Kenneth Brantley v. Cathy Annette Glover

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REL: 08/12/2011 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2011 2100378 Kenneth B r a n t l e y v. Cathy Annette Glover Appeal from Limestone C i r c u i t (CV-08-114) Court THOMAS, J u d g e . Kenneth B r a n t l e y appeals from the d e n i a l o f h i s motion t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f Cathy A n n e t t e Glover by the Limestone C i r c u i t Court. We a f f i r m . 2100378 Glover purchased The manufactured a used manufactured home, which home f r o m B r a n t l e y . Brantley had purchased in T e n n e s s e e a n d w h i c h was l i c e n s e d i n T e n n e s s e e , was l o c a t e d i n Ardmore. Glover I n March signed 2006, an i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the purchase, installment payment agreement ("the a g r e e m e n t " ) , a g r e e i n g t o p a y B r a n t l e y 16 m o n t h l y payments o f $350 b e g i n n i n g on o r b e f o r e A p r i l 30, 2006, a n d e n d i n g on J u l y 30, 2007. Glover was a l s o payment b y A u g u s t 30, 2007. that Glover would incur was 10 d a y s agreement past r e q u i r e d t o make a f i n a l The a g r e e m e n t f u r t h e r a $35 l a t e due a n d t h a t the entire w o u l d be i m m e d i a t e l y remaining due. provided f e e f o r a n y payment t h a t i f Glover balance Glover $250 d e f a u l t e d on t h e under t h e agreement and B r a n t l e y e n t e r e d into the agreement i n Alabama. In April 2008, Glover filed a complaint i n the t r i a l c o u r t r e q u e s t i n g an a c c o u n t i n g a n d d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f . complaint, Glover due t h a t she h a d p a i d a l l t h e amounts u n d e r t h e a g r e e m e n t ; h o w e v e r , she a l l e g e d , still demanding Glover her alleged requested account $2,131 i n satisfaction that the t r i a l statements, In her 2 o f t h e agreement. court review and o t h e r B r a n t l e y was evidence t h e agreement, and determine 2100378 whether G l o v e r the owed any a d d i t i o n a l moneys t o B r a n t l e y u n d e r agreement. Brantley, May 1, 2008. a c t i n g p r o se, answered G l o v e r ' s complaint on In h i s answer, B r a n t l e y a l l e g e d t h a t G l o v e r had made o n l y 13 o f t h e r e q u i r e d 16 $350 m o n t h l y payments and t h a t 6 of those resulted payments i n the assessment of l a t e that Glover s t i l l fees, h a d been more t h a n pursuant 10 d a y s l a t e , fees. Brantley which alleged owed $906.02 i n payments and $1,050 i n l a t e to the a t t a c h e d t o h i s answer terms of the agreement. a statement l i s t i n g Glover's Brantley payment h i s t o r y a l o n g w i t h c o r r e s p o n d e n c e he h a d s e n t G l o v e r r e g a r d i n g h e r a l l e g e d l a t e and o v e r d u e p a y m e n t s . On June 29, 2010, G l o v e r amended h e r c o m p l a i n t , a d d i n g a claim under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, codified a t § 12-19-270 e t s e q . , A l a . Code 1975 ( " t h e A L A A " ) , alleging t h a t , b a s e d on t h e d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d b y B r a n t l e y a n d t h e documents s u b m i t t e d by G l o v e r , t h e r e was no g r o u n d on w h i c h B r a n t l e y c o u l d oppose t h e r e l i e f r e q u e s t e d b y Glover. G l o v e r r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a w a r d G l o v e r an attorney fee. 3 2100378 The trial court set a hearing S e p t e m b e r 13, 2010, trial i n which court, conflict counsel between the trial court held and h e r c o u n s e l for Glover he stated hearing another case; B r a n t l e y f o r S e p t e m b e r 28, in this received i t s hearing were p r e s e n t that he On a l e t t e r to mailed 2010. the had a c a s e and a hearing S e p t e m b e r 28, in letter. a copy o f t h i s on scheduling The 2010. Glover a t t h e h e a r i n g ; B r a n t l e y was not present. On October 6, 2010, the trial judgment d e c l a r i n g t h a t G l o v e r due under the a g r e e m e n t and and transferring The trial title court to further court had paid t h a t no the entered in full Glover evidence submitted On October at the 14, 2010, t r i a l c o u r t , w h i c h was alleging new t h a t he hearing counsel's had remained home t o Glover. $3,151.30 a t t o r n e y f e e , p u r s u a n t t o h e r c l a i m u n d e r t h e ALAA. c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t i t s j u d g m e n t was default a l l amounts unpaid balance manufactured awarded a as The trial b a s e d on t h e t e s t i m o n y S e p t e m b e r 28, Brantley 2010, mailed a t h o u g h t t h a t he S e p t e m b e r 13, of 2010, the conflict letter. 4 w o u l d be and hearing. letter to f i l e d by t h e c l e r k on O c t o b e r 15, date because an notified cited in Brantley also the 2010, of a Glover's alleged 2100378 that Glover which he had not p r o v i d e d 20, 2010. Brantley f u r t h e r a l l e g e d t h a t he was s u r p r i s e d when he later received the d e f a u l t occurred on t h e o r i g i n a l l y requested On Brantley had obtained a hearing January filed subpoena judgment before on September stating that the hearing had scheduled date. Brantley also the t r i a l court. 11, 2 0 1 1 , t h r o u g h an "Amendment O c t o b e r 14, 2010." his a h i m w i t h payment r e c e i p t s , f o r newly obtained counsel, t o R u l e 55 a n d 59 L e t t e r I n h i s amended m o t i o n , B r a n t l e y Dated repeated a s s e r t i o n s r a i s e d i n h i s O c t o b e r 14, 2010, l e t t e r and, i n a d d i t i o n , a s s e r t e d t h a t he h a d p r e v i o u s l y a r g u e d t o t h e t r i a l court that Glover that Glover owed h i m money u n d e r t h e a g r e e m e n t , had acknowledged Brantley had claimed Brantley also argued matter j u r i s d i c t i o n that that i n h e r amended Glover the t r i a l Glover had not proven a c t i o n was s u f f i c i e n t l y amount of that Brantley $2,131. lacked subject- court that Brantley further asserted Brantley's frivolous the attorney 5 defense t o w a r r a n t an a w a r d t h e ALAA a n d t h a t G l o v e r h a d n o t s u b m i t t e d the complaint b e c a u s e , B r a n t l e y s a i d , he h a d p u r c h a s e d t h e m a n u f a c t u r e d home i n T e n n e s s e e . that owed noting fee to the under evidence t o support awarded. Brantley's 2100378 p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n was d e n i e d 59.1, A l a . R. C i v . P. by o p e r a t i o n o f l a w . See R u l e Brantley subsequently appealed t o t h i s court. On a p p e a l , lacked subject-matter contends arising seq., that first argues that the t r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over the case. the claims under t h e T r u t h and t h a t court. that Brantley those i n Glover's complaint i n Lending Act, claims court Brantley are claims 15 U.S.C. § 1601 e t h a d t o be b r o u g h t i n federal I n s u p p o r t o f h i s argument, B r a n t l e y c i t e s o n l y state extension that the Truth of credit i n L e n d i n g A c t can a p p l y i n connection with cases to the the purchase of a m a n u f a c t u r e d home. "'The [Truth i n L e n d i n g A c t ] has t h e b r o a d purpose o f p r o m o t i n g " t h e i n f o r m e d use o f c r e d i t " by a s s u r i n g disclosure of c r e d i t Fin. Servs., "meaningful terms" t o consumers.'" P a r r i s h v. B l a z e r I n c . , 868 So. 2d 406, 410 (Ala. 2003)(quoting F o r d M o t o r C r e d i t Co. v . M i l h o l l i n , 444 U.S. 555, 559 quoting i n turn 15 U.S.C. e x p l a i n e d how t h e T r u t h in which Glover § 1601)). Brantley (1980), has n o t i n Lending A c t a p p l i e s t o t h i s alleged that she h a d p a i d amounts due u n d e r t h e a g r e e m e n t w h i l e 6 Brantley Brantley case, a l l the alleged that 2100378 she had not. disclosure Glover d i d n o t make any of terms i n the agreement. b a s i s f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the Truth case. Because t h i s Truth i n Lending Act, a r g u m e n t has no Brantley failing to a r e l a t i n g to Therefore, we see i n Lending Act to involve claims the no this under the Brantley's subject-matter-jurisdiction merit. next hold c a s e does n o t claims 1 argues hearing that on the his trial motion court to set erred aside by the d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t and by s u b s e q u e n t l y a l l o w i n g h i s m o t i o n t o be d e n i e d by o p e r a t i o n o f l a w . court, law, by B r a n t l e y contends t h a t the a l l o w i n g h i s motion t o be denied by operation f a i l e d t o a p p l y t h e a n a l y s i s r e q u i r e d by K i r t l a n d v. Morgan A u t h o r i t y Sewer Service, Inc., 524 So. trial 2d 600 of Fort (Ala. 1988). "A t r i a l c o u r t has b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n i n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r t o g r a n t o r deny a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t . K i r t l a n d v. F o r t Morgan A u t h . B e c a u s e we h o l d t h a t t h e T r u t h i n L e n d i n g A c t has no a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s c a s e , we e x p r e s s no o p i n i o n as t o w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t w o u l d have had s u b j e c t - m a t t e r jurisdiction o v e r t h e c a s e i f G l o v e r had a l l e g e d a c l a i m p u r s u a n t t o t h e Truth i n Lending Act. A d d i t i o n a l l y , b e c a u s e we h o l d t h a t G l o v e r ' s c l a i m s were n o t b r o u g h t p u r s u a n t t o t h e T r u t h i n L e n d i n g A c t , we n e e d n o t a d d r e s s B r a n t l e y ' s argument t h a t G l o v e r ' s a l l e g e d c l a i m under the Truth i n Lending Act was b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s . 1 7 2100378 Sewer S e r v . , I n c . , 524 So. 2d 600 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) . In r e v i e w i n g an a p p e a l from a t r i a l court's order r e f u s i n g t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment, t h i s C o u r t must d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r i n r e f u s i n g t o s e t a s i d e t h e default judgment the trial court exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n . 524 So. 2d a t 604. That d i s c r e t i o n , although broad, r e q u i r e s the t r i a l c o u r t to balance two competing p o l i c y interests associated with d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t s : the need t o promote judicial economy and a l i t i g a n t ' s r i g h t t o d e f e n d an a c t i o n on t h e m e r i t s . 524 So. 2d a t 604. These i n t e r e s t s must be balanced under the two-step process established in Kirtland. "We begin the balancing process with the p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t c a s e s s h o u l d be d e c i d e d on the m e r i t s w h e n e v e r i t i s p r a c t i c a b l e t o do s o . 524 So. 2d a t 604. The t r i a l c o u r t must t h e n a p p l y a t h r e e - f a c t o r a n a l y s i s f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d i n Ex p a r t e I l l i n o i s C e n t r a l G u l f R.R., 514 So. 2d 1283 (Ala. 1 9 8 7 ) , i n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r t o deny a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t . K i r t l a n d , 524 So. 2d a t 605. The b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n a r y a u t h o r i t y g i v e n t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n m a k i n g t h a t d e c i s i o n s h o u l d n o t be e x e r c i s e d without c o n s i d e r i n g the f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s : '1) w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t has a m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e ; 2) w h e t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l be u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c e d i f t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t i s s e t a s i d e ; and 3) w h e t h e r t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was a r e s u l t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s own c u l p a b l e c o n d u c t . ' 524 So. 2d a t 605." Z e l l e r v. B a i l e y , 950 As Inc., we 897 stated So. So. 2d 1149, i n Richardson 2d 345 1152-53 v. ( A l a . C i v . App. ( A l a . 2006). Integrity Bible Church, 2004) : "Because of the importance of the interest of p r e s e r v i n g a p a r t y ' s r i g h t t o a t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s , t h i s c o u r t has h e l d t h a t where a t r i a l c o u r t d o e s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t i t has c o n s i d e r e d t h e m a n d a t o r y K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s i n denying a motion to set aside a 8 2100378 d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t , s u c h as where a R u l e 5 5 ( c ) [ , A l a . R. C i v . P.,] m o t i o n i s d e n i e d by o p e r a t i o n o f l a w , the d e n i a l of the motion to s e t a s i d e the d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t w i l l be r e v e r s e d and t h e c a u s e remanded f o r the t r i a l c o u r t to address the K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s . " 897 So. 2d a t 349. However, i n o r d e r t o t r i g g e r t h e m a n d a t o r y requirement that t r i a l the p a r t y f i l i n g court consider the Kirtland factors, a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t must a l l e g e and p r o v i d e a r g u m e n t s and e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g a l l t h r e e of the 463, his Kirtland 468 Carroll v. (Ala. 2008)("Because C a r r o l l initial Williams, has failed 6 So. to 3d satisfy burden under the K i r t l a n d a n a l y s i s [of p r o v i d i n g allegations factors], f a c t o r s . See and we will evidence relating not the hold to trial a l l three court in Kirtland error for a l l o w i n g C a r r o l l ' s m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e the d e f a u l t judgment t o be denied by operation Kirtland analysis."). 2 of law without having applied the See a l s o M a i d e n v. F e d e r a l N a t ' l M o r t g . A l t h o u g h Judge B r y a n a t t e m p t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s c a s e f r o m C a r r o l l , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d i n t h a t c a s e t h a t , i n order to t r i g g e r the t r i a l c o u r t ' s duty to analyze the K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s , " [ t ] h e law i s w e l l s e t t l e d i n Alabama that the defaulting party has the initial burden of demonstrating the e x i s t e n c e of the t h r e e K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s . " 6 So. 3d a t 467 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . Thus, o u r supreme c o u r t has c l e a r l y h e l d t h a t a movant must a r g u e a l l t h r e e K i r t l a n d factors i n a motion to set aside a default judgment. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h i s c o u r t i s b o u n d by t h e d e c i s i o n s o f o u r supreme c o u r t . § 12-3-16, A l a . Code 1975 ("The d e c i s i o n s o f 2 9 2100378 Ass'n, (Ala. [Ms. Civ. 2090942, M a r c h 11, App. 2011)(noting d e n i a l by o p e r a t i o n the the 2011] that So. we will 3d , n.3 not reverse the of law o f a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t Supreme C o u r t s h a l l g o v e r n t h e h o l d i n g s courts of appeals "). and decisions of M o r e o v e r , S u m l i n v. S u m l i n , 931 So. 2d 40 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 5 ) , w h i c h i s c i t e d by Judge B r y a n f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t "a f a i l u r e t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t one o r b o t h o f t h e s e c o n d [-¬ t h a t t h e n o n m o v i n g p a r t y w o u l d n o t be u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c e d ] and t h i r d [-- t h a t t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was n o t t h e r e s u l t o f the movant's c u l p a b l e conduct ] K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s s u p p o r t s the g r a n t i n g of r e l i e f from a d e f a u l t judgment i s not n e c e s s a r i l y f a t a l t o a m o t i o n f o r s u c h r e l i e f , " 931 So. 2d a t 48, i s i n a p p o s i t e t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s case. In S u m l i n , t h e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h i s c o u r t was w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t had e x c e e d e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n a p p l y i n g t h e K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s t o deny a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t , n o t whether the t r i a l c o u r t ' s duty to perform the Kirtland a n a l y s i s had b e e n t r i g g e r e d . The s e c t i o n o f t h e opinion q u o t e d above was p a r t o f o u r d i s c u s s i o n o f w h e t h e r a m o v i n g p a r t y c o u l d p r e v a i l on a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t i f t h e e q u i t i e s were i n f a v o r o f t h e n o n m o v i n g p a r t y w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s e c o n d and t h i r d f a c t o r s , n o t w h e t h e r a p a r t y c o u l d p r e v a i l on a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t i f t h e p a r t y had f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e any a r g u m e n t o r a l l e g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h o s e f a c t o r s . Thus, S u m l i n does n o t c o n t r o l t h e outcome o r t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h i s c a s e . Even i f S u m l i n were a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s c a s e , t h i s c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n S u m l i n c a n n o t be u s e d t o o v e r r u l e o r m o d i f y o u r supreme c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n C a r r o l l . See W a l k e r v. C a p s t o n e B l d g . C o r p . , [Ms. 2081153, M a r c h 26, 2010] So. 3d , (Ala. C i v . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ( " T h i s c o u r t i s b o u n d by t h e d e c i s i o n s o f o u r supreme c o u r t , and we a r e n o t a t l i b e r t y t o o v e r r u l e t h o s e d e c i s i o n s or t o choose not t o f o l l o w them."). 10 2100378 j u d g m e n t when t h e movant f a i l s to argue the e x i s t e n c e of K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s i n h i s or her motion). In t h i s case, B r a n t l e y ' s motion t o s e t a s i d e the judgment, together with a d d r e s s e d w h e t h e r he claim requesting Brantley also argument had answer to a meritorious Glover's defense a d e c l a r a t o r y j u d g m e n t and addressed Kirtland analysis. or his the culpable-conduct the second factor default complaint, to her Glover's ALAA c l a i m . f a c t o r of However, B r a n t l e y p r o v i d e d concerning the no in the allegation the Kirtland a n a l y s i s -- w h e t h e r G l o v e r w o u l d be u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c e d i f t h e default j u d g m e n t were set aside. Because B r a n t l e y a l l e g e t h a t G l o v e r w o u l d n o t be u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c e d by did setting a s i d e the d e f a u l t judgment, B r a n t l e y d i d not t r i g g e r the trial c o u r t ' s duty to analyze the K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s . A c c o r d i n g l y , will not Brantley's reverse the trial court's motion t o be denied by operation a n a l y z i n g t h e K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s . See R u d o l p h v. P h i l y a w , 909 So. 2d 200, decision of Carroll, 6 So. 204 and Pittman, J . , concur. Moore, J . , c o n c u r s s p e c i a l l y , w i t h 11 writing. we allow without 3d a t ( A l a . C i v . App. AFFIRMED. Thompson, P . J . , to law not 468; 2005) . 2100378 Bryan, J . , concurs i n the r e s u l t , w i t h 12 writing. 2100378 MOORE, J u d g e , c o n c u r r i n g Because court, not am constrained I concur with make sense judgment will I not to be for have to by opposing party and prove unfair the rulings the main o p i n i o n . a party allege moving or set that would and be opposing unfair party Inc., prejudice disproving court Therefore, to before unfair overrules raise 2002), however, t h i s court v. party p o s i t i o n to assert Royal 903 go e.g., So. 2d 802, forward should Randolph, Co. of ( A l a . 2004) is usually in a far should him from prejudice rest on the with the issue of have any burden of and 828 i s bound to p l a c e 13 811 might b e f a l l burden Unless movant. Ins. substantial that movant prejudice. Phillips opposing noted, the and the default have m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y how " ) . a many o p i n i o n s p o s i t i o n t o know what p r e j u d i c e the d e l a y , aside the ("[C]ommon s e n s e d i c t a t e s t h a t a p l a i n t i f f better supreme See, prejudice. Crowne I n v s . , our i n the best i s obviously As of I b e l i e v e t h a t i t does to prove unfairly prejudiced. the A m e r i c a v. specially. until So. the 2d 2 69 supreme (Ala. t h e b u r d e n on the 2100378 Kenneth letter Brantley to the t r i a l Annette Glover d i d not assert court w o u l d n o t be u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c e d it i shighly unlikely the p a r t i e s centered terms due u n d e r number set almost between of the held was made the default from paid Glover full would have h i s motion. 2008), solely through evidence i n existence received made attached on S e p t e m b e r remained court of the only the Whatever at t r i a l The payments made and B r a n t l e y . payment a l lthe a part the exhibits were that between by B r a n t l e y . installment 28, on the motion to judgment. i t remains that t e c h n i c a l requirement of r a i s i n g (Ala. reveals The d i s p u t e had f u l l y which any payments certainly Nevertheless, in note, 1 5 , 2 0 1 0 , when t h e t r i a l aside the note I t appears that had t o prove October she would be. a promissory to the note. transactions Glover of the record on w h e t h e r G l o v e r timeliness the pleadings 2010, that Cathy i f the default were n o t a t i s s u e ; t h e p a r t i e s c o n t e s t e d and pursuant to My r e v i e w of the promissory pleadings, his original o r i n h i s amended m o t i o n t h a t judgment were s e t a s i d e . moneys i n either In C a r r o l l o u r supreme Brantley lack of u n f a i r v. W i l l i a m s , court 14 d i d not clearly satisfy prejudice 6 S o . 3 d 4 63, indicated that 468 the 2100378 d e n i a l by operation of judgment would not lack 931 law be reversed of u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e So. 2d t h a t the 40, 48 failure necessarily judgment. be fatal to supreme c o u r t that the movant b e a r s to factor t o be assert the considered in Carroll, as motion. a default to assert In S u m l i n v. 2005), this a motion set court Sumlin, suggested adopt that burden of reasoning raising of unfair prejudice at a determinant. to worst, law Brantley's 15 a i f i t and default and a As should I insists proving that not lack movant's be a whether to set aside i n determining the aside a n a l y s i s i n Sumlin, seems, however, fatal the to It lack d e f a u l t judgment, not deficiency to prejudice. failure aside to a s s e r t l a c k of u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e should the court i n the I a g r e e w i t h much o f unfair set i f the movant f a i l e d ( A l a . C i v . App. urge of of a motion to a s t a t e d by demands t h a t appeal. only our we supreme view that 2100378 BRYAN, J u d g e , c o n c u r r i n g The main o p i n i o n i n the result. states: " [ I ] n order to t r i g g e r the mandatory requirement f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r t h e K i r t l a n d [ v. F o r t Morgan A u t h o r i t y Sewer S e r v i c e , I n c . , 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988),] f a c t o r s , a p a r t y f i l i n g a motion t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t must a l l e g e and p r o v i d e a r g u m e n t s and e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g a l l t h r e e o f t h e K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s . See C a r r o l l v. W i l l i a m s , 6 So. 3d 463, 468 ( A l a . 2008) " So. 3d 463 3d a t . I do not r e a d C a r r o l l v. W i l l i a m s , 6 So. ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) , as e s t a b l i s h i n g a b r i g h t - l i n e r u l e s t a t i n g that a t r i a l court default judgment alleged and need not unless s u p p o r t e d by consider each of a motion to set aside the Kirtland factors argument and evidence. I a are believe t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e i n C a r r o l l c i t e d i n t h e m a i n o p i n i o n must be viewed i n the the context defaulting party, judgment, completely framework e s t a b l i s h e d Sewer Service, defaulting Inc., party of the f a c t s of t h a t case. In i n h i s motion to set aside failed by to carry 524 So. in Carroll 2d d i d not the his 600 burden Fort K i r t l a n d v. Morgan (Ala. address Carroll, under 1988). the In addressing the first 16 the Authority The second t h i r d K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s i n h i s motion to s e t a s i d e the judgment. default and default Kirtland factor, i.e., 2100378 whether made there only i s a meritorious defense, the d e f a u l t i n g party a bare legal conclusion unsupported by e v i d e n c e , w h i c h i s an i n s u f f i c i e n t s h o w i n g u n d e r K i r t l a n d . 467-68. Accordingly, the d e f a u l t i n g party n o t have p o s s i b l y p r e v a i l e d on h i s m o t i o n d e f a u l t judgment. 6 So. 3d a t i n Carroll could to s e t aside the Thus, i t w o u l d have b e e n p o i n t l e s s f o r t h e supreme c o u r t t o r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t a n d remand t h e c a s e f o r the t r i a l court to consider the K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s . C a r r o l l d i d not i n v o l v e a s i t u a t i o n i n which a d e f a u l t i n g party presented demonstrate a meritorious one o r b o t h defense o f the second but failed and t h i r d to Kirtland f a c t o r s . A d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y has t h e burden o f " d e m o n s t r a t [ i n g ] the existence prerequisite aside." of when Kirtland, a meritorious seeking t o have defense a 524 So. 2d a t 605. as default a threshold judgment s e t However, "a f a i l u r e t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t one o r b o t h o f t h e s e c o n d a n d t h i r d factors supports the granting of relief from fatal to a motion a Kirtland default judgment i s not n e c e s s a r i l y relief." S u m l i n v . S u m l i n , 931 So. 2d 40, 48 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2005). f o r such See, e . g . , F r i e s C o r r . E q u i p . , I n c . v . Con-Tech, I n c . , 559 So. 2d 557, 561 ( A l a . 1 9 9 0 ) ; B.E.H., J r . v. S t a t e e x r e l . 17 2100378 M.E.C. , [Ms. 2100151, A p r i l 8, 2011] App. 2 0 1 1 ) ; C a l h o u n v. Civ. App. (Ala. C i v . App. party's relieve aside appropriate without to factors the and B r a c k n e l l , 993 Aldridge 1997). failure Kirtland set 2008); trial So. v. So. 3d (Ala. Civ. 2d Hamilton, 902, 907 708 So. (Ala. 2d 194 Thus, I do n o t t h i n k t h a t a d e f a u l t i n g allege, before court a argue, trial and court from h a v i n g support should a motion of K i r t l a n d . c a s e , a d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y may three necessarily to consider a d e f a u l t judgment i n l i g h t a l l In be e n t i t l e d t o demonstrating a l l three K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s . 3 See the relief Sumlin (noting t h a t there i s a strong b i a s i n favor of d e c i d i n g cases on t h e m e r i t s , e s p e c i a l l y when t h e y i n v o l v e c h i l d c u s t o d y ) other cases c i t e d d i d not case, Kenneth B r a n t l e y , demonstrate to the trial requirement of a m e r i t o r i o u s defense. to reverse the and above. However, i n t h i s party, to judgment and remand court the the defaulting threshold Thus, t h e r e i s no the case f o r the need trial I n o t e a l s o t h a t K i r t l a n d s t a t e s t h a t "a t r i a l c o u r t must f i r s t presume t h a t a d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y has a r i g h t t o a t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s ; and, t h e n , w i t h t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n i n m i n d , t h e t r i a l c o u r t must c o n s i d e r t h e t h r e e - f a c t o r a n a l y s i s . " 524 So. 2d a t 608. 3 18 2100378 c o u r t to c o n s i d e r the K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s . i n the result. 19 A c c o r d i n g l y , I concur

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