Ex parte Johns & Kirksey, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re:Thomas C. Dodson III v. Johns & Kirksey, Inc.)

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REL: 02/08/2013 Notice: This o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter of Decisions, Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2111228 Ex p a r t e Johns & K i r k s e y , Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In r e : Thomas C. Dodson I I I v. Johns & K i r k s e y , I n c . ) (Tuscaloosa C i r c u i t Court, CV-10-694) PITTMAN, J u d g e . Johns & K i r k s e y , and general I n c . ("the e m p l o y e r " ) , a m e t a l - r o o f i n g contractor, petitions for a writ o f mandamus 2111228 d i r e c t i n g the Tuscaloosa C i r c u i t Court set ("the trial court") a s i d e an i n t e r l o c u t o r y o r d e r i t e n t e r e d on A u g u s t 9, i n an a c t i o n b r o u g h t b y Thomas C. Dodson I I I ("the pursuant 2012, employee"), t o t h e A l a b a m a W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t , § 25-5-1 e t s e q . , A l a . Code 1975 On J u l y 2, 2010, t h a t he had o f and to ("the Act"). 1 We deny t h e the employee sued the employer, sustained a cumulative-trauma i n the course petition. alleging injury arising out o f h i s employment w i t h t h e e m p l o y e r and s e e k i n g b o t h m e d i c a l b e n e f i t s u n d e r § 25-5-77, A l a . Code 1975, and p e r m a n e n t - d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s u n d e r § 25-5-57, A l a . Code 1975. 2 Specifically, the employee's a l l e g e d t h a t , on November 4, 1996, complaint, as amended, he had s u s t a i n e d an injury The e m p l o y e r ' s mandamus p e t i t i o n , w h i c h was f i l e d on S e p t e m b e r 20, 2012, a l s o sought r e l i e f w i t h r e s p e c t to i n t e r l o c u t o r y o r d e r s e n t e r e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t on J u l y 20 and O c t o b e r 27, 2 0 1 1 ; h o w e v e r , on S e p t e m b e r 25, 2012, we d i s m i s s e d t h e e m p l o y e r ' s p e t i t i o n i n s o f a r as i t had s o u g h t r e l i e f w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h o s e o r d e r s b e c a u s e t h e p e t i t i o n was u n t i m e l y as to them. See Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. ("The p r e s u m p t i v e l y reasonable time f o r f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n s e e k i n g r e v i e w o f an o r d e r o f a t r i a l c o u r t ... s h a l l be t h e same as t h e t i m e f o r t a k i n g an a p p e a l . " ) , and R u l e 4 ( a ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. App. P. ("Except as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d h e r e i n , i n a l l c a s e s i n w h i c h an a p p e a l i s p e r m i t t e d by l a w as o f r i g h t ... t o a c o u r t o f a p p e a l s , t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l r e q u i r e d by R u l e 3 [ , A l a . R. App. P.,] s h a l l be f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i t h i n 42 d a y s (6 weeks) o f t h e e n t r y o f t h e j u d g m e n t o r o r d e r appealed from "). 1 2 The employee d i d not seek t e m p o r a r y - d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s . 2 2111228 to h i s lower back w h i l e l i f t i n g a p i e c e of s t r u c t u r a l s t e e l i n the with course injury he of his had employment sustained on the employer; that November 4, 1996, s u r g i c a l l y r e p a i r e d by R i c k M c K e n z i e , M.D. ("Dr. on the November 7, 1996; reached a settlement and medical the e m p l o y e e and regarding vocational benefits t h e November 4, the that 1996, the i n j u r y and benefits the had f r o m t h e November 7, had t o work f o r t h e full returned d u t i e s , w h i c h had surgery, had of amount o f that, the after employee i n c l u d e d p e r f o r m i n g manual l a b o r ; and t o h i s b a c k and the a result his injuries in 1996, compensation as due; had performed e m p l o y e e t h e r e a f t e r had labor was been McKenzie"), open t h e e m p l o y e r and t h a t the manual left employee recuperating due had employer t h e amount o f t h e e m p l o y e e was the sustained cumulative-trauma r i g h t l e g as a r e s u l t o f course of his employment performing with employer. A n s w e r i n g , the employer d e n i e d t h a t the employee the had s u s t a i n e d c u m u l a t i v e - t r a u m a i n j u r i e s , d e n i e d t h a t the employee was e n t i t l e d t o b e n e f i t s under the A c t , affirmative The asserted various defenses. trial F e b r u a r y 29, and court 2010, set t h a t was the case for l i m i t e d to the 3 a bench trial on i s s u e whether the 2111228 e m p l o y e e had 2010, sustained a c o m p e n s a b l e i n j u r y . On February t h e e m p l o y e r moved t o s t r i k e a p o r t i o n o f t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Dr. McKenzie, which the t h a t he i n t e n d e d The trial to introduce court sustained tried the issue deposition e m p l o y e e had a t t h e F e b r u a r y 29, whether indicated 2010, the 2012. trial. employee a c o m p e n s a b l e c u m u l a t i v e - t r a u m a i n j u r y on 29 and A p r i l 17, 28, had February D u r i n g the t r i a l , the t r i a l c o u r t heard t h e l i v e t e s t i m o n y o f w i t n e s s e s and a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e the deposition and testimony photographs. court The that witnesses, deposition included testimony of the was documents, t e s t i m o n y a d m i t t e d by portion the written of subject Dr. of McKenzie's the the trial deposition employer's motion to strike. On A u g u s t 9, determining 2012, that the t r a u m a i n j u r y t h a t was the the trial employee court had entered sustained adjudication entitled until the to of (4) d e n y i n g t h e (1) cumulative- compensable under the A c t , (2) a w a r d i n g the issue permanent-disability e m p l o y e e had order a e m p l o y e e m e d i c a l b e n e f i t s u n d e r § 25-5-77, the an whether benefits the (3) employee under r e a c h e d maximum m e d i c a l deferring § 25-5-57 improvement, employer's motion to s t r i k e a p o r t i o n of 4 was Dr. 2111228 M c K e n z i e ' s d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y , a n d (5) a w a r d i n g t h e e m p l o y e e costs i n t h e amount o f $ 1 , 8 1 1 . The e m p l o y e r then filed its mandamus p e t i t i o n on S e p t e m b e r 20, 2012. I n i t i a l l y , t h e e m p l o y e r a r g u e s t h a t i t s mandamus p e t i t i o n s h o u l d be t r e a t e d as an a p p e a l b e c a u s e , t h e e m p l o y e r s a y s , t h e trial court's judgment. "'An judgment.'" App. 2005) (Ala. August 9, appeal 2012, o r d e r ordinarily constituted lies only from a final a final A l v i r a v. C a m p b e l l , 909 So. 2d 847, 849 ( A l a . C i v . ( q u o t i n g T o m l i n s o n v . T o m l i n s o n , 816 So. 2d 57, 58 C i v . App. 2001)). "A final judgment completely a d j u d i c a t e s a l l m a t t e r s i n c o n t r o v e r s y between t h e p a r t i e s . " S t a n f o r d v. F e i g e , 816 So. 2d 5 0 1 , 502 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2001) . T h i s c o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t an o r d e r d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t an i n j u r y is compensable only, under t h e A c t and awarding without adjudicating the issue entitled to disability benefits, medical whether benefits the worker i s does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a final j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e s u c h an o r d e r does n o t c o m p l e t e l y a d j u d i c a t e the Inc., Inc. worker's claim under t h e A c t . See Ex p a r t e 67 So. 3d 136, 138 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 1 1 ) ; v. C o w a r t , quashed, 48 So. 3d 632 Ex p a r t e S o u t h e r n C a r e , 5 Cowabunga, SouthernCare, ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 9 ) , I n c . , 48 So. 3d 635 writ (Ala. 2111228 2 0 1 0 ) ; Homes o f L e g e n d , I n c . v. O ' N e a l , 855 So. 2d 536 ( A l a . C i v . App. So. 2d 2 0 0 3 ) ; and USA 1019 although the employee Motor Express, ( A l a . C i v . App. August 9, had s u s t a i n e d 2003). 2012, claim a compensable insofar as b e n e f i t s u n d e r § 25-5-57; expressly deferred e m p l o y e e was § 25-5-57 the present determined injury case, that the and a w a r d e d him the i t sought permanent-disability t h e A u g u s t 9, 2012, order the a d j u d i c a t i o n of the i s s u e whether the e n t i t l e d to permanent-disability until 853 i t d i d not adjudicate indeed, the employee improvement. A c c o r d i n g l y , final In order m e d i c a l b e n e f i t s u n d e r § 25-5-77, employee's I n c . v. R e n n e r , judgment t h a t w i l l had reached benefits maximum under medical t h e A u g u s t 9, 2012, o r d e r i s n o t a s u p p o r t an a p p e a l . I d . I n Cowabunga, Cowabunga, I n c . , d o i n g b u s i n e s s as Domino's Pizza ("Cowabunga"), interlocutory sustained a order sought determining compensable injury appellate that and review Thomas W. of an Short had awarding Short medical b e n e f i t s . A l t h o u g h we r u l e d t h a t an a p p e a l w o u l d n o t l i e f r o m that interlocutory determined order, Cowabunga, 67 So. 3d a t 138, we t h a t Cowabunga was e n t i t l e d t o a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w o f 6 2111228 t h a t i n t e r l o c u t o r y o r d e r b y a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t o f mandamus because " [ a ] w a i t i n g r e v i e w o f t h e o r d e r by a p p e a l [ a f t e r a f i n a l judgment had been e n t e r e d ] would o n l y f o r c e [Cowabunga] t o i n c u r f u r t h e r e x p e n s e s t h a t i t may n o t owe a n d t h a t i t may n e v e r r e c o v e r f r o m [ S h o r t ] who, as e v i d e n c e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t [Cowabunga] i s now v o l u n t a r i l y p a y i n g t e m p o r a r y - t o t a l - d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s , i s c u r r e n t l y u n a b l e t o e a r n wages." Cowabunga, present case disability August 67 So. 3d a t 139. A l t h o u g h 9, potentially i s not paying benefits, 2012, force i n the t h e employee t e m p o r a r y - t o t a l - d e l a y i n g review order t h e employer awarding t h e employer of the t r i a l medical court's benefits would t o i n c u r m e d i c a l expenses i t may n o t owe a n d may n o t be a b l e t o r e c o v e r f r o m t h e e m p l o y e e . A c c o r d i n g l y , we c o n c l u d e t h a t an a p p e a l w o u l d employer will to an a d e q u a t e review the t r i a l t h e employer's remedy i n t h i s not a f f o r d the case, and, t h e r e f o r e , c o u r t ' s August 9, 2012, o r d e r mandamus p e t i t i o n . See Cowabunga. pursuant "Mandamus i s a d r a s t i c a n d e x t r a o r d i n a r y w r i t , t o be i s s u e d o n l y where t h e r e i s (1) a c l e a r l e g a l r i g h t i n t h e p e t i t i o n e r t o t h e o r d e r s o u g h t ; (2) an i m p e r a t i v e d u t y upon t h e r e s p o n d e n t t o p e r f o r m , a c c o m p a n i e d b y a r e f u s a l t o do s o ; (3) t h e l a c k o f a n o t h e r a d e q u a t e remedy; a n d (4) p r o p e r l y i n v o k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court." Ex p a r t e I n t e g o n C o r p . , 672 So. 2d 497, 499 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) . 7 we 2111228 The employer determining convincing that argues the evidence cumulative-trauma that the employee that he trial had had court proved sustained by a erred clear " I n o r d e r t o p r o v e t h a t an i n j u r y a r o s e f r o m w o r k - r e l a t e d c u m u l a t i v e t r a u m a , an e m p l o y e e must p r e s e n t c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e o f l e g a l and m e d i c a l c a u s a t i o n . V a l t e x , I n c . v. Brown, 897 So. 2d 332, 334 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 4 ) ; S a f e c o I n s . Co. v. B l a c k m o n , 851 So. 2d 532, 537 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 2 ) ; and § 25-5-81(c), A l a . Code 1975. 'Clear and convincing' evidence i s "'evidence that, when w e i g h t e d a g a i n s t evidence i n o p p o s i t i o n , w i l l produce i n the mind of the t r i e r of f a c t a f i r m c o n v i c t i o n as t o e a c h e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f t h e c l a i m and a high probability as to the c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n . P r o o f by c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e r e q u i r e s a l e v e l of proof g r e a t e r than a preponderance of the evidence or the s u b s t a n t i a l weight of the e v i d e n c e , but l e s s than beyond a reasonable doubt.' 1975. "'To establish legal causation, the e m p l o y e e must p r o v e t h a t " t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f h i s o r h e r d u t i e s as an e m p l o y e e e x p o s e d him or her t o a danger or r i s k m a t e r i a l l y i n excess of t h a t to which people are n o r m a l l y exposed i n t h e i r everyday l i v e s . " Ex p a r t e T r i n i t y I n d u s . , I n c . , 680 So. 2d 262, 267 ( A l a . 1996) . To e s t a b l i s h m e d i c a l c a u s a t i o n , t h e e m p l o y e e must p r o v e t h a t t h e d a n g e r o r r i s k t o w h i c h t h e e m p l o y e e was exposed "'was i n fact [a] c o n t r i b u t i n g 8 and compensable injury. "§ 2 5 - 5 - 8 1 ( c ) , A l a . Code in 2111228 cause of the i n j u r y ' " f o r which b e n e f i t s a r e s o u g h t . I d . a t 269 (quoting C i t y of T u s c a l o o s a v. Howard, 55 A l a . App. 701, 318 So. 2d 729, 732 ( C i v . 1 9 7 5 ) ) . ' " M a d i x , I n c . v. Champion, 927 So. 2d 833, 837 ( A l a . Civ. App. 2005). On appeal, when an employer c h a l l e n g e s a f i n d i n g t h a t an e m p l o y e e has p r o v e n a work-related cumulative-trauma injury, t h i s court reviews the r e c o r d to determine whether the t r i a l c o u r t , b a s e d on i t s weighing of the competing evidence, reasonably could have been clearly c o n v i n c e d t h a t c u m u l a t i v e t r a u m a i n t h e employment l e g a l l y and m e d i c a l l y c a u s e d t h e i n j u r y . Ex p a r t e M c I n i s h , 47 So. 3d 767, 770 ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) . " City o f Gadsden v. App. Scott, 61 So. 3d 296, 301-02 (Ala. Civ. 2010). " I n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r i t was r e a s o n a b l e f o r a t r i a l c o u r t t o have c o n c l u d e d t h a t a f a c t was p r o v e n by c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e , i . e . , w h e t h e r i t was reasonable f o r the f a c t - f i n d e r to reach a firm c o n v i c t i o n as t o e a c h e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f t h e c l a i m and i n f e r a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y as t o t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t must l i m i t i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o 'whether t h e r e was substantial evidence before the t r i a l c o u r t to support a f a c t u a l f i n d i n g , b a s e d upon t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s w e i g h i n g o f the evidence, t h a t would' produce a f i r m c o n v i c t i o n i n t h e m i n d o f t h e t r i e r o f f a c t . Ex p a r t e M c I n i s h , 47 So. 3d [767,] 778 [ ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) ] . "As t o t h e ' s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ' s t a n d a r d o f a p p e l l a t e review, ' s u b s t a n t i a l evidence' p r o p e r l y i s d e f i n e d as ' " e v i d e n c e o f s u c h w e i g h t and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the e x i s t e n c e o f t h e f a c t s o u g h t t o be p r o v e d . " ' Ex p a r t e T r i n i t y I n d u s . , I n c . , 680 So. 2d 262, 268-69 ( A l a . 1996) ( q u o t i n g West v. F o u n d e r s L i f e A s s u r a n c e 9 2111228 Co. o f F l o r i d a , 547 So. 2d 870, 871 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ) . F u r t h e r , A l a . Code 1975, § 2 5 - 5 - 8 1 ( e ) ( 2 ) , mandates t h e use o f t h e ' s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ' s t a n d a r d o f a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w when r e v i e w i n g 'pure f i n d i n g s o f f a c t , ' b u t i t does n o t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n c a s e s i n which a c l a i m a n t ' s e v i d e n t i a r y burden at t r i a l i s a 'preponderance of the evidence' or 'clear and c o n v i n c i n g ' evidence; because the Act i s s i l e n t i n t h a t r e g a r d , a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s must r e v i e w j u d g m e n t s by v i e w i n g e v i d e n c e a d d u c e d t o meet e i t h e r the 'preponderance' or the 'clear and convincing' evidentiary burden under the same 'substantial evidence' standard, f o r e c l o s i n g a p p e l l a t e reweighing of evidence i n both types o f c a s e s . Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d at 773. That said, the ' s u b s t a n t i a l evidence' s t a n d a r d of review i s a p p l i e d i n ' n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s ' i n t h e two t y p e s of c a s e s , w i t h 'the quantum o f p r o o f n e c e s s a r y t o s u s t a i n on a p p e a l ' a f i n d i n g o f f a c t i n a ' c l e a r and convincing' context being 'greater than' t h a t i n a 'preponderance' c o n t e x t . I d . a t 777-78." DeShazo C r a n e Co. App. v. Harris, 57 So. 3d 105, 108 (Ala. Civ. 2009). In i t s August 9, 2012, following pertinent factual order, the trial c o u r t made findings: "In 1996, t h e [employee] i n j u r e d h i s l o w e r b a c k while working f o r the [employer] and underwent s u r g e r y t o r e p a i r i t . T h i s i n j u r y was a c c e p t e d as c o m p e n s a b l e u n d e r t h e W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t by [the employer's] workers' compensation i n s u r e r at t h e t i m e and t h e c l a i m was s e t t l e d , l e a v i n g t h e m e d i c a l b e n e f i t s open. T h e r e a f t e r , t h e [employee] r e t u r n e d t o work f o r t h e [ e m p l o y e r ] a t f u l l d u t y , and was n o t on l i g h t , l i m i t e d o r r e s t r i c t e d d u t y . He p e r f o r m e d h i s n o r m a l j o b i n a n o r m a l f a s h i o n . He then left the [employer] t o work f o r another company. I n 2005, he r e t u r n e d t o w o r k f o r t h e 10 the 2111228 [ e m p l o y e r ] as a s u p e r i n t e n d e n t . A g a i n , he p e r f o r m e d h i s n o r m a l j o b i n a n o r m a l manner and was n o t on l i m i t e d , l i g h t , or r e s t r i c t e d duty. B e g i n n i n g i n 2008, t h e [ e m p l o y e r ] s t a r t e d h a v i n g t r o u b l e w i t h h i s b a c k and r e p o r t e d t o t h e [ e m p l o y e r ] t h a t he t h o u g h t he w o u l d have t o have a n o t h e r s u r g e r y i f h i s b a c k c o n t i n u e d t o d e t e r i o r a t e . On J a n u a r y 27, 2010, t h e [employee] r e t u r n e d t o Dr. R i c k McKenzie, the s u r g e o n who had o p e r a t e d on h i m i n 1996. Dr. M c K e n z i e n o t e d t h a t t h e [employee] n e e d e d a d d i t i o n a l surgery. In February 2010, the [employee's] employment d u t i e s c h a n g e d t o an o f f i c e s e t t i n g . He has c o n t i n u e d w o r k i n g on a f u l l t i m e b a s i s i n t h a t c a p a c i t y t h r o u g h t h e d a t e o f t r i a l . The [employee] i s n o t c l a i m i n g any t e m p o r a r y t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y . "The c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e [ e m p l o y e e ' s ] work as a s u p e r i n t e n d e n t f r o m 2005 u n t i l F e b r u a r y 2010 i n v o l v e d a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f manual l a b o r , i n a d d i t i o n to s u p e r v i s o r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . While the w i t n e s s e s ' t e s t i m o n y d i f f e r e d as t o t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t i m e t h a t t h e [employee] s p e n t p e r f o r m i n g manual labor as compared to supervisory duties, a l l witnesses t e s t i f i e d that the [employee's] work i n c l u d e d e l e m e n t s o f manual l a b o r . A f t e r w e i g h i n g the c r e d i b i l i t y of the w i t n e s s e s , the c o u r t f i n d s t h a t the [employee's] j o b i n c l u d e d a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f b e n d i n g o v e r t o work on i t e m s a t h i s f e e t o r u n d e r n e a t h them, l i f t i n g and c a r r y i n g i t e m s o f v a r y i n g w e i g h t s , s t a n d i n g , w a l k i n g , and c l i m b i n g . These a c t i v i t i e s were n o t p e r f o r m e d i n s p o r a d i c , i s o l a t e d i n s t a n c e s b u t were a r o u t i n e p a r t o f h i s e v e r y d a y j o b . Dr. M c K e n z i e t e s t i f i e d by d e p o s i t i o n t h a t i f t h e [employee] p e r f o r m e d t h i s t y p e o f work i n h i s j o b , t h e n h i s b a c k i n j u r y was a t l e a s t work r e l a t e d i n p a r t . He s u m m a r i z e d h i s t e s t i m o n y by stating: " ' I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o say t h a t t h i s i n j u r y i s e n t i r e l y w o r k - r e l a t e d . He has a j o b t h a t r e q u i r e s a l o t o f h e a v y l i f t i n g and does a l o t o f l i f t i n g f l o o r t o knee. The b e s t I 11 2111228 can s u r m i s e i s t h a t t h i s i s a c o m b i n a t i o n of wear and t e a r t h a t has o c c u r r e d f r o m j u s t w o r k i n g and j u s t e x a c e r b a t e d by t h i s g e n t l e m a n ' s d e g e n e r a t i v e d i s c p r o b l e m s and weak d i s c t h a t p r e s e n t as a c o m b i n a t i o n o f h i s w o r k - r e l a t e d e v e n t . The o n l y way I can be f a i r a b o u t t h i s d e a l i s t o s a y t h a t t h i s is a fifty percent work comp issue, secondary to the disc rupture that p r e d i s p o s e d w e a k n e s s o f t h e d i s c s p a c e . And t h e n f i f t y p e r c e n t ... b e c a u s e o f t h e j o b and t y p e a c t i v i t i e s t h a t he d o e s . T h i s i s n o t an e n t i r e l y work r e l a t e d e v e n t ; however t h i s c l e a r l y has work r e l a t e d e v e n t i s s u e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t . And I am d e e m i n g t h i s a fifty fifty problem.' (McKenzie d e p o s i t i o n September 29, 2011, pp. 4 1 - 4 2 ) . "From t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e [ e m p l o y e e ' s ] work f r o m 2005 t h r o u g h F e b r u a r y 2010, d i d , i n f a c t , c o n t r i b u t e t o h i s need f o r a d d i t i o n a l s u r g e r y and t h e e v i d e n c e i s c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g (as defined by the Legislature) that he has a compensable c u m u l a t i v e i n j u r y . "The [ e m p l o y e r ] has d e n i e d t h e [employee's] c l a i m , a l t h o u g h i t i s noted t h a t t h i s case p r e s e n t e d c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e and t h e r e were g r o u n d s f o r t h e denial." Based determined on those factual the employee that cumulative-trauma had the sustained a trial court compensable i n j u r y w h i l e working f o r the employer 2005 t h r o u g h F e b r u a r y The e m p l o y e r findings, from 2010. argues t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e h a d p r o v e d by c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e 12 2111228 that his duties amount had r e q u i r e d o f manual labor" him t o p e r f o r m and that "a significant h i s performance of that manual l a b o r had exposed him t o a danger o r r i s k o f s u s t a i n i n g a cumulative-trauma that to which lives was people injury t h a t was materially are n o r m a l l y exposed i n excess i n their of everyday a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . The e v i d e n c e in conflict regarding how much manual l a b o r t h e e m p l o y e e h a d been r e q u i r e d t o p e r f o r m i n t h e c o u r s e o f h i s employment from 2005 t h r o u g h February 2010 and r e g a r d i n g the nature of t h e manual l a b o r he h a d been r e q u i r e d t o p e r f o r m d u r i n g period. The employee testified at t r i a l that he that had spent a p p r o x i m a t e l y 60% o f h i s t i m e a t work p e r f o r m i n g m a n u a l labor f r o m 2005 t h r o u g h F e b r u a r y 2010. He f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e m a n u a l l a b o r he h a d p e r f o r m e d d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d h a d lifting heavy retrofitting stoop, squat, materials roofs, tasks and equipment; that had l a b o r on g e n e r a l - c o n t r a c t i n g jobs. that and he and p e r f o r m i n g bend, manual He f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d the m a j o r i t y o f t h e work he h a d p e r f o r m e d retrofitting r o o f s was a t t h e l e v e l 13 installing required and k n e e l r e p e t i t i v e l y ; involved in installing of h i s f e e t . that and 2111228 Jerry Wyatt, one of the employer's t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t he h a d w o r k e d on a job with employee the employee had spent for 6 weeks approximately subcontractors, general-contracting i n 2008 and that the 75% t o 80% o f h i s t i m e t h a t j o b p e r f o r m i n g manual l a b o r . W y a t t f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d the manual labor p e r f o r m e d by t h e employee on t h a t on that j o b had i n v o l v e d h a n g i n g m e t a l d o o r s t h a t w e i g h e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 65 t o 70 pounds e a c h , u n l o a d i n g 4 - f o o t by 8 - f o o t s h e e t s o f S h e e t r o c k b r a n d d r y w a l l p r o d u c t w e i g h i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y 45 t o 50 each, carrying employee's 2 sheets helper approximately 50 a of that distance linear feet product of 35 of pounds at a time w i t h yards, lockers and the installing packaged i n boxes w e i g h i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y 100 p o u n d s . Stuart employer laborer general that he employee f r o m 1997 and ("Stuart"), until having had worked had manual 2011, h i s way up worked having to the for begun the as position a of testified jobs that with the m a j o r i t y labor. h i s employment had t e s t i f i e d by d e p o s i t i o n . He on spent who February worked superintendent, performing left Kirksey as Stuart a t h e employee of h i s time also general 14 and on testified those that superintendent the jobs he had with the 2111228 employer i n F e b r u a r y 2011 b e c a u s e o f t h e t o l l he h a d b e e n r e q u i r e d t o p e r f o r m had taken on h i s body. employer, as a g e n e r a l s u p e r i n t e n d e n t In a d d i t i o n , W i l l i a m Johns and R o b e r t K i r k s e y that h a d r a r e l y come t o j o b s i t e s . estimated February Stuart t e s t i f i e d ( " R o b e r t " ) , t h e owners o f t h e The two owners o f t h e e m p l o y e r Johns t h e manual l a b o r 2010, that, also t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l . during the period t h e employee had spent from 2005 50% of through h i s time p e r f o r m i n g manual l a b o r , w i t h 25% o f t h a t manual l a b o r h a v i n g fallen i n the light-duty range a n d 2 5 % i n t h e medium-duty r a n g e . R o b e r t e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e h a d s p e n t 20% o f h i s t i m e p e r f o r m i n g manual l a b o r assisted by Winston, a l a b o r e r employed by t h e employer trial, to a helper a n d t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e h a d been i n performing manual labor. Charles who t e s t i f i e d a t e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e employee had spent a p p r o x i m a t e l y 35% 40% o f h i s t i m e p e r f o r m i n g m a n u a l Given the c o n f l i c t i n g labor. e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g how much m a n u a l l a b o r t h e employee had p e r f o r m e d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d f r o m 2005 t h r o u g h F e b r u a r y 2010 a n d r e g a r d i n g t h e n a t u r e o f t h a t m a n u a l l a b o r , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l of the competing evidence, c o u r t , b a s e d on i t s w e i g h i n g r e a s o n a b l y c o u l d have 15 determined 2111228 t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e had p e r f o r m e d a s u b s t a n t i a l amount o f manual l a b o r i n the 2005 c o u r s e o f h i s employment w i t h through February involved l i f t i n g and kneeling; had and exposed him that See t o a danger or competing City the trial evidence, p e r f o r m e d by of respect labor court, the t h a t manual 680 supra. b a s e d on properly to had squatting, exposed i n t h e i r Gadsden , ruled t h e e m p l o y e e was from labor r i s k m a t e r i a l l y i n excess normally trauma i n j u r y t o h i s back. With manual T r i n i t y Indus., Inc., and conclude that that t h a t h i s performance of Ex p a r t e 1996); that r e p e t i t i v e bending, stooping, to which people are lives. (Ala. and 2010; the employer the So. everyday 2d 262, 267 Consequently, i t s weighing of that the manual l e g a l cause of of we the labor cumulative- Id. issue whether the manual labor p e r f o r m e d by t h e e m p l o y e e c o n s t i t u t e d t h e m e d i c a l c a u s e o f h i s back i n j u r y , the deposition written medical M a r c h 10, the the 2010 deposition trial c o u r t had testimony record ("the of before Dr. regarding McKenzie, a visit medical record"), t e s t i m o n y o f Les i t the by and F o w l e r , M.D. transcript Dr. the the McKenzie's employee on transcript of ("Dr. t h e p h y s i c i a n s e l e c t e d by t h e e m p l o y e r ' s i n s u r a n c e 16 of Fowler"), carrier to 2111228 p e r f o r m an i n d e p e n d e n t m e d i c a l e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e e m p l o y e e . p e r t i n e n t p a r t , the m e d i c a l r e c o r d In states: "The [employee] and I had a n i c e d i s c u s s i o n today i n the presence of h i s w i f e r e g a r d i n g his previous injury. He had a previous huge disc h e r n i a t i o n a t L5-S1 w h i c h was t r e a t e d by d i s c e c t o m y . He had done w e l l f r o m t h i s b u t over time has d e v e l o p e d w o r s e n i n g b a c k p a i n . He r e t u r n e d with s e v e r e d i s c d e g e n e r a t i o n a t L 5 - S 1 , w h i c h was his ruptured d i s c l e v e l . " I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o say t h a t t h i s i n j u r y i s e n t i r e l y work-related. He has done w e l l , he has a j o b t h a t r e q u i r e s a l o t o f h e a v y l i f t i n g . He does a l o t o f l i f t i n g f r o m f l o o r - t o - k n e e . The b e s t I can s u r m i s e i s , t h i s i s a c o m b i n a t i o n o f wear and t e a r t h a t has occurred from j u s t w o r k i n g , and this exacerbated this gentleman's degenerative disc p r o b l e m s and weak d i s c t h a t was p r e s e n t as a c o m b i n a t i o n of h i s w o r k - r e l a t e d event. "The o n l y way I can be f a i r a b o u t t h i s d e a l i s t o say t h a t t h i s i s a 50% workman's comp i s s u e secondary to the disc rupture, the predisposed w e a k n e s s o f t h e d i s c s p a c e , and t h e n 50% b e c a u s e o f t h e t y p e o f j o b and a c t i v i t i e s he d o e s . T h i s i s n o t an entirely work-related event; however, this c l e a r l y has w o r k - r e l a t e d event issues associated w i t h i t , and I am d e e m i n g t h i s a 50/50 p r o b l e m . " Consistent his w i t h the m e d i c a l r e c o r d , deposition that performed i n the had contributed the Dr. M c K e n z i e t e s t i f i e d i n manual l a b o r that the c o u r s e o f h i s employment w i t h to the employee the d e g e n e r a t i o n of h i s d i s k at 17 had employer L5-S1. 2111228 In his deposition, Dr. Fowler gave the following testimony: " [ C o u n s e l f o r the employer:] Cumulative trauma i s t h e t y p e c l a i m he i s m a k i n g , D o c t o r . And I t h i n k we can s t i p u l a t e [ t h e e m p l o y e e ] c o n t i n u e d t o work f o r t h i s company i n s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s f r o m 1996 u n t i l I assume e v e n t h r o u g h t o d a y ? "[Counsel f o r the employee]: Correct. "[Counsel f o r the employer:] Assuming those f a c t s to be t r u e [ , ] D o c t o r [,] can you s a y t o a r e a s o n a b l e degree of medical c e r t a i n t y whether or not h i s c o n t i n u e d work i n t h a t environment would have contributed independently to h i s current medical condition? "[The w i t n e s s : ] Y e s . I mean t h e work t h a t he i s d o i n g i f i t i s , you know, p h y s i c a l t y p e a c t i v i t y with l i f t i n g , pushing, p u l l i n g , those w i l l have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e p r o b l e m t h a t he i s e x p e r i e n c i n g r i g h t now. "[Counsel for the employer:] Would permanently worsened h i s c o n d i t i o n ? "[The We witness:] conclude deposition have Yes." that, testimony i t of based Dr. on the McKenzie, medical and record, the t e s t i m o n y o f Dr. F o w l e r , t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e a s o n a b l y t h a t t h e manual l a b o r t h e e m p l o y e e had p e r f o r m e d deposition determined i n the o f h i s employment w i t h t h e e m p l o y e r f r o m 2005 t h r o u g h 2010 was course February i n f a c t a c o n t r i b u t i n g cause of the employees' 18 the disk 2111228 d e g e n e r a t i o n a t L 5 - S 1 . See Ex p a r t e T r i n i t y I n d u s . , s u p r a ; and City o f Gadsden , trial did supra. Consequently, we conclude that c o u r t , b a s e d on i t s w e i g h i n g o f t h e c o m p e t i n g not err performed from in ruling that manual labor the evidence, employee i n t h e c o u r s e o f h i s employment w i t h t h e 2005 through cumulative-trauma February injury 2010 to caused his back the the had employer employee's from a medical standpoint. Id. B a s e d upon t h e f o r e g o i n g a n a l y s i s , we must c o n c l u d e the employer has failed to show t h a t i t has a r i g h t t o a w r i t o f mandamus d i r e c t i n g t h e t r i a l aside i t s August 9, 2012, order insofar that clear legal court to set as that order d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e has s u s t a i n e d a c u m u l a t i v e - t r a u m a injury that i s compensable under the Act and awarded the e m p l o y e e m e d i c a l b e n e f i t s u n d e r § 25-5-77. The employer outside strike also i t s discretion a portion of argues that i n denying Dr. However, e v e n i f t h e t r i a l the the McKenzie's trial court employer's deposition c o u r t h a d s t r i c k e n Dr. acted motion to transcript. McKenzie's d e p o s i t i o n t r a n s c r i p t i n i t s e n t i r e t y , t h e m e d i c a l r e c o r d and Dr. Fowler's deposition testimony 19 constitute substantial 2111228 evidence supporting the t r i a l without deciding, employer's motion determination causation. employee had p r o v e d m e d i c a l court's Therefore, that the t r i a l to strike, court erred i t s denial that the assuming, i n denying the of the motion was h a r m l e s s e r r o r . See R u l e 45, A l a . R. App. P. ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t the improper admission o f evidence i s not a b a s i s f o r r e l i e f in an appellate court when the error complained of i s harmless). F i n a l l y , t h e employer's p e t i t i o n s t a t e s t h a t t h e employer i s s e e k i n g a w r i t o f mandamus d i r e c t i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o s e t a s i d e i t s A u g u s t 9, 2012, o r d e r i n s o f a r as t h a t o r d e r awarded t h e e m p l o y e e c o s t s i n t h e amount o f $1,811. " A c c o r d i n g 25-5-89 a n d 12-21-144, [ A l a . ] Code 1975, t h e t a x i n g o f c o s t s i n a case i s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , to the g u i d e l i n e of Rule 54(d), v. Gold Kist, t o §§ subject [ A l a . ] R. C i v . P." L i t t l e t o n I n c . , 480 So. 2d 1236, 1238 ( A l a . C i v . 1 9 8 5 ) ; s e e a l s o Ex p a r t e E l l e n b u r g , 627 So. 2d 398, 400 App. (Ala. 1 9 9 3 ) . The e m p l o y e r h a s made no s h o w i n g w h a t s o e v e r t h a t t h e trial court acted employee c o s t s outside i t s discretion i n t h e amount o f $1,811. 20 i n awarding the 2111228 A c c o r d i n g l y , f o r t h e r e a s o n s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , we deny t h e employer's p e t i t i o n i n i t s entirety. PETITION DENIED. Thompson, P . J . , c o n c u r s . Moore, J . , c o n c u r s s p e c i a l l y , w h i c h Thomas, J . , j o i n s . Donaldson, J . , recuses h i m s e l f . 21 2111228 MOORE, J u d g e , c o n c u r r i n g Although part of seq., the Ala. I maintain Civ. Code writing, by v. Thomas, t h a t my J.), So. and Ex p a r t e 2011) opinion supreme c o u r t , d e c i d e s a writ employer"). 2d that that SCI Alabama 1211 (Ala. result, the with merits Cowabunga, I n c . , of a I j o i n e d by So. Thomas, minority a m a j o r i t y of t h i s I am Johns & K i r k s e y , concur Dodson I I I ("the substantial evidence demonstrating compensable back resulting fully employee") that from he the ("the main presented sustained cumulative to petition Inc. with on court, constrained the m e r i t s of the o p i n i o n t h a t Thomas C. 22 67 (Moore, J . , c o n c u r r i n g i n remains i n the consider regard, injury et "nonfinal" 1207, i n the otherwise, o f mandamus f i l e d by In from a 25-5-1 § 1975, c a n n o t be r e v i e w e d v i a a p e t i t i o n Hence, u n l e s s and u n t i l a g r e e t h a t t h i s c o u r t may for 984 dissenting in part, with writing, this court. or our appeals J., concurring determination I recognize Code Compensation Act, Hester, 143-44 ( A l a . C i v . App. p a r t and 25-5-81, A l a . a t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e , see )(Moore, joined § authorizes a w r i t o f mandamus, see 3d 136, J.), Inc. 2007 compensability for 1975, t h e one Servs., App. that Alabama Workers' judgments l i k e Funeral specially. a trauma 2111228 w i t h i n h i s employment a n d t h a t t h e e m p l o y e r d i d n o t p r e s e n t any other ground warranting the mandamus. Thomas, J . , c o n c u r s . 23 issuance of a writ of

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