Tina Neal v. Sem Ray, Inc., and Ronder Stringer

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REL: 2/11/11 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 2091068 T i n a Neal v. Sem Ray, Inc., and Ronder S t r i n g e r Appeal from Pike C i r c u i t (CV-08-218) Court BRYAN, J u d g e . Tina Neal, thep l a i n t i f f below, appeals from a p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f Sem Ray, I n c . ("Sem R a y " ) , a n d R o n d e r S t r i n g e r , two o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s b e l o w , w i t h r e s p e c t t o Neal's claim of negligence i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f a dump t r u c k . 2091068 We affirm. The f o l l o w i n g f a c t s a r e u n d i s p u t e d . S t r i n g e r a n d N e a l a r e cousins. driver. Stringer On J u l y and a s k e d i s employed 2 1 , 2008, b y Sem Ray as a Stringer dump-truck telephoned Neal's her to ride with Stringer on a t r i p mother to deliver a l o a d o f g r a v e l t o a j o b s i t e i n A t m o r e ; however, N e a l ' s mother could not ride Consequently, her company. with Stringer Stringer due t o a p r i o r engagement. asked N e a l t o r i d e w i t h h e r and keep Initially, Neal d i d n o t want t o g o ; h o w e v e r , N e a l ' s mother asked N e a l t o r i d e w i t h S t r i n g e r because N e a l ' s mother c o u l d n o t go, a n d N e a l agreed t o go. The n e x t d a y , S t r i n g e r p i c k e d up N e a l i n T r o y a t 3:30 a.m., a n d t h e y h e a d e d t o A t m o r e . E n r o u t e t o A t m o r e , t h e dump t r u c k t u r n e d o v e r , and N e a l was i n j u r e d . On December 19, 2008, N e a l F i r s t Continental Leasing, 1 sued S t r i n g e r , stating Sem Ray, a n d c l a i m s o f n e g l i g e n c e and w a n t o n n e s s i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e dump t r u c k a g a i n s t a l l t h e d e f e n d a n t s ; c l a i m s o f n e g l i g e n c e and wantonness i n t h e h i r i n g , training, and s u p e r v i s i o n of Stringer a g a i n s t Sem Ray a n d T h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l does n o t i n d i c a t e t h e n a t u r e o f F i r s t C o n t i n e n t a l L e a s i n g ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h S t r i n g e r , Sem Ray, t h e dump t r u c k , o r t h e a c c i d e n t . 1 2 2091068 F i r s t C o n t i n e n t a l L e a s i n g ; c l a i m s o f n e g l i g e n c e and wantonness in the entrustment Ray and F i r s t and wantonness Ray, First o f t h e dump t r u c k t o S t r i n g e r a g a i n s t Sem C o n t i n e n t a l L e a s i n g ; and c l a i m s jointly and s e v e r a l l y Continental Leasing, against and of negligence S t r i n g e r , Sem fictitiously named parties. Answering, Leasing denied asserted negligence Stringer, Sem liability a n d , as an that they Ray, a n d F i r s t were n o t l i a b l e Continental affirmative with respect defense, t o Neal's c l a i m s b e c a u s e , t h e y s a i d , N e a l was a g u e s t i n t h e dump t r u c k w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e A l a b a m a G u e s t S t a t u t e , § 32-1-2, A l a . Code 1975, when s h e was i n j u r e d . Stringer, Sem Ray, 2 Subsequently, a n d F i r s t C o n t i n e n t a l L e a s i n g moved f o r a summary j u d g m e n t , w h i c h N e a l Following 2 a hearing, opposed. the t r i a l court entered an S e c t i o n 32-1-2 p r o v i d e s : "The owner, o p e r a t o r o r p e r s o n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e s h a l l n o t be l i a b l e f o r l o s s o r damage a r i s i n g f r o m i n j u r i e s t o o r d e a t h o f a g u e s t w h i l e b e i n g t r a n s p o r t e d w i t h o u t payment t h e r e f o r i n o r upon s a i d m o t o r v e h i c l e , r e s u l t i n g from t h e o p e r a t i o n t h e r e o f , u n l e s s such i n j u r i e s o r d e a t h a r e c a u s e d by t h e w i l l f u l o r wanton m i s c o n d u c t o f s u c h o p e r a t o r , owner o r p e r s o n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the o p e r a t i o n o f s a i d motor v e h i c l e . " 3 order 2091068 d e n y i n g t h e summary-judgment m o t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c l a i m of wantonness i n the operation o f t h e dump truck against S t r i n g e r a n d g r a n t i n g t h e summary-judgment m o t i o n w i t h to a l l Neal's other claims. The t r i a l court d i dnot c e r t i f y the p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t as a f i n a l Rule 54(b), A l a . R. C i v . P., a n d i t s u b s e q u e n t l y jury t r i a l with respect operation of t h e dump judgment p u r s u a n t t o conducted a t o N e a l ' s c l a i m o f wantonness i n t h e truck against Stringer. The returned a v e r d i c t i n favor of Stringer with respect claim, and t h e t r i a l verdict. Thereafter, court entered Neal timely court, which t r a n s f e r r e d the appeal § respect to that a j u d g m e n t on t h a t appealed jury jury t o t h e supreme t o t h i s court pursuant t o 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1975. In her brief to this court, Neal argues and authority only with respect t o her claim of negligence cites i n the o p e r a t i o n o f t h e dump t r u c k a g a i n s t S t r i n g e r a n d Sem Ray. I n Tucker v. C u l l m a n - J e f f e r s o n 317, Counties Gas D i s t r i c t , 319 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) , t h e supreme c o u r t 864 So. 2 d stated: "In h i s b r i e f t o t h i s C o u r t Tucker argues and c i t e s a u t h o r i t y o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e summary j u d g m e n t on h i s b r e a c h - o f - c o n t r a c t c l a i m ; he n e v e r expresses disagreement with the d i s m i s s a l of h i s f r a u d c l a i m o r t h e summary j u d g m e n t as t o h i s c l a i m a l l e g i n g ' o t h e r w r o n g f u l c o n d u c t . ' A p p a r e n t l y , he 4 2091068 has e l e c t e d n o t t o p u r s u e t h o s e c l a i m s . 'When an a p p e l l a n t f a i l s t o p r o p e r l y a r g u e an i s s u e , t h a t i s s u e i s w a i v e d a n d w i l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d . B o s h e l l v. K e i t h , 418 So. 2 d 89 ( A l a . 1 9 8 2 ) . ' Asam v . D e v e r e a u x , 686 So. 2 d 1222, 1224 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 6 ) . 'An a p p e a l s c o u r t w i l l c o n s i d e r o n l y t h o s e i s s u e s p r o p e r l y d e l i n e a t e d as s u c h , a n d no m a t t e r w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d on a p p e a l u n l e s s p r e s e n t e d a n d a r g u e d i n b r i e f . Ex p a r t e R i l e y , 464 So. 2d 92 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) . ' B r a x t o n v . S t e w a r t , 539 So. 2 d 284, 286 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 8 8 ) . A c c o r d i n g l y , we t r e a t t h e f r a u d c l a i m and t h e c l a i m a l l e g i n g 'other w r o n g f u l c o n d u c t ' as h a v i n g b e e n a b a n d o n e d b y T u c k e r , a n d we a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t s as t o t h o s e c l a i m s . Thus, we a d d r e s s o n l y t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e summary j u d g m e n t on t h e b r e a c h - o f - c o n t r a c t c l a i m . " 864 So. 2d a t 319. Accordingly, failure i n t h e case t o present now b e f o r e argument a n d t o c i t e any o f h e r c l a i m s o t h e r than u s , due t o N e a l ' s authority regarding her claim of negligence i n the o p e r a t i o n o f t h e dump t r u c k a g a i n s t S t r i n g e r a n d Sem Ray, we t r e a t a l l o f her claims other than h e r c l a i m of negligence i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e dump t r u c k a g a i n s t S t r i n g e r a n d Sem Ray as h a v i n g been a b a n d o n e d b y N e a l , a n d we a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t s with respect t o a l l of those only the propriety respect t o Neal's c l a i m s . Thus, we w i l l of the p a r t i a l claim of negligence summary consider judgment with i n the operation of the dump t r u c k a g a i n s t S t r i n g e r a n d Sem Ray. See T u c k e r . Our r e v i e w of the p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t w i t h 5 respect 2091068 to Neal's truck claim against following o f n e g l i g e n c e i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e dump Stringer a n d Sem Ray i s governed by t h e principles: " T h i s C o u r t ' s r e v i e w o f a summary j u d g m e n t i s de novo. W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e Farm Mut. A u t o . I n s . Co., 886 So. 2 d 72, 74 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . We a p p l y t h e same s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w as t h e t r i a l court applied. S p e c i f i c a l l y , we must d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e movant has made a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s a n d t h a t t h e movant i s e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . R u l e 5 6 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P.; B l u e C r o s s & B l u e S h i e l d o f A l a b a m a v . H o d u r s k i , 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) . I n m a k i n g s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , we must r e v i e w t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e nonmovant. W i l s o n v . Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 ( A l a . 1986) . Once t h e movant makes a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e b u r d e n t h e n s h i f t s t o t h e nonmovant t o p r o d u c e ' s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ' as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of a genuine issue of material fact. B a s s v. S o u t h T r u s t Bank o f B a l d w i n C o u n t y , 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ; A l a . Code 1975, § 12-21-12. ' [ S ] u b s t a n t i a l evidence i s evidence o f such weight and q u a l i t y t h a t f a i r - m i n d e d p e r s o n s i n t h e e x e r c i s e of i m p a r t i a l judgment can r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e f a c t s o u g h t t o be p r o v e d . ' West v . F o u n d e r s L i f e A s s u r . Co. o f F l a . , 547 So. 2d 870, 871 ( A l a . 1989) Dow v. A l a b a m a (Ala. Democratic Party, 897 So. 2 d 1035, 1038-39 2004). Citing Cash v. C a l d w e l l , 603 So. 2d 1001 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) , N e a l argues t h a t t h e evidence e s t a b l i s h e d a genuine material fact r e g a r d i n g whether 6 issue of s h e was a g u e s t i n t h e dump 2091068 t r u c k o p e r a t e d by S t r i n g e r w i t h i n t h e meaning o f t h e Alabama G u e s t S t a t u t e b e c a u s e , she s a y s , t h e e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t she accompanied S t r i n g e r a t t h e i n s t a n c e o f S t r i n g e r f o r a p u r p o s e t h a t b e n e f i t e d S t r i n g e r on a t r i p t h a t was s o l e l y f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f S t r i n g e r a n d Sem Ray. I n C a s h v . C a l d w e l l , t h e supreme c o u r t s u m m a r i z e d t h e f a c t s a n d t h e p r o c e d u r a l p e r t i n e n t t o the Cashes' negligence history claim against Caldwell: " I n A p r i l 1988, E v e l y n a n d R i c h a r d C a s h l e f t t h e i r home i n C a l i f o r n i a f o r a t r i p o f s e v e r a l weeks across the country i n t h e i r mobile home. They planned t o s t o p i n Birmingham t o see R i c h a r d ' s s i s t e r , Mary C a s h C a l d w e l l , a n d h i s m o t h e r , M r s . S w e a t t , who was i l l . W h i l e t h e C a s h e s were i n T e x a s , R i c h a r d t e l e p h o n e d Mary, a n d she a s k e d them t o come t o B i r m i n g h a m b e c a u s e t h e i r m o t h e r ' s c o n d i t i o n was d e t e r i o r a t i n g a n d she n e e d e d h e l p . "On A p r i l 18, 1988, E v e l y n d r o v e w i t h Mary t o take Mrs. Sweatt t o see h e r p h y s i c i a n i n Birmingham. The d o c t o r a d m i t t e d M r s . S w e a t t t o t h e h o s p i t a l immediately. Mary and E v e l y n r e t u r n e d home t o r e t r i e v e Mrs. Sweatt's p e r s o n a l b e l o n g i n g s . That e v e n i n g Mary, E v e l y n , a n d R i c h a r d r e t u r n e d t o t h e h o s p i t a l t o see Mrs. Sweatt. "The three left the h o s p i t a l i n Mary's a u t o m o b i l e , j u s t as i t was b e g i n n i n g t o r a i n . Mary was d r i v i n g , R i c h a r d was i n t h e r i g h t f r o n t s e a t , and E v e l y n was i n t h e r i g h t b a c k s e a t . A l l t h r e e were w e a r i n g s e a t b e l t s . I t began r a i n i n g v e r y h a r d , and soon t h e r e was t h r e e t o f o u r i n c h e s o f w a t e r on t h e r o a d . As Mary began t o make a s h a r p l e f t t u r n , t h e c a r went i n t o a c o u n t e r c l o c k w i s e s p i n a n d h i t a t e l e p h o n e p o l e . E v e l y n was s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d when h e r s i d e o f t h e c a r was c r u s h e d as i t h i t t h e 7 2091068 telephone p o l e . On April 16, 1990, Evelyn and R i c h a r d s u e d Mary; E v e l y n s o u g h t damages b a s e d on her p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s a r i s i n g out of the a c c i d e n t , and R i c h a r d s o u g h t damages b a s e d on an a l l e g e d l o s s of consortium. "On December 16, 1991, Mary moved f o r a summary j u d g m e n t , c l a i m i n g t h a t E v e l y n was a g u e s t i n t h e c a r and was t h e r e f o r e b a r r e d f r o m s u i n g h e r , as t h e a u t o m o b i l e d r i v e r , u n d e r § 32-1-2, Code o f A l a b a m a 1975. The t r i a l j u d g e c o n c l u d e d ... t h a t b o t h E v e l y n and R i c h a r d were ' g u e s t s ' i n M a r y ' s c a r , s o , as a m a t t e r o f l a w , u n d e r § 32-1-2, t h e y c o u l d have no r e c o v e r y b a s e d on n e g l i g e n c e " 603 So. 2d at 1002. Reversing the summary judgment with r e s p e c t t o E v e l y n and R i c h a r d ' s n e g l i g e n c e c l a i m , t h e supreme court s t a t e d : "We must d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n h o l d i n g t h a t t h e C a s h e s were ' g u e s t s ' as a m a t t e r of law. The Cashes contend that they were 'passengers,' and t h u s a r e n o t b a r r e d f r o m s u i n g u n d e r t h e A l a b a m a G u e s t S t a t u t e , § 32-1-2. They a r g u e f u r t h e r t h a t i f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had i n t e n d e d to l i m i t l i a b i l i t y i n f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , i t w o u l d have so p r o v i d e d i n t h e G u e s t Statute. " "The s t a t u t e does n o t d e f i n e t h e w o r d ' g u e s t ' ; t h e r e f o r e , we must l o o k t o c a s e l a w . I n Wagnon v. P a t t e r s o n , 260 A l a . 297, 303, 70 So. 2d 244 (1954), t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : "'"The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of a r i d e r confers a o n l y on t h e p e r s o n t o whom t h e g i v e n , and no b e n e f i t s o t h e r t h a n 8 i f the benefit ride i s s u c h as 2091068 are i n c i d e n t a l t o h o s p i t a l i t y , g o o d w i l l o r t h e l i k e , on t h e p e r s o n f u r n i s h i n g t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , the r i d e r i s a guest; but i f h i s c a r r i a g e tends t o promote t h e mutual i n t e r e s t o f b o t h h i m s e l f and [ t h e ] d r i v e r f o r t h e i r common b e n e f i t , t h u s c r e a t i n g a j o i n t b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e m o t o r i s t a n d h i s r i d e r , o r where t h e r i d e r accompanies t h e d r i v e r a t t h e i n s t a n c e o f the l a t t e r f o r the purpose of having t h e r i d e r render a b e n e f i t or s e r v i c e t o the d r i v e r on a t r i p w h i c h i s p r i m a r i l y f o r t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f some o b j e c t i v e o f t h e d r i v e r , the r i d e r i s a p a s s e n g e r and n o t a g u e s t . " ' "Quoting Hasbrook v. Wingate, N.E.2d 87 ( 1 9 4 9 ) . 152 O h i o S t . 50, 87 "The facts i n this case would permit a factfinder t o conclude that t h e Cashes were p r o m o t i n g t h e i r own m u t u a l i n t e r e s t a n d t h a t o f t h e i r s i s t e r and s i s t e r - i n - l a w i n c a r i n g f o r R i c h a r d and M a r y ' s a i l i n g m o t h e r . They e s t a b l i s h t h a t Mary a s k e d h e r b r o t h e r a n d h i s w i f e t o come t o B i r m i n g h a m e a r l i e r than they had planned t o , i n order t o h e l p h e r w i t h t h e c a r e o f t h e a i l i n g m o t h e r . We c a n n o t s a y , as a m a t t e r o f l a w , t h a t t h e C a s h e s were 'guests' w i t h i n t h e meaning o f t h e Guest S t a t u t e u n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . W h e t h e r t h e C a s h e s were g u e s t s o r were p a s s e n g e r s i s a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e jury, and t h a t q u e s t i o n s h o u l d n o t have been d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e t r i a l j u d g e as a m a t t e r o f l a w . Roe v . L e w i s , 416 So. 2d 750 ( A l a . 1 9 8 2 ) ; S e l l e r s v . S e x t o n , 576 So. 2d 172 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) . " 603 So. 2d a t 1003. Although facts the facts i n t h e case now i n Cash v. C a l d w e l l d i f f e r before from t h e u s , t h e o p i n i o n i n Cash v. C a l d w e l l s t a t e s t h a t "'"where t h e r i d e r a c c o m p a n i e s t h e d r i v e r 9 2091068 at the instance rider render of the l a t t e r a benefit or f o r the purpose service to the of h a v i n g the driver on a trip w h i c h i s p r i m a r i l y f o r t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f some o b j e c t i v e o f t h e driver, t h e r i d e r i s a p a s s e n g e r and n o t a g u e s t . " ' " 603 2d a t 1003. N e a l a r g u e s t h a t t h a t l a n g u a g e i n C a s h v. i n d i c a t e s t h a t she was dump t r u c k because, So. Caldwell a passenger r a t h e r than a guest i n the she says, the evidence i n the case now b e f o r e us w o u l d p e r m i t a j u r y t o f i n d t h a t S t r i n g e r a s k e d N e a l to ride with i.e., her keep h e r i n order to render a s e r v i c e company, on a trip that was to Stringer, solely a t t a i n m e n t o f an o b j e c t i v e o f S t r i n g e r and Sem f o r the Ray. S t r i n g e r and Sem Ray a r g u e , h o w e v e r , t h a t , as a m a t t e r o f law, N e a l was a guest because, they say, (1) p u r e l y s o c i a l i n n a t u r e ; (2) N e a l a c c o m p a n i e d instance only of N e a l ' s mother r a t h e r benefit S t r i n g e r was received by the from Neal's (3) t h e riding t h e b e n e f i t o f c o m p a n i o n s h i p , w h i c h was i n c i d e n t a l b e n e f i t and was was S t r i n g e r at the t h a n S t r i n g e r ; and Stringer trip with only an n e i t h e r m a t e r i a l nor t a n g i b l e . We d i s a g r e e w i t h S t r i n g e r and Sem R a y ' s argument t h a t t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e t r i p was p u r e l y s o c i a l b e c a u s e t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e was to d e l i v e r gravel f o r Sem Ray; 10 h o w e v e r , we trip agree t h a t i t 2091068 is undisputed accompany that Stringer's was purely her purpose social in asking because the Neal to undisputed evidence e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t S t r i n g e r asked Neal to r i d e w i t h her t o keep h e r company. W i t h argument t h a t Neal r e s p e c t t o S t r i n g e r and accompanied N e a l ' s mother r a t h e r than which fact-finder could invitation and, a original Stringer at the S t r i n g e r , t h e r e was find that therefore, Ray's instance evidence Stringer that Sem Neal of from issued the rode with S t r i n g e r a t S t r i n g e r ' s i n s t a n c e , a l t h o u g h N e a l ' s mother p l a y e d a r o l e i n persuading Neal to accept the i n v i t a t i o n . with Stringer and Sem Ray's argument the only that the We agree undisputed evidence established that Stringer was whether, as a m a t t e r o f l a w , a r i d e r i s a g u e s t "'"where t h e companionship. b e n e f i t Neal provided to Thus, the issue before us is r i d e r accompanies the d r i v e r at the i n s t a n c e of the l a t t e r f o r the purpose of having the r i d e r render a b e n e f i t or s e r v i c e t o the driver [solely i n the form of companionship] on a trip w h i c h i s p r i m a r i l y f o r t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f some o b j e c t i v e o f t h e d r i v e r . " ' " C a s h v. C a l d w e l l , I n K l e i n v. 429 H a r r i s , 268 ( 1 9 5 8 ) , o u r supreme c o u r t 603 So. 3d a t A l a . 540, stated: 11 545, 1003. 108 So. 2d 425, 2091068 "As s a i d i n B l a i r v. G r e e n e , 247 A l a . 104, 22 So. 2d 834 [ ( 1 9 4 5 ) ] , q u o t i n g f r o m a n o t h e r c a s e , i f t h e t r i p is f o r any b e n e f i t to the driver (defendant), conferred or a n t i c i p a t e d , i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o take the case o u t o f t h e guest s t a t u t e . But i t i s s a i d i n S u l l i v a n v. D a v i s , 263 A l a . 685, 83 So. 2d 434, 437, [(1955)] that a mere i n c i d e n t a l b e n e f i t t o the d r i v e r i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t . The b e n e f i t t h u s c o n f e r r e d must i n some way have i n d u c e d t h e d r i v e r t o e x t e n d t h e o f f e r t o t h e r i d e r . I t must be ' m a t e r i a l a n d tangible a n d must f l o w f r o m t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n provided'." However, t h e p a r t i e s addressing the have n o t c i t e d issue incidental or determining whether i s material located a and a rider r e s e a r c h has n o t l o c a t e d have whether any c a s e s s p e c i f i c a l l y companionship tangible is merely f o r purposes i s a passenger of o r a g u e s t . Our an A l a b a m a c a s e on p o i n t ; h o w e v e r , we decision o f t h e Ohio Supreme Court that p r o v i d e s g u i d a n c e . I n S t i l t n e r v. B a h n e r , 10 O h i o S t . 2d 216, 227 N.E. 2d 192 ( 1 9 6 7 ) , t h e d r i v e r h a d t e l e p h o n e d t h e r i d e r a t a b a r - r e s t a u r a n t and asked t h e r i d e r t o spend t h e n i g h t driver's home because the driver was lonely. at the The rider r e f u s e d t h e d r i v e r ' s r e q u e s t ; however, t h e d r i v e r drove t o t h e b a r - r e s t a u r a n t and, by r e p e a t e d r e q u e s t s , p e r s u a d e d t h e r i d e r to spend t h e n i g h t riding with at the driver's the driver en r o u t e home. W h i l e t h e r i d e r was to the driver's a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d a n d t h e r i d e r was i n j u r e d . 12 home, an The r i d e r then 2091068 sued the driver, stating a claim of n e g l i g e n c e . The trial c o u r t d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f t h e d r i v e r b a s e d on Ohio Guest appealed to Statute, the Ohio judgment of the t r i a l Ohio of which Court was then in effect. of Appeals, which c o u r t . The 3 The the rider r e v e r s e d the d r i v e r then appealed to the Supreme C o u r t . R e v e r s i n g t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e O h i o A p p e a l s , t h e O h i o Supreme C o u r t Court stated: "The f i r s t q u e s t i o n t o be d e t e r m i n e d i s w h e t h e r the e v i d e n c e was s u c h as t o e n a b l e r e a s o n a b l e m i n d s to conclude t h a t [ t h e r i d e r ] , a t the time of the a c c i d e n t i n w h i c h she was i n j u r e d , was r i d i n g i n [the d r i v e r ' s ] a u t o m o b i l e as 'a g u e s t ... w h i l e ... being transported without payment' for her t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h o s e words as A p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 y e a r s a f t e r S t i l t n e r was d e c i d e d , t h e O h i o Supreme C o u r t , i n P r i m e s v. T y l e r , 43 O h i o S t . 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , h e l d t h a t t h e O h i o G u e s t S t a t u t e , O h i o Rev. Code Ann. § 4515.02, was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ; h o w e v e r , when S t i l t n e r was d e c i d e d , t h e O h i o G u e s t S t a t u t e was t h e same as the A l a b a m a G u e s t S t a t u t e i n a l l m a t e r i a l r e s p e c t s , a l t h o u g h i t s l a n g u a g e was n o t i d e n t i c a l t o t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e A l a b a m a G u e s t S t a t u t e . The O h i o G u e s t S t a t u t e p r o v i d e d : 3 "The owner, o p e r a t o r , o r p e r s o n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the o p e r a t i o n o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e s h a l l n o t be l i a b l e f o r l o s s o r damage a r i s i n g f r o m i n j u r i e s t o o r d e a t h of a g u e s t , r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e o p e r a t i o n o f s a i d motor v e h i c l e , w h i l e such guest i s b e i n g t r a n s p o r t e d w i t h o u t payment t h e r e f o r i n o r upon s a i d m o t o r v e h i c l e , u n l e s s s u c h i n j u r i e s o r d e a t h a r e c a u s e d by the w i l l f u l o r w a n t o n m i s c o n d u c t o r s u c h o p e r a t o r , owner, o r p e r s o n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n o f s a i d motor v e h i c l e . " 13 2091068 used i n t h e Ohio R e v i s e d Code. Guest Statute, Section 4515.02, "Payment, w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f S e c t i o n 4515.02, R e v i s e d Code, must be payment o r b e n e f i t a c c e p t e d o r a g r e e d upon b y t h e d r i v e r as c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . However, s u c h payment o r b e n e f i t n e e d n o t be money. I t i s s u f f i c i e n t t h a t t h e g u e s t , by h i s p r e s e n c e i n t h e a u t o m o b i l e , r e n d e r s s e r v i c e or a s s i s t a n c e intended to benefit p r i m a r i l y the d r i v e r , or intends t o render s e r v i c e or assistance at the d e s t i n a t i o n which w i l l p r i m a r i l y b e n e f i t the d r i v e r , o r has b e f o r e t h e t r i p r e n d e r e d such s e r v i c e or assistance, i f the b e n e f i t or s e r v i c e i s material, as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a mere social b e n e f i t , or nominal or i n c i d e n t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o expenses. " I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , no money was a g r e e d upon as consideration. A non-monetary b e n e f i t of a r i d e r ' s company, s o c i e t y o r c o m p a n i o n s h i p i s n o t such a m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n as may constitute payment and remove t h e r i d e r f r o m t h e s t a t u s o f 'a guest ... being transported without payment therefor.' " I f we were t o h o l d t h a t [ t h e r i d e r ] i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e was n o t a g u e s t ' b e i n g transported without payment therefor,' then any time a driver-host, d e s i r i n g to attend a s o c i a l or sporting e v e n t o r e v e n w a t c h T.V. a t home b u t w a n t i n g companionship, s h o u l d persuade a r e l u c t a n t f r i e n d t o j o i n him, t h e f r i e n d , w h i l e b e i n g t r a n s p o r t e d f o r s u c h p u r p o s e , w o u l d be a p a y i n g g u e s t . "A r e l u c t a n t g u e s t may s t i l l be a g u e s t w i t h i n the meaning o f t h e g u e s t s t a t u t e ; and t h e f a c t , t h a t t h e h o s t - d r i v e r i s much more i n t e r e s t e d i n h a v i n g the r i d e r ' s s o c i a l companionship than the r i d e r i s i n g i v i n g t h a t s o c i a l companionship, cannot support a conclusion e i t h e r that the r i d e r i s not a guest or t h a t he i s p a y i n g f o r h i s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . 14 2091068 "The C o u r t o f A p p e a l s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e r e l i e d upon i t s u n r e p o r t e d o p i n i o n i n Hogan v . F i n c h , w h i c h was a f f i r m e d i n 8 O h i o S t . 2d 3 1 , 222 N.E.2d 633 (1966). However, t h e r e , t h e [ d r i v e r ] a g r e e d t o t r a n s p o r t [ t h e r i d e r ] t o h e r home, i f t h e [ r i d e r ] would l o o k a f t e r [ t h e d r i v e r ' s ] younger b r o t h e r a t a swimming c l u b . The [ r i d e r ] t h e r e was n o t g i v i n g o n l y t h e p l e a s u r e o f h e r company, b u t h a d p e r f o r m e d a material service for the d r i v e r i n return for her transportation. "We c o n c l u d e t h a t , where a d r i v e r b y r e p e a t e d r e q u e s t s p e r s u a d e s a f r i e n d t o go i n t h e d r i v e r ' s v e h i c l e t o s p e n d t h e n i g h t a t t h e d r i v e r ' s home b e c a u s e t h e d r i v e r i s l o n e l y , a n d where no o t h e r s e r v i c e i s t o be p e r f o r m e d b y t h e f r i e n d , a n d no b e n e f i t o t h e r t h a n h i s company i s t o be c o n f e r r e d upon t h e d r i v e r , s u c h f r i e n d , as a m a t t e r o f l a w , becomes a g u e s t ' b e i n g t r a n s p o r t e d w i t h o u t payment t h e r e f o r ' w i t h i n t h e meaning o f t h e Ohio Guest Statute." 10 O h i o S t . 2 d a t 218-20, 227 N.E. 2d a t 194-95. We the find only Stiltner benefit persuasive Neal's riding and conclude with S t r i n g e r was c o m p a n i o n s h i p , N e a l , Stringer that, because conferred as a m a t t e r o f l a w , was a g u e s t i n t h e dump t r u c k d r i v e n b y S t r i n g e r . A c c o r d i n g l y , a f f i r m the p a r t i a l Sem Ray w i t h on we summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f S t r i n g e r a n d respect t o Neal's claim of negligence i nthe o p e r a t i o n o f t h e dump t r u c k . AFFIRMED. Thompson, concur. P . J . , and P i t t m a n , 15 Thomas, a n d Moore, J J . ,

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