Lakshimi Sola v. Prasad Sola

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REL: 09/14/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2012 2110380 Lakshimi S o l a v. Prasad S o l a Appeal from Madison C i r c u i t (DR-08-150.01) Court THOMPSON, P r e s i d i n g J u d g e . Lakshimi Sola ("the w i f e " ) appeals s e t t i n g a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment e n t e r e d ("the wife d e f a u l t judgment"). from Prasad Sola from a judgment on F e b r u a r y 4, 2009 The d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t d i v o r c e d t h e ("the h u s b a n d " ) , d i v i d e d t h e p a r t i e s ' 2110380 marital among property, other and a l l o c a t e d t h e p a r t i e s ' m a r i t a l things. Specifically, the default awarded t h e w i f e t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e t h e f i r s t m o r t g a g e on t h a t r e s i d e n c e . to pay t h e balance which was residence. secured and ordered line by on a second judgment h e r t o pay The h u s b a n d was on t h e p a r t i e s ' e q u i t y mortgage debt, ordered of c r e d i t , the m a r i t a l A t t h e t i m e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d , t h e b a l a n c e owed on t h e e q u i t y l i n e o f c r e d i t was $ 9 2 , 3 9 7 . 9 7 . The husband d i d n o t a p p e a l from t h e d e f a u l t judgment. On August 20, contempt a g a i n s t refused 2010, t h e w i f e t o make t h e m o n t h l y payments had t h r e a t e n e d a petition for t h e h u s b a n d , a l l e g i n g t h a t he h a d f a i l e d o r c r e d i t s i n c e December 2009. On filed on t h e e q u i t y l i n e of She a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d h e r f a t h e r a n d h e r w i t h b o d i l y harm. October 4, 2010, t h e h u s b a n d answered the wife's c o n t e m p t p e t i t i o n a n d a s k e d t h a t t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t be s e t aside. that 1 I n h i s m o t i o n , t h e h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he was unaware a default judgment had been entered against him u n t i l T h e h u s b a n d does n o t d i s p u t e t h a t he was s e r v e d w i t h t h e c o m p l a i n t i n t h e d i v o r c e a c t i o n , t h a t he d i d n o t answer t h e c o m p l a i n t , a n d t h a t he d i d n o t make an a p p e a r a n c e i n t h a t action. 1 2 2110380 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 t h e month a f t e r t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was entered. In h i s motion to set aside husband also stated that support of her 21, 2010, of the was unaware o f the wife's t e s t i m o n y from the the wife's wife. in testified attempts that The testimony that, of the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e time testimony motion f o r a d e f a u l t judgment u n t i l to the m a r i t a l residence a d e f a u l t judgment, the when h i s a t t o r n e y b o t h r e q u e s t e d and "denied" out he the to those September r e c e i v e d a copy husband s t a t e d t h a t since the had returned " s p o r a d i c a l l y " f o r s e v e r a l weeks attempts at The wife reconciliation had been I n h i s m o t i o n , t h e h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he resided m a r i t a l residence f r o m May 2008 t o December 2008 and that period, The with the w i f e majority of d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was and the he had had the wife at apparently unsuccessful. i n the he h u s b a n d moved i n A u g u s t 2007, he reconcile. in had continuously believed that, during reconciled. husband's motion devoted to the p a r t i e s ' to set aside finances. the After making a s s e r t i o n s of f a c t to support h i s p o s i t i o n , the husband stated: "The [husband] b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e d e f a u l t d i v o r c e t h a t was i s s u e d t o t h e [ w i f e ] i s g r o s s l y i n e q u i t a b l e and i s based on misstatements and falsehoods c o n t a i n e d i n the [ w i f e ] ' s t e s t i m o n y i n s u p p o r t of 3 2110380 her application for a default divorce. The [husband] was unaware t h a t t h e [ w i f e ] was p r o c e e d i n g t o t a k e a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t him, and a f t e r t h e [husband] l e a r n e d o f t h e d e f a u l t d i v o r c e , the [wife] f r a u d u l e n t l y r e p r e s e n t e d to the [husband] t h a t she was g o i n g t o r e f i n a n c e and assume t h e t o t a l mortgage f o r the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e , lulling the [husband] i n t o f a i l i n g t o c h a l l e n g e the default decree of d i v o r c e e a r l i e r . " The husband then asked the responsibility of trial court t o r e l i e v e him paying the balance of the tenus hearing was held the line of 2011, December 12, of to equity credit. An ore consider the claims p r e s e n t e d at the raised hearing by both also h u s b a n d , who testified judgment challenged on s a i d he that February had wife 22, entered. The evidence circumstances During the e a r n e d a law had t o l d him 2009. He degree hearing, in about the stated he India, default had not t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t s o o n e r b e c a u s e , he s a i d , when the wife t o l d him him that she were the parties. r e l a t e d t o e v e n t s and b e f o r e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was the on was financial about the going issues to default talk to between the were g o i n g t o s e t t l e t h o s e i s s u e s . 4 j u d g m e n t , she her also lawyer because h u s b a n d and her told there and He a l s o c l a i m e d he d i d they not 2110380 challenge was t h e d e f a u l t judgment earlier t r y i n g t o d e a l w i t h i s s u e s h i s c h i l d r e n were The parties reconciliation testified and t h e i r 2007, when t h e y regarding living f i r s t separated, of the m a r t i a l residence filed her complaint their attempts and F e b r u a r y residence together The w i f e August The h u s b a n d i n i t i a l l y moved on A u g u s t 12, 2007. for a divorce The i n F e b r u a r y 2008, s a i d the husband r e t u r n e d " s p o r a d i c a l l y , " and at 4, 2009, when h u s b a n d was s e r v e d w i t h t h e summons and c o m p l a i n t 27, 2008. having. arrangements between t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d . out b e c a u s e , he s a i d , he that they had wife and t h e on F e b r u a r y to the m a r i t a l resumed living f r o m A p r i l 2008 t h r o u g h December 2008 i n an e f f o r t t o r e c o n c i l e , b u t t h a t she d i d n o t i n t e n d t h e l i v i n g arrangement t o be a n y t h i n g b u t a t r i a l o r c o n d i t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . She s a i d t h a t she d i d n o t d i s m i s s t h e d i v o r c e a c t i o n and t h a t she n e v e r s u g g e s t e d t o t h e h u s b a n d t h a t she d i d n o t i n t e n d t o go t h r o u g h with the d i v o r c e . In vacation the wife December 2008, the t o t h e Bahamas. husband left wife said, On t h e r e t u r n t r i p , the f a m i l y at a h o t e l and c h i l d r e n r e t u r n e d they took a the wife i n Miami. said, When t h e t o H u n t s v i l l e on J a n u a r y 1, 5 family 2009, 2110380 the w i f e s a i d , t h e h u s b a n d was n o t a t t h e m a r i t a l residence. She s a i d he came t o r e t r i e v e h i s c l o t h e s on J a n u a r y 2, 2009, and l e f t again without The husband testified residence marital in April temporary s i t u a t i o n . for i n d i c a t i n g where he was good." "stopped He said the divorce" that when he returned to the 2008, he d i d n o t r e g a r d i t as a He s a i d h i s " i m p r e s s i o n that going. the wife after was I was t h e r e had t o l d he h a d r e t u r n e d h i m she h a d to the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e , b u t t h e w i f e t e s t i f i e d t h a t she d i d n o t s a y t h a t t o the husband. T h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a f t e r t h e h u s b a n d left the m a r i t a l residence 2, 2009, the p a r t i e s made any f u r t h e r a t t e m p t s t o w a r d r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . The r e c o r d indicates on J a n u a r y that a large part of the hearing on t h e h u s b a n d ' s R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was d e v o t e d t o t h e p a r t i e s ' t e s t i m o n y regarding their f i n a n c e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e i r income, a s s e t s , and d e b t s . Because that of evidence appeal, we w i l l After court said i s not p e r t i n e n t t o our d i s p o s i t i o n this not discuss i ti n d e t a i l . the p a r t i e s presented i t s main concern was 6 their evidence, the order the t r i a l r e q u i r i n g the 2110380 h u s b a n d t o make t h e p a y m e n t s on the second mortgage used secure the home-equity l i n e of c r e d i t . the The trial to c o u r t made f o l l o w i n g statement: "All right. I am g o i n g t o g i v e you e a c h o f you t o do b r i e f s . ten days f o r "I w i l l be honest with you, had I known e v e r y t h i n g t h a t t h e r e was t o know I w o u l d n o t have e n t e r e d the [ d e f a u l t judgment] t h a t I d i d . The one t h i n g a n d I ' l l j u s t l e t y ' a l l know up f r o n t . The one t h i n g t h a t c a u s e s me t r o u b l e , p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e j u d g m e n t o f d i v o r c e i s m a k i n g t h e h u s b a n d pay the s e c o n d m o r t g a g e on t h e h o u s e . T h a t i s what c a u s e s me t h e most t r o u b l e . "And I am g o i n g t o e n c o u r a g e y ' a l l t o t a l k and see i f y ' a l l can r e a c h an a g r e e m e n t , b u t o t h e r w i s e t e n d a y s t o do b r i e f s . And I mean e x t e n s i v e b r i e f s . Assume t h i s c a s e i s g o i n g t o be a p p e a l e d . And, and t h e i s s u e s a r e g o i n g t o be, number one, what can be u s e d a t t h i s p o i n t u n d e r R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , [ A l a . R. C i v . P.,] upon w h i c h I can s e t t h i s d e c r e e a s i d e . And the second i s s u e i s i f I f i n d the p a r t i e s , i n f a c t , r e c o n c i l e d during that eight-month p e r i o d that they were t o g e t h e r , w h i c h I w i l l t e l l you I am l e a n i n g t h a t way, had I known t h a t , I p r o b a b l y w o u l d n o t have s i g n e d t h e d e c r e e . "What, what i s t h e e f f e c t t h a t , t h e e f f e c t o f t h a t on t h i s j u d g m e n t o f d i v o r c e ? In o t h e r words, does t h a t make any o r d e r t h a t I e n t e r t h e r e a f t e r void? I f i t i s v o i d , i t i s as i f i t does n o t e x i s t . And a v o i d o r d e r , as I u n d e r s t a n d t h e l a w , a v o i d order--not voidable, but a void order can be a t t a c k e d a t any time." The p a r t i e s submitted b r i e f s as requested. The husband a g a i n asked the t r i a l c o u r t t o f i n d t h a t the d e f a u l t judgment, 7 2110380 " b a s e d on the wife's affidavit d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t ] , was aside based on [submitted i n support g r o s s l y i n e q u i t a b l e and fraud court s h o u l d be set of j u r i s d i c t i o n b a s e d on r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s d u r i n g the her p o s i t i o n , the the lack pendency of the d i v o r c e . " upon of In her b r i e f , and/or the w i f e summarized stating: " [ T ] h e h u s b a n d [had] s l e p t on h i s r i g h t s . Both p a r t i e s have moved on and l i v e d t h e i r l i v e s and c o n d u c t e d t h e i r f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s as s i n g l e p e o p l e for a p e r i o d of years. The h u s b a n d s h o u l d n o t now be a l l o w e d t o r e o p e n t h e c a s e b e c a u s e he has l a t e l y d e c i d e d t h e t e r m s o f t h e d i v o r c e were u n f a i r t o him." On December 27, 2011, the trial s e t t i n g a s i d e the d e f a u l t judgment. court court entered In the o r d e r , an order the trial found "from the evidence t h a t the p a r t i e s r e c o n c i l e d d u r i n g the pendency of the o r i g i n a l d i v o r c e a c t i o n p e n d i n g b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s , ... w h i c h a b r o g a t e d t h e c a u s e o f t h e i r a c t i o n . H a l e v. H a l e , 878 So. 2d 313 (Ala. C i v . App. 2003) . As a r e s u l t of their r e c o n c i l i a t i o n d u r i n g the pendency of t h a t a c t i o n , t h i s C o u r t l o s t s u b j e c t - m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n , and t h e o n l y a l l o w a b l e judgment a f t e r t h e i r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w o u l d have b e e n an o r d e r o f d i s m i s s a l . R i k a r d v. R i k a r d , 380 So. 2d 842 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 8 0 ) . " The trial t h e p a r t i e s had action, court concluded t h a t , b a s e d on i t s f i n d i n g t h a t r e c o n c i l e d d u r i n g the pendency of the t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was 8 v o i d and the d i v o r c e divorce action 2110380 was due t o be d i s m i s s e d . that, because current the d e f a u l t judgment court was then determined void, the wife's c o n t e m p t a c t i o n b a s e d on t h a t j u d g m e n t was due t o be dismissed. The w i f e The w i f e aside The t r i a l appealed. contends t h a t the t r i a l the d e f a u l t default timely judgment nearly judgment had been e n t e r e d court erred i n s e t t i n g three and a f t e r years after the the p a r t i e s had r e l i e d on t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t i n t h e i r c o n d u c t . The default judgment was entered Although i n h i s motion to s e t aside on F e b r u a r y 4, 2009. t h e d e f a u l t judgment t h e h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he was "unaware t h a t t h e [ w i f e ] h a d t a k e n a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t h i m u n t i l he r e c e i v e d a copy o f t h e Court's decree from counsel 2009," he t e s t i f i e d f o r t h e [wife] i n o r around March at the hearing t h a t he f i r s t learned of t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t on F e b r u a r y 22, 2009, when, he s a i d , t h e w i f e t o l d him about i t . R u l e 5 5 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., provides t h a t a p a r t y can f i l e a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment not more t h a n According 30 d a y s a f t e r entry of the d e f a u l t t o t h e h u s b a n d ' s own t e s t i m o n y , judgment. he was aware o f t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t w i t h i n 30 d a y s o f i t s e n t r y ; h o w e v e r , he t o o k no s t e p s t o have t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t s e t a s i d e o r t o c o n t a c t 9 2110380 an a t t o r n e y . The h u s b a n d t e s t i f i e d t h a t he d i d n o t c h a l l e n g e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t b a s e d on r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s he s a i d h i s w i f e made--on t h e same d a y he s a i d she t o l d j u d g m e n t - - t h a t t h e r e were f i n a n c i a l needed t o be challenge with settled. He said i s s u e s b e t w e e n them he a l s o that d i d not pursue a t o t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e he was b u s y d e a l i n g p r o b l e m s h i s c h i l d r e n were reason, him of t h e d e f a u l t having. Regardless of the t h e h u s b a n d f a i l e d t o t i m e l y move t o have t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t s e t a s i d e p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 5 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. He a l s o d i d n o t a p p e a l from t h e d e f a u l t judgment. I t was n o t u n t i l t h e w i f e s o u g h t t o have t h e t r i a l h o l d t h e husband i n contempt f o r h i s f a i l u r e payments decided aside required i n the default to challenge judgment t h e d e f a u l t judgment. t o make c e r t a i n that t h e husband H i s motion t o s e t t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was f i l e d on O c t o b e r 4, 2010, one y e a r a n d e i g h t months a f t e r t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was Although t h e husband d i d not s p e c i f y t h a t have t h e j u d g m e n t s e t a s i d e Civ. court P., t h e t r i a l 60(b) entered. he was m o v i n g t o pursuant t o Rule 60(b), court pointed out a t the hearing A l a . R. that Rule was t h e o n l y mechanism b y w h i c h t o have t h e j u d g m e n t s e t aside. 10 2110380 R u l e 60(b) p r o v i d e s f o r r e l i e f from a judgment i n c e r t a i n circumstances, and i t p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "(b) M i s t a k e s ; I n a d v e r t e n c e ; E x c u s a b l e N e g l e c t ; N e w l y D i s c o v e r e d E v i d e n c e ; F r a u d , e t c . On m o t i o n and upon s u c h t e r m s as a r e j u s t , t h e c o u r t may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a f i n a l judgment, o r d e r , o r p r o c e e d i n g f o r t h e following reasons: (1) m i s t a k e , inadvertence, s u r p r i s e , o r e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t ; (2) n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e w h i c h b y due d i l i g e n c e c o u l d n o t have b e e n d i s c o v e r e d i n t i m e t o move f o r a new t r i a l u n d e r Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , o r o t h e r m i s c o n d u c t o f an a d v e r s e p a r t y ; (4) t h e j u d g m e n t i s v o i d ; (5) t h e j u d g m e n t has b e e n s a t i s f i e d , r e l e a s e d , o r d i s c h a r g e d , o r a p r i o r j u d g m e n t upon w h i c h i t i s b a s e d h a s b e e n r e v e r s e d o r o t h e r w i s e v a c a t e d , o r i t i s no l o n g e r e q u i t a b l e t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t s h o u l d have p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n ; o r (6) a n y o t h e r r e a s o n justifying r e l i e f from t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e judgment. The m o t i o n s h a l l be made w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e , a n d f o r r e a s o n s ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , a n d (3) n o t more t h a n f o u r (4) months a f t e r t h e j u d g m e n t , o r d e r , o r p r o c e e d i n g was entered or taken." A motion brought under Rule reasonable-time a t any t i m e . requirement 60(b)(4) o f Rule i s not subject t o the 6 0 ( b ) a n d may be b r o u g h t Ex p a r t e F u l l C i r c l e D i s t r i b . , L.L.C., 883 So. 2d 638, 643 ( A l a . 2003) ("As a n u l l i t y , a v o i d j u d g m e n t h a s no e f f e c t and i s s u b j e c t t o a t t a c k a t any t i m e . " ) . In reason this case, t h e husband explicitly stated that the he s o u g h t t o have t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t s e t a s i d e was 11 2110380 because he b e l i e v e d i t was i n e q u i t a b l e a n d , as he s a i d i n h i s motion, he wanted responsibility the f o r the trial court second residence." The h u s b a n d ' s characterized as " m i s s t a t e m e n t s the [wife]'s testimony" given d e f a u l t judgment. "to relieve mortgage argument on was b a s e d and falsehoods the him o f marital on what he contained i n i n support of her motion f o ra We n o t e t h a t " p e r j u r y i s n o t a f r a u d on t h e Court, which i s a Rule 60(b)(6) ground, w h i c h i s a R u l e 60(b) (3) g r o u n d . but i n t r i n s i c fraud, Brown v . K i n g s b e r r y , 349 So. 2d 564 ( A l a . 1 9 7 7 ) , S p i n d l o w v. S p i n d l o w , 512 So. 2d 918 ( A l a . Civ. App. 1 9 8 7 ) , 1969)." Ex p a r t e Lockwood v. Bowles, Third Generation, (Ala. 2001). filed 20 months a f t e r 46 F.R.D. 625 (D.D.C. I n c . , 820 So. 2d 89, 90 However, t h e h u s b a n d ' s R u l e 60(b) m o t i o n t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was was entered far b e y o n d t h e 4-month p e r i o d i n w h i c h a p a r t y may t i m e l y make a motion pursuant t o Rule 60(b)(3). judgment could not properly Accordingly, the default be s e t a s i d e pursuant t o Rule 60(b)(3). The the trial default asserting c o u r t was d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f judgment in light of i n support of h i s motion 12 what t h e husband to set aside was the default 2110380 judgment. At the end of the " [ H ] a d I known e v e r y t h i n g have entered the order hearing, the t h a t t h e r e was that I did" as second mortgage. trial f a r as the t h a t , i f i t had f o u n d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had eight-month p e r i o d tell you I'm point to prepare under Rule had 60(b) court also about upon court "what which be can which I ' l l set probably used at this this decree terms of the three years trial c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t f i n d i n g t h a t the d e f a u l t judgment was a void judgment that I t appears judgment p u r s u a n t means t o r e a c h t h a t r e s u l t . had that to Rule The seeking I C l e a r l y , the earlier. c o u r t was stated i n s t r u c t e d the can I the aside." default trial The not "reconciled during I known t h a t , the decree." briefs The ordering t h e y were t o g e t h e r , l e a n i n g t h a t way, w o u l d n o t have s i g n e d parties that said: t o know I w o u l d h u s b a n d t o pay that judge t o change been e n t e r e d the husband 6 0 ( b ) ( 4 ) was the nearly and the the only h u s b a n d does n o t c o n t e n d t h a t Rule 60(b)(6) i s a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s case. 2 M o r e o v e r , as n o t e d , t h e h u s b a n d ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e w i f e submitted f a l s e e v i d e n c e or m i s s t a t e m e n t s i n s u p p o r t of her a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a d e f a u l t judgment f a l l s under R u l e 6 0 ( b ) ( 3 ) ; t h e r e f o r e , t h o s e a l l e g a t i o n s c a n n o t a l s o be u s e d t o s u p p o r t a claim f o r r e l i e f pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). See R.E. Grills, I n c . v. D a v i s o n , 641 So. 2d 225, 229 ( A l a . 1994) ("Clause ( 6 ) , however, i s m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e of the s p e c i f i c grounds of 2 13 2110380 "The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w on a p p e a l f r o m an o r d e r g r a n t i n g [or denying] r e l i e f under R u l e 6 0 ( b ) ( 4 ) , Ala. R. C i v . P. ('the j u d g m e n t i s v o i d ' ) , i s n o t w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t has e x c e e d e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n . When t h e d e c i s i o n t o g r a n t o r t o deny r e l i e f t u r n s on t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e j u d g m e n t , d i s c r e t i o n has no f i e l d o f o p e r a t i o n . C a s s i o p p i v. Damico, 536 So. 2d 938, 940 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) . ' I f the judgment i s v o i d , i t is t o be set aside; i f i t i s v a l i d , i t must stand A judgment i s v o i d o n l y i f the court which rendered i t l a c k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n of the s u b j e c t matter, or of the p a r t i e s , or i f i t a c t e d i n a manner i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h due p r o c e s s . ' Seventh Wonder v. S o u t h b o u n d R e c o r d s , I n c . , 364 So. 2d 1173, 1174 ( A l a . 1978) (emphasis added)." Ex p a r t e Full Circle Distrib., Citing 2 0 0 3 ) , and Hale v. Hale, L.L.C., 883 878 So. R i k a r d v. R i k a r d , 387 1980), the t r i a l 2d So. So. 313 2d 842 2d a t 641. (Ala. Civ. App. (Ala. Civ. App. c o u r t i n t h i s case d e t e r m i n e d t h a t i t d i d not have s u b j e c t - m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r the d e f a u l t judgment because, i t the pendency of said, the divorce parties action. had during the p a r t i e s while a s u i t f o r divorce i s pending w i l l abrogate the Pride v. Pride, (emphasis added). 631 So. 2d reconciliation the of c a u s e o f a c t i o n , and t h e t r i a l "A reconciled c o u r t u s u a l l y must d i s m i s s i t . " 247, 248 (Ala. Civ. Upon r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , t h e t r i a l App. 1993) court loses c l a u s e s (1) t h r o u g h ( 5 ) , and a p a r t y may n o t o b t a i n r e l i e f u n d e r c l a u s e (6) i f i t w o u l d have b e e n a v a i l a b l e u n d e r c l a u s e s (1) t h r o u g h ( 5 ) . " ) . 14 2110380 subject-matter general rule, dismissal. 370 jurisdiction the only over allowable the p a r t i e s , judgment and, i s an o r d e r a of R i k a r d , 387 So. 2d a t 843 ( c i t i n g M c N u t t v . B e a t y , So. 2d 998 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) , a n d James v . James, 369 So. 2d 811 (Ala. C i v . App. 1979)). However, H a l e a n d R i k a r d e a c h i n v o l v e d a p p e a l s in which trial determinations before So. is as final courts were regarding required to of cases make factual whether the p a r t i e s had r e c o n c i l e d j u d g m e n t s were e n t e r e d . See P r i d e v . P r i d e , 631 2d a t 248-49 ("Whether t h e r e h a s b e e n a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n a question from of fact a l l the evidence largely which the t r i a l court before '[r]econciliation i s i t since a s t a t e o f t h e minds of both must So. 2d at 317 determine o f t h e p a r t i e s t o be d e t e r m i n e d from a l l o f t h e e v i d e n c e and r e a s o n a b l e inferences therefrom.' ... and p r o p e r R i k a r d a t 846."); see a l s o Hale, (Implicit i n the trial court's 878 judgment d i s m i s s i n g t h e d i v o r c e a c t i o n was a f a c t u a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had r e c o n c i l e d . ) . I n t h i s c a s e , when t h e h u s b a n d s o u g h t t o have t h e d e f a u l t judgment there set aside based was no d i v o r c e on t h e p a r t i e s ' a c t i o n pending. 15 "reconciliation," A final judgment had 2110380 a l r e a d y been e n t e r e d b a s e d on t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d . t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d , the t r i a l the judgment action. or seek misrepresentations in support In 1993)), The h u s b a n d to set jurisdiction d i d not appeal i t aside over from that on the based o f f a c t he now c l a i m s were made b y t h e w i f e o f h e r a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a d e f a u l t judgment. Osborn (quoting t h e r e was no a s s e r t i o n t h a t c o u r t d i d n o t have s u b j e c t - m a t t e r divorce When v . Roche, Patterson 813 So. 2d 8 1 1 , 818 v. Hays, o u r supreme c o u r t ( A l a . 2001) 623 So. 2d 1142, 1145 (Ala. noted: " ' [ R ] e l i e f [ p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 6 0 ( b ) ] s h o u l d n o t be g r a n t e d t o a p a r t y who h a s f a i l e d t o do e v e r y t h i n g r e a s o n a b l y w i t h i n h i s power t o a c h i e v e a f a v o r a b l e r e s u l t b e f o r e t h e j u d g m e n t becomes f i n a l ; o t h e r w i s e , a m o t i o n f o r such r e l i e f from a f i n a l judgment would l i k e l y become a mere s u b s t i t u t e f o r a p p e a l a n d w o u l d subvert t h e p r i n c i p l e o f f i n a l i t y o f judgments.'" I f t h e h u s b a n d d e s i r e d t o c o n t e s t t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t on the ground filed the p a r t i e s had r e c o n c i l e d a f t e r the divorce complaint evidence motion that i n support t o s e t aside of that the wife i n F e b r u a r y 2008, a n d t o p r e s e n t ground, the default he c o u l d judgment have pursuant filed a t o Rule 5 5 ( c ) , he c o u l d have a p p e a l e d f r o m t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t , o r he could have filed a t i m e l y motion 16 to s e t aside the default 2110380 judgment p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 6 0 ( b ) ( 3 ) . h u s b a n d was aware o f t h e d e f a u l t By h i s own t e s t i m o n y , t h e judgment h i m s e l f o f a n y one o f t h o s e o p t i o n s . i n time He h a s n o t a s s e r t e d t h a t he was d e n i e d due p r o c e s s i n t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s . to defend the divorce action, the d e f a u l t judgment. to avail He c h o s e n o t a n d he c h o s e n o t t o c h a l l e n g e I n s t e a d , t h e h u s b a n d w a i t e d n e a r l y 20 months a f t e r t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d t o s e e k t o have i t setaside. E v e n t h e n , t h e h u s b a n d ' s m o t i o n was made a f t e r the w i f e sought to t o have h i m h e l d i n c o n t e m p t f o r h i s make payments on t h e s e c o n d husband sought relieve failure mortgage, and t h e reason t h e t o have t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t s e t a s i d e was t o him o f t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of paying that second mortgage. Twenty months a f t e r t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d (and almost four years a f t e r he was s e r v e d w i t h t h e c o m p l a i n t i n the d i v o r c e a c t i o n ) , t h e husband f o r t h e f i r s t time evidence he in an misrepresentations judgment. evidence reconciled attempt to the wife refute made I t was a l s o t h e f i r s t to support during t h e pendency 17 i n seeking time his position what says the t h e husband that presented were default presented the parties had o f t h e d i v o r c e a c t i o n and, 2110380 t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e d i v o r c e a c t i o n s h o u l d have been d i s m i s s e d . The p a r t i e s have n o t c i t e d a n y a u t h o r i t y t h a t w o u l d a l l o w the t r i a l c o u r t , a t t h i s l a t e date, t o r e v i s i t f a c t on w h i c h i t b a s e d t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t . r e v e a l e d no a u t h o r i t y f o r s u c h a c t i o n . the f i n d i n g s of Our r e s e a r c h h a s Without a doubt, i t i s p r e f e r a b l e t o have i s s u e s f u l l y l i t i g a t e d b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s . However, once a d e f e n d a n t i n a c i v i l a c t i o n has b e e n p r o p e r l y s e r v e d w i t h a summons a n d c o m p l a i n t , i f he o r she c h o o s e s n o t t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n p r o c e s s , he o r she does so a t his o r h e r own p e r i l . To a l l o w a d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y t o i g n o r e procedural r u l e s and t o l i t i g a t e an i s s u e o n l y i f a n d when i t suits o r h e r , even after him entered, would judgments. do Such away years with finality a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . conceivable that one or a judgment the p r i n c i p l e i s necessary of f i n a l i t y to the For example, i n t h i s both of has the p a r t i e s been of orderly case, i t i s could have r e m a r r i e d a n d e v e n h a d c h i l d r e n s i n c e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was entered. For t h e reasons s e t f o r t h above, t h e t r i a l s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t on a f a c t u a l 18 court erred i n determination 2110380 so t h a t t h e h u s b a n d w o u l d be r e l i e v e d o f h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o p a y the second mortgage. Accordingly, t h e judgment i s r e v e r s e d . REVERSED AND REMANDED. P i t t m a n , B r y a n , a n d Thomas, J J . , c o n c u r . Moore, J . , d i s s e n t s , w i t h 19 writing. 2110380 MOORE, J u d g e , d i s s e n t i n g . I d i s s e n t from the r e v e r s a l of the t r i a l setting aside entered by during the as the void a previous trial court. pendency of abrogates the jurisdiction R i k a r d v. R i k a r d , 387 So. over 2d 842, and James v. James, 369 So. The trial action circumstances a 6 0 [ , A l a . R. that thus, deprives reconciliation time." (Ala. C i v . App. of 843 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1980); ( A l a . C i v . App. 1979). court 812 may take under See such any o t h e r a c t i o n i s jurisdiction. See Id. "Rule a l l o w s a p a r t y t o move t o s e t a s i d e Shamburger v. 2009) a court action. judgment t h a t i s v o i d f o r l a c k of s u b j e c t - m a t t e r a t any reconciles divorce i s to d i s m i s s the complaint; C i v . P.,] was the 2d 811, v o i d f o r l a c k of subject-matter couple case, c a u s e o f a c t i o n and, subject-matter only d e f a u l t judgment t h a t I f a married a divorce c o u r t ' s judgment Lambert, (emphasis a d d e d ) . 24 So. a jurisdiction 3d 1139, 1142 3 The main o p i n i o n c o n c l u d e s t h a t the husband f i l e d f o r r e l i e f f r o m t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t t o o l a t e and t h a t t o g r a n t s u c h r e l i e f " w o u l d do away w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e o f f i n a l i t y o f judgments." So. 3d a t . In support of t h a t a s s e r t i o n , t h e m a i n o p i n i o n q u o t e s O s b o r n v. R o c h e , 813 So. 2d 811, 818 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) , w h i c h , i n t u r n , q u o t e s P a t t e r s o n v. Hays, 623 So. 2d 1142, 1145 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) . I n o t e , h o w e v e r , t h a t n e i t h e r o f t h e m o t i o n s f o r r e l i e f f r o m j u d g m e n t f i l e d i n t h o s e c a s e s was b a s e d on l a c k o f s u b j e c t - m a t t e r jurisdiction. 3 20 2110380 In the present case, the husband f i l e d f o r Rule Ala. R. C i v . P., r e l i e f , and, b a s e d on t h e e v i d e n c e the trial court determined that 60(b), presented, the p a r t i e s had r e c o n c i l e d d u r i n g the pendency o f the d i v o r c e a c t i o n . court hears ore tenus testimony, facts a r e presumed "'[W]hen i t s f i n d i n g s on a trial disputed c o r r e c t and i t s j u d g m e n t b a s e d on those f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d u n l e s s t h e j u d g m e n t i s p a l p a b l y erroneous or m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t . ' " 2d 429, 433 122, 125 ( A l a . 2005) ( A l a . 2002)). F a d a l l a v. F a d a l l a , 929 So. ( q u o t i n g P h i l p o t v. S t a t e , 843 So. 2d B a s e d on o u r r e v i e w o f t h e r e c o r d and a p p l y i n g the law s e t f o r t h i n R i k a r d , supra, I cannot conclude t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t the p a r t i e s had r e c o n c i l e d during the erroneous pendency of the divorce or m a n i f e s t l y unjust. judgment e n t e r e d of subject-matter Thus, action was the d e f a u l t palpably divorce a f t e r t h a t r e c o n c i l i a t i o n was v o i d f o r l a c k jurisdiction, and t h e t r i a l court properly s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t as v o i d . B a s e d on t h e f o r e g o i n g , I w o u l d a f f i r m t h e t r i a l judgment s e t t i n g aside the previous d i v o r c e a c t i o n as v o i d . 21 court's d e f a u l t judgment i n t h e

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