Jennifer Crawford v. State of Alabama

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REL04/29/2011Crawford Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 CR-09-1227 Jennifer Crawford v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal PER Court CURIAM. The appellant, of p r o p e r t y Ala. from J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t (CC-08-1537) J e n n i f e r C r a w f o r d , was c o n v i c t e d of theft i n the second degree, a v i o l a t i o n of § 13A-8-4(a), C o d e 1 9 7 5 , a n d was s e n t e n c e d t o 10 y e a r s i n p r i s o n , which CR-09-1227 sentence was supervised The suspended probation. State's and This 1 s h e was appeal evidence i n v e s t i g a t o r with Target discount retail discount the from e B a y Web site the Target t o show t h a t investigating Birmingham area items stores years' Rick Frees, when operates at Target received t h a t he s h o u l d look at similar i n the area. losses an he f o r J.S.P. B a r g a i n s . numerous three followed. several shoplifters site listed various in on C o r p o r a t i o n , w h i c h owns a n d s t o r e s , began stores information tended placed Frees to items Police that the stolen then from conducted of undercover cities o f T r u s s v i l l e , Moody, H u f f m a n , a n d B i r m i n g h a m , w i t h t h e of a c o n f i d e n t i a l Det. Scott testified Huffman players that store Salser to pawn 24, 2007, three new by Target. When t h e y e n t e r e d He Police he a n d M.B. iPods said -- Department went portable to the media t h a t he h a d h i s h a n d t h e s t o r e , he s a i d , employees, i n c l u d i n g Crawford, i n the M.B. of the Birmingham on O c t o b e r -- p r o v i d e d bandaged. informant, Pawn s t o r e s a series help s a l e s at Jim's Super found were b e h i n d several store the counter. They C r a w f o r d was a l s o i n d i c t e d f o r r e c e i v i n g s t o l e n p r o p e r t y i n t h e second degree; however, t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h a t c h a r g e b e f o r e t h e c a s e was s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y . 1 2 CR-09-1227 approached C r a w f o r d w i t h t h e t h r e e new i P o d s , p u t t h e i P o d s o n the c o u n t e r , and t o l d Crawford, he said, When C r a w f o r d $195 Crawford went that to another for in Det. Salser g i v e them that Crawford was how much t h e y w o u l d asked while a pay i P o d a n d i f t h e y c o u l d b r i n g m o r e new iPods the next day. jury. 2 State played a recording of the transaction I t shows t h e f o l l o w i n g : asked Det. S a l s e r was b e t t e r "I'm tired home now." about then you w r e s t l e Salser responded: asked with i t . " I'm Det. Salser responded cases "Yep." M.B. about After so t i r e d . again, also a f Crawford won't M.B. that M.B. said: I'm r e a d y t o go Det. S a l s e r : "You'll them g e t me o n e g o o d l i c k through man. f o rthe the transaction the b l e e d i n g had stopped. of s t e a l i n g , M.B. During h i s hand. and t h a t before to Stidham. entered information into testified on t h e t r a n s a c t i o n M.B. a 60-gigabyte The it Bryan them. S t i d h a m w e n t i n t o t h e b a c k a n d came b a c k w i t h t h e money w h i l e C r a w f o r d working employee, came b a c k s h e s a i d t h a t t h e s h o p w o u l d f o r the merchandise. computer. they wanted t o s e l l think you?" twice and D e t . s a i d : "Man, s _ _ _ , I n e e d g b i g s c r e e n t . v . and be told them how much they P u r s u a n t t o R u l e 13, A l a . R. A p p . P., we r e q u e s t e d t h e audio r e c o r d i n g of the t r a n s a c t i o n . 2 3 CR-09-1227 would get and Det. things f o r the Salser out Todd that in iPods, of M.B. responded: the Posey police of the Trussville, discovered appeared to be cut Trusville my damn h a n d I guess," getting and a for them sale on They f o u n d s h i p p i n g folder of operations. that the J.S.P. stores Trussville new Bargains that had store items that Internet l a b e l s , packaging materials, items The At contained the testified a t J i m ' s S u p e r Pawn Huffman. room tickets for P o l i c e Department warrants site. sting "I bad, case." they executed search Moody, s a i d : "That's not Web and a been bought during the labeled "items bought for Birmingham Police Department f o l d e r was eBay." Det. James testified said that that, Salser, said were of the he was the lead during the sale i n v o l v i n g C r a w f o r d , M.B., neither that iPods Coleman the M.B. nor iPods were stolen. Det. Det. i n v e s t i g a t o r on Salser stolen, Coleman executed a search warrant at the two Crawford area of of the the iPods store and the had w e n t up but they further third 4 to iPod on the and Crawford testified in case. implied Huffman s t o r e purchased the and the that that Det. and the they discovered back sales He storage floor. He CR-09-1227 testified that according to the c i t y supposed t o provide information in but that, case, i n this code, regarding they gave o n l y the items they two s e r i a l T h e r e was a l s o t e s t i m o n y t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t a pawnshop up to hold f o r sale merchandise Super were Pawn part-time to clean that and t h a t the store handled transactions, manager on w h a t and Det. Salser merchandise it items the store came i n w i t h to Stidham, putting i t but she would responsibilities She had buy. the iPods, at Jim's occasionally to On consult t h e day Crawford testified who was i n t h e b a c k , Crawford said that anything a case, that t o imput t h e data that she went b a c k and that the iPods were s t o l e n , t h a t that no o n e e x p l i c i t l y told 5 that i t was l o u d her that was from the t r a n s a c t i o n . or Det. Salser i n t o a case or anything she d i d n o t hear a n y t h i n g M.B. a n d he e x a m i n e d s h e d i d n o t h e a r M.B. about breaking a she s a i d , she t o o k t h e them t h e p r i c e and t h e n she went t o t h e c o m p u t e r t h a t away f r o m t h e c o u n t e r say numbers. s h e was w o r k i n g her primary said, take location. and m e r c h a n d i s e . she and gave h e r a p r i c e . told i n 2007 were state law r e q u i r e d f o r 15 d a y s b e f o r e or t r a n s f e r r i n g i t to another Crawford t e s t i f i e d pawnshops t o do w i t h l e dher to believe i n t h e s t o r e , and the iPods were stolen. CR-09-1227 She said that computer she digits of would not customers the put the number mixed up and transposed serial brought numbers. Salser take i n new argues sufficient Specifically, Det. got she knowingly Crawford present when she a n d M.B. items were Crawford the iPods the property property to that appeal evidence argues that the to the that support State "explicitly" she State her d i d not that the four she pawn. on and in middle testified stolen i P o d s were s t o l e n ; r a t h e r , the of failed prove that they only implied stolen. "In d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t o f t h e j u r y and t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , t h e e v i d e n c e m u s t be r e v i e w e d i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . Cumbo v . S t a t e , 368 So. 2 d 871 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 7 8 ) , c e r t . denied, 368 So. 2d 877 ( A l a . 1979). Conflicting evidence p r e s e n t s a j u r y q u e s t i o n not s u b j e c t to r e v i e w on appeal, p r o v i d e d the s t a t e ' s evidence e s t a b l i s h e s a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e . Gunn v. S t a t e , 387 So. 2 d 280 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 387 So. 2 d 283 ( A l a . 1980). The trial court's denial of a m o t i o n f o r a j u d g m e n t o f a c q u i t t a l m u s t be r e v i e w e d by d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e e x i s t e d l e g a l e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e j u r y , a t t h e t i m e t h e m o t i o n was made, from w h i c h t h e j u r y by f a i r i n f e r e n c e c o u l d have f o u n d t h e a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y . Thomas v . S t a t e , 363 So. 2d 1020 ( A l a . C r . App. 1978 ) . I n a p p l y i n g t h i s standard, the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t w i l l determine o n l y i f l e g a l e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d from which the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 6 to conviction. r e p r e s e n t e d to her argues, many that the that CR-09-1227 reasonable d o u b t . W i l l i s v . S t a t e , 447 So. 2d 199 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 3 ) ; Thomas v . S t a t e . When the e v i d e n c e r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s o f f a c t f o r t h e j u r y and such evidence, i f b e l i e v e d , i s s u f f i c i e n t to s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n , the d e n i a l of a m o t i o n f o r a judgment o f a c q u i t t a l by t h e t r i a l c o u r t does n o t c o n s t i t u t e e r r o r . Y o u n g v . S t a t e , 283 A l a . 676, 220 So. 2d 843 (1969); W i l l i s v. S t a t e . A v e r d i c t o f c o n v i c t i o n w i l l n o t be s e t a s i d e on t h e g r o u n d o f i n s u f f i c i e n c y of the evidence unless, allowing a l l reasonable presumptions f o r i t s c o r r e c t n e s s , the preponderance o f t h e e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t t h e v e r d i c t i s so d e c i d e d as t o c l e a r l y c o n v i n c e t h i s c o u r t t h a t i t was w r o n g a n d unjust." Breckenridge v. State, 628 So. 2d 1012, 1018 (Ala. Crim. 1993). "'"The r o l e o f a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s i s n o t t o s a y w h a t t h e f a c t s a r e . Our r o l e ... i s to judge whether the evidence i s l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t t o a l l o w s u b m i s s i o n o f an i s s u e for decision to the jury." Ex parte Bankston, 358 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Ala. 1 9 7 8 ) . An a p p e l l a t e c o u r t may interfere with the jury's v e r d i c t only where i t reaches "a clear conclusion that the f i n d i n g and j u d g m e n t a r e w r o n g . " K e l l y v. S t a t e , 273 A l a . 240 , 2 4 4 , 139 So. 2d 326 ( 1 9 6 2 ) . "The r u l e i s c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s S t a t e t h a t a v e r d i c t of c o n v i c t i o n s h o u l d n o t be s e t a s i d e on t h e g r o u n d o f the insufficiency of the evidence to s u s t a i n the v e r d i c t , u n l e s s , a f t e r a l l o w i n g all reasonable presumptions of its correctness, the preponderance of the e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t t h e v e r d i c t i s so decided as t o c l e a r l y c o n v i n c e t h e c o u r t t h a t i t was w r o n g and u n j u s t . " B r i d g e s v. State, 284 Ala. 412, 420, 225 So. 2d 821 (1969) A verdict on conflicting 7 App. CR-09-1227 e v i d e n c e i s c o n c l u s i v e on a p p e a l . R o b e r s o n v . S t a t e , 162 A l a . 3 0 , 50 So. 345 (1909). "[W]here t h e r e i s ample e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by the s t a t e to support a v e r d i c t , i t should n o t be o v e r t u r n e d e v e n t h o u g h t h e e v i d e n c e offered by the defendant is in sharp conflict therewith and presents a s u b s t a n t i a l d e f e n s e . " F u l l e r v . S t a t e , 269 A l a . 3 1 2 , 3 3 3 , 113 So. 2d 153 ( 1 9 5 9 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , F u l l e r v . A l a b a m a , 361 U.S. 936, 80 S . C t . 3 8 0 , 4 L . E d . 2 d 358 ( 1 9 6 0 ) . ' Granger [ v . S t a t e ] , 473 So. 2 d [ 1 1 3 7 , ] 1139 [(Ala. C r i m . App. 1985)]. " . . . ' C i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e a l o n e i s enough t o s u p p o r t a g u i l t y v e r d i c t of the most h e i n o u s c r i m e , p r o v i d e d the j u r y b e l i e v e s beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t t h e a c c u s e d i s g u i l t y . ' W h i t e v. S t a t e , 294 A l a . 2 6 5 , 2 7 2 , 314 So. 2d 857 , c e r t . d e n i e d , 423 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 373, 46 L . E d . 2 d 288 (1975). 'Circumstantial evidence i s i n nowise considered i n f e r i o r e v i d e n c e a n d i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e same w e i g h t as d i r e c t e v i d e n c e p r o v i d e d i t p o i n t s t o t h e g u i l t of the accused.' C o c h r a n v . S t a t e , 500 So. 2 d 1 1 6 1 , 1177 ( A l a . C r . App. 1984), a f f i r m e d i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , r e v e r s e d i n p a r t on o t h e r g r o u n d s , Ex p a r t e C o c h r a n , 500 So. 2d 1179 ( A l a . 1985)." White v. State, 546 So. 2d 1014, 1017 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1989). "[B]ecause i n t e n t i s a s t a t e of mind, i t i s r a r e l y s u s c e p t i b l e of d i r e c t or p o s i t i v e p r o o f . I n s t e a d , t h e e l e m e n t o f i n t e n t m u s t u s u a l l y be i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e f a c t s t e s t i f i e d t o by t h e w i t n e s s e s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s as d e v e l o p e d b y t h e e v i d e n c e . S e a t o n v . S t a t e , 645 So. 2d 3 4 1 , 343 (Ala. Crim. A p p . 1994) ( q u o t i n g M c C o r d v . S t a t e , 501 So. 2 d 5 2 0 , 5 2 8 - 2 9 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 6 ) ) . ... F i n a l l y , ' " [ t ] h e i n t e n t of a defendant at the time of the o f f e n s e i s a j u r y q u e s t i o n . " ' C.G. v . S t a t e , 841 So. 2d 2 8 1 , 291 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 1 ) , a f f ' d , 841 So. 2 d 292 8 CR-09-1227 (Ala. 2 0 0 2 ) , q u o t i n g Downing v. S t a t e , 9 8 3 , 985 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1993)." Pilley v. State, 930 So. 2d 550 , 564-65 620 So. 2d (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). Section if he 13A-8-2, A l a . Code 1975, states: "A p e r s o n c o m m i t s t h e c r i m e o f t h e f t o f p r o p e r t y or she: fi "(3) K n o w i n g l y o b t a i n s or e x e r t s c o n t r o l over p r o p e r t y i n the c u s t o d y of a law enforcement agency w h i c h was e x p l i c i t l y r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e p e r s o n b y an agent of the law enforcement agency as being stolen." (Emphasis provides theft added.) that Section 3 theft 13A-8-4(a), of p r o p e r t y i n the of p r o p e r t y "which exceeds i n v a l u e b u t d o e s n o t e x c e e d two ($2,500) i n value, and which five Ala. second hundred Code degree i s the dollars ($500) thousand f i v e hundred i s not 1975, taken from dollars the person of another." Alabama necessary 2(3), to has yet to satisfy the A l a . Code 1975. address "explicit" In order to the extent requirement sustain of evidence of § 13A-8- a conviction for S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 8 - 2 ( 3 ) , A l a . Code 1975, was a d d e d when t h e t h e f t s t a t u t e was amended e f f e c t i v e S e p t e m b e r 1, 2003. See A c t No. 2003-355, A l a . A c t s 2003. 3 9 CR-09-1227 theft of property, "[k]nowingly the obtain[ed] State had being to to or e x e r t [ e d ] c u s t o d y of a law enforcement represented as the prove control agency that Crawford over property i n w h i c h was explicitly [ h e r ] b y an a g e n t o f t h e l a w e n f o r c e m e n t stolen." § 13A-8-2(3), Ala. agency Code 1975 (emphasis principle of statutory added). It is a well established i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t "[w]here the meaning of the p l a i n of the s t a t u t e i s c l e a r , plain So. language." 2d 501, 504 construction language engage parte (Ala. instruct a statute in judicial statute (Ala. of Ex i t m u s t be c o n s t r u e d United 1993). this to to Ex parte Stations, Inc., of interpret e x a c t l y what construction only i s ambiguous." according to i t s "Principles Court mean Serv. i f the Pratt, language 815 statutory the plain i t says and language i n the So. 2d 532, 2001). " ' " [ C ] r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s m u s t be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d , to avoid ensnaring behavior t h a t i s not clearly p r o s c r i b e d . " ' U n i t e d S t a t e s v . B r i d g e s , 493 F.2d 9 1 8 , 922 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 4 ) . " ' I n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . B o s t o n & M. RR C o . , 380 U.S. 1 5 7 , 85 S . C t . 8 6 8 , 8 7 0 , 13 L . E d . 2 d 728 ( 1 9 6 5 ) , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t s t a t e d : 10 628 to 535 CR-09-1227 "'"A c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e i s t o be construed strictly, not l o o s e l y . Such a r e t h e t e a c h i n g s of our cases from U n i t e d States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L.Ed. 37 [ ( 1 8 2 0 ) ] , down t o t h i s day. C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l s a i d in that case: "'"'The r u l e that penal laws a r e t o be construed s t r i c t l y , i s , p e r h a p s , n o t much l e s s old than construction itself. I t i s founded on the tenderness of the law f o r the r i g h t s o f i n d i v i d u a l s ; a n d on the plain principle that the power of punishment i s vested i n the l e g i s l a t i v e , not i n t h e j u d i c i a l department.' I d . , p. 95. "'"The fact that a particular a c t i v i t y may b e w i t h i n t h e same g e n e r a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and p o l i c y of those covered does not necessarily bring i t w i t h i n the ambit of the criminal prohibition. United States v. W e i t z e l , 2 4 6 U.S. 5 3 3 , 38 S . C t . 3 8 1 , 62 L . E d . 872 [ ( 1 9 1 8 ) ] . " " ' M o r e o v e r , "one ' i s n o t t o b e s u b j e c t e d t o a p e n a l t y u n l e s s t h e words o f t h e s t a t u t e plainly impose i t , ' Keppel v. Tiffin S a v i n g s B a n k , 197 U.S. 3 5 6 , 3 6 2 , 25 S . C t . 4 4 3 , 49 L . E d . 790 [ ( 1 9 0 5 ) ] . ' [ W ] h e n c h o i c e h a s t o b e made b e t w e e n t w o r e a d i n g s o f w h a t 11 CR-09-1227 c o n d u c t C o n g r e s s h a s made a c r i m e , i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e , b e f o r e we c h o o s e t h e h a r s h e r alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken i n language t h a t i s clear and d e f i n i t e . ' United States v. Universal C . I . T . C r e d i t C o r p . , 34 4 U.S. 218, 2 2 1 - 2 2 2 , 73 S . C t . 2 2 7 , 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 , 97 L.Ed. 260 [ ( 1 9 5 2 ) ] . " United States v. C a m p o s - S e r r a n o , 404 U.S. 2 9 3 , 2 9 7 , 92 S . C t . 4 7 1 , 4 7 4 , 30 L . E d . 2 d 457 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . ' "Bridges, 493 F . 2 d a t 9 2 3 . "'Words u s e d i n t h e s t a t u t e must be g i v e n t h e i r natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly u n d e r s t o o d meaning.' Alabama Farm B u r e a u Mut. C a s u a l t y I n s . Co. v . C i t y o f H a r t s e l l e , 460 S o . 2 d 1 2 1 9 , 1 2 2 3 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) . The g e n e r a l rule of construction f o r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e A l a b a m a C r i m i n a l Code i s f o u n d i n A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , § 13A-1-6: ' A l l p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s t i t l e s h a l l be c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f a i r import o f t h e i r terms t o promote j u s t i c e and t o effect the objects of the law, i n c l u d i n g the purposes stated i n section 1 3 A - 1 - 3 . ' Among t h e purposes stated i n § 13A-1-4 i s t h a t found i n subsection ( 2 ) : 'To g i v e f a i r w a r n i n g o f t h e n a t u r e of t h e conduct p r o s c r i b e d . ' " Carroll v. S t a t e , 599 So. 2 d 1 2 5 3 , 1264-65 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1992). The term expressed leaving "explicit" without no question i s defined vagueness, as to as "fully implication meaning or W e b s t e r ' s C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y 441 ( 1 1 t h or revealed or ambiguity: intent." Merriam ed. 2003). The u s e 4 A l t h o u g h the term " e x p l i c i t " i s d e f i n e d i n earlier editions of Black's Law D i c t i o n a r y , a definition for 4 12 CR-09-1227 of the term "explicitly" When t h e p l a i n , applied provision which the ordinary, t o the language legislature intended law-enforcement Here, that Crawford that stolen. Indeed, for explain that that have presented a n d an by under knowledge, were particular beyond that i n the custody of stolen. the State seeking the lead established represent t o pawn to had been investigator i n this Coleman testified informant t o go the property this d i d not e x p l i c i t l y they meaning i s i ti s clear that the the property Det. Coleman, as much. Det. S a l s e r statute a n d M.B. the iPods admitted charged a g e n c y was i n f a c t the evidence Det. S a l s e r case, a person be i m p l i e d , i s not ambiguous. and commonly u n d e r s t o o d i n § 13A-8-2(3), of the theft could i n § 13A-8-2(3) that into the plan was t h e pawnshop, was s t o l e n , a n d s e e i f t h e p a w n s h o p would take the property. H o w e v e r , he a d m i t t e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e sale M.B., nor i n v o l v i n g Crawford, Det. Salser implied that said that and Det. S a l s e r , the iPods t h e y were s t o l e n . were neither stolen The f a c t t h a t M.B. but merely Det. S a l s e r and " e x p l i c i t " i s not i n c l u d e d i n the current e d i t i o n , which i s the e i g h t h e d i t i o n . See B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y 519 ( 5 t h e d . 1979) ( " e x p l i c i t " d e f i n e d as " [ n ] o t o b s c u r e o r a m b i g u o u s ; having no disguised meaning or reservation; clear in understanding."). 13 CR-09-1227 M.B. b e l i e v e d during their that The by § 13A-8-2(3), s t a t u t e connotes lesser term use of the term of p r o o f , i t would that Crawford the were stolen, iPods support a conviction b e c a u s e no e x p l i c i t the i P o d s were For theft and "explicitly" such the State presented the evidence § i n the intended to require may h a v e h a d r e a s o n under was 13A-8-2(3), i n fact stolen. evidence to believe that insufficient A l a . Code to 1975, that 5 reasons, of p r o p e r t y i n the second rendered a a precise r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w e r e made t o C r a w f o r d the foregoing a judgment r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " as n o t have used Although indicating proximity to l e v e l of proof than normally Had t h e l e g i s l a t u r e as " e x p l i c i t l y . " said A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . a more s t r i n g e n t by law. degree of her close t o e s t a b l i s h an " e x p l i c i t legislature's required " h a d t o h a v e h e a r d " w h a t was c o n v e r s a t i o n because them s i m p l y f a i l s required Crawford Crawford's degree conviction f o r i s due t o be s e t a s i d e i n her favor. R E V E R S E D AND JUDGMENT RENDERED. W e l c h , P . J . , a n d Windom, K e l l u m , Burke, and J o i n e r , JJ., concur. C f . F l o w e r s v. 1992) (holding that e q u i p m e n t was " r i p p e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n under 5 S t a t e , 843 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. C r i m . App. an o f f i c e r ' s s l a n g s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e o f f " was s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v e an e x p l i c i t a s i m i l a r Texas t h e f t s t a t u t e ) . 14

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