Brandon v. Brandon
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John Earl Brandon ("father") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to transfer the portion of a custody-modification action filed by Carolyn Anne Brandon ("mother") involving the parties' minor son to the Pickens Circuit Court. In June 2012, the mother petitioned the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court for emergency relief to enforce her right to five weeks of summer visitation with the minor son, as provided in the agreement; to hold the father in contempt for violating visitation orders; and to modify postminority-support provisions of the agreement by transferring control of funds for the older daughter's postsecondary education to the mother. The father answered the petition, filed a counterpetition seeking to hold the mother in contempt and seeking clarification of court orders regarding postsecondary educational costs for the older daughter, and moved to transfer to the Pickens Circuit Court all issues in the mother's petition that related to the minor son. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the father demonstrated a clear legal right to select the venue for adjudication of the claims pertaining to his son, and the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court was without discretion to deny his choice. The Court issued the writ and remanded the case to the Tuscaloosa court to vacate its order denying the father's motion to transfer the claims related to the minor son and to enter an order transferring those claims to the Pickens Circuit Court.
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REL: 11/30/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter of Decisions, A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 1111538 Ex p a r t e John E a r l Brandon PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS ( I n r e : John E a r l Brandon v. Carolyn Anne Brandon) (Tuscaloosa C i r c u i t Court, STUART, DR-07-1178.02) Justice. J o h n E a r l B r a n d o n ("the f a t h e r " ) p e t i t i o n s t h i s C o u r t f o r a w r i t o f mandamus d i r e c t i n g t h e T u s c a l o o s a C i r c u i t C o u r t t o 1111538 t r a n s f e r the p o r t i o n of t h i s c u s t o d y - m o d i f i c a t i o n a c t i o n filed b y C a r o l y n Anne B r a n d o n ("the m o t h e r " ) i n v o l v i n g t h e p a r t i e s ' minor son t o t h e P i c k e n s C i r c u i t C o u r t . We g r a n t t h e p e t i t i o n and i s s u e t h e w r i t . F a c t s and P r o c e d u r a l H i s t o r y On February 25, 2009, the father and t h e mother were d i v o r c e d by a judgment o f the T u s c a l o o s a C i r c u i t C o u r t . The j u d g m e n t a p p r o v e d and i n c o r p o r a t e d a s e p a r a t e a g r e e m e n t g i v i n g the mother daughters primary physical custody o f t h e two and g i v i n g t h e f a t h e r p r i m a r y p h y s i c a l 1 then minor custody of t h e m i n o r s o n . The a g r e e m e n t c o n t a i n e d d e t a i l e d v i s i t a t i o n and custody provisions, postdivorce well responsibilities medical expenses, e t c . daughters as as provisions f o r such items controlling as insurance, S i n c e t h e d i v o r c e , t h e m o t h e r and t h e have r e s i d e d i n T u s c a l o o s a County; the f a t h e r and t h e s o n have r e s i d e d i n P i c k e n s C o u n t y . On Circuit five June 7, Court weeks of 2012, the mother f o r emergency summer petitioned relief visitation the Tuscaloosa to enforce her r i g h t with the minor son, to as p r o v i d e d i n the agreement; t o h o l d the f a t h e r i n contempt f o r 1 One of the daughters i s no l o n g e r a 2 minor. 1111538 violating visitation orders; and to modify postminority- s u p p o r t p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e agreement by t r a n s f e r r i n g c o n t r o l o f funds f o r the o l d e r daughter's mother. The father counterpetition seeking seeking postsecondary answered to hold the education to the petition, the mother i n contempt c l a r i f i c a t i o n of court orders regarding educational costs transfer to the mother's petition for Pickens that the older Circuit related daughter, Court filed and postsecondary and moved a l l issues t o the minor a son. to i n the In his m o t i o n f o r a change o f v e n u e , t h e f a t h e r e x p l a i n e d : " [ P ] u r s u a n t t o § 30-3-5, [ A l a . Code 1975,] s i n c e t h e p r i o r o r d e r s r e g a r d i n g c u s t o d y o f [ t h e m i n o r son] were e n t e r e d i n t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f T u s c a l o o s a C o u n t y , and s i n c e [ t h e f a t h e r ] and [ t h e m i n o r son] have r e s i d e d i n P i c k e n s C o u n t y f o r a p e r i o d o f a t least three (3) consecutive years immediately p r e c e d i n g the f i l i n g of [the mother's] p e t i t i o n , [the f a t h e r ] has a c h o i c e o f v e n u e as t o T u s c a l o o s a County or Pickens County." In July motion 2012, for a after change conducting a hearing of venue, the trial on the court father's denied the motion. The f a t h e r t h e n p e t i t i o n e d t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s f o r mandamus relief. The Court of 3 Civil Appeals denied the 1111538 p e t i t i o n without A u g u s t 2 1 , 2012) an o p i n i o n . Ex p a r t e B r a n d o n So. 3d Standard (No. 2111105, ( A l a . C i v . App. 2012) (table). o f Review "'A p e t i t i o n f o r t h e w r i t o f mandamus is t h e a p p r o p r i a t e means b y w h i c h t o challenge a t r i a l court's order regarding a change o f v e n u e . The w r i t o f mandamus i s an e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e m e d y ; i t w i l l n o t be i s s u e d u n l e s s t h e p e t i t i o n e r shows " ' " ( 1 ) a clear legal right i n the p e t i t i o n e r to t h e o r d e r s o u g h t ; (2) an i m p e r a t i v e d u t y upon t h e r e s p o n d e n t t o p e r f o r m , a c c o m p a n i e d by a r e f u s a l t o do s o ; (3) t h e l a c k o f a n o t h e r a d e q u a t e remedy; a n d (4) p r o p e r l y i n v o k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t . " ' " Ex p a r t e I n v e r n e s s C o n s t r . Co., 775 So. 2d 153, 156 ( A l a . 2000) ( q u o t i n g Ex p a r t e G a t e s , 675 So. 2d 371, 374 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ) ; Ex p a r t e P f i z e r , I n c . , 746 So. 2d 960, 962 (Ala. 1999).' "Ex p a r t e C h i l d r e n ' s Hosp. o f A l a b a m a , 931 So. 2d 1, 5-6 ( A l a . 2005) . "Applying the general rules to a p e t i t i o n for a w r i t o f mandamus c h a l l e n g i n g a r u l i n g r e l a t e d t o v e n u e , t h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d : 'The b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g i m p r o p e r venue i s on t h e p a r t y r a i s i n g t h e i s s u e a n d on r e v i e w o f an o r d e r t r a n s f e r r i n g o r r e f u s i n g t o t r a n s f e r , a w r i t o f mandamus w i l l n o t be g r a n t e d u n l e s s t h e r e i s a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f e r r o r on t h e p a r t of the t r i a l judge.' Ex p a r t e F i n a n c e America C o r p . , 507 So. 2d 458, 460 ( A l a . 1987) . 'Our r e v i e w i s l i m i t e d t o o n l y t h o s e f a c t s t h a t were b e f o r e t h e t r i a l court.' Ex p a r t e Kane, 989 So. 2d 509, 511 (Ala. 2008)." Ex p a r t e Lugo de V e g a , 65 So. 3d 886, 891 ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) . 4 1111538 Discussion The father parent, legal he h a s , right to contends that, as the minor son's c u s t o d i a l p u r s u a n t t o § 30-3-5, A l a . Code 1975, chose the venue for adjudication mother's c l a i m s i n v o l v i n g the minor son. The a clear, of the m o t h e r does not d i s p u t e t h a t t h e f a t h e r s a t i s f i e s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f § 30-3¬ 5; she m a i n t a i n s because, she t h a t t h e s t a t u t e does n o t a p p l y argues, C i r c u i t Court pleads but the a c t i o n she filed in this i n the C i r c u i t Court. She Tuscaloosa not o n l y c l a i m s i n v o l v i n g the minor a l s o c l a i m s as t o w h i c h venue i s p r o p e r i n t h e remain i n the Section son, Tuscaloosa contends t h a t , because i t i s improper t r a n s f e r the e n t i r e a c t i o n , the c l a i m s i n v o l v i n g the minor should case Tuscaloosa C i r c u i t Court. 30-3-5 s t a t e s : " N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g any l a w t o t h e c o n t r a r y , venue of a l l p r o c e e d i n g s f o r p e t i t i o n s or other a c t i o n s s e e k i n g m o d i f i c a t i o n , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , or enforcement of a f i n a l decree awarding custody of a c h i l d ... and/or granting visitation rights ... and/or granting post-minority benefits for a child or c h i l d r e n i s c h a n g e d so t h a t v e n u e w i l l l i e i n : (1) the original circuit court rendering the final d e c r e e ; o r (2) i n t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t o f t h e c o u n t y where b o t h t h e c u r r e n t c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t o r , i n t h e c a s e o f p o s t - m i n o r i t y b e n e f i t s , where t h e most recent c u s t o d i a l parent, that parent having custody a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c h i l d ' s a t t a i n i n g m a j o r i t y , and t h e c h i l d o r c h i l d r e n have r e s i d e d f o r a p e r i o d o f 5 to son 1111538 at least three consecutive years immediately preceding the filing of the p e t i t i o n or other a c t i o n . The c u r r e n t o r most r e c e n t c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t s h a l l be a b l e t o c h o o s e t h e p a r t i c u l a r v e n u e as h e r e i n p r o v i d e d , r e g a r d l e s s of which p a r t y f i l e s the p e t i t i o n or other a c t i o n . " (Emphasis added.) S e c t i o n 30-3-5 p r o v i d e s t h a t venue f o r an a c t i o n s e e k i n g modification, interpretation, i n v o l v i n g a c h i l d i s proper or enforcement either i n the c i r c u i t i s s u e s the order or i n the c i r c u i t the c u s t o d i a l parent and provides that 99 ( A l a . C i v . App. least of the a c t i o n . i f the custodial S e c t i o n 30-3-5 parent and child then the c u s t o d i a l parent See a l s o Ex p a r t e B a k e r , 575 So. 2d 98, 1 9 9 0 ) ; J o h n s o n v. Meadows, 628 So. 2d 892 So. 2d 850 l a n g u a g e i n § 30-3-5 i s c l e a r and C i v . App. 1 9 9 3 ) ; and C e r u z z i v. C e r u z z i , 688 (Ala. C i v . App. 1997). custodial The parent The legislature "shall be unequivocally stated that able to choose venue" w i t h r e g a r d t o c l a i m s i n v o l v i n g 'shall' is mandatory." clear court that t h e c h i l d have r e s i d e d f o r a t (Ala. unambiguous. order where s a t i s f y the r e s i d e n c e requirement, can s e l e c t t h e v e n u e . an c o u r t of the county three years before the f i l i n g further of and unambiguous the and Ex p a r t e P r u d e n t i a l I n s . Co. 6 is the child. the particular "The imperative of America, 721 word and So. 1111538 2d 1135, 1138 ( A l a . 1998). u s e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e I n Ex Court that discretion to parent transfer; to custodial i n the parte Hester, recognized grant parent T h i s C o u r t i s b o u n d by t h e words 682 "§ or statute. So. 30-3-5 to deny rather, shall be addressed 2d able Court facts here. and son entry the divorce transfer residence. petitioned the action The court this Court the m o t h e r and the denied custodial the current venue." ones daughter The presented of the r e s i d e d i n the entered; the mother county the for a writ father Six years a f t e r petitioned f a t h e r moved, p u r s u a n t to no granted p h y s i c a l custody of judgment, The court the that this granted p h y s i c a l custody r e s i d e d i n an a d j a c e n t c o u n t y . of trial by to the t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t was c u s t o d y of the son. to choose similar ( A l a . 1996), the motion to t h e m i n o r s o n , and t h e m o t h e r was county i n which gives a I n H e s t e r , t h e f a t h e r was The 7 i t provides Hester the minor daughter. 6, and for t o § 30-3-5, o f h i s and motion, the the the son's father o f mandamus d i r e c t i n g the c o u r t t o t r a n s f e r t h e c a s e t o t h e c o u n t y o f h i s and t h e s o n ' s residence. We granted the w r i t , stating: "The f a t h e r has shown t h a t he was awarded p r i m a r y p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d , t h a t he and 7 1111538 h i s son have l i v e d i n F r a n k l i n C o u n t y f o r o v e r t h r e e y e a r s , and t h a t t h e u n d e r l y i n g a c t i o n i s a c u s t o d y p e t i t i o n i n v o l v i n g t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e son o n l y . He has t h e r e f o r e d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t he has a c l e a r l e g a l r i g h t u n d e r § 30-3-5 t o c h o s e t h e venue o f t h i s a c t i o n and t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t had no d i s c r e t i o n t o deny h i s choice." 682 So. The 2d 7-8. mother contends p a r t e H e s t e r does n o t case like this one though a c u s t o d i a l 30-3-5 f o r t h e transfer get this Court's c o n t r o l t h i s case. involving She multiple p a r e n t may satisfy i s sought i s not the She in Ex maintains, i n a that, even r e q u i r e m e n t s of venue t o w h i c h a p r o p e r venue f o r a l l t h e no a p p l i c a t i o n and t o choose venue. decision claims, s e l e c t i o n of venue, i f the t h e n § 30-3-5 has not that § the claims, t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t does argues: "Section 30-3-5 i s s i l e n t a b o u t s e v e r i n g or b i f u r c a t i n g c l a i m s i n o r d e r t o t r a n s f e r one o r more but l e s s than a l l of the c l a i m s i n the p r o c e e d i n g . If the case pending was properly filed in Tuscaloosa, there is no option available for t r a n s f e r i f t h e e n t i r e c a s e c a n n o t be transferred. ... [ A ] l l o f t h e c l a i m s i n t h e ' u n d e r l y i n g action' p e n d i n g must be p r o p e r i n t h e v e n u e c h o s e n o f t h e p a r t y r e q u e s t i n g the t r a n s f e r . " To the agree w i t h the m o t h e r and t o deny a c u s t o d i a l parent o p p o r t u n i t y t o s e l e c t venue as p r o v i d e d i n § 30-3-5 regard to claims i n v o l v i n g a c h i l d 8 in a with custody-modification 1111538 a c t i o n b e c a u s e t h o s e c l a i m s were f i l e d w i t h o t h e r c l a i m s w o u l d r e q u i r e t h i s Court to i g n o r e the p l a i n language of the s t a t u t e and to thwart the purpose this Court can envision this s t a t u t e may of the s t a t u t e . L i k e the mother, s i t u a t i o n s where t h e a p p l i c a t i o n c r e a t e i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s and of inequities. However, t h i s C o u r t i s b o u n d t o s a y what t h e l a w i s , n o t what it s h o u l d be. The f a t h e r has shown t h a t he was custody of resided i n Pickens mother the filed minor the son, County present that awarded p r i m a r y p h y s i c a l he and f o r over action, the three and minor He has, therefore, demonstrated before he requested that a clear and the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court the a the minor legal right u n d e r § 30-3-5 t o s e l e c t t h e venue f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n o f claims, have years change o f venue as t o o n l y t h o s e c l a i m s i n v o l v i n g son. son was those without d i s c r e t i o n t o deny h i s c h o i c e . Conclusion B a s e d on t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h e f a t h e r i s e n t i t l e d t o a w r i t of mandamus. The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court vacate i t s order denying the f a t h e r ' s motion 9 i s directed to t r a n s f e r to the 1111538 claims related transferring t o t h e minor son and t o e n t e r those claims t o the Pickens C i r c u i t an order Court. PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. Woodall, B o l i n , P a r k e r , Main, and Wise, J J . , concur. Shaw, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e r e s u l t . Murdock, J . , d i s s e n t s . Malone, C . J . , recuses h i m s e l f . 10 1111538 SHAW, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g i n t h e r e s u l t ) . I concur i n the result reached i n t h e main opinion. A l a b a m a Code 1975, § 30-3-5, s t a t e s : " N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g any l a w t o t h e c o n t r a r y , venue of a l l proceedings f o r p e t i t i o n s or other a c t i o n s seeking m o d i f i c a t i o n , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , or enforcement of a f i n a l decree awarding custody of a c h i l d or c h i l d r e n to a parent and/or g r a n t i n g visitation r i g h t s ... w i l l l i e i n : (1) t h e o r i g i n a l c i r c u i t court rendering the f i n a l decree; o r (2) i n t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t o f t h e c o u n t y where b o t h t h e c u r r e n t c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t ... and t h e c h i l d o r c h i l d r e n have resided f o r a p e r i o d of at l e a s t three consecutive years immediately preceding the f i l i n g of the p e t i t i o n or other a c t i o n . The c u r r e n t o r most r e c e n t c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t s h a l l be a b l e t o c h o o s e t h e p a r t i c u l a r venue as h e r e i n p r o v i d e d , r e g a r d l e s s o f which p a r t y f i l e s the p e t i t i o n or other a c t i o n . " (Emphasis The expressly added.) mother provide argues that f o r the n e c e s s i t y , of proceedings, this Code severance of section claims, does and, not by i n t h e manner o r d e r e d by t h i s C o u r t t o d a y ; t h e f a t h e r , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e c t i o n does n o t e x p r e s s l y p r e c l u d e such a severance. The m o t h e r i s c o r r e c t t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e does n o t r e f e r t o a s e v e r a n c e o f t h e claims as a means o f c o m p l y i n g w i t h t h e mandate o f t h e Code section; however, t h e Code s e c t i o n g o v e r n s venue matters relating to the proper 11 procedure for only, not assuring 1111538 compliance with i t . is that What t h e the " c u s t o d i a l p a r t i c u l a r venue s e c t i o n does p r o v i d e , h o w e v e r , parent " shall be a b l e t o choose t h e Ordering the severance of the claims i n t h e manner c o n t e m p l a t e d b y t h e m a i n o p i n i o n e f f e c t u a t e s t h e apparent intent of the language of the Code section; p r e c l u d i n g s u c h a s e v e r a n c e o r o r d e r i n g a l l t h e c l a i m s t o be t r a n s f e r r e d t o the Pickens C i r c u i t Court would not a l l o w both c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t s t o have a s a y i n c h o o s i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e venue, as t h e Code section contemplates i n cases involving s p l i t custody of m u l t i p l e c h i l d r e n . Ordering the severance of the claims provisions that i n this manner allows o f t h e Code s e c t i o n . severance efficient contemplates contrary," aspirational of judicial the claims nature i s not of i n the the "[n]otwithstanding requiring compliance, the general e f f i c i e n c y advanced by t h e mother. 12 with A l t h o u g h t h e mother administration, compliance, thus f o r compliance argues interest Code the of section any l a w t o t h e n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the legal principles of 1111538 MURDOCK, J u s t i c e (dissenting). S e c t i o n 30-3-5, A l a . Code 1975, makes r e f e r e n c e s i m p l y t o "the custodial involving multiple parents. as parent"; i t does claims by not and reference against two actions custodial T h a t i s , § 30-3-5 does n o t c o n t e m p l a t e a c a s e this, i n which custody o f two o r more s i b l i n g s such has been b i f u r c a t e d and i n w h i c h c l a i m s and c o u n t e r c l a i m s r e g a r d i n g t h e continued single custodial rights action. Consequently, § 30-3-5 t o t h e p r e s e n t issue presented, The from involving "solution" two to counterclaims. parents i t is the are p a r t of application case t h a t i s the source a of o f t h e venue not the s o l u t i o n t o t h a t i s s u e . correct "solution" applying of both the last sentence "custodial any t o t h e venue action of parents" involving § is issue that results 30-3-5 a case as the the to same multiple claims or When t h e venue o f an a c t i o n i s a p p r o p r i a t e as t o one c l a i m o r p a r t y , i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e as t o o t h e r c l a i m s o r p a r t i e s i n t h e same a c t i o n . See R u l e 8 2 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. ("Where s e v e r a l c l a i m s o r p a r t i e s have b e e n j o i n e d , t h e s u i t 13 1111538 may be b r o u g h t i n any c o u n t y i n w h i c h any one o f t h e c o u l d p r o p e r l y have been brought."). claims 2 The m o t h e r i s t h e " m a s t e r " o f h e r c o m p l a i n t . Venue f o r the mother's a c t i o n t o modify the p r i o r c u s t o d y judgment o f the Tuscaloosa i n that venue Circuit f o r a l l other Court claims i s proper court, i n her a c t i o n i s proper and i n that c o u r t as w e l l . The issue main opinion of severance, contains no yet severance discussion p e r se o f t h e of the mother's and t h e I a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t § 30-3-5 opens w i t h t h e c l a u s e "[n]otwithstanding any l a w t o t h e c o n t r a r y . " Logically, h o w e v e r , t h i s c l a u s e c a n be a r e f e r e n c e o n l y t o " l a w " o u t s i d e the s t a t u t e i n which i t appears. N o r m a l l y , one could u n d e r s t a n d t h i s c l a u s e t o mean t h a t w h a t e v e r venue r u l e f o l l o w s i n the s t a t u t e w i l l supersede "law" o u t s i d e the s t a t u t e , f o r example Rule 8 2 ( c ) . The o b v i o u s p r o b l e m w i t h a t t e m p t i n g t o a p p l y s u c h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e i s t h a t t h e venue c o n f l i c t we a r e h e r e t r y i n g t o r e s o l v e i s i t s e l f e n t i r e l y a f u n c t i o n o f t h e s e n t e n c e s i n § 30-3-5 t h a t f o l l o w t h i s o p e n i n g c l a u s e . The c l a u s e " [ n ] o t w i t h s t a n d i n g any law t o t h e c o n t r a r y " t h a t opens t h i s s t a t u t o r y s e c t i o n logically c a n n o t r e s o l v e t h e venue c o n f l i c t created i n s u b s e q u e n t p o r t i o n s o f t h e same s t a t u t e . Thus, R u l e 8 2 ( c ) remains s t a n d i n g as a p e r f e c t l y w e l l s u i t e d d e v i c e f o r r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e venue c o n f l i c t now b e f o r e u s . 2 Looked a t from another p e r s p e c t i v e , the r e f e r e n c e t o "[n]otwithstanding any law t o the c o n t r a r y " should be u n d e r s t o o d as r e f e r r i n g t o venue p r o v i s i o n s s u c h as t h o s e i n § 6-3-7, A l a . Code 1975, t h a t s u b s t a n t i v e l y and d i r e c t l y c o n f l i c t with this statute. 14 1111538 father's respective Court's holding however, claims and separate today. gave and claims actions. the claims necessary court for so presented See ( t r i a l court's order) with a trial The reasons issues is that not F to be the of expressly ruling, should Appendix result the the ruled, various severed father's into petition ("[T]he c a s e w o u l d have t o be b i f u r c a t e d r e l a t e d to the son being heard in Pickens C o u n t y and the c l a i m s r e l a t e d to the daughters being heard i n Tuscaloosa County. things, the B i f u r c a t i o n could result possibility r e s u l t s and of overlapping the waste of j u d i c i a l resources."). Before and the t h e manner p r e s c r i b e d i n t h e m a i n o p i n i o n , we be required d i s c r e t i o n and a severance proceeding. So. to 2d 368, See 371 w e l l as that the trial e r r e d as a m a t t e r o f l a w of severance], t h a t may conclude the various parties' l a s t s e n t e n c e o f § 30-3-5 in to other issues, inconsistent resources a p p l y i n g the i n , among claims court first would exceeded i t s i n r e f u s i n g to presented order in this Ex p a r t e T u r p i n V i s e I n s . Agency, I n c . , 705 ( A l a . 1997) ("In e x e r c i s i n g i t s d i s c r e t i o n [as the t r i a l court should c o n s i d e r the prejudice r e s u l t to the p a r t i e s i f the c l a i m s are severed," "practicality, j u d i c i a l economy, and 15 the as possibility 1111538 of i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s . " we c a n do t h a t i n t h i s (emphasis a d d e d ) ) . I do n o t b e l i e v e case. I f we a r e n o t a b l e t o f i n d e r r o r as a m a t t e r o f l a w u n d e r normal severance s t a n d a r d s , then the o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e upon w h i c h we c o u l d p r o c e e d w o u l d be t h a t t h e s t a t u t e premise itself somehow g i v e s t h e f a t h e r an a b s o l u t e r i g h t t o s e v e r a n c e i n a bifurcated statute. concept custody case. Nowhere of No s u c h r i g h t i n § 30-3-5 severance. The i s expressed i n the i s t h e r e any m e n t i o n statute speaks only of the to a p p r o p r i a t e venue f o r a g i v e n " p r o c e e d i n g " o r " a c t i o n . " 16 the
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