Linda Lee Cochran v. Joseph P. Chapman

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REL: 09/16/2011 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2011 2100550 L i n d a Lee Cochran v. Joseph P. Chapman Appeal from M o b i l e C i r c u i t Court (DR-07-500885) THOMPSON, Presiding Linda Circuit Lee Cochran Court reasons judgment. Judge. appeals from d i v o r c i n g h e r from set forth herein, we a judgment Joseph reverse of the Mobile P. C h a p m a n . the t r i a l For the court's 2100550 This i s the second time this court. See C o c h r a n v . C h a p m a n , 21 2008). We set to the present forth appeal some o f in the action So. has 3d 1244 been b e f o r e this (Ala. Civ. App. procedural history relevant Cochran: "On J u n e 8, 2 0 0 7 , Chapman f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t f o r a d i v o r c e a g a i n s t Cochran. Among o t h e r t h i n g s , he a l l e g e d i n h i s c o m p l a i n t t h a t he a n d C o c h r a n had m a r r i e d on D e c e m b e r 3 1 , 1 9 8 9 , a n d h a d l i v e d t o g e t h e r u n t i l t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n on J u n e 1, 2 0 0 7 . In her a n s w e r t o t h e c o m p l a i n t , C o c h r a n d e n i e d t h a t she and Chapman w e r e m a r r i e d . " T h e t r i a l o f t h e m a t t e r on N o v e m b e r 14, 2 0 0 7 , f o c u s e d on w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s h a d e n t e r e d i n t o a c o m m o n - l a w m a r r i a g e ; i t was a p p a r e n t l y c o n c e d e d t h a t i f t h e y w e r e m a r r i e d , i t was s o l e l y b y v i r t u e o f t h e common l a w . On N o v e m b e r 2 0 , 2 0 0 7 , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s s u e d a judgment d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t the p a r t i e s had n o t e n t e r e d i n t o a common-law m a r r i a g e . "On D e c e m b e r 5, 2 0 0 7 , Chapman f i l e d a m o t i o n t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t . He a r g u e d t h a t s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e was o f f e r e d at the t r i a l to i n d i c a t e t h a t the p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d by v i r t u e o f t h e common l a w a n d that the trial court's j u d g m e n t was c o n t r a r y to pleadings that C o c h r a n had filed i n a previous divorce action between the p a r t i e s t h a t had been d i s m i s s e d . On F e b r u a r y 11, 2008, t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d Chapman's m o t i o n and v a c a t e d i t s November 20, 2007, j u d g m e n t . In i t s order, the t r i a l c o u r t found t h a t the p a r t i e s had, i n f a c t , e n t e r e d i n t o a common-law m a r r i a g e . The t r i a l c o u r t s e t t h e c a s e f o r a t r i a l on J u l y 2 3 , 2008. "On F e b r u a r y 28, 2008, C o c h r a n f i l e d a m o t i o n a s k i n g the t r i a l c o u r t to c e r t i f y the February 11, 2 0 0 8 , o r d e r a s f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. 2 2100550 C i v . P. T h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d C o c h r a n ' s Thereafter, Cochran appealed the t r i a l F e b r u a r y 11, 2008, o r d e r . " 21 motion. court's So. 3d a t 1 2 4 5 . On a p p e a l , setting aside parties had t h i s c o u r t found i t sfinal judgment the a d j u d i c a t e a w h o l e c l a i m , ' a s was n e c e s s a r y t o make t h e order subject under certification I d . a t 1246. which the appeal supporting common-law that 'fully a a determining order [ d i d ] not to into and court's marriage 54(b)." entered that "the t r i a l of finality T h u s , we c o n c l u d e d that the order was t a k e n was n o t a f i n a l the appeal, a n d we dismissed Rule from judgment capable the appeal. of Id. at 1246-47. On tenus January 31, 2011, t h e t r i a l proceeding, a f t e r which, on F e b r u a r y a judgment d i v o r c i n g t h e p a r t i e s Cochran appeals. finding that marriage and 1992), their Lofton v. o u r supreme that that property Estate court their into i t s judgment o f Weaver, set forth 611 a second ore 3, 2 0 1 1 , i t e n t e r e d the t r i a l i s due t o be 3 held and d i v i d i n g and she had e n t e r e d and, as a r e s u l t , dividing In She c o n t e n d s Chapman court property. court a erred i n common-law d i v o r c i n g them vacated. So. 2d the standard 335 ( A l a . of review 2100550 appropriate to t h i s case: "'Courts of t h i s s t a t e c l o s e l y s c r u t i n i z e c l a i m s of common law marriage and require clear and convincing proof thereof.' B a k e r v . T o w n s e n d , 484 So. 2 d 10 97 , 10 98 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 98 6 ) , citing W a l t o n v. W a l t o n , 409 So. 2 d 858 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). A t r i a l judge's f i n d i n g s of f a c t s based on ore tenus evidence are presumed c o r r e c t , and a judgment based on those findings will not be r e v e r s e d u n l e s s t h e y a r e f o u n d t o be p l a i n l y and p a l p a b l y wrong. C o p e l a n d v . R i c h a r d s o n , 551 So. 2 d 3 5 3 , 354 ( A l a . 1989). The t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t m u s t be v i e w e d i n l i g h t o f a l l t h e e v i d e n c e a n d a l l logical inferences therefrom, and i t 'will be a f f i r m e d i f , u n d e r any reasonable aspect of the testimony, there i s c r e d i b l e evidence to support the judgment.' Adams v . B o a n , 559 So. 2d 1 084 , 1 08 6 (Ala. 1990) (citation omitted)." 611 So. 2d a t 336. " C l e a r and convincing evidence" i s defined as " [ e ] v i d e n c e t h a t , when w e i g h e d a g a i n s t e v i d e n c e i n o p p o s i t i o n , w i l l produce i n the mind of the t r i e r of f a c t a f i r m c o n v i c t i o n as t o e a c h e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t of the claim and a high probability as t o the c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n . P r o o f by c l e a r and convincing evidence requires a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or the s u b s t a n t i a l weight of the evidence, but l e s s than beyond a reasonable doubt." § 6-11-20(b)(4), A l a . Code a common-law m a r r i a g e , this 1975. D i s c u s s i n g the c o u r t has elements written: "In Alabama, recognition of a common-law marriage r e q u i r e s proof of the f o l l o w i n g elements: (1) c a p a c i t y ; (2) present, mutual agreement to permanently e n t e r the marriage r e l a t i o n s h i p to the 4 of 2100550 e x c l u s i o n o f a l l o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; a n d (3) p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p as a m a r r i a g e and public assumption of marital duties and cohabitation. Stringer [ v . S t r i n g e r ] , 689 S o . 2 d [ 1 9 4 , ] 195 [ ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 1 9 9 7 ) ] , q u o t i n g C r o s s o n v . C r o s s o n , 668 S o . 2 d 8 68 , 870 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 1 9 9 5 ) , c i t i n g B o s w e l l v . B o s w e l l , 497 S o . 2 d 4 7 9 , 480 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . Whether t h e e s s e n t i a l elements o f a common-law m a r r i a g e e x i s t i s a q u e s t i o n o f f a c t . S t r i n g e r , s u p r a , c i t i n g J o h n s o n v . J o h n s o n , 270 A l a . 5 8 7 , 120 S o . 2 d 7 3 9 ( 1 9 6 0 ) , a n d A r r o w T r u c k i n g L i n e s v . R o b i n s o n , 507 S o . 2 d 1 3 3 2 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) . Whether t h e p a r t i e s had t h e i n t e n t , o r t h e mutual assent, to enter the marriage r e l a t i o n s h i p i s also a question of fact. S e e M i c k l e v . S t a t e , 21 S o . 66 (18 9 6 ) . " Gray v. Bush, The parties that 835 S o . 2 d 1 9 2 , 194 November 14, 2007, had entered i n t o hearing i n 1989. parties lived Subsequently, land that, in they hearing focused that the parties At the outset of t h e i r a on w h e t h e r t h e a common-law m a r r i a g e . indicated together ( A l a . C i v . App. 2001). mobile moved home mobile that that home a c c o r d i n g t o Chapman, Testimony at had begun living relationship, the Chapman onto the parties owned. a parcel had of purchased t o g e t h e r ; however, a c c o r d i n g t o Cochran, she had p u r c h a s e d t h e property. held the t i t l e I t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t Cochran tothe property. Chapman wide mobile testified that the parties home i n 1 9 9 7 o r 1 9 9 8 a n d t h a t 5 purchased he s p e n t a double- two y e a r s 2100550 remodeling i t b e f o r e t h e y moved i n t o double-wide mobile home had been c a s h a d v a n c e on o n e o f C o c h r a n ' s titled in Cochran's parties shared name. credit credit involved stated using that the a $10,000 c a r d s and t h a t indicated i t was that i n improving the mobile t h a t he made p a y m e n t s on Cochran's testified together, that Cochran and a bank a n d he h a d o p e n e d statement f o r that a bank account l i s t e d b o t h o f t h e i r names was e n t e r e d i n t o e v i d e n c e . testified that she h a d owned made Chapman an a u t h o r i z e d not h a v e h i s own b a n k cashing the cards. Chapman account He purchased Testimony the expenses home, a n d Chapman t e s t i f i e d i t . checks stated that that that account and t h a t Cochran she had user o f the account because account and had been h a v i n g he r e c e i v e d from he d i d difficulty h i s customers. t h e a c c o u n t was n o t o p e n f o r l o n g that Cochran and t h a t she had closed i t . Testimony credit card Cochran's indicated related name. credit-card to Cochran account user of the account. that, a a t some point, credit-card testified and t h a t Testimony account that Chapman was that had a was she h a d owned just at the hearing 6 Chapman an in that authorized indicated that, 2100550 at some p o i n t , insurance policy. separate It the p a r t i e s At the time that but, instead, "single" on undisputed their that that they when Chapman i n 2004, application enrollment listed her she contingent relationship applied married held as She employer's as h e r p r i m a r y as f o r a loan i n "single" stated that, retirement beneficiary on on h e r plan, she a n d Chapman i n d i c a t i n g on t h e f o r m her that as her t o Chapman was " f r i e n d . " to Cochran, Cochran h e r s e l f o u t as b e i n g that he c o n s i d e r e d testified married that Chapman's himself she had t o Chapman a n d t h a t Chapman t o a n y o n e a s h e r h u s b a n d . she had n o t u s e d t h e t i t l e name o r t a k e n status I t i s likewise t o a bank herself insurance. beneficiary, never introduced that their a p p l i c a t i o n t h a t he was s i n g l e . A l t h o u g h Chapman t e s t i f i e d be listed tax returns. listed f o r h e r new h e r mother each joint tax t h a t when s h e s t a r t e d w o r k i n g f o r a new f o r health form they had the p a r t i e s d i d not f i l e 2 0 0 6 , he i n d i c a t e d i n t h e l o a n employer automobile- policies. respective Cochran t e s t i f i e d o w n e d an o f t h e 2007 h e a r i n g , automobile-insurance i s undisputed returns had j o i n t l y 7 never she had She s t a t e d "Mrs." i n c o n j u n c t i o n surname. to with her 2100550 At t h e November several One of their 14, 2007, and a friends hearing, family f r i e n d o f C h a p m a n ' s , who years, testified that he together and had a c q u i r e d he like" "felt whether that the there between the p a r t i e s Another indicate been m a r r i e d had that lived stated that b u t he a d m i t t e d that He had never been and him. He and t h a t , in their that they were had never, that the p a r t i e s conversations each single. with She i n her presence, to others. testified and she had spent her husband socially and t h a t each other contact with known seen o r h e a r d t h e p a r t i e s a n o t h e r as h u s b a n d and w i f e that admitted married. testified the p a r t i e s introduce also of r e s p o n d e d n e g a t i v e l y when a s k e d b y mother indicated parties a subject f r i e n d o f C h a p m a n ' s , who h a d a l s o t h e y were Cochran's f o r many had together. j u d g e w h e t h e r he h a d e v e r that called witnesses. the p a r t i e s w e r e many y e a r s when he d i d n o t h a v e parties. trial as the p a r t i e s t h e p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d , t h e p a r t i e s f o r many y e a r s , the that property t h e p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d conversation member h a d known knew the p a r t i e s never her, they also stated introduced one A f r i e n d of Cochran's she had never as h u s b a n d and w i f e . 8 had time heard the with the parties 2100550 As previously noted, the trial court initially d e t e r m i n e d , f o l l o w i n g t h e November 14, 2007, h e a r i n g , parties order had not entered s e t t i n g aside parties court action that had entered indicated a common-law m a r r i a g e . judgment into that f o rdivorce into a i t was and determining common-law taking marriage, judicial t h a t Chapman h a d f i l e d 2005, w h i c h s u b s e q u e n t l y h a d been d i s m i s s e d action"). in I n that not m a r r i e d . action filed After the t r i a l on t h e b a s i s a motion ("the Chapman's a c t i o n , t h a t that In its that the the notice against case, Cochran had maintained moving t o dismiss that the trial o f an Cochran i n 2005 divorce theposition, the parties court dismissed were t h e 2005 divorce the p a r t i e s had r e c o n c i l e d , Cochran t o r e i n s t a t e t h e case i n which she a s s e r t e d : "That s i n c e t h e time o f Order o f D i s m i s s a l d a t e d M a r c h 2 2 , 2 0 0 6 , [Chapman] h a s d e s t r o y e d [Cochran's] r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y and caused significant damage t o t h e r e n t a l p r o p e r t y on [ C o c h r a n ' s ] l a n d b y removing appliances and d i s c o n n e c t i n g u t i l i t y lines. That [Cochran has been] t o l d by t h e a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t [the p a r t i e s ] a r e common l a w m a r r i e d and [that Chapman] c a n n o t be r e m o v e d . That t h i s Honorable C o u r t needs t o r u l e as t o t h e d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y a n d b i l l s f r o m t h i s common l a w m a r r i a g e . " Chapman, i n moving to judgment i n t h e present married by v i r t u e s e t aside t h e November 20, 2007, case f i n d i n g t h a t t h e p a r t i e s were n o t o f t h e common 9 law, argued that t h e above 2100550 s t a t e m e n t i n C o c h r a n ' s m o t i o n f r o m t h e 2 0 0 5 d i v o r c e a c t i o n was an admission marriage As by Cochran the existence of a common-law between the p a r t i e s . previously after this 2008, order the t r i a l court dismissed court stated, the appeal from finding that common-law m a r r i a g e . of of the parties' the parties held because had the t r i a l entered of the evidence issue of whether Particularly, March 17, wedding presented the at that parties court Chapman s u b m i t t e d 2006, band he said in into evidence f o r h i s purchase that hearing were, into had However, on t h e married. a receipt, of a diamond Cochran's ring dated and as a g i f t , wedding ring. b u t s h e s t a t e d t h a t he h a d n o t g i v e n Also submitted Chapman's a p p l i c a t i o n Cochran as application the present his action note, her a listed that N o v e m b e r 1 9 , 2 0 0 7 , w h i c h was w e l l after filed 10 and however, was that had been We from at the hearing f o r w a t e r s e r v i c e i n w h i c h he h a d spouse. i s dated as e v i d e n c e a possession. C o c h r a n a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t she had r e c e i v e d a diamond r i n g Chapman a already bears fact, in were 11, on t h e d i v i s i o n r e s o l v e d t h e i s s u e whether t h e p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d . some hearing the February T h a t h e a r i n g was f o c u s e d assets a five days after the 2100550 first o r e t e n u s p r o c e e d i n g . T h e r e was some e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d indicating that the p a r t i e s had a second together, although Cochran testified credit-card account that account that b e l o n g e d t o h e r a n d t h a t Chapman was m e r e l y an a u t h o r i z e d of user the account. To demonstrate that the parties had entered into a c o m m o n - l a w m a r r i a g e , Chapman was r e q u i r e d t o p r e s e n t c l e a r and convincing (2) p r e s e n t , evidence agreement the exclusion assumption of of enter the marriage a l lother the to Among prove public In v. B i s h o p , 445 ( C i v . 1976), this a Cochran recognition as a m a r r i a g e . 443, as We and (3) public marriage and public argues of Gray, 835 S o . that Chapman the parties' agree. 57 A l a . A p p . court mutual r e l a t i o n s h i p to and c o h a b i t a t i o n . " other things, relationship Bishop relationships; relationship of m a r i t a l duties a t 194. failed "(1) c a p a c i t y ; to permanently recognition 2d of 6 1 9 , 6 2 2 , 330 So. 2d wrote: "We c a n n o t d i s p u t e t h a t p u b l i c k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o m m o n - l a w m a r r i a g e i s t h e m o s t e f f e c t i v e means o f i n s u r i n g t h a t t h e m o r e c a s u a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n men and women are not elevated to the status of marriage. T h e m a r r i a g e r e l a t i o n s h i p may be s h o w n i n a n y way t h a t c a n be k n o w n b y o t h e r s , s u c h a s l i v i n g t o g e t h e r a s man a n d w i f e , r e f e r r i n g t o e a c h o t h e r i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f o t h e r s as b e i n g i n t h a t relation, 11 2100550 d e c l a r i n g t h e r e l a t i o n i n v a r i o u s types o f documents and transactions, sharing household duties and e x p e n s e s , a n d g e n e r a l l y e n g a g i n g i n '... a l l o f t h e numerous a s p e c t s o f day-to-day m u t u a l e x i s t e n c e o f married persons.' B e c k v . B e c k , 286 A l a . 692, 246 So. 2 d 420 [ ( 1 9 7 1 ) ] ; V i n s o n v . V i n s o n , [2 60 A l a . 2 5 4 , 69 S o . 2 d 431 ( 1 9 5 3 ) ] . " The record i n this and convincing evidence, publicly recognized case does not support as that a indicating that the parties the as m a r r i e d , public they introduced there i s no themselves contrary, referred the evidence to themselves Cochran's returns. Chapman were and referred to of others. to Cochran To t h e parties regularly documents f o r a loan, and i n t h e p a r t i e s ' submitted that i n t h e many single documents, evidence married, i n Chapman's a p p l i c a t i o n The o n l y document the p a r t i e s they employment that both was indicating they i n the presence as b e i n g i s no as b e i n g that clear out g e n e r a l l y to i s no e v i d e n c e indicates including referred h e l d themselves t o anyone by relationship There indicating as b e i n g m a r r i e d they prepared, in evidence the parties' marriage. there themselves a finding, into evidence i n which a s h i s s p o u s e was p r e p a r e d a l r e a d y had begun l i t i g a t i n g the question tax after whether married. Although i t i s true that the parties 12 lived together f o r 2100550 many y e a r s , this court p a r t i e s may h a v e l i v e d is insufficient common-law 21, has s t a t e d together t o show t h a t marriage." "[t]he or cohabited, ( A l a . C i v . App. 2011). indicating that the p a r t i e s had a j o i n t a joint which was to hold is i n holding and t h a t jointly, their a c k n o w l e d g m e n t as a m a r r i a g e . Chapman's that surname, and contradicts 3d a t ___ a parties' a policy those relationship had joint they jointly, (reversing common-law assumed of the evidence that the the t r i a l parties married. court's existed r e l a t i o n s h i p had not a c h i e v e d a marriage despite and As n o t e d , C o c h r a n n e v e r view marriage accounts public the bulk any Nor gained t h e m s e l v e s o u t t o t h e p u b l i c as b e i n g So. account f o r and by h o l d i n g a part, i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t accounts any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t , policy plainly account, in t h e m s e l v e s o u t t o t h e p u b l i c as h u s b a n d and w i f e . there that those checking into Although controverted credit-card automobile-insurance p o l i c y , there intended, alone, [Ms. 2 0 9 0 8 8 6 , J a n . evidence, time, standing the v. H o l s t o n , Reese some short that had entered was a fact the p a r t i e s 2011] ___ So. 3d ___ , ___ there that and presented had See R e e s e , judgment holding public finding that recognition evidence i n d i c a t i n g that the purported 13 held the as wife 2100550 had told members o f h e r t h a t the p u r p o r t e d were m a r r i e d , parties So. were the f a m i l y had t h a t two 2d a t 4 4 5 - 4 6 that wife's and the church that p a r t i e s were believed t h a t the f u n e r a l p r o g r a m s had married); Bishop, ( r e v e r s i n g the 57 trial Ala. parties indicated App. court's a common-law m a r r i a g e e x i s t e d and married, at that 622, 330 judgment f i n d i n g holding that the facts showing p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n of m a r r i a g e were too meager to that the parties evidence indicating medical-consent twice form introduced allowed considered the the that as themselves the the purported purported purported purported wife married, wife and as her signed spouse, his wife, two despite husband wife's show that to he that and children a he use his surname). It decision appears and that the determining c o m m o n - l a w m a r r i a g e , may statements contained divorce a c t i o n to parties' property authorities common l a w trial that as the in reversing p a r t i e s had have r e l i e d on the i t s prior entered into previously the effect that divided a result, she because she seeking she had to have the by were m a r r i e d by v i r t u e o f the she could been 2005 told that 14 was a quoted i n Cochran's motion to r e i n s t a t e the t h a t Chapman and and, court, not have Chapman 2100550 removed from her property. Those statements C o c h r a n ' s m o t i o n do n o t p e r s u a d e u s t h a t the trial appears court's that action that marriage, alleged, finding Cochran took the parties divorce action that the parties that public to recognition reversal trial common-law marriage. does not support were married, remanded dismissing a only because, common-law n o t have to the level by v i r t u e of court that she Chapman had before court's t h e judgment 15 court had entered and c o n v i n c i n g finding that and f o r the entry the action. cannot and r e l a t i o n s h i p had gained i s reversed court we i t clear Thus, t h e t r i a l clear admission o f t h e common l a w . the parties Because o f an the evidence, the parties' the t r i a l to the t r i a l divorce into she c o u l d as a m a r r i a g e . i n finding I t i n Cochran's motion t o r e i n s t a t e the as r i s i n g convincing evidence that marriage. When r e a d i n c o n t e x t , we s i m p l y do the t o t a l i t y the supports i n t h e 2005 position that were m a r r i e d Considering conclude that told view the a l l e g a t i o n s 2005 common-law had not entered and she a l t e r e d she had been a the evidence the position removed f r o m h e r p r o p e r t y . not of contained i n erred into a evidence the parties t h e cause of a i s judgment 2100550 R E V E R S E D AND REMANDED Pittman, Bryan, WITH Thomas, INSTRUCTIONS. and Moore, 16 J J . , concur.

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