Paul Murphy Brantley et al. v. Carl O. Meeks et al.

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REL: 09/14/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter o f Decisions, Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2012 2110585 Paul Murphy B r a n t l e y e t a l . v. C a r l O. Meeks e t a l . Appeal from Shelby C i r c u i t (CV-07-900023) Court THOMPSON, P r e s i d i n g J u d g e . This i s t h e second time these this court. p a r t i e s have been before Intheprevious opinion, t h i s court explained the procedural h i s t o r y of the l i t i g a t i o n as f o l l o w s : 2110585 "Paul Murphy B r a n t l e y a p p e a l [ e d ] from the judgment of the Shelby C i r c u i t C o u r t i n f a v o r of P r u d e n t i a l R e l o c a t i o n , I n c . ( ' P r u d e n t i a l ' ) , f o r whom G e r a l d P. S c r u s h y and K i m b e r l y B. S c r u s h y [ w e r e ] s u b s t i t u t e d on a p p e a l . Brantley also appeal[ed] from a separate judgment of the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f C a r l O. Meeks and P a t r i c i a Meeks i n t h e same l i t i g a t i o n . This court consolidated the a p p e a l s , and, f o r t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h h e r e i n , we d i s m i s s them. 1 " G e n e r a l l y , when r e s o l v i n g an a p p e a l i n v o l v i n g m u l t i p l e p a r c e l s o f r e a l p r o p e r t y , i t i s somewhat d i f f i c u l t t o d e s c r i b e the r e l a t i v e l o c a t i o n s of the v a r i o u s p a r c e l s of p r o p e r t y at i s s u e . For purposes of these appeals, we w i l l s i m p l i f y the present m a t t e r by s t a t i n g t h a t t h e a p p e a l s i n v o l v e two parcels of p r o p e r t y , an e a s e m e n t , and a road. P a r c e l A l i e s t o t h e n o r t h o f p a r c e l B. Parcel B i s b o r d e r e d on t h e s o u t h by a c o u n t y h i g h w a y . A 6 0 - f o o t easement c o n n e c t s P a r c e l A t o t h e h i g h w a y . The easement r u n s t h e l e n g t h o f p a r c e l B a l o n g i t s western boundary. "Brantley's predecessors i n i n t e r e s t owned p a r c e l A and p a r c e l B. Those p r e d e c e s s o r s c o n v e y e d p a r c e l B t o Guy B u r n s , S r . , and Guy B u r n s , J r . , r e s e r v i n g t o t h e m s e l v e s a 2 0 - f o o t easement a c r o s s p a r c e l B t o a c c e s s t h e h i g h w a y . The l o c a t i o n o f t h e e a s e m e n t was n o t d e f i n e d . " I n F e b r u a r y 1982, t h e B u r n s e s c o n v e y e d p a r c e l B t o J.C. W h i t e and C a r o l W h i t e , s u b j e c t t o t h e u n d e f i n e d e a s e m e n t . I n 1983, t h e W h i t e s c o n v e y e d t o Brantley's predecessors the presently existing 6 0 - f o o t easement. The d e e d c o n v e y i n g t h e e a s e m e n t r e a d s , i n p a r t : ' G r a n t o r s g r a n t h e r e i n an easement across [ p a r c e l B ] o n l y f o r the purpose of g a i n i n g access to grantee's property [ ( p a r c e l A ) ] . Grantees h e r e i n a g r e e t o abandon any o t h e r means o f a c c e s s t o s a i d property heretofore reserved across [ p a r c e l 2 2110585 " I n 1984, P a u l B r a n t l e y and one o f h i s f a m i l y members, B i l l y B r a n t l e y , p u r c h a s e d p a r c e l A. In 1998, they subdivided i t i n t o m u l t i p l e l o t s . At some p o i n t , B r a n t l e y b u i l t a 1 0 - f o o t - w i d e a s p h a l t d r i v e w a y t h r o u g h the easement from p a r c e l A t o the county highway. " I n J a n u a r y 2006, t h e W h i t e s c o n v e y e d p a r c e l B t o M a v e r i c k E n t e r p r i s e s , LLC ( ' M a v e r i c k ' ) . In A p r i l 2006, M a v e r i c k c o n v e y e d a p o r t i o n o f p a r c e l B t o R o n a l d W a l k e r and K a t h e r i n e W a l k e r . Thereafter, M a v e r i c k began c o n s t r u c t i n g a house f o r the W a l k e r s on t h e i r l o t . M a v e r i c k s u b d i v i d e d t h e p o r t i o n o f p a r c e l B t h a t i t c o n t i n u e d t o own. I n May 2006, M a v e r i c k s o l d two o f t h e n e w l y d i v i d e d p o r t i o n s o f p a r c e l B t o C a r l Dewayne Meeks and S a n d r a Meeks and two o t h e r n e w l y d i v i d e d p o r t i o n s o f p a r c e l B t o C a r l O. Meeks and P a t r i c i a Meeks. "On J a n u a r y 22, 2007, t h e W a l k e r s f i l e d an action against Brantley. They a l l e g e d t h a t i n November 2006 B r a n t l e y e n t e r e d t h e i r p r o p e r t y and c u t down t h r e e l a r g e t r e e s l o c a t e d on t h e e a s e m e n t , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t the t r e e s d i d not i m p a i r h i s access to h i s property. " B r a n t l e y f i l e d an a n s w e r and a c o u n t e r c l a i m . In the c o u n t e r c l a i m , B r a n t l e y added M a v e r i c k and Kenneth C a r t e r , M a v e r i c k ' s m a n a g i n g member, as counterclaim defendants. Brantley a l l e g e d that, i n r e t a l i a t i o n f o r B r a n t l e y ' s c u t t i n g down t h e t h r e e t r e e s l o c a t e d i n the easement, C a r t e r s h o t s e v e r a l h o l e s i n B r a n t l e y ' s w a t e r l i n e , d e s t r o y i n g i t . On M a r c h 30, 2007, t h e W a l k e r s f i l e d a motion to dismiss Brantley's counterclaim, arguing that B r a n t l e y ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m d i d not seek r e l i e f a g a i n s t them. "On June 21, 2007, B r a n t l e y f i l e d an amendment t o h i s answer and h i s c o u n t e r c l a i m . I n i t , he a l l e g e d t h a t C a r t e r had begun s u b d i v i d i n g p a r c e l B. B r a n t l e y a s s e r t e d t h a t he and h i s a t t o r n e y had 3 2110585 n o t i f i e d Carter of h i s objection to Carter's planned u s e o f t h e d r i v e w a y on t h e easement a n d t o C a r t e r ' s a d v e r t i s i n g t o others a r i g h t t o use t h a t driveway. B r a n t l e y a l l e g e d t h a t he h a d been h a r a s s e d a n d i n t i m i d a t e d by t h e W a l k e r s , C a r t e r , and M a v e r i c k and t h a t t h e y h a d damaged a n d d e s t r o y e d p o r t i o n s o f t h e driveway B r a n t l e y had c o n s t r u c t e d . "On June 26, 2007, the p a r t i e s filed a s t i p u l a t i o n o f d i s m i s s a l w i t h p r e j u d i c e as t o a l l the c l a i m s between t h e W a l k e r s and B r a n t l e y , and they requested that the remaining parties be r e a l i g n e d t o show B r a n t l e y as t h e p l a i n t i f f and C a r t e r and M a v e r i c k as d e f e n d a n t s . On A u g u s t 5, 2007, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g w i t h p r e j u d i c e t h e c l a i m s between t h e W a l k e r s and B r a n t l e y a n d r e a l i g n i n g t h e r e m a i n i n g p a r t i e s as they had requested. "On November 13, 2007, t h e W a l k e r s property to Prudential. sold their "On A u g u s t 27, 2009, B r a n t l e y f i l e d an amended c o m p l a i n t i n w h i c h he a d d e d C a r l O. Meeks, P a t r i c i a Meeks, a n d P r u d e n t i a l as d e f e n d a n t s . He a l l e g e d t h a t t h e d r i v e w a y he h a d c o n s t r u c t e d t h r o u g h t h e easement was a 'private road,' that he had m a i n t a i n e d t h e easement f o r more t h a n 20 y e a r s , t h a t he h a d p o s t e d 'no t r e s p a s s i n g ' s i g n s on t h e r o a d on t h e e a s e m e n t , a n d t h a t he h a d p l a c e d a l o c k e d g a t e a c r o s s t h e r o a d on t h e e a s e m e n t . He a s s e r t e d t h a t he h a d a ' p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t ' t o t h e e a s e m e n t a n d the road across i t . Brantley alleged that the M e e k s e s were t r y i n g t o s e l l t h e i r p r o p e r t y a n d t h a t t h e y h a d b e e n a d v i s i n g o t h e r s t h a t t h e r o a d on t h e easement was a v a i l a b l e t o a c c e s s t h e i r property. B r a n t l e y a l l e g e d t h a t C a r l O. Meeks h a d removed a n d damaged B r a n t l e y ' s s i g n s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e r o a d i n t h e easement was p r i v a t e . Brantley asserted the allegations i n h i s previous amended counterclaim r e g a r d i n g C a r t e r and M a v e r i c k . He a l l e g e d t h a t C a r t e r , M a v e r i c k , a n d C a r l O. Meeks h a d h a r a s s e d and 4 2110585 i n t i m i d a t e d h i m and t h a t t h e y h a d damaged and d e s t r o y e d p o r t i o n s o f t h e r o a d on t h e e a s e m e n t . He s o u g h t a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t h e r o a d on t h e easement was a ' p r i v a t e r o a d ' and t h a t t h e 6 0 - f o o t easement was 'an e x c l u s i v e easement of P l a i n t i f f Paul B r a n t l e y f o r the B r a n t l e y Family S u b d i v i s i o n . ' He a l s o s o u g h t an a w a r d o f damages a g a i n s t Carter, M a v e r i c k , and t h e M e e k s e s . "On S e p t e m b e r 28, 2009, C a r l O. Meeks f i l e d a separate a c t i o n against Brantley. T h a t a c t i o n was assigned case number CV-09-900726. In his complaint, Meeks sought a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment d e f i n i n g t h e e a s e m e n t as p e r m i s s i v e i n nature, d e f i n i n g i t as s o l e l y f o r i n g r e s s and egress, prohibiting Brantley from asserting exclusive c o n t r o l o v e r t h e e a s e m e n t , and o r d e r i n g B r a n t l e y t o c e a s e and d e s i s t f r o m h a r a s s i n g Meeks and o t h e r s who u s e d t h e e a s e m e n t and t o remove a l l o f t h e s i g n a g e B r a n t l e y h a d p l a c e d on t h e e a s e m e n t . Meeks a l s o s o u g h t an o r d e r f r o m t h e c o u r t e n j o i n i n g B r a n t l e y f r o m h a r a s s i n g h i m and o t h e r s u s i n g t h e e a s e m e n t , f r o m p l a c i n g s i g n s on t h e easement w i t h o u t Meeks's w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n , a n d f r o m e x e r c i s i n g any c o n t r o l o v e r t h e easement b e y o n d t h e mere u s e o f t h e "On O c t o b e r 13, 2009, B r a n t l e y f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s Meeks's a c t i o n on t h e b a s i s t h a t B r a n t l e y ' s a c t i o n h a d b e e n p e n d i n g b e f o r e Meeks's a c t i o n was i n i t i a t e d and s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e c a u s e Meeks's a c t i o n to abate. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , he a r g u e d t h a t Meeks's action should be c o n s o l i d a t e d w i t h h i s a c t i o n . Meeks f i l e d a r e s p o n s e i n w h i c h he i n d i c a t e d t h a t , a t t h e t i m e he f i l e d h i s a c t i o n , he was unaware t h a t B r a n t l e y h a d a d d e d h i m as a p a r t y i n B r a n t l e y ' s amended c o m p l a i n t . He a g r e e d t h a t h i s a c t i o n s h o u l d be consolidated with Brantley's action. Subsequently, the trial court consolidated B r a n t l e y ' s a c t i o n w i t h Meeks's a c t i o n and i n d i c a t e d t h a t B r a n t l e y ' s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s Meeks's a c t i o n was moot. 5 2110585 "On O c t o b e r 22, 2009, P r u d e n t i a l f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., a n d a s u p p o r t i n g b r i e f . P r u d e n t i a l argued t h a t the amended c o m p l a i n t made no c l a i m s against P r u d e n t i a l a n d t h a t i t d i d n o t demand a j u d g m e n t against Prudential. P r u d e n t i a l a l s o argued that Brantley could not state facts s u f f i c i e n t to convert h i s ' e x p r e s s , p e r m i s s i v e e a s e m e n t f r o m 1 9 8 3 ' i n t o an ' e x c l u s i v e easement b y p r e s c r i p t i o n . ' Finally, Prudential asserted that Brantley's claims against i t were b a r r e d b y t h e d o c t r i n e o f r e s j u d i c a t a b a s e d on t h e d i s m i s s a l w i t h p r e j u d i c e o f B r a n t l e y ' s c l a i m s against the Walkers, P r u d e n t i a l ' s predecessors i n interest. To i t s s u p p o r t i n g brief, Prudential a t t a c h e d deeds i n i t s c h a i n o f t i t l e . "Brantley filed a response t o P r u d e n t i a l ' s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s i n w h i c h he a p p e a r e d t o a r g u e t h a t the e a s e m e n t was p r i v a t e a n d r e s e r v e d for his e x c l u s i v e u s e a n d t h a t t h e owners o f t h e s u b s e r v i e n t p r o p e r t i e s were n o t e n t i t l e d t o u s e t h e e a s e m e n t a n d the r o a d t h a t r a n t h r o u g h t h e easement. Brantley a r g u e d t h a t h i s c l a i m s a g a i n s t P r u d e n t i a l were n o t b a r r e d by t h e d o c t r i n e o f r e s j u d i c a t a because t h e d i s m i s s a l as t o t h e W a l k e r s r e l a t e d o n l y t o t h e i r c l a i m t h a t B r a n t l e y h a d c u t down some t r e e s i n t h e easement, because t h e r e had n o t been a final j u d g m e n t i n t h e m a t t e r , a n d b e c a u s e t h e r e was no i d e n t i t y of the p a r t i e s . I n support of h i s response t o t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , B r a n t l e y a t t a c h e d an a f f i d a v i t , e x e c u t e d by B i l l y B r a n t l e y , D a v i d E i l a n d , and h i m s e l f . I n part, that a f f i d a v i t read: "'Our names a r e P a u l B r a n t l e y , B i l l y B r a n t l e y , and D a v i d E i l a n d . P a u l B r a n t l e y and B i l l y B r a n t l e y a r e t h e owners o f t h e B r a n t l e y F a m i l y S u b d i v i s i o n a n d have b e e n s i n c e 1984. The p r o p e r t y was p u r c h a s e d a t t h a t t i m e f r o m P a u l B r a n t l e y , R a l p h E. Coleman, a n d J . S h e r r i l l H a n c o c k . The p r o p e r t y c o n s i s t e d o f 41.7 a c r e s . We h a d o u r homes b u i l t a n d l o c a t e d on t h e f a m i l y 6 2110585 s u b d i v i s i o n and have l i v e d t h e r e f r o m 1985 f o r w a r d and have b e e n i n p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e property since that time. David E i l a n d p u r c h a s e d l o t 3 w h i c h i s 5.43 a c r e s i n 1998 and h a d l i v e d on t h e p r o p e r t y a n d b e e n i n p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e same s i n c e t h a t t i m e . I n o r d e r t o a c c e s s t h e p r o p e r t y , we b u i l t a 60 f o o t r i g h t o f way w i t h a p e r s o n a l 10 f o o t a s p h a l t d r i v e way a l o n g w i t h a 3 i n c h w a t e r l i n e f o r u t i l i t y p u r p o s e s and power l i n e s f o r p e r s o n a l u s e . The c o u n t y r e q u i r e d t h e 60 f o o t r i g h t o f way t o e s t a b l i s h t h e F a m i l y S u b d i v i s i o n i n 1998 "' The County accepted the s u b d i v i s i o n w i t h the p r i v a t e d r i v e being p r i v a t e l y m a i n t a i n e d and t h e C o u n t y t o have no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s m a i n t e n a n c e and upkeep. " ' S i n c e t h a t t i m e and p r i o r t h e r e t o , access has b e e n by p r i v a t e r o a d and m a i n t a i n e d by t h e a f f i a n t s . The p r i v a t e 60 f o o t r i g h t o f way has a t e n f o o t a s p h a l t d r i v e w h i c h was b u i l t and p a i d f o r b y a f f i a n t , P a u l B r a n t l e y , a n d h a d been t a k e n care [ o f ] by the a f f i a n t s and their families. "'The p r o p e r t y has been p o s t e d a t a l l t i m e s as a p r i v a t e r o a d and a c c e s s h a s b e e n c o n t r o l l e d a t v a r i o u s t i m e s by a c a b l e d entrance and v i d e o surveillance. Our m a i l b o x e s a r e l o c a t e d on C o u n t y R o a d 22 and our garbage c o l l e c t i o n i s a t County Road 22. We have no p u b l i c t r a f f i c and have h a d none f o r t h e s e 22 y e a r s of our s o l e ownership. Affiant Paul Brantley i s f a m i l i a r w i t h the p r e v i o u s usage of s a i d r o a d and p r i o r t o t h i s t i m e t h e r o a d has 7 2110585 b e e n p r i v a t e as h i s f a m i l y has owned t h e p r o p e r t y s i n c e t h e 1930s. The r i g h t o f way and p r i v a t e r o a d was d e s i g n a t e d 60 f e e t t o the west s i d e o f t h e p r o p e r t y i n the 1980s.' "Brantley also attached t o the response several p i c t u r e s o f t h e r o a d on t h e e a s e m e n t a n d deeds i n d i c a t i n g how t h e p r o p e r t i e s a t i s s u e h a d b e e n t r a n s f e r r e d over time. "Prudential f i l e d a reply i n support of i t s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s i n w h i c h i t a r g u e d , among o t h e r things, that, i n d e c i d i n g the motion t o dismiss, 'the C o u r t c a n s i m p l y r e v i e w t h e e x p r e s s e a s e m e n t , n o t e i t s c l a r i t y a n d d e t e r m i n e as a m a t t e r o f l a w that t h e easement i s n o t e x c l u s i v e which will dispose of the matter.' I t argued that '[t]he e a s e m e n t i s c l e a r a n d unambiguous on i t s f a c e and g i v e s no one -- i n c l u d i n g B r a n t l e y an e x c l u s i v e right of access.' "On J a n u a r y 12, 2010, t h e M e e k s e s f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , f o r a summary judgment. They a d o p t e d P r u d e n t i a l ' s a r g u m e n t s i n s u p p o r t o f i t s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s as w e l l as t h e m a t e r i a l P r u d e n t i a l submitted i n support of that motion. The Meekses a r g u e d t h a t , b a s e d on t h e evidence Prudential and B r a n t l e y had submitted, B r a n t l e y d i d n o t have an e x c l u s i v e easement o v e r t h e servient property. "Brantley f i l e d a response t o t h e Meekses' m o t i o n i n w h i c h he a d o p t e d t h e r e s p o n s e he h a d f i l e d to P r u d e n t i a l ' s motion. To h i s r e s p o n s e , B r a n t l e y a t t a c h e d a c o p y o f a s u b d i v i s i o n p l a t t h a t , when considered i n conjunction with other evidence the parties had submitted, demonstrated that only P r u d e n t i a l a n d t h e M e e k s e s owned p o r t i o n s o f t h e o r i g i n a l s e r v i e n t e s t a t e t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e easement r a n a n d t h a t M a v e r i c k no l o n g e r owned any p o r t i o n o f the o r i g i n a l s e r v i e n t e s t a t e . 8 2110585 "On F e b r u a r y 19, 2010, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r g r a n t i n g P r u d e n t i a l ' s m o t i o n and d i s m i s s i n g Brantley's action against i t . The t r i a l court c e r t i f i e d t h e j u d g m e n t as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. B r a n t l e y f i l e d an a p p e a l t o the supreme court of that order; that court t r a n s f e r r e d B r a n t l e y ' s appeal t o t h i s court pursuant t o § 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1975. "On A p r i l 30, 2010, t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e M e e k s e s ' m o t i o n and e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t i n t h e i r f a v o r as t o a l l B r a n t l e y ' s c l a i m s against them. The t r i a l court c e r t i f i e d t h e summary j u d g m e n t as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) . The t r i a l c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t C a r l O. Meeks's c l a i m s a g a i n s t B r a n t l e y , w h i c h t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e f e r r e d t o as a c o u n t e r c l a i m , were s t a y e d p e n d i n g any a p p e a l o f t h e summary j u d g m e n t . B r a n t l e y f i l e d an a p p e a l o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t t o t h e supreme c o u r t , w h i c h t r a n s f e r r e d the appeal to t h i s court pursuant t o § 12-2-7(6). This court consolidated Brantley's appeals. " The S c r u s h y s a r e s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t t o p r o p e r t y t h a t P r u d e n t i a l h a d owned t h a t h a d f o r m e d the b a s i s of B r a n t l e y ' s c l a i m s a g a i n s t P r u d e n t i a l . " 1 B r a n t l e y v. S c r u s h y , 2010). In that 57 So. 2d 787, 788-91 case, this court ( A l a . C i v . App. dismissed t h e two f r o m t h e two s e p a r a t e summary-judgment o r d e r s a f t e r that the orders sufficiently from which final to Scrushy, supra. Meekses' counterclaims the appeals support Specifically, against 9 the the were t a k e n appeals. court Brantley, appeals concluding were n o t Brantley v. held that the which were not 2110585 addressed i n the A p r i l too closely orders 30, 2010, summary-judgment intertwined with the claims so as t o make t h e p u r p o r t e d order, resolved Rule 54(b) were i n t h e two certifications inappropriate. After this court issued B r a n t l e y v. S c r u s h y , s u p r a , add originally plaintiffs") those plaintiffs a r e owners o f owned b y B r a n t l e y b u t s u b d i v i d e d I n t h a t amended c o m p l a i n t , (hereinafter o f judgment i n B r a n t l e y amended h i s c o m p l a i n t t o additional plaintiffs; property i t s certificate together B r a n t l e y and t h e o t h e r referred to as by him. plaintiffs "the Brantley s o u g h t a j u d g m e n t d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e easement was p r i v a t e a n d a p p l i e d o n l y t o t h e p r o p e r t y owned b y t h e B r a n t l e y plaintiffs. The Brantley d e f e n d a n t s who owned p r o p e r t y create to plaintiffs do i n o b t a i n i n g p e r m i s s i o n We n o t e t h a t t h e r e c o r d allegations against Brantley p l a i n t i f f s ' complaint. 10 to subdivide indicates that the c o u r t as a r e s u l t them made i n t h e t r i a l amended the as t h e y h a d a g r e e d from t h e county S c r u s h y s were a d d e d as p a r t i e s i n t h e t r i a l of that n e a r t h e easement h a d f a i l e d t o an easement on t h e i r own p r o p e r t y , t h e i r property. alleged court i n the 2110585 The and M e e k s e s moved t o renew t h e i r summary-judgment m o t i o n moved to complaint. strike The the Brantley Brantley plaintiffs' plaintiffs then filed amended a s e e k i n g t o be a l l o w e d t o amend B r a n t l e y ' s c o m p l a i n t . motion Brantley l a t e r moved t o c o m p e l t h e d e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e M e e k s e s , and the Meekses the opposed motion to On that The trial court denied compel. F e b r u a r y 16, judgment motion. in favor 2012, of the the t r i a l Meekses court entered on Brantley's a summary claims and n o t e d t h a t t h e M e e k s e s ' c l a i m s a g a i n s t B r a n t l e y were d i s m i s s e d without prejudice. The trial court also granted the Meekses' motion to s t r i k e the B r a n t l e y p l a i n t i f f s ' complaint the B r a n t l e y p l a i n t i f f s ' trial m o t i o n t o amend t h e c o u r t t h e n d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e r e was delay, and i t judgment o r d e r certified as the February and denied complaint. The no j u s t r e a s o n f o r 16, 2012, summary- f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. Civ. P. The B r a n t l e y p l a i n t i f f s t i m e l y a p p e a l e d , and t h e a p p e a l transferred to t h i s c o u r t by § 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code Initially, we Brantley p l a i n t i f f s note the supreme c o u r t , p u r s u a n t was to 1975. that in their brief on appeal the do n o t a r g u e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n 11 2110585 s t r i k i n g t h e i r amended c o m p l a i n t , of them except Brantley action. The pertain only reason, i n t h i s o p i n i o n , we as b e i n g arguments the to issues a s s e r t e d by which e f f e c t i v e l y denied a l l status asserted relevant in to of plaintiffs the appellants' Brantley, r e f e r t o the in and, the brief for a r g u m e n t s on that appeal Brantley. As i n B r a n t l e y v. S c r u s h y , s u p r a , none o f t h e p a r t i e s a d d r e s s e d the q u e s t i o n whether the order e n t e r e d by t h e has trial court i s s u f f i c i e n t l y f i n a l to support t h i s appeal. Brantley v. did Scrushy, Rule So. 3d i t s February alter 19, 54(b), against 57 in at 2010, favor that defendant. 791-92. of 1 The order, Prudential The trial court made f i n a l on F e b r u a r y 16, pursuant Brantley's 2012, not order, to claims also We n o t e t h a t u n d e r R u l e 2 5 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., an a c t i o n may be c o n t i n u e d a g a i n s t a d e f e n d a n t who has t r a n s f e r r e d h i s , h e r , o r i t s i n t e r e s t i n t h e a c t i o n i f no m o t i o n t o s u b s t i t u t e p a r t i e s i s made, o r i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e s s u c h a m o t i o n . See A m e r i c a n C r e d i t Co. o f A l a b a m a , I n c . v. B r a d f o r d , 414 So. 2d 119, 121 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1982) ("'The most s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e of R u l e 25(c) i s t h a t i t does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t a n y t h i n g be done a f t e r an i n t e r e s t has b e e n t r a n s f e r r e d . The a c t i o n may be c o n t i n u e d by o r a g a i n s t t h e o r i g i n a l p a r t y , and t h e j u d g m e n t w i l l be b i n d i n g on h i s s u c c e s s o r i n i n t e r e s t e v e n t h o u g h he i s n o t named. An o r d e r o f j o i n d e r i s m e r e l y a discretionary determination by t h e t r i a l court that the t r a n s f e r e e ' s presence would f a c i l i t a t e the conduct of the l i t i g a t i o n . ' " ( q u o t i n g 7A W r i g h t & M i l l e r , F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e § 1958, a t p. 6 6 4 ) ) . See a l s o Ex p a r t e Simmons, 1 12 2110585 certified the as claims claims final remaining the trial summary-judgment judgment pursuant order easement. disposed b e t w e e n t h e M e e k s e s and court resolved order and the 16, parties' property. s o u g h t m o n e t a r y damages 19, 2012, The 2010, summary- rights in the final from C a r l we conclude to support this that those t h a t he was a " r e s e r v e d easement." 487, 132 Meeks, So. orders court erred i n n o t e n t i t l e d t o what he r e f e r s to See R e p u b l i c S t e e l C o r p . v. Payne, 2d 581, 584 are appeal. appeal, B r a n t l e y argues t h a t the t r i a l determining O. on h i s c l a i m s o f h a r a s s m e n t and damage t o Accordingly, sufficiently 483, of a l l Brantley. i n i t s February i t s February a l l p e r t a i n to C a r t e r , and M a v e r i c k Ala. 54(b), The o n l y c l a i m s t h a t r e m a i n e d p e n d i n g were t h o s e i n which B r a n t l e y On to Rule (1961) ("The as 272 r u l e seems t o 791 So. 2d 371, 382 ( A l a . 2000) ("Rule 2 5 ( c ) c l e a r l y a l l o w s Simmons, upon remand, t o c o n t i n u e h e r a c t i o n a g a i n s t [ t h e o r i g i n a l d e f e n d a n t ] o r move t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o s u b s t i t u t e o r j o i n [ p o s s i b l e assignees of the o r i g i n a l d e f e n d a n t ] . " ) . Thus, although the t r i a l c o u r t d i d not f o r m a l l y s u b s t i t u t e the Scrushys f o r P r u d e n t i a l , the order p e r t a i n i n g to P r u d e n t i a l d i s p o s e s o f any c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e S c r u s h y s t h a t B r a n t l e y m i g h t maintain with regard to the original claims against P r u d e n t i a l . F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f r e s o l v i n g t h i s a p p e a l , and i n l i n e w i t h B r a n t l e y v. S c r u s h y , we a g a i n r e f e r t o P r u d e n t i a l o r t h e S c r u s h y s as " P r u d e n t i a l . " 13 2110585 be well settled reservation; that an easement may be the subject a n d t h a t a r e s e r v a t i o n o f an easement i n a d e e d by w h i c h l a n d s a r e conveyed i s e q u i v a l e n t , the creation easement o f t h e easement, by t h e grantee Brantley's of a f o r the purpose of t o an e x p r e s s of the lands."). argument on t h i s grant of the The s u b s t a n c e o f issue i s that the reservation of t h e easement i n B r a n t l e y ' s d e e d c o n v e y e d t o h i m a " p r i v a t e " o r exclusive precludes right t o use t h e easement the r i g h t s of others, use t h e e a s e m e n t . and that that even t h e s e r v i e n t owners, t o The 1983 d e e d t h a t c o n v e y e d t h e c u r r e n t 60- f o o t easement t o B r a n t l e y ' s p r e d e c e s s o r s - i n - i n t e r e s t in right relevant part: "Grantors grant herein provided, an easement across [ p a r c e l B] o n l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f g a i n i n g a c c e s s t o g r a n t e e ' s property. access B]." G r a n t e e s h e r e i n a g r e e t o abandon any o t h e r means o f to said property heretofore The d e e d contains no m e n t i o n t h a t servient-estate owners were reserved curtailed across [parcel the r i g h t s with regard of the to the easement. On a p p e a l , (Ala. B r a n t l e y c i t e s A r p v . Edmonds, 706 So. 2d 736 C i v . App. property 1997). In that case, t h e deed awarding to the Arps' predecessors-in-interest provided 14 fora 2110585 25-foot easement a c r o s s t h e p r o p e r t y owned by t h e Edmondses. The A r p s a n d o t h e r s u s e d a d i r t r o a d t o a c c e s s f r o m 1971 u n t i l 1993, when t h e Edmondses road and property; constructed another the Edmondses, its holding, b u t o u r supreme c o u r t o u r supreme demonstrated The t r i a l court dirt to access road was used openly t h a t t h e easement was n e c e s s a r y the t r i a l the road Arps' increased court found i n favor of reversed. concluded that t h e c r e a t i o n o f an easement b y p r e s e n t i n g " s u b s t a n t i a l evidence property "eradicated" the d i r t Mr. Edmonds e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e new the value of h i s p r o p e r t y . the road their In reaching the Arps had implication by of u n i t y of ownership, and c o n t i n u o u s l y to reach and that court misapplied Arp since the Arps' that 1971, property, the law t o the facts." v. Edmonds, 706 So. 2d a t 739. B r a d l e y c o n t e n d s t h a t he h a d u s e d h i s easement as h a d t h e Arps i n A r p v. Edmonds, s u p r a . However, i t i s unclear t h a t argument a s s i s t s B r a n t l e y ' s p o s i t i o n on a p p e a l . Edmonds, s u p r a , how A r p v. does n o t a d d r e s s t h e r i g h t s o f t h e s e r v i e n t - e s t a t e owner i n t h e easement by implication. I n i t s o r d e r s i n f a v o r o f P r u d e n t i a l and t h e M e e k s e s , t h e trial court relied upon B l a l o c k v. C o n z e l m a n , 751 So. 2d 2 15 2110585 (Ala. 1999). In that case, the C o n z e l m a n s had over a p o r t i o n of B l a l o c k ' s p r o p e r t y , an easement and a l l t h e p a r t i e s u s e d t h a t easement as a d r i v e w a y t o a c c e s s t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e homes. Blalock made p l a n s to would connect to the construct a easement. circular The driveway that Conzelmans i n i t i a t e d an a c t i o n t o b l o c k t h a t p r o p o s e d c o n s t r u c t i o n , c i t i n g t h e damage t o t h e t r e e s and l a n d s c a p e n e a r t h e easement t h a t w o u l d The trial court held that Blalock could not occur. construct the p r o p o s e d c i r c u l a r d r i v e w a y , c o n c l u d i n g t h a t the Conzelmans had established the easement, that they either p r e s c r i p t i v e use had through Blalock reserved easement to v. their and the Conzelmans' "for ingress and that that to exclusive deed Our or use of through supreme c o u r t their rejected reversed. Conzelman, owned by t h e C o n z e l m a n s . concluded right of the easement. both of those c o n c l u s i o n s In a supra, So. language relevant to and from" 2d a t 3. did not Our create the supreme an an property court exclusive easement i n f a v o r of the Conzelmans; i t e x p l a i n e d : "The g e n e r a l r u l e i n A l a b a m a and e l s e w h e r e i s 'that the [ f e e ] owner o f a s e r v i e n t e s t a t e may h i m s e l f use t h e l a n d upon w h i c h an easement has b e e n d e d i c a t e d so l o n g as s u c h r i g h t does n o t c o n f l i c t 16 deed predecessors-in-interest egress 751 the 2110585 w i t h t h e p u r p o s e and c h a r a c t e r o f t h e e a s e m e n t . ' Duke v. P i n e C r e s t Homes, I n c . , 358 So. 2d 148, 150 (Ala. 1978) (emphasis added); see Carter v. S t r i n g f e l l o w , 293 A l a . 525, 306 So. 2d 273 (1975) ('The r i g h t t o use t h e l a n d on w h i c h an e a s e m e n t has b e e n d e d i c a t e d r e m a i n s i n t h e owner o f t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e so l o n g as s u c h r i g h t does n o t c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e p u r p o s e and c h a r a c t e r o f t h e e a s e m e n t ' ) ; and C o l l i n s v. A l a b a m a Power Co., 214 A l a . 643, 108 So. 868 ( 1 9 2 6 ) . M o r e o v e r , '[a] p r i n c i p l e o f c o n c u r r e n t , rather than exclusive, use underlies the law c o n c e r n i n g easement.' McMahon v. H i n e s , 298 Ill. App. 3d 231, 239, 697 N.E.2d 1199, 1206, 232 Ill. Dec. 269, 276 (1998). 'Therefore, use of an e a s e m e n t by b o t h l a n d o w n e r s must be p e r m i t t e d i n accordance w i t h t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s . ' Id. See a l s o F e d o r k o P r o p e r t i e s , I n c . v. C.F. Zurn & A s s o c s . , 720 A.2d 147 (Pa. S u p e r . 1998) (the mere use o f t h e t e r m ' e x c l u s i v e e a s e m e n t ' i n an easement c o n v e y a n c e d i d n o t ' g r a n t an e a s e m e n t e x c l u s i v e o f the servient estate'). Nothing i n the deeds c o n v e y i n g l o t s 1 and 2 s u g g e s t s t h e C o n z e l m a n s ' e a s e m e n t was g r a n t e d or r e s e r v e d e x c l u s i v e l y f o r them." B l a l o c k v. court a l s o h e l d t h a t the purposes of did C o n z e l m a n , 751 not accessing extend to their a a t 5-6. property In t h a t them to case, the easement f o r an and the that preserve a f f e c t t h e i r use of the that the easement trees and easement. supreme c o u r t a l s o r e j e c t e d t h e C o n z e l m a n s ' argument that t h e i r having maintained for 2d C o n z e l m a n s had allow landscape t h a t d i d not The So. number of years the l a n d s c a p i n g near the easement converted 17 the easement into a 2110585 p r e s c r i p t i v e easement i n t h e i r supra. The supreme c o u r t favor. B l a l o c k v. Conzelman, explained: "'[A] p o s s e s s i o n p e r m i s s i v e i n i t s i n c e p t i o n c a n n o t become a d v e r s e to the owner u n t i l a positive a s s e r t i o n o f a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o t h e owner i s b r o u g h t t o him.' Monaghan v. Wagner, 487 So. 2d 815, 819 ( M i s s . 1 9 8 6 ) , c i t i n g W i l l i a m s v. P a t t e r s o n , 198 M i s s . 120, 21 So. 2d 477 ( 1 9 4 5 ) ; see a l s o T a y l o r v. S.S. K r e s g e Co., 326 M i c h . 580, 40 N.W.2d 636 (1950). 'Ordinary acts of ownership, c o n s i s t e n t ----- w i t h p e r m i s s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , are not s u f f i c i e n t t o constitute an adverse h o l d i n g capable of ever ripening into a t i t l e . ' H a r k i n s & Co. v. L e w i s , 535 So. 2d 104, 117 ( A l a . 1988) (emphasis added)." B l a l o c k v. C o n z e l m a n , 751 The So. 2d a t 5. f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e a r e on p o i n t w i t h t h o s e o f B l a l o c k v. C o n z e l m a n , s u p r a . The deeds a t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e a w a r d e d B r a n t l e y an e a s e m e n t t o a c c e s s h i s p r o p e r t y . Under B l a l o c k v. C o n z e l m a n , s u p r a , t h e s e r v i e n t - e s t a t e owner a l s o has t h e to use conflict the easement with the C o n z e l m a n , 751 So. to the purpose 2d a t 6 t h e p a r t i e s have c o n c u r r e n t and neither party can extent of the that created. c r e a t e s m u t u a l r i g h t s and use easement. ("[P]ursuant does not Blalock to the g e n e r a l v. rule, r i g h t s t o t h e use o f t h e e a s e m e n t , prevent the other e a s e m e n t i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t h e easement was that right from purposes using the f o r which Thus, t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e e a s e m e n t obligations."). 18 In t h i s case, the 2110585 easement the i s being properties access t h e i r easement u s e d by t h e p a r t i e s h a v i n g adjacent t o t h e easement properties. i s being used Brantley an i n t e r e s t i n as a d r i v e w a y to has n o t a l l e g e d t h a t t h e i n a manner inconsistent with i t s p u r p o s e ; r a t h e r , he a l l e g e s o n l y t h a t t h e r e a r e more property owners u s i n g to that t h e easement as a d r i v e w a y . The r i g h t a d d i t i o n a l u s e , h o w e v e r , was a f f o r d e d t o t h e Meekses a n d o t h e r owners o f t h e p r o p e r t y estate. subdivided f r o m p a r c e l B, t h e s e r v i e n t We c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y d e t e r m i n e d t h a t B l a l o c k v. Conzelman, supra, case i t c o r r e c t l y entered and, t h e r e f o r e , j u d g m e n t on t h e c l a i m s respective attempting not provide a summary to e s t a b l i s h the p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s i n t h e easement. that the t r i a l did that governs the f a c t s of t h i s Therefore, we conclude court properly determined that Brantley's deed him o r h i s s u c c e s s o r s - i n - i n t e r e s t a r i g h t t o e x c l u s i v e use o f t h e easement. B r a n t l e y a l s o a r g u e s on a p p e a l t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t in entering a summary judgment on h i s c l a i m s i m p o s i t i o n o f a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement. v. B e l c h e r , supreme Brantley cites 284 A l a . 254, 224 So. 2d 613 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , court affirmed a judgment 19 seeking erred the Belcher i n which our finding that, under t h e 2110585 f a c t s i n t h a t case, the p l a i n t i f f s had demonstrated a right to a plaintiffs prescriptive demonstrated easement. In that case, the t h a t t h e y and o t h e r s h a d u s e d a r o a d a c r o s s t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y f o r more t h a n 20 y e a r s u n d e r a c l a i m o f right. The supreme court rejected the defendants' argument t h a t t h e u s e o f t h e c l a i m e d easement was p e r m i s s i v e , n o t i n g t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s knew a b o u t t h e use and d i d n o t o b j e c t t o i t , which, necessarily demonstrate tenus the court a f f i r m e d . rule, i t determined, a p e r m i s s i v e use. Citing d i d not the ore B e l c h e r v. B e l c h e r , s u p r a . A l s o , B r a n t l e y r e l i e s on A p l e y v. T a g e r t , 584 So. 2d 816 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) , i n w h i c h t h e A p l e y s p u r c h a s e d p r o p e r t y upon w h i c h was a r o a d u s e d b y t h e T a g e r t s t o a c c e s s t h e i r p r o p e r t y . Apleys sued to declare their rights i n t h e easement p r e v e n t t h e T a g e r t s from u s i n g t h e easement. The and t o The e v i d e n c e i n t h a t case i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e T a g e r t s had used t h e p r o p e r t y f o r 30 y e a r s t o g a i n a c c e s s t o t h e i r p r o p e r t y . The supreme c o u r t h e l d t h a t the f a c t s of t h a t case w a r r a n t e d the i m p o s i t i o n of a prescriptive easement i n f a v o r o f t h e T a g e r t s b e c a u s e t h e T a g e r t s h a d u s e d t h e roadway t o a c c e s s t h e i r p r o p e r t y u n d e r a claim of r i g h t . 20 2110585 Both supra, both Belcher v. Belcher, and A p l e y v. are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the f a c t s o f t h i s of those cases, attempting to prevent easement. In t h i s are supra, seeking the the case, to prevent access h i s property. servient-estate easement holder Tagert, case. owners from In were using the none o f t h e s e r v i e n t - e s t a t e owners B r a n t l e y from u s i n g t h e easement t o Rather, B r a n t l e y i s seeking t o e s t a b l i s h a prescriptive r i g h t t o h i s e x c l u s i v e u s e o f t h e easement t o the of exclusion the s e r v i e n t - e s t a t e owners. Belcher v. B e l c h e r , s u p r a , and A p l e y v. T a g e r t , s u p r a , do n o t s u p p o r t h i s claim to prevent t h e s e r v i e n t - e s t a t e owners from u s i n g the easement. Assuming, prescriptive however, that one could easement t h a t w o u l d p r e c l u d e servient-estate owner through the theory establish the r i g h t s of a a of the prescriptive e a s e m e n t , B r a n t l e y may n o t p r e v a i l on t h i s a r g u m e n t u n d e r t h e facts of t h i s case. Brantley's right t o u s e t h e easement began w i t h p e r m i s s i v e use, i . e . , t h e g r a n t o f t h e easement. Such p e r m i s s i v e u s e c a n n o t be s a i d t o be a d v e r s e unless the s e r v i e n t - e s t a t e owner a s s e r t s i n some manner t h a t t h e easement holder lacked the r i g h t t o use 21 t h e easement. B l a l o c k v. 2110585 C o n z e l m a n , 751 So. 2d a t 5. of signs and c o n s t r u c t i n g constituted evidence B r a n t l e y argues t h a t h i s p o s t i n g a paved driveway of h i s adverse on t h e e a s e m e n t use. However, those a c t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e " ' [ o ] r d i n a r y acts of ownership, consistent with Brantley's permissive claim possession,'" and d i d n o t cause t o u s e t h e easement t o become a d v e r s e servient estate. Blalock v. Conzelman, to that of the So. at 751 2d 5 ( e m p h a s i s o m i t t e d ) . We c a n n o t a g r e e w i t h B r a n t l e y t h a t he h a s demonstrated that the t r i a l court erred i n determining had not presented s u f f i c i e n t the e a s e m e n t so as t o w a r r a n t t h e i m p o s i t i o n t h a t he evidence o f h i s adverse use of o f an e x c l u s i v e easement i n h i s f a v o r , i . e . , a r i g h t t o e x c l u d e t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e owners f r o m u s i n g t h e e a s e m e n t . B l a l o c k v. C o n z e l m a n , supra. B r a n t l e y a l s o a r g u e s on a p p e a l t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t in determining the doctrine a claim and t h a t h i s c l a i m a g a i n s t P r u d e n t i a l was b a r r e d b y of res j u d i c a t a . against the p a r t i e s ' the Walkers 2 Brantley originally i n w h i c h he s o u g h t sought damages S e e s u p r a n o t e 1. 22 from Brantley asserted t o determine r i g h t s i n t h e easement a t i s s u e i n t h i s the Walkers 2 erred matter, f o r removing 2110585 trees from the easement. successor-in-interest. Prudential The t r i a l is the court entered Walkers' an o r d e r that i n c o r p o r a t e d an a g r e e m e n t r e a c h e d b y B r a n t l e y a n d t h e W a l k e r s and p r o v i d e d actually order with B r a n t l e y a r g u e s on a p p e a l t h a t t h o s e c l a i m s prejudice. t h a t t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c l a i m s were d i s m i s s e d were dismissed without prejudice, but the t r i a l does n o t s u p p o r t t h a t a r g u m e n t . Prudential, as the Walkers' entering Prudential, i t s February the t r i a l later added successor-in-interest, d e f e n d a n t i n one o f h i s amended In Brantley court's as a complaints. 19, 2010, order i n favor of c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t B r a n t l e y had not a s s e r t e d any c l a i m a g a i n s t P r u d e n t i a l and, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i t was appropriate addition, Brantley the had to dismiss trial Prudential court asserted found claims from the a c t i o n . that, that were even In assuming cognizable, that those c l a i m s h a d been a d d r e s s e d and r e s o l v e d as p a r t o f t h e o r d e r i n favor of the Walkers, P r u d e n t i a l ' s p r e d e c e s s o r s - i n - i n t e r e s t . In h i s b r i e f on a p p e a l , Brantley court erred i n determining were barred by that that h i s claims against the d o c t r i n e conclude that the t r i a l argues only of res j u d i c a t a . the Prudential However, court i s correct that Brantley 23 trial we failed 2110585 to assert claims against Prudential relief, and, f o r t h a t reason, whether any p u r p o r t e d claims against Prudential could we that properly need n o t r e a c h Brantley be b a r r e d might sought the issue have asserted by t h e d o c t r i n e of res the t r i a l court stated: judicata. I n i t s F e b r u a r y 19, 2010, o r d e r , "The c o u r t f i r s t f i n d s t h a t B r a n t l e y makes no c l a i m a n d demands no j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t Prudential Relocation, Inc. The o n l y m e n t i o n o f P r u d e n t i a l R e l o c a t i o n , I n c . , i n t h e Amended C o m p l a i n t comes i n the i n t r o d u c t o r y paragraph i n which B r a n t l e y merely describes P r u d e n t i a l R e l o c a t i o n , Inc.'s corporate s t a t u s a n d i d e n t i f i e s i t as t h e s u c e s s o r i n i n t e r e s t of property owned b y t h e W a l k e r s . Likewise, B r a n t l e y ' s S e c o n d Amended C o m p l a i n t a l l e g e s no c l a i m against Prudential Relocation; to the extent that t h i s amendment s e e k s a d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t s r e g a r d i n g t h i s easement, t h e C o u r t d i s p o s e s o f t h i s claim herein. S i n c e B r a n t l e y makes no a l l e g a t i o n s o f any a c t i o n s b y P r u d e n t i a l R e l o c a t i o n , I n c . , t a k e n or not taken i n derogation o f any l a w s or a g r e e m e n t s , t h e C o m p l a i n t s t a t e s no c l a i m a g a i n s t P r u d e n t i a l R e l o c a t i o n , I n c . , under Alabama Rule o f C i v i l Procedure 12(b)(6)." Our court's review of the record determination on a p p e a l regarding supports the nature of the t r i a l Brantley's c l a i m s a g a i n s t P r u d e n t i a l i n h i s amended c o m p l a i n t i n w h i c h he first asserted claims against Prudential. The e x i s t e n c e " s e c o n d " amended c o m p l a i n t i n w h i c h B r a n t l e y asserted of a claims a g a i n s t P r u d e n t i a l i s m e n t i o n e d s e v e r a l t i m e s i n t h e r e c o r d on 24 2110585 appeal; those references complaint" was complaint. We demand, filed document, or filed indicate that after note t h a t one 7, filed amending" c o m p l a i n t . the August i n a brief on A u g u s t the "second 2009, 27, 2009, Brantley court's amended i n support of h i s j u r y refers contemporaneously, This amended as to a c l e r k contacted that "second the t r i a l c o u r t ' s c l e r k t o o b t a i n a document f i l e d on o r a f t e r A u g u s t 7, 2009, that trial c o u r t ' s c l e r k was u n a b l e t o l o c a t e any s u c h f i l i n g . was might be a " s e c o n d the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y amended of Brantley, complaint," as but the the appellant, It to ensure that the record contains s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o warrant a reversal. So. J.B. v . C l e b u r n e C n t y . Dep't o f Human R e s . , 992 2d 34, 40-41 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 8 ) . failed to determining demonstrate that the Thus, B r a n t l e y h a s trial court erred t h a t he f a i l e d t o a s s e r t a v a l i d c l a i m f o r r e l i e f against Prudential. F u r t h e r , i n h i s b r i e f on a p p e a l , has the nature not i d e n t i f i e d asserted against his claims favor assert in Prudential. against claims o f any c l a i m s he m i g h t have Given Brantley's argument that P r u d e n t i a l are not barred of the Walkers, against Brantley i t appears that Brantley Prudential seeking 25 by t h e o r d e r i n intended to a determination of 2110585 the rights already of the p a r t i e s stated, this i n the court has easement. affirmed However, the t r i a l r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s i n t h e easement. assuming t h a t B r a n t l e y had a s s e r t e d c o g n i z a b l e Prudential concerning easement, affirmance did the those as court's Thus, e v e n claims against whether P r u d e n t i a l had r i g h t s t o use the claims of the t r i a l have been court's resolved by determination this that court's Brantley n o t have an e x c l u s i v e easement s u c h t h a t he c o u l d p r e v e n t servient-estate Accordingly, Brantley's we claims owners conclude from that against using i t is Prudential the easement. irrelevant were whether barred by the d o c t r i n e of res j u d i c a t a . Brantley also states as an issue that the t r i a l e r r e d i n d e n y i n g h i s m o t i o n t o compel t h e d e p o s i t i o n s M e e k s e s ; he f i l e d t h a t m o t i o n t o c o m p e l a f t e r t h i s dismissed of the court t h e o r i g i n a l a p p e a l i n B r a n t l e y v. S c r u s h y , and h a d remanded t h e c a u s e b a c k t o t h e t r i a l Brantley's court court. had supra, However, b r i e f on a p p e a l does n o t s e t f o r t h an argument as t o t h a t i s s u e , and he c i t e s t o no a u t h o r i t y i n s u p p o r t o f h i s general statement that motion t o compel. the t r i a l For that court reason, 26 we erred i n denying the do n o t a d d r e s s that 2110585 issue. Beachcroft 2d 703, 708 P r o p s . , LLP v. C i t y o f A l a b a s t e r , ( A l a . 2004) 901 So. ( d e c l i n i n g t o a d d r e s s an argument n o t s u p p o r t e d b y a u t h o r i t y and n o t i n g t h a t i t i s n o t t h e f u n c t i o n of an appellate court to perform an appellant's research). AFFIRMED. Pittman, B r y a n , and Thomas, J J . , c o n c u r . Moore, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e r e s u l t , w i t h o u t w r i t i n g . 27 legal

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