driver s license and her responses to post-arrest police questions which were vague and ambiguous as to time and scope. She contended the answers were not relevant, were unfairly prejudicial, lacked foundation, and may have related to prior acts. 3 ¶19 In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we view the facts in verdict, the and defendant. 1307 light most favorable to upholding all conflicts in the resolve the evidence jury's against State v. Girdler, 138 Ariz. 482, 488, 675 P.2d 1301, (1983). Credibility finder, not this court. determinations are for the fact See State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 21, 3 Estrada also argued below in part that the statements lacked foundation because the officer who questioned her in Spanish and testified at trial to her answers had not been certified by the Glendale Police Department as a Spanish translator. By not specifically arguing this issue on appeal she has abandoned and waived it, and we do not consider it. See State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175, 771 P.2d 1382, 1390 (1989). 12 926 P.2d 468, 488 (1996). There is, of course, no distinction between the evidence. probative value of direct and circumstantial State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 560 n.1, 858 P.2d 1152, 1163 n.1 (1993). Reversible error based on insufficiency of the evidence occurs only where there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction. State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200, 928 P.2d 610, 624 (1996) (citation omitted). To set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury. State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484, 486 (1987). ¶20 Estrada argues that the evidence failed to demonstrate that she knew that there was marijuana in the trailer, had agreed to assist in its possessed the marijuana. transport by renting the RV, or The State was required to prove that Estrada knew that the trailer she and her boyfriend were hauling contained marijuana. -1003(A)(2010); See A.R.S. §§ 13-3405(A)(2), (4) (2010), & State v. Fierro, 220 Ariz. 337, 339, ¶ 5, 206 P.3d 786, 788 (App. 2009). The knowledge necessary to support these established convictions can circumstantial evidence. be either by direct or State v. Diaz, 166 Ariz. 442, 445, 803 P.2d 435, 438 (App. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds, 168 Ariz. 363, 813 P.2d 728 (1991). 13 It can be established by showing that appellant was aware of the high probability that the packages contained [marijuana] and that [s]he acted with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the true contents of the packages. Id. (citation omitted); see also Fierro, 220 Ariz. at 339, ¶¶ 5-9, 206 P.3d at 788 (finding no error in instruction on deliberate ignorance and accordingly affirming conviction of defendant who admitted that he knew there were drugs in the bed of the truck, but claimed he did not know what type of drugs he was transporting ). Similarly, [c]riminal conspiracy need not be, and usually cannot be, proved by direct evidence. common scheme evidence. or plan may Arredondo, 155 be inferred Ariz. at 317, from 746 The circumstantial P.2d at 487. Finally, it is not necessary with respect to the element of knowing possession to show that any one person had exclusive or actual possession of the drugs at issue; it is sufficient that the drugs were found in a place under a person s dominion or control and under circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred that the defendant existence of the [drugs]. 9-10, 155 P.3d 357, 359 had actual knowledge of the State v. Cox, 214 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶¶ (App. 2007) (citation and internal quotations omitted), aff d, 217 Ariz. 353, 358, 174 P.3d 265, 270 (2007); see also State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 27-28, ¶ 41, 170 P.3d 266, 276-77 (App. 2007). ¶21 Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in 14 the light most favorable to supporting the verdict, we find that the State offered sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Estrada s convictions. 2008, in an RV that Estrada was arrested on December 12, was pulling a trailer in which police discovered more than five hundred pounds of marijuana hidden in a secret trailer compartment reeked marijuana. of behind an gasoline inoperable used to sand mask the buggy. smell The of the Estrada admitted to the officer immediately after her arrest that her role in the operation was to agree to be the authorized driver for the RV when it was rented because she was the one with the driver s license. She admitted that unidentified persons paid the bill for the RV rental and other bills of hers. She admitted that she knew that she and her boyfriend were transporting something illegal because they drove to a location, stayed a few hours, and drove back. Police observed her sitting in the RV when the men hooked up the white cargo trailer with the secret compartment to the RV prior to one of those trips south to pick up the marijuana near the Mexican border. Police observed a blue Dodge pickup truck bringing the white cargo trailer for hookup. The same truck had performed the same operation with the other two RVs with identical white cargo trailers National Park that and had back made to similar Maricopa pounds of marijuana. 15 trips County to with Organ Pipe hundreds of ¶22 The State offered sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that Estrada had conspired with her boyfriend and the person who paid to rent the RV to commit the charged offenses. The State presented evidence that she had been an accomplice in the charged offenses by acting as the authorized driver for the RV and accompanying her young son and boyfriend on the overnight trips to bring back the marijuana hidden in compartment of the trailer hauled behind the RV. the secret It was for the jury, not this Court, to evaluate the credibility of her denials to police that she specifically knew the illegal substance was marijuana in light of her admission that she knew they were hauling something illegal in the trailer. Ariz. at 21, 926 P.2d at 488. See Dickens, 187 On this record, we find the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict her of the charged crimes. ¶23 Estrada additionally argues that the evidence would not have been sufficient had the judge not erred in admitting her post-arrest statements, which she argued below should have been excluded in their entirety because the officer did not pinpoint the time period he was asking her about. The judge overruled Estrada s objections, because the absence of reference to specific dates goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the statement. wasn t making However, Estrada was free to argue that she reference to the 16 crimes charged. The judge further advised her counsel, If there s a specific statement you re objecting to where she clearly is referring to something else, bring it my attention, but the fact that it s ambiguous means it goes to the jury, and the jurors determine what it is, in fact, she subsequently interview, is describing. testified which had to been the The interviewing content conducted in of the Spanish at officer videotaped Estrada s request, and was not shown to the jury. ¶24 We find no merit in Estrada s argument that her statements should have been precluded because, in the absence of reference to specific dates, she may have been referring to other offenses for which she was not on trial. Because Estrada cites no legal authority for her argument that her post-arrest statements were inadmissible on this basis, she has arguably abandoned and waived it. at 1390. See Carver, 160 Ariz. at 175, 771 P.2d In any case, we find the argument has no merit. The officer asked Estrada questions about her role in transporting marijuana for sale immediately after she was arrested in an RV hauling more than five hundred pounds of marijuana. It is reasonable to conclude that her responses related to the conduct for which she was caught. Moreover, to any extent that she may have been referring to prior conduct, the conduct was relevant to show her knowledge of the illegal activity in which she was involved, a key issue at trial. 17 Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). We accordingly find no abuse of discretion in the judge s admission of her statements at trial over Estrada s objections as to vagueness of the time period discussed. 4 ¶25 Finally, she argues that the evidence would not have been sufficient had the judge not erred in untimely disclosed, signed rental agreement. admitting the The judge allowed the late-disclosed document to be admitted on the condition that the State would reinstate a plea offer made before trial. court reasoned that its admission would not cause The Estrada significant prejudice because the information contained in the disclosed document clearly is consistent with the information contained in the document that was disclosed last week. We review a trial court s imposition of sanctions for discovery violations for abuse of discretion. State v. Lee, 185 Ariz. 549, 555-56, 917 P.2d 692, 698-99 (1996). We will not find an abuse of discretion in a discovery ruling unless a defendant shows that nondisclosure. he suffered prejudice as a result of the State v. Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. 441, 448, 702 P.2d 670, 677 (1985). Finally, we will not find that a 4 We also reject Estrada s claim that the judge abused his discretion in overruling her hearsay objection to the officer s testimony that he asked Estrada whether it was true, as another person had told him, that she knew they were transporting marijuana. The statement embedded in the question was not offered for the proof of the matter asserted, but rather to elicit her response. It accordingly was not hearsay. Ariz. R. Evid. 801. 18 trial court judge has would have circumstances. 40, 93 P.3d abused its discretion reached the unless same no result reasonable under the State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345, 353-54, ¶ 1061, 1069-70 (2004) (citation and internal quotation omitted). ¶26 We find no such abuse of the court s considerable discretion in imposing this sanction for the State s discovery violations. The prosecutor explained that she had previously disclosed a America, and plethora had not of known documents of the obtained existence of from Cruise the signed agreement until it came to light during defense counsel s recent interview of Cruise America s custodian of records. The judge s finding that the late-disclosed document did not cause Estrada significant prejudice because it was similar to a previouslydisclosed document is supported by the record. The record shows that the unsigned agreement differed from the late-disclosed document admitted at trial only by virtue of the absence of Estrada s signature and a copy of her driver s license. The record shows that the previously disclosed document contained Estrada s driver s license information, a cell phone number, an address, and a date of birth. 5 In light of the prior disclosure 5 Estrada has failed to ensure that a copy of the previouslydisclosed document, marked Ex. # 122, is in the record on appeal. We accordingly refer to the discussion in the record as to the difference between the late-disclosed document, Ex. # 19 of a rental agreement, we agreement decline similar to find to the that late-disclosed the judge rental abused his discretion in admitting it contingent on the reinstatement of the pre-trial plea offer. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. at 353-54, ¶ 40, 93 P.3d at 1069-70. Conclusion ¶27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Estrada s convictions and sentences. /s/ DONN KESSLER, Presiding Judge CONCURRING: /s/ DANIEL A. BARKER, Judge /s/ JON W. THOMPSON, Judge 163, and the previously disclosed document, Ex. # 122. 20

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.