State of Alabama v. Holcomb Blake Pressley et al.

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REL: 04/20/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL OCTOBER TERM, APPEALS 2011-2012 2100618 S t a t e o f Alabama v. Holcomb Blake P r e s s l e y et a l . Appeal from T a l l a d e g a C i r c u i t Court (CV-09-434) PITTMAN, The Judge. State Talladega 150 p i c k u p ("the o f Alabama appeals from a judgment of the C i r c u i t C o u r t f o r f e i t i n g t o t h e S t a t e a 2 0 0 6 F o r d Ftruck t i t l e d grandson"), i n t h e name o f H o l c o m b B l a k e subject t ot h es a t i s f a c t i o n Pressley o f a $10,774.50 2100618 lien We on the truck reverse held by t h e judgment satisfaction December of f o r f e i t u r e of the grandmother's Facts The Peggy Holcomb ("the grandson 3, and at and charged with o c c u p i e d by the grandson and room d i s c l o s e d commonly On December 22, 2009, § 20-2-93(a)(5), used the truck substances The and grandson complaint. March and 9, court granted forfeiture claiming 2010, the c a s e was an room parked well as the i n t e r e s t i n the 2 9, grandson controlled to the allegations moved t o i n t e r v e n e motion the or s e l l the grandmother, on A u g u s t ingredients methamphetamine. of the truck denied outside a complaint pursuant to receive, grandmother's tried of the motel alleging that forfeiture / r e t i r e d biology teacher, proceedings, 1975, to transport, answered On filed on and truck as motel possession to manufacture the State seeking Talladega the the pickup used A l a . Code a search methamphetamine, equipment had and A truck. History arrested of methamphetamine. i t requires i n t e r e s t i n the Procedural manufacture that i n s o f a r as was 2009, grandmother"). a to 2010. of the 70-year-old i n the truck. State. forfeiture The trial intervene; the An for attorney 2100618 the g r a n d s o n was did not present The months truck present during but the grandson a defense. evidence established before the t r i a l , the that grandson's -- t h e g r a n d m o t h e r on F e b r u a r y 9, arrest and the 2 0 0 9 -- seizure 10 of the and t h e g r a n d s o n , accompanied by the g r a n d s o n ' s 2 - y e a r - o l d d a u g h t e r , h a d t r a v e l e d t o an a u t o m o b i l e dealership i n Decatur, Georgia, to purchase a truck. The grandmother t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had wanted t o buy t h e t r u c k f o r herself, of to haul her family, the truck. y a r d and garden s u p p l i e s , a n d f o r a n y member i n c l u d i n g t h e g r a n d s o n , who The grandmother explained might need use the grandson that to had been d r i v i n g an u n r e l i a b l e , o l d e r - m o d e l t r u c k down and often automobile After particular that to drive he t o and the grandmother truck to had occasionally from h i s p l a c e and t h a t had broken of borrowed employment. the grandson had purchase at the her decided on dealership, the grandmother t e l e p h o n e d a l o a n o f f i c e r a t h e r T a l l a d e g a bank inquire about a loan. The officer advised her that d r a w on h e r e x i s t i n g h o m e - e q u i t y l i n e funds f o r the purchase. grandmother issued of c r e d i t she to obtain a to could the The b a n k d e p o s i t e d t h e f u n d s , a n d t h e a check t o the d e a l e r s h i p 3 i n t h e amount o f 2100618 $14,674.50. insurance The grandmother then a g e n t and v e h i c l e and the a s k e d him g r a n d s o n as automobile-liability The for the an add the insured truck automobile- as d r i v e r on her testified that, the of an and the completion s a l e , she and the truck paperwork concerning the during the said, she discussions however, vehicle might not she because had she have the concerning that of sale assumed had paid been present transaction. that for she [her] name." dealership, "title Whaley, contradicted grandmother had to J o h n W. was the that d i r e c t e d him, truck to She she for on a l l the owner testimony. said i n the presence of the a certificate title lists the of documents, title grandson as to the the 4 the she said, t o "put He Documentary i n c l u d i n g the truck. owner of The the the of had the truck b u s i n e s s manager of [the g r a n d s o n ] . " sale a l l testified, s u b m i t t e d by the S t a t e i n d i c a t e s t h a t the g r a n d s o n ' s appears taken therefore, for the i t , and, the a l l the g r a n d s o n had a s k e d the b u s i n e s s manager a t the d e a l e r s h i p in existing negotiations turns minding the grandson's t w o - y e a r - o l d daughter; she insured policy. grandmother purchase to telephoned her that the the grandson, evidence signature application certificate vehicle. of 2100618 The grandmother testified purchase of the truck, an oral agreement purchase price grandmother a week. The grandmother title in the grandson of testimony the have knowledge have t e s t i f i e d that lock box The and would she had arrest been the listed vehicle. indicated that the on obtained by the the entered into pay grandson her the gave agreed t o pay the her of t i t l e looking at r e t r i e v e d i t from her and after $50 to her. she had put t h e c e r t i f i c a t e without seizure i t and lock of the truck the c e r t i f i c a t e The the grandson's had box of the the uncontradicted drug offense was "could reasonable diligence use of the See A l a . Code 1975, g r a n d s o n made $ 5 0 - p e r - w e e k after as o r c o n s e n t and t h a t she exercise of not that of t i t l e grandmother's of the intended i l l e g a l prevented such use." The grandson truck. committed w i t h o u t her knowledge not the grandson had down p a y m e n t her had shortly also d e l i v e r e d the c e r t i f i c a t e grandson's owner of until realized the He and whereby $2,000 per she that, payments [truck] so as t o § 20-2-93(h). on the truck to the grandmother u n t i l h i s work hours were r e d u c e d , a f t e r w h i c h he p a i d out only $25 p e r w e e k . of b u s i n e s s and When t h e g r a n d s o n ' s e m p l o y e r the grandson 5 lost h i s job, the went grandson 2100618 painted, mowed, a n d lieu making of trimmed shrubbery payments. g r a n d s o n ' s payments and The f o r the trial court his labor i n lieu grandmother found that of payments in the totaled $3,900. The trial court entered a judgment on March f o r f e i t i n g the t r u c k to the State, "subject to the lien of State the [grandmother] appealed g r a n d s o n has from not i n the that favored amount o f judgment this on court Standard of a 31, 2011, unperfected $10,774.50." March with 4, 2011. The The brief. Review "'Our s t a n d a r d of review i s w e l l s e t t l e d . A t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t b a s e d on o r e t e n u s e v i d e n c e w i l l be p r e s u m e d c o r r e c t a n d w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d on appeal absent a showing t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t acted outside i t s discretion or that the judgment is u n s u p p o r t e d b y t h e e v i d e n c e so as t o be p l a i n l y a n d p a l p a b l y wrong. S c h o l l v . P a r s o n s , 655 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995). However, when an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t i s p r e s e n t e d w i t h an i s s u e o f l a w , we r e v i e w t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t as t o t h a t i s s u e de n o v o . Ex p a r t e P e r k i n s , 646 So. 2d 46 ( A l a . 19 9 4 ) . ' " Pepper v. Pepper, 65 So. 3d 421, ( q u o t i n g H e n d e r s o n v. Henderson, App. tenus only 2007)). to the The ore trial 425 978 standard court's (Ala. Civ. So. of findings 6 2d 36, review of 39 App. 2010) (Ala. Civ. " i s applicable fact, not its 2100618 conclusions 1993) and o f l a w . " Ex p a r t e (citing Williams Cash, Moore v. M c N i d e r , v. Nearen, 624 S o . 2 d 5 7 6 , 577 551 S o . 2 d 1028 540 S o . 2 d 1 3 7 1 (Ala. (Ala. (Ala. 1989), 1989)). Discussion In J e s t e r v. S t a t e , a father had l o a n e d h i s s o n money t o b u y an a u t o m o b i l e . signed month u n t i l included a document a description the " f i r s t automobile. of illegal action agreeing t o pay the father t h e i n d e b t e d n e s s was p a i d f a t h e r as t h e " f i r s t as 668 S o . 2 d 822 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 1 9 9 5 ) , in full. of the automobile lienholder." a n d , when t h e S t a t e the automobile, of t i t l e listed f o r the f o r possession initiated the father i n t e r e s t i n t h e v e h i c l e was p r o t e c t e d Code 1975. T h a t s e c t i o n The d o c u m e n t T h e f a t h e r was a l s o T h e s o n was s u b s e q u e n t l y a r r e s t e d against $200 p e r and i d e n t i f i e d t h e l i e n h o l d e r " on t h e c e r t i f i c a t e drugs, The s o n a claimed forfeiture that h i s under § 20-2-93(h),A l a . provides: "An owner's o r bona f i d e l i e n h o l d e r ' s i n t e r e s t i n any t y p e o f p r o p e r t y o t h e r than r e a l p r o p e r t y and fixtures shall be f o r f e i t e d under this section u n l e s s t h e owner o r bona f i d e l i e n h o l d e r p r o v e s b o t h that the act or omission subjecting the property to f o r f e i t u r e was c o m m i t t e d o r o m i t t e d w i t h o u t t h e owner's o r l i e n h o l d e r ' s knowledge o r consent and t h a t t h e owner o r l i e n h o l d e r c o u l d n o t have o b t a i n e d by t h e e x e r c i s e o f r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e knowledge o f 7 2100618 the intended i l l e g a l use of the p r o p e r t y have p r e v e n t e d such u s e . " The offense parties was consent committed and t h a t exercise stipulated i n Jester without the that the father's t h e f a t h e r " c o u l d n o t have of reasonable diligence so as t o knowledge son's knowledge obtained of the i l l e g a l u s e o f t h e p r o p e r t y so as t o have p r e v e n t e d The s o l e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e whether the addressing father that claimed by Article 9A) the determine and, whether was court i n Jester, a question, interest of this "bona this Uniform he h a d a s e c u r i t y Acts 2001 within January the meaning of § such use." 1, In analyzed Article Code the 9 ("UCC") (now 1 former ( r e p e a l e d and r e c o d i f i e d , b y A c t No. 2002)), to i n the vehicle p a r t y " w i t h i n t h e meaning of 7-9A-102(a)(72)(A) (effective intended t h e r e f o r e , was first interest or by the lienholder." former Commercial § 7 - 9 - 1 0 5 ( 1 ) ( m ) , A l a . Code 1975 as § court the f a t h e r under t h u s , was a " s e c u r e d revised, fide drug 481, § and a as 1, A l a . "lienholder" 20-2-93(h). E f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 0 2 , A r t i c l e 9 o f t h e UCC, e n t i t l e d "Secured T r a n s a c t i o n s ; Sales of Accounts and C h a t t e l Paper," was r e p e a l e d a n d r e p l a c e d b y A r t i c l e 9A, e n t i t l e d "Secured Transactions." S e e A c t No. 4 8 1 , § 1, A l a . A c t s 2 0 0 1 . 1 8 2100618 This court undertook because the State fide Jester, Although the Article 9 analysis this State's having court argument p r a c t i t i o n e r s were a security interest d i d not e x p l i c i t l y was faced correct. with a variety of distinctions. the these artificial security 185 1975, Code 354, 356 § 7-1-201(35) personal eliminated distinctions interest." B.R. property Patterson (Bankr. v. S p r a d l i n N.D. UCC i n 1965, consensual lien "bona i n the pre-Code security Adoption devices b y r e p l a c i n g them w i t h and of their the A r t i c l e 9 (In re Patterson), A l a . 1995). See A l a . Code ( " ' S e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t ' means an i n t e r e s t i n or fixtures p e r f o r m a n c e o f an o b l i g a t i o n . " ) . the Jester say so i n "Under d e v i c e s , each b a s e d upon a r t i f i c i a l Commercial in a r g u e d t h a t t h e f a t h e r c o u l d n o t be a l i e n h o l d e r " without vehicle. law, an whenever which transaction that Article payment Since Alabama's adoption parties to as s e c u r i t y f o r a d e b t , secured secures a contract create of a that transaction i s a i s governed by A r t i c l e 9). 9A (formerly "The i n t e n t o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i n e n a c t i n g A r t i c l e 9 of Alabama's U.C.C. was to include a l l transactions i n which borrowers created consensual 9 or 2100618 liens u n d e r t h e same c o n s i s t e n t r u l e s . Then, as now, i t i s t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n a n d t h e i n t e n t of the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s which determines whether a transaction i s an Article 9 secured t r a n s a c t i o n or something e l s e . " [ 2 ] Mattheiss 20, 26 v. Title (Bankr. Loan N.D. Express Ala. (In re M a t t h e i s s ) , 1997), disagreed g r o u n d s , C h a r l e s H a l l M o t o r s , I n c . v. L e w i s F.3d 1280, The 1282 "was Substances patterned Substances Act Commissioners Myers, 2 94 questioned (Ala. Controlled forfeiture interest provision Act, § on other (In re Lewis), after the recommended Ala. 260, 264, on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 1996). Substances the proposed by the Alabama 314 Uniform National Laws." 137 Uniform So. of 2d 505(a)(4)(iv) 1970 Conference 853, State, 689 provided (1 9 7 5 ) , So. of the of ex r e l . 856 2d 221 Uniform that o f a c o n v e y a n c e encumbered by a bona f i d e i s subject 1975, Controlled R e e d e r v. S t a t e W i l h i t e v. Section Act of 20-2-1 e t s e q . , A l a . Code on U n i f o r m S t a t e C r i m . App. with B.R. (11th C i r . 1998). forfeiture Controlled 214 "[a] security to the i n t e r e s t of the secured p a r t y i f he Article 9A (formerly A r t i c l e 9) d o e s n o t g o v e r n the creation of n o n c o n s e n s u a l l i e n s t h a t a r i s e by o p e r a t i o n of law, s u c h as j u d g m e n t l i e n s and v a r i o u s s t a t u t o r y l i e n s f o r s e r v i c e s o r m a t e r i a l s , see A l a . Code 1975, § 7 - 9 A - 1 0 9 ( d ) ( 2 ) , b u t i t does a p p l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p r i o r i t y o f such l i e n s , see A l a . Code 1975, § 7-9A-333. 2 10 2100618 neither had omission." Uniform knowledge was 93(a)(4)c. Act No. Section was by by the substituted interest" subsequently One first might appeared 1988 Section discuss only analysis. term for used assume that i n Alabama the other the term "bona Former § in 20-2- provision in amended § of 1988," by adding Ala. Acts the 1988 1988 lienholder" in security subsection (a)(4)c. (a)(5)(c). "bona forfeiture cases i s true. The fide lienholder" decided first after use of 20-2-93 has been amended m u l t i p l e t i m e s . those amendments t h a t a r e p e r t i n e n t t o 11 20¬ fide term reverse See changes, fide originally and ( a ) ( 5 ) , and § 2, 20-2- 1981, F o r f e i t u r e Act 651, § (a)(5)c. again "bona the in subsection amendment, b u t 3 3 No. as in 1981). subsection the (h) previously 5, Drug P r o f i t s Among subsection the verbatim, legislature 1988). amendment current 13, the enactment of f o r e g o i n g Act May or amended (May ( h ) , see (effective and 1981 1988, r e n a m i n g i t "The subsection was act provision in foregoing codified, r e w r i t i n g , among o t h e r s , current The to r e c o d i f i e d as s u b s e c t i o n a verbatim In consented 20-2-93 ( a ) ( 4 ) c . was the Uniform A c t . 2-93 originally 81-413, A l a . A c t s 93(a)(4)c. nor (Emphasis added.) Act subsection of the the We our 2100618 term "bona f i d e 2 d 1050 when § l i e n h o l d e r " was ( A l a . 1981), a c a s e d e c i d e d b e f o r e t h e 1988 20-2-93(a)(4)c. security p r o t e c t e d persons interest[s]" Singleton i n S i n g l e t o n v . S t a t e , 396 from companion huge drug-smuggling truck and a participants a airplane, Alabama of the plane tons of marijuana. that had loaned recognizing equated the airfield, a fide money dealt Star." After they backed up to the f o u r and the bank's s e c u r i t y possessing that interest purchase interest, of the at cargo one-half i n t e r v e n o r i n S i n g l e t o n was f o r the with i n the pre-dawn hours and began u n l o a d i n g o v e r The Shipping tractor-trailer "Aruba i n the operation landed doors "bona Air ( A l a . 1981), operation involving DC-6 small south holding case, I n t e r n a t i o n a l v . S t a t e , 392 S o . 2 d 828 a amendment, forfeiture. i t s and So. a bank truck. In the S i n g l e t o n court with being a lienholder: "[Section 20-2-93(a)(4)c.] contemplates the f o r f e i t u r e of encumbered conveyances, s u b j e c t , of course, to the i n t e r e s t s of secured p a r t i e s . The clear language of the statute evidences a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o p r o t e c t bona f i d e l i e n h o l d e r s w i t h o u t d e s t r o y i n g t h e r i g h t o f t h e S t a t e t o condemn a vehicle used in violation of the Controlled Substances A c t . " 396 So. concluded 2d at 1055 that merely (some emphasis being added). a secured 12 party But, or a the court lienholder 2100618 without knowledge of the intended was i n s u f f i c i e n t . or The c o u r t determined the holder use of the v e h i c l e a secured party s o m e t h i n g more i n o r d e r l i e n h o l d e r must d e m o n s t r a t e considered illegal t o be o f a bona that fide security interest: "[T]he h o l d e r o f a bona f i d e s e c u r i t y c a r r i e [ s ] the burden of proving that i knowledge or n o t i c e of the intended i l that i t could n o t have obtained reasonable d i l i g e n c e . " 396 S o . 2 d a t 1054 Air Shipping, our (final emphasis supreme reasonable-diligence added). court condition i n t e r e s t ... t d i d n o t have l e g a l use and knowledge by In Singleton imported additional caselaw, from the including Edwards v. S t a t e , 2 1 3 A l a . 122 , 104 S o . 2 5 5 ( 1 9 2 5 ) , the of automobiles condemnation unlawful We transportation conclude legislature replacing that, "bona of Singleton fide i n t e r e s t s were p r o t e c t e d intended has Code used to substitute a term and d i d n o t i n t e n d , security from that, interest" with 32-8-61(b) ("A security 13 by the the category of persons forfeiture according but, rather, to Singleton, t h e same m e a n i n g w h e n u s e d i n t h e same c o n t e x t . 1975, § i n the when i t a m e n d e d § 2 0 - 2 - 9 3 i n 1 9 8 8 , t h e t e r m "bona f i d e l i e n h o l d e r , " t o a l t e r whose had been concerning of prohibited l i q u o r s . was c o g n i z a n t the term that and interest [ina Cf. A l a . vehicle 2100618 for which Uniform a certificate Certificate of t i t l e of T i t l e i s required and A n t i t h e f t A c t ] i s p e r f e c t e d by t h e d e l i v e r y t o t h e [Department o f Revenue] certificate of t i t l e the of t i t l e , by t h e Alabama of the e x i s t i n g i f a n y , an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a c e r t i f i c a t e c o n t a i n i n g t h e name a n d a d d r e s s o f t h e l i e n h o l d e r a n d date of h i s s e c u r i t y (emphasis agreement and t h e r e q u i r e d f e e . " added)). O u r a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e 1 9 8 8 amendment t o § 2 0 - 2 - 9 3 the marks of having been influenced supported by t h e f a c t t h a t of-knowledge-or-consent reasonable-diligence former § 93(a)(5)c. protected forfeited vehicle Singleton the legislature requirement condition. 20-2-93(a)(4)c. by the " i f [the secured the protection current the amendment, subject subsection property without however, the former secured to forfeiture have neither had legislature omission." made now must t h e a c t t h a t been § 20-2i n a act or to the a d d i t i o n a l condition (h): not only the party party] knowledge of nor consented t o t h e [ i l l e g a l ] After statute t h e 1988 amendment, and, subsequently, the interest of a i s also added t o t h e l a c k - i n Before bears that found i n subjected "committed or omitted t h e owner's o r l i e n h o l d e r ' s knowledge o r c o n s e n t , " b u t 14 2100618 also "by the the owner or l i e n h o l d e r must exercise of intended such use." "bona See, 737 illegal Our fide e.g., n.3 In whether use of cases lienholder" State ex (Ala. Civ. Jester, a reasonable the diligence property after and have been u n a b l e Jester "secured r e l . W a t k i n s v. App. this security so obtain knowledge as have to to have employed party" of the prevented the terms interchangeably. S e l l e r s , 894 So. 2d 733, 2004). court explained agreement exists that the requires determination a inquiry: "'[T]he question of whether a security agreement i s e s t a b l i s h e d calls for two i n d e p e n d e n t i n q u i r i e s w h i c h may be stated as f o l l o w s : "'"The c o u r t must f i r s t resolve, as a q u e s t i o n o f l a w , w h e t h e r t h e language embodied i n the w r i t i n g objectively indicates that the parties may have intended to c r e a t e or p r o v i d e f o r a s e c u r i t y agreement. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] If the language crosses this objective threshold [citations o m i t t e d ] , t h a t i s , i f the w r i t i n g evidences a possible secured transaction and thus satisfies the statute of frauds requirement, then the f a c t f i n d e r must i n q u i r e w h e t h e r the p a r t i e s actually intended to create a security interest. [Citations 15 two-step 2100618 omitted.] Parol evidence is admissible to inform the latter [ c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ] , but not the former, i n q u i r y . " ' " J . W h i t e & R. S u m m e r s , U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l C o d e , § 23-3 at 905 (2d ed. 1 9 8 0 ) , as quoted i n In re O w e n s b o r o C a n n i n g Co., 82 B.R. 450, 453-54 ( B a n k r . W.D. K y . 1988) ( e m p h a s i s and b r a c k e t s added by the bankruptcy court)." Jester, 668 So. whether "the and 2d at 823. first step w r i t i n g evidences a possible thus s a t i s f i e s the frauds The [Article requirement" -- 9 (now of the inquiry secured Article necessarily transaction 9A)] statute includes, as component of a s e c u r i t y agreement, t h a t t h e r e a writing. In requirement that a that case, the that complied with of frauds, recodified, Ala. Acts decisions relied that v. as the son had § 7-9-203, revised, as § from other Ga. App. 527, dwell written the Code 1, jurisdictions t o be not 1975 Act 2002)). upon 9 which 16 839 481, this See (1977); in statute and § Moreover, s e c u r i t y agreements. S.E.2d the (repealed No. be agreement intra-family written 233 on because, Article 7-9A-203 by ( e f f e c t i v e January were d e t e r m i n e d of Ala. 2001 141 did executed a written requirements in Jester also involved State, court s e c u r i t y a g r e e m e n t be f a t h e r and former this of an indispensable Jester, 1, the court contracts Hallman State v. 2100618 One 1 9 7 9 P o n t i a c T r a n s Am, and S t a t e v. Fouse, 1984). 7 7 1 P . 2 d 682 ( U t a h C t . A p p . 1 9 8 9 ) ; 120 W i s . 2 d 4 7 1 , 3 5 5 N.W.2d 3 6 6 ( C t . A p p . I n t h e p r e s e n t case, however, t h e grandmother grandson had an oral purchase the truck agreement from that the grandson t h e grandmother. purposes whether conducting secured party, who this i s a whose lienholder We Appeals i n State buy of two-step the test made inquiry: "bona employed o f § 20-2- by t h e Utah grandparents had loaned t h e i r grandson one lienholder" under T r a n s Am, him a whether fide forfeiture v . One 1 9 7 9 P o n t i a c determine f o rpurposes as a from to i n Jester to a third qualifies i s protected adopted inquiry the father court proceeded interest which the and thus a l i e n h o l d e r 93(h). in then t h e 20-2-93(h). the interest 93(h), oral c o u l d n o t be a " s e c u r e d p a r t y " o r a l i e n h o l d e r f o r of § After would I f that agreement d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a " s e c u r i t y agreement," grandmother and t h e § 20-2Court of supra, a case t h e funds t o an a u t o m o b i l e : "'To a s c e r t a i n t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e term " b o n a f i d e " we t u r n t o W e b s t e r ' s T h i r d New Int'l Dictionary, 250 (1986), wherein "bona fide" i s d e f i n e d a s b e i n g "made i n g o o d f a i t h w i t h o u t f r a u d or d e c e i t . . . . " S i m i l a r l y , B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y 160 ( 5 t h e d . 1979), d e f i n e s "bona f i d e " as " i n o r 17 2100618 w i t h good f a i t h ; h o n e s t l y , openly, and s i n c e r e l y ; w i t h o u t d e c e i t o r f r a u d . " A c c o r d i n g l y , we h o l d t h a t t o e s t a b l i s h a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i s "bona fide" under the forfeiture statute, one must only e s t a b l i s h an a c t u a l , g o o d f a i t h interest i n the p r o p e r t y n o t d e r i v e d by f r a u d o r d e c e i t . Under t h i s definition, the [grandparents] have a bona fide s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n [the grandson's] [automobile]. The [grandparents] loaned [the grandson] money towards the purchase and r e p a i r of t h e [automobile] and a b a l a n c e o f $3,883 r e m a i n e d due on t h i s l o a n . The [ g r a n d p a r e n t s ] b e l i e v e d i n good f a i t h t h a t [ t h e grandson] would repay t h e loan and t h a t they had a l i e n against the [automobile] t o secure t h e i r loan. F i n a l l y , t h e S t a t e does n o t c l a i m t h e [grandparents] knew of [the grandson's] illegal use of the [automobile] to transport drugs. Based on t h e f o r e g o i n g , we c o n c l u d e t h e [ g r a n d p a r e n t s ] h a d a b o n a f i d e s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t w i t h i n t h e meaning o f [the Utah f o r f e i t u r e s t a t u t e ] . ' " Jester, 668 S o . 2 d a t 8 2 5 T r a n s Am, 771 P.2d a t 685) (quoting State (emphasis v . One 1979 added by t h i s Pontiac court i n Jester). The pertinent trial court's judgment in this case states, part: "18. [T]he c o u r t i s reasonably s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e [ g r a n d m o t h e r ] h a s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t s h e [was] a bona f i d e h o l d e r o f an u n p e r f e c t e d lien on t h e subject v e h i c l e at the time of s e i z u r e . In making t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e c o u r t has r e l i e d upon t h e c a s e o f J e s t e r v . S t a t e , 668 S o . 2 d 822 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 5 ) , f o r t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f 'bona f i d e l i e n h o l d e r , ' w h i c h d e f i n e s 'bona f i d e l i e n h o l d e r ' a s a p e r s o n who, b e f o r e t h e s e i z u r e o f t h e v e h i c l e , h a d an a c t u a l , good f a i t h i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y n o t d e r i v e d b y f r a u d o r d e c e i t ... a n d o n e who h a d n o 18 in 2100618 a c t u a l knowledge o r c o n s t r u c t i v e knowledge o f [the] intended i l l e g a l u s e o f t h e v e h i c l e . T h e r e was n o e v i d e n c e o f f r a u d o r d e c e i t on t h e p a r t o f t h e [grandmother] or that the [grandmother] had knowledge o r c o n s t r u c t i v e knowledge o f t h e i n t e n d e d i l l e g a l use. II "23. ... [ T ] h e C o u r t i s r e a s o n a b l y s a t i s f i e d that the [the grandson] and [the grandmother] intended to provide a security interest i n the s u b j e c t v e h i c l e as e v i d e n c e d by t h e s a l e s agreement, possession d e l i v e r e d t o t h e [grandson] and [the grandson's] p a y m e n t s made i n f u r t h e r a n c e of the agreement. " 2 4 . ... [ T ] h e a c t i o n s o f t h e [ t h e g r a n d s o n ] a n d [the grandmother] removed t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n from t h e Statute o f Frauds, as p o s s e s s i o n of the subject vehicle was placed i n the [grandson] by the [ g r a n d m o t h e r ] a n d m o n e y was p a i d b y t h e [ g r a n d s o n ] t o w a r d t h e p u r c h a s e a n d t h e same was a c c e p t e d b y t h e [grandmother]. "25. ... [T]he Court i s satisfied the [ g r a n d m o t h e r ] h a s an u n p e r f e c t e d security lien i n t h e s u b j e c t v e h i c l e i n t h e amount o f $10,774.50, d e r i v e d b y s u b t r a c t i n g t h e sum o f $ 3 , 9 0 0 . 0 0 (money p a i d b y t h e [ g r a n d s o n ] ) f r o m t h e sum o f $ 1 4 , 6 7 4 . 5 0 ( t h e sum p a i d b y t h e [ g r a n d m o t h e r ] f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of t h e t r u c k t o Superior Chevrolet)." Although the t r i a l court cited Jester, i tappears not t o have u n d e r t a k e n t h e two-step i n q u i r y s e t o u t i n t h a t determining whether w i t h i n t h e meaning and thus, t h e grandmother of A r t i c l e n e c e s s a r i l y , was a was 9 [now A r t i c l e "a secured party 9A] o f t h e U.C.C. 'lienholder' within 19 case f o r t h e meaning 2100618 o f A l a . Code 1975, 825. Instead, grandmother proceeded § 20-2-93(h)." the trial a "secured was immediately court to See apparently party" the [was] one intended i n the who property had no illegal not of that "had that she instance, trial court The a secured e r r e d as a t t a c h m e n t and was a faith deceit' and the vehicle." party a matter the c o n s t r u c t i v e knowledge of the f r a u d or at then 'an a c t u a l , g o o d Id. at 825-26. o m i t t i n g t h e i n q u i r y a s t o w h e t h e r t h e g r a n d m o t h e r was, first 2d " l i e n h o l d e r " and d e r i v e d by a c t u a l or use or So. assumed determination "bona f i d e l i e n h o l d e r " b e c a u s e she interest J e s t e r , 668 of and thus a In in the lienholder, the law. e n f o r c e a b i l i t y of a s e c u r i t y interest i s g o v e r n e d b y § 7 - 9 A - 2 0 3 , w h i c h was adopted contemporaneously with Article 9; the provides, 2002 repeal of former that section in pertinent part: "(a) A t t a c h m e n t . A security interest attaches t o c o l l a t e r a l when i t b e c o m e s e n f o r c e a b l e against t h e d e b t o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o l l a t e r a l , u n l e s s an agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment. "(b) Enforceability. Except as otherwise p r o v i d e d i n s u b s e c t i o n s (c) t h r o u g h ( i ) ,a security i n t e r e s t i s e n f o r c e a b l e a g a i n s t t h e d e b t o r and t h i r d p a r t i e s w i t h respect to the c o l l a t e r a l only i f : "(1) value has been 20 given; 2100618 "(2) t h e d e b t o r has r i g h t s i n the c o l l a t e r a l o r t h e power t o t r a n s f e r r i g h t s i n t h e c o l l a t e r a l t o a s e c u r e d p a r t y ; and is "(3) met: one of the following conditions "(A) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral and, i f the security interest covers timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned; "(B) t h e c o l l a t e r a l i s n o t a c e r t i f i c a t e d s e c u r i t y and i s i n the possession of the secured party under Section 7-9A-313 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement; "(C) the c o l l a t e r a l i s a certificated security i n r e g i s t e r e d form and t h e s e c u r i t y c e r t i f i c a t e has been d e l i v e r e d t o the secured p a r t y under S e c t i o n 7-8-301 p u r s u a n t t o t h e d e b t o r ' s s e c u r i t y agreement; or "(D) the collateral i s deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or letter-of-credit r i g h t s , and t h e s e c u r e d p a r t y has control under Section 7-7-106, 7-9A-104, 7-9A-105, 7-9A-106, o r 7-9A-107 p u r s u a n t t o t h e d e b t o r ' s s e c u r i t y agreement." (Emphasis added.) 21 2100618 "Authentication," means either symbol, as r e f e r e n c e d "to sign" or encrypt in § or "to execute or s i m i l a r l y § 7-9A-102 replaces explains that the language debtors to "sign" include authentication computer-generated within "authenticate" generally 7-9-203(1) (a), requiring security and not "Ala. Comment t o of a l l records, records a record a The O f f i c i a l agreement including just cmt. 9 ( b ) . B u t i t i s c l e a r t h a t record frauds Ala. written § adopt tangible so as to intangible writings, t h e c o n c e p t o f a s e c u r i t y a g r e e m e n t . A l a . Code 1975, § 7-9A-102 or a the term i n former or otherwise process C o d e 1 9 7 5 , § 7 - 9 A - 1 0 2 ( a ) (7) (A) & (B) . 7-9A-203(b)(3)(A), i s required applicable Code 1975, i n order to Article § 9A 7-9A-203 to some f o r m o f w r i t i n g satisfy (formerly cmt. Article statute 9) (explaining . of See that "enforceability requires compliance with an e v i d e n t i a r y r e q u i r e m e n t i n t h e n a t u r e o f a Statute of Frauds"). the debtor's 3 the s e c u r i t y agreement and 4 The only exceptions to the authenticated-writing requirement of § 7-9A-203(b)(3)(A) are found i n subparagraphs ( b ) ( 3 ) ( B ) , ( C ) , a n d (D) o f § 7 - 9 A - 2 0 3 -- i n s t a n c e s i n w h i c h the secured p a r t y r e t a i n s the c o l l a t e r a l i n i t s possession or under i t s c o n t r o l . 4 22 2100618 "The s i n e qua demonstrating non an "to of objective intended to transfer security to a parte (Ala. the record observer, interest 4 agreement" in James J. of a signed security writing [a] debtor that property as & White S. (6th ed. Cmty. Bank o f A s h f o r d , (stating that, "[b]ecause is a personal C o m m e r c i a l C o d e § 31-3 People's 2000) an creditor." Summers, U n i f o r m Ex a security 775 So. t h e r e i s no agreement ... , Robert 2010). See 2d 823 819, evidence the [party c l a i m i n g t o have a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n proceeds from the of crops] has disputed ( A l a . 1983) not Div. of 483, enforceable General Rebel Lumber Elec. Co., Peoples 487, 154 as a S.E.2d 886, secured party collateral, his security interest, [§ 109A-9-203 (1)b., of e q u i t a b l e mortgage 23 (1967) is in 1240, or Code and the 1245 citing 115 (stating a Ga. that, of writing Ann.], v. oral, i t and possession absent Ga. e n f o r c e a b l e even a g a i n s t the debtor, theory 2d agreement," 889 the the So. the Corp. Auto. Loan & F i n . Corp. of Athens, "'[u]nless satisfies Credit 437 security sale claim against ( s t a t i n g t h a t , " [ s ] i n c e t h e a g r e e m e n t was enforceable M c D o n a l d v. App. specifically proceeds...."); Strickland was no in the which is not c a n n o t be made s o on like'") (quoting § 2100618 109A-9-203, Hoc, Ga. Code Ann., I n c . v. M c A l l i s t e r ( B a n k r . N.D. [former] of agreement written is A l a . Code 1975, Baldwin 748 rights i f agreement, Cnty. in v. (Bankr. the Taylor S.D. (a) (b) the value debtor has collateral"); Ala. which (citing former The § trial is also 217, 1982) (stating has been security signed given Ala. rather Code (c) t h e d e b t o r has Nat'l Inc.), that Bank 18 B.R. "[a] 746, claimed a s e c u r i t y agreement d e s c r i b i n g the given as security is unenforceable" c o u r t a p p a r e n t l y assumed t h a t our applicable to establishes evidenced its § the of 7-9-203)). 1975, than a the reference J e s t e r to the " s t a t u t e of f r a u d s " n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e d § 2, 225 by First (In re Modern Mix, security interest without collateral B.R. § 7-9-203(1), a s e c u r e d p a r t y f o r t h e s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t and acquired 215 See ( s t a t i n g t h a t , "[u]nder the a p p l i c a b l e enforceable security Comment))). (In re M c A l l i s t e r ) , A l a . 1996) portions Official the general Alabama 7-9A-203(b)(3)(A), transactions requirement the subject that to a court purported 24 8-9¬ Statute of Frauds, statute of frauds Article 9A, which security interest by a w r i t i n g or a r e c o r d , because i n Paragraph judgment the t r i a l in to apply a 24 be of possession- 2100618 and-partial-performance exception to the writing requirement. However, that "possession" to the extent there exception t o the w r i t i n g requirement must be i n t h e s e c u r e d Peoples Auto. Loan may exist a o f § 7-9A-203, party, not the debtor. & F i n . Corp. of Athens, possession See M c D o n a l d v. supra, and note 4 supra. To t h e e x t e n t that the t r i a l c o u r t may h a v e a s s u m e d § 8 - 9 - 2 ( 7 ) , A l a . Code 1975, a p p l i e d t o t h e a g r e e m e n t the grandmother section and the grandson, i t was that between mistaken. That provides: "In t h e f o l l o w i n g cases, every agreement i s v o i d u n l e s s s u c h a g r e e m e n t o r some n o t e o r memorandum thereof expressing the consideration i s i n writing and s u b s c r i b e d b y t h e p a r t y t o be c h a r g e d t h e r e w i t h or some o t h e r person by him thereunto lawfully authorized i n writing: II "(7) Every agreement o r commitment to lend money, d e l a y o r f o r b e a r r e p a y m e n t t h e r e o f o r t o modify t h e p r o v i s i o n s of such an a g r e e m e n t o r commitment except f o r consumer loans with a p r i n c i p a l amount f i n a n c e d l e s s t h a n $25,000." S e c t i o n 8-9-2(7) d o e s n o t a p p l y t o an a g r e e m e n t t o r e p a y money already Page lent; v. G u l f i t a p p l i e s t o a commitment Coast Motors, 903 25 t o l e n d money. S o . 2 d 148 See ( A l a . C i v . App. 2100618 2 0 0 4 ) , a n d R o z e l l v . C h i l d e r s , 888 S o . 2 d 1 2 4 4 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 2004). We now make e x p l i c i t for w h a t was i m p l i c i t governed who a s s e r t s by A r t i c l e 9A an i n t e r e s t i n a v e h i c l e t h a t w o u l d (formerly n e c e s s a r i l y be a " s e c u r e d The the State by c i t i n g § 20-2-93 State, trial however, court various 9 and by d e l v i n g when the State cites relied, Article 9) o f t h e UCC be must party." d i s s e n t t a k e s us t o t a s k former A r t i c l e of that, p u r p o s e s o f f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n s b r o u g h t u n d e r § 20-2-93, an intervenor for i n Jester: forcreating legal provisions and argues of A r t i c l e into the l e g i s l a t i v e has f a i l e d Jester, arguments t o do the decision that the 9A a n d history either. upon which The the grandmother "did nothing t o s e c u r e h e r i n t e r e s t i n t h e ... t r u c k . She d i d n o t h a v e a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t w i t h [ t h e g r a n d s o n ] a n d s h e was n o t l i s t e d o n t h e t i t l e . [The grandmother] only provided evidence that she provided t h e i n i t i a l funds t o purchase t h e v e h i c l e , and she l a t e r d e c i d e d t o s e l l t h e t r u c k t o [ t h e g r a n d s o n ] . T h i s was n o t e n o u g h t o p e r f e c t a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n the property or t o e s t a b l i s h ownership." State's brief, grandmother, at also 9 (emphasis added). r e l y i n g on J e s t e r , response, argues: "Indeed, t h e t r i a l court e x p r e s s l y [the grandmother's] interest i n 'unperfected.' However, the 26 In determined that the truck was trial court's the 2100618 determination that the [grandmother] had an unperfected security i n t e r e s t i n the subject vehicle was s u p p o r t e d b y s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l . " Grandmother's cite Jester court's trial brief, a t 15 i n support judgment r e l i e d court misconceive a l l rely the import of (emphasis their on J e s t e r . on t h e same of that added). positions, Both and parties the trial When t h e p a r t i e s a n d t h e precedent, precedent, then and they a l l an appellate court does a d i s s e r v i c e t o t h e bench and b a r by a v o i d i n g t h e issue and guise of Rule failing to correct the misconceptions under 2 8 , A l a . R. A p p . P. " [ T ] h i s c o u r t may c h o o s e t o a f f i r m a c a s e o n t h e b a s i s o f R u l e 28 w h e n a n a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f f a i l s t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e r u l e , b u t t h i s c o u r t i s b y no means r e q u i r e d t o d o s o . S e e K i r k s e y v . R o b e r t s , 613 S o . 2d 3 5 2 , 353 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ; B i s h o p v . R o b i n s o n , 516 So. 2d 7 2 3 , 724 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1987); a n d Thoman E n g ' r s , I n c . v . M c D o n a l d , 57 A l a . A p p . 2 8 7 , 2 8 9 , 328 So. 2 d 2 9 3 , 2 9 5 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . T h e d e c i s i o n i s a m a t t e r o f d i s c r e t i o n , and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s other than compliance with the rule are integral to the exercise of that d i s c r e t i o n . Among t h o s e o t h e r considerations are w h e t h e r t h e a r g u m e n t 'has b e e n r a i s e d i n a manner w h i c h i s f a i r t o a l l c o n c e r n e d , ' M c D o n a l d , 57 A l a . A p p . a t 2 9 0 , 328 S o . 2 d a t 2 9 4 ; w h e t h e r t h e a p p e l l e e adequately responds t o the issues r a i s e d by the appellant i n brief despite the noncompliance, B i s h o p , 516 So. 2 d a t 724; w h e t h e r t h e c o u r t i s a b l e to adequately discern the issues presented, Kirksey, 613 S o . 2 d a t 3 5 3 ; a n d t h e e m p h a s i s p l a c e d b y t h e R u l e s o f A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e on r e a c h i n g t h e m e r i t s o f o u r c a s e s . M c D o n a l d , 57 A l a . A p p . a t 2 8 9 , 328 S o . 2d a t 2 9 5 . I n l i g h t o f t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , we 27 the 2100618 choose t o address the m e r i t s despite the d e f i c i e n c i e s of Dubose v. Dubose 964 of the [State's] [its] brief." S o . 2 d 4 2 , 46 n.5 appeal ( A l a . C i v . App. To b e c l e a r , p e r f e c t i o n i s n o t a t i s s u e i n t h i s was i t at issue the g r a n d m o t h e r was concerned secured trial i n Jester. with court We erred she case, nor are not concerned with a perfected whether party. We secured party; was, in conclude that the she whether r a t h e r , we first was 2007). not are instance, and as a m a t t e r o f l a w i n h o l d i n g that a the otherwise. Conclusion The trial court c o r r e c t l y concluded that interest i n the truck under 20-2-93(a)(5). § concluding that the was due t o be However, grandmother w h o s e i n t e r e s t i n t h e t r u c k was § 20-2-93(h). grandmother agreement a secured and, and under party therefore, Because the the grandson the forfeited the was a trial bona protected oral to the court fide erred between constitute was the meaning of § a 28 by the security was not 7-9A-102(a)(72)(A) not a " l i e n h o l d e r " w i t h i n the meaning § 20-2-93(h). in lienholder § 7-9A-203(b)(3)(A), the grandmother within State from f o r f e i t u r e agreement d i d not grandson's of 2100618 The judgment satisfaction the cause judgment i s reversed insofar of the grandmother's i n t e r e s t i s remanded i n favor R E V E R S E D AND f o r the rendition as i t requires i n the truck, and entry and of a of the State. REMANDED. Thomas, J . , c o n c u r s . Thompson, P.J., concurs i n the result, Bryan, J . , dissents, without Moore, J . , dissents, with 29 writing. writing. without writing. 2100618 MOORE, J u d g e , I dissenting. respectfully dissent. In i t s b r i e f to primarily Holcomb that ("the the court, State court trial the erred in g r a n d m o t h e r " ) was i n t e r e s t may be 93(h), Code Ala. this protected 1975. F-150 truck father who held State, 668 So. in this that a 2d The had perfected 822 finding argues that Peggy a "bona f i d e l i e n h o l d e r " whose i n a f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n under § State the grandmother never obtained Ford of Alabama 20-2- e s s e n t i a l l y contends that a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n the 2006 been seized security (Ala. Civ. App. because, unlike interest in 1995), the Jester p r e s e n t any e v i d e n c e t h a t i n t e r e s t i n the v e h i c l e . she perfected a II "... [The g r a n d m o t h e r ] d i d n o t h i n g t o s e c u r e h e r i n t e r e s t i n t h e F o r d F-150 truck. She d i d n o t h a v e a written contract with [Holcomb B l a k e ] Pressley [ ( ' t h e g r a n d s o n ' ) ] , a n d s h e was n o t l i s t e d on the [certificate of] title. [The grandmother] only provided evidence that she provided the initial f u n d s t o p u r c h a s e t h e v e h i c l e , and she l a t e r d e c i d e d t o s e l l the t r u c k t o [the g r a n d s o n ] . T h i s was not enough to perfect a security interest in the property " 30 v. grandmother case "did not security the 2100618 State's brief, premises: a to (1) "perfected That argument b a s i c a l l y security interest" (2) that certificate with of nonexistence automobile. self-evident authority. a a i n personal that See and (3) of that the t h e y do parte that Farm Mut. Auto. 2005))). However, authority not require Dekle, t h a t are Ins. Co. the to holds subject v. So. must cite not interest has support 2d 909 1257, provided any of 2d the in the to 1262 legal (Ala. authority 806, this the a so n e c e s s a r i l y legal So. list on "self-evident" (citing Motley, State to indicates some c i t a t i o n 991 formed interest automobile security appellant p r o p o s i t i o n s of law who failure security an perfected Ex three property Each of those p r o p o s i t i o n s are not (holding legal l i e n h o l d e r " i s one perfected title of asserts a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t c a n n o t be a written contract; lienholder 2008) 9. t h a t a "bona f i d e forfeiture; without a p. 822 court premises for State (Ala. with no of its In that argument. The case, State this interest does court under cite held former Jester that a Article 31 v. State, party who 9 (now supra. holds Article a 9A) security of the 2100618 Uniform Commercial Code ("the U.C.C.") is 5 "necessarily" " l i e n h o l d e r " w i t h i n the meaning of § 20-2-93(h), 825, but this court does not hold a the argument argues 1975, be i n Jester, a Article under 'secured party' former 668 So. 2d a party State 823 under i n J e s t e r was So. that, State Code t h e f a t h e r c a n n o t be a 'bona Article 9 of question the because a secured party under i t c u r r e n t l y e x i s t s and as 3d the main at despite referencing a legislature 5 of raised 9 of the Uniform Commercial See note . Ultimately, amending the i t found Article "security interest" intended that i t existed statute only or he i s legislative that statute, i n the past. determines any language "secured party," secured parties So. 3d the 9. opinion remove this that a 1 i n the main o p i n i o n . 32 to fide U.C.C."), b u t h i s t o r y o f § 20-2-93 and t h e c a s e l a w c o n s t r u i n g as 9 ("The The m a i n o p i n i o n d e v o t e s s e v e r a l p a g e s t o t h e both who Article The at 2d a t [ A l a . Code 1975,] § 20-2-93(h) u n l e s s d i d not decide that father that "lienholder." see [former] § 7-9-102(2), court i n Jester So. ' t o s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s c r e a t e d by c o n t r a c t , ' A l a . Code lienholder' a also that because applies hold s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t under U.C.C. c a n n o t that d i d not 668 a at the holding . 2100618 security i n t e r e s t s under w o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d 3d at 452 former 9 (now A r t i c l e v. R e g i o n s Bank, ( " I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t when t h e l e g i s l a t u r e a 'material act,' i t i s 'presumed t o i n d i c a t e a change i n l e g a l 1A that by t h e main various and as next any Statutory i n i t sb r i e f argument f o r any o f t h e caselaw relied upon pages d e l v i n g spends s e v e r a l i n former A r t i c l e construing those cannot into 9 and c u r r e n t articles be created this court, property. the State of former A r t i c l e decisional law without this 33 a that 9A a writing a security interest So. 3d a t does . In i t s not mention a single 9 or A r t i c l e from Article to establish the debtor's consent to create to specific personal provision to opinion interest to rights.'" and Notably, original opinion. caselaw brief Statutes statutory-construction n o r does i t c i t e provisions evidencing Singer, [an] t h e S t a t e d o e s n o t make a n y l e g i s l a t i v e - h i s t o r y main security i n the language of (6thed. 2002))). nor any other matter, The J. § 22:30 to t h i s court, argument, change Norman Construction So. 977 S o . 2 d 4 4 6 , makes (quoting 9A) l i e n h o l d e r s under § 20-2-93(h). ; b u t see P i n i g i s ( A l a . 2007) Article or 9A a n d d o e s n o t c i t e any other state that 2100618 requires debtor a written i n order Because did security agreement authenticated for a security interest to exist. t h e main opinion concludes that t h e grandmother n o t have a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t and t h e r e f o r e "lienholder" opinion within does by the not t h e meaning address the of § could 20-2-93(h), State's argument n o t be a t h e main that the grandmother d i dnot p e r f e c t her s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n t h e t r u c k b e c a u s e s h e was n o t l i s t e d of t i t l e . a s a l i e n h o l d e r on t h e c e r t i f i c a t e However, I must n o t e t h a t t h e S t a t e d i d n o t p r o v i d e this court with any s t a t u t o r y o r other that a u t h o r i t y to support proposition either. " ' R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. A p p . P., r e q u i r e s t h a t arguments i n an appellant's ... b r i e f contain "citations t o the cases, statutes, [and] o t h e r authorities ... r e l i e d o n , " ' U n i v e r s i t y o f S o u t h A l a b a m a v . P r o g r e s s i v e I n s . C o . , 904 S o . 2 d 1 2 4 2 , 1247 (Ala. 2004), and t h e e f f e c t of noncompliance w i t h t h i s r u l e i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d . ' " [ W ] h e r e no l e g a l a u t h o r i t y i s c i t e d or argued, the e f f e c t i s t h e same a s i f no a r g u m e n t h a d b e e n made."' S t e e l e v . R o s e n f e l d , L L C , 936 S o . 2 d 4 8 8 , 493 ( A l a . 2 0 0 5 ) ( q u o t i n g B e n n e t t v . B e n n e t t , 506 So. 2 d 1 0 2 1 , 1023 (Ala. C i v . App. 1987) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d i n S t e e l e ) ) . " Walden v. H u t c h i n s o n , the absence 987 S o . 2 d 1 1 0 9 , 1 1 2 0 o f an argument supported (Ala. 2007). by l e g a l authority, In an a l l e g e d e r r o r of law committed by a t r i a l court i s considered "essentially Id. An unchallenged on appeal." 34 appellant 2100618 waives t h e r i g h t t o a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w o f a r u l i n g on a o f l a w when t h e a p p e l l a n t f a i l s that point as required Stream, 988 Slack v. court cannot for the 78-79 court to see ( A l a . 1992), (Ala. perform v. an 516, 533-34 Ala. R. App. S p r a d l i n v. ( A l a . 2008). Spradlin, i t i s not Realty the legal Inv. P. 601 arguments So. function 722 So. 2d 76, of research. Co., This this City 2d of 747, 752 State fails to Auto. I n s . Co. v. 1998). 2d 806, 822 ( A l a . 2005) that failure to ... disregarding comply provides those basis purchased grandson's the the this argued and and ("[I]t i s well settled requirements Court f o r r e v e r s i n g the State argues Farm Mut. with arguments.), arguments p r o p e r l y no the State So. 28(a)(10) arguments see 909 a those support, Motley, The 2d 28(a)(10), appellant's Business appropriately find Rule because Disregarding the So. t o c i t e a n y l e g a l a u t h o r i t y on cure t h a t d e f i c i e n c y by c r e a t i n g l e g a l appellant, Birmingham by question with Rule basis a of for concentrating supported by judgment of the solely the on State, trial I court. t h a t the evidence proved t h a t the grandmother truck illegal as a sham use, as occurred 35 transaction i n Lee to v. protect State the ex r e l . 2100618 H a r e , 259 court are Ala. disagreed that t r i a l 66 So. 2d 881 (1953). w i t h t h a t a s s e r t i o n , and supported B u c h a n a n , 936 on 455, by So. substantial 2d 1084, court erred agreement between the g r a n d m o t h e r and payment f o r the satisfied of Frauds. However, 6 argument b e f o r e the trial the on appeal. first 2011) time Dec. 16, error Statute of of Frauds judgment w a i v e s any See So. failure law to relating that was (holding conclusive The State that the regarding grandson did Simmons file v. i n concluding not v. the Code 1975, raise i t c a n n o t be 3d to the that raised Simmons, [Ms. App. a postjudgment motion ruling on for exception first objection to that r u l i n g and on to the time in the that, in the T h e S t a t e d o e s n o t a r g u e t h a t § 8-9-2 does not a p p l y t r a n s a c t i o n between t h e g r a n d m o t h e r and t h e g r a n d s o n , main o p i n i o n determines. So. 3 d a t . 36 for (Ala. Civ. , committed 6 the the f a c t s are State and findings 2005) 8-9-2, A l a . the court, 2011] (holding that alleged § trial Buchanan substantial evidence). trial truck See ( A l a . C i v . App. court's r e s o l u t i o n of d i s p u t e d a l s o argues t h a t the 2100017, i t s factual evidence. 1087 a p p e a l when s u p p o r t e d b y Statute However, the to as 2100618 absence of preserved any other for appellate formal review). B a s e d on t h e f o r e g o i n g court's objection, the issue i s not 7 a n a l y s i s , I would a f f i r m the t r i a l judgment. T h e S t a t e a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e g r a n d m o t h e r was n o t t h e "owner" o f t h e t r u c k f o r p u r p o s e s o f § 2 0 - 2 - 9 3 ( h ) , A l a . Code 1975. The t r i a l court f o u n d t h a t t h e g r a n d m o t h e r was a l i e n h o l d e r , n o t t h e owner o f t h e t r u c k , s o I f i n d no n e e d t o address t h a t argument. 7 37

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