Ankrom v. Alabama

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Justia Opinion Summary

Petitioners Hope Ankrom and Amanda Kimbrough each petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' decisions in their respective cases. The Court granted their petitions and consolidated the cases because both presented the same issue of first impression for the Court's consideration: whether the term "child" as used in section 26-15-3.2, Ala. Code 1975 (the chemical endangerment statute), included an unborn child. The appellate court concluded that it did, and the Supreme Court agreed. The Court of Criminal Appeals judgments was affirmed in both cases.

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Rel: 01/11/2013 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 1110176 Ex p a r t e Hope E l i s a b e t h Ankrom PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In r e : Hope E l i s a b e t h Ankrom v. S t a t e o f Alabama) (Coffee C i r c u i t Court, CC-09-395; Court o f C r i m i n a l Appeals, CR-09-1148) 1110219 Ex p a r t e Amanda H e l a i n e Borden Kimbrough PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In r e : Amanda H e l a i n e Borden Kimbrough v. S t a t e o f Alabama) ( C o l b e r t C i r c u i t Court, CC-08-381; Court o f C r i m i n a l Appeals, CR-09-0485) PARKER, J u s t i c e . Hope E l i s a b e t h Ankrom a n d Amanda H e l a i n e B o r d e n K i m b r o u g h ("the p e t i t i o n e r s " ) e a c h p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t f o r a w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i t o review the Court o f C r i m i n a l Appeals' decisions in their these cases. cases, each impression We g r a n t e d of which for this Court's t h e p e t i t i o n s and c o n s o l i d a t e d p r e s e n t s t h e same i s s u e of f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n : Whether t h e term " c h i l d " as u s e d i n § 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1975 ("the c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e " ) , i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d . that i t does a n d t h a t the Court 2 Concluding of C r i m i n a l Appeals reached 1 1 1 0 1 7 6 ; 1110219 t h e c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n i n b o t h c a s e s , we a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t s o f the Court of C r i m i n a l I. Facts The Ankrom's Court Appeals. and P r o c e d u r a l of C r i m i n a l Appeals History recounted the facts c a s e as f o l l o w s i n i t s o p i n i o n : "At the g u i l t y - p l e a hearing, s t i p u l a t e d to the f o l l o w i n g f a c t s : the parties "'On J a n u a r y 31, 2009, t h e d e f e n d a n t , Hope Ankrom, gave b i r t h t o a s o n , [B.W.], at Medical Center E n t e r p r i s e . Medical records showed that [Ankrom] tested p o s i t i v e f o r cocaine p r i o r to g i v i n g b i r t h and t h a t t h e c h i l d t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r cocaine a f t e r b i r t h . " ' D e p a r t m e n t o f Human R e s o u r c e s w o r k e r A s h l e y A r n o l d became i n v o l v e d and d e v e l o p e d a plan f o r the care of the c h i l d . During the i n v e s t i g a t i o n [Ankrom] admitted to A s h l e y t h a t she h a d u s e d m a r i j u a n a w h i l e she was p r e g n a n t b u t d e n i e d u s i n g c o c a i n e . " ' M e d i c a l r e c o r d s f r o m h e r d o c t o r show that he documented a substance abuse problem s e v e r a l times during her pregnancy and she h a d t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r c o c a i n e and m a r i j u a n a on more t h a n one o c c a s i o n d u r i n g her pregnancy.' "On F e b r u a r y 18, 2009, Ankrom was a r r e s t e d a n d c h a r g e d w i t h c h e m i c a l endangerment o f a c h i l d . On A u g u s t 25, 2009, t h e g r a n d j u r y i n d i c t e d Ankrom. The indictment stated that Ankrom ' d i d knowingly, recklessly, or i n t e n t i o n a l l y cause or p e r m i t a c h i l d , t o - w i t : [B.W.], a b e t t e r d e s c r i p t i o n o f w h i c h i s t o t h e G r a n d J u r y o t h e r w i s e unknown, t o be 3 of 1 1 1 0 1 7 6 ; 1110219 e x p o s e d t o , t o i n g e s t o r i n h a l e , o r t o have c o n t a c t with a c o n t r o l l e d substance, chemical substance, or d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a a s d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-12-260 o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a , 1975, t o - w i t : C o c a i n e , i n v i o l a t i o n of Section [26-15-3.2(a)(l)].' "On S e p t e m b e r 25, 2009, Ankrom f i l e d a m o t i o n s t y l e d as a ' M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s I n d i c t m e n t . ' In that m o t i o n , a f t e r s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e f a c t s , Ankrom a r g u e d t h a t ' [ t ] h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f [§ 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , ] shows t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d f o r the s t a t u t e t o apply o n l y t o a c h i l d , n o t a f e t u s ' ; t h a t ' c o u r t s i n o t h e r s t a t e s w h i c h have e n a c t e d t h e same o r s i m i l a r c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e s have determined that s u c h s t a t u t e s do n o t a p p l y t o p r e n a t a l c o n d u c t t h a t a l l e g e d l y harms a f e t u s ' ; t h a t '[t]he state's contention that the defendant v i o l a t e d t h i s s t a t u t e renders the law impermissibly vague, and t h e r e f o r e t h e r u l e o f l e n i t y a p p l i e s ' ; t h a t ' [ t ] h e l e g i s l a t u r e has p r e v i o u s l y considered amending t h e s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e p r e n a t a l c o n d u c t t h a t harms a f e t u s , a n d d e c l i n e d t o do s o ' ; t h a t ' t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t been a c c o r d e d due p r o c e s s b e c a u s e t h e r e was no n o t i c e t h a t h e r c o n d u c t was i l l e g a l under t h i s s t a t u t e ' ; t h a t ' [ t ] h e p r o s e c u t i o n of pregnant women is a violation of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee o f E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n ' ; and that ' [ p ] r o s e c u t i o n of pregnant, a l l e g e d l y druga d d i c t e d women i s a g a i n s t p u b l i c p o l i c y f o r numerous m o r a l a n d e t h i c a l r e a s o n s . ' The S t a t e r e s p o n d e d t o t h a t m o t i o n on O c t o b e r 13, 2009. In the State's r e s p o n s e , i t a g r e e d t h a t on J a n u a r y 31, 2009, Ankrom gave b i r t h t o a s o n a n d t h a t m e d i c a l r e c o r d s showed t h a t Ankrom t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r c o c a i n e i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r t o g i v i n g b i r t h and t h a t t h e c h i l d t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r cocaine a f t e r b i r t h . B a s e d on t h a t c o n d u c t , t h e S t a t e a r g u e d t h a t p r o s e c u t i o n o f Ankrom was p r o p e r u n d e r § 2 6 - 1 5 - 3 . 2 , A l a . Code 1975. On O c t o b e r 15, 2009, t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d Ankrom's motion. 4 1110176; 1110219 "On A p r i l 1, 2010, Ankrom p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o a v i o l a t i o n o f § 2 6 - 1 5 - 3 . 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975." Ankrom v. S t a t e , (Ala. [Ms. CR-09-1148, Aug. 26, 2011] C r i m . App. 2 0 1 1 ) . years i n p r i s o n , So. 3d Ankrom was s e n t e n c e d b u t h e r s e n t e n c e was s u s p e n d e d p l a c e d on p r o b a t i o n f o r one y e a r . Ankrom, to three a n d she was So. 3d a t . I n i t s u n p u b l i s h e d memorandum i n K i m b r o u g h v . S t a t e (No. CR-09-0485, S e p t . 23, 2 0 1 1 ) , ___ So. 3d 2011) (table), the Court of Criminal ( A l a . C r i m . App. Appeals recounted the f a c t s o f K i m b r o u g h ' s c a s e as f o l l o w s : "In September 2008, Amanda H e l a i n e Borden K i m b r o u g h was i n d i c t e d f o r t h e c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t of a c h i l d t h a t r e s u l t e d i n death, a v i o l a t i o n of § 2 6 - 1 5 - 3 . 2 ( a ) ( 3 ) , A l a . Code 1975. The i n d i c t m e n t stated: "'The g r a n d j u r y o f s a i d c o u n t y c h a r g e that, before the f i n d i n g of theindictment, Amanda H e l a i n e B o r d e n K i m b r o u g h , whose name i s o t h e r w i s e unknown t o t h e G r a n d J u r y t h a n as s t a t e d , ... d i d k n o w i n g l y , r e c k l e s s l y , or i n t e n t i o n a l l y cause o r p e r m i t a c h i l d , Timmy Wayne K i m b r o u g h , t o be e x p o s e d t o , t o i n g e s t o r i n h a l e , o r t o have c o n t a c t w i t h a controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine, and the exposure, ingestion, i n h a l a t i o n , or contact r e s u l t e d i n t h e d e a t h o f Timmy Wayne K i m b r o u g h , i n v i o l a t i o n o f [§] 26-15-3.2 o f t h e Code o f Alabama [1975], a g a i n s t t h e peace and d i g n i t y of the State of Alabama.' 5 1110176; 1110219 "Kimbrough, t h r o u g h r e t a i n e d c o u n s e l , filed s e v e r a l p r e t r i a l motions, i n c l u d i n g four motions to d i s m i s s the i n d i c t m e n t . In her motions t o d i s m i s s , K i m b r o u g h a l l e g e d : (1) t h a t t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n § 26-15-3.2 d i d n o t i n c l u d e an u n b o r n c h i l d , and t h e r e f o r e , h e r c o n d u c t i n s m o k i n g methamphetamine w h i l e pregnant d i d not c o n s t i t u t e the o f f e n s e of the chemical endangerment of a child; (2) that prosecuting her for violating § 26-15-3.2 for c o n d u c t t h a t o c c u r r e d d u r i n g h e r p r e g n a n c y when, she says, t h a t conduct d i d not c o n s t i t u t e the o f f e n s e of chemical endangerment of a c h i l d , v i o l a t e d the doctrine of separation of powers; (3) that i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n § 26-15-3.2 t o i n c l u d e an u n b o r n c h i l d r e n d e r e d t h e s t a t u t e v o i d f o r v a g u e n e s s and v i o l a t e d h e r d u e - p r o c e s s r i g h t t o n o t i c e t h a t h e r c o n d u c t was p r o s c r i b e d ; and (4) t h a t i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n § 26-15-3.2 t o i n c l u d e an u n b o r n c h i l d v i o l a t e d h e r r i g h t t o e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n under the law. The t r i a l c o u r t denied t h e m o t i o n s w i t h o u t comment. "Kimbrough initially proceeded to trial; however, a f t e r the t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d her m o t i o n f o r a judgment of a c q u i t t a l at the c l o s e of the S t a t e ' s case, Kimbrough r e a c h e d a p l e a agreement w i t h the S t a t e , and t h e j u r y was d i s m i s s e d . Pursuant to the p l e a agreement, Kimbrough p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o the c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t o f a c h i l d as c h a r g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t , and t h e t r i a l c o u r t s e n t e n c e d h e r t o 10 y e a r s ' imprisonment. "Before e n t e r i n g her g u i l t y p l e a , Kimbrough's counsel expressly reserved Kimbrough's r i g h t to appeal s e v e r a l i s s u e s , namely: and " ' C o l b e r t County being improper j u r i s d i c t i o n . i m p r o p e r venue "'The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue with an u n b o r n c h i l d i s n o t c o v e r e d by [§ 26-15¬ 3.2, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 ] . 6 1110176; 1110219 "'The d e n i a l o f i n d i g e n c y s t a t u s on her b e h a l f f o r the purposes of expert witnesses. The p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h i s s t a t u t e shows t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d the s t a t u t e t o apply o n l y t o a c h i l d and n o t an u n b o r n c h i l d . T h i s s t a t u t e i s vague and impermissibly vague. And t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has d e c l i n e d t o pass a s t a t u t e t h a t w o u l d i n c l u d e an u n b o r n c h i l d i n t h i s type o f s i t u a t i o n . A n d t h a t [Kimbrough] has n o t been a f f o r d e d due p r o c e s s b e c a u s e t h e r e was no n o t i c e t o h e r t h a t t h e c o n d u c t was i l l e g a l u n d e r t h e s t a t u t e . "'The p r o s e c u t i o n o f p r e g n a n t women i s a v i o l a t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n [sic] of the g u a r a n t y o f e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n . And t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f a p r e g n a n t a d d i c t e d woman i s against public policy f o r e t h i c a l and morale [ s i c ] reasons. A n d [Kimbrough] i s not a r e [ s p o n s i b l e ] p e r s o n as d e f i n e d under the s t a t u t e . "'And anything else I objected to.' "The record reflects the following facts. S h o r t l y b e f o r e 10 a.m. on A p r i l 29, 2008, K i m b r o u g h was a d m i t t e d t o t h e H e l e n K e l l e r H o s p i t a l i n C o l b e r t County e x p e r i e n c i n g l a b o r p a i n s . She was 25 weeks and 5 d a y s p r e g n a n t a t t h e t i m e . Her o b s t e t r i c i a n , D r . F.C. G a p u l t o s , J r . , d i a g n o s e d h e r w i t h p r e t e r m l a b o r and ' o c c u l t c o r d p r o l a p s e , ' a c o n d i t i o n i n which t h e u m b i l i c a l cord descends through t h e b i r t h canal before the fetus, r e s u l t i n g i n the blood flow through the u m b i l i c a l cord being c u t o f f . Dr. Gapultos also ordered a urine drug screen on Kimbrough, which came back positive for methamphetamine. Both Dr. Gapultos and t h e biological father o f Kimbrough's unborn child c o n f r o n t e d h e r a b o u t u s i n g methamphetamine w h i l e 7 1110176; 1110219 pregnant, b u t Kimbrough denied u s i n g w h i l e she was p r e g n a n t . methamphetamine "A C a e s a r i a n s e c t i o n was p e r f o r m e d on K i m b r o u g h and, a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1:21 p.m., she d e l i v e r e d a baby b o y she named Timmy Wayne K i m b r o u g h ('Timmy'). Timmy was n o t b r e a t h i n g when he was b o r n ; he was b l u e ; a n d h i s h e a r t r a t e was l o w f o r a newborn i n f a n t , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 80 b e a t s p e r m i n u t e . P e d i a t r i c s t a f f who were p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e C a e s a r i a n s e c t i o n immediately began m a n u a l r e s u s c i t a t i o n e f f o r t s on Timmy. I n i t i a l l y , Timmy i m p r o v e d , w i t h h i s h e a r t r a t e r i s i n g above 100 b e a t s p e r m i n u t e a n d h i s c o l o r b e c o m i n g more p i n k i s h . Timmy was i n t u b a t e d a n d placed on a v e n t i l a t o r . However, after the i n t u b a t i o n , Timmy's c o n d i t i o n d e c l i n e d r a p i d l y a n d he d i e d a t 1:40 p.m., 19 m i n u t e s a f t e r he was b o r n . "The p e d i a t r i c i a n who t r e a t e d Timmy o p i n e d t h a t he h a d d i e d f r o m ' r e s p i r a t o r y a r r e s t s e c o n d a r y t o prematurity.' However, D r . E m i l y Ward, a m e d i c a l examiner w i t h t h e Alabama Department o f F o r e n s i c Sciences who performed an autopsy on Timmy, determined that Timmy had died from 'acute methamphetamine i n t o x i c a t i o n . ' A t o x i c o l o g y s c r e e n c o n d u c t e d on Timmy's b l o o d a n d a s a m p l e o f h i s l i v e r t i s s u e showed t h a t he h a d b o t h methamphetamine a n d amphetamine, a 'metabolite of methamphetamine' produced when the body 'converts' the methamphetamine i n t o amphetamine, i n h i s s y s t e m . "The Colbert County Department o f Human R e s o u r c e s ('DHR') was n o t i f i e d r e g a r d i n g K i m b r o u g h ' s t e s t i n g p o s i t i v e f o r methamphetamine a n d Timmy's death, and Kimbrough's o t h e r two c h i l d r e n w e r e t e m p o r a r i l y removed f r o m h e r home a n d p l a c e d w i t h K i m b r o u g h ' s m o t h e r . A DHR s o c i a l w o r k e r s p o k e w i t h Kimbrough r e g a r d i n g a s a f e t y p l a n f o r h e r c h i l d r e n on two occasions. During one of those conversations, Kimbrough admitted that she h a d smoked methamphetamine w i t h a f r i e n d t h r e e d a y s b e f o r e she h a d e x p e r i e n c e d l a b o r p a i n s . In J u l y 8 1110176; 1110219 2008, a f t e r h a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n w o u l d be s a f e i n K i m b r o u g h ' s home, DHR returned Kimbrough's c h i l d r e n t o h e r c u s t o d y . " K i m b r o u g h was s e n t e n c e d t o 10 y e a r s i n p r i s o n a n d a p p e a l e d h e r c o n v i c t i o n and sentence b e f o r e h e r s c h e d u l e d p r o b a t i o n could be h e l d ; however the record r e m a i n e d f r e e on b o n d d u r i n g indicates of Criminal Appeals. she h a s her appeal. Ankrom a n d K i m b r o u g h a p p e a l e d t h e i r Court that hearing convictions In i t s opinion to the i n Ankrom, that c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e word " c h i l d " i n t h e chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e i n c l u d e d an u n b o r n child: "Ankrom a l l e g e s t h a t t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n § 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1975, does n o t i n c l u d e a v i a b l e f e t u s . The S t a t e r e s p o n d s t h a t t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m ' c h i l d , ' as u s e d i n t h e s t a t u t e , i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d . " ' P r i n c i p l e s of statutory construction i n s t r u c t t h i s Court t o i n t e r p r e t the p l a i n language of a s t a t u t e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s a n d t o engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n only i f the language i n the s t a t u t e i s ambiguous.' Ex p a r t e P r a t t , 815 So. 2d 532, 535 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) . '[T]he fundamental r u l e [ i s ] that criminal statutes are construed strictly against the State.' Ex p a r t e Hyde, 778 So. 2d 237, 239 n.2 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) . 'The " r u l e o f l e n i t y r e q u i r e s t h a t 'ambiguous c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e [ s ] ... be c o n s t r u e d i n favor of the accused.'"' Ex p a r t e B e r t r a m , 884 So. 2d 889, 892 ( A l a . 2003) ( q u o t i n g C a s t i l l o v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 530 U.S. 120, 131, 120 S . C t . 2090, 147 L . E d . 2d 94 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ) . 9 1110176; 1110219 " ' A l t h o u g h p e n a l s t a t u t e s a r e t o be s t r i c t l y construed, c o u r t s are not r e q u i r e d t o abandon common s e n s e . U n i t e d S t a t e s v. G r e e n , 446 F.2d 1169, 1173 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 1 ) . A b s e n t any i n d i c a t i o n t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e words must be g i v e n t h e i r o r d i n a r y and normal meaning. Day v. S t a t e , 378 So. 2d 1156, 1158 (Ala. Cr. App.), r e v e r s e d on other grounds, 378 So. 2d 1159 (Ala. 1979).' " W a l k e r v. S t a t e , App. 1982) . 428 So. 2d 139, 141 (Ala. Crim. "The l e g i s l a t u r e has s t a t e d t h a t ' [ t ] h e p u b l i c p o l i c y of the S t a t e of Alabama i s t o p r o t e c t l i f e , born, and unborn. This is particularly true c o n c e r n i n g unborn l i f e t h a t i s capable of l i v i n g o u t s i d e t h e womb.' § 2 6 - 2 2 - 1 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975. C h a p t e r 15 o f T i t l e 26, A l a . Code 1975, does n o t d e f i n e the term ' c h i l d . ' However, C h a p t e r s 14 and 16 o f T i t l e 26, A l a . Code 1975, d e f i n e a ' c h i l d ' as a ' p e r s o n ' u n d e r t h e age o f 18 y e a r s . § 26-14-1(3), A l a . Code 1975; § 2 6 - 1 6 - 2 ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975. " A l s o , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has i n t e r p r e t e d t h e t e r m 'minor c h i l d ' i n A l a b a m a ' s w r o n g f u l - d e a t h of-minor s t a t u t e to include a v i a b l e fetus that received p r e n a t a l i n j u r i e s causing death before a live birth. E i c h v. Town o f G u l f S h o r e s , 293 A l a . 95, 300 So. 2d 354 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the Court h e l d t h a t 'the p a r e n t s o f an e i g h t and one-half month o l d s t i l l b o r n f e t u s [ a r e ] e n t i t l e d t o m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n f o r t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f t h e child'; thus, the Court e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d the v i a b l e f e t u s as a ' c h i l d . ' E i c h , 293 A l a . a t 100, 300 So. 2d a t 358. "Furthermore, the d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of a word p r o v i d e s the meaning o r d i n a r y p e o p l e would g i v e the word. C a r p e t I n s t a l l a t i o n & S u p p l i e s of G l e n c o v. A l f a Mut. I n s . Co., 628 So. 2d 560, 562 (Ala. 10 1110176; 1110219 1993) . A c c o r d i n g t o Merriam-Webster's Collegiate D i c t i o n a r y 214 ( 1 1 t h e d . 2 0 0 3 ) , t h e w o r d ' c h i l d ' i s d e f i n e d as 'an u n b o r n o r r e c e n t l y b o r n p e r s o n . ' The w o r d ' c h i l d ' i s d e f i n e d i n B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y 254 ( 8 t h e d . 2 0 0 4 ) , as '[a] b a b y o r f e t u s . ' "The p r e s e n t c a s e W h i t n e r v. S t a t e , 328 We f i n d t h e r e a s o n i n g Court i n t h a t case t o i s s i m i l a r to the s i t u a t i o n i n S.C. 1, 492 S.E.2d 777 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . o f t h e S o u t h C a r o l i n a Supreme be p e r s u a s i v e . "In Whitner, a mother p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o c r i m i n a l c h i l d neglect, a v i o l a t i o n o f S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-50 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , f o r c a u s i n g h e r b a b y t o be b o r n w i t h c o c a i n e m e t a b o l i t e s i n i t s s y s t e m by r e a s o n o f t h e mother's i n g e s t i o n of c r a c k c o c a i n e d u r i n g the t h i r d t r i m e s t e r of her pregnancy. On a p p e a l , t h e S o u t h C a r o l i n a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e m o t h e r h a d been p r o p e r l y c o n v i c t e d of the charge. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-50 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , p r o v i d e d i n r e l e v a n t p a r t : 'Any p e r s o n h a v i n g t h e l e g a l c u s t o d y o f any c h i l d ... , who s h a l l , w i t h o u t l a w f u l e x c u s e , r e f u s e o r n e g l e c t t o p r o v i d e ... t h e p r o p e r c a r e and a t t e n t i o n f o r s u c h c h i l d ... , so t h a t t h e l i f e , h e a l t h o r c o m f o r t o f s u c h c h i l d ... i s e n d a n g e r e d o r i s l i k e l y t o be endangered, s h a l l be g u i l t y o f a m i s d e m e a n o r a n d s h a l l be p u n i s h e d w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e c i r c u i t court.' W h i t n e r , 328 S.C. a t 5, 492 S.E.2d a t 77 9. The i s s u e on a p p e a l was w h e t h e r that s t a t u t e encompassed m a t e r n a l a c t s t h a t endanger or were l i k e l y t o e n d a n g e r t h e l i f e , h e a l t h , o r c o m f o r t of a v i a b l e f e t u s . I d . The C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t "'[u]nder [South C a r o l i n a ' s ] Children's Code, " c h i l d " means a " p e r s o n u n d e r t h e age o f e i g h t e e n . " S.C. Code Ann. § 2 0 - 7 - 3 0 ( 1 ) (1985). The question for this Court, t h e r e f o r e , i s whether a v i a b l e f e t u s i s a "person" f o r purposes of the C h i l d r e n ' s Code.' "328 S.C. a t 6, 492 S.E.2d a t 11 779. 1110176; 1110219 "The S o u t h C a r o l i n a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t v i a b l e f e t u s i s a c h i l d u n d e r S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-50 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , r e a s o n i n g : "'South Carolina law has long recognized that v i a b l e fetuses are persons holding certain legal rights and privileges. I n 1960, t h i s C o u r t d e c i d e d H a l l v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960). That case concerned the a p p l i c a t i o n of South C a r o l i n a ' s w r o n g f u l d e a t h s t a t u t e t o an i n f a n t who d i e d f o u r hours a f t e r her b i r t h as a r e s u l t of injuries sustained prenatally during viability. The A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e d t h a t a v i a b l e f e t u s was n o t a p e r s o n w i t h i n t h e purview of the w r o n g f u l death statute, because, i n t e r a l i a , a f e t u s i s thought to have no s e p a r a t e b e i n g a p a r t f r o m the mother. "'We f o u n d s u c h a r e a s o n f o r e x c l u s i o n from recovery "unsound, illogical and unjust," and concluded t h e r e was "no m e d i c a l o r o t h e r b a s i s " f o r t h e "assumed identity" o f m o t h e r and v i a b l e unborn child. I d . a t 262, 113 S.E.2d a t 793. In light of that conclusion, this Court u n a n i m o u s l y h e l d : "We have no d i f f i c u l t y i n concluding that a fetus having reached that p e r i o d o f p r e n a t a l m a t u r i t y where i t i s capable of independent l i f e a p a r t from i t s mother i s a p e r s o n . " I d . a t 263, 113 S.E.2d a t 793 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . "'Four years later, i n Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 ( 1 9 6 4 ) , we i n t e r p r e t e d H a l l as s u p p o r t i n g a finding that a viable fetus injured while s t i l l i n t h e womb n e e d n o t be b o r n a l i v e f o r a n o t h e r t o m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n f o r t h e wrongful death of the f e t u s . 12 1110176; 1110219 "'"Since a v i a b l e c h i l d i s a p e r s o n b e f o r e s e p a r a t i o n from the body o f i t s m o t h e r and since prenatal injuries tortiously i n f l i c t e d on s u c h a c h i l d a r e a c t i o n a b l e , i t i s apparent that the c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e s such an ' a c t , n e g l e c t o r d e f a u l t ' by t h e defendant, to the i n j u r y of the child " ' " "'"Once t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e u n b o r n , v i a b l e c h i l d as a p e r s o n is accepted, we have no difficulty i n holding that a cause of a c t i o n for tortious i n j u r y t o such a c h i l d a r i s e s i m m e d i a t e l y upon t h e i n f l i c t i o n of the i n j u r y . " "'Id. a t 613, 138 S.E.2d a t 44 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . F o w l e r makes p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r t h a t H a l l r e s t e d on t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e v i a b l e f e t u s as a p e r s o n v e s t e d w i t h l e g a l rights. "'More r e c e n t l y , we h e l d t h e w o r d " p e r s o n " as u s e d i n a c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e includes viable fetuses. S t a t e v. H o r n e , 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984), c o n c e r n e d South C a r o l i n a ' s murder s t a t u t e , S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (1976). The defendant i n t h a t case stabbed h i s w i f e , who was n i n e months' p r e g n a n t , i n t h e n e c k , arms, and abdomen. Although doctors p e r f o r m e d an e m e r g e n c y c a e s a r e a n s e c t i o n t o d e l i v e r the c h i l d , the c h i l d d i e d while still i n t h e womb. The d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d of v o l u n t a r y manslaughter and a p p e a l e d h i s c o n v i c t i o n on t h e g r o u n d S o u t h 13 1110176; 1110219 Carolina did feticide. not recognize the crime of "'This Court disagreed. In a u n a n i m o u s d e c i s i o n , we h e l d i t w o u l d be " g r o s s l y i n c o n s i s t e n t ... to construe a v i a b l e f e t u s as a ' p e r s o n ' f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of imposing c i v i l l i a b i l i t y w h i l e r e f u s i n g to g i v e i t a s i m i l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n the criminal context." I d . a t 447, 319 S.E.2d a t 704 ( c i t i n g F o w l e r v. Woodward, s u p r a ) . A c c o r d i n g l y , the Court r e c o g n i z e d the crime of f e t i c i d e w i t h r e s p e c t to v i a b l e f e t u s e s . "'Similarly, we do not see any r a t i o n a l basis for f i n d i n g a v i a b l e fetus i s not a "person" i n the p r e s e n t c o n t e x t . I n d e e d , i t w o u l d be a b s u r d t o r e c o g n i z e t h e v i a b l e f e t u s as a p e r s o n f o r p u r p o s e s o f h o m i c i d e l a w s and w r o n g f u l d e a t h s t a t u t e s but not for purposes of statutes p r o s c r i b i n g c h i l d abuse. Our h o l d i n g i n H a l l that a v i a b l e fetus i s a person rested p r i m a r i l y on t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d "person" in light of e x i s t i n g medical knowledge c o n c e r n i n g f e t a l development. We do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p l a i n and o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d " p e r s o n " has c h a n g e d i n any way t h a t w o u l d now deny v i a b l e f e t u s e s s t a t u s as p e r s o n s . "'The policies enunciated in the Children's Code a l s o s u p p o r t o u r p l a i n meaning r e a d i n g of "person." S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-20(C) ( 1 9 8 5 ) , w h i c h d e s c r i b e s South Carolina's policy concerning c h i l d r e n , e x p r e s s l y s t a t e s : " I t s h a l l be the p o l i c y of t h i s S t a t e to c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e p r e v e n t i o n o f c h i l d r e n ' s p r o b l e m s as t h e most i m p o r t a n t s t r a t e g y w h i c h can be planned and implemented on behalf of c h i l d r e n and t h e i r f a m i l i e s . " (emphasis 14 1110176; 1110219 a d d e d ) . The abuse o r n e g l e c t o f a c h i l d a t any time d u r i n g c h i l d h o o d can e x a c t a p r o f o u n d t o l l on t h e c h i l d h e r s e l f as w e l l as on s o c i e t y as a w h o l e . However, t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f abuse o r n e g l e c t which takes place a f t e r b i r t h often pale in c o m p a r i s o n t o t h o s e r e s u l t i n g f r o m abuse s u f f e r e d by t h e v i a b l e f e t u s b e f o r e b i r t h . This policy of prevention supports a r e a d i n g of the word "person" to include v i a b l e f e t u s e s . Furthermore, the scope of t h e C h i l d r e n ' s Code i s q u i t e b r o a d . It a p p l i e s " t o a l l c h i l d r e n who have n e e d o f services." S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-20(B) (1985) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . When c o u p l e d w i t h the comprehensive r e m e d i a l purposes of the Code, t h i s l a n g u a g e s u p p o r t s t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d to i n c l u d e v i a b l e f e t u s e s w i t h i n the scope of the Code's p r o t e c t i o n . ' " W h i t n e r , 328 S.C. a t 6-8, 492 S.E.2d a t 779-81. " L i k e w i s e , i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , we do n o t see any reason to h o l d t h a t a v i a b l e f e t u s i s not i n c l u d e d i n t h e t e r m ' c h i l d , ' as t h a t t e r m i s u s e d i n § 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1975. Not o n l y have t h e c o u r t s of t h i s S t a t e i n t e r p r e t e d the term ' c h i l d ' to include a v i a b l e fetus i n other contexts, the d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of the term ' c h i l d ' e x p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n p e r s o n o r a f e t u s . In everyday usage, there i s n o t h i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r y about u s i n g the term ' c h i l d ' to i n c l u d e a v i a b l e f e t u s . For e x a m p l e , i t i s n o t uncommon f o r someone t o s t a t e t h a t a mother i s p r e g n a n t w i t h her f i r s t 'child.' Unless the legislature specifically states o t h e r w i s e , t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i s s i m p l y a more g e n e r a l t e r m t h a t e n c o m p a s s e s t h e more s p e c i f i c t e r m ' v i a b l e fetus.' I f the l e g i s l a t u r e d e s i r e s to p r o s c r i b e conduct a g a i n s t only a 'viable fetus,' i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o use t h a t s p e c i f i c t e r m . However, i f the l e g i s l a t u r e d e s i r e s to p r o s c r i b e conduct a g a i n s t 15 1110176; 1110219 a viable fetus age, t h e t e r m meaning. In ' c h i l d ' and a and a l l other persons under a c e r t a i n ' c h i l d ' i s s u f f i c i e n t t o convey t h a t f a c t , p r o s c r i b i n g conduct against a ' v i a b l e f e t u s ' w o u l d be r e d u n d a n t . "The t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n § 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1975, i s unambiguous; thus, this Court must i n t e r p r e t t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s a n d n o t engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of the language i n the s t a t u t e . Also, because t h e s t a t u t e i s unambiguous, t h e r u l e o f l e n i t y does n o t a p p l y . We do n o t s e e any r a t i o n a l basis f o r concluding t h a t t h e p l a i n and o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' does n o t i n c l u d e a viable fetus." Ankrom, Criminal So. 3d a t Appeals . affirmed Citing Ankrom, Kimbrough's the Court of conviction i n an u n p u b l i s h e d memorandum. As n o t e d , b o t h Ankrom a n d K i m b r o u g h s e p a r a t e l y p e t i t i o n e d t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i , a l l e g i n g that the issue d e c i d e d by t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s i n t h e i r cases presented a m a t e r i a l this question of f i r s t respective impression f o r Court. II. "We review interpretation questions de novo, court's conclusions. 1989)." Standard o f Review of giving statutory no construction deference to the and trial G r e e n e v . Thompson, 554 So. 2d 376 ( A l a . P i t t s v. G a n g i , 896 So. 2d 433, 434 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) . 16 1110176; 1110219 III. Ankrom and Kimbrough Discussion were convicted of violating the c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e by c a u s i n g t h e i r u n b o r n c h i l d r e n to ingest petitioners' before a controlled cases are not substance. The disputed; thus, the of only the issue t h i s C o u r t i s whether the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e governs the p e t i t i o n e r s ' conduct. The 1975, facts We c o n c l u d e t h a t i t does. c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e , § 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code provides: "(a) A r e s p o n s i b l e p e r s o n commits t h e c r i m e o f c h e m i c a l endangerment of e x p o s i n g a c h i l d t o an e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h he o r she does any o f the following: "(1) Knowingly, recklessly, i n t e n t i o n a l l y causes or p e r m i t s a c h i l d be e x p o s e d t o , [ ] t o i n g e s t o r i n h a l e , 1 or to or We n o t e t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e w o r d " e x p o s e " i s n o t d e f i n e d i n t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e and none o f t h e p a r t i e s have r a i s e d t h e m e a n i n g o f t h a t w o r d as an i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e , t h a t w o r d i n a s i m i l a r s t a t u t e i n a n o t h e r s t a t e has been i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean p l a c i n g a c h i l d i n a s i t u a t i o n t h a t i n v o l v e s a r i s k o f p h y s i c a l harm. See S t a t e v. G a l l e g o s , 171 P.3d 426, 430 (Utah 2007) : 1 "We a g r e e w i t h d e f e n d a n t s ' a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e r e must be an a c t u a l r i s k o f harm t o a c h i l d i n o r d e r f o r conduct to c o n s t i t u t e 'exposure' under the statute. ... "... I f t h e mere p r e s e n c e , f o r e x a m p l e , o f a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e i n t h e same room o r h o u s e w i t h 17 1110176; 1110219 to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Section 13A-12-260. A v i o l a t i o n under this subdivision i s a Class C felony. "(2) V i o l a t e s s u b d i v i s i o n (1) a n d a c h i l d s u f f e r s s e r i o u s p h y s i c a l i n j u r y by exposure t o , i n g e s t i o n o f , i n h a l a t i o n o f , or c o n t a c t w i t h a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , chemical substance, or drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a . A v i o l a t i o n under t h i s s u b d i v i s i o n i s a Class B felony. "(3) V i o l a t e s s u b d i v i s i o n (1) a n d t h e exposure, i n g e s t i o n , i n h a l a t i o n , or contact r e s u l t s i n the death of the c h i l d . A v i o l a t i o n under t h i s s u b d i v i s i o n i s a C l a s s A felony. "(b) The c o u r t s h a l l impose p u n i s h m e n t p u r s u a n t to t h i s s e c t i o n r a t h e r than imposing punishment a u t h o r i z e d u n d e r any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n o f l a w , u n l e s s another p r o v i s i o n of law provides f o r a greater p e n a l t y or a l o n g e r term of imprisonment. "(c) I t i s an a f f i r m a t i v e defense to a violation of t h i s section that the c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e was p r o v i d e d by l a w f u l p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e c h i l d , a n d t h a t i t was a d m i n i s t e r e d t o t h e c h i l d i n accordance with the p r e s c r i p t i o n i n s t r u c t i o n s provided with the c o n t r o l l e d substance." c h i l d r e n c o n s t i t u t e s e n d a n g e r m e n t , many i n n o c e n t p o s s e s s o r s o f l e g a l p r e s c r i p t i o n drugs i n secure p l a c e s i n t h e i r homes w o u l d be c o m m i t t i n g f e l o n i e s under the s t a t u t e . C h i l d r e n a r e n o t 'exposed t o ' s u b s t a n c e s t h e y c a n n o t a c q u i r e o r be harmed b y e v e n t h o u g h t h e y may be u n d e r t h e same r o o f w i t h them." 18 1110176; The First, 1110219 petitioners raise the p e t i t i o n e r s three argue main that arguments the Court on of appeal. Criminal A p p e a l s m i s a p p l i e d t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e i n Ankrom when i t applied that statute t o the use o f a s u b s t a n c e by a p r e g n a n t woman t h a t of t h a t resulted controlled i n the ingestion c o n t r o l l e d substance by h e r unborn c h i l d . Next, the p e t i t i o n e r s argue t h a t t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s ' d e c i s i o n in Ankrom argue t h a t i s bad p u b l i c policy. the Court of Criminal Finally, the p e t i t i o n e r s Appeals' decision v i o l a t e s both the United States Constitution i n Ankrom and t h e Alabama Constitution. A. THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN ANKROM WHEN IT APPLIED THE CHEMICAL-ENDANGERMENT STATUTE TO THE USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE BY A PREGNANT WOMAN THAT RESULTED I N THE INGESTION OF THAT CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE BY HER UNBORN CHILD. The petitioners present seven arguments i n support of t h e i r p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e does n o t protect 1. unborn The w o r d statute, children. "child," as u s e d does n o t i n c l u d e i n the chemical-endangerment an u n b o r n 19 child. 1110176; 1110219 Ankrom a r g u e s t h a t " [ t ] h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t i n t e n d f o r the term statute] 'child' to used impliedly brief, a t 6, intent of 'child' as and the that in include states that [the an chemical-endangerment unborn this ascribe comports the Ankrom's b r i e f , a t 8-9. Ankrom's " C o u r t must d e t e r m i n e l e g i s l a t u r e and with child," meaning to the legislature's be subjected concerning favor of to statutory the word intent." She a r g u e s t h a t " [ c ] r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s a r e t o be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d i n f a v o r o f t h o s e p e r s o n s to the their operation" and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are accused." Ankrom's brief, that sought " a l l doubts to predominate at 7. Similarly, Kimbrough argues t h a t "[b]ecause t h i s i s a c r i m i n a l case, perceived any a m b i g u i t y i n t h e c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e must be r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r o f r e v e r s i n g t h e c o n v i c t i o n . " In support o f h e r a r g u m e n t , K i m b r o u g h c i t e s Ex p a r t e B e r t r a m , 884 889 in So. 2d ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) , and a r g u e s t h a t t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s " i n c o r r e c t l y determined t h a t i t need not observe the r u l e of l e n i t y because the word ' c h i l d ' p l a i n l y a p p l i e d to a fetus.' [H]owever, i t s a n a l y s i s demonstrates term 24. ... 'child' i s , at best, 'viable that ambiguous." Kimbrough's b r i e f , the at Thus, K i m b r o u g h a r g u e s , " i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s C o u r t must 20 1110176; 1110219 r e j e c t the [Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals'] d e c i s i o n u s u r p i n g the l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n and r e w r i t i n g Alabama law." brief, In Kimbrough's a t 25. Bertram, t h i s Court stated: "'A b a s i c r u l e o f r e v i e w i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s i s t h a t c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s a r e t o be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d i n f a v o r o f t h o s e p e r s o n s s o u g h t t o be s u b j e c t e d t o t h e i r operation, i . e . , defendants. "'Penal statutes are to reach meaning than t h e i r words. no further i n "'One who commits an a c t w h i c h does n o t come w i t h i n t h e words o f a c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e , a c c o r d i n g t o the g e n e r a l and p o p u l a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f those w o r d s , when t h e y a r e n o t u s e d t e c h n i c a l l y , i s n o t t o be p u n i s h e d t h e r e u n d e r , m e r e l y b e c a u s e t h e a c t may contravene the p o l i c y of the s t a t u t e . "'No p e r s o n i s t o be made s u b j e c t t o p e n a l s t a t u t e s by i m p l i c a t i o n and a l l doubts c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are t o predominate i n favor of the accused.'" 884 So. 2d a t 891 ( q u o t i n g C l e m e n t s 725 ( A l a . 1979) (citations v. S t a t e , 370 So. 2d 723, omitted; emphasis added in Bertram)). In ascertaining the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s statute, t h i s Court w i l l to the language used intent i n enacting a f i r s t attempt t o a s s i g n p l a i n meaning by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . As t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s e x p l a i n e d i n W a l k e r v. S t a t e , 428 So. 2d 139, 21 1110176; 1110219 141 be ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) , " [ a ] l t h o u g h strictly common words construed, sense. must (Citations "[t]he courts Absent be are not required t o abandon any i n d i c a t i o n t o t h e c o n t r a r y , given their omitted.) fundamental penal statutes are to ordinary Similarly, this rule of statutory and normal Court the meaning." has h e l d construction that i s to a s c e r t a i n and give e f f e c t t o the i n t e n t o f the l e g i s l a t u r e i n enacting the statute. legislature should statute i t s e l f . " So. 2 d 1301, We statute. So. look I f possible, be gathered from the i n t e n t of the the language of the V o l k s w a g e n o f A m e r i c a , I n c . v. D i l l a r d , 579 1305 ( A l a . first 1991). f o r that intent i n t h e words As t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n Ex p a r t e 2 d 960, 964 ( A l a . Pfizer, of the I n c . , 746 1999): "'When t h e l a n g u a g e o f a s t a t u t e i s p l a i n a n d u n a m b i g u o u s , as i n t h i s c a s e , c o u r t s must e n f o r c e t h e s t a t u t e as w r i t t e n b y g i v i n g t h e w o r d s o f t h e s t a t u t e t h e i r o r d i n a r y p l a i n m e a n i n g -- t h e y must i n t e r p r e t t h a t l a n g u a g e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s and t h u s g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e a p p a r e n t i n t e n t o f t h e Legislature.' Ex p a r t e T.B., 698 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 1997). J u s t i c e Houston wrote t h e f o l l o w i n g for t h i s C o u r t i n D e K a l b C o u n t y LP Gas Co. v . S u b u r b a n Gas, I n c . , 729 So. 2d 270 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) : "'In d e t e r m i n i n g t h e meaning o f a statute, t h i s Court looks to the p l a i n 22 1110176; 1110219 meaning o f t h e words as w r i t t e n l e g i s l a t u r e . A s we have s a i d : by t h e "'"'Words u s e d i n a s t a t u t e must be g i v e n their natural, plain, ordinary, a n d commonly understood meaning, a n d where p l a i n language i s used a court i s bound t o i n t e r p r e t t h a t language t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s . I f the language o f t h e s t a t u t e i s unambiguous, then t h e r e i s no room f o r j u d i c i a l construction and t h e c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e must be g i v e n effect.'" " ' B l u e C r o s s & B l u e S h i e l d v . N i e l s e n , 714 So. 2d 293, 296 ( A l a . 1998) ( q u o t i n g IMED C o r p . v . S y s t e m s Eng'g A s s o c s . C o r p . , 602 So. 2d 344, 346 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ) ; s e e a l s o Tuscaloosa County Comm'n v. Deputy S h e r i f f s ' A s s ' n , 589 So. 2d 687, 689 ( A l a . 19 9 1 ) ; C o a s t a l S t a t e s Gas T r a n s m i s s i o n Co. v. A l a b a m a Pub. S e r v . Comm'n, 524 So. 2d 357, 360 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) ; A l a b a m a Farm B u r e a u Mut. C a s . I n s . Co. v . C i t y o f H a r t s e l l e , 460 So. 2d 1219, 1223 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) ; Dumas B r o t h e r s M f g . Co. v . S o u t h e r n G u a r . I n s . Co., 431 So. 2d 534, 536 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) ; Town o f L o x l e y v . R o s i n t o n W a t e r , Sewer & F i r e P r o t e c t i o n A u t h . , I n c . , 376 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 1979). I t i s t r u e t h a t when l o o k i n g a t a s t a t u t e we m i g h t s o m e t i m e s t h i n k t h a t the ramifications o f t h e words a r e i n e f f i c i e n t o r u n u s u a l . However, i t i s o u r j o b t o s a y what t h e l a w i s , n o t t o s a y what i t s h o u l d be. T h e r e f o r e , o n l y i f t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l way t o i n t e r p r e t t h e words a s s t a t e d w i l l we l o o k b e y o n d t h o s e words t o determine l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . To a p p l y a d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y would turn t h i s Court i n t o 23 1110176; 1110219 a l e g i s l a t i v e body, a n d d o i n g t h a t , o f c o u r s e , w o u l d be u t t e r l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the d o c t r i n e o f s e p a r a t i o n o f powers. See Ex p a r t e T.B. , 698 So. 2d 127, 130 ( A l a . 1997) .'" Thus, o n l y when l a n g u a g e i n a s t a t u t e i s ambiguous C o u r t engage i n s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n . will this As we s t a t e d i n Ex p a r t e P r a t t , 815 So. 2d 532, 535 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) , " [ p ] r i n c i p l e s o f statutory plain construction instruct this Court to i n t e r p r e t the l a n g u a g e o f a s t a t u t e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s a n d t o engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o n l y i f t h e l a n g u a g e i n t h e s t a t u t e i s ambiguous." As t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s e x p l a i n e d rule of construction referenced the language issue of the statute i n these normal meaning cases i n Ankrom, t h e i n B e r t r a m a p p l i e s o n l y where i n question i s whether o f t h e word " c h i l d " i s ambiguous; the p l a i n , includes ordinary, an u n b o r n the and child. C o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e word " c h i l d " i n t h e chemical-endangerment statute plainly the and unambiguously Court of C r i m i n a l includes Appeals s t a t e d unborn i n Ankrom t h a t d e c l i n i n g t o "engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . " 24 children, i t was So. 3d a t 1110176; 1110219 Kimbrough argues t h a t "the c h e m i c a l endangerment s t a t u t e , by i t s plain language, does not apply t o unborn children, p r e g n a n t women, o r t h e b i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s t h a t o c c u r pregnancy, labor, or d e l i v e r y . " Kimbrough's b r i e f , during a t 10. K i m b r o u g h a r g u e s t h a t " [ t ] h e r e i s no h i n t i n t h e t e r m s o f t h i s statute as t h e y a r e 'commonly u n d e r s t o o d ' that i t has any a p p l i c a t i o n t o a p r e g n a n t woman's r e l a t i o n s h i p t o h e r f e t u s . " Kimbrough's b r i e f , a t 12. ordinary of meaning endangerment statute] born and t h e r e f o r e Instead, [the word e x i s t i n a world Kimbrough's b r i e f , Kimbrough also 'child' i n the "[t]he chemical- i s l i m i t e d t o c h i l d r e n who have contact w i t h drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a or s o l d . " Kimbrough argues, argues been where t h e y m i g h t come i n o r p l a c e s where d r u g s a r e made a t 12. that "[t]he extrinsic materials r e l i e d upon b y t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s do n o t s u p p o r t e x p a n d i n g t h e l a w t o h o l d p r e g n a n t women c r i m i n a l l y l i a b l e i n r e l a t i o n t o the v i a b l e fetus they c a r r y . " a t 19. She a r g u e s t h a t t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e i s ambiguous b e c a u s e , "had plain Kimbrough's b r i e f , she says, the Court of Criminal to r e s o r t to e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l t o support i t s language interpretation." 25 Kimbrough's brief, Appeals purported a t 19. 1110176; 1110219 T h a t " r e l i a n c e " on t h a t e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l , K i m b r o u g h " c l e a r l y acknowledges t h a t the term ' c h i l d ' i n [the endangerment s t a t u t e ] brief, the a t 19. Court i s , at best, A d d i t i o n a l l y , Kimbrough of Criminal definitions i t cited, "arbitrary" manner, "selection reading of ambiguous." a Appeals argues, chemical- Kimbrough's argues t h a t , correctly even i f applied the t h o s e d e f i n i t i o n s were s e l e c t e d i n an and their favorite of the s t a t u t e . selection definition" Kimbrough's demonstrates rather brief, than a the plain a t 15-16. C o n v e r s e l y , the S t a t e argues t h a t " [ t ] h e p l a i n meaning of the word 'child,' as used in the s t a t u t e , i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d . " chemical-endangerment "child," but statute i t argues that The S t a t e a d m i t s t h a t t h e does "an [chemical-endangerment] not unborn define child the word i s a person." C i t i n g t h i s Court's d e c i s i o n i n Carpet I n s t a l l a t i o n & Supplies o f G l e n c o e v. A l f a M u t u a l I n s u r a n c e Co., (Ala. 1993), the State argues that 628 "[t]his So. 2d 560, C o u r t has 562 stated t h a t the d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of a word p r o v i d e s the meaning ordinary people definitions 271 (9th give the word." of the word " c h i l d " ed. 2009) ("[a] baby 26 The State from B l a c k ' s or fetus"), then Law and cites Dictionary Merriam- 1110176; 1110219 Webster's Collegiate Dictionary unborn or r e c e n t l y born p e r s o n " ) . 214 (11th ed. 2008) ("an S t a t e ' s b r i e f i n Ankrom, a t 8. As t h e d e f i n i t i o n s c i t e d by t h e S t a t e i n d i c a t e , t h e p l a i n meaning of the word " c h i l d " children Kimbrough's born unborn and i s b r o a d enough t o encompass a l l unborn -- including c h i l d r e n i n the cases before Ankrom's us. As C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s s a i d i n Ankrom: " L i k e w i s e , i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , we do n o t see any r e a s o n t o h o l d t h a t a v i a b l e f e t u s i s n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e t e r m ' c h i l d , ' as t h a t t e r m i s u s e d i n § 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1975. Not o n l y have t h e c o u r t s of t h i s State i n t e r p r e t e d the term ' c h i l d ' to include a viable fetus i n other contexts, the d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of the term ' c h i l d ' e x p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n p e r s o n o r a f e t u s . In everyday usage, t h e r e i s n o t h i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r y about u s i n g the term ' c h i l d ' t o i n c l u d e a v i a b l e f e t u s . For e x a m p l e , i t i s n o t uncommon f o r someone t o s t a t e t h a t a mother i s p r e g n a n t w i t h her f i r s t 'child.' Unless the legislature specifically states o t h e r w i s e , t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i s s i m p l y a more g e n e r a l t e r m t h a t e n c o m p a s s e s t h e more s p e c i f i c t e r m ' v i a b l e fetus.' I f the l e g i s l a t u r e d e s i r e s t o p r o s c r i b e conduct against only a 'viable fetus,' i t is n e c e s s a r y t o u s e t h a t s p e c i f i c t e r m . However, i f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d e s i r e s to p r o s c r i b e conduct a g a i n s t a v i a b l e f e t u s and a l l o t h e r p e r s o n s u n d e r a c e r t a i n age, t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n v e y t h a t meaning. In f a c t , p r o s c r i b i n g conduct a g a i n s t a ' c h i l d ' and a ' v i a b l e f e t u s ' w o u l d be r e d u n d a n t . 1975, "The t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n § 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code i s unambiguous; thus, this Court must 27 and the 1110176; 1110219 i n t e r p r e t t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s a n d n o t engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of the language i n the s t a t u t e . Also, because t h e s t a t u t e i s unambiguous, t h e r u l e o f l e n i t y does n o t a p p l y . We do n o t s e e any r a t i o n a l basis f o r concluding t h a t the p l a i n and o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' does n o t i n c l u d e a viable fetus." We f i n d t h i s r e a s o n i n g persuasive and agree w i t h the Court o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s t h a t t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e word " c h i l d " i n the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e i n c l u d e s unborn c h i l d r e n . In word her reply brief, " o r " i n both Ankrom a r g u e s definitions that cited the use o f the by the State is d i s j u n c t i v e , m e a n i n g t h a t o n l y one o f t h e p o s s i b l e d e f i n i t i o n s could be applicable: "recently person"; born i.e., person" i f "child" i f t h e word then i t cannot "child" also c a n mean " u n b o r n p e r s o n " a l s o mean " r e c e n t l y b o r n p e r s o n . " c a n mean mean "unborn then i t cannot Ankrom a r g u e s t h a t " i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e Alabama l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e portion of Black's and Merriam-Webster's s a y s 'baby' ' o r r e c e n t l y b o r n p e r s o n . ' " dictionaries that Ankrom's r e p l y b r i e f , a t 6. The use o f the word " o r , " however, does not always i n d i c a t e t h a t o n l y one o f t h e j o i n e d words i s a p p l i c a b l e i n a particular situation. This Court has r e p e a t e d l y 28 recognized 1110176; 1110219 t h a t the word " o r " i s n o t always i n t e n d e d disjunction. Ala. 269, necessary 'or' to express As t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n R u t l a n d v. E m a n u e l , 202 272, 80 So. 107, 110 (1918), t o add t h a t , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g a r e , when a b s t r a c t l y considered, r e s p e c t i v e meanings, the j u d i c i a l " [ i ] t i s hardly t h e words 'and' a n d unambiguous i n their f u n c t i o n o f r e a d i n g one o f them as i f t h e o t h e r h a d been u s e d i s n o t t h e r e b y restricted." See a l s o H i l l i a r d v. B i n f o r d ' s H e i r s , 10 A l a . 977, 996 In r e Opinion 559, 563 strict of the J u s t i c e s , (1949). (1847); 252 A l a . 194, 198, 41 So. 2d 2 The m u l t i p l e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e use and meaning o f t h e w o r d " o r " a r e n o t h i n g new; as t h i s C o u r t e x p l a i n e d i n H a r r i s v. P a r k e r , 41 A l a . 604, 605 ( 1 8 6 8 ) : 2 " T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l a n g u a g e m i g h t be a d o p t e d , i f we were b o u n d t o c o n s t r u e t h e w o r d i n t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h i t i s used by t h e b e s t w r i t e r s o f t h e E n g l i s h language, and thus s a c r i f i c e the obvious meaning 'Or' i s d e f i n e d t o be a ' c o n n e c t i v e , t h a t marks an a l t e r n a t i v e ; ' 'one o f two; e i t h e r ; other.' In strict accuracy, such is i t s signification But i t i s not always used i n t h a t sense. I t i s o f t e n , i n common p a r l a n c e , a n d even i n w r i t t e n i n s t r u m e n t s , u s e d i n t h e sense o f 'both.' ... Our S a v i o r s a y s : ' F o r when two o r t h r e e a r e g a t h e r e d t o g e t h e r i n my name, t h e r e am I i n t h e m i d s t o f them;' y e t t h e C h r i s t i a n w o r l d does n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t e x t t o i m p l y an a s s u r a n c e o f h i s p r e s e n c e when one o r t h e o t h e r o f t h e s p e c i f i e d numbers are gathered together, leaving i t undetermined which. On the contrary, i t is understood t o convey a promise o f presence both i n 29 1110176; 1110219 2. O t h e r s t a t u t e s i n t h e A l a b a m a Code r e q u i r e i n t e r p r e t t h e word Ankrom Title "child" argues that as e x c l u d i n g u n b o r n "[t]here a r e many this Court to children. clues throughout 26 and o t h e r A l a b a m a Code S e c t i o n s w h i c h show t h a t t h e legislature statute] brief, d i d not intend t o a p p l y t o an a t 9. She cites for unborn [the child chemical-endangerment or fetus." Ankrom's § 2 6 - 1 4 - 1 ( 2 ) , A l a . Code 1975, which d e f i n e s " c h i l d " as " [ a ] p e r s o n u n d e r t h e age o f 18 y e a r s , " § 2 6 - 1 6 - 9 1 ( 2 ) , A l a . Code 1975, w h i c h d e f i n e s "child" person her who birthday." has not yet reached his or and as " [ a ] eighteenth Ankrom a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s , a p p e a r i n g i n t h e c h a p t e r s i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g and f o l l o w i n g t h e c h a p t e r containing the chemical-endangerment statute, reflect l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t i n the chemical-endangerment well. 547, Ankrom c i t e s D r a p e r v. S t a t e ex r e l . 557, 57 So. 772, 775 statute, Patillo, the as 175 A l a . (1911), i n which t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t "[w]hen words w h i c h have a known m e a n i n g and s i g n i f i c a n c e are used in a statute, i t must be presumed that a g a t h e r i n g o f two, and i n a g a t h e r i n g o f t h r e e as w e l l i n t h e one as i n t h e o t h e r . " 30 -¬ the 1110176; 1110219 Legislature and u s e d o r a d o p t e d them i n t h e i r w e l l - k n o w n m e a n i n g sense; the c o n t r a r y Ankrom a l s o Legislature notes e.g., child," that, has chosen unborn c h i l d w i t h i n see, not appearing." to c l a r i f y the s t a t u t e § 26-23-1 s e e , e.g., i n other statutes, i t s intent by u s i n g 26-23A-1 et to include t h e words e t s e q . , A l a . Code § the Alabama 1975, 3 an "fetus," or "unborn s e q . , A l a . Code 1975. 4 Ankrom a r g u e s t h a t , i f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a d i n t e n d e d t o i n c l u d e unborn children i n the c l a s s of persons chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e , protected by t h e i t w o u l d have u s e d e i t h e r o f t h o s e more s p e c i f i c t e r m s t o c l a r i f y t h e s c o p e o f t h e s t a t u t e . Ankrom's brief, a t 10. that the Additionally, Ankrom notes enacted i n 2006, t h e same y e a r chemical-endangerment Kimbrough, brief, statute t h e l e g i s l a t u r e amended homicide statute to s p e c i f i c a l l y define unborn c h i l d . i n her reply was the " p e r s o n " t o i n c l u d e an Ankrom's r e p l y b r i e f , a t 3. like Ankrom, points to specific instances where t h e A l a b a m a Code s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r s t o u n b o r n c h i l d r e n C h a p t e r 23 o f T i t l e 26 o f t h e A l a b a m a Code i s e n t i t l e d "Alabama P a r t i a l - B i r t h A b o r t i o n Ban A c t o f 1997." 3 the C h a p t e r 23A o f T i t l e 26 o f t h e A l a b a m a Code i s e n t i t l e d "The Woman's R i g h t To Know A c t . " 4 31 1110176; 1110219 and argues that "when t h e Alabama legislature legislates r e g a r d i n g t h e unborn i t uses c l e a r and u n e q u i v o c a l rather than t h e now ambiguous term brief, a t 27. Kimbrough intent to l i m i t t h e meaning o f t h e word " c h i l d " also 'child.'" claims that language, Kimbrough's the l e g i s l a t i v e to children who have a l r e a d y b e e n b o r n i s d e m o n s t r a t e d b y t h e e x c e p t i o n i n § 2 6 - 1 5 - 3 . 2 ( c ) , A l a . Code 1975, f o r m e d i c a t i o n s p r e s c r i b e d to t h e c h i l d , b e c a u s e , she s a y s , " [ p ] r e s c r i p t i o n s a r e n o t w r i t t e n for" unborn children. Kimbrough a l s o "child" State alleges includes agencies, that, unborn which Kimbrough's 5 brief, 12-13. i f the d e f i n i t i o n o f the word children, distinguish then many between forms used by children already b o r n a n d c h i l d r e n y e t t o be b o r n , must be r e v i s e d . brief, at Kimbrough's a t 17-18. Similarly, i n her reply brief, Kimbrough argues that " [ t ] h e m e a n i n g o f t h e [ c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t ] s t a t u t e does n o t t u r n on t h e m e a n i n g o f ' c h i l d . ' " 5 Section 26-15-3.2(c), A l a . Kimbrough's r e p l y b r i e f , a t Code 1975, s t a t e s : " I t i s an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e t o a v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t t h e c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e was p r o v i d e d by l a w f u l p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e c h i l d , a n d t h a t i t was a d m i n i s t e r e d t o t h e c h i l d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e prescription instructions provided with the c o n t r o l l e d substance." 32 1110176; 1110219 6. Kimbrough statute argues contains that "[t]he more t h a n 50 w o r d s , none o f w h i c h m e n t i o n a p r e g n a n t woman's d r u g u s e " and interpretation court language as [chemical-endangerment] require a a whole." that "the to Kimbrough's rules examine reply of statutory the brief, statutory at s u p p o r t of t h i s argument, Kimbrough c i t e s B o u t w e l l 988 So. 2d 1015, the (Ala. 2007), i n which t h i s Court 1020 State, stated i n i s o l a t i o n , but entire legislative statutory intent, a considers scheme; court response, general intent variety of to other l e g i s l a t u r e has of Alabama in protect statutory is to protect Code 1975. that "[e]very health Code 1975. and State look to to the to The of ascertain entire act clauses." argues unborn that the life is provisions. legislature's evident For from example, s t a t e d t h a t " [ t ] h e p u b l i c p o l i c y of the 26-22-1(a), A l a . declared the construe them i n t h e c o n t e x t moreover, should i n s t e a d o f i s o l a t e d p h r a s e s and In In v. t h a t , " [ i ] n i n t e r p r e t i n g a s t a t u t e , a c o u r t does n o t provisions 6. life, born, and the State unborn." § legislature has c h i l d i s e n t i t l e d to l i v e i n s a f e t y and survive S i m i l a r l y , the a into adulthood." l e g i s l a t u r e has 33 created an § 26-16-90, exception to Ala. the 1110176; 1110219 education requirements "is f o r a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e when t h e a p a r e n t w i t h t h e c a r e and child." § 16-28-40, A l a . Code 1975 children are recognized p r o p e r t y , s e e , e.g., "any custody other included person, within statute, see of a minor or unborn (emphasis persons with added). born or unborn"), d e f i n i t i o n of 13A-6-1(a)(3), and Code to real ( r e f e r r i n g to are "person" Ala. Unborn regard § 19-3-170, A l a . Code 1975 the § as person specifically i n the 1975 homicide (defining " p e r s o n " as "a human b e i n g , i n c l u d i n g an u n b o r n c h i l d i n u t e r o a t any stage of development, r e g a r d l e s s of v i a b i l i t y " ) . State notes applied that, Alabama's i n f o r m e d by t h e s e s t a t u t e s , wrongful-death statute c h i l d r e n at a l l stages of g e s t a t i o n . ( A l a . 2 0 1 1 ) ; H a m i l t o n v. S c o t t , 2012). Ultimately, State to protect has unborn See Mack v. Carmack, So. 3d 597 the t h i s Court The 79 97 So. 3d 728 ( A l a . argues, " i t would be inconsistent t o t r e a t an u n b o r n c h i l d as a p e r s o n f o r p u r p o s e s of a s s i g n i n g c i v i l and c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y , b u t n o t do so u n d e r [the chemical-endangerment Ankrom, a t statute]." State's brief in 16. A review of the s t a t u t e s c i t e d by t h e p e t i t i o n e r s and the c o n t e x t of the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e 34 provides of no 1110176; 1110219 c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e as t o how t h i s C o u r t s h o u l d i n t e r p r e t t h e w o r d " c h i l d " as t h a t t e r m i s u s e d i n t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t statute. by The s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e w o r d " c h i l d " the p e t i t i o n e r s are not conclusive maximum age f o r childhood without because cited both set a s e t t i n g a minimum age. S i m i l a r l y , when K i m b r o u g h a r g u e s i n h e r r e p l y b r i e f t h a t " t h e e x a m p l e s p u t f o r t h b y t h e S t a t e show t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e u s e s the explicit rather term rely than Kimbrough's on reply brief, legislature's "fetus" 'unborn decision and "unborn child' the now to refer ambiguous term a t 10, she f a i l s t o use child" was t h e more to the unborn, 'child,'" t o note t h a t the restrictive appropriate words i n those other s t a t u t e s because those s t a t u t e s a p p l i e d o n l y t o p r o t e c t unborn children. cited by t h e p e t i t i o n e r s c o n t r a d i c t s t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e word "child" in 6 I n sum, nothing the chemical-endangerment i n the s t a t u t e s statute to include an unborn c h i l d o r r e q u i r e s t h i s C o u r t t o i n t e r p r e t t h e w o r d " c h i l d " as e x c l u d i n g unborn c h i l d r e n . U s i n g t h e word " f e t u s " o r "unborn c h i l d " i n p l a c e o f t h e w o r d " c h i l d " w o u l d n o t have been a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e c h e m i c a l endangerment s t a t u t e because t h a t s t a t u t e a l s o protects c h i l d r e n a f t e r t h e y have been b o r n . 6 35 1110176; 1110219 3. The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f a t t e m p t s t o amend t h e c h e m i c a l endangerment statute demonstrates that t h e word u s e d i n t h a t s t a t u t e does n o t i n c l u d e u n b o r n Kimbrough "child" children. argues t h a t " [ t ] h e L e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f [the chemical-endangerment statute] and subsequent legislative i n a c t i o n c l a r i f y t h a t the L e g i s l a t u r e never intended to apply t o a [ s i c ] p r e g n a n t women who c o n t i n u e used a c o n t r o l l e d substance." Kimbrough's claims of the statute that 7 as "[t]he sponsor" t h i s law t o term and brief, a t 28. She chemical-endangerment " i s on r e c o r d s a y i n g he d i d n o t i n t e n d t h e l a w t o be used against new m o t h e r s , " 8 Kimbrough's brief, a t 28-29, a n d Kimbrough's a s s e r t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e was o n l y 1 s p o n s o r o f t h e chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e ; however, t h e r e were a c t u a l l y 21 s p o n s o r s o f S e n a t e B i l l 133, w h i c h was e v e n t u a l l y e n a c t e d a s A c t No. 2006-204, A l a . A c t s 2006. A c t No. 2006-204 a d d e d § 26-15-3.2 t o t h e A l a b a m a Code. 7 To s u p p o r t h e r a s s e r t i o n t h a t " [ t ] h e sponsor o f t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e " i s on r e c o r d s a y i n g he d i d n o t i n t e n d t h e l a w t o be u s e d a g a i n s t new m o t h e r s , " Kimbrough cites P h i l l i p Rawls, N a t i o n a l I r e Over A l a . Prosecuting P r e g n a n t Moms, USA TODAY ( A u g u s t 1, 2 0 0 8 ) , w h i c h on t h e d a y this opinion was released could be found at h t t p : / / w w w . u s a t o d a y . c o m / n e w s / n a t i o n / 2 0 08-0 8-01-427 41967 0 9_x. htm. I n t h a t a r t i c l e , former Alabama S t a t e Senator L o w e l l B a r r o n , who was one o f t h e 21 s p o n s o r s o f t h e c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e , s t a t e d : " I h a t e t o s e e a young m o t h e r p u t i n p r i s o n away f r o m h e r c h i l d . B u t i f s h e c o u l d be p u t i n a t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m w i t h h e r c h i l d r e n , t h a t w o u l d be t h e b e s t course. Maybe we n e e d t o r e v i s i t t h e l e g i s l a t i o n . " Former Senator Barron's views are i r r e l e v a n t ; t h i s Court w i l l n o t 8 36 1110176; 1110219 that the "there chemical have b e e n s e v e r a l l e g i s l a t i v e endangerment s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e f e t u s e s p r e n a t a l l y t o c o n t r o l l e d substances." 29. She c i t e s House B i l l chemical-endangerment unborn children, while prescribed Session ofthe s h e c l a i m s , w o u l d have amended statute adding f o r the treatment exposed Kimbrough's b r i e f , a t 723 (2008 R e g u l a r Alabama L e g i s l a t u r e ) , which, the a t t e m p t s t o amend t o apply an e x c e p t i o n specifically to f o r medication o f t h e p r e g n a n t mother o r t h e rely solely on t h e v i e w s of a single l e g i s l a t o r i n a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e i n t e n t o f a b i l l , e v e n when t h a t l e g i s l a t o r was a s p o n s o r o f t h e b i l l . See, e . g . , U t i l i t y C t r . , I n c . v . C i t y o f F t . Wayne, 868 N.E.2d 453, 459 ( I n d . 2007) ("'In i n t e r p r e t i n g s t a t u t e s , we do n o t i m p u t e t h e o p i n i o n s o f one l e g i s l a t o r , even a b i l l ' s sponsor, t o t h e e n t i r e l e g i s l a t u r e unless those views f i n d s t a t u t o r y e x p r e s s i o n . ' " (quoting A Woman's C h o i c e - E a s t S i d e Women's C l i n i c v . Newman, 671 N.E.2d 104, 110 ( I n d . 1 9 9 6 ) , c i t i n g i n t u r n O ' L a u g h l i n v . B a r t o n , 582 N.E.2d 817, 821 ( I n d . 1 9 9 1 ) ) ) ; Doe v . B r i d g e p o r t P o l i c e D e p ' t , 198 F.R.D. 3 2 5 , 348 n. 16 (D. Conn. 2001) ( " ' P o s t - e n a c t m e n t v i e w s o f t h o s e i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e l e g i s l a t i o n s h o u l d n o t be considered when i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s t a t u t e . ' " ( q u o t i n g 2A S i n g e r , S u t h e r l a n d S t a t u t o r y C o n s t r u c t i o n ( 5 t h ed. 1999 Supp.) § 48:20, a t 1 8 4 ) ) ; D a v i s v . C i t y o f Leawood, 257 K a n . 512, 528, 893 P.2d 233, 244 (1995) ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t " p o s t - e n a c t m e n t statements of i n d i v i d u a l legislators" are not " r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r s o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t " ) ; I n r e F.D. P r o c e s s i n g , I n c . , 119 Wash. 2d 452, 4 6 1 , 832 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1992) ("[T]he comments o f a s i n g l e l e g i s l a t o r are generally considered inadequate to establish legislative intent." ( c i t i n g Yakima v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s ' n o f F i r e F i g h t e r s , L o c a l 469, 117 Wash. 2d 655, 818 P.2d 1076 ( 1 9 9 1 ) , a n d C o n v e n t i o n Ctr. C o a l i t i o n v . S e a t t l e , 107 Wash. 2d 370, 730 P.2d 636 (1986))). 37 1110176; unborn 1110219 child. Kimbrough's brief, t h a t " [ t ] h e debate about the b i l l was d e l i b e r a t e , existing illegal 30. not the r e s u l t law a l r e a d y Bill Bill 601 pregnant that similar b i l l s none o f t h o s e b i l l s this history women who Kimbrough's used an brief, at were i n t r o d u c e d i n 2010 (2010 R e g u l a r S e s s i o n ) ) 34 a n d i n 2011 (2011 R e g u l a r S e s s i o n ) ) became l a w . 9 us[ing] Thus, K i m b r o u g h c o n c l u d e s , " l e a v e s no d o u b t t h a t t h e s e e f f o r t s have the c r i m i n a l (House and t h a t because o f p u b l i c h e a l t h and p u b l i c p o l i c y c o n c e r n s to argues o f an u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e reached 8 and Senate B i l l Kimbrough makes c l e a r t h a t i t s d e a t h drug and c o n t i n u e d t o term." She a l l e g e s (House a t 30. failed relating l a w t o a d d r e s s what t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i t s e l f r e c o g n i z e s t o be h e a l t h p r o b l e m s r e l a t i n g t o p r e g n a n c y and d r u g u s e . " The State Kimbrough's argues brief, a t 34. i n response t h a t the language of the c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e " i s c l e a r : an u n b o r n c h i l d i s a 'child' as t h a t statute]." word i s used State's b r i e f i n the i n Kimbrough, [chemical-endangerment a t 52-53. The S t a t e A d d i t i o n a l l y , we t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f t h e f a c t t h a t again during t h e 2012 R e g u l a r S e s s i o n o f t h e Alabama L e g i s l a t u r e a n o t h e r b i l l amending t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e ( S e n a t e B i l l 31) was i n t r o d u c e d . That b i l l l i k e w i s e did not pass. 9 38 1110176; 1110219 argues that, because unambiguous, the chemical-endangerment " i t would be inappropriate examine e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l s t o amend t h e s t a t u t e . " The State also assumptions," originally is the that, amendments "contrary Kimbrough -- a n d a l w a y s h a s b e e n -- i n c l u d e d statute's K i m b r o u g h , a t 54. Court is to failure b r i e f i n K i m b r o u g h , a t 52-53. i n t e n d e d t o make i t e x p l i c i t endangerment] for this s u c h as t h e L e g i s l a t u r e ' s State's argues statute Kimbrough's refers to "were t h a t an u n b o r n within protections." Thus, t h e S t a t e to the [chemical- State's argues, "[t]he child brief fact in that t h e L e g i s l a t u r e u l t i m a t e l y f a i l e d t o t a k e any a c t i o n on t h e s e proposed amendments believed the s t a t u t e its protection State's brief and may easily be read clearly included that statute i t d i d n o t need U.S. that i t within clarification." i n K i m b r o u g h , a t 54-55. i s problematic. 633, 650 a t t e m p t s t o amend As t h e U n i t e d Court stated i n Pension B e n e f i t 496 proof an u n b o r n c h i l d I n t e r p r e t i n g a s t a t u t e b a s e d on l a t e r that as States Supreme G u a r a n t y C o r p . v . LTV C o r p . , (1990): "[S]ubsequent l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y i s a 'hazardous basis for inferring t h e i n t e n t o f an e a r l i e r ' Congress. I t i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y d a n g e r o u s g r o u n d on w h i c h t o r e s t an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a p r i o r s t a t u t e 39 1110176; 1110219 when i t c o n c e r n s , as i t does h e r e , a p r o p o s a l t h a t does n o t become l a w . C o n g r e s s i o n a l i n a c t i o n l a c k s 'persuasive s i g n i f i c a n c e ' because ' s e v e r a l e q u a l l y t e n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s ' may be drawn f r o m s u c h i n a c t i o n , 'including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.'" (Citations In omitted.) this case, i t i s possible to conclude, as K i m b r o u g h argues, that the l e g i s l a t u r e understood the o r i g i n a l chemical- e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e t o p r o t e c t o n l y c h i l d r e n who were a l r e a d y born. that I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t o c o n c l u d e , as t h e S t a t e the legislature endangerment unborn -- and unnecessary intent. statute that attempts This Court legislature apart endangerment statute supra, understood to protect proposals the a l l children to to c l a r i f y amend that t h e p l a i n meaning the of that the statute before in (Ala. 1997) ("'"[S]ubsequent were of the chemical- u s ; as discussed statutory language i s to See LTV C o r p . , I n c . , 706 So. 2d 1134, 1139 legislative h e l p f u l as a g u i d e t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l a w . ' " 40 and the i n c l u d e w i t h i n i t s p r o t e c t i o n unborn c h i l d r e n . B e c t o n v. Rhone-Poulenc, born the i n t e n t i o n s language i s now supra; -- chemical- the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s o r i g i n a l cannot determine from original argues, history" (quoting i s not Covalt 1110176; 1110219 v. Carey citing Canada i n turn I n c . , 860 F.2d 1434, Pierce v. 1438 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 8 8 ) , Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988))). 4. The l a n g u a g e i n t h e c h i l d - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e makes t h a t s t a t u t e i n a p p l i c a b l e t o unborn Kimbrough argues children. t h a t t h e chemical-endangerment statute c a n n o t p l a i n l y be r e a d t o p r o t e c t u n b o r n c h i l d r e n b e c a u s e , s h e says, t h e word "environment" i n the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e c a n n o t r e f e r t o an u n b o r n c h i l d ' s e x i s t e n c e w i t h i n i t s mother's womb. 'environment' She s t a t e s to be 'uterus,' o r 'womb.'" t h e words "uterus" "environment"; person's synonymous defines with 'pregnant woman,' "environment" refers surroundings, to the s i t u a t i o n 1979) defines "environment" cultural, as " [ t ] h e aesthetic, totality and s o c i a l o f t h e word simply i n which B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y f a c t o r s which surround and a f f e c t essential dictionary However, i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o f i n d t h e word his or her l i f e . lives." "[n]o o r "womb" i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n lives economic, that to a a person 479 ( 5 t h e d . of physical, c i r c u m s t a n c e s and ... t h e q u a l i t y o f p e o p l e s ' C l e a r l y , f o r an u n b o r n c h i l d , t h e m o t h e r ' s womb i s an part of i t s physical 41 circumstances; i n the cases 1110176; 1110219 before u s , i t was while Ankrom's and Kimbrough's c h i l d r e n were w i t h i n t h e i r m o t h e r s ' wombs t h a t t h e y controlled unborn ingested substances. Kimbrough also statute describes argues that "[t]he very title of the t h e c r i m i n a l i z e d a c t i o n as e x p o s i n g a c h i l d t o an e n v i r o n m e n t where c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s a r e ' p r o d u c e d ' or 'distributed' reasonably neither intelligent functions." solely -- of which woman's u n d e r s t a n d i n g Kimbrough's b r i e f , i n the t i t l e would a t 18. of the s t a t u t e , be statute contained does n o t o v e r r i d e i n that a of her bodily These words appear not i n the text of the s t a t u t e , a n d , as t h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y h e l d , a within the t i t l e of t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e words statute: "'The title o r p r e a m b l e may be u s e d t o remove ambiguity or u n c e r t a i n t y i n a s t a t u t e ; i t cannot, however, be used to contradict the p l a i n , unambiguous t e r m s o f t h e s t a t u t e i t s e l f . See Newton v. C i t y o f T u s c a l o o s a , 251 A l a . 209, 218, 36 So. 2d 487, 494 (1948) ("both t h e p r e a m b l e a n d t h e t i t l e o f an a c t may be l o o k e d to i n order t o remove ambiguities and u n c e r t a i n t y i n the enacting c l a u s e " ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. M c C r o r y , 119 F. 861 ( 5 t h Cir. 1903) ( i f t h e a c t i s f r e e f r o m d o u b t o r a m b i g u i t y , t h e t i t l e o f an a c t may n o t be r e s o r t e d t o i n c o n s t r u i n g t h e a c t ) ; a n d B a r t l e t t v. M o r r i s , 9 P o r t . 266 ( A l a . 1839) ( t h e t i t l e o f an a c t may e x p l a i n what i s d o u b t f u l , b u t i t c a n n o t c o n t r o l what i s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e body o f t h e a c t ) . ' " 42 1110176; 1110219 C i t y o f B e s s e m e r v. M c C l a i n , 957 (Harwood, J . , c o n c u r r i n g quoting a i n part from main o p i n i o n on r e h e a r i n g ) ) So. on and reading, the 1084 ( A l a . 2006) dissenting i n part o r i g i n a l deliverance (emphasis added). plain-meaning 2d 1061, (withdrawn In t h i s case, because, word "child" in the "distribute" in the title of that given chemical- e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e i n c l u d e s u n b o r n c h i l d r e n , t h e use word and statute of the cannot be i n t e r p r e t e d t o c o n t r a d i c t the p l a i n meaning of the t e x t of the statute. 5. T h i s C o u r t s h o u l d f o l l o w t h e m a j o r i t y o f s t a t e s i n r e f u s i n g to a p p l y the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e to p r o t e c t unborn children. Kimbrough jurisprudence argues that, from other "[d]espite states refusing the overwhelming to extend criminal l a w s t o p r e g n a n t women i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e u n b o r n c h i l d r e n t h e y carry, one ... outlier [t]he [Court of C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s ] chose t o state, South i n a p p l i c a b l e i n Alabama." v. S t a t e 328 S.C. 1, 492 Carolina," whose "unique K i m b r o u g h ' s b r i e f , a t 53. S.E.2d 777 (1997), i s not Kimbrough argues, because "South C a r o l i n a 43 courts, follow law is Whitner persuasive, ... unlike 1110176; 1110219 A l a b a m a ' s c o u r t s , have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o c r e a t e new common l a w crime[s]." The State Appeals, of Kimbrough's b r i e f , that, t h i s Court "should Whitner drug argues use and f i n d like the Court of Criminal r e l y on t h e p e r s u a s i v e reasoning [Ankrom and] K i m b r o u g h ' s that violated a t 54. prenatal [the chemical-endangerment statute]." S t a t e ' s b r i e f i n K i m b r o u g h , a t 30. W h i t n e r , t h e S t a t e a r g u e s , is persuasive permits child, because South C a r o l i n a law, l i k e a wrongful-death and because, defined, at least a c t i o n f o r the death i n both f o r some states, t h e word criminal offenses, Alabama l a w , o f an u n b o r n "person" is to include unborn c h i l d r e n . Additionally, by t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e c a s e s r e l i e d on the p e t i t i o n e r s i n advancing this argument are not p e r s u a s i v e b e c a u s e , t h e S t a t e s a y s , "[m]any o f t h e s t a t e s t h a t have d i s a l l o w e d t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f p r e g n a n t women f o r c o n d u c t committed during t h e i r pregnancies have done so on g r o u n d s o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n b a s e d on t h e i r own s t a t e l a w . " brief has i n K i m b r o u g h , a t 39. separate State's F o r e x a m p l e , a t l e a s t one s t a t e statutory provisions covering endangerment i n v o l v i n g unborn c h i l d r e n . 44 cases o f chemical See K i l m o n v. S t a t e , 1110176; 1110219 394 Md. 168, 905 A . 2 d 306 ( 2 0 0 6 ) . whose corresponding statutes Courts prohibit i n other states, "delivery" of the c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e t o a c h i l d , have h e l d t h a t t h o s e statutes do n o t p r o t e c t u n b o r n c h i l d r e n b e c a u s e u s e o f t h e c o n t r o l l e d substance by t h e mother and the t r a n s f e r o f t h a t substance t o h e r c h i l d t h r o u g h h e r body i s n o t " d e l i v e r y . " State, 602 So. 2d 1288 ( F l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ; See J o h n s o n v . S t a t e v . L u s t e r , 204 Ga. App. 156, 419 S.E.2d 32 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; a n d P e o p l e v . H a r d y , 188 M i c h . App. 3 0 5 , 469 N.W.2d 50 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . f a c t t h a t t h e i r s t a t e ' s homicide killing o f an u n b o r n child S e v e r a l c o u r t s have c i t e d t h e statute d i d not apply to the as r e l e v a n t t o h o l d i n g t h a t t h e chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e s i n those s t a t e s d i d not p r o t e c t unborn c h i l d r e n . 190, 280 See R e i n e s t o v . S u p e r i o r C o u r t , 894 P.2d 733 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ; Commonwealth v . W e l c h , (Ky. 1 9 9 3 ) . 182 A r i z . 864 S.W.2d A n d , t h e C a l i f o r n i a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o C a l i f o r n i a ' s m u r d e r s t a t u t e , a f e t u s was d i s t i n c t from a human b e i n g ; c o n s e q u e n t l y , child f o r purposes statute. 141 an u n b o r n c h i l d was n o t a of California's See R e y e s v . S u p e r i o r C o u r t , C a l . R p t r . 912 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . Furthermore, the State argues: 45 chemical-endangerment 75 C a l . App. 3 d 214, 1110176; 1110219 "Alabama l a w , u n l i k e t h e s t a t u t o r y schemes i n some o f t h e s e s t a t e s , does n o t p r o v i d e f o r s e p a r a t e treatment f o r crimes committed against unborn children. I n s t e a d , i t e x p r e s s l y i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d w i t h i n the d e f i n i t i o n of 'person' i n i t s c r i m i n a l homicide and a s s a u l t s t a t u t e s . Thus, i n Alabama, v i o l e n t crimes committed a g a i n s t unborn c h i l d r e n a r e p r o s e c u t e d u n d e r t h e same p r o v i s i o n s as v i o l e n t crimes committed a g a i n s t a d u l t s and c h i l d r e n who have b e e n b o r n . " State's b r i e f i n K i m b r o u g h , a t 42 (citations omitted). The S t a t e n o t e s t h a t , u n l i k e some o t h e r s t a t e s t h a t have a d d r e s s e d t h i s i s s u e , Alabama's c h i l d - a b u s e a person between under birth 26-14-1(3); Geiser, t h e age o f 18 and 18 s t a t u t e s d e f i n e a " c h i l d " as years years. 26-16-2(1); rather See a A l a . Code and 26-16-91(2). 763 N.W.2d 469 (N.D. 2009) than person 1975, Compare §§ State v. (reversing the conviction of a p r e g n a n t mother under a s t a t u t e s i m i l a r t o t h e c h e m i c a l endangerment statute, relying i n part on a North Dakota s t a t u t e e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d i n g t h a t age i s t o be c a l c u l a t e d f r o m birth). I n sum, a l t h o u g h , majority as t h e p e t i t i o n e r s c o r r e c t l y s t a t e , a o f j u r i s d i c t i o n s have h e l d t h a t u n b o r n c h i l d r e n a r e not a f f o r d e d p r o t e c t i o n from t h e use o f a c o n t r o l l e d substance by t h e i r m o t h e r s , t h e y n o n e t h e l e s s f a i l t o c o n v i n c e t h i s C o u r t that the d e c i s i o n s of those courts 46 are persuasive and s h o u l d 1110176; 1110219 be f o l l o w e d by t h i s C o u r t . 505 U.S. 833, interests the life 846 See (1992) ("[T]he J., concurring 6. The plain meaning mention legitimate i n protecting 97 So. 3d 728, specially, Casey, 740 j o i n e d by ... (quoted w i t h ( A l a . 2012) Stuart, Bolin, JJ.))). Court children has become a c h i l d . " a p p r o v a l i n H a m i l t o n v. S c o t t , and W i s e , State from the o u t s e t of the pregnancy o f t h e f e t u s t h a t may (Parker, P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d v. when of C r i m i n a l Appeals word erred of the "child" the definitions cited i n holding included by that viable that court the unborn did not viability. Kimbrough notes that neither of the dictionary d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e w o r d " c h i l d " c i t e d by t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l Appeals those i n Ankrom m e n t i o n d e f i n i t i o n s are at "viability," odds with and the she Court argues of that Criminal A p p e a l s ' h o l d i n g i n Ankrom, i . e . , t h a t t h e w o r d " c h i l d " i n t h e chemical-endangerment statute S i m i l a r l y , Ankrom a r g u e s of the includes Court a endangerment of statute a "viable fetus." i n her r e p l y b r i e f t h a t the Criminal "viable includes Appeals fetus" even does not 47 -- that the word though the mention holding "child" chemical- viability -- 1110176; 1110219 demonstrates the a m b i g u i t y o f the word " c h i l d " i n the s t a t u t e and r e q u i r e s t h i s C o u r t t o l o o k b e y o n d t h e " p l a i n m e a n i n g " o f t h a t word. Ankrom's reply brief, a t 7. The d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e w o r d " c h i l d " c i t e d b y t h e C o u r t o f Criminal Appeals previable and v i a b l e distinction usage of meaning in Ankrom of nor "child" as chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e . Appeals' insertion definition previous of of the word distinguish because the i n the p l a i n "child," the word not unborn c h i l d r e n i s not found the word do the between viability meaning and o r d i n a r y i s i t found t h a t word i n the i s used plain i n the Instead, the Court of C r i m i n a l viability "child" was standard based decisions holding that parents on into this the Court's could not b r i n g a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n f o r t h e d e a t h o f an u n b o r n c h i l d b e f o r e viability. Those c a s e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y G e n t r y v. G i l m o r e , 613 So. 2d 1241 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , a d o p t e d t h e v i a b i l i t y d i s t i n c t i o n , a t least i n part, Wade, 410 U.S. because of a m i s p l a c e d 113 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . deference t o Roe v. A f t e r Ankrom was d e c i d e d , h o w e v e r , t h i s C o u r t o v e r r u l e d G e n t r y i n Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 (Ala. 2011), specifically p e r m i t i n g r e c o v e r y o f damages f o r 48 1110176; 1110219 the wrongful death of any unborn child, regardless of viability. The Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals also l o o k e d to the C a r o l i n a Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n W h i t n e r . G e n t r y , r e l i e d on Roe U.S. in 833 the South Whitner, like and on P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d v. C a s e y , 505 (1992), f o r i t s d e s c r i p t i o n of the S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t life However, o f an u n b o r n o u t s i d e the child right to b e f o r e and abortion after viability. c r e a t e d i n Roe and u p h e l d i n P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d , t h e v i a b i l i t y d i s t i n c t i o n has no place 97 i n the laws of t h i s So. 3d 728, 737 State. ( A l a . 2012) with Stuart, Bolin, See H a m i l t o n v. S c o t t , (Parker, J . , c o n c u r r i n g s p e c i a l l y , and W i s e , JJ., joining). Thus, a l t h o u g h W h i t n e r i s p e r s u a s i v e on t h e i s s u e an unborn Whitner's child is a adoption inconsistent with person of and the the p l a i n viability a "child," distinction we find to be meaning of the word " c h i l d " and w i t h the laws of t h i s S t a t e . the thus whether Furthermore, to the e x t e n t t h a t Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals l i m i t e d the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the chemical-endangerment Ankrom, this Court inconsistent with statute to v i a b l e expressly the p l a i n rejects unborn that children in distinction as meaning of the word " c h i l d " 49 and 1110176; 1110219 with the laws of t h i s State. B e c a u s e we r e j e c t the Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals' a p p l i c a t i o n of a v i a b i l i t y d i s t i n c t i o n , petitioners' 7. The the a r g u m e n t s on t h e i s s u e a r e moot. Court of Criminal Appeals' decision i n Ankrom is "absurd." Kimbrough argues that "[a]pplying [the endangerment s t a t u t e ] t o p r e g n a n t women who despite a absurd having and health used illogical unintended controlled by the continue to substance r e s u l t s harmful Alabama would to j u s t i c e Kimbrough's brief, at 35. a r g u m e n t , K i m b r o u g h q u o t e s Lane v. S t a t e , (Ala. 2010) a t 1075 (quoting In i n w h i c h we of this 3d 824, stated: "'To d i s c e r n t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , t h e C o u r t must f i r s t l o o k t o t h e l a n g u a g e of the s t a t u t e . I f , g i v i n g the s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e i t s p l a i n and o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g , we c o n c l u d e t h a t the language i s unambiguous, t h e r e i s no room f o r j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . I f a l i t e r a l c o n s t r u c t i o n w o u l d p r o d u c e an a b s u r d and u n j u s t r e s u l t t h a t i s c l e a r l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p u r p o s e and p o l i c y o f t h e s t a t u t e , s u c h a c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o be avoided.'" 50 that irrational C i t y o f B e s s e m e r v. M c C l a i n , 957 (citations omitted)), public and support 66 So. term produce and Legislature" " [ s ] t a t u t e s s h o u l d be c o n s t r u e d t o a v o i d a b s u r d and results." chemical- So. 828 2d 1110176; 1110219 However, as d i s c u s s e d that supra, the " p l a i n and o r d i n a r y this Court has d e t e r m i n e d meaning" o f t h e word " c h i l d " i n the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e i s unambiguous; t h a t , given i t s p l a i n meaning, t h e word " c h i l d " i n c l u d e s unborn c h i l d r e n ; and that, consequently, the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e i s a p p l i c a b l e t o Ankrom a n d K i m b r o u g h . Pratt, 815 construction language So. 2d instruct of a statute engage i n j u d i c i a l statute at 535, this "[p]rinciples Court only Thus, t h e r e what case, need r e a s o n s she b e l i e v e s statute to protect that applying the p l a i n i t says i s "no room f o r of the chemical-endangerment not address statutory and t o i f the language i n the construction" a n d we of to interpret t o mean e x a c t l y construction i s ambiguous." As we s t a t e d i n Ex p a r t e statute the merits judicial i n this o f Kimbrough's the chemical-endangerment unborn c h i l d r e n i s absurd. B. THE COURT OF CRIMINALS APPEALS' DECISION IN ANKROM I S BAD PUBLIC POLICY. Although amici curiae the b r i e f s o f the p e t i t i o n e r s and o f s e v e r a l recite numerous potential i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s Court's decision 51 public-policy i n these cases, p o l i c y 1110176; cannot 1110219 be the determining factor i n our decision; public- p o l i c y a r g u m e n t s s h o u l d be d i r e c t e d t o t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , n o t t o t h i s Court. As we s t a t e d i n B o l e s v. P a r r i s , 367 2006): (Ala. legislature, formulate "[I]t is that the a n d n o t t h i s C o u r t , h a s t h e e x c l u s i v e domain t o i s not because p o l i c y i s unimportant p o l i c y arguments a r e i l l - s u i t e d & Assocs., (Ala. established p u b l i c p o l i c y i n Alabama." This M well 952 So. 2d 364, 1998) to j u d i c i a l I n c . v. C i t y o f I r o n d a l e , 723 but because resolution. See So. 2d 592, 599 ("'There a r e r e a s o n a b l e p o l i c y a r g u m e n t s on b o t h s i d e s o f t h i s i s s u e ; h o w e v e r , t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i s t h e body that must c h o o s e b e t w e e n s u c h c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . ' " ( q u o t i n g C i t y o f T u s c a l o o s a v. T u s c a l o o s a V e n d i n g Co., 545 So. 2d 13, 14 recognize the (Ala. 1989))). For this reason, a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s s t a t u t e , we f o r r e s o l u t i o n by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . G r e e n , 782 So. 2d 223, 231 the we that the p u b l i c p o l i c y of t h i s State i s r e l e v a n t to decline p e t i t i o n e r s ' p u b l i c - p o l i c y a r g u m e n t s ; we l e a v e with although wisdom constitutional of issues. As we to address the those matters s t a t e d i n M a r s h v. ( A l a . 2000), " [ t ] h e s e concerns d e a l legislative policy rather than Matters of p u b l i c p o l i c y are f o r the 52 1110176; 1110219 L e g i s l a t u r e and, w h e t h e r w i s e o r u n w i s e , l e g i s l a t i v e p o l i c i e s are o f no Inc. concern to the c o u r t s . " v. J a c k s o n , 823 other grounds, ("The So. Ex p a r t e Legislature 2d 1237, See 1248 T h i c k l i n , 824 i s endowed w i t h also Cavalier Mfg. , (2001), o v e r r u l e d So. the 2d 723 on ( A l a . 2002) exclusive domain f o r m u l a t e p u b l i c p o l i c y i n A l a b a m a , a domain upon w h i c h judiciary considering amici the shall not trod."). the p o l i c y curiae, issues would legislature be may interpretation remiss disagree and therefore r a i s e d by l i m i t i n g ourselves chemical-endangerment We We refrain to the from the p e t i t i o n e r s or to i n t e r p r e t i n g the t e x t of statute. i f we with failed the to recognize result a p p l i c a t i o n of the of that this the Court's chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e and i s f r e e t o amend t h e s t a t u t e t o e f f e c t a d i f f e r e n t scope f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t a t u t e . in Ex p a r t e J a c k s o n , 614 So. 2d 405, 408 As t h i s C o u r t s a i d ( A l a . 1993): "If the Legislature disagrees with our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of [the s t a t u t e ] , then i t w i l l enact appropriate l e g i s l a t i o n t o m o d i f y t h e s t a t u t e and y i e l d a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t i n subsequent cases. With t h a t a c t i o n , t h i s C o u r t w o u l d n o t be a s k e d t o do s o . T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t make s u c h a m o d i f i c a t i o n f o r it." C. 53 1110176; THE 1110219 DECISION OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS I N ANKROM VIOLATES BOTH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE ALABAMA CONSTITUTION. Ankrom a n d K i m b r o u g h p r e s e n t f o u r a r g u m e n t s p e r t a i n i n g t o the constitutionality The State of the chemical-endangerment contends t h a t t h i s Court should not address those c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arguments because, i t s a y s , the scope o f t h e w r i t granted by t h i s b r i e f , a t 10. We a g r e e . any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l first impression, granted "they are outside Court." The S t a t e ' s N e i t h e r Ankrom n o r K i m b r o u g h arguments i n their w h i c h were certiorari statute. review; respective the only as grounds noted above, raised grounds o f on w h i c h we we granted c e r t i o r a r i r e v i e w t o c o n s i d e r o n l y t h e i s s u e whether t h e word "child" unborn i n the chemical-endangerment child; grounds, arguments. we d e n i e d including Because statute certiorari review grounds advancing those these c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o p e r l y b e f o r e u s , we w i l l IV. includes an as t o a l l o t h e r constitutional arguments are not n o t a d d r e s s them. Conclusion We c o n c l u d e t h a t C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s c o r r e c t l y h e l d t h a t t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e word 54 "child" i n the chemical- 1110176; 1110219 endangerment However, we reasoning statute expressly insofar as chemical-endangerment that exception, we includes Appeals in therefore a f f i r m those unborn child or r e j e c t the Court of C r i m i n a l i t limits the application fetus. Appeals' of s t a t u t e t o a v i a b l e unborn c h i l d . agree w i t h Criminal an both the d e c i s i o n s Ankrom and the With of the Court of Kimbrough, and we decisions. 1110176 -- AFFIRMED. 1110219 -- AFFIRMED. Woodall, Parker, S t u a r t , B o l i n , and Main, J J . , concur. J . , concurs s p e c i a l l y . Shaw, J . , c o n c u r s i n p a r t and c o n c u r s i n the r e s u l t . Malone, C.J., and Murdock, J . , d i s s e n t . Wise, J . , recuses h e r s e l f . * * J u s t i c e W i s e was p r e s i d i n g j u d g e o f t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s when t h a t c o u r t i n i t i a l l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e s e c a s e s . 55 1110176; 1110219 PARKER, J u s t i c e (concurring specially). I n Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c r e a t e d a f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t f o r pregnant women, a l l o w i n g them t o t e r m i n a t e t h e i r p r e g n a n c i e s t h r o u g h m e d i c a l a b o r t i o n s under c e r t a i n that those children. circumstances, i n spite abortions resulted Subsequently, i n the death of the fact of their Roe h a s s o m e t i m e s been unborn misread as h o l d i n g t h a t t h o s e u n b o r n c h i l d r e n a r e n o t p e r s o n s a n d do n o t have t h e same f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s as does e v e r y o t h e r p e r s o n , w h i c h r i g h t s must be p r o t e c t e d b y t h e l a w . As I e x p l a i n e d i n H a m i l t o n v. S c o t t , 97 So. 3d 728, 737 ( A l a . 2012) ( P a r k e r , J . , c o n c u r r i n g s p e c i a l l y , j o i n e d by S t u a r t , B o l i n , and Wise, J J . ) , n o t h i n g c o u l d be f u r t h e r I concur authored. from t h e t r u t h . i n the decision of the Court today, I w r i t e s p e c i a l l y t o emphasize t h a t t h i s holding that the p l a i n statute requires unborn children, language of the the a p p l i c a t i o n i s consistent of that with which I decision, chemical-endangerment statute many to protect statutes and d e c i s i o n s throughout our n a t i o n t h a t r e c o g n i z e unborn c h i l d r e n as p e r s o n s with legally enforceable rights i n many a r e a s o f t h e l a w . T h i s s p e c i a l c o n c u r r e n c e b r i e f l y s u m m a r i z e s some o f 56 1110176; 1110219 the p r o t e c t i o n s and r i g h t s o f unborn c h i l d r e n i n f i v e areas o f t h e l a w -- p r o p e r t y l a w , c r i m i n a l l a w , t o r t l a w , g u a r d i a n s h i p l a w , a n d h e a l t h - c a r e l a w -- d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e b r e a d t h o f l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d the r i g h t s o f unborn I. For centuries, unborn c h i l d r e n father children. 1 0 P r o p e r t y Law t h e law o f p r o p e r t y has r e c o g n i z e d t h a t are persons with rights. For example, i f a ( o r , i n some s t a t e s , a c l o s e r e l a t i v e ) d i e d b e f o r e h i s c h i l d was b o r n , t h a t c h i l d w o u l d i n h e r i t f r o m t h e f a t h e r as i f he o r she h a d a l r e a d y b e e n b o r n a t t h e t i m e t h e f a t h e r d i e d . 1 1 The c i t a t i o n s t o s t a t e c o d e s a n d c a s e s i n t h e f o o t n o t e s i n t h i s s p e c i a l w r i t i n g a r e drawn l a r g e l y f r o m t h e f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e : P a u l B e n j a m i n L i n t o n , The L e g a l S t a t u s o f t h e U n b o r n C h i l d u n d e r S t a t e Law, 6 U. S t . Thomas J . L. & Pub. P o l ' y 141 ( F a l l 2011). I have n o t i n d e p e n d e n t l y c h e c k e d o r v e r i f i e d these sources. 10 S e e § 43-8-47, A l a . Code 1975; see a l s o A l a s k a S t a t . § 13.12.108 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; A r i z . Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 14-2108 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; A r k . Code Ann. § 28-9-210 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; C a l . P r o b . Code § 6407 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; C o l o . Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 1 5 - 1 1 - 1 0 4 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; D e l . Code Ann. t i t . 12, § 505 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; F l a . S t a t . Ann. § 732.106 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 5 3 - 2 - 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Haw. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 560:2-108 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 15-2-108 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; 755 I l l . Comp. S t a t . Ann. § 5/2-3 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. § 29-1-2-6 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 633.220 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; Kan. S t a t . Ann. § 5 9 - 5 0 1 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. §§ 391.070, 394.460 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; L a . C i v . Code Ann. a r t . 940 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; Me. Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 18, § 2-108 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; Md. Code Ann., E s t . & T r u s t s , § 3-107 ( 2 0 0 1 ) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 190B § 2-302 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. § 700.2108 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; M i n n . S t a t . Ann. § 524.2-108 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; H a r p e r v. A r c h e r , 4 Smedes & M 99, 12 M i s s . 11 57 1110176; 1110219 Similarly, i fa will f a i l e d to provide f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c h i l d born a f t e r the e x e c u t i o n of the w i l l and a c h i l d born, the omitted c h i l d could, i n many c a s e s , r e c e i v e in t o what he o r she w o u l d the e s t a t e received equal i n value was a share i f the t e s t a t o r had d i e d i n t e s t a t e o r a share i n v a l u e t o t h a t p r o v i d e d t o c h i l d r e n named i n t h e w i l l . have equal 1 2 Some 9 (1845) ( n o t i n g t h a t " f r o m t h e t i m e o f c o n c e p t i o n t h e i n f a n t i s i n e s s e , f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t a k i n g any e s t a t e w h i c h i s f o r h i s b e n e f i t , ... p r o v i d e d ... t h a t t h e i n f a n t be b o r n a l i v e , and after such a period of f o e t a l existence that i t s c o n t i n u a t i o n i n l i f e m i g h t be r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d " ) ; Mo. Ann. S t a t . § 474.050 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; Mont. Code Ann. § 72-2-118 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 30-2308 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 111.085 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; N.H. Rev. S t a t . Ann. §§ 21.20 (2008) ( d e f i n i n g " i s s u e " ) , 561:1 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; N . J . S t a t . Ann. § 3B:5-8 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; N.M. S t a t . Ann. § 4 5 - 2 - 1 0 4 ( A ) ( 2 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; N.Y. E s t . Powers & T r u s t s Law § 4 - 1 . 1 ( c ) (McKinney 1 9 9 8 ) ; N.C. Gen. S t a t . § 29-9 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; N.D. C e n t . Code § 30.1-04-04 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. § 2105.14 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; O k l a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 84, § 228 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; Or. Rev. S t a t . § 112.075 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; 20 Pa. Cons. S t a t . Ann. § 2104(4) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-108 (2009); S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws § 29A-2-108 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-108 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; U t a h Code Ann. § 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 4 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; V t . S t a t . Ann. t i t . 14, § 303 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; V a . Code Ann. § 64.1-8.1 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 1 1 . 0 2 . 0 0 5 ( 8 ) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; W. V a . Code Ann. § 42-1-8 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; W i s . S t a t . Ann. § 8 5 4 . 2 1 ( 5 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Wyo. S t a t . Ann. § 2-4-103 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . S e e § 4 3 - 8 - 9 1 , A l a . Code 1975; see a l s o A l a s k a S t a t . § 13.12.302 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; A r i z . Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 14-2302 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; A r k . Code Ann. § 28-39-407 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; C a l . P r o b . Code § 21620 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; C o l o . Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 15-11-302 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Conn. Gen. S t a t . Ann. § 45a-256b ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; D e l . Code Ann. t i t . 12, §§ 3 0 1 , 310 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; F l a . S t a t . Ann. § 732.302 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 53-4-48 (Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) ; Haw. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 560:2-302 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; I d a h o Code Ann. § 15-2-302 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; 755 I l l . Comp. S t a t . Ann. 12 58 1110176; 1110219 states apply a s i m i l a r in land, as w e l l . r u l e to ownership of future interests 1 3 § 5/4-10 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. § 29-1-3-8 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 633.267 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 394.382 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; L a . C i v . Code Ann. a r t . 1474 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; Me. Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 18, § 2-302 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; Md. Code Ann., E s t . & T r u s t s , § 3-301 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 1 ) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c h . 191, § 20 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. § 700.2302 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; M i n n . S t a t . Ann. § 524.2-302 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; M i s s . Code Ann. §§ 91-5-3, 91-5-5 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; Mo. Ann. S t a t . § 474.240 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; Mont. Code Ann. § 72-2-332 (2011) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 30-2321 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. §§ 133.160, 133.180 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; N.H. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 551:10 (2006) ; N . J . S t a t . Ann. § 3B:5-16 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; N.M. Stat. § 45-2-302 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; N.Y. E s t . Powers & T r u s t s Law § 5-32 ( M c K i n n e y Supp. 2 0 1 2 ) ; N.C. Gen. S t a t . § 31-5.5 (2009) (see a l s o § 41-5 ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t an u n b o r n c h i l d " s h a l l be deemed a p e r s o n c a p a b l e o f t a k i n g by d e e d o r o t h e r w r i t i n g any e s t a t e w h a t e v e r i n t h e same manner as i f he were b o r n " ) ) ; N.D. C e n t . Code § 30.1-06-02 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.34 (2007) ; O k l a . S t a t . Ann. t i t . 84, § 131 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; Or. Rev. S t a t . § 112.405 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; 20 Pa. Cons. S t a t . Ann. § 2 5 1 4 ( 4 ) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; R . I . Gen. Laws § 33-6-23 e t s e q . ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-302 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws § 29A-2-302 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-3-103 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Tex. P r o b . Code Ann. § 67 (Vernon Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; U t a h Code Ann. § 75-2-302 (Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) ; V t . S t a t . Ann. t i t . 14, §§ 303, 332 e t s e q . ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; V a . Code Ann. §§ 64.1-70, 64.1-71 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 11.12.091 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; W. V a . Code Ann. §§ 4 1 - 4 - 1 , 41-4-2 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; W i s . S t a t . Ann. § 8 5 4 . 2 1 ( 5 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) . S e e § 35-4-8, A l a . Code 1975; s e e a l s o C a l . C i v . Code §§ 698, 739 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; C o l o . Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 38-30-119 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 381.140 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; M i n n . S t a t . Ann. § 500.14 (2012) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 111.080 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; N.M. S t a t . Ann. § 47-1-21 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ; N.D. C e n t . Code § 47-02-19 (1999) (see a l s o § 4 7 - 0 2 - 2 9 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.14 (2010) ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t c o u r t may a p p o i n t a t r u s t e e t o r e p r e s e n t t h e f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) ; O k l a . S t a t . Ann. t i t . 12, § 1147.1 (2000) ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t c o u r t may a p p o i n t a t r u s t e e t o r e p r e s e n t t h e f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) ; S.D. 13 59 1110176; 1110219 II. There the are at l e a s t states have Criminal three increasingly Law aspects of c r i m i n a l protected fetal l a w where life: first, c r i m i n a l i z i n g f e t a l h o m i c i d e ; second, making the pregnancy of a h o m i c i d e v i c t i m an a g g r a v a t i n g f a c t o r t h a t can l e a d t o t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y ; and, t h i r d , e x e c u t i o n of pregnant A. In is of an Fetal-Homicide Statutes homicide medical abortion. unborn mother's the criminals. a s t r o n g m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s , criminal prohibiting unless killing i t occurs as an u n b o r n the result The m a j o r i t y o f s t a t e s p r o h i b i t any child, other than request, regardless a medical abortion of child § a killing at gestational C o d i f i e d Laws § 43-3-14 (2004) (see a l s o P r o p . Code Ann. § 112.036 ( V e r n o n 2 0 0 7 ) . of 43-3-16); the age. 14 Tex. S e e A l a . Code 1975, § 1 3 A - 6 - 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) ; A l a s k a S t a t . § 11.81.900(b)(62) ( d e f i n i n g " u n b o r n c h i l d " ) ; § 11.41.150 e t seq. (2008); A r i z . Rev. S t a t . Ann. §§ 13-1102(A), (B) (negligent homicide), 13-1103(A)(5), (B) ( m a n s l a u g h t e r ) , 1 3 - 1 1 0 4 ( A ) , (B) ( s e c o n d - d e g r e e m u r d e r ) , 1 3 - 1 1 0 5 ( A ) ( 1 ) , (C) ( f i r s t - d e g r e e murder) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-5-80 (feticide), 40-6-393.1 (feticide by vehicle), 52-7-12.3 ( f e t i c i d e by v e s s e l ) (2007 & Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) ; I d a h o Code Ann. §§ 18-4016 (defining "human embryo" and "fetus"), 18-4001 ( d e f i n i n g " m u r d e r " ) , 18-4006 ( d e f i n i n g " m a n s l a u g h t e r " ) ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; 720 I l l . Comp. S t a t . Ann. §§ 5/9-1.2 ( i n t e n t i o n a l h o m i c i d e o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) , 5/9-2.1 ( v o l u n t a r y m a n s l a u g h t e r o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) , 5/9-3.2 ( i n v o l u n t a r y m a n s l a u g h t e r o r r e c k l e s s h o m i c i d e 14 60 1110176; 1110219 o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. § 35-42-1-6 ( f e t i c i d e ) (2011) ( s e e a l s o I n d . Code Ann. §§ 3 5 - 4 2 - 1 - 1 ( 4 ) (murder), 35-42-1-3(a)(2) (voluntary manslaughter), 35-42-1-4(b), (d) ( i n v o l u n t a r y m a n s l a u g h t e r ) (2011)); Kan. S t a t . Ann. § 21-5419 (Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . § 507A.010 et seq. ( f e t a l homicide) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; L a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. §§ 14:2(A)(11) (defining "unborn c h i l d " ) , 14:32.5 (defining "feticide"), 14:32.6 e t s e q . ( s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e s ) (2012); M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.90a e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; M i n n . S t a t . Ann. § 609.266 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; M i s s . Code Ann. § 97-3-37 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 28-388 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; N.D. C e n t . Code § 12.1-17.1-01 e t s e q . ( 1 9 9 7 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2 9 0 3 . 0 1 ( A ) , (B) ( a g g r a v a t e d m u r d e r ) , 2903.02(A) ( m u r d e r ) , 2903.03(A) (voluntary manslaughter), 2903.04(A), (B) ( i n v o l u n t a r y m a n s l a u g h t e r ) ; 2903.041(A) ( r e c k l e s s h o m i c i d e ) , 2903.05(A) (negligent homicide), 2903.06(A) (aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular homicide, and vehicular manslaughter), 2903.09(A), (B) ( d e f i n i t i o n s ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; O k l a . S t a t . Ann. t i t . 2 1 , § 691 ( d e f i n i n g " h o m i c i d e " ) , t i t . 63, § 1-730(4) ( d e f i n i n g " u n b o r n c h i l d " ) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; 18 P a . Cons. S t a t . Ann. § 2601 e t s e q . ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1083 (Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws §§ 2 2 - 1 - 2 ( 3 1 ) ( d e f i n i n g " p e r s o n " ) , 22-1-2(50A) (defining "unborn c h i l d " ) ; 22-16-1 (defining " h o m i c i d e " ) , 22-16-1.1 ( f e t a l h o m i c i d e ) , 22-17-6 ( i n t e n t i o n a l k i l l i n g o f a human f e t u s ) (Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; Tenn. Code A n n . § 39-13-214 (Supp. 2 0 1 2 ) ; T e x . P e n a l Code §§ 1.07(a)(26) (defining "individual"), 1.07(a)(38) (defining "person") (Vernon 2 0 1 1 ) ; U t a h Code Ann. § 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 1 ( 1 ) ( a ) (Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) ; W. V a . Code Ann. § 61-2-30 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; W i s . S t a t . Ann. §§ 939.75(1) ( d e f i n i n g "unborn c h i l d " ) , 940.01(1)(b) (firstdegree intentional homicide), 940.02(1m) (first-degree reckless h o m i c i d e ) , 940.05(2g) (second-degree intentional homicide), 940.06(2) (second-degree reckless homicide), 940.08(2) (homicide by n e g l i g e n t h a n d l i n g o f a dangerous weapon, e x p l o s i v e , o r f i r e ) , 9 4 0 . 0 9 ( 1 ) ( c ) , ( 1 ) ( c m ) , ( 1 ) ( d ) , (1)(e) (homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle), 940.09(1g)(c), (1g)(cm), (1g)(d) (homicide by i n t o x i c a t e d use o f a f i r e a r m ) , 940.10(2) ( h o m i c i d e b y n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n o f a v e h i c l e ) , 940.04(1) ( i n t e n t i o n a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e o f an unborn child) (2011) (see a l s o Wis. S t a t . Ann. § 9 4 0 . 0 4 ( 2 ) ( a ) (2005) ( i n t e n t i o n a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e o f an 61 1110176; 1110219 However, some states limit the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of homicide s t a t u t e s b a s e d on t h e g e s t a t i o n a l age o f t h e f e t u s . common age r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e v i a b i l i t y , which i s that of child the pregnancy where t h e unborn s u r v i v i n g b i r t h and l i v i n g outside which i s the point during t h e womb, the pregnancy The most portion i s capable 15 of and quickening, when the pregnant "unborn q u i c k child")). In addition to the foregoing s t a t u t e s , M i s s o u r i has e n a c t e d a s t a t u t e p r o v i d i n g a r u l e o f c o n s t r u c t i o n , s e e Mo. A n n . S t a t . § 1.205 ( 2 0 0 0 ) , w h i c h h a s b e e n a p p l i e d t o t h e s t a t e ' s h o m i c i d e s t a t u t e s , m a k i n g them a p p l i c a b l e t o a n y k i l l i n g o f an u n b o r n c h i l d a t a n y s t a g e o f g e s t a t i o n t h a t i s n o t t h e r e s u l t o f an a b o r t i o n . See S t a t e v . Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1 9 9 2 ) , S t a t e v . Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. C t . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , S t a t e v . R o l l e n , 133 S.W.3d 57 (Mo. C t . App. 2 0 0 3 ) . Fla. S t a t . A n n . §§ 7 8 2 . 0 9 ( 5 ) (homicide) (defining "unborn quick child" i n terms of v i a b i l i t y ) , 782.071 ( v e h i c u l a r h o m i c i d e ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; I n d . Code A n n . §§ 3 5 - 4 2 - 1 - 1 ( 4 ) (murder), 35-42-1-3(a)(2) (voluntary manslaughter), 3 5 - 4 2 - 1 - 4 ( b ) , (d) ( i n v o l u n t a r y m a n s l a u g h t e r ) (2011) (see a l s o I n d . Code Ann. § 35-42-1-6 ( f e t i c i d e ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ) ; Md. Code A n n . , C r i m . Law § 2-103 (Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws A n n . § 750.322 (2004) (a " q u i c k e n i n g " manslaughter s t a t u t e that, s u b s e q u e n t t o Roe v . Wade, t h e M i c h i g a n Supreme C o u r t l i m i t e d t o p o s t - v i a b i l i t y c r i m i n a l a c t s , L a r k i n v . C a h a l a n , 208 N.W.2d 176 ( M i c h . 1973)) (see a l s o M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.90a e t seq. (2004)); R . I . Gen. Laws § 11-23-5 (2002) (defining " q u i c k e n i n g " i n terms o f v i a b i l i t y ) . 1 5 62 1110176; 1110219 woman f i r s t n o t i c e s t h e movements o f h e r u n b o r n c h i l d . s t a t e s have c r e a t e d B. Seven s t a t e s o t h e r age r e q u i r e m e n t s . Penalty-Enhancement specifically p r e g n a n t woman i s an a g g r a v a t i n g provide 1 6 A few 1 7 Statutes that t h e murder o f a f a c t o r t h a t may j u s t i f y t h e Nev. Rev. S t a t . A n n . § 200.210 (2006) ( m a n s l a u g h t e r ) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9 A . 3 2 . 0 6 0 ( 1 ) ( b ) (2012) ( m a n s l a u g h t e r ) ; Wis. S t a t . Ann. § 9 4 0 . 0 4 ( 2 ) ( a ) (2005) ( i n t e n t i o n a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e o f an " u n b o r n q u i c k c h i l d " ) (see a l s o Wis. S t a t . Ann. §§ 939.75(1) ( d e f i n i n g " u n b o r n c h i l d " ) , 940.01(1)(b) ( f i r s t - d e g r e e i n t e n t i o n a l h o m i c i d e ) , 940.02(1m) ( f i r s t - d e g r e e reckless homicide), 940.05(2g) (second-degree i n t e n t i o n a l homicide), 940.06(2) (second-degree reckless homicide), 940.08(2) (homicide by n e g l i g e n t h a n d l i n g o f a dangerous weapon, e x p l o s i v e s , o r f i r e ) , 9 4 0 . 0 9 ( 1 ) ( c ) , (cm), ( d ) , a n d (e) (homicide by i n t o x i c a t e d use o f a v e h i c l e ) , 9 4 0 . 0 9 ( 1 g ) ( c ) , (1g)(cm), (1g)(d) (homicide by i n t o x i c a t e d use o f a f i r e a r m ) , 940.10(2) ( h o m i c i d e b y n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n o f a v e h i c l e ) , 940.04(1) ( i n t e n t i o n a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e o f an u n b o r n child) (2011)). 16 A r k a n s a s draws t h e l i n e a t 12 weeks' g e s t a t i o n ; s e e A r k . Code Ann. §§ 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(a), (b) (2009) ( c r o s s - r e f e r e n c i n g h o m i c i d e o f f e n s e s ) , § 5-10-101 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; u n d e r C a l i f o r n i a law, t h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r h a s b e e n d e f i n e d t o i n c l u d e t h e u n l a w f u l k i l l i n g o f a " f e t u s , " see C a l . P e n a l Code § 1 8 7 ( a ) (2008) ( i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e C a l i f o r n i a Supreme C o u r t t o mean " p o s t - e m b r y o n i c " -- i . e . , 7 t o 8 weeks' g e s t a t i o n ) , P e o p l e v. D a v i s , 7 C a l . 4 t h 797, 872 P.2d 5 9 1 , 599, 30 C a l . R p t r . 2 d 50 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; V i r g i n i a a l s o h a s e n a c t e d a statute p r o h i b i t i n g the " [ k ] i l l i n g [ o f ] a f e t u s , " V a . Code Ann. § 18.2-32.2 ( 2 0 0 9 ) , b u t t h e t e r m " f e t u s " i s n o t d e f i n e d i n t h e c r i m i n a l code a n d h a s n o t y e t b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e Supreme C o u r t o f V i r g i n i a . 1 7 63 1110176; 1110219 i m p o s i t i o n o f the death p e n a l t y . murder o f a p r e g n a n t 1 8 In nine other states, the woman a n d h e r u n b o r n c h i l d can l e a d t o the a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e death p e n a l t y under s t a t u t e s t h a t a l l o w for i m p o s i n g t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y where a d e f e n d a n t m u r d e r s more than one p e r s o n killing i n a single t h a t would incident. be c a p i t a l murder 1 9 And i n F l o r i d a , i f the pregnant a woman d i e d i s c a p i t a l murder i f t h e mother s u r v i v e s b u t h e r unborn child dies. C. 2 0 R e s t r i c t i o n s on I m p o s i t i o n o f t h e D e a t h P e n a l t y Of t h e 33 s t a t e s i n w h i c h t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i s a u t h o r i z e d by law, a t l e a s t 23 s t a t e s have statutes p r o h i b i t i n g the A r i z . Rev. S t a t . § 1 3 - 7 5 1 ( F ) ( 9 ) (specifically listing t h e k i l l i n g o f an u n b o r n c h i l d a s an a g g r a v a t i n g f a c t o r ) ; C o l o . Rev. S t a t . A n n . § 1 8 - 1 . 3 - 1 2 0 1 ( 5 ) ( q ) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; D e l . Code Ann. t i t . 11, § 4 2 0 9 ( e ) ( 1 ) ( p ) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(16) ( l i m i t e d t o c a s e s where t h e u n b o r n c h i l d h a d r e a c h e d v i a b i l i t y ) ; 42 P a . Cons. S t a t . Ann. § 9 7 1 1 ( d ) ( 1 7 ) ( l i m i t e d t o c a s e s where t h e p r e g n a n c y i s i n i t s third t r i m e s t e r ) ; Tenn. Code A n n . § 3 9 - 1 3 - 2 0 4 ( i ) ( 1 6 ) (Supp. 2 0 1 2 ) ; Va. Code A n n . § 1 8 . 2 - 3 1 ( 1 1 ) (Supp. 2 0 1 2 ) . 1 8 S e e § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . Code 1975; A r k . Code Ann. § 5 - 1 0 - 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 ) , ( 9 A ) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 1 9 - 2 5 1 5 ( 9 ) ( b ) ; Mo. Rev. S t a t . § 565.032 2 ( 2 ) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code. Ann. § 2 9 2 9 . 0 4 ( A ) ( 9 ) ; O k l a . S t a t . t i t . 2 1 , § 701.12 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 1 6 - 3 - 2 0 ( C ) ( a ) ( 9 ) ; V e r n o n ' s Tex. P e n a l Code Ann. § 1 9 . 0 3 ( a ) ( 7 ) ; U t a h Code A n n . § 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 2 ( 1 ) ( b ) . 19 2 0 Fla. S t a t . Ann. § 782.09(1)(a) 64 (2012). 1110176; 1110219 execution of a pregnant sentenced to death, woman. t h e woman's permitting t h e unborn c h i l d protecting t h a t unborn c h i l d ' s III. Tort I f a pregnant sentence t o develop woman i s i s suspended, a n d be b o r n , thus life. T o r t Law law r e c o g n i z e s t h e humanity o f unborn c h i l d r e n by permitting a c t i o n s t o r e c o v e r damages f o r p r e n a t a l for prenatal wrongful A. Thirty prenatal 21 states injuries, i n j u r y and death. Prenatal permit Injuries recovery regardless o f damages of the f o r nonfatal g e s t a t i o n a l age o f t h e A l a . Code 1975, § 15-18-86; A r i z . Rev. S t a t . A n n . §§ 13-4025, 4026 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; A r k . Code Ann. § 1 6 - 9 0 - 5 0 6 ( d ) ( 2 ) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; C a l . P e n a l Code §§ 3705, 3706 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; F l a . S t a t . Ann. § 922.08 ( 2 0 0 1 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 17-10-34, 17-10-39 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; I d a h o Code Ann. §§ 19-2713, 19-2714, 19-2719a ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. § 35-38-6-10 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; K a n . S t a t . Ann. § 22-4009 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 4 3 1 . 2 4 0 ( 2 ) ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; L a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 15:567(D) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; Md. Code Ann., C o r r . S e r v s . § 3-902(e) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; M i s s . Code Ann. § 99-19-57 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; Mo. Ann. S t a t . § 546.800 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; Mont. Code A n n . §§ 46-19-203, 46-19-204 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. §§ 29-2540, 29-2541 (200 9 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 17 6.465 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. § 2949.31 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; O k l a . Rev. S t a t . A n n . t i t . 22, §§ 1010, 1011 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A) ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws § 23A-27A-27 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; U t a h Code Ann. § 77-19-202 (Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) ; Wyo. S t a t . §§ 7-13-912, 7-13-913 (2007). 2 1 65 1110176; 1110219 unborn c h i l d a t t h e time the c h i l d s u f f e r e d those i n j u r i e s . 2 2 W o l f e v. I s b e l l , 280 So. 2 d 758, 761 ( A l a . 1973) (express statement i n context o f wrongful-death action); W a l k e r b y P i z a n o v . M a r t , 790 P.2d 735, 739 ( A r i z . C t . A p p . 1990) ( d i c t u m i n w r o n g f u l - l i f e a c t i o n ) ; C a l . C i v . Code § 43.1 (2007) ("A c h i l d c o n c e i v e d , b u t n o t y e t b o r n , i s deemed an e x i s t i n g p e r s o n , s o f a r as n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t s i n t h e event o f t h e c h i l d ' s subsequent b i r t h . " ) ; Keleman v. S u p e r i o r C o u r t , 136 C a l . App. 3 d 861, 186 C a l . R p t r . 566, 568 (1982) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; E m p i r e C a s . Co. v . S t . P a u l F i r e & M a r i n e I n s . Co., 764 P.2d 1 1 9 1 , 1195-97 ( C o l o . 1988) (by implication i n decision recognizing cause o f a c t i o n f o r p r e - c o n c e p t i o n t o r t ) ; Simon v . M u l l i n , 380 A . 2 d 1353, 1357 (Conn. S u p e r . C t . 1977) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; Day v . N a t i o n w i d e Mut. I n s . Co., 328 So. 2d 560, 562 ( F l a . D i s t . C t . App. 1976) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; L a R u s s o v . G a r n e r , 888 So. 2d 712, 719 ( F l a . D i s t . C t . App. 2004) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; H o r n b u c k l e v . P l a n t a t i o n P i p e L i n e Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; M c A u l e y v . W i l l s , 251 Ga. 3, 303 S.E.2d 258, 259-60 (1983) ( d i c t u m i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; R e n s l o w v. M e n n o n i t e Hosp., 67 I l l . 2d 348, 352-53, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1252-53, 10 I l l . Dec. 484, 486-87 (1977) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n d e c i s i o n r e c o g n i z i n g cause o f a c t i o n f o r p r e c o n c e p t i o n t o r t ) ; S t a l l m a n v . Y o u n g q u i s t , 125 I l l . 2d 267, 272-73, 531 N.E.2d 355, 357-58, 126 I l l . Dec. 60, 62-63 (1988) (following R e n s l o w ) ; Cowe b y Cowe v . Forum Group, I n c . , 541 N.E.2d 962, 967-68 ( I n d . C t . App. 1 9 8 9 ) , a f f ' d i n p a r t , r e v ' d i n p a r t , a n d remanded, 575 N.E.2d 630, 636-37 ( I n d . 1991) ( a d o p t i n g Restatement (Second) o f T o r t s § 8 6 9 ( 1 ) ) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; Humes v . C l i n t o n , 246 K a n . 590, 596, 792 P.2d 1032, 1037 (1990) ( d i c t u m i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Danos v . S t . P i e r r e , 402 So. 2d 633 ( L a . 1981) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Group H e a l t h A s s ' n , I n c . v . B l u m e n t h a l , 295 Md. 104, 117-18, 453 A . 2 d 1198, 1206-07 (1983) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; P a y t o n v . A b b o t t L a b s . , 386 Mass. 540, 559-64, 437 N.E.2d 1 7 1 , 182-85 (1982) (prenatal i n j u r y ) ; T o r i g i a n v . W a t e r t o w n News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Womack v . B u c h h o r n , 384 M i c h . 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; C o n n o r v . Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; B e r g s t r e s s e r 2 2 66 1110176; 1110219 v. M i t c h e l l , 448 F. Supp. 10, 14-15 (E.D. Mo. 1 9 7 7 ) , a f f ' d , 577 F.2d 22, 25-26 ( 8 t h C i r . 1978) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n d e c i s i o n r e c o g n i z i n g cause o f a c t i o n f o r p r e c o n c e p t i o n t o r t ) ; M i l l e r v. D u h a r t , 637 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Mo. C t . App. 1982) ( d i c t u m i n " w r o n g f u l - l i f e " c a s e ) ; Weaks v . M o u n t e r , 88 Nev. 118, 121-22, 493 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1972) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; W h i t e v . Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 532-33, 458 P.2d 617, 620-21 (1969) (express s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; B e n n e t t v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 4 8 3 , 147 A . 2 d 108 (1958) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; S m i t h v . B r e n n a n , 31 N . J . 3 5 3 , 362-63, 157 A . 2 d 497, 502 (1960) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; Hughson v . S t . F r a n c i s Hosp. o f P o r t J e r v i s , 459 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (N.Y. App. D i v . 1983) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; K e l l y v . G r e g o r y , 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (N.Y. App. D i v . 1953) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; S t e t s o n v . E a s t e r l i n g , 274 N.C. 152, 155-56, 161 S.E.2d 531, 533-34 (1968) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Gay v . Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 399, 146 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1966) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; H o p k i n s v . McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 864 (N.D. 1985) ( a d o p t i n g R e s t a t e m e n t (Second) o f t h e Law o f T o r t s § 869(1) i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; E v a n s v . O l s o n , 550 P.2d 924, 927 ( O k l a . 1976) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; S i n k l e r v . K n e a l e , 401 P a . 267, 273, 164 A . 2 d 93, 96 (1960) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; S y l v i a v . G o b e i l l e , 101 R . I . 76, 220 A . 2 d 222 (1966) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; Re C e r t i f i c a t i o n o f a Q u e s t i o n o f Law f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; D e l g a d o v . Y a n d e l l , 468 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App. 1 9 7 1 ) , w r i t r e f ' d n . r . e . p e r c u r i a m , 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; K a l a f u t v . G r u v e r , 239 Va. 278, 283, 389 S.E.2d 6 8 1 , 683-84 (1990) ( a d o p t i n g Restatement (Second) o f T o r t s § 869(1) i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; H a r b e s o n v . P a r k e - D a v i s , I n c . , 98 Wash. 2d 460, 479, 656 P.2d 483, 495 (1983) ( d i c t u m i n " w r o n g f u l - l i f e " c a s e ) ; S e a t t l e - F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank v . R a n k i n , 59 Wash. 2d 288, 290¬ 91, 367 P.2d 835, 837-38 (1962) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; F a r l e y v . S a r t i n , 195 W. V a . 6 7 1 , 6 8 1 , 466 S.E.2d 522, 532 (1995) (express statement i n context of wrongful-death action); K w a t e r s k i v . S t a t e Farm Mut. A u t o I n s . Co., 148 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Wis. 1967) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; P u h l v . M i l w a u k e e A u t o . I n s . Co., 99 N.W.2d 163, 169-71 ( W i s . 1959) ( d i c t u m i n p r e n a t a l - i n j u r y c a s e ) , 67 1110176; 1110219 Seventeen action o t h e r s t a t e s a n d t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a p e r m i t an t o r e c o v e r damages injuries occur after for prenatal viability, injuries b u t have not when those determined w h e t h e r an a c t i o n may be b r o u g h t f o r i n j u r i e s o c c u r r i n g b e f o r e viability. 2 3 o v e r r u l e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , I n r e E s t a t e o f S t r o m s t e d , 299 N.W.2d 226, 229-30 (Wis. 1980) . See g e n e r a l l y R o l a n d F. C h a s e , A n n o t . , L i a b i l i t y f o r P r e n a t a l I n j u r i e s , 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971 & Supp. May 2011) ( c o l l e c t i n g c a s e s ) . C r u s s e l l v . E l e c t r o l u x Home P r o d s . , I n c . , 4 99 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1138-41 (W.D. A r k . 2007) ( a p p l y i n g A r k a n s a s l a w ) ; L u f f v . H a w k i n s , 551 A . 2 d 437, 438 n.1 ( D e l . S u p e r . C t . 1988) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Worgan v . Greggo & F e r r a r a , I n c . , 128 A . 2 d 557 ( D e l . S u p e r . C t . 1956) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Wade v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 745 F. Supp. 1573, 1579 (D. Haw. 1990) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; V o l k v. B a l d a z o , 651 P.2d 1 1 , 13 (Idaho 1982) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Lambert v. S i s t e r s o f Mercy H e a l t h C o r p . , 369 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1985) ( r e c o g n i z i n g a c t i o n f o r m e d i c a l m a l p r a c t i c e i n a t t e n d i n g p r e g n a n t woman); K i l k e r v. M u l r y , 437 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa C t . App. 1988) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; M i t c h e l l v . Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; C i t y o f L o u i s v i l l e v. Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Ky. 1968) (same); V e r k e n n e s v . C o r n i e a , 229 M i n n . 3 6 5 , 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (same); P e h r s o n v . K i s t n e r , 222 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. 1974) ( f o l l o w i n g V e r k e n n e s ) ; R a i n e y v . H o r n , 221 M i s s . 269, 281-82, 72 So. 2d 434, 439-40 (1954) (express statement i n context o f wrongful-death action); S t r z e l c z y k v . J e t t , 264 Mont. 153, 870 P.2d 730 (1994) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; H a r t l e y v . Guthmann, 248 Neb. 13, 532 N.W.2d 331 (1995) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; M i l e s v . Box B u t t e C n t y . , 241 Neb. 588, 489 N.W.2d 829 (1992) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; D a v i l a v . B o d e l s o n , 103 N.M. 2 4 3 , 704 P.2d 1119 (N.M. C t . App. 1985) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; W i l l i a m s v . M a r i o n R a p i d Transit, I n c . , 152 O h i o S t . 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949) 2 3 68 1110176; 1110219 B. Wrongful Death F o r t y s t a t e s and the D i s t r i c t o f Columbia p e r m i t r e c o v e r y of damages f o r the wrongful post-viability birth. 2 4 specially, Of t h e s e o f an u n b o r n t o t h a t c h i l d cause See H a m i l t o n v . S c o t t , concurring JJ.). injuries death joined states, child i t s death when before 97 So. 3d a t 737 ( P a r k e r , J . , by 2 also Stuart, Bolin, and Wise, a l l o w r e c o v e r y i n any case ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; G r i f f i t h s v . D o c t o r s Hosp., 150 O h i o App. 3d 234, 238, 780 N.E.2d 603, 606 (2002) ( d i c t u m i n w r o n g f u l d e a t h c a s e ) ; M a l l i s o n v . Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h c a s e ) ; H a l l v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 262, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1960) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Shousha v. M a t t h e w s D r i v u r s e l f S e r v . , I n c . , 210 Tenn. 384, 395-96, 358 S.W.2d 4 7 1 , 476 (1962) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; R e i s e r v . L o h n e r , 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) ( a p p a r e n t l y r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t a cause o f a c t i o n f o r p r e n a t a l i n j u r i e s e x i s t s i n U t a h ) ; V a i l l a n c o u r t v. M e d i c a l C t r . Hosp. o f V e r m o n t , I n c . , 139 V t . 138, 141-42, 425 A . 2 d 92, 94-95 (1980) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n wrongful-death action); G r e a t e r S o u t h e a s t Cmty. Hosp. v . W i l l i a m s , 482 A . 2 d 394, 396 & n.2 (D.C. C t . App. 1984) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f wrongful-death action). I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e c a s e s c i t e d s u p r a nn. 22-23, s e e : E i c h v . G u l f S h o r e s , 293 A l a . 95, 300 So. 2d 354 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; S u m m e r f i e l d v . S u p e r i o r C o u r t , 144 A r i z . 467, 474-79, 698 P.2d 712, 719-24 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; A k a v . J e f f e r s o n Hosp. A s s ' n , I n c . , 344 A r k . 627, 637-43, 42 S.W.3d 508, 515-19 (2001) (see a l s o A r k . Code Ann. § 1 6 - 6 2 - 1 0 2 ( a ) (1) ( M i c h i e 2005) ( r e c o g n i z i n g c a u s e of a c t i o n f o r t h e w r o n g f u l - d e a t h o f a v i a b l e unborn c h i l d ) ) ; E s p a d e r o v . F e l d , 649 F. Supp. 1480, 1483-85 (D. C o l o . 1 9 8 6 ) , c i t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l i n K e e f e v . P i z z a Hut o f A m e r i c a , I n c . , 868 P.2d 1092, 1094 ( C o l o . C t . App. 1 9 9 4 ) ; G o r k e v . L e c l e r c , 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A . 2 d 448 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; F l o r e n c e v . Town o f 2 4 69 1110176; 1110219 where t h e c h i l d dies after q u i c k e n i n g even i f i t i s n o t y e t P l a i n f i e l d , 48 Conn. Supp. 4 4 0 , 452-60, 849 A . 2 d 7, 15-19 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; P o r t e r v . L a s s i t e r , 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; S h i r l e y v . B a c o n , 154 Ga. App. 2 0 3 , 267 S.E.2d 809 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; Wade v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 745 F. Supp. 1573 (D. Haw. 1990); C h r i s a f o g e o r g i s v. Brandenberg, 55 I l l . 2 d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; H a l e v . M a n i o n , 189 K a n . 143, 368 P.2d 1 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; S t a t e e x r e l . Odham v . Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A . 2 d 71 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; Mone v . G r e y h o u n d L i n e s , I n c . , 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; O ' N e i l l v . M o r s e , 385 M i c h . 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; J a r v i s v . P r o v i d e n c e Hosp., 178 M i c h . App. 586, 444 N.W.2d 236, 238 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ; O'Grady v . Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1 9 8 3 ) ; S t r z e l c z y k v . J e t t , 264 Mont. 153, 870 P.2d 730 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . § 3 0 - 8 0 9 ( 1 ) (2010); P o l i q ui n v. ^n v i \ / r - , ^ ^ ^ ^ - , i ^ 1 r\i -NT TT 1 r\ A - r o c -A o / i n / - r n c T N . a i ^ , M a c d o n a l d , 101 N.H. 104, 135 A . 2 d 249 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ; S a l a z a r v . S t . V i n c e n t Hosp. , 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (N.M. C t . App. 1 9 8 0 ) ; D i D o n a t o v . Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ; W e r l i n g v . Sandy, 17 O h i o S t . 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; L i b b e e v . P e r m a n e n t e C l i n i c , 268 O r . 258, 518 P.2d 636 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; Amadio v . L e v i n , 509 Pa. 199, 501 A . 2 d 1085 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; P r e s l e y v . N e w p o r t Hosp. , 117 R . I . 177, 365 A . 2 d 748 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ; F o w l e r v . Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; Re C e r t i f i c a t i o n o f Q u e s t i o n o f Law f r o m U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 38 7 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1 9 8 6 ) ; Tenn. Code A n n . § 2 0 - 5 - 1 0 6 ( c ) ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; Tex. C i v . P r a c . & Rem. Code A n n . § 7 1 . 0 0 1 ( 4 ) (Vernon 2 0 0 6 ) ; Carranza v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 267 P.3d 912 (Utah 2011) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g f o r m e r U t a h Code A n n . § 78-11-6 (Supp. 2 0 0 6 ) ) ; Moen v . Hanson, 85 Wash. 2 d 597, 537 P.2d 266 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . See g e n e r a l l y S h e l d o n R. S h a p i r o , A n n o t . , R i g h t t o M a i n t a i n A c t i o n o r t o R e c o v e r Damages f o r D e a t h o f U n b o r n C h i l d , 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978 & Supp. May 2011) ( c o l l e c t i n g c a s e s ) . 70 1110176; 1110219 viable, of 2 5 a n d 11 s t a t e s a l l o w r e c o v e r y r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e s t a g e pregnancy when t h e i n j u r y a n d d e a t h occur. 2 6 P o r t e r v . L a s s i t e r , 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; R a i n e y v . H o r n , 221 M i s s . 269, 72 So. 2d 434 ( 1 9 5 4 ) ; M i s s . Code A n n . § 11-7-13 (2004) (amending w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e an " u n b o r n q u i c k c h i l d " ) . 2 5 M a c k v . Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 ( A l a . 2 0 1 1 ) ; 740 I l l . Comp. S t a t . A n n . § 180/2.2 (2010) (amending w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e t o a p p l y t o an u n b o r n c h i l d r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e s t a g e o f g e s t a t i o n o r d e v e l o p m e n t ) (but s e e M i l l e r v . I n f e r t i l i t y Group of I l l i n o i s , I n c . , 386 I l l . App. 3 d 1 4 1 , 897 N.E.2d 837, 325 I l l . Dec. 298 (2008) ( s t a t u t e does n o t a p p l y t o p r e - i m p l a n t e d f e r t i l i z e d o v a ) ) ; J o h n s o n v . S o u t h e r n New O r l e a n s L i g h t & T r a c t i o n Co., D o c k e t 9048 ( L a . C t . App. Dec. 10, 1923) ( r e j e c t i n g v i a b i l i t y s t a n d a r d f o r w r o n g f u l death o f unborn c h i l d ) ; Danos v . S t . P i e r r e , 402 So. 2d 633, 638-39 ( L a . 1981) ( a p p r o v i n g J o h n s o n ' s r e j e c t i o n o f v i a b i l i t y ) ; Danos v . S t . P i e r r e , 383 So. 2d 1019, 1027 ( L a . C t . App. 1980) ( L o t t i n g e r , J . , c o n c u r r i n g ) , a f f ' d , 402 So. 2 d 633 ( L a . 1 9 9 1 ) ; L a . C i v . Code Ann. a r t . 26 (1999) ("An u n b o r n c h i l d s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d as a n a t u r a l p e r s o n f o r w h a t e v e r r e l a t e s t o i t s i n t e r e s t s f r o m t h e moment o f c o n c e p t i o n ; I f t h e c h i l d i s b o r n dead, i t s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d n e v e r t o have e x i s t e d as a p e r s o n , e x c e p t f o r purposes o f a c t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from i t s w r o n g f u l d e a t h . " ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws A n n . § 600.2922a ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; C o n n o r v . Monkem, 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g s t a t u t e s e t t i n g f o r t h r u l e o f c o n s t r u c t i o n ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . § 3 0 - 8 0 9 ( 1 ) (2010) (amending w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e "an u n b o r n c h i l d i n u t e r o a t any s t a g e o f g e s t a t i o n " ) ; O k l a . S t a t . A n n . t i t . 12, § 1 0 5 3 ( F ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) , t i t . 63, § 1-730 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; S.D. Code A n n . § 21-5-1 (1987) (amending w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e "an u n b o r n c h i l d " ) ; Wiersma v . M a p l e L e a f Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e ) ; T e x . Civ. P r a c . & Rem. Code A n n . § 7 1 . 0 0 1 ( 4 ) (Vernon 2008) (defining " i n d i v i d u a l " i n wrongful-death statute t o include "an unborn child a t every stage of gestation from f e r t i l i z a t i o n u n t i l b i r t h " ) ; C a r r a n z a v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 267 P.3d 912 (Utah 2 0 1 1 ) ; F a r l e y v . S a r t i n , 195 W. V a . 67, 466 S.E.2d 522 (1995) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e ) . 26 71 1110176; 1110219 IV. All court states to interests G u a r d i a n s h i p Law -- b y s t a t u t e , appoint a guardian o f an u n b o r n e s t a t e s and t r u s t s . r u l e , or precedent child ad litem to -- p e r m i t a represent the i n various matters including 2 7 S e e § 19-3B-305, A l a . Code 1975; A l a s k a S t a t . § 1 3 . 0 6 . 1 2 0 ( 4 ) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; A r i z . Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 14-1408 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; A r k . Code Ann. § 2 8 - 7 3 - 3 0 5 ( a ) (Supp. 2 0 0 9 ) ; C a l . C i v . P r a c . Code § 373.5 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; C o l o . Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 1 5 - 1 0 - 4 0 3 ( 5 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Conn. Gen. S t a t . Ann. § 45a-132 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; D e l a w a r e : R u l e 17(c), Chancery Court Rules (2012); F l a . S t a t . Ann. § 731.303(4) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 5 3 - 1 1 - 2 ( b ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; H a w a i i : R u l e 2 8 ( b ) , P r o b a t e R u l e s ; I d a h o Code Ann. § 1 5 - 1 - 4 0 3 ( d ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; 735 I l l . Comp. S t a t . Ann. § 5/2-501 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. § 2 9 - 1 - 1 - 2 0 ( b ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 633A.6306 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Kan. S t a t . A n n . § 59-2205 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 389A.035 (2010); L a . C i v . Code Ann. a r t . 252 (2008) (authorizing appointment of "curator" to represent the i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n p e r s o n ) ; Me. Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 18-B, § 305 (2011) ( a u t h o r i z i n g a p p o i n t m e n t o f a " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " t o r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n p e r s o n i n a m a t t e r c o n c e r n i n g a t r u s t ) ; S p e n c e r v . M c M u l l e n , 198 Md. 90, 81 A . 2 d 237 (1951) ( a u t h o r i z i n g a p p o i n t m e n t o f a g u a r d i a n a d l i t e m t o r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2045 ( 1 9 9 6 ) ; M i n n . S t a t . Ann. § 501B.19 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; M i s s i s s i p p i : R u l e 1 7 ( c ) , R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e ; Mo. Ann. S t a t . § 4 7 2 . 3 0 0 ( 4 ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Mont. Code Ann. § 7 2 - 3 5 - 3 1 3 ( 1 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 3 0 - 2 2 2 2 ( 4 ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 1 5 5 . 1 4 0 ( 1 ) ( h ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; N.H. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 498-A:23 (2009) ( e m i n e n t - d o m a i n p r o c e e d i n g s ) ; New J e r s e y : R u l e 4 : 2 6 - 3 ( a ) , R u l e s o f C o u r t ; N.M. S t a t . § 45-1-403(D) (Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; N.Y. S u r r . C t . P r o c . A c t Law § 315 (McKinney 1994); N o r t h C a r o l i n a : R u l e 1 7 ( b ) ( 4 ) , R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e ; N.D. C e n t . Code § 3 0 . 1 - 0 3 - 0 3 ( 5 ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. § 5803.05 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; O k l a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 12, § 1147.3 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; Or. Rev. S t a t . § 130.120 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; P e n n s y l v a n i a : R u l e 1 2 . 4 ( a ) , O r p h a n s ' C o u r t R u l e s ; S.C. Code Ann. § 6 2 - 1 - 4 0 3 ( 4 ) 27 72 1110176; 1110219 V. Every H e a l t h - C a r e Law s t a t e p e r m i t s competent a d u l t s t o execute directives, including living attorney f o r h e a l t h care. wills o r she i s u n a b l e health care. states prohibit powers of These documents d e s c r i b e t h e t y p e s of h e a l t h care the author wishes he and d u r a b l e advance to receive or not receive i f t o make d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g h i s o r h e r With a few l i m i t e d the withdrawal e x c e p t i o n s , however, or withholding of most life- s u s t a i n i n g t r e a t m e n t f r o m a p r e g n a n t woman, r e g a r d l e s s o f h e r advance directive. 2 8 Similarly, those states generally ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws § 5 5 - 3 - 3 2 ( 3 ) ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 5 - 3 0 5 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Tex. P r o p . Code § 1 1 5 . 0 1 4 ( a ) (Vernon Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; U t a h Code Ann. § 75-7-305 (2010); V e r m o n t : R u l e 1 8 ( c ) , P r o b a t e R u l e s ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 11.96A.160 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; W. V a . Code A n n . § 44D-3-305 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; W i s . Stat. Ann. § 4 8 . 2 3 5 ( 1 ) ( f ) (2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-305(a) (2009) (authorizing appointment of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n p e r s o n i n matters concerning a t r u s t ) . S e e § 2 2 - 8 A - 4 ( h ) , A l a . Code 1975 ("Advance D i r e c t i v e f o r H e a l t h C a r e , " § 3 ) ; s e e a l s o A l a s k a S t a t . § 13.52.055 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; A r k . Code Ann. § 2 0 - 1 7 - 2 0 6 ( c ) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; Conn. Gen. S t a t . Ann. § 19a-574 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; D e l . Code Ann. t i t . 16, § 2 5 0 3 ( j ) ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; F l a . S t a t . A n n . § 765.113(2) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 31-32-4 (2009) (Form, P a r t Two, 5 ( 9 ) ) , 3 1 - 3 2 - 9 ( a ) ( 1 ) ; I d a h o Code Ann. §§ 39-4504 (2002) (A L i v i n g W i l l , 5 4 ) , 39-4505 (2002) (A D u r a b l e Power o f A t t o r n e y f o r H e a l t h C a r e , 5 4 ) ; 755 I l l . Comp. S t a t . Ann. 3 5 / 3 ( c ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. § 1 6 - 3 6 - 4 - 8 ( d ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 144A.6(2) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; K a n . S t a t . Ann. § 6 5 - 2 8 , 1 0 3 ( a ) (2008) ( l a s t s e n t e n c e ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. §§ 3 1 1 . 6 2 5 ( 1 ) ( f o r m ) , 311.629(4) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 28 73 1110176; 1110219 p r o h i b i t an a g e n t a c t i n g u n d e r a h e a l t h - c a r e power o f a t t o r n e y f r o m a u t h o r i z i n g an abortion. 2 9 Conclusion The decision widespread of t h i s Court today i s i n keeping w i t h l e g a l r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t unborn c h i l d r e n are the persons 7 0 0 . 5 5 0 9 ( 1 ) ( d ) , 7 0 0 . 5 5 1 2 ( 1 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Mo. Ann. S t a t . § 459.025 (2007) ; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 5 0 - 9 - 1 0 6 ( 7 ) , 5 0 - 9 - 2 0 2 ( 3 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. §§ 2 0 - 4 0 8 ( 3 ) (2008), 30-3417(1)(b) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 4 4 9 . 6 2 4 ( 4 ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 137-J:5(V)(c) (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 2 3 - 0 6 . 5 - 0 9 ( 5 ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. § 1337.13(D) ( 2 0 0 6 ) , § 2133.06(B) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; O k l a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 63, §§ 3101.4(C) (Advance D i r e c t i v e f o r H e a l t h C a r e Form, 5 I V ( c ) ) , 3101.8(C) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; 20 Pa. Cons. S t a t . Ann. §§ 5 4 2 9 ( a ) , (b) (2008) (see a l s o t i t . 20, § 5 4 2 9 ( b ) (do-not-resuscitate o r d e r s ) ) ; R . I . Gen. Laws §§ 2 3 - 4 . 1 0 - 5 ( c ) , 2 3 - 4 . 1 1 - 6 ( c ) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-77-70 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , 62-5-504(G) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws §§ 34-12D-10 ( 2 0 0 4 ) , 59-7-2.8 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; Tex. H e a l t h & S a f e t y Code Ann. § 166.049 (Vernon 2010) (see a l s o § 166.098 (do-not-resuscitate orders)); Utah Code Ann. § 75-2a-123(1) (Supp. 2010); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7 0 . 1 2 2 . 0 3 0 ( 1 ) ( d ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; W i s . S t a t . Ann. § 154.03 ( D i r e c t i v e to Attending Physician, para. 4) (2006) (see also § 154.19(1)(e) ( d o - n o t - r e s u s c i t a t e orders)). S e e § 2 6 - 1 - 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975; see a l s o A l a s k a Stat. § 13.26.150(e)(2) (2008) (restriction on guardian a u t h o r i z i n g an a b o r t i o n ) ; C a l . P r o b . Code § 4652(e) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; Fla. S t a t . Ann. § 765.113(1) (2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 3 1 - 3 2 - 1 4 ( b ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. § 1 6 2 A . 8 5 0 ( 1 ) ( e ) (2009) ; N.D. C e n t . Code § 2 3 - 0 6 - 5 . 0 3 ( 6 ) (Supp. 2 0 0 9 ) ; O k l a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 30, § 3-119(3) (2009) ( r e s t r i c t i o n on g u a r d i a n a u t h o r i z i n g an a b o r t i o n ) ; Or. Rev. S t a t . § 127.540(5) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; Tex. H e a l t h & S a f e t y Code § 1 6 6 . 1 5 2 ( f ) ( 4 ) (Vernon 2010) (see a l s o § 166.163 ( f o r m o f d i s c l o s u r e s t a t e m e n t ) ) ; Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-2 983.3(B) (Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) . 29 74 1110176; 1110219 w i t h r i g h t s t h a t s h o u l d be p r o t e c t e d b y l a w . Today, t h e o n l y major area in which unborn children are denied legal p r o t e c t i o n i s a b o r t i o n , and t h a t d e n i a l i s o n l y because o f the dictates cases o f Roe. Furthermore, i s consistent with the d e c i s i o n the Declaration Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h s t a t e s t h a t i n the present of Rights " a l l men a r e e q u a l l y f r e e a n d i n d e p e n d e n t ; t h a t t h e y a r e endowed b y t h e i r with certain inalienable rights; i n the Creator that among t h e s e a r e l i f e , l i b e r t y and the p u r s u i t o f h a p p i n e s s . " A l a . C o n s t . 1901, § 1 (emphasis added). 3 0 These words, borrowed from t h e f i r s t guarantee o f t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o f Independence, which s t a t e s t h a t "[w]e h o l d t h e s e t r u t h s t o be s e l f - e v i d e n t , t h a t a l l men a r e c r e a t e d e q u a l , t h a t t h e y a r e endowed b y t h e i r C r e a t o r w i t h c e r t a i n u n a l i e n a b l e R i g h t s , t h a t among t h e s e a r e L i f e , L i b e r t y a n d t h e p u r s u i t o f H a p p i n e s s , " a f f i r m t h a t each p e r s o n has a God-given right to l i f e . 30 75 1110176; SHAW, 1110219 Justice (concurring i n part and concurring i n the result). These cases present the very narrow i s s u e word " c h i l d " i n A l a . Code 1975, § 26-15-3.2, endangerment statute," Section 26-15-3.2(a) includes an unborn whether the the "chemical- child or fetus. provides: "(a) A r e s p o n s i b l e p e r s o n commits t h e c r i m e o f c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t o f e x p o s i n g a c h i l d t o an e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h he o r she does any o f t h e following: "(1) Knowingly, recklessly, or i n t e n t i o n a l l y causes or p e r m i t s a c h i l d t o be e x p o s e d t o , t o i n g e s t o r i n h a l e , o r t o have c o n t a c t w i t h a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-12-260. ... "(2) V i o l a t e s s u b d i v i s i o n (1) a n d a c h i l d s u f f e r s s e r i o u s p h y s i c a l i n j u r y by exposure t o , i n g e s t i o n o f , i n h a l a t i o n o f , or c o n t a c t w i t h a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , chemical substance, or drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a . "(3) V i o l a t e s s u b d i v i s i o n (1) a n d t h e exposure, i n g e s t i o n , i n h a l a t i o n , or contact r e s u l t s i n t h e d e a t h o f t h e c h i l d . ... " On J a n u a r y 31, 2009, a s o n , B.W. The Hope E l i s a b e t h Ankrom gave b i r t h t o evidence at t r i a l indicated that Ankrom t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r c o c a i n e p r i o r t o g i v i n g b i r t h and t h a t the child tested p o s i t i v e f o r cocaine a f t e r h i s b i r t h . 76 Medical 1110176; 1110219 r e c o r d s showed t h a t Ankrom h a d t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r c o c a i n e and marijuana on more Ankrom was c h a r g e d w i t h and p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o v i o l a t i n g § 26- 15-3.2(a)(1) in intentionally ingest or than one that she inhale, evidence Kimbrough knowingly, c a u s e d o r p e r m i t t e d B.W. or to have s u b s t a n c e , namely, c o c a i n e . The occasion during at indicated the that her pregnancy. recklessly, t o be contact with exposed a to, to controlled 3 1 trial she p r e g n a n t w i t h h e r s o n , Timmy. of Amanda Helaine Borden i n g e s t e d methamphetamine while He was b o r n p r e m a t u r e l y d u r i n g t h e 2 5 t h week o f t h e p r e g n a n c y and d i e d 19 m i n u t e s a f t e r from acute charged methamphetamine with, and pleaded or intoxication. guilty to, birth Kimbrough violating § was 26-15- 3 . 2 ( a ) ( 3 ) i n t h a t she k n o w i n g l y , r e c k l e s s l y , o r i n t e n t i o n a l l y caused inhale, namely, or or p e r m i t t e d Timmy to have t o be contact with methamphetamine, 32 exposed a to, to controlled ingest or substance, which r e s u l t e d i n h i s death. " C o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e " f o r p u r p o s e s o f § 26-15-3.2 i s d e f i n e d by A l a . Code 1975, § 2 6 - 1 5 - 2 ( 2 ) , w h i c h r e f e r s t o A l a . Code 1975, § 2 0 - 2 - 2 ( 4 ) , w h i c h i n t u r n r e f e r s t o , among o t h e r Code s e c t i o n s , A l a . Code 1975, § 20-2-25, w h i c h d e f i n e s c o c a i n e as a S c h e d u l e I I c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e . 3 1 Methamphetamine i s a Schedule I I I c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e . See A l a . Code 1975, § 20-2-27. 32 77 1110176; 1110219 The B.W. only issue involved i n t h e s e two a p p e a l s i s w h e t h e r a n d Timmy were e a c h a " c h i l d " w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f § 26- 15-3.2(a). "In d e t e r m i n i n g t h e meaning o f a s t a t u t e , t h i s C o u r t l o o k s t o t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e words as w r i t t e n b y t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . As we have s a i d : "'"Words u s e d i nn a s t a t u t e must be g i v e n i their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly u n d e r s t o o d m e a n i n g , a n d where p l a i n language i s u s e d a c o u r t i s bound t o i n t e r p r e t t h a t l a n g u a g e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s . I f t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e i s u n a m b i g u o u s , t h e n t h e r e i s no room f o r j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n D e K a l b C o u n t y LP Gas Co. v . S u b u r b a n Gas, I n c . , 729 So. 2d 270, 275 Nielsen, (Ala. 1998) (quoting Blue Cross & Blue 714 So. 2d 293, 296 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) , q u o t i n g Corp. v. Systems (Ala. Eng'g A s s o c s . Corp., S h i e l d v. i n t u r n IMED 602 So. 2d 344, 346 1992)). I s e e no p a t e n t o r l a t e n t a m b i g u i t y i n t h e w o r d i t i s n o t a term o f a r t and c o n t a i n s This Court's most cited dictionary no i n h e r e n t defines "child"; uncertainty. "child" as "an unborn or r e c e n t l y born person." Merriam-Webster's C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y 214 ( 1 1 t h e d . 2003) . The v e n e r a b l e O x f o r d Dictionary being; defines English " c h i l d " as an " u n b o r n o r n e w l y b o r n human fatus, infant." I I I The O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y 113 78 1110176; 1110219 (2d. e d . 1 9 8 9 ) . Dictionary 388 See a l s o Webster's (2002) (defining r e c e n t l y b o r n human b e i n g " ) . T h i r d New "child" as International "an unborn or The l a n g u a g e o f t h e Code s e c t i o n i s c l e a r ; t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o c o n s t r u e , no n e e d t o a t t e m p t t o d i v i n e the " i n t e n t " of the l e g i s l a t u r e , t h e Code f o r e x a m p l e s o f i t s u s a g e . and no n e e d t o s e a r c h C l e a r l y , B.W. a n d Timmy were e a c h a " c h i l d " u n d e r § 26-15-3.2 when t h e y were e x p o s e d to, ingested, inhaled, or had contact with a controlled substance. Some o f t h e a r g u m e n t s expressed by situations, 3 3 the made i n t h e s e c a s e s o r c o n c e r n s Justices are premised on hypothetical d i f f e r e n t from the f a c t s b e f o r e us, i n which the Code s e c t i o n m i g h t be e i t h e r unconstitutional seemingly unwise i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . as a p p l i e d I t goes w i t h o u t or saying T h e C h i e f J u s t i c e ' s e x a m p l e i n h i s d i s s e n t o f a woman, n o t k n o w i n g she was p r e g n a n t , b e i n g p r o s e c u t e d f o r d r i n k i n g wine i s i n a p p o s i t e . Wine i s n o t a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , c h e m i c a l s u b s t a n c e , o r d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a as t h o s e t e r m s a r e d e f i n e d i n t h e Code, a n d t h e mens r e a p r o v i s i o n s o f § 26-15¬ 3.2 w o u l d a r g u a b l y r e q u i r e t h a t a d e f e n d a n t know t h a t a c h i l d i s p r e s e n t . Such mens r e a r e q u i r e m e n t w o u l d a l s o a r g u a b l y n o t be s a t i s f i e d i n t h e s i t u a t i o n where an e x p e c t a n t m o t h e r i s a d m i n i s t e r e d a p r e s c r i p t i o n drug under the d i r e c t i o n of a p h y s i c i a n ; i t i s d i f f i c u l t to conclude t h a t the r e q u i s i t e c r i m i n a l i n t e n t e x i s t s where a woman--in g o o d f a i t h - - a c t s i n a c c o r d w i t h the s u p e r i o r m e d i c a l knowledge o f her t r e a t i n g physician. Thus, no e x c e p t i o n f o r p h y s i c i a n - p r e s c r i b e d c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s w o u l d a p p e a r t o be n e c e s s a r y . 33 79 1110176; 1110219 t h a t we c a n n o t s t r i k e down t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e Code s e c t i o n in Ankrom's section "'[i]t this because t h e Code i n some o f t h e enactments o f t h e Alabama other legislature, i s w e l l established that the l e g i s l a t u r e , Court, has t h e e x c l u s i v e policy i n Alabama.'" 2010) (Shaw, Parris, merely I t i s n o t t h e r o l e o f t h i s C o u r t t o s i t i n judgment 3 4 t h e wisdom and cases m i g h t be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a p p l i e d context. of and Kimbrough's domain to formulate and n o t public S u t t l e s v. Roy, 75 So. 3d 90, 104 ( A l a . J . , concurring specially 952 So. 2d 364, 367 and q u o t i n g ( A l a . 2006)). B o l e s v. See a l s o A l a . C o n s t . 1 9 0 1 , A r t . I I I , § 43. I concur w i t h t h e main o p i n i o n ' s " c h i l d " as u s e d i n § 26-15-3.2 includes to the remainder of the o p i n i o n , This certiorari 3 4 holding that t h e word an u n b o r n c h i l d . As I concur i n the r e s u l t . Court d i d not grant the p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of t o r e v i e w t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f § 26-15-3.2. 80 1110176; 1110219 MALONE, C h i e f I Justice (dissenting). respectfully construction dissent. of A l a . Code 1975, endangerment" s t a t u t e . the fundamental criminal construed few of the Crim. 53 [Ms. by the v. "The itself. rights So. States rule strictly, statutory that 3d 151 this intend to 14, That words governed regarding are actions department." parte 3d v. (Ala. is Chief J u s t i c e John M a r s h a l l in U.S. 95 18 (5 Wheat.) laws are to much l e s s old than the i n d i v i d u a l s ; and A fundamental penal not the Billingsley So. is Ex be rule Wiltberger, i s , perhaps, 2012] to criminalize. and by this of that 2010); the "chemical- statutes criminalizing (Ala. tenderness on power o f p u n i s h m e n t i s v e s t e d judicial on construction such avoid I t i s f o u n d e d on of § 26-15-3.2, t h e specifically 2012). exemplified (1820): turns Court i s therefore CR-10-0540, Dec. App. United not to case many c a s e s e s p o u s i n g t h i s p r i n c i p l e a r e Theodorou, State, did of i.e., narrowly legislature This rule statutes, This the Although s e t t l e d r u l e , i t refuses construction the p l a i n p r i n c i p l e that the the law legislative, the to apply 81 construed for i n the of be 76, majority not in the acknowledges i t , instead favoring 1110176; 1110219 a "common-sense" reading statute that statute as b r o a d l y of construes the the term as p o s s i b l e , chemical-endangerment "child" as to include used unborn in the children back to the i n s t a n t of c o n c e p t i o n . I have g r e a t difficulty accepting this construction in l i g h t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s a c t i o n i n 2006 t o amend A l a . Code 1975, § 13A-6-1(a)(3), statutes, A l a . Code 1975, the definition of that statute distinct from majority's the that language homicide "unborn was enacted uses i n the the child." that term homicide in The same year, "child," statute. as The r a t i o n a l e f o r i t s expansive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the statute i s that "unborn child" in statute shows children in specifically the Alabama's an statute statute in of § 13A-6-1 e t s e q . , t o i n c l u d e specifically chemical-endangerment of part "person" chemical-endangerment but a a i n s p i t e of the p l a i n language the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s use other concern statutes such for protection a l l instances, the even used the word " c h i l d , " chemical-endangerment when as of the the the of unborn legislature Although doubt the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s concern f o r the p r o t e c t i o n 82 homicide and n o t " u n b o r n statute. term I child," do not of unborn 1110176; 1110219 children, I wisdom the of statute. acting within an I must correct intent "child" in l e g i s l a t u r e as in to the statutes distinguish supplant the p l a i n language v. E d w a r d s , 32 My So. of 3d of the First, conceived, pregnant, set but and who by language used by actual l e g i s l a t u r e ' s use Court requires in this the context of the give as e x p r e s s e d i n Jefferson Cnty. who is majority's to other, majority without thereafter Comm'n ( A l a . 2009). the the to C o u r t must wisdom a s i m p l e a p p l i c a t i o n of by the i n other That i s , the leads out of when i t "common-sense" chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e problems. law principles terms 586 with potentially the is statute. 572, expansion of Court statute i n t e n t and the disagreement expansion this and purposed legislative specific term "unborn c h i l d " the two this judicial t h a t the those collective whether the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e . e f f e c t to the to chemical-endangerment was between the i t relates question contemporaneously using criminal questioning conservative legislature. I believe term was concerns Secondly, implying the have has 83 to i s that more the practical, present a woman knowledge that a glass that state who has she is o f w i n e , makes her 1110176; 1110219 subject to a felony State. Whether t h e c h e m i c a l s t h a t a r e h a r m f u l t o t h e unborn child are legal prosecution or i l l e g a l , a t the " d i s c r e t i o n " their ingestion of the o r use by a woman who h a s c o n c e i v e d h a s become a f e l o n y e v e n t h o u g h t h e act that intent. i s c r i m i n a l i z e d i s committed w i t h o u t I believe construed t h e chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e as by t h e m a j o r i t y for challenges of t h e Alabama require that therefore and the U n i t e d with expectant every situations that opinion mother, among many t h i n g s ; a these number impacted that concerns of by the majority's intentionally the statute pregnancy. I a do those things opinion. "common-sense" chemical-endangerment statue w i l l of Constitutions raises in are s i g n i f i c a n t l y m a t t e r " b a s e d on t h e m a j o r i t y ' s either Sates complex religious r a c i a l background, economic s t a t u s , and t h e n a t u r e o f conception, for concerns due p r o c e s s o f a n d e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n u n d e r t h e l a w s . the majority's the raises profound t o i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y under t h e p r o v i s i o n s Furthermore, faith, knowledge o r or not, strong not " a l l do n o t Finally, and s a d l y construction, now s u p p l y the women who h a v e , run afoul of the p r o s c r i p t i o n s incentive believe 84 to that terminate the their majority's 1110176; 1110219 construction legislature construction respectfully reflects or the long of the intent settled criminal 85 wisdom law governing statutes; dissent. and I this must of the Court's therefore 1110176; 1110219 MURDOCK, J u s t i c e ( d i s s e n t i n g ) . I Malone agree with much o f what i n h i s dissenting arguments made opinion b y Hope E l i s a b e t h Dismiss Indictment." i s said and Ankrom by Chief Justice with many of the i n her "Motion t o I n h e r m o t i o n , Ankrom a r g u e d " ' t h a t " c o u r t s i n o t h e r s t a t e s w h i c h have enacted t h e same or s i m i l a r chemical endangerment statutes have determined that such statutes do n o t a p p l y to p r e n a t a l c o n d u c t t h a t a l l e g e d l y harms a fetus"; that "[t]he state's contention that the defendant v i o l a t e d t h i s s t a t u t e r e n d e r s t h e law i m p e r m i s s i b l y vague, and therefore the r u l e of l e n i t y applies"; that "[t]he legislature has p r e v i o u s l y considered amending the statute to include prenatal c o n d u c t t h a t harms a f e t u s , a n d d e c l i n e d t o do s o " ; t h a t " t h e defendant has n o t been accorded due p r o c e s s b e c a u s e t h e r e was no n o t i c e t h a t her conduct was illegal under this statute"; that "[t]he prosecution of p r e g n a n t women i s a v i o l a t i o n of the constitutional guarantee of Equal P r o t e c t i o n " ; and t h a t " [ p ] r o s e c u t i o n o f pregnant, a l l e g e d l y drug-addicted women is against p u b l i c p o l i c y f o r numerous moral and e t h i c a l r e a s o n s . " ' " So. August quoting 3d a t 26, 2011] ( q u o t i n g Ankrom v . S t a t e , So. 3d , (Ala. Crim. i n t u r n Ankrom's m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s 86 [Ms. CR-09-1148, App. 2011), her indictment). 1110176; 1110219 In p a r t i c u l a r , I would must p r o v i d e ordinary prohibited. United n.12 persons States (11th C i r . 1997). 2d 347, So. 349 2d (1952). with v. See ( A l a . 1993); 202 reiterate also f o r the applicable v. to c r i m i n a l statutes. States, " r u l e of l e n i t y ... be regard, 530 U.S. of 120, requires construed in that favor State, strict 131 115 Ex p a r t e due-process foundation United rules clear notice Sepulveda, Fuller This that criminal 257 to legislature conclude, understood statute to protect So. 3d at changes t h a t . as the only possibility. 658 So. requirement is and 60 the lenity Castillo (explaining that v. the 'ambiguous c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e [ s ] of the accused'"). Kimbrough original children Nothing 887 A l a . 502, I note the s t a t e m e n t i n the main o p i n i o n possible 882, Mutrie, generally (2000) o f what i s F.3d construction See statutes this that " i ti s that the chemical-endangerment who i n the argues, In were statute already as now born." written 3 5 Indeed, i f i t i s not p o s s i b l e t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e understood the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e as p r o t e c t i n g o n l y c h i l d r e n who a r e a l r e a d y b o r n , has i t n o t made i n t o a f e l o n y the a c t of a pregnant mother i n i n g e s t i n g drugs p r e s c r i b e d t o h e r by a p h y s i c i a n ? The s t a t u t e c o n t a i n s an e x c e p t i o n f o r d r u g s p r e s c r i b e d t o a c h i l d , see A l a . Code 1975, § 26-15-3.2(c), but n o t i c e a b l y l a c k s any exception for c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s p r e s c r i b e d t o t h e m o t h e r by a p h y s i c i a n . 3 5 87 1110176; 1110219 I respectfully dissent. (The comment i n n o t e 33 o f J u s t i c e Shaw's s p e c i a l w r i t i n g r e g a r d i n g c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and p h y s i c i a n - p r e s c r i b e d substances p r e s u m e s t h a t one c a n n o t be g u i l t y o f v i o l a t i n g t h e c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e w i t h o u t h a v i n g an i n t e n t t o harm t h e c h i l d or a t l e a s t knowledge t h a t the exposure c o n t e m p l a t e d i s l i k e l y t o do s o . The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t i n c l u d e s u c h a requirement i n the s t a t u t e . The only criminal intent p r e s c r i b e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e r e l a t e s t o t h e e x p o s u r e e l e m e n t i t s e l f ( i . e . , the requirement t h a t the defendant " [ k ] n o w i n g l y , r e c k l e s s l y , o r i n t e n t i o n a l l y c a u s e s o r p e r m i t s a c h i l d t o be e x p o s e d t o " t h e s u b s t a n c e o r p a r a p h e r n a l i a a t i s s u e (emphasis added)).) 88