Supreme Court of Virginia - Justia Case Law Summarieshttps://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/virginia-supreme-court/2024-03-29T01:17:59-08:00Justia Inchttps://www.justia.com/Justia Lawhttps://justatic.com/v/20240328145339/shared/images/social-media/law.pngCopyright 2024 Justia Inchttps://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2024/230115.htmlMcCants v. CD & PB Enterprises, LLC2024-02-15T05:13:21-08:002024-02-15T05:13:21-08:00
In Virginia, Bryant McCants arranged for his 1970 Ford Mustang Mach 1 to be repaired at a shop operated by CD & PB Enterprises, LLC, doing business as Maaco Collision Repair & Auto Painting. The repair shop was managed by Hanson Butler, a part owner and employee of CD & PB Maaco. After the work was completed, McCants inspected the vehicle and was unsatisfied with the work, prompting Butler to agree to repaint it. However, due to various personal circumstances, McCants was unable to pick up the vehicle for several months. In the meantime, Butler initiated the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles' abandoned-vehicle process, which resulted in him acquiring title to the vehicle, which he later sold.
McCants sued Butler for conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The jury found in favor of McCants on the conversion claim only and awarded him $78,500. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that Butler had properly followed the abandoned-vehicle process and had obtained legal title to the vehicle.
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that a rational jury could have found that Butler wrongfully used the DMV's abandoned-vehicle process as a pretext for severing McCants's ownership rights in the vehicle and thereafter claiming it for himself. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the jury’s verdict, and affirmed the trial court’s confirmation order. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2024/230115.html" target="_blank">View "McCants v. CD & PB Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
In Virginia, Bryant McCants arranged for his 1970 Ford Mustang Mach 1 to be repaired at a shop operated by CD & PB Enterprises, LLC, doing business as Maaco Collision Repair & Auto Painting. The repair shop was managed by Hanson Butler, a part owner and employee of CD & PB Maaco. After the work was completed, McCants inspected the vehicle and was unsatisfied with the work, prompting Butler to agree to repaint it. However, due to various personal circumstances, McCants was unable to pick up the vehicle for several months. In the meantime, Butler initiated the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles' abandoned-vehicle process, which resulted in him acquiring title to the vehicle, which he later sold.
McCants sued Butler for conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The jury found in favor of McCants on the conversion claim only and awarded him $78,500. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that Butler had properly followed the abandoned-vehicle process and had obtained legal title to the vehicle.
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that a rational jury could have found that Butler wrongfully used the DMV's abandoned-vehicle process as a pretext for severing McCants's ownership rights in the vehicle and thereafter claiming it for himself. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the jury’s verdict, and affirmed the trial court’s confirmation order.
2024-02-15stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKELSEYhttps://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2024/220445.htmlSample v. Commonwealth2024-02-08T05:11:53-08:002024-02-08T05:11:53-08:00
The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case of Dwayne Lamont Sample, Jr., who was convicted of attempted robbery. Sample challenged his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an out-of-court identification from a victim based on a single photo showup, which he deemed impermissibly suggestive and thus unreliable. Sample also contested the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of the lower courts, agreeing that the single photo showup, while generally viewed with suspicion, was not impermissibly suggestive in this case. The court found that the police officer's comment before showing the photo did not make the identification virtually inevitable, and was more of an expression of suspicion than a definite assertion. In evaluating the case, the court applied the five factors from Neil v. Biggers to assess the likelihood of misidentification, and found that all five factors weighed in favor of the victim’s identification reliability.
Sample also argued that the DNA evidence and the victim's identification were insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court disagreed, noting that the trial court had considered and rejected Sample's theory of secondary DNA transfer due to a lack of supporting evidence. The court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found Sample guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the DNA evidence, eyewitness identifications, and Sample's proximity to the scene of the crime. The court affirmed Sample's conviction for attempted robbery. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2024/220445.html" target="_blank">View "Sample v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case of Dwayne Lamont Sample, Jr., who was convicted of attempted robbery. Sample challenged his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an out-of-court identification from a victim based on a single photo showup, which he deemed impermissibly suggestive and thus unreliable. Sample also contested the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of the lower courts, agreeing that the single photo showup, while generally viewed with suspicion, was not impermissibly suggestive in this case. The court found that the police officer's comment before showing the photo did not make the identification virtually inevitable, and was more of an expression of suspicion than a definite assertion. In evaluating the case, the court applied the five factors from Neil v. Biggers to assess the likelihood of misidentification, and found that all five factors weighed in favor of the victim’s identification reliability.
Sample also argued that the DNA evidence and the victim's identification were insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court disagreed, noting that the trial court had considered and rejected Sample's theory of secondary DNA transfer due to a lack of supporting evidence. The court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found Sample guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the DNA evidence, eyewitness identifications, and Sample's proximity to the scene of the crime. The court affirmed Sample's conviction for attempted robbery.
2024-02-08stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMANNhttps://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/230127.htmlCommonwealth v. Delaune2023-12-14T05:10:58-08:002023-12-14T05:10:58-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to interpret Code § 19.2-306.1, a statute enacted in 2021 that addresses the range of punishment a court may impose upon the revocation of a suspended sentence. The defendant, Emily Katherine Delaune, was convicted of three drug offenses in 2019 and was sentenced to six years of incarceration, with four years suspended. After her release, she violated the terms of her probation by using drugs and absconding from supervision. The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach revoked Delaune's suspended sentence based on these violations and ordered her to serve 60 days of active incarceration.
Delaune appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that under Code § 19.2-306.1, the circuit court was prohibited from imposing more than 14 days of active incarceration based on her technical violations. The Attorney General asserted that Code § 19.2-306.1 did not retroactively apply to Delaune’s probation violations.
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the parties had implicitly agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 during the probation revocation hearing, and that the Attorney General was bound by this agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia also agreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Code § 19.2-306.1, stating that the circuit court could not impose a term of active incarceration based on Delaune’s drug use, which constituted a first technical violation under the statute, and could impose a maximum of 14 days of active incarceration for Delaune’s absconding violation, which was automatically classified as a second technical violation under the statute. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the circuit court erred when it ordered Delaune to serve 60 days of active incarceration. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/230127.html" target="_blank">View "Commonwealth v. Delaune" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to interpret Code § 19.2-306.1, a statute enacted in 2021 that addresses the range of punishment a court may impose upon the revocation of a suspended sentence. The defendant, Emily Katherine Delaune, was convicted of three drug offenses in 2019 and was sentenced to six years of incarceration, with four years suspended. After her release, she violated the terms of her probation by using drugs and absconding from supervision. The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach revoked Delaune's suspended sentence based on these violations and ordered her to serve 60 days of active incarceration.
Delaune appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that under Code § 19.2-306.1, the circuit court was prohibited from imposing more than 14 days of active incarceration based on her technical violations. The Attorney General asserted that Code § 19.2-306.1 did not retroactively apply to Delaune’s probation violations.
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the parties had implicitly agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 during the probation revocation hearing, and that the Attorney General was bound by this agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia also agreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Code § 19.2-306.1, stating that the circuit court could not impose a term of active incarceration based on Delaune’s drug use, which constituted a first technical violation under the statute, and could impose a maximum of 14 days of active incarceration for Delaune’s absconding violation, which was automatically classified as a second technical violation under the statute. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the circuit court erred when it ordered Delaune to serve 60 days of active incarceration.
2023-12-14stateVirginiaSupreme Court of Virginiahttps://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211114.htmlSchmuhl v. Clarke2023-12-14T05:10:58-08:002023-12-14T05:10:58-08:00
In this case, Andrew Schmuhl ("Schmuhl") appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At his trial, Schmuhl had claimed he was involuntarily intoxicated due to prescription medications at the time of committing a home invasion, which resulted in several criminal charges. His trial counsel argued that Schmuhl's involuntary intoxication was a separate defense from an insanity defense, which they chose not to raise. However, the trial court ruled that without an insanity defense, Schmuhl could not present expert testimony about his mental state, effectively barring his involuntary intoxication defense. Schmuhl was found guilty on all counts. Schmuhl later filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective due to misunderstanding the law regarding the admissibility of mental state evidence without an insanity defense. The habeas court ruled that trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that Schmuhl was not prejudiced by their performance. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the habeas court's decision, finding that Schmuhl's trial counsel's performance was objectively reasonable given the unclear state of the law at the time. The court noted that had trial counsel’s arguments been successful, they would have carried significant strategic benefits for Schmuhl, and that trial counsel's unsuccessful attempt to extend existing law for their client's benefit was not deficient. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211114.html" target="_blank">View "Schmuhl v. Clarke" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, Andrew Schmuhl ("Schmuhl") appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At his trial, Schmuhl had claimed he was involuntarily intoxicated due to prescription medications at the time of committing a home invasion, which resulted in several criminal charges. His trial counsel argued that Schmuhl's involuntary intoxication was a separate defense from an insanity defense, which they chose not to raise. However, the trial court ruled that without an insanity defense, Schmuhl could not present expert testimony about his mental state, effectively barring his involuntary intoxication defense. Schmuhl was found guilty on all counts. Schmuhl later filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective due to misunderstanding the law regarding the admissibility of mental state evidence without an insanity defense. The habeas court ruled that trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that Schmuhl was not prejudiced by their performance. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the habeas court's decision, finding that Schmuhl's trial counsel's performance was objectively reasonable given the unclear state of the law at the time. The court noted that had trial counsel’s arguments been successful, they would have carried significant strategic benefits for Schmuhl, and that trial counsel's unsuccessful attempt to extend existing law for their client's benefit was not deficient.
2023-12-14stateVirginiaSupreme Court of Virginiahttps://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211061.htmlVlaming v. West Point School Board2023-12-14T05:10:57-08:002023-12-14T05:10:57-08:00
In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in favor of Peter Vlaming, a high school French teacher who was terminated by the West Point School Board for refusing to use a transgender student's preferred pronouns. Vlaming had chosen to use the student's preferred name but avoided using any third-person pronouns to refer to the student as it conflicted with his religious beliefs. The School Board fired Vlaming for not complying with its policy to use government-mandated pronouns.
Vlaming sued the School Board, alleging that his termination violated his constitutional, statutory, and contractual rights. The Circuit Court dismissed Vlaming's claims, holding that they failed to state legally viable causes of action. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Court concluded that Vlaming alleged a legally viable claim under Article I, Section 16 of the Virginia Constitution, involving the free exercise of religion. It also found that he had sufficiently set forth a statutory free exercise claim under the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
In addition, the Court found that the lower court had erroneously dismissed Vlaming's free speech claims under Article I, Section 12 of the Virginia Constitution, since the claims involved an allegation of compelled speech on an ideological topic. The Court also revived his claim under Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution, which offers a version of procedural due process rights. Finally, it ruled that the lower court had erred in dismissing his claim that the school board had breached his employment contract, since the claims supporting the breach-of-contract claim were legally viable. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211061.html" target="_blank">View "Vlaming v. West Point School Board" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in favor of Peter Vlaming, a high school French teacher who was terminated by the West Point School Board for refusing to use a transgender student's preferred pronouns. Vlaming had chosen to use the student's preferred name but avoided using any third-person pronouns to refer to the student as it conflicted with his religious beliefs. The School Board fired Vlaming for not complying with its policy to use government-mandated pronouns.
Vlaming sued the School Board, alleging that his termination violated his constitutional, statutory, and contractual rights. The Circuit Court dismissed Vlaming's claims, holding that they failed to state legally viable causes of action. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Court concluded that Vlaming alleged a legally viable claim under Article I, Section 16 of the Virginia Constitution, involving the free exercise of religion. It also found that he had sufficiently set forth a statutory free exercise claim under the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
In addition, the Court found that the lower court had erroneously dismissed Vlaming's free speech claims under Article I, Section 12 of the Virginia Constitution, since the claims involved an allegation of compelled speech on an ideological topic. The Court also revived his claim under Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution, which offers a version of procedural due process rights. Finally, it ruled that the lower court had erred in dismissing his claim that the school board had breached his employment contract, since the claims supporting the breach-of-contract claim were legally viable.
2023-12-14stateVirginiaSupreme Court of Virginiahttps://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/230400.htmlVerizon Virginia LLC v. SCC2023-11-30T05:10:05-08:002023-11-30T05:10:05-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State Corporation Commission dismissing Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821.
Verizon, a telecommunications company, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the Commission requesting a declaration that either Capital Beltway Express LLC (CBE) or The Lane Construction Corporation was responsible for costs pursuant to section 33.2-1815(B) to relocate some of Verizon's utility facilities, as required by the Virginia Department of Transportation in the underlying project to extend portions of the I-495 express lanes. The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Verizon appealed, arguing that sections 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821 granted the Commission jurisdiction to resolve which party was responsible for the costs of the utility relocations necessitated by the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/230400.html" target="_blank">View "Verizon Virginia LLC v. SCC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State Corporation Commission dismissing Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821.
Verizon, a telecommunications company, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the Commission requesting a declaration that either Capital Beltway Express LLC (CBE) or The Lane Construction Corporation was responsible for costs pursuant to section 33.2-1815(B) to relocate some of Verizon's utility facilities, as required by the Virginia Department of Transportation in the underlying project to extend portions of the I-495 express lanes. The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Verizon appealed, arguing that sections 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821 granted the Commission jurisdiction to resolve which party was responsible for the costs of the utility relocations necessitated by the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the State Corporation Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition.
2023-11-30stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCharles S. Russell230400https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220596.htmlCommonwealth v. Puckett2023-11-22T05:27:47-08:002023-11-22T05:27:47-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's sentence for malicious wounding, holding that the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's restitution order as violative of Va. Code 19.2-305.1.
Defendant was convicted of the malicious wounding of Justin Hawks. As a condition of Defendant's probation and suspended sentence the trial court ordered Defendant to reimburse the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services (DMAS) for Hawks's medical expenses. The court of appeals reversed the restitution award to DMAS and remanded the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 19.2-305.1 authorized the trial court to order restitution as a condition of Defendant's probation and sentence and to order payment of that restitution to DMAS for the portion of the medical expenses incurred by Hawks that DMAS had paid. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220596.html" target="_blank">View "Commonwealth v. Puckett" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's sentence for malicious wounding, holding that the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's restitution order as violative of Va. Code 19.2-305.1.
Defendant was convicted of the malicious wounding of Justin Hawks. As a condition of Defendant's probation and suspended sentence the trial court ordered Defendant to reimburse the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services (DMAS) for Hawks's medical expenses. The court of appeals reversed the restitution award to DMAS and remanded the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 19.2-305.1 authorized the trial court to order restitution as a condition of Defendant's probation and sentence and to order payment of that restitution to DMAS for the portion of the medical expenses incurred by Hawks that DMAS had paid.
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for malicious wounding, holding that the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's restitution order as violative of Va. Code 19.2-305.1.
2023-11-22stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey220596https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220715.htmlCommonwealth v. McBride2023-10-19T04:41:50-08:002023-10-19T04:41:50-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction, after a jury trial, of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense, and possession of heroin and Furanylfentanyl with the intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense, holding that Rule 3A:15 does not preclude a trial court from timely reconsidering a motion to strike.
At issue in this appeal was whether Rule 3A:15 or the Double Jeopardy Clause restricts a trial court's authority to reconsider a motion to strike that the trial court granted in error. The court of appeals concluded that, once a court grants a motion to strike, the court is foreclosed from reconsidering its decision under Rule 3A:15, which requires the court to enter an order of acquittal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Rule 3A:15 does not prevent a court from reconsidering its ruling on a motion to strike; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause restricts a court's authority to reconsider a motion to strike, but those limitations were not implicated in this case. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220715.html" target="_blank">View "Commonwealth v. McBride" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction, after a jury trial, of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense, and possession of heroin and Furanylfentanyl with the intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense, holding that Rule 3A:15 does not preclude a trial court from timely reconsidering a motion to strike.
At issue in this appeal was whether Rule 3A:15 or the Double Jeopardy Clause restricts a trial court's authority to reconsider a motion to strike that the trial court granted in error. The court of appeals concluded that, once a court grants a motion to strike, the court is foreclosed from reconsidering its decision under Rule 3A:15, which requires the court to enter an order of acquittal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Rule 3A:15 does not prevent a court from reconsidering its ruling on a motion to strike; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause restricts a court's authority to reconsider a motion to strike, but those limitations were not implicated in this case.
The Supreme Court held thatt Rule 3A:15 does not preclude a trial court from timely reconsidering a motion to strike.
2023-10-19stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough220715https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220536.htmlMoison v. Commonwealth2023-10-19T04:41:50-08:002023-10-19T04:41:50-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions of three counts of aggravated sexual battery by a parent under Va. Code 18.2-67.3 and four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child under Va. Code 18.2-370.1 but vacated the portion of the court of appeals' opinion deciding that Laurie Lee's proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi, holding that the court erred in part.
In affirming Defendant's convictions the court of appeals defined alibi as a defense based on the physical impossibility of committing a crime and held that Lee's proffered testimony served as an alibi because it placed Defendant outside of the room where the offenses occurred. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the opinion deciding that the proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi but affirmed the otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling on the merits of this case because Defendant waived his challenge that the proffered testimony was offered for impeachment. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220536.html" target="_blank">View "Moison v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions of three counts of aggravated sexual battery by a parent under Va. Code 18.2-67.3 and four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child under Va. Code 18.2-370.1 but vacated the portion of the court of appeals' opinion deciding that Laurie Lee's proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi, holding that the court erred in part.
In affirming Defendant's convictions the court of appeals defined alibi as a defense based on the physical impossibility of committing a crime and held that Lee's proffered testimony served as an alibi because it placed Defendant outside of the room where the offenses occurred. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the opinion deciding that the proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi but affirmed the otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling on the merits of this case because Defendant waived his challenge that the proffered testimony was offered for impeachment.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment affirming Defendant's convictions but vacated the portion of the court of appeals' opinion deciding that Laurie Lee's proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi, holding that the court erred in part.
2023-10-19stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaPer Curiam220536https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/210389.htmlMcKeithen v. City of Richmond2023-10-19T04:41:49-08:002023-10-19T04:41:49-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in this real property dispute, holding that the escheat provision of Va. Code 58.1-3967, as applied to the factual circumstances of this case, violated Va. Const. art. I, 11.
The City of Richmond obtained a judicial sale of a parcel of property that was subject to a statutory lien for delinquent taxes. The circuit court confirmed the sale and directed that the City's lien for delinquent taxes, along with its costs and legal fees, be fully paid by the purchase proceeds. Although the sale proceeds satisfied the tax lien, the circuit court concluded that section 58.1-3967 required it to award a portion of the surplus sale proceeds to the City instead of an unsatisfied junior lienor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to this particular case, section 58.1-3967 unconstitutionally authorized the City to take the proceeds and keep them for itself. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/210389.html" target="_blank">View "McKeithen v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in this real property dispute, holding that the escheat provision of Va. Code 58.1-3967, as applied to the factual circumstances of this case, violated Va. Const. art. I, 11.
The City of Richmond obtained a judicial sale of a parcel of property that was subject to a statutory lien for delinquent taxes. The circuit court confirmed the sale and directed that the City's lien for delinquent taxes, along with its costs and legal fees, be fully paid by the purchase proceeds. Although the sale proceeds satisfied the tax lien, the circuit court concluded that section 58.1-3967 required it to award a portion of the surplus sale proceeds to the City instead of an unsatisfied junior lienor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to this particular case, section 58.1-3967 unconstitutionally authorized the City to take the proceeds and keep them for itself.
The Supreme Court held that the escheat provision of Va. Code 58.1-3967, as applied to the factual circumstances of this case, violated Va. Const. art. I, 11.
2023-10-19stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey210389https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/230172.htmlAnderson v. Clarke2023-10-12T05:08:59-08:002023-10-12T05:08:59-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) failed timely to release him from prison because it under-calculated his earned sentence credits (ESCs), holding that the circuit court did not err.
In his habeas corpus petition, Appellant argued that he was entitled to enhanced ESCs under the General Assembly's 2020 amendments to Va. Code 53-1-202.3 as set forth in House Bill 5148 (HB 5148). The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that Appellant was not entitled to immediate release because he was precluded from earning enhanced ESCs for time served prior to July 1, 2022. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not eligible to receive enhanced ESCs under HB 5148. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/230172.html" target="_blank">View "Anderson v. Clarke" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) failed timely to release him from prison because it under-calculated his earned sentence credits (ESCs), holding that the circuit court did not err.
In his habeas corpus petition, Appellant argued that he was entitled to enhanced ESCs under the General Assembly's 2020 amendments to Va. Code 53-1-202.3 as set forth in House Bill 5148 (HB 5148). The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that Appellant was not entitled to immediate release because he was precluded from earning enhanced ESCs for time served prior to July 1, 2022. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not eligible to receive enhanced ESCs under HB 5148.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err.
2023-10-12stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCharles S. Russell230172https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211071.htmlMonroe v. Monroe2023-07-20T04:10:02-08:002023-07-20T04:10:02-08:00
The Supreme Court vacated the sanctions order entered by the trial court against Joseph Monroe for pursuing a shareholder-derivative suit against his wife, Lisa Monroe, the majority shareholder of a closely held corporation, holding that the sections order violated Rule 1:1.
Lisa and Joseph were the married co-owners of MEPCO Materials, Inc. One week after Joseph, as the then-sole director, filed for divorce he caused MEPCO to filed a civil action against Lisa for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. After Joseph resigned his position at MEPCO he sought to convert the action to a shareholder-derivative action. The granted the motions, converted the suit to a derivative action, and then dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Thereafter, the trial court granted Lisa's motion for sanctions and ordered Joseph to pay $70,097 to MEPCO and Lisa. The Supreme Court vacated the order granting sanctions, holding (1) Joseph had standing to appeal the sanctions award; but (2) the sanctions order violated Rule 1:1 because it was not timely entered. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211071.html" target="_blank">View "Monroe v. Monroe" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court vacated the sanctions order entered by the trial court against Joseph Monroe for pursuing a shareholder-derivative suit against his wife, Lisa Monroe, the majority shareholder of a closely held corporation, holding that the sections order violated Rule 1:1.
Lisa and Joseph were the married co-owners of MEPCO Materials, Inc. One week after Joseph, as the then-sole director, filed for divorce he caused MEPCO to filed a civil action against Lisa for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. After Joseph resigned his position at MEPCO he sought to convert the action to a shareholder-derivative action. The granted the motions, converted the suit to a derivative action, and then dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Thereafter, the trial court granted Lisa's motion for sanctions and ordered Joseph to pay $70,097 to MEPCO and Lisa. The Supreme Court vacated the order granting sanctions, holding (1) Joseph had standing to appeal the sanctions award; but (2) the sanctions order violated Rule 1:1 because it was not timely entered.
The Supreme Court vacated the sanctions order against Joseph Monroe for pursuing a shareholder-derivative suit against his wife, holding that the sections order violated Rule 1:1.
2023-07-20stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey211071https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220665.htmlPrease v. Clarke2023-07-06T04:08:59-08:002023-07-06T04:08:59-08:00
The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus and issued the writ directed to the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections ordering that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner was entitled to relief on his claim that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted murder that, if awarded, would result in his immediate release from incarceration.
In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner argued that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted aggravated murder. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the Virginia Department of Corrections misinterpreted Va. Code 53.1-202.3(A) and, as a result, miscalculated his release date. The Supreme Court agreed, granted Petitioner's petition, and ordered that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner established that he was entitled to relief. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220665.html" target="_blank">View "Prease v. Clarke" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus and issued the writ directed to the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections ordering that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner was entitled to relief on his claim that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted murder that, if awarded, would result in his immediate release from incarceration.
In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner argued that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted aggravated murder. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the Virginia Department of Corrections misinterpreted Va. Code 53.1-202.3(A) and, as a result, miscalculated his release date. The Supreme Court agreed, granted Petitioner's petition, and ordered that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner established that he was entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus and issued a writ ordering that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits.
2023-07-06stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell220665https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220223.htmlTomlin v. Commonwealth2023-06-29T04:40:04-08:002023-06-29T04:40:04-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult causing serious injury, holding that the trial court, sitting as fact-finder, rationally determined that Defendant's abuse and neglect of her mother caused the mother to suffer a "serious bodily injury" under Va. Code 18.2-369(B).
Defendant's mother required emergency medical care and hospitalization after lying in a squalid condition on the floor of her apartment for at least two days. The Commonwealth charged Defendant under section 18.2-369(B) and, after a trial, the court found Defendant guilty of the abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult causing serious injury. On appeal, Defendant argued that no rational fact-finder could conclude that her mother's bedsores constituted "serious bodily injury" under section 18.2-369(B)-(C). The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's mother suffered a "serious bodily injury" under section 18.2-369(C). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220223.html" target="_blank">View "Tomlin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult causing serious injury, holding that the trial court, sitting as fact-finder, rationally determined that Defendant's abuse and neglect of her mother caused the mother to suffer a "serious bodily injury" under Va. Code 18.2-369(B).
Defendant's mother required emergency medical care and hospitalization after lying in a squalid condition on the floor of her apartment for at least two days. The Commonwealth charged Defendant under section 18.2-369(B) and, after a trial, the court found Defendant guilty of the abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult causing serious injury. On appeal, Defendant argued that no rational fact-finder could conclude that her mother's bedsores constituted "serious bodily injury" under section 18.2-369(B)-(C). The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's mother suffered a "serious bodily injury" under section 18.2-369(C).
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision affirming Defendant's conviction of abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult causing serious injury, holding that a rational trier of fact could have found that Defendant caused her mother to suffer a "serious bodily injury" under Va. Code 18.2-369(B).
2023-06-29stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey220223https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220378.htmlWalker v. Commonwealth2023-06-01T04:10:24-08:002023-06-01T04:10:24-08:00
In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require a court to pre-screen eyewitness identification testimony before the eyewitness can be permitted to make an identification of the defendant for the first time in open court.
Defendant was indicted on four counts of robbery and four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony for robbing a bank. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due process did not compel the circuit court to pre-screen the identification at issue when that identification was made for the first time in court; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendant's identification was more probative than prejudicial; and (3) Defendant was properly convicted of a second or subsequent offense of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220378.html" target="_blank">View "Walker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require a court to pre-screen eyewitness identification testimony before the eyewitness can be permitted to make an identification of the defendant for the first time in open court.
Defendant was indicted on four counts of robbery and four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony for robbing a bank. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due process did not compel the circuit court to pre-screen the identification at issue when that identification was made for the first time in court; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendant's identification was more probative than prejudicial; and (3) Defendant was properly convicted of a second or subsequent offense of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.
In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require a court to pre-screen eyewitness identification testimony before the eyewitness can be permitted to make an identification of the defendant for the first time in open court.
2023-06-01stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough220378https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/210779.htmlGloss v. Wheeler2023-05-18T04:39:50-08:002023-05-18T04:39:50-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that Defendants, five members of the Prince William County Board of Supervisors, knowingly and willfully violated the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), holding that the circuit court erred by granting Defendants' motion to strike.
Plaintiffs, residents of Prince William County, filed a petition for mandamus and injunctive alleging that Defendants violated VFOIA by attending a meeting as defined by VFOIA without complying with statutory requirements. At the conclusion of Plaintiffs' evidence the circuit court granted Defendants' motion to strike on the grounds that the gathering did not constitute a meeting under VFOIA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to strike. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/210779.html" target="_blank">View "Gloss v. Wheeler" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that Defendants, five members of the Prince William County Board of Supervisors, knowingly and willfully violated the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), holding that the circuit court erred by granting Defendants' motion to strike.
Plaintiffs, residents of Prince William County, filed a petition for mandamus and injunctive alleging that Defendants violated VFOIA by attending a meeting as defined by VFOIA without complying with statutory requirements. At the conclusion of Plaintiffs' evidence the circuit court granted Defendants' motion to strike on the grounds that the gathering did not constitute a meeting under VFOIA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to strike.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment ruling that Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, holding that the circuit court erred by granting Defendants' motion to strike.
2023-05-18stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCharles S. Russell210779https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220072.htmlOreze Healthcare v. Eastern Shore Community Services Bd.2023-05-04T04:41:49-08:002023-05-04T04:41:49-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court entering summary judgment favor of Eastern Shore Community Services Board (ESCSB) and holding that Oreze Healthcare LLC's conveyance of real property to a third party prohibited Oreze from pursuing its breach of contract claim against ESCSB, holding that ESCSB was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
ESCSB and Oreze entered into a commercial lease agreement under which ESCSB agreed to lease the four buildings comprising an assisted living facility whose license had been suspended and to provide interim care to its residents until a permanent solution was reached. When water damaged the buildings and no remedy was reached before ESCSB terminated the lease Oreze brought this complaint for breach of contract. While the lawsuit was pending, Oreze conveyed the property to a third party by general warranty deed. The circuit court granted summary judgment for ESCSB, ruling that Oreze failed to reserve its claims in the deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deed did not extinguish or transfer Oreze's right to sue ESCSB for property damage arising from an alleged breach of the lease. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220072.html" target="_blank">View "Oreze Healthcare v. Eastern Shore Community Services Bd." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court entering summary judgment favor of Eastern Shore Community Services Board (ESCSB) and holding that Oreze Healthcare LLC's conveyance of real property to a third party prohibited Oreze from pursuing its breach of contract claim against ESCSB, holding that ESCSB was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
ESCSB and Oreze entered into a commercial lease agreement under which ESCSB agreed to lease the four buildings comprising an assisted living facility whose license had been suspended and to provide interim care to its residents until a permanent solution was reached. When water damaged the buildings and no remedy was reached before ESCSB terminated the lease Oreze brought this complaint for breach of contract. While the lawsuit was pending, Oreze conveyed the property to a third party by general warranty deed. The circuit court granted summary judgment for ESCSB, ruling that Oreze failed to reserve its claims in the deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deed did not extinguish or transfer Oreze's right to sue ESCSB for property damage arising from an alleged breach of the lease.
The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment holding that Plaintiff's conveyance of real property to a third party prohibited Plaintiff from pursuing its breach of contract claim against Defendant, holding that Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
2023-05-04stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaChafin220072https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220116.htmlSuffolk City School Bd. v. Wahlstrom2023-04-27T04:09:34-08:002023-04-27T04:09:34-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), Va. Code 2.2-3700 et seq., requires that public bodies permit members of the public to be physically present in the room where an open meeting occurs, holding that the trial court did not err.
Plaintiff brought this action against the Board, a Board member, and superintendent of schools alleging that Defendants violated VFOIA's open meeting provisions by excluding her from a meeting room where a Board open meeting took place. The trial court granted judgment for Plaintiff and awarded her attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that the Board violated VFOIA by denying Plaintiff entry into the meeting room; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her remaining allegations of error. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220116.html" target="_blank">View "Suffolk City School Bd. v. Wahlstrom" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), Va. Code 2.2-3700 et seq., requires that public bodies permit members of the public to be physically present in the room where an open meeting occurs, holding that the trial court did not err.
Plaintiff brought this action against the Board, a Board member, and superintendent of schools alleging that Defendants violated VFOIA's open meeting provisions by excluding her from a meeting room where a Board open meeting took place. The trial court granted judgment for Plaintiff and awarded her attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that the Board violated VFOIA by denying Plaintiff entry into the meeting room; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her remaining allegations of error.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the Virginia Freedom of Information Act requires that public bodies permit members of the public to be physically present in the room where an open meeting occurs, holding that there was no error.
2023-04-27stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCharles S. Russell220116https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220034.htmlWilliams v. Commonwealth2023-04-20T04:38:22-08:002023-04-20T04:38:22-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for an expungement under Va. Code 19.2-392.2, holding that, in light of this Court's clarification of the standard that applies to the review of expungement petitions when the claim is that the original charge was "otherwise dismissed," remand was appropriate.
Appellant was arrested on the charge of accessory after the fact of homicide and pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice, an amended charge. Appellant later filed a petition for expungement, arguing that the accessory after the fact of homicide charge qualified for expungement because it was "otherwise dismissed." The circuit court denied the petition on the grounds that the original charge that was later amended was not "completely separate and unrelated." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the circuit court did not rely on a Blockburger comparison of the elements to deny the expungement petition, remand was necessary. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220034.html" target="_blank">View "Williams v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for an expungement under Va. Code 19.2-392.2, holding that, in light of this Court's clarification of the standard that applies to the review of expungement petitions when the claim is that the original charge was "otherwise dismissed," remand was appropriate.
Appellant was arrested on the charge of accessory after the fact of homicide and pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice, an amended charge. Appellant later filed a petition for expungement, arguing that the accessory after the fact of homicide charge qualified for expungement because it was "otherwise dismissed." The circuit court denied the petition on the grounds that the original charge that was later amended was not "completely separate and unrelated." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the circuit court did not rely on a Blockburger comparison of the elements to deny the expungement petition, remand was necessary.
The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Appellant's petition for an expungement, holding that remand was necessary.
2023-04-20stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaPer Curiam220034https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220058.htmlRanger v. Hyundai Motor America2023-04-06T05:09:30-08:002023-04-06T05:09:30-08:00
Ranger purchased a new Hyundai vehicle in 2018. Ranger experienced some problems with the vehicle, and it had to be repeatedly repaired. His lawyer wrote a demand letter to Hyundai, seeking a refund of the purchase price “along with all interest paid on the finance note as well as attorney fees and incidental and consequential damages.” Hyundai offered to repurchase the vehicle “pursuant to the applicable statutes” and offered to pay some of the attorney’s fees. Ranger refused the offer on the basis that Hyundai failed to sufficiently reimburse him for his pre-litigation attorney’s fees.
Ranger then sued under the Lemon Law, Code 59.1-207.10. The circuit court dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. To satisfy the refund requirements under Virginia’s Lemon Law, a manufacturer is not required to pay pre-litigation attorney’s fees. The manufacturer’s refund satisfied the requirements of the Lemon Law. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220058.html" target="_blank">View "Ranger v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law</a>
Ranger purchased a new Hyundai vehicle in 2018. Ranger experienced some problems with the vehicle, and it had to be repeatedly repaired. His lawyer wrote a demand letter to Hyundai, seeking a refund of the purchase price “along with all interest paid on the finance note as well as attorney fees and incidental and consequential damages.” Hyundai offered to repurchase the vehicle “pursuant to the applicable statutes” and offered to pay some of the attorney’s fees. Ranger refused the offer on the basis that Hyundai failed to sufficiently reimburse him for his pre-litigation attorney’s fees.
Ranger then sued under the Lemon Law, Code 59.1-207.10. The circuit court dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. To satisfy the refund requirements under Virginia’s Lemon Law, a manufacturer is not required to pay pre-litigation attorney’s fees. The manufacturer’s refund satisfied the requirements of the Lemon Law.
A manufacturer's repurchase of a vehicle satisfied the Virginia Lemon Law; the manufacturer was not required to pay the purchaser's pre-litigation attorneys' fees.
2023-04-06stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough220058https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220039.htmlYourko v. Yourko2023-03-30T04:41:51-08:002023-03-30T04:41:51-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the ruling of the circuit court that it lacked the authority to amend the Military Pension Division Order (MPDO) it issued earlier memorializing the parties' negotiated agreement regarding the division of Defendant's military retirement pay, holding that the court of appeals erred.
After the final decree was entered in this case, Husband moved to amend the final decree, the equitable distribution order, and the MPDO. The circuit court dismissed the motion on the ground that the court had no authority to amend the MPDO because more than twenty-one days had passed since the order was entered. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that federal law preempted Virginia law on questions involving the divisibility of military retirement benefits. The Supreme Court adopted the holding of the court of appeals in Owen v. Owen, 14 Va. App. 623 (1992), with regard to the division of military retirement benefits and reversed, holding that federal law did not bar the parties' in this case from upholding the MPDO. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220039.html" target="_blank">View "Yourko v. Yourko" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the ruling of the circuit court that it lacked the authority to amend the Military Pension Division Order (MPDO) it issued earlier memorializing the parties' negotiated agreement regarding the division of Defendant's military retirement pay, holding that the court of appeals erred.
After the final decree was entered in this case, Husband moved to amend the final decree, the equitable distribution order, and the MPDO. The circuit court dismissed the motion on the ground that the court had no authority to amend the MPDO because more than twenty-one days had passed since the order was entered. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that federal law preempted Virginia law on questions involving the divisibility of military retirement benefits. The Supreme Court adopted the holding of the court of appeals in Owen v. Owen, 14 Va. App. 623 (1992), with regard to the division of military retirement benefits and reversed, holding that federal law did not bar the parties' in this case from upholding the MPDO.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the ruling of the circuit court that it lacked the authority to amend an order it previously issued memorializing the parties' negotiated agreement regarding the division of Defendant's military retirement pay, holding that the court of appeals erred.
2023-03-30stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell220039https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211143.htmlBerry v. Bd. of Supervisors2023-03-23T04:08:20-08:002023-03-23T04:08:20-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Residents' claims against the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Residents' complaint.
Residents brought this action seeking declaratory relief and to enjoin the Board from adopting an updated zoning ordinance via electronic meeting. In the alternatively, if the Board adopted the ordinance via an electronic meeting, Residents sought a declaration that any action by the Board or approval concerning the ordinance was void ab initio. The circuit court denied relief, finding, among other things, that Residents' claims were moot and that the Board had the authority to adopt the ordinance in an electronic meeting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that the Board's adoption of the ordinance mooted Residents' declaratory judgment claim; (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Residents' complaint as premature; and (3) the Board adopted the ordinance in a manner that violated the open meeting provisions of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, Va. Code 2.2-3700 et seq. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211143.html" target="_blank">View "Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Residents' claims against the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Residents' complaint.
Residents brought this action seeking declaratory relief and to enjoin the Board from adopting an updated zoning ordinance via electronic meeting. In the alternatively, if the Board adopted the ordinance via an electronic meeting, Residents sought a declaration that any action by the Board or approval concerning the ordinance was void ab initio. The circuit court denied relief, finding, among other things, that Residents' claims were moot and that the Board had the authority to adopt the ordinance in an electronic meeting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that the Board's adoption of the ordinance mooted Residents' declaratory judgment claim; (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Residents' complaint as premature; and (3) the Board adopted the ordinance in a manner that violated the open meeting provisions of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, Va. Code 2.2-3700 et seq.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment dismissing Residents' claims against the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, holding that the circuit court erred.
2023-03-23stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCharles S. Russell211143https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211126.htmlCommonwealth v. Barney2023-03-16T04:12:00-08:002023-03-16T04:12:00-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals vacating a jury verdict convicting Defendant of using a firearm during the commission of a robbery, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court abused its discretion as to a jury instruction and in holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.
Defendant handed a note to a cashier demanding money or her life and then put her hand in a pocket and pointed what appeared to be a handgun at the cashier, who took the threat seriously. The jury convicted Defendant of using a firearm during the commission of a robbery. The court of appeals vacated the verdict, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting at least one of Defendant's ten supplemental jury instructions and that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the bulge in Defendant's pocket was a firearm. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not supplementing an agreed-upon jury instruction defining a firearm; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211126.html" target="_blank">View "Commonwealth v. Barney" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals vacating a jury verdict convicting Defendant of using a firearm during the commission of a robbery, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court abused its discretion as to a jury instruction and in holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.
Defendant handed a note to a cashier demanding money or her life and then put her hand in a pocket and pointed what appeared to be a handgun at the cashier, who took the threat seriously. The jury convicted Defendant of using a firearm during the commission of a robbery. The court of appeals vacated the verdict, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting at least one of Defendant's ten supplemental jury instructions and that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the bulge in Defendant's pocket was a firearm. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not supplementing an agreed-upon jury instruction defining a firearm; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict.
The Supreme Court reinstated Defendant's convictions, holding that the court of appeals erred by vacating the jury verdict.
2023-03-16stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey211126https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220230.htmlHorn v. Webb2023-02-09T05:22:33-08:002023-02-09T05:22:33-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court in this property dispute, holding that the evidence did not support the judgment in connection with Kevin and Meredith Horn's claim of a prescriptive easement to dock a boat on James and Hong Webbs' property.
The Horns claimed a prescriptive easement to store small watercraft on the Webbs' land and further claimed a prescriptive easement to lock a boat on the Webbs' property. The Webbs brought this complaint alleging trespass and nuisance and seeking a declaratory judgment of their rights. The Horns counterclaimed that they had a prescriptive easement to both dock the boat and to store the watercraft. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Webbs and awarded them compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in rejecting the Horns' claim of a prescriptive easement to store smaller watercraft; (2) the Horns established the existence of a prescriptive easement to dock a boat; and (3) nothing in the record established malice on the part of the Horns in filing their lawsuit, and therefore, the award of punitive damages was improper. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/220230.html" target="_blank">View "Horn v. Webb" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court in this property dispute, holding that the evidence did not support the judgment in connection with Kevin and Meredith Horn's claim of a prescriptive easement to dock a boat on James and Hong Webbs' property.
The Horns claimed a prescriptive easement to store small watercraft on the Webbs' land and further claimed a prescriptive easement to lock a boat on the Webbs' property. The Webbs brought this complaint alleging trespass and nuisance and seeking a declaratory judgment of their rights. The Horns counterclaimed that they had a prescriptive easement to both dock the boat and to store the watercraft. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Webbs and awarded them compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in rejecting the Horns' claim of a prescriptive easement to store smaller watercraft; (2) the Horns established the existence of a prescriptive easement to dock a boat; and (3) nothing in the record established malice on the part of the Horns in filing their lawsuit, and therefore, the award of punitive damages was improper.
The Supreme Court reversed in part the circuit court's judgment in this property dispute, holding that the evidence did not support the judgment in connection with Kevin and Meredith Horn's claim of a prescriptive easement to dock a boat on James and Hong Webbs' property.
2023-02-09stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough220230https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211021.htmlMorgan v. Board of Supervisors2023-02-02T05:14:57-08:002023-02-02T05:14:57-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this case brought by several homeowners against the Board of Supervisors of Hanover County, holding that the circuit court erred.
Plaintiffs brought this complaint argument that the Board violated Virginia law by approving rezoning and special-exception requests authorizing the nearby construction of a large distribution and warehousing facility. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' demurrers on the grounds that Plaintiffs did not have standing to assert their claims and that some of the claims were speculative and not ripe for adjudication. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in finding that Plaintiffs' pleadings did not allege a sufficient factual basis for standing; and (2) erred when it dismissed three claims on the alternative ground that those counts asserted speculative claims not ripe for adjudication. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211021.html" target="_blank">View "Morgan v. Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this case brought by several homeowners against the Board of Supervisors of Hanover County, holding that the circuit court erred.
Plaintiffs brought this complaint argument that the Board violated Virginia law by approving rezoning and special-exception requests authorizing the nearby construction of a large distribution and warehousing facility. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' demurrers on the grounds that Plaintiffs did not have standing to assert their claims and that some of the claims were speculative and not ripe for adjudication. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in finding that Plaintiffs' pleadings did not allege a sufficient factual basis for standing; and (2) erred when it dismissed three claims on the alternative ground that those counts asserted speculative claims not ripe for adjudication.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment dismissing this case brought by several homeowners against the Board of Supervisors of Hanover County, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the claims failed on standing and ripeness grounds.
2023-02-02stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey211021https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211226.htmlColas v. Tyree2023-01-26T05:11:44-08:002023-01-26T05:11:44-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court entering judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of the estate of Jeffrey Tyree on a battery count but for the defense on a gross negligence count, holding that the circuit court erred in declining to grant the motion to strike filed by Detective Bradley Colas.
Colas, a police officer, shot and killed Tyree. Tyree's estate brought this action against Colas and another police officer, Officer Nigal Tuft-Williams, alleging gross negligence and battery. During trial, the trial court granted Tuft-Williams' motion to strike and denied Colas' motions to strike. After the jury found for the estate on the battery count Colas appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to strike. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court erred in declining to grant Colas' motion to strike. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/211226.html" target="_blank">View "Colas v. Tyree" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court entering judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of the estate of Jeffrey Tyree on a battery count but for the defense on a gross negligence count, holding that the circuit court erred in declining to grant the motion to strike filed by Detective Bradley Colas.
Colas, a police officer, shot and killed Tyree. Tyree's estate brought this action against Colas and another police officer, Officer Nigal Tuft-Williams, alleging gross negligence and battery. During trial, the trial court granted Tuft-Williams' motion to strike and denied Colas' motions to strike. After the jury found for the estate on the battery count Colas appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to strike. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court erred in declining to grant Colas' motion to strike.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the estate of Jeffrey Tyree on a battery count but for the defense on a gross negligence count, holding that the circuit court erred in declining to grant the motion to strike filed by Defendant
2023-01-26stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough211226https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/210893.htmlForness v. Commonwealth2023-01-19T05:08:56-08:002023-01-19T05:08:56-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition seeking to expunge a felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge from his record, holding that the circuit court did not err.
Appellant was arrested and charged with felony DWI. When it was determined that Appellant did not have a prior felony DWI conviction the arrest warrant was subsequently amended to charge Appellant with a misdemeanor DWI. Appellant was found guilty of the misdemeanor DWI. While his appeal was pending, Appellant filed a petition seeking to expunge the felony DWI charge from his record. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the amendment to the arrest warrant did not render the felony DWI charge "otherwise dismissed" for the purposes of Va. Code 19.2-392.2. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/210893.html" target="_blank">View "Forness v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition seeking to expunge a felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge from his record, holding that the circuit court did not err.
Appellant was arrested and charged with felony DWI. When it was determined that Appellant did not have a prior felony DWI conviction the arrest warrant was subsequently amended to charge Appellant with a misdemeanor DWI. Appellant was found guilty of the misdemeanor DWI. While his appeal was pending, Appellant filed a petition seeking to expunge the felony DWI charge from his record. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the amendment to the arrest warrant did not render the felony DWI charge "otherwise dismissed" for the purposes of Va. Code 19.2-392.2.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment dismissing Appellant's petition seeking to expunge a felony driving while intoxicated charge from his record, holding that the circuit court did not err.
2023-01-19stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell210893https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/211050.htmlArch Insurance Co. v. FVCbank2022-12-29T05:40:57-08:002022-12-29T05:40:57-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court striking Arch Insurance Company's conversion and unjust enrichment claims, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Arch was incapable of demonstrating a priority right to the disputed funds at issue in this case as a matter of law.
FVCbank provided Dominion Mechanical Contractors, Inc. with a revolving line of credit. Arch, a surety company, issued contract surety bonds for some of Dominion's projects. Due to Dominion's later financial troubles, FVCbank froze Dominion's accounts. Arch and Dominion sued, claiming conversion and unjust enrichment. The circuit court granted FVCbank's motion to strike Arch's claims, finding that because FVCbank had a priority interest in Dominion's accounts, there was no legal claim for unjust enrichment or conversion. The circuit court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly concluded that FVCbank's interest in Dominion's deposit accounts took priority over Arch's interest as a matter of law; and (2) properly dismissed the claims with prejudice. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/211050.html" target="_blank">View "Arch Insurance Co. v. FVCbank" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court striking Arch Insurance Company's conversion and unjust enrichment claims, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Arch was incapable of demonstrating a priority right to the disputed funds at issue in this case as a matter of law.
FVCbank provided Dominion Mechanical Contractors, Inc. with a revolving line of credit. Arch, a surety company, issued contract surety bonds for some of Dominion's projects. Due to Dominion's later financial troubles, FVCbank froze Dominion's accounts. Arch and Dominion sued, claiming conversion and unjust enrichment. The circuit court granted FVCbank's motion to strike Arch's claims, finding that because FVCbank had a priority interest in Dominion's accounts, there was no legal claim for unjust enrichment or conversion. The circuit court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly concluded that FVCbank's interest in Dominion's deposit accounts took priority over Arch's interest as a matter of law; and (2) properly dismissed the claims with prejudice.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment striking Arch Insurance Company's conversion and unjust enrichment claims, holding that the circuit court did not err.
2022-12-29stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMann211050https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/211033.htmlMorgan v. Commonwealth2022-12-29T05:40:57-08:002022-12-29T05:40:57-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated under Va. Code 18.2-308.012, holding that, under the facts of this case, Defendant did not "carry" the handgun, as contemplated by the statute.
A police officer performed a traffic stop of a vehicle seen driving "erratically." Defendant, the driver, provided the officer
With a valid weapons permit after informing the officer that a gun was next to him in a zipped bag on his front passenger seat. Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and subsequently found guilty of carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated, driving under the influence, and impersonating a police officer. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction under section 18.2-308.012, holding (1) "carry" within the meaning of section 18.2-308.012 is limited to physically carrying the handgun on one's person such that it moves when he moves; and (2) Defendant did not "carry" the handgun under the statute. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/211033.html" target="_blank">View "Morgan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated under Va. Code 18.2-308.012, holding that, under the facts of this case, Defendant did not "carry" the handgun, as contemplated by the statute.
A police officer performed a traffic stop of a vehicle seen driving "erratically." Defendant, the driver, provided the officer
With a valid weapons permit after informing the officer that a gun was next to him in a zipped bag on his front passenger seat. Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and subsequently found guilty of carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated, driving under the influence, and impersonating a police officer. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction under section 18.2-308.012, holding (1) "carry" within the meaning of section 18.2-308.012 is limited to physically carrying the handgun on one's person such that it moves when he moves; and (2) Defendant did not "carry" the handgun under the statute.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment upholding Defendant's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated, holding that Defendant did not "carry" the handgun as contemplated by Va. Code 18.2-308.012.
2022-12-29stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell211033https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/211032.htmlCounty of Isle of Wight v. International Paper Co.2022-12-29T05:40:56-08:002022-12-29T05:40:56-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that International Paper Co. had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the County of Isle of Wight's tax scheme violated the requirement of the Virginia Constitution that taxation be uniform, holding that the circuit court did not err.
In 2017, the County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution authorizing an "economic development retention grant program" that would benefit certain taxpayers. International Paper filed a refund action alleging that the County's tax and retention grant scheme violated the uniformity requirement of the Virginia Constitution. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of International Paper, concluding that the County's tax scheme created an unconstitutional non-uniform tax. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/211032.html" target="_blank">View "County of Isle of Wight v. International Paper Co." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that International Paper Co. had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the County of Isle of Wight's tax scheme violated the requirement of the Virginia Constitution that taxation be uniform, holding that the circuit court did not err.
In 2017, the County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution authorizing an "economic development retention grant program" that would benefit certain taxpayers. International Paper filed a refund action alleging that the County's tax and retention grant scheme violated the uniformity requirement of the Virginia Constitution. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of International Paper, concluding that the County's tax scheme created an unconstitutional non-uniform tax.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that International Paper Co. had established that the County of Isle of Wight's tax scheme violated the requirement of the Virginia Constitution that taxation be uniform, holding that the circuit court did not err.
2022-12-29stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough211032https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/211048.htmlHartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.2022-12-08T05:16:46-08:002022-12-08T05:16:46-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting a "First Amended Complaint in Interpleader with Accompanying Prayer for Declaratory Relief" filed by Allstate Insurance Company and apportioning the interpleaded funds, holding that there was no error.
Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company and The Shoe Department brought this appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in its construction and application of Va. Code 65.2-309 and 65.2-311 and Williams v. Capital Hospice & Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 66 Va. App. 161 (2016) to this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by failing to award the available Allstate coverage "to Hartford in full" or, alternatively, by failing to "permit [the requested] intracompany arbitration to proceed because there was no issue to be resolved in the requested arbitration; and (2) the circuit court provided the requisite "verdict or settlement" from which competing claims could be satisfied, and there was no error in the circuit court's apportionment of the funds. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/211048.html" target="_blank">View "Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting a "First Amended Complaint in Interpleader with Accompanying Prayer for Declaratory Relief" filed by Allstate Insurance Company and apportioning the interpleaded funds, holding that there was no error.
Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company and The Shoe Department brought this appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in its construction and application of Va. Code 65.2-309 and 65.2-311 and Williams v. Capital Hospice & Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 66 Va. App. 161 (2016) to this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by failing to award the available Allstate coverage "to Hartford in full" or, alternatively, by failing to "permit [the requested] intracompany arbitration to proceed because there was no issue to be resolved in the requested arbitration; and (2) the circuit court provided the requisite "verdict or settlement" from which competing claims could be satisfied, and there was no error in the circuit court's apportionment of the funds.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting a "First Amended Complaint in Interpleader with Accompanying Prayer for Declaratory Relief" and apportioning the interpleaded funds, holding that there was no error.
2022-12-08stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCharles S. Russell211048https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/220004.htmlGEICO Advantage Insurance Co. v. Miles2022-12-01T05:16:04-08:002022-12-01T05:16:04-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Liosha Miles on the issue of whether each of the two insurance policies in this case provided separate tranches of insurance of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, holding that the circuit court erred.
Given her disagreement with GEICO Advantage Insurance Company and GEICO Choice Insurance Company (collectively, GEICO), Miles filed this action seeking a declaration that each policy at issue contained separate $50,000 limits for UM and UIM coverage and that GEICO owed her addition amounts for her UIM claims related to a single automobile accident caused by the negligence of two different drivers other than herself. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Miles. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) UIM coverage is a constituent part of UM coverage; and (2) consequently, the circuit court erred in concluding that Va. Code 38.2-2206(A) required each policy to provide Miles with separate UM and UIM coverage limits for injuries arising from a single accident. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/220004.html" target="_blank">View "GEICO Advantage Insurance Co. v. Miles" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Liosha Miles on the issue of whether each of the two insurance policies in this case provided separate tranches of insurance of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, holding that the circuit court erred.
Given her disagreement with GEICO Advantage Insurance Company and GEICO Choice Insurance Company (collectively, GEICO), Miles filed this action seeking a declaration that each policy at issue contained separate $50,000 limits for UM and UIM coverage and that GEICO owed her addition amounts for her UIM claims related to a single automobile accident caused by the negligence of two different drivers other than herself. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Miles. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) UIM coverage is a constituent part of UM coverage; and (2) consequently, the circuit court erred in concluding that Va. Code 38.2-2206(A) required each policy to provide Miles with separate UM and UIM coverage limits for injuries arising from a single accident.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Liosha Miles on the issue of whether each of the two insurance policies in this case provided separate tranches of insurance of uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured motorist coverage, holding that the circuit court erred.
2022-12-01stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCharles S. Russell220004https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/220130.htmlAppalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm'n2022-10-27T04:21:37-08:002022-10-27T04:21:37-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the State Corporation Commission (SCC) that approved a petition filed by the Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) to obtain a rate-adjustment clause pursuant to Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(5)(e), holding that, contrary to the arguments brought by Applalachian Voices on appeal, the SCC applied the proper legal standard governing such requests.
VEPCO made its request to recover projected costs of purchasing allowances through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade market regulating carbon dioxide emissions by electric utilities. On appeal, Appalachian Voices, a nonprofit environmental organization, argued that the SCC failed to apply the law when it approved VEPCO's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the SCC did not misunderstand or fail o apply the legal standard governing petitions filed pursuant to Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(5)(e). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/220130.html" target="_blank">View "Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the State Corporation Commission (SCC) that approved a petition filed by the Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) to obtain a rate-adjustment clause pursuant to Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(5)(e), holding that, contrary to the arguments brought by Applalachian Voices on appeal, the SCC applied the proper legal standard governing such requests.
VEPCO made its request to recover projected costs of purchasing allowances through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade market regulating carbon dioxide emissions by electric utilities. On appeal, Appalachian Voices, a nonprofit environmental organization, argued that the SCC failed to apply the law when it approved VEPCO's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the SCC did not misunderstand or fail o apply the legal standard governing petitions filed pursuant to Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(5)(e).
The Supreme Court affirmed the State Corporation Commission's (SCC) order approving a petition filed by the Virginia Electric and Power Company to obtain a rate-adjustment clause pursuant to Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(5)(e), holding that the SCC applied the proper legal standard governing such requests.
2022-10-27stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey220130https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210972.htmlWilliams v. Janson2022-10-20T04:24:25-08:002022-10-20T04:24:25-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court determining that an auctioneer had verbally modified its advertised terms prior to the start of the auction and ordering the conveyance of a fee simple interest in a parcel of real property by special warranty deed to Plaintiff, holding that the circuit court erred.
Plaintiff attended an auction advertised by Plaintiff for the sale of the property at issue. Plaintiff's bid was the high bid, but Defendants refused to sell the property for that amount. Plaintiff brought this complaint seeking specific performance, alleging that, in the pre-auction announcement, Defendants used language stating that the auction was going to be an absolute auction. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance and ordered the conveyance of the property by special warranty deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that the auction was an absolute auction rather than an auction with reserve; and (2) therefore, no contract was formed between the parties. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210972.html" target="_blank">View "Williams v. Janson" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court determining that an auctioneer had verbally modified its advertised terms prior to the start of the auction and ordering the conveyance of a fee simple interest in a parcel of real property by special warranty deed to Plaintiff, holding that the circuit court erred.
Plaintiff attended an auction advertised by Plaintiff for the sale of the property at issue. Plaintiff's bid was the high bid, but Defendants refused to sell the property for that amount. Plaintiff brought this complaint seeking specific performance, alleging that, in the pre-auction announcement, Defendants used language stating that the auction was going to be an absolute auction. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance and ordered the conveyance of the property by special warranty deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that the auction was an absolute auction rather than an auction with reserve; and (2) therefore, no contract was formed between the parties.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's determination that an auctioneer had verbally modified its advertised terms prior to the start of the auction and ordering the conveyance of a fee simple interest in a parcel of real property by special warranty deed to Plaintiff, holding that the court erred.
2022-10-20stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell210972https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210848.htmlHawkins v. Town of South Hill2022-10-20T04:24:24-08:002022-10-20T04:24:24-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court partially denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus and purportedly denying his request for attorney's fees and costs, holding that the circuit court misapplied a definition of "personnel information."
In his mandamus petition, Appellant requested documents related to employment disputes in the Town of South Hill, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The circuit court denied the petition in part after applying definitions of "personnel record" from a previous version of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) instead of "personnel information." The court further refused to award attorney's fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of the personnel information exemption under VFOIA. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210848.html" target="_blank">View "Hawkins v. Town of South Hill" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court partially denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus and purportedly denying his request for attorney's fees and costs, holding that the circuit court misapplied a definition of "personnel information."
In his mandamus petition, Appellant requested documents related to employment disputes in the Town of South Hill, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The circuit court denied the petition in part after applying definitions of "personnel record" from a previous version of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) instead of "personnel information." The court further refused to award attorney's fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of the personnel information exemption under VFOIA.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment partially denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus and denying his request for attorney's fees and costs, holding that the circuit court misapplied a definition of "personnel information."
2022-10-20stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMann210848https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210787.htmlDaily Press, LLC v. Commonwealth2022-10-20T04:24:24-08:002022-10-20T04:24:24-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed three rulings by the trial court in a pending criminal case in these consolidated appeals, holding that the trial court erred in barring public access to a pretrial bail hearing, by keeping certain motions and exhibits under seal, and by finding that the City of Newport News lacked standing to oppose any public access to sealed documents that the City had previously produced in response to a subpoena.
The underlying case involved a murder indictment and ancillary charges against a Newport News police officer. Two newspaper publishers and a reporter filed an appeal challenging rulings barring access to the pretrial bail hearing and keeping motions and exhibits under seal. The City challenged the ruling that the City lacked standing to oppose public access to the sealed documents it produced in response to the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed all three holdings, holding that the trial court erred as to all three rulings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210787.html" target="_blank">View "Daily Press, LLC v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed three rulings by the trial court in a pending criminal case in these consolidated appeals, holding that the trial court erred in barring public access to a pretrial bail hearing, by keeping certain motions and exhibits under seal, and by finding that the City of Newport News lacked standing to oppose any public access to sealed documents that the City had previously produced in response to a subpoena.
The underlying case involved a murder indictment and ancillary charges against a Newport News police officer. Two newspaper publishers and a reporter filed an appeal challenging rulings barring access to the pretrial bail hearing and keeping motions and exhibits under seal. The City challenged the ruling that the City lacked standing to oppose public access to the sealed documents it produced in response to the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed all three holdings, holding that the trial court erred as to all three rulings.
The Supreme Court reversed three rulings by the trial court in a pending criminal case, holding that the trial court erred in barring public access to a pretrial bail hearing, by keeping certain motions and exhibits under seal, and by finding that the City of Newport News lacked standing to oppose any public access to sealed documents that the City had previously produced.
2022-10-20stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey210787https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210935.htmlTaylor v. Aids-Hilfe Koln e.V.2022-10-13T04:54:59-08:002022-10-13T04:54:59-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court admitting the will at issue in this case to probate and appointing an administrator for the estate of James A. Townsey but otherwise reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting relief on counts two and three of the complaint.
The circuit court admitted Townsey's will to probate, appointed an administrator for the estate, and awarded the proceeds of a brokerage account to a German charity. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly admitted the will to probate and appointed an administrator for Townsey's estate; and (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellant on counts two and three of the complaint. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210935.html" target="_blank">View "Taylor v. Aids-Hilfe Koln e.V." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court admitting the will at issue in this case to probate and appointing an administrator for the estate of James A. Townsey but otherwise reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting relief on counts two and three of the complaint.
The circuit court admitted Townsey's will to probate, appointed an administrator for the estate, and awarded the proceeds of a brokerage account to a German charity. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly admitted the will to probate and appointed an administrator for Townsey's estate; and (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellant on counts two and three of the complaint.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's judgment admitting a will to probate and appointing an administrator for the decedent's estate but otherwise reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting relief on counts two and three of the complaint.
2022-10-13stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaHairston210935https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210934.htmlCornell v. Benedict2022-10-13T04:54:58-08:002022-10-13T04:54:58-08:00
The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Va. Code 40.1-29(J), joint employer liability in a collective action for unpaid wages cannot be imposed upon individuals who act directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
Plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated to recover wages allegedly unpaid by Christian Psychotherapy Services (CPS), their employer. Plaintiffs also named as defendants Jason Benedict and Cheryl Ludvik. In the complaint, Plaintiffs argued that Benedict and Ludvik should be considered as employers who were liable, jointly and severally, with CPS for the unpaid wages pursuant to section 40.1-29(J). The circuit court sustained Benedict's and Ludvik's pleas in bar, concluding that neither individual met the definition of "employer." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that section 40.1-2 adopts a narrower definition of "employer" than the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and thus excludes individuals from implied employer liability under section 40.1-29(J). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210934.html" target="_blank">View "Cornell v. Benedict" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Va. Code 40.1-29(J), joint employer liability in a collective action for unpaid wages cannot be imposed upon individuals who act directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
Plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated to recover wages allegedly unpaid by Christian Psychotherapy Services (CPS), their employer. Plaintiffs also named as defendants Jason Benedict and Cheryl Ludvik. In the complaint, Plaintiffs argued that Benedict and Ludvik should be considered as employers who were liable, jointly and severally, with CPS for the unpaid wages pursuant to section 40.1-29(J). The circuit court sustained Benedict's and Ludvik's pleas in bar, concluding that neither individual met the definition of "employer." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that section 40.1-2 adopts a narrower definition of "employer" than the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and thus excludes individuals from implied employer liability under section 40.1-29(J).
The Supreme Court held that joint employer liability in a collective action for unpaid wages cannot be imposed upon individuals who act directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
2022-10-13stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaS. Bernard Goodwyn210934https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210800.htmlAshland, LLC v. Virginia-American Water Co.2022-10-13T04:54:58-08:002022-10-13T04:54:58-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Ashland, LLC's claim against Virginia-American Water Company for an alleged breach of contract, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Va. Const. art. IX, 4 deprived it of jurisdiction to adjudicate Ashland's contract claim.
Ashland filed suit against Virginia-American, which provided water to Ashland pursuant to a tariff issued by the State Corporation Commission, after a power outage disrupted water service to Ashland, resulting in $515,000 in damages due to lost business and profits. Ashland's complaint asserted a breach of contract claim based on an alleged violation of the tariff. The circuit court concluded that the promulgation of a tariff by the Commission is an action of the Commission, and therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that circuit courts are free to read and then apply the terms of a tariff as adopted by the Commission as necessary to resolve a common law dispute. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210800.html" target="_blank">View "Ashland, LLC v. Virginia-American Water Co." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Ashland, LLC's claim against Virginia-American Water Company for an alleged breach of contract, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Va. Const. art. IX, 4 deprived it of jurisdiction to adjudicate Ashland's contract claim.
Ashland filed suit against Virginia-American, which provided water to Ashland pursuant to a tariff issued by the State Corporation Commission, after a power outage disrupted water service to Ashland, resulting in $515,000 in damages due to lost business and profits. Ashland's complaint asserted a breach of contract claim based on an alleged violation of the tariff. The circuit court concluded that the promulgation of a tariff by the Commission is an action of the Commission, and therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that circuit courts are free to read and then apply the terms of a tariff as adopted by the Commission as necessary to resolve a common law dispute.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Ashland, LLC's claim against a water company for an alleged breach of contract, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Va. Const. art. IX, 4 deprived it of jurisdiction to adjudicate Ashland's contract claim.
2022-10-13stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCharles S. Russell210800https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210320.htmlAV Automotive, LLC v. Gebreyessus2022-09-16T01:46:51-08:002022-09-16T01:46:51-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court awarding sanctions against Plaintiffs, holding that the circuit court erred in awarding the total amount of the attorney's fees claimed.
Plaintiffs brought this claim alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with a contractual relationship or business expectancy, and business conspiracy against Defendant, a former employee. After the circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motions to nonsuit as to all parties the circuit court granted Defendant's motion for sanctions, awarding sanctions of $213,197 - Defendant's total attorney's fees - against Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) was within its discretion to award sanctions against Plaintiffs; but (2) erred in awarding sanctions for certain conduct and in failing to segregate sanctionable claim from the attorney's fees requested. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210320.html" target="_blank">View "AV Automotive, LLC v. Gebreyessus" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court awarding sanctions against Plaintiffs, holding that the circuit court erred in awarding the total amount of the attorney's fees claimed.
Plaintiffs brought this claim alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with a contractual relationship or business expectancy, and business conspiracy against Defendant, a former employee. After the circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motions to nonsuit as to all parties the circuit court granted Defendant's motion for sanctions, awarding sanctions of $213,197 - Defendant's total attorney's fees - against Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) was within its discretion to award sanctions against Plaintiffs; but (2) erred in awarding sanctions for certain conduct and in failing to segregate sanctionable claim from the attorney's fees requested.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court awarding sanctions against Plaintiffs, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding the total amount of the attorney's fees claimed.
2022-09-15stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough210320https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210501.htmlFines v. Rappahannock Area Community Services Bd.2022-09-08T04:51:20-08:002022-09-08T04:51:20-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's claims against the Rappahannock Area Community Services Board (RACSB) based on its determination that RACSB was a municipal corporation entitled to sovereign immunity, holding that RACSB is not a municipal corporation.
Appellant received psychological therapy through RACSB at its facilities when he was between six to eight years old. Appellant brought this action against the estate of Scott Henry and RACSB, alleging that Henry, a therapist employed by RACSB, molested him during his counseling sessions. RACSB filed a plea in bar, claiming that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as either an "arm" of the Commonwealth or as a municipal corporation performing a governmental function. The circuit court granted the plea in bar, concluding that RACSB was a municipal corporation that was performing a governmental function by providing mental health treatment to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that RACSB was not a municipal corporation because it lacked the fundamental characteristics of such an entity. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210501.html" target="_blank">View "Fines v. Rappahannock Area Community Services Bd." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's claims against the Rappahannock Area Community Services Board (RACSB) based on its determination that RACSB was a municipal corporation entitled to sovereign immunity, holding that RACSB is not a municipal corporation.
Appellant received psychological therapy through RACSB at its facilities when he was between six to eight years old. Appellant brought this action against the estate of Scott Henry and RACSB, alleging that Henry, a therapist employed by RACSB, molested him during his counseling sessions. RACSB filed a plea in bar, claiming that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as either an "arm" of the Commonwealth or as a municipal corporation performing a governmental function. The circuit court granted the plea in bar, concluding that RACSB was a municipal corporation that was performing a governmental function by providing mental health treatment to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that RACSB was not a municipal corporation because it lacked the fundamental characteristics of such an entity.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision dismissing Appellant's claims against the Rappahannock Area Community Services Board based on its determination that RACSB was a municipal corporation entitled to sovereign immunity, holding that RACSB is not a municipal corporation.
2022-09-08stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell210501https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210640.htmlAmes Center, L.C. v. Soho Arlington, LLC2022-08-18T04:09:06-08:002022-08-18T04:09:06-08:00
The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court holding that no justiciable dispute existed between the parties following the court's holding that the plaintiff qualified as a third-party beneficiary of a 1973 ground lease, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in sua sponte dismissing this declaratory-judgment action as nonjusticiable.
A developer filed a declaratory judgment action against the lessee of an adjoining property seeking to resolve conflicting interpretations of a lease provision. The circuit court concluded that the developer was a third-party beneficiary of the long-term ground lease in this case and dismissed the case on the grounds that there were no further justiciable controversies to resolve. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that dismissal was premature because the parties continued categorically to disagree on what specific rights, if any, the developer had under the lease and when those rights could be asserted. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210640.html" target="_blank">View "Ames Center, L.C. v. Soho Arlington, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court holding that no justiciable dispute existed between the parties following the court's holding that the plaintiff qualified as a third-party beneficiary of a 1973 ground lease, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in sua sponte dismissing this declaratory-judgment action as nonjusticiable.
A developer filed a declaratory judgment action against the lessee of an adjoining property seeking to resolve conflicting interpretations of a lease provision. The circuit court concluded that the developer was a third-party beneficiary of the long-term ground lease in this case and dismissed the case on the grounds that there were no further justiciable controversies to resolve. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that dismissal was premature because the parties continued categorically to disagree on what specific rights, if any, the developer had under the lease and when those rights could be asserted.
The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order holding that no justiciable dispute existed between the parties following the court's holding that the plaintiff qualified as a third-party beneficiary of a ground lease, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in sua sponte dismissing this declaratory-judgment action as nonjusticiable.
2022-08-18stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey210640https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210391.htmlAppalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Commission2022-08-18T04:09:05-08:002022-08-18T04:09:05-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part rulings made by the State Corporation Commission during its triennial review of Appalachian Power Company's rates, terms, and conditions pursuant to Va. Code 56.585.1, holding that remand was required for further proceedings.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Commission (1) erred in finding that it was not reasonable for Appalachian to record its costs associated with the early retirement of its coal-fired power plants as asset impairments; (2) did not err when it implemented depreciation rates from the revised 2017 Depreciation Study for the years 2018 and 2019 in the triennial review; (3) did not err by refusing to apply Va. Code 56-585.1(E) retroactively; and (4) did not err in finding Appalachian's affiliate costs under an Inter-Company Power Agreement with Ohio Valley Electric Cooperation to be reasonable. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210391.html" target="_blank">View "Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Commission" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part rulings made by the State Corporation Commission during its triennial review of Appalachian Power Company's rates, terms, and conditions pursuant to Va. Code 56.585.1, holding that remand was required for further proceedings.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Commission (1) erred in finding that it was not reasonable for Appalachian to record its costs associated with the early retirement of its coal-fired power plants as asset impairments; (2) did not err when it implemented depreciation rates from the revised 2017 Depreciation Study for the years 2018 and 2019 in the triennial review; (3) did not err by refusing to apply Va. Code 56-585.1(E) retroactively; and (4) did not err in finding Appalachian's affiliate costs under an Inter-Company Power Agreement with Ohio Valley Electric Cooperation to be reasonable.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part rulings made by the State Corporation Commission during its triennial review of Appalachian Power Company's rates, terms, and conditions, holding that remand was required for further proceedings.
2022-08-18stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey210391210634https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210569.htmlHill v. Commonwealth2022-08-11T04:08:28-08:002022-08-11T04:08:28-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court finding Appellant in violation of probation and sentencing him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence, holding that there was no error.
On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence because the period of suspension had lapsed before his probation violation. The court of appeals disagreed, upholding the circuit court's judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's order was consistent with, not violative of, the revocation power authorized by Va. Code 19.2-306(A). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210569.html" target="_blank">View "Hill v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court finding Appellant in violation of probation and sentencing him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence, holding that there was no error.
On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence because the period of suspension had lapsed before his probation violation. The court of appeals disagreed, upholding the circuit court's judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's order was consistent with, not violative of, the revocation power authorized by Va. Code 19.2-306(A).
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment finding Appellant in violation of probation and sentencing him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence, holding that there was no error.
2022-08-11stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey210569https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210530.htmlCommonwealth v. Kilpatrick2022-08-04T05:21:05-08:002022-08-04T05:21:05-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of three counts of computer solicitation of a minor, first offense, and two counts of computer solicitation of a minor, second offense, holding that any presumed error in excluding certain expert testimony was harmless.
In his appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Dr. Maurice Fisher, which Defendant intended to use in support of his entrapment defense. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the testimony did not express an opinion on the ultimate issue of Defendant's mental state at the time of the alleged offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence of Defendant's prurient interest was overwhelming, and therefore, the testimony would not have influenced the jury or would have had but slight effect. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210530.html" target="_blank">View "Commonwealth v. Kilpatrick" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of three counts of computer solicitation of a minor, first offense, and two counts of computer solicitation of a minor, second offense, holding that any presumed error in excluding certain expert testimony was harmless.
In his appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Dr. Maurice Fisher, which Defendant intended to use in support of his entrapment defense. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the testimony did not express an opinion on the ultimate issue of Defendant's mental state at the time of the alleged offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence of Defendant's prurient interest was overwhelming, and therefore, the testimony would not have influenced the jury or would have had but slight effect.
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of computer solicitation of a minor, holding that any presumed error in excluding certain expert testimony was harmless.
2022-08-04stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaPer Curiam210530https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210568.htmlCoxcom, LLC v. Fairfax County2022-07-14T04:09:23-08:002022-07-14T04:09:23-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying a refund of Business and Professional Occupational License (BPOL) taxes Coxcom, LLC paid to Fairfax County on the grounds that the Internet Tax Freedom Act's (ITFA) grandfather clause permitted the County to impose the tax, holding that the grandfather clause did not apply.
Since 2000, Cox had provided internet access service to customers in the County. In 2016, Cox filed a request for a BPOL tax refund for the tax years 2013 through 2015, asserting that the federal ITFA preempted the County from imposing the BPOL tax on internet access service revenues. The circuit court concluded that the BPOL tax qualified for the grandfather clause exemption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that the ITFA applied to the County's BPOL tax; and (2) the grandfather clause did not rescue the County's imposition of a tax on internet access services. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210568.html" target="_blank">View "Coxcom, LLC v. Fairfax County" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying a refund of Business and Professional Occupational License (BPOL) taxes Coxcom, LLC paid to Fairfax County on the grounds that the Internet Tax Freedom Act's (ITFA) grandfather clause permitted the County to impose the tax, holding that the grandfather clause did not apply.
Since 2000, Cox had provided internet access service to customers in the County. In 2016, Cox filed a request for a BPOL tax refund for the tax years 2013 through 2015, asserting that the federal ITFA preempted the County from imposing the BPOL tax on internet access service revenues. The circuit court concluded that the BPOL tax qualified for the grandfather clause exemption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that the ITFA applied to the County's BPOL tax; and (2) the grandfather clause did not rescue the County's imposition of a tax on internet access services.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment denying a refund of Business and Professional Occupational License taxes Coxcom, LLC paid to Fairfax County on the grounds that the Internet Tax Freedom Act's grandfather clause permitted the County to impose the tax, holding that the grandfather clause did not apply.
2022-07-14stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough210568https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210509.htmlPatterson v. City of Danville2022-07-07T04:24:52-08:002022-07-07T04:24:52-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's plea in bar to Plaintiff's negligence claim on the ground that he was protected by derivative sovereign immunity and granting Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim because it was insufficiently pleaded, holding that there was no legal error in either of these decisions.
Langston Patterson was an inmate in the Danville Adult Detention Center (DADC) when he suffered cardiac arrest and later died. The personal representative of his estate sued Defendant, the DADC physician, claiming that Defendant committed medical malpractice by failing to provide the necessary and appropriate care to Patterson. The circuit court granted Defendant's plea in bar to Plaintiff's negligence claim and Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error of law or any irrationality in the fact-finding of the circuit court; and (2) Defendant's claim for gross negligence failed as a matter of law. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210509.html" target="_blank">View "Patterson v. City of Danville" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's plea in bar to Plaintiff's negligence claim on the ground that he was protected by derivative sovereign immunity and granting Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim because it was insufficiently pleaded, holding that there was no legal error in either of these decisions.
Langston Patterson was an inmate in the Danville Adult Detention Center (DADC) when he suffered cardiac arrest and later died. The personal representative of his estate sued Defendant, the DADC physician, claiming that Defendant committed medical malpractice by failing to provide the necessary and appropriate care to Patterson. The circuit court granted Defendant's plea in bar to Plaintiff's negligence claim and Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error of law or any irrationality in the fact-finding of the circuit court; and (2) Defendant's claim for gross negligence failed as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment granting Defendant's plea in bar to Plaintiff's negligence claim and granting Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim, holding that there was no legal error in either of these decisions.
2022-07-07stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaDanville210509https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210721.htmlSeymour v. Roanoke County Board of Supervisors2022-06-09T04:40:37-08:002022-06-09T04:40:37-08:00
Southwest Virginia Wildlife Center of Roanoke (SVWC) provides medical and rehabilitative care to 2,000 animals each year. SVWC is located at the end of a shared private easement that is approximately 476 feet long; the other properties that can only be accessed by the easement’s unpaved, single-lane dirt driveway, across their lawns. The easement is not maintained by any governmental entity. SVWC sought a special use permit to build a large “raptor building.” The Zoning Administrator determined that existing “accessory structures” on SVWC's property were either improperly granted zoning permits or had not been granted permits. The Board of Supervisors granted the special use permit, which retroactively authorized the accessory structures and the construction of the raptor building, subject to conditions requiring buffering and materials. Neighboring owners challenged the approval, arguing that traffic on the easement has increased “20- to 50-fold” since, SVWC began operating in 2014, causing “congestion, noise, dust, and light pollution” and posing a danger to their children.
The trial court dismissed their complaint, citing lack of standing. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed. The dust, noise, and light pollution allegedly caused by the traffic on the easement constitute particularized harm to the plaintiffs. The complaint sufficiently alleged that the construction of the raptor building and the corresponding expansion of SVWC’s services would cause more traffic and supports a reasonable inference that the decision to retroactively approve the accessory structures would lead to traffic on the easement. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210721.html" target="_blank">View "Seymour v. Roanoke County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law</a>
Southwest Virginia Wildlife Center of Roanoke (SVWC) provides medical and rehabilitative care to 2,000 animals each year. SVWC is located at the end of a shared private easement that is approximately 476 feet long; the other properties that can only be accessed by the easement’s unpaved, single-lane dirt driveway, across their lawns. The easement is not maintained by any governmental entity. SVWC sought a special use permit to build a large “raptor building.” The Zoning Administrator determined that existing “accessory structures” on SVWC's property were either improperly granted zoning permits or had not been granted permits. The Board of Supervisors granted the special use permit, which retroactively authorized the accessory structures and the construction of the raptor building, subject to conditions requiring buffering and materials. Neighboring owners challenged the approval, arguing that traffic on the easement has increased “20- to 50-fold” since, SVWC began operating in 2014, causing “congestion, noise, dust, and light pollution” and posing a danger to their children.
The trial court dismissed their complaint, citing lack of standing. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed. The dust, noise, and light pollution allegedly caused by the traffic on the easement constitute particularized harm to the plaintiffs. The complaint sufficiently alleged that the construction of the raptor building and the corresponding expansion of SVWC’s services would cause more traffic and supports a reasonable inference that the decision to retroactively approve the accessory structures would lead to traffic on the easement.
Virginia Supreme Court reinstates a challenge to a special use permit for a wildlife rehabilitation center; owners, sharing an easement with the center, have standing.
2022-06-09stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaChafin210721https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210414.htmlCity of Charlottesville v. Regulus Books, LLC2022-06-09T04:40:36-08:002022-06-09T04:40:36-08:00
Regulus, an LLC solely owned by Klug, is the holding company for all the rights, transactions, and income related to Klug’s literary works, which include several internationally-received legal fiction novels. In 2018, Klug filed a Virginia income tax return, attaching thereto a Schedule C to indicate that he derived business income in Charlottesville. The city could not locate a business license issued to Klug or to Regulus and requested information about Klug’s business and his income therefrom for the tax years 2015-2018. Klug responded that Charlottesville’s Ordinance does not apply to him because he “offer[s] no goods or services to the public[,]” has “no physical storefront or shingle[,]” “do[es] not advertise[,]” has no employees, has no inventory, and offers a “product” that is intangible intellectual property.
The Virginia Supreme Court held that a freelance writer’s business does not provide a service and is not covered by the ordinance’s catchall provision. The court did not reach the question of whether the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the freelance writer. The court affirmed the circuit court’s decision to order the city to refund Klug his tax payments but concluded that the circuit court erred by awarding costs not essential for the prosecution of the suit. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210414.html" target="_blank">View "City of Charlottesville v. Regulus Books, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
Regulus, an LLC solely owned by Klug, is the holding company for all the rights, transactions, and income related to Klug’s literary works, which include several internationally-received legal fiction novels. In 2018, Klug filed a Virginia income tax return, attaching thereto a Schedule C to indicate that he derived business income in Charlottesville. The city could not locate a business license issued to Klug or to Regulus and requested information about Klug’s business and his income therefrom for the tax years 2015-2018. Klug responded that Charlottesville’s Ordinance does not apply to him because he “offer[s] no goods or services to the public[,]” has “no physical storefront or shingle[,]” “do[es] not advertise[,]” has no employees, has no inventory, and offers a “product” that is intangible intellectual property.
The Virginia Supreme Court held that a freelance writer’s business does not provide a service and is not covered by the ordinance’s catchall provision. The court did not reach the question of whether the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the freelance writer. The court affirmed the circuit court’s decision to order the city to refund Klug his tax payments but concluded that the circuit court erred by awarding costs not essential for the prosecution of the suit.
Virginia Supreme Court holds that Charlotteville's ordinance, licensing and taxing businesses, does not apply to a freelance writer.
2022-06-09stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaLeRoy F. Millette, Jr.210414https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201523.htmlBoard of Supervisors v. Route 29, LLC2022-06-02T04:40:10-08:002022-06-02T04:40:10-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding in favor of the owner of rezoned property who claimed that the triggering of a conditional proffer operated as an unconstitutional condition, holding that the trial court did not err in ultimately reversing the zoning violation.
The Board of Supervisors of Albemarle County approved a rezoning for property subject to voluntary proffers. A conditional proffer called the transit proffer continuously applied since the original rezoning. The county approved the establishment of a commuter route to run from Albemarle County to downtown Charlottesville and concluded that a substantial portion of the funding for the route could come from the transit proffer funds. The county approved the appropriation of funds to establish the commuter route. When the property owner failed to make payments required by the transit proffer the county concluded that the owner was in violation of the county's zoning ordinance. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of the owner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the county's demurrer and motion to strike and did not err in reversing the zoning violation. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201523.html" target="_blank">View "Board of Supervisors v. Route 29, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding in favor of the owner of rezoned property who claimed that the triggering of a conditional proffer operated as an unconstitutional condition, holding that the trial court did not err in ultimately reversing the zoning violation.
The Board of Supervisors of Albemarle County approved a rezoning for property subject to voluntary proffers. A conditional proffer called the transit proffer continuously applied since the original rezoning. The county approved the establishment of a commuter route to run from Albemarle County to downtown Charlottesville and concluded that a substantial portion of the funding for the route could come from the transit proffer funds. The county approved the appropriation of funds to establish the commuter route. When the property owner failed to make payments required by the transit proffer the county concluded that the owner was in violation of the county's zoning ordinance. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of the owner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the county's demurrer and motion to strike and did not err in reversing the zoning violation.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment finding in favor of the owner of rezoned property who claimed that the triggering of a conditional proffer operated as an unconstitutional condition, holding that the court did not err in ultimately reversing the zoning violation.
2022-06-02stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaS. Bernard Goodwyn201523https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210538.htmlAnders Larsen Trust v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County2022-05-26T04:09:05-08:002022-05-26T04:09:05-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court that Neighbors lacked standing to challenge the judgment of Fairfax County's Zoning Administrator and Board of Zoning Appeals concluding that NewPort Academy, which sought to open a residential treatment center for teenage girls, was a "by right" use, holding that Neighbors had standing.
Neighbors, who either owned houses or lived in houses next to the proposed treatment center, argued that the proposed facility was not a "by right" use in the zoning district, thus requiring a special exception permit to operate in a residential zone. The circuit court concluded that Neighbors lacked standing to challenge the Board's decision and dismissed the case on that basis. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the allegations made by Neighbors were sufficient to establish that they had standing. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210538.html" target="_blank">View "Anders Larsen Trust v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court that Neighbors lacked standing to challenge the judgment of Fairfax County's Zoning Administrator and Board of Zoning Appeals concluding that NewPort Academy, which sought to open a residential treatment center for teenage girls, was a "by right" use, holding that Neighbors had standing.
Neighbors, who either owned houses or lived in houses next to the proposed treatment center, argued that the proposed facility was not a "by right" use in the zoning district, thus requiring a special exception permit to operate in a residential zone. The circuit court concluded that Neighbors lacked standing to challenge the Board's decision and dismissed the case on that basis. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the allegations made by Neighbors were sufficient to establish that they had standing.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision concluding that Neighbors lacked standing to challenge the judgment of Fairfax County Zoning Administrator and Board of Zoning Appeals concluding that NewPort Academy, which sought to open a residential treatment center for teenage girls, was a "by right" use, holding that Neighbors had standing.
2022-05-26stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough210538https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201329.htmlEdwards v. Omni International Services, Inc.2022-05-26T04:09:04-08:002022-05-26T04:09:04-08:00
In this personal injury case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's plea in bar and dismissing this case with prejudice, holding that the date of Plaintiff's second filing did not relate back to the date of her first filing and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
After Plaintiff learned that she had erred in naming Defendant in her initial pleading Plaintiff non-suited the case. One month later, Plaintiff filed the present action, correctly naming Defendant. Defendant filed a plea in bar, arguing that the present action was filed over two years after the cause of action accrued and was thus time-barred. Plaintiff objected, arguing that the error in naming Defendant was a misnomer subject to correction. The court sustained the plea in bar, concluding that Plaintiff's original filing did not relate back to the date of the original filing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's second filing was barred by the statute of limitations. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201329.html" target="_blank">View "Edwards v. Omni International Services, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
In this personal injury case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's plea in bar and dismissing this case with prejudice, holding that the date of Plaintiff's second filing did not relate back to the date of her first filing and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
After Plaintiff learned that she had erred in naming Defendant in her initial pleading Plaintiff non-suited the case. One month later, Plaintiff filed the present action, correctly naming Defendant. Defendant filed a plea in bar, arguing that the present action was filed over two years after the cause of action accrued and was thus time-barred. Plaintiff objected, arguing that the error in naming Defendant was a misnomer subject to correction. The court sustained the plea in bar, concluding that Plaintiff's original filing did not relate back to the date of the original filing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's second filing was barred by the statute of limitations.
In this personal injury case, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment sustaining Defendant's plea in bar and dismissing this case with prejudice, holding that the date of Plaintiff's second filing did not relate back to the date of her first filing.
2022-05-26stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCharles S. Russell201329https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210260.htmlLaRock v. City of Norfolk2022-05-19T04:42:15-08:002022-05-19T04:42:15-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court refusing to implement the decision of the grievance panel to reinstate Petitioner to her position as an employee for the City of Norfolk, holding that the circuit court erred in refusing to implement the grievance panel's decision.
After holding a hearing regarding Petitioner's termination the grievance panel decided to reinstate Petitioner and award her backpay. When the City Manager declined to implement the panel's decision Petitioner brought this action. The circuit court ruled that it would not enforce the panel's decision because it was against public policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it failed to implement the panel's binding decision and reinstate Petitioner. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210260.html" target="_blank">View "LaRock v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court refusing to implement the decision of the grievance panel to reinstate Petitioner to her position as an employee for the City of Norfolk, holding that the circuit court erred in refusing to implement the grievance panel's decision.
After holding a hearing regarding Petitioner's termination the grievance panel decided to reinstate Petitioner and award her backpay. When the City Manager declined to implement the panel's decision Petitioner brought this action. The circuit court ruled that it would not enforce the panel's decision because it was against public policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it failed to implement the panel's binding decision and reinstate Petitioner.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment refusing to implement the decision of the grievance panel to reinstate Petitioner to her position as an employee for the City of Norfolk, holding that the circuit court erred in refusing to implement the grievance panel's decision.
2022-05-19stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaLeRoy F. Millette, Jr.210260https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201510.htmlChesapeake Hospital Authority v. State Health Commissioner2022-05-19T04:42:14-08:002022-05-19T04:42:14-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court upholding the State Health Commissioner's denial of Chesapeake Regional Medical Center's (CMRC) application for a Certificate of Public Need, holding that the harmless error doctrine does not apply to an error of law in an administrative agency case under the Virginia Administrative Process Act.
CMRC applied for a new open-heart surgery service and additional cardiac catheterization equipment. The Commissioner denied the application. CRMC appealed, contending that the Commissioner erred in his interpretation of the relevant administrative regulation. The circuit court affirmed, determining that the Commissioner's incorrect interpretation and application of the regulation was harmless error. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in applying the harmless error doctrine to the agency's legal error in interpreting and applying its own regulations; and (2) the lower courts erred by failing to remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201510.html" target="_blank">View "Chesapeake Hospital Authority v. State Health Commissioner" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court upholding the State Health Commissioner's denial of Chesapeake Regional Medical Center's (CMRC) application for a Certificate of Public Need, holding that the harmless error doctrine does not apply to an error of law in an administrative agency case under the Virginia Administrative Process Act.
CMRC applied for a new open-heart surgery service and additional cardiac catheterization equipment. The Commissioner denied the application. CRMC appealed, contending that the Commissioner erred in his interpretation of the relevant administrative regulation. The circuit court affirmed, determining that the Commissioner's incorrect interpretation and application of the regulation was harmless error. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in applying the harmless error doctrine to the agency's legal error in interpreting and applying its own regulations; and (2) the lower courts erred by failing to remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' judgments upholding the State Health Commissioner's denial of Chesapeake Regional Medical Center's application for a Certificate of Public Need, holding that the harmless error doctrine does not apply to an error of law in an administrative agency case under the Virginia Administrative Process Act.
2022-05-19stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaLawrence L. Koontz, Jr.201510https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210489.htmlIn re Honorable Bennett2022-04-21T04:41:22-08:002022-04-21T04:41:22-08:00
In this action challenging the Supreme Court's sealing of the record of the disciplinary action against Judge Adrianne L. Bennett by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission the Supreme Court unsealed certain filings in the case but concluded that the Commission's records attached to a mandamus petition should remain under seal.
At issue was the order of the Supreme Court disposing of Judge Bennett's petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition in connection with this matter, which the Supreme Court ordered sealed along with all other documents of the proceedings. The publisher of a news entity asked the Supreme Court to unseal the order sealing the proceedings regarding Judge Bennett's mandamus petition and filed a petition to vacate the sealing order. The Supreme Court unsealed the remainder of the filings in this case but held that the records of the Commission attached to the mandamus petition should remain under seal, holding that Judge Bennett had a statutory right to keep that information confidential. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210489.html" target="_blank">View "In re Honorable Bennett" on Justia Law</a>
In this action challenging the Supreme Court's sealing of the record of the disciplinary action against Judge Adrianne L. Bennett by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission the Supreme Court unsealed certain filings in the case but concluded that the Commission's records attached to a mandamus petition should remain under seal.
At issue was the order of the Supreme Court disposing of Judge Bennett's petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition in connection with this matter, which the Supreme Court ordered sealed along with all other documents of the proceedings. The publisher of a news entity asked the Supreme Court to unseal the order sealing the proceedings regarding Judge Bennett's mandamus petition and filed a petition to vacate the sealing order. The Supreme Court unsealed the remainder of the filings in this case but held that the records of the Commission attached to the mandamus petition should remain under seal, holding that Judge Bennett had a statutory right to keep that information confidential.
In this action challenging the Supreme Court's sealing of the record of the disciplinary action against Judge Adrianne L. Bennett by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission the Supreme Court unsealed certain filings in the case but concluded that the Commission's records attached to a mandamus petition should remain under seal.
2022-04-21stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaPer Curiam210489https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210443.htmlErie Insurance Exchange v. Jones2022-04-14T04:26:58-08:002022-04-14T04:26:58-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy as a "farm type vehicle," holding that the circuit court erred.
Diamond Jones was injured while riding as a passenger on the back of an ATV driven by the daughter of Jennifer and Richard Rekowski. Jones filed a negligence action against the Rekowskis, who were insured by a homeowner's policy issued by Erie Insurance Exchange, and then filed this action seeking a judgment that Erie was obligated to pay the insurance claim. The circuit court concluded that the policy covered the accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ATV involved in the accident was not a "farm type" vehicle; and (2) therefore, the ATV was excluded from coverage by the homeowner's insurance policy. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210443.html" target="_blank">View "Erie Insurance Exchange v. Jones" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy as a "farm type vehicle," holding that the circuit court erred.
Diamond Jones was injured while riding as a passenger on the back of an ATV driven by the daughter of Jennifer and Richard Rekowski. Jones filed a negligence action against the Rekowskis, who were insured by a homeowner's policy issued by Erie Insurance Exchange, and then filed this action seeking a judgment that Erie was obligated to pay the insurance claim. The circuit court concluded that the policy covered the accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ATV involved in the accident was not a "farm type" vehicle; and (2) therefore, the ATV was excluded from coverage by the homeowner's insurance policy.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's ruling that an all-terrain vehicle was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy as a "farm type vehicle," holding that the circuit court erred.
2022-04-14stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough210443https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210382.htmlBoyle v. Anderson2022-04-14T04:26:58-08:002022-04-14T04:26:58-08:00
The Supreme Court held that the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act, Va. Code 8.01-581.01 to -.016 (VUAA), and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1-16 (FAA), do not compel enforcement of an arbitration clause in a trust.
The decedent created an inter vivos irrevocable trust that was divided into three shares for his children and grandchildren. The trust contained an unambiguous arbitration clause. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, the trust's trustee, alleging breach of duty. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a trust is neither a contract nor an agreement that can be enforced against a beneficiary; and (2) therefore, neither the VUAA nor the FAA compel arbitration. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210382.html" target="_blank">View "Boyle v. Anderson" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act, Va. Code 8.01-581.01 to -.016 (VUAA), and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1-16 (FAA), do not compel enforcement of an arbitration clause in a trust.
The decedent created an inter vivos irrevocable trust that was divided into three shares for his children and grandchildren. The trust contained an unambiguous arbitration clause. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, the trust's trustee, alleging breach of duty. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a trust is neither a contract nor an agreement that can be enforced against a beneficiary; and (2) therefore, neither the VUAA nor the FAA compel arbitration.
The Supreme Court held that the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act do not compel enforcement of an arbitration clause in a trust.
2022-04-14stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough210382https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201419.htmlKittrell v. Fowler2022-03-24T05:09:59-08:002022-03-24T05:09:59-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed in this interlocutory appeal of a decision of the circuit court overruling Appellants' demurrer and allowing Appellees to proceed with their claims, holding that the circuit court erred.
Appellees brought this action against Margaret's Future Trust, the Estate of Walter, Jr. and another trust seeking an accounting of each party's assets, restitution, and the imposition of a constructive construct on the trusts' assets based on Walter, Jr.'s alleged fraudulent conduct and breach of fiduciary duty as trustee of Walter, Sr.'s and Margaret's estates. The circuit court subsequently allowed Appellees to amend their complaint to add claims relating to the arms-length sale by their mother, Margaret, of her minority interest in Hurley, LLC, in 2006 and to joint the relevant members of Hurley, LLC as defendants. In this interlocutory appeal, Appellants argued that the circuit court improperly conferred standing on Appellees to pursue claims challenging and seeking to "unwind" the 2006 Hurley Transaction. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision on these issues, dismissed Appellees' claims relating to the Hurley Transaction, and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Appellees lacked standing to bring the claims regarding the Hurley Transaction. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201419.html" target="_blank">View "Kittrell v. Fowler" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed in this interlocutory appeal of a decision of the circuit court overruling Appellants' demurrer and allowing Appellees to proceed with their claims, holding that the circuit court erred.
Appellees brought this action against Margaret's Future Trust, the Estate of Walter, Jr. and another trust seeking an accounting of each party's assets, restitution, and the imposition of a constructive construct on the trusts' assets based on Walter, Jr.'s alleged fraudulent conduct and breach of fiduciary duty as trustee of Walter, Sr.'s and Margaret's estates. The circuit court subsequently allowed Appellees to amend their complaint to add claims relating to the arms-length sale by their mother, Margaret, of her minority interest in Hurley, LLC, in 2006 and to joint the relevant members of Hurley, LLC as defendants. In this interlocutory appeal, Appellants argued that the circuit court improperly conferred standing on Appellees to pursue claims challenging and seeking to "unwind" the 2006 Hurley Transaction. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision on these issues, dismissed Appellees' claims relating to the Hurley Transaction, and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Appellees lacked standing to bring the claims regarding the Hurley Transaction.
In this interlocutory appeal of a decision of the circuit court overruling Appellants' demurrer and allowing Appellees to proceed with their claims, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred.
2022-03-24stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaPer Curiam201419https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201007.htmlSidya v. World Telecom Exchange Communications, LLC2022-03-24T05:09:59-08:002022-03-24T05:09:59-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the latest decision of the trial court in this third appeal addressing remaining contests between the parties in this case, holding that the trial court erred in part.
World Telecom Exchange Communications, LLC, a wholly owned American subsidiary of a Dubai parent company, sued Yacoub Sidya, alleging tortious interference with a business expectancy, misappropriation of protected trade secrets, and civil conspiracy. On two prior occasions the case was before the Supreme Court, which reversed in part the rulings at issue and remanded the cause. In this latest appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) there was no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's partial final judgment; (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to strike the evidence in support of a claim for attorney fees; and (3) the trial court erred in awarding post-judgment interest on the punitive and treble damages. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201007.html" target="_blank">View "Sidya v. World Telecom Exchange Communications, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the latest decision of the trial court in this third appeal addressing remaining contests between the parties in this case, holding that the trial court erred in part.
World Telecom Exchange Communications, LLC, a wholly owned American subsidiary of a Dubai parent company, sued Yacoub Sidya, alleging tortious interference with a business expectancy, misappropriation of protected trade secrets, and civil conspiracy. On two prior occasions the case was before the Supreme Court, which reversed in part the rulings at issue and remanded the cause. In this latest appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) there was no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's partial final judgment; (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to strike the evidence in support of a claim for attorney fees; and (3) the trial court erred in awarding post-judgment interest on the punitive and treble damages.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the latest decision of the trial court in this third appeal addressing remaining contests between the parties, holding that the trial court erred in part.
2022-03-24stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey201007https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201349.htmlCalifornia Condominium Ass'n v. Peterson2022-03-17T04:10:24-08:002022-03-17T04:10:24-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing an action brought by a condominium association against the owner of two condominium units for unpaid special assessments, holding that the circuit court erred by granting the condominium owner's plea in bar.
The association brought suit seeking a nonjudicial foreclosure on liens recorded against the owner's condominium units and damages for breach of a declaration. The owner filed a plea in bar asserting that the claim could not survive either of two potential statutes of limitation. The circuit court granted the plea in bar, concluding that the action was barred by the thirty-six-month statute of limitations in former Va. Code 55-79.84(D). The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that the association's failure to introduce the declaration into evidence at an ore tenus hearing precluded the court from deciding whether to grant or deny the plea in bar. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201349.html" target="_blank">View "California Condominium Ass'n v. Peterson" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing an action brought by a condominium association against the owner of two condominium units for unpaid special assessments, holding that the circuit court erred by granting the condominium owner's plea in bar.
The association brought suit seeking a nonjudicial foreclosure on liens recorded against the owner's condominium units and damages for breach of a declaration. The owner filed a plea in bar asserting that the claim could not survive either of two potential statutes of limitation. The circuit court granted the plea in bar, concluding that the action was barred by the thirty-six-month statute of limitations in former Va. Code 55-79.84(D). The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that the association's failure to introduce the declaration into evidence at an ore tenus hearing precluded the court from deciding whether to grant or deny the plea in bar.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment dismissing this action brought by a condominium association against the owner of two condominium units for unpaid special assessments, holding that the circuit court erred by granting the owner's plea in bar.
2022-03-17stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey201349https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201515.htmlStahl v. Stitt2022-03-03T05:23:46-08:002022-03-03T05:23:46-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to enforce the "midnight deadline" rule set forth in section 4-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as adopted by Va. Code 8.4-302 and W. Va. Code 46-4-302, holding that there was no error.
In her second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that MCNB Bank and Trust Company (MCNB) violated the midnight deadline rule adopted from the UCC and, therefore, MCNB was strictly liable for the payment of a check in the amount of $245,271.25. The circuit court granted summary judgment for MCNB, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue her claim because she did not have any right to rely on the prompt payment of the check at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it granted MCNB’s motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff's alleged lack of standing to enforce the midnight deadline rule. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201515.html" target="_blank">View "Stahl v. Stitt" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to enforce the "midnight deadline" rule set forth in section 4-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as adopted by Va. Code 8.4-302 and W. Va. Code 46-4-302, holding that there was no error.
In her second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that MCNB Bank and Trust Company (MCNB) violated the midnight deadline rule adopted from the UCC and, therefore, MCNB was strictly liable for the payment of a check in the amount of $245,271.25. The circuit court granted summary judgment for MCNB, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue her claim because she did not have any right to rely on the prompt payment of the check at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it granted MCNB’s motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff's alleged lack of standing to enforce the midnight deadline rule.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to enforce the "midnight deadline" rule set forth in section 4-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as adopted by Va. Code 8.4-302, holding that there was no error.
2022-03-03stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaChafin201515https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201413.htmlFarah v. Commonwealth2022-02-17T05:17:11-08:002022-02-17T05:17:11-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining what portion of a settlement was subject to the Commonwealth's Medicaid lien, holding that there was no error.
Appellant was seriously injured in a car accident. Because the Commonwealth's Medicaid program paid for a portion of Appellant's medical care the Commonwealth was entitled to a lien on the proceeds of an ensuing settlement between Appellant and the driver who caused the accident. At issue was what portion of the settlement was subject to the Medicaid lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's judgment was proper under the deferential standard. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201413.html" target="_blank">View "Farah v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining what portion of a settlement was subject to the Commonwealth's Medicaid lien, holding that there was no error.
Appellant was seriously injured in a car accident. Because the Commonwealth's Medicaid program paid for a portion of Appellant's medical care the Commonwealth was entitled to a lien on the proceeds of an ensuing settlement between Appellant and the driver who caused the accident. At issue was what portion of the settlement was subject to the Medicaid lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's judgment was proper under the deferential standard.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment determining what portion of a settlement was subject to the Commonwealth's Medicaid lien, holding that there was no error.
2022-02-17stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough201413https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201263.htmlVirginia Department of Taxation v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco2022-02-10T05:38:25-08:002022-02-10T05:38:25-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that the Virginia Department of Taxation's corporation income tax assessments for the years in issue were erroneous and ordering the Department to refund Lorillard Tobacco Company the amount of its overpayments on the assessments for the years in issue, holding that there was no error.
Lorillard filed an application for correction of erroneous assessment of corporation income taxes challenging the denial of its refund claims for certain assessments. The circuit court held that the Department's assessments were erroneous and ordered the Department to correct the assessments by refunding Lorillard the amount of its overpayments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201263.html" target="_blank">View "Virginia Department of Taxation v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that the Virginia Department of Taxation's corporation income tax assessments for the years in issue were erroneous and ordering the Department to refund Lorillard Tobacco Company the amount of its overpayments on the assessments for the years in issue, holding that there was no error.
Lorillard filed an application for correction of erroneous assessment of corporation income taxes challenging the denial of its refund claims for certain assessments. The circuit court held that the Department's assessments were erroneous and ordered the Department to correct the assessments by refunding Lorillard the amount of its overpayments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment holding that the Virginia Department of Taxation's corporation income tax assessments were erroneous and ordering the Department to refund Lorillard Tobacco Company the amount of its overpayments on the assessments for the years in issue, holding that there was no error.
2022-02-10stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaS. Bernard Goodwyn201263https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210011.htmlCortez-Rivas v. Commonwealth2022-02-03T05:10:42-08:002022-02-03T05:10:42-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for rape, holding that Defendant did not suffer any violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.
On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecution violated his right to confrontation by failing to produce as a witness a police officer who translated for a police detective at the crime scene. At trial, the Commonwealth offered the testimony of a different police officer who, separately, translated the exchange between Defendant and the detective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no constitutional requirement for the officer at issue to be confronted at trial. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/210011.html" target="_blank">View "Cortez-Rivas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for rape, holding that Defendant did not suffer any violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.
On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecution violated his right to confrontation by failing to produce as a witness a police officer who translated for a police detective at the crime scene. At trial, the Commonwealth offered the testimony of a different police officer who, separately, translated the exchange between Defendant and the detective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no constitutional requirement for the officer at issue to be confronted at trial.
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for rape, holding that Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution were not violated.
2022-02-03stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough210011https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201310.htmlGodlove v. Rothstein2022-02-03T05:10:42-08:002022-02-03T05:10:42-08:00
The Supreme Court granted Daniel Rothstein's motion to dismiss the appeal brought by Robert Godlove and Theresa Wolfe (together, Appellants) and vacated the judgment of the trial court in favor of Rothstein, holding that this case was moot.
The trial court interpreted a deed of dedication as permitting Rothstein to extend a paved driveway within an easement running across Appellants' property to Rothstein's property. After Appellants filed a notice of appeal, Rothstein filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. The Supreme Court granted the motion and vacated the judgment, holding that there was no longer any live controversy. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201310.html" target="_blank">View "Godlove v. Rothstein" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted Daniel Rothstein's motion to dismiss the appeal brought by Robert Godlove and Theresa Wolfe (together, Appellants) and vacated the judgment of the trial court in favor of Rothstein, holding that this case was moot.
The trial court interpreted a deed of dedication as permitting Rothstein to extend a paved driveway within an easement running across Appellants' property to Rothstein's property. After Appellants filed a notice of appeal, Rothstein filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. The Supreme Court granted the motion and vacated the judgment, holding that there was no longer any live controversy.
The Supreme Court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss Appellants' appeal brought and vacated the judgment of the trial court in favor of Appellee, holding that this case was moot.
2022-02-03stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey201310https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/200803.htmlSmallwood v. Commonwealth2022-01-13T06:16:27-08:002022-01-13T06:16:27-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the revocation of Defendant's deferred disposition and conviction for possession of heroin due to Defendant's failure to pay court costs, holding that there was no error.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of heroin. The agreement specified that Defendant would pay all court costs and the costs of any programs ordered by Defendant's probation officer. The circuit court deferred its finding that the facts were sufficient for a finding of guilt for one year subject to the terms and conditions in the plea agreement. The court further ordered that Defendant pay the costs of prosecution. The circuit court subsequently revoked Defendant's deferred disposition and adjudicated him guilty for failure to pay his court costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/200803.html" target="_blank">View "Smallwood v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the revocation of Defendant's deferred disposition and conviction for possession of heroin due to Defendant's failure to pay court costs, holding that there was no error.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of heroin. The agreement specified that Defendant would pay all court costs and the costs of any programs ordered by Defendant's probation officer. The circuit court deferred its finding that the facts were sufficient for a finding of guilt for one year subject to the terms and conditions in the plea agreement. The court further ordered that Defendant pay the costs of prosecution. The circuit court subsequently revoked Defendant's deferred disposition and adjudicated him guilty for failure to pay his court costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment affirming the revocation of Defendant's deferred disposition and conviction for possession of heroin due to his failure to pay court costs, holding that there was no error.
2022-01-13stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell200803https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201322.htmlEmmanuel Worship Center v. City of Petersburg2022-01-06T05:09:19-08:002022-01-06T05:09:19-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing a bill of review after determining that the underlying matter was an action at law and that a bill of review was inappropriate, holding that the circuit court erred.
The City of Petersburg brought an action against the Emmanuel Worship Center and its trustees (collectively, EWC) for delinquent taxes. The circuit court found that EWC owed the City for delinquent real estate taxes and then issued a decree of sale. EWC paid to redeem its property and then filed a bill of review seeking reversal or modification of the decree of sale and an award of the amounts it had paid to the City, arguing that it was constitutionally exempt from paying real estate taxes because the property was owned and used exclusively for religious purposes. The circuit court denied the bill of review. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in determining that the underlying action was an action at law, and (2) erred in holding that because more than three years had passed since the taxes were assessed they were beyond review. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2022/201322.html" target="_blank">View "Emmanuel Worship Center v. City of Petersburg" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing a bill of review after determining that the underlying matter was an action at law and that a bill of review was inappropriate, holding that the circuit court erred.
The City of Petersburg brought an action against the Emmanuel Worship Center and its trustees (collectively, EWC) for delinquent taxes. The circuit court found that EWC owed the City for delinquent real estate taxes and then issued a decree of sale. EWC paid to redeem its property and then filed a bill of review seeking reversal or modification of the decree of sale and an award of the amounts it had paid to the City, arguing that it was constitutionally exempt from paying real estate taxes because the property was owned and used exclusively for religious purposes. The circuit court denied the bill of review. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in determining that the underlying action was an action at law, and (2) erred in holding that because more than three years had passed since the taxes were assessed they were beyond review.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment dismissing a bill of review after concluding that the underlying matter was an action at law and that a bill of review was inappropriate, holding that the circuit court erred.
2022-01-06stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaWilliam C. Mims201322https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/210027.htmlCommonwealth v. Richard2021-12-29T05:39:18-08:002021-12-29T05:39:18-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and reinstated that conviction, holding that the court of appeals erred in reversing Defendant's conviction for conspiracy.
In reversing Defendant's conviction, the court of appeals ruled that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying two proffered jury instructions regarding the single-buyer/seller relationship exception to conspiracy liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the proffered jury instructions concerning a single-buyer/seller relationship. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/210027.html" target="_blank">View "Commonwealth v. Richard" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and reinstated that conviction, holding that the court of appeals erred in reversing Defendant's conviction for conspiracy.
In reversing Defendant's conviction, the court of appeals ruled that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying two proffered jury instructions regarding the single-buyer/seller relationship exception to conspiracy liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the proffered jury instructions concerning a single-buyer/seller relationship.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment reversing Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, holding that the court of appeals erred in reversing Defendant's conviction.
2021-12-29stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaS. Bernard Goodwyn210027https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201202.htmlStoots v. Marion Life Saving Crew, Inc.2021-12-22T05:09:51-08:002021-12-22T05:09:51-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court ruling that Marion Life Saving Crew, Inc. (MLSC) and its paramedics were entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to Va. Code 8.01-255(A)(5), holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that MLSC was immune from liability.
Plaintiff, the administrator of the Estate of Calvin Harmon Shoots, brought this wrongful death complaint alleging that Defendants' grossly negligent conduct was the direct and proximate cause of the premature death of Shoots. The circuit court ruled (1) the paramedics were clearly negligent but that they were absolutely immune from liability under section 8.01-225(A)(5); and (2) MLSC was immune because the paramedics were immune from liability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly ruled that the paramedics were immune from liability; but (2) the paramedics' immunity from civil liability was not dispositive of whether section 8.01-225 applied to MLSC, and therefore, the circuit court erred in ruling that MLSC was immune because the paramedics were also immune. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201202.html" target="_blank">View "Stoots v. Marion Life Saving Crew, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court ruling that Marion Life Saving Crew, Inc. (MLSC) and its paramedics were entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to Va. Code 8.01-255(A)(5), holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that MLSC was immune from liability.
Plaintiff, the administrator of the Estate of Calvin Harmon Shoots, brought this wrongful death complaint alleging that Defendants' grossly negligent conduct was the direct and proximate cause of the premature death of Shoots. The circuit court ruled (1) the paramedics were clearly negligent but that they were absolutely immune from liability under section 8.01-225(A)(5); and (2) MLSC was immune because the paramedics were immune from liability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly ruled that the paramedics were immune from liability; but (2) the paramedics' immunity from civil liability was not dispositive of whether section 8.01-225 applied to MLSC, and therefore, the circuit court erred in ruling that MLSC was immune because the paramedics were also immune.
The Supreme Court reversed in part the circuit court's ruling that Marion Life Saving Crew, Inc. (MLSC) and its paramedics were entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to Va. Code 8.01-255(A)(5), holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that MLSC was immune from liability because the paramedics were also immune.
2021-12-22stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell201202https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201145.htmlCarter v. Commonwealth2021-12-22T05:09:50-08:002021-12-22T05:09:50-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of battering a police officer under Va. Code 18.2-57(C), holding that Defendant's contentions on appeal were without merit.
Defendant was charged with assault and battery on a police officer, a felony. At trial, Defendant argued that she had used force to expel a trespasser, and therefore, her use of force was not unlawful. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the convictions was supported by sufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Defendant's use of force was not justified by the law of trespass. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201145.html" target="_blank">View "Carter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of battering a police officer under Va. Code 18.2-57(C), holding that Defendant's contentions on appeal were without merit.
Defendant was charged with assault and battery on a police officer, a felony. At trial, Defendant argued that she had used force to expel a trespasser, and therefore, her use of force was not unlawful. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the convictions was supported by sufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Defendant's use of force was not justified by the law of trespass.
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of battering a police officer, holding that Defendant's contentions on appeal were without merit.
2021-12-22stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough201145https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201362.htmlGarner v. Joseph2021-12-16T05:10:06-08:002021-12-16T05:10:06-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court holding that the owners of an easement were not indispensable parties to a boundary adjustment suit filed by their neighbors, holding that, under the facts and circumstances, the holders of the easement were necessary parties.
The neighbors in this case were Thomas and Christine Garner, Ellen Edwards, and Vincent and Theresa Joseph. In 2015, a court concluded that the Garners had the riparian right to construct a pier on the easement that they held. Thereafter, the Josephs filed a complaint against Edwards seeking to establish the riparian boundaries between their respective properties. Following an apportionment proceeding, the Josephs demanded that the Garners cease using their illegal pier construction and applicable riparian waters. The Garners asserted that because they hadn't been joined as necessary parties in the apportionment proceeding, depriving them of their opportunity to defend their interests. The Josephs responded that the Garners lacked standing to challenge the riparian lines and had not, therefore, been necessary parties. The circuit court concluded that the Garners were not necessary parties and therefore lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Garners were necessary parties to the boundary adjustment suit. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201362.html" target="_blank">View "Garner v. Joseph" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court holding that the owners of an easement were not indispensable parties to a boundary adjustment suit filed by their neighbors, holding that, under the facts and circumstances, the holders of the easement were necessary parties.
The neighbors in this case were Thomas and Christine Garner, Ellen Edwards, and Vincent and Theresa Joseph. In 2015, a court concluded that the Garners had the riparian right to construct a pier on the easement that they held. Thereafter, the Josephs filed a complaint against Edwards seeking to establish the riparian boundaries between their respective properties. Following an apportionment proceeding, the Josephs demanded that the Garners cease using their illegal pier construction and applicable riparian waters. The Garners asserted that because they hadn't been joined as necessary parties in the apportionment proceeding, depriving them of their opportunity to defend their interests. The Josephs responded that the Garners lacked standing to challenge the riparian lines and had not, therefore, been necessary parties. The circuit court concluded that the Garners were not necessary parties and therefore lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Garners were necessary parties to the boundary adjustment suit.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's holding that the owners of an easement were not indispensable parties to a boundary adjustment suit filed by their neighbors, holding that the holders of the easement were necessary parties.
2021-12-16stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough201362https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201160.htmlEhrhardt v. SustainedMED, LLC2021-12-02T06:10:53-08:002021-12-02T06:10:53-08:00
The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in this case in awarding SustainedMED, LLC attorneys' fees as well as expenses and costs in excess of $24,999.94 on its indemnification claim because the award exceeded the maximum indemnification amount allowed under an indemnity agreement.
Sellers entered into a stock purchase agreement (SPA) for the sale of their collective shares in Cyfluent, Inc. to SustainedMED. The total purchase price for the sale of the Cyfluent stock was $4,900,000. The SPA included an indemnity agreement requiring Sellers to indemnify Sustained MED for losses resulting from inaccuracies in or breach of any representations or warranties made by Sellers. SustainedMED filed suit against Sellers alleging misrepresentations and fraud in the inducement. The circuit court ruled in favor of SustainedMED and awarded SustainedMED $972,323.50 in attorneys' fees and $64,225 in litigation expenses and costs. The Supreme Court reversed as to the award of attorneys' fees and costs, holding that the circuit court erred in awarding attorneys' fees and costs in excess of $24,999.94 on SustainedMED's indemnification claim because of the SPA's indemnification cap of $4,900,000. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201160.html" target="_blank">View "Ehrhardt v. SustainedMED, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in this case in awarding SustainedMED, LLC attorneys' fees as well as expenses and costs in excess of $24,999.94 on its indemnification claim because the award exceeded the maximum indemnification amount allowed under an indemnity agreement.
Sellers entered into a stock purchase agreement (SPA) for the sale of their collective shares in Cyfluent, Inc. to SustainedMED. The total purchase price for the sale of the Cyfluent stock was $4,900,000. The SPA included an indemnity agreement requiring Sellers to indemnify Sustained MED for losses resulting from inaccuracies in or breach of any representations or warranties made by Sellers. SustainedMED filed suit against Sellers alleging misrepresentations and fraud in the inducement. The circuit court ruled in favor of SustainedMED and awarded SustainedMED $972,323.50 in attorneys' fees and $64,225 in litigation expenses and costs. The Supreme Court reversed as to the award of attorneys' fees and costs, holding that the circuit court erred in awarding attorneys' fees and costs in excess of $24,999.94 on SustainedMED's indemnification claim because of the SPA's indemnification cap of $4,900,000.
The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in this case in awarding Plaintiff attorneys' fees as well as expenses and costs in excess of $24,999.94 on its indemnification claim because the award exceeded the maximum indemnification amount allowed under an indemnity agreement.
2021-12-02stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaS. Bernard Goodwyn201160https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201204.htmlCommonwealth v. Cady2021-10-28T05:09:09-08:002021-10-28T05:09:09-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing a misdemeanor conviction based upon a jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of reckless driving, holding that the court of appeals erroneously held as a matter of law that no rational jury could have found Defendant guilty of reckless driving.
The Commonwealth alleged that Defendant, while driving along a two-lane road, abandoned his duty to keep a proper lookout for a substantial period of time and recklessly struck and killed a motorcyclist who had stopped to make a left turn. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's conviction order, holding that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence supported the jury's verdict. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201204.html" target="_blank">View "Commonwealth v. Cady" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing a misdemeanor conviction based upon a jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of reckless driving, holding that the court of appeals erroneously held as a matter of law that no rational jury could have found Defendant guilty of reckless driving.
The Commonwealth alleged that Defendant, while driving along a two-lane road, abandoned his duty to keep a proper lookout for a substantial period of time and recklessly struck and killed a motorcyclist who had stopped to make a left turn. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's conviction order, holding that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence supported the jury's verdict.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment reversing a misdemeanor conviction based upon a jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of reckless driving, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding as a matter of law that no rational jury could have found Defendant guilty of reckless driving.
2021-10-28stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey201204https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201245.htmlAyers v. Brooke Road, LLC2021-10-21T05:09:22-08:002021-10-21T05:09:22-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Brooke Road, LLC's demurrers to Troy Ayers' complaints to vacate several confessed judgments, holding that the circuit court erred.
In his second amended complaint, Ayers alleged that he was never served with certified copies of the confessed judgments, and therefore, the confessed judgments were void ab initial under the terms of Va. Code 8.01-438. Brooke Road filed a demurrer, arguing that the deadline set forth in Va. Code 8.01-433 barred Ayers' claims. The circuit court sustained Brooke Road's demurrer based on the application of section 8.01-433. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in sustaining Brooke Road's demurrers based on the application of the provisions of section 8.01-433. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201245.html" target="_blank">View "Ayers v. Brooke Road, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Brooke Road, LLC's demurrers to Troy Ayers' complaints to vacate several confessed judgments, holding that the circuit court erred.
In his second amended complaint, Ayers alleged that he was never served with certified copies of the confessed judgments, and therefore, the confessed judgments were void ab initial under the terms of Va. Code 8.01-438. Brooke Road filed a demurrer, arguing that the deadline set forth in Va. Code 8.01-433 barred Ayers' claims. The circuit court sustained Brooke Road's demurrer based on the application of section 8.01-433. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in sustaining Brooke Road's demurrers based on the application of the provisions of section 8.01-433.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment sustaining Brooke Road, LLC's demurrers to Troy Ayers' complaints to vacate several confessed judgments, holding that the court erred.
2021-10-21stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaChafin201245https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200840.htmlPhillips v. Rohrbaugh2021-10-21T05:09:21-08:002021-10-21T05:09:21-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting demurrers as to all claims filed by John Mark Rohrbaugh Sr.'s daughter seeking both an equitable and a statutory accounting from her brother in his former capacity as an agent managing their father's financial affairs pursuant to a power of attorney (POA) and in his current capacity as co-executor of their father's estate, holding that there was no error.
Plaintiff brought this complaint against John Mark Rohrbaugh Jr. in both his individual capacity and in his capacity as a co-executor of the Rohrbaugh Sr. estate requesting a statutory accounting from Rohrbaugh Jr. concerning his actions pursuant to his father's POA and requesting an equitable accounting. The circuit court granted the demurrers to the complaint and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it dismissed on demurrer Plaintiff's equitable and statutory accounting claims. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200840.html" target="_blank">View "Phillips v. Rohrbaugh" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting demurrers as to all claims filed by John Mark Rohrbaugh Sr.'s daughter seeking both an equitable and a statutory accounting from her brother in his former capacity as an agent managing their father's financial affairs pursuant to a power of attorney (POA) and in his current capacity as co-executor of their father's estate, holding that there was no error.
Plaintiff brought this complaint against John Mark Rohrbaugh Jr. in both his individual capacity and in his capacity as a co-executor of the Rohrbaugh Sr. estate requesting a statutory accounting from Rohrbaugh Jr. concerning his actions pursuant to his father's POA and requesting an equitable accounting. The circuit court granted the demurrers to the complaint and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it dismissed on demurrer Plaintiff's equitable and statutory accounting claims.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment granting demurrers as to all claims filed by Plaintiff seeking both an equitable and a statutory accounting from her brother in his former capacity as an agent managing their father's financial affairs pursuant to a power of attorney and in his current capacity as co-executor of their father's estate, holding that there was no error.
2021-10-21stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey200840https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/210168.htmlWhite v. United States2021-10-14T05:09:24-08:002021-10-14T05:09:24-08:00
The Supreme Court answered a certified question regarding whether, under Virginia common law, an individual can be convicted of robbery by means of threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy, in the positive and that the accusation of "sodomy" involves a crime against nature under extant criminal law.
In a federal district court, Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant objected to the United States' request that he receive an enhanced sentence based on his prior convictions for three predicate violent felonies, including a Virginia robbery conviction, arguing that under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), a felony is defined as a violent felony only if it categorically requires a physical force element and that the physical force element is not always required to prove robbery in Virginia. The Supreme Court agreed, held that Virginia's longstanding common-law robbery doctrine, which recognizes that threatening to accuse someone of committing a crime against nature can be constructive violence, remains the law of the Commonwealth. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/210168.html" target="_blank">View "White v. United States" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court answered a certified question regarding whether, under Virginia common law, an individual can be convicted of robbery by means of threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy, in the positive and that the accusation of "sodomy" involves a crime against nature under extant criminal law.
In a federal district court, Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant objected to the United States' request that he receive an enhanced sentence based on his prior convictions for three predicate violent felonies, including a Virginia robbery conviction, arguing that under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), a felony is defined as a violent felony only if it categorically requires a physical force element and that the physical force element is not always required to prove robbery in Virginia. The Supreme Court agreed, held that Virginia's longstanding common-law robbery doctrine, which recognizes that threatening to accuse someone of committing a crime against nature can be constructive violence, remains the law of the Commonwealth.
The Supreme Court held that Virginia's longstanding common-law robbery doctrine, which recognizes that threatening to accuse someone of committing a crime against nature can be constructive violence, remains the law of the Commonwealth.
2021-10-14stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey210168https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201267.htmlGivago Growth, LLC v. iTech AG, LLC2021-10-14T05:09:23-08:002021-10-14T05:09:23-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioners' amended complaint against iTech AG, LLC and Robbins Law Group, PLLC (collectively, Appellees) alleging malicious abuse of process, slander of title, tortious interference with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy arising out of the filing of a lis pendens, holding that the circuit court erred in sustaining Appellees' demurrers.
In their demurrers to Petitioners' complaint, Appellees argued that the filing of a lis pendens is entitle to absolute privilege and that the complaint dd not plead valid claims for slander of title, tortious interference with contractual relations, or civil conspiracy. The circuit court sustained the demurrers on the basis that the information contained in a memorandum of lis pendens is subject to absolute privilege. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the information contained in the lis pendens was not sufficiently "relevant and pertinent to the matter under inquiry" for absolute privilege to apply in this case. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201267.html" target="_blank">View "Givago Growth, LLC v. iTech AG, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioners' amended complaint against iTech AG, LLC and Robbins Law Group, PLLC (collectively, Appellees) alleging malicious abuse of process, slander of title, tortious interference with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy arising out of the filing of a lis pendens, holding that the circuit court erred in sustaining Appellees' demurrers.
In their demurrers to Petitioners' complaint, Appellees argued that the filing of a lis pendens is entitle to absolute privilege and that the complaint dd not plead valid claims for slander of title, tortious interference with contractual relations, or civil conspiracy. The circuit court sustained the demurrers on the basis that the information contained in a memorandum of lis pendens is subject to absolute privilege. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the information contained in the lis pendens was not sufficiently "relevant and pertinent to the matter under inquiry" for absolute privilege to apply in this case.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment dismissing Petitioners' amended complaint against Appellees alleging malicious abuse of process, slander of title, tortious interference with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy arising out of the filing of a lis pendens, holding that the circuit court erred in sustaining Appellees' demurrers.
2021-10-14stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaWilliam C. Mims201267https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/210113.htmlTaylor v. Northam2021-09-02T04:09:17-08:002021-09-02T04:09:17-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Governor Ralph S. Northam's order to remove the Robert E. Lee Monument in Richmond, Virginia from property owned by the Commonwealth was not improper or unlawful, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were without merit.
At issue in this case was whether language in an 1890 deed, signed by the then Governor of Virginia, and an 1889 joint resolution of the General Assembly requesting and authorizing the Governor to sign the deed, prohibited Governor Northam from ordering the removal of the state-owned Lee Monument from state-owned property. The circuit court found that the language in the deed created restrictive covenants but that those restrictive covenants were unenforceable and that the Governor's actions seeking to remove the Lee Monument did not contradict public policy or violate the Virginia Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the circuit court did not err. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/210113.html" target="_blank">View "Taylor v. Northam" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Governor Ralph S. Northam's order to remove the Robert E. Lee Monument in Richmond, Virginia from property owned by the Commonwealth was not improper or unlawful, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were without merit.
At issue in this case was whether language in an 1890 deed, signed by the then Governor of Virginia, and an 1889 joint resolution of the General Assembly requesting and authorizing the Governor to sign the deed, prohibited Governor Northam from ordering the removal of the state-owned Lee Monument from state-owned property. The circuit court found that the language in the deed created restrictive covenants but that those restrictive covenants were unenforceable and that the Governor's actions seeking to remove the Lee Monument did not contradict public policy or violate the Virginia Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the circuit court did not err.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment concluding that Governor Ralph S. Northam's order to remove the Robert E. Lee Monument in Richmond, Virginia from property owned by the Commonwealth was proper, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were without merit.
2021-09-02stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaS. Bernard Goodwyn210113https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201307.htmlGregory v. Northam2021-09-02T04:09:17-08:002021-09-02T04:09:17-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that Plaintiff had not articulated a legally viable cause of action and denied any requests made for injunctive relief, holding that there was no reversible error in the judgment.
Plaintiff brought this complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief concerning Governor Ralph S. Northam's order to the Department of General Services to remove the Robert E. Lee Monument in Richmond, Virginia from Commonwealth property. The circuit court dismissed the claims, holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim that he possessed the legal right to prohibit the Commonwealth from moving the monument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's claim with prejudice. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201307.html" target="_blank">View "Gregory v. Northam" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that Plaintiff had not articulated a legally viable cause of action and denied any requests made for injunctive relief, holding that there was no reversible error in the judgment.
Plaintiff brought this complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief concerning Governor Ralph S. Northam's order to the Department of General Services to remove the Robert E. Lee Monument in Richmond, Virginia from Commonwealth property. The circuit court dismissed the claims, holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim that he possessed the legal right to prohibit the Commonwealth from moving the monument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's claim with prejudice.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment ruling that Plaintiff had not articulated a legally viable cause of action and denied any requests made for injunctive relief, holding that there was no reversible error.
2021-09-02stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaPer Curiam201307https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200791.htmlCity of Charlottesville v. Sclafani2021-08-26T04:25:45-08:002021-08-26T04:25:45-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment of the court of appeals applying the law of the case doctrine to this appeal of an award of workers' compensation benefits but affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the Workers Compensation Commission's award of benefits to Plaintiff, holding that the evidence supported the award.
Plaintiff's claim was initially denied on the basis that, although Plaintiff had clearly suffered an injury, he failed to establish an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event that caused the injury. The Commission reversed the Deputy Commissioner's ruling and entered an award of benefits. The court of appeals ultimately affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in its application of the law of the case doctrine; and (2) the evidence supported the Commission's award of benefits to Plaintiff. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200791.html" target="_blank">View "City of Charlottesville v. Sclafani" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment of the court of appeals applying the law of the case doctrine to this appeal of an award of workers' compensation benefits but affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the Workers Compensation Commission's award of benefits to Plaintiff, holding that the evidence supported the award.
Plaintiff's claim was initially denied on the basis that, although Plaintiff had clearly suffered an injury, he failed to establish an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event that caused the injury. The Commission reversed the Deputy Commissioner's ruling and entered an award of benefits. The court of appeals ultimately affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in its application of the law of the case doctrine; and (2) the evidence supported the Commission's award of benefits to Plaintiff.
The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals' judgment applying the law of the case doctrine to this appeal of an award of workers' compensation benefits but affirmed the portion of the judgment upholding the Workers Compensation Commission's award of benefits to Plaintiff, holding that the evidence supported the award.
2021-08-26stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell200791https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201118.htmlEubank v. Thomas2021-08-05T05:08:37-08:002021-08-05T05:08:37-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' abuse of process claim, holding that the claim for abuse of process failed as a matter of law.
Mathews County initiated criminal proceedings against Plaintiffs alleging that Plaintiffs added an expansion of their residence and that the expansion encroached on neighboring property. The warrants were later dismissed or nolle prossed. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint against the County Administrator and two County employees alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process.The circuit court granted the County employees' demurrer and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the "thing decided" doctrine does not apply to a claim of malicious prosecution or abuse of process; (2) Plaintiffs' allegations of malicious prosecution were sufficient to withstand demurrer; and (3) Plaintiffs' claim of abuse of process failed as a matter of law because Plaintiffs did not allege that any particular process was abused. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201118.html" target="_blank">View "Eubank v. Thomas" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' abuse of process claim, holding that the claim for abuse of process failed as a matter of law.
Mathews County initiated criminal proceedings against Plaintiffs alleging that Plaintiffs added an expansion of their residence and that the expansion encroached on neighboring property. The warrants were later dismissed or nolle prossed. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint against the County Administrator and two County employees alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process.The circuit court granted the County employees' demurrer and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the "thing decided" doctrine does not apply to a claim of malicious prosecution or abuse of process; (2) Plaintiffs' allegations of malicious prosecution were sufficient to withstand demurrer; and (3) Plaintiffs' claim of abuse of process failed as a matter of law because Plaintiffs did not allege that any particular process was abused.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim and affirmed the court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' abuse of process claim, holding that the claim for abuse of process failed as a matter of law.
2021-08-05stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough201118https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/191545.htmlLopez v. Intercept Youth Services, Inc.2021-08-05T05:08:36-08:002021-08-05T05:08:36-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting a plea in bar and dismissing a complaint alleging that an employer operating a residential program for at-risk youth had negligently failed to protect an employee who had been murdered by one of the residents, holding that the court correctly held that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for the employee's death.
Plaintiff, the estate of the murdered employee, filed a negligence claim against Defendant, the employer, claiming that the employer had negligently created an unsafe work environment for the employee. Defendant responded by filing a plea in bar, arguing that the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Va. Code 65.2-307(A) precluded the negligence and wrongful death claims. The court granted the plea in bar and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly held that the employee's murder had arisen out of the conditions of her employment and that the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act applied. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/191545.html" target="_blank">View "Lopez v. Intercept Youth Services, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting a plea in bar and dismissing a complaint alleging that an employer operating a residential program for at-risk youth had negligently failed to protect an employee who had been murdered by one of the residents, holding that the court correctly held that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for the employee's death.
Plaintiff, the estate of the murdered employee, filed a negligence claim against Defendant, the employer, claiming that the employer had negligently created an unsafe work environment for the employee. Defendant responded by filing a plea in bar, arguing that the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Va. Code 65.2-307(A) precluded the negligence and wrongful death claims. The court granted the plea in bar and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly held that the employee's murder had arisen out of the conditions of her employment and that the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act applied.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment granting a plea in bar and dismissing a complaint alleging that an employer operating a residential program for at-risk youth had negligently failed to protect an employee who had been murdered by one of the residents, holding that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for the employee's death.
2021-08-05stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey191545https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/191716.htmlPotter v. BFK, Inc.2021-07-22T04:07:45-08:002021-07-22T04:07:45-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment finding that a Buell Classifier was ordinary building material and, as such, was subject to Virginia's statute of repose, holding that the Buell Classifier at issue was equipment within the meaning of Va. Code 8.01-250.
Luck Stone Corporation owned and operated a stone quarry. A part of its operation was system for the production of manufactured sand. In 2007, Luck Stone replaced earlier equipment with two Buell Classifiers and other components of the sand manufacturing system with products manufactured by BFK, Inc. Daniel Potter, who was employed by Luck Stone as a driver, was killed during the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff, Daniel's father, brought an action under the Virginia Wrongful death Act, Va. Code 8.01-50, against BFK. BFK filed a plea in bar, arguing that Plaintiff's action was barred under the statute of repose because the Buell Classifier did not qualify as equipment or machinery. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the action against BFK. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Buell Classifier was equipment within the meaning of section 8.01-250, and therefore, the circuit court erred in sustaining BFK's plea in bar based on its conclusion that the Buell Classifier qualified as ordinary building materials. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/191716.html" target="_blank">View "Potter v. BFK, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment finding that a Buell Classifier was ordinary building material and, as such, was subject to Virginia's statute of repose, holding that the Buell Classifier at issue was equipment within the meaning of Va. Code 8.01-250.
Luck Stone Corporation owned and operated a stone quarry. A part of its operation was system for the production of manufactured sand. In 2007, Luck Stone replaced earlier equipment with two Buell Classifiers and other components of the sand manufacturing system with products manufactured by BFK, Inc. Daniel Potter, who was employed by Luck Stone as a driver, was killed during the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff, Daniel's father, brought an action under the Virginia Wrongful death Act, Va. Code 8.01-50, against BFK. BFK filed a plea in bar, arguing that Plaintiff's action was barred under the statute of repose because the Buell Classifier did not qualify as equipment or machinery. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the action against BFK. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Buell Classifier was equipment within the meaning of section 8.01-250, and therefore, the circuit court erred in sustaining BFK's plea in bar based on its conclusion that the Buell Classifier qualified as ordinary building materials.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court finding that a Buell Classifier was ordinary building material and, as such, was subject to Virginia's statute of repose, Va. Code 8.01-250, holding that the Buell Classifier at issue was equipment within the meaning of section 8.01-250.
2021-07-22stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell191716https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201172.htmlVirginia Electric & Power Co. v. State Corporation Commission2021-07-15T04:38:41-08:002021-07-15T04:38:41-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the State Corporation Commission finding that a pumped storage hydroelectric facility (or pumped storage) generates "renewable energy" under the former definition in Va. Code 56-576 and that the amended definition would not apply to contracts executed before the amendment's effective date, holding that there was no error.
The Commission concluded that pumped storage satisfied the statutory definition of renewable energy in effect at the time that the service provider executed its contracts and declined to find that the amended definition would apply retroactively to contracts executed before the amendment's effective date. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its interpretation of the statute or its finding that pumped storage satisfied the former definition of renewable energy; and (2) the Commission did not err in refusing retroactively to apply the amended statutory definition of renewable energy to the service provider's contracts that were executed before the amendment took effect. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201172.html" target="_blank">View "Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. State Corporation Commission" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the State Corporation Commission finding that a pumped storage hydroelectric facility (or pumped storage) generates "renewable energy" under the former definition in Va. Code 56-576 and that the amended definition would not apply to contracts executed before the amendment's effective date, holding that there was no error.
The Commission concluded that pumped storage satisfied the statutory definition of renewable energy in effect at the time that the service provider executed its contracts and declined to find that the amended definition would apply retroactively to contracts executed before the amendment's effective date. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its interpretation of the statute or its finding that pumped storage satisfied the former definition of renewable energy; and (2) the Commission did not err in refusing retroactively to apply the amended statutory definition of renewable energy to the service provider's contracts that were executed before the amendment took effect.
The Supreme Court affirmed the State Corporation Commission's decision finding that a pumped storage hydroelectric facility generates "renewable energy" under the former definition in Va. Code 56-576 and that the amended definition would not apply to contracts executed before the amendment's effective date, holding that there was no error.
2021-07-15stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaChafin201172https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201108.htmlEvans v. Evans2021-07-15T04:38:41-08:002021-07-15T04:38:41-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court vacating as void ab initio a portion of an earlier divorce decree that had ordered Appellant to pay child support because the court issuing the support award never acquired personal jurisdiction over Father, holding that there was no error.
The circuit court concluded that the divorce court did not have personal jurisdiction over Appellant when it issued the final divorce decree, and therefore, the portion of the final decree order an in personam award of child support was void ab initio. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the divorce court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over Appellant pursuant to Appellee's requested service by order of publication; and (2) therefore, the provisions of the divorce decree awarding child support were void ab initio. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201108.html" target="_blank">View "Evans v. Evans" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court vacating as void ab initio a portion of an earlier divorce decree that had ordered Appellant to pay child support because the court issuing the support award never acquired personal jurisdiction over Father, holding that there was no error.
The circuit court concluded that the divorce court did not have personal jurisdiction over Appellant when it issued the final divorce decree, and therefore, the portion of the final decree order an in personam award of child support was void ab initio. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the divorce court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over Appellant pursuant to Appellee's requested service by order of publication; and (2) therefore, the provisions of the divorce decree awarding child support were void ab initio.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment vacating as void ab initio a portion of an earlier divorce decree that had ordered Appellant to pay child support because the court issuing the support award never acquired personal jurisdiction over Father, holding that circuit court did not err.
2021-07-15stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey201108https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200703.htmlKinsey v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.2021-07-15T04:38:40-08:002021-07-15T04:38:40-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Virginia Electric and Power Company's (VEPCO) plea in bar regarding conflict preemption and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaints alleging common law personal injury, holding that conflict preemption barred Plaintiffs' claims.
After VEPCO installed smart meters on Plaintiffs' home Plaintiffs fell ill with symptoms of unknown origin or cause. Plaintiffs sued VEPCO for common law injuries. The circuit court granted VEPCO's plea in bar and dismissed the complaints, finding that the claims were barred by conflict preemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims as preempted by federal law. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200703.html" target="_blank">View "Kinsey v. Virginia Electric & Power Co." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Virginia Electric and Power Company's (VEPCO) plea in bar regarding conflict preemption and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaints alleging common law personal injury, holding that conflict preemption barred Plaintiffs' claims.
After VEPCO installed smart meters on Plaintiffs' home Plaintiffs fell ill with symptoms of unknown origin or cause. Plaintiffs sued VEPCO for common law injuries. The circuit court granted VEPCO's plea in bar and dismissed the complaints, finding that the claims were barred by conflict preemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims as preempted by federal law.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment sustaining Virginia Electric and Power Company's plea in bar regarding conflict preemption and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaints alleging common law personal injury, holding that conflict preemption barred Plaintiffs' claims.
2021-07-15stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaDonald W. Lemons200703https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200823.htmlDill v. Kroger Limited Partnership I2021-07-08T04:22:13-08:002021-07-08T04:22:13-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendants' motion to strike as to all of Plaintiff's claims, holding that the circuit court erred in granting Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim.
Plaintiff was prosecuted for shoplifting at a Kroger supermarket, but the case was dismissed when it became clear that Plaintiff had been misidentified. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Kroger and one of its managers (collectively, Defendants) asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The circuit court granted Defendants' motions to strike as to all of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in granting Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim because it ignored evidence that was favorable to Plaintiff; and (2) the circuit court did not err in granting Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's remaining claims. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200823.html" target="_blank">View "Dill v. Kroger Limited Partnership I" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendants' motion to strike as to all of Plaintiff's claims, holding that the circuit court erred in granting Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim.
Plaintiff was prosecuted for shoplifting at a Kroger supermarket, but the case was dismissed when it became clear that Plaintiff had been misidentified. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Kroger and one of its managers (collectively, Defendants) asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The circuit court granted Defendants' motions to strike as to all of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in granting Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim because it ignored evidence that was favorable to Plaintiff; and (2) the circuit court did not err in granting Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's remaining claims.
The Supreme Court reversed in part the circuit court's judgment granting Defendants' motion to strike as to all of Plaintiff's claims, holding that the court erred in granting Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim.
2021-07-08stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaS. Bernard Goodwyn200823https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200748.htmlPinedo v. Commonwealth2021-07-08T04:22:13-08:002021-07-08T04:22:13-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court refusing to instruct the jury "with the model instruction regarding a claim-of-right defense," holding that the claim-of-right defense did not apply under these circumstances.
Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At trial, Defendant asserted a claim-of-right defense, arguing that he lacked the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of robbery or the other offenses that relied on the robbery charge. The circuit court, however, refused to give the model jury instruction regarding the claim-of-right defense. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it refused to instruct the jury regarding the claim-of-right defense. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200748.html" target="_blank">View "Pinedo v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court refusing to instruct the jury "with the model instruction regarding a claim-of-right defense," holding that the claim-of-right defense did not apply under these circumstances.
Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At trial, Defendant asserted a claim-of-right defense, arguing that he lacked the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of robbery or the other offenses that relied on the robbery charge. The circuit court, however, refused to give the model jury instruction regarding the claim-of-right defense. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it refused to instruct the jury regarding the claim-of-right defense.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment affirming the decision of the circuit court refusing to instruct the jury "with the model instruction regarding a claim-of-right defense," holding that the claim-of-right defense did not apply under these circumstances.
2021-07-08stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaChafin200748https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200336.htmlLucas v. Riverhill Poultry, Inc.2021-07-01T04:37:55-08:002021-07-01T04:37:55-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court entering judgment on the jury's verdict for Defendants in this wrongful death action, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's evidentiary rulings.
This case arising from an unexplained single-vehicle accident in which both occupants died. At issue during trial was which of the two occupants was the driver. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err (1) in excluding portions of the medical examiner's autopsy report and Plaintiff's experts' opinions regarding the identity of the driver and Gerald Hilliard's alleged sleep disorder; and (2) in refusing Plaintiff's proffered jury instruction on falling asleep at the wheel. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200336.html" target="_blank">View "Lucas v. Riverhill Poultry, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court entering judgment on the jury's verdict for Defendants in this wrongful death action, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's evidentiary rulings.
This case arising from an unexplained single-vehicle accident in which both occupants died. At issue during trial was which of the two occupants was the driver. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err (1) in excluding portions of the medical examiner's autopsy report and Plaintiff's experts' opinions regarding the identity of the driver and Gerald Hilliard's alleged sleep disorder; and (2) in refusing Plaintiff's proffered jury instruction on falling asleep at the wheel.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's entry of judgment on the jury's verdict for Defendants in this wrongful death action, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's evidentiary rulings.
2021-07-01stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaLeRoy F. Millette, Jr.200336https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/191413.htmlGrayson v. Westwood Buildings L.P.2021-06-24T04:58:22-08:002021-06-24T04:58:22-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court finding in favor of Landlord against all of defendants except two on Landlord's suit against two tenants and seven other parties for fraudulent and voluntary conveyances and against a single defendant for conversion, holding that the trial court misapplied Virginia law and made factually insupportable findings.
In its letter opinion, the trial court made each of the defendants which the court had found liable jointly and severally liable with in personam judgments for the unpaid rent, Landlord's attorney fees, and sanctions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's in personal, joint and several judgments in this case must be reversed as legally erroneous and factually insupportable; and (2) the trial court erred in finding the single defendant liable for conversion. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/191413.html" target="_blank">View "Grayson v. Westwood Buildings L.P." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court finding in favor of Landlord against all of defendants except two on Landlord's suit against two tenants and seven other parties for fraudulent and voluntary conveyances and against a single defendant for conversion, holding that the trial court misapplied Virginia law and made factually insupportable findings.
In its letter opinion, the trial court made each of the defendants which the court had found liable jointly and severally liable with in personam judgments for the unpaid rent, Landlord's attorney fees, and sanctions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's in personal, joint and several judgments in this case must be reversed as legally erroneous and factually insupportable; and (2) the trial court erred in finding the single defendant liable for conversion.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's finding in favor of Landlord against all of defendants except two on Landlord's action alleging fraudulent and voluntary conveyances and conversion, holding that the trial court misapplied Virginia law and made factually insupportable findings.
2021-06-24stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey191413https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200356.htmlNicholson v. Commonwealth2021-06-17T04:42:40-08:002021-06-17T04:42:40-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's appeal of her condition of driving on a suspended license, fifth offense, on the basis that her notice of appeal was fatally defective, holding that Appellant's notice of appeal was adequate.
After oral argument on the merits, the court of appeals sua sponte raised the inconsistency between Appellant's notice of appeal, which identified the Commonwealth of Virginia as the prosecuting authority, and the circuit court's sentencing order, which named Albermarle County as the prosecuting authority. On remand, the circuit court entered an order nunc pro tunc that retained Albemarle County as the prosecuting authority. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as "fatally defective." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) while the notice of appeal incorrectly named the Commonwealth rather than Albemarle County, that defect was not fatal and was subject to waiver; and (2) because Albemarle County entered a general appearance, any defect associated with a failure to notify the County was waived. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200356.html" target="_blank">View "Nicholson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's appeal of her condition of driving on a suspended license, fifth offense, on the basis that her notice of appeal was fatally defective, holding that Appellant's notice of appeal was adequate.
After oral argument on the merits, the court of appeals sua sponte raised the inconsistency between Appellant's notice of appeal, which identified the Commonwealth of Virginia as the prosecuting authority, and the circuit court's sentencing order, which named Albermarle County as the prosecuting authority. On remand, the circuit court entered an order nunc pro tunc that retained Albemarle County as the prosecuting authority. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as "fatally defective." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) while the notice of appeal incorrectly named the Commonwealth rather than Albemarle County, that defect was not fatal and was subject to waiver; and (2) because Albemarle County entered a general appearance, any defect associated with a failure to notify the County was waived.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment dismissing Appellant's appeal of her condition of driving on a suspended license on the basis that her notice of appeal was fatally defective, holding that Appellant's notice of appeal was adequate.
2021-06-17stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough200356https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200504.htmlGaliotos v. Galiotos2021-06-03T05:07:32-08:002021-06-03T05:07:32-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in these appeals regarding two brothers' disputes concerning the administration of their deceased mother's estate, holding that the circuit court did not err in removing both brother from their fiduciary roles and replacing them with a disinterested third party.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in removing the brothers as co-executors on the basis that the brothers were, to the detriment of the estate, deadlocked concerning the administration of the estate; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the brothers compensation, legal fees, and costs; and (3) there was no reversible error regarding the presence of a third brother in the courtroom during the trial. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200504.html" target="_blank">View "Galiotos v. Galiotos" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in these appeals regarding two brothers' disputes concerning the administration of their deceased mother's estate, holding that the circuit court did not err in removing both brother from their fiduciary roles and replacing them with a disinterested third party.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in removing the brothers as co-executors on the basis that the brothers were, to the detriment of the estate, deadlocked concerning the administration of the estate; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the brothers compensation, legal fees, and costs; and (3) there was no reversible error regarding the presence of a third brother in the courtroom during the trial.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment in these appeals regarding two brothers' disputes concerning the administration of their deceased mother's estate, holding that the circuit court did not err in removing both brother from their fiduciary roles and replacing them with a disinterested third party.
2021-06-03stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaS. Bernard Goodwyn200504https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201028.htmlNorton v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County2021-05-27T05:07:43-08:002021-05-27T05:07:43-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellants' challenges to certain amendments to the Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance and the imposition of a Transient Occupancy Tax, holding that the circuit court did not err.
Appellants owned or possessed homes within Fairfax County. In 2018, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County amended the Zoning Ordinance (the STL Amendment) redefining a dwelling and adding definitions for "transient occupancy" and "short-term lodging." The Board also amended the County Code to impose a transient occupancy tax of two percent of the cost of the short-term lodging (the TOT Amendment). Appellants brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the STL Amendment and the TOT Amendment. The trial court dismissed Appellants' claims with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing Appellants' challenges to the amendments. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201028.html" target="_blank">View "Norton v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellants' challenges to certain amendments to the Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance and the imposition of a Transient Occupancy Tax, holding that the circuit court did not err.
Appellants owned or possessed homes within Fairfax County. In 2018, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County amended the Zoning Ordinance (the STL Amendment) redefining a dwelling and adding definitions for "transient occupancy" and "short-term lodging." The Board also amended the County Code to impose a transient occupancy tax of two percent of the cost of the short-term lodging (the TOT Amendment). Appellants brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the STL Amendment and the TOT Amendment. The trial court dismissed Appellants' claims with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing Appellants' challenges to the amendments.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment dismissing Appellants' challenges to certain amendments to the Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance and the imposition of a Transient Occupancy Tax, holding that the circuit court did not err.
2021-05-27stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCleo E. Powell201028https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201006.htmlLogan v. Commonwealth2021-05-27T05:07:43-08:002021-05-27T05:07:43-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's misdemeanor conviction for attempting to purchase a firearm while subject to a protective order, holding that the admission of certain evidence did not violate Defendant's confrontation right.
At issue was whether a return of service on a preliminary protective order, which included the serving deputy's signature and the time and date of service, was testimonial evidence subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court of appeals concluded that the signing and dating of the return of service was a ministerial duty on the part of the deputy sheriff that was functionally distinct from the delivery of live testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the return of service was intended to serve a primarily administrative purpose, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and therefore, the admission of the evidence did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/201006.html" target="_blank">View "Logan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's misdemeanor conviction for attempting to purchase a firearm while subject to a protective order, holding that the admission of certain evidence did not violate Defendant's confrontation right.
At issue was whether a return of service on a preliminary protective order, which included the serving deputy's signature and the time and date of service, was testimonial evidence subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court of appeals concluded that the signing and dating of the return of service was a ministerial duty on the part of the deputy sheriff that was functionally distinct from the delivery of live testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the return of service was intended to serve a primarily administrative purpose, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and therefore, the admission of the evidence did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment affirming Defendant's misdemeanor conviction for attempting to purchase a firearm while subject to a protective order, holding that the admission of certain evidence did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.
2021-05-27stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaWilliam C. Mims201006https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200963.htmlBonanno v. Quinn2021-05-27T05:07:42-08:002021-05-27T05:07:42-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing a petition for appeal filed by a person who was not a party in the proceeding from which the appeal was taken, holding that there was no error in the judgment of the court of appeals.
Michelina Bonanno was the mother of Elizabeth Quinn. Elizabeth had a daughter from a previous relationship. Elizabeth and Bonanno were awarded joint legal custody of the child, and Elizabeth was awarded physical custody. Elizabeth subsequently married James Quinn. When Elizabeth died, James filed a petition for adoption, asserting that Bonanno's consent was unnecessary because of lack of visitation or contact. After the circuit court entered a final order of adoption Bonanno filed a motion to vacate and set aside the order and then filed a petition for appeal. James filed a motion to dismiss, noting that Bonanno had not filed a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding. The circuit court denied Bonanno a hearing on the motions, and Bonanno appealed. The circuit court dismissed the appeals, concluding that Bonanno lacked standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) lacked jurisdiction to hear Bonanno's petition for appeal; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by awarding James appellate attorney's fees. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200963.html" target="_blank">View "Bonanno v. Quinn" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing a petition for appeal filed by a person who was not a party in the proceeding from which the appeal was taken, holding that there was no error in the judgment of the court of appeals.
Michelina Bonanno was the mother of Elizabeth Quinn. Elizabeth had a daughter from a previous relationship. Elizabeth and Bonanno were awarded joint legal custody of the child, and Elizabeth was awarded physical custody. Elizabeth subsequently married James Quinn. When Elizabeth died, James filed a petition for adoption, asserting that Bonanno's consent was unnecessary because of lack of visitation or contact. After the circuit court entered a final order of adoption Bonanno filed a motion to vacate and set aside the order and then filed a petition for appeal. James filed a motion to dismiss, noting that Bonanno had not filed a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding. The circuit court denied Bonanno a hearing on the motions, and Bonanno appealed. The circuit court dismissed the appeals, concluding that Bonanno lacked standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) lacked jurisdiction to hear Bonanno's petition for appeal; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by awarding James appellate attorney's fees.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision dismissing a petition for appeal filed by a person who was not a party in the proceeding from which the appeal was taken, holding that there was no error in the judgment of the court of appeals.
2021-05-27stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaWilliam C. Mims200963https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200695.htmlMachen v. Williams2021-05-27T05:07:42-08:002021-05-27T05:07:42-08:00
In this appeal arising out of a suit to impeach a will the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying a plea in bar, holding that if the circuit court erred in denying the plea in bar, any error was harmless.
Ten days before the decedent's death, Robert Machen, a lawyer who had befriended the decedent, presented the decedent with copies of a will he had drafted for her signature. The decedent signed the will, which contained a no-contest clause providing that the decedent's family members would get nothing from the estate if they contested the will. All family members except David Williams signed a release form. Williams then brought this suit to impeach the will. Machen filed a plea in bar asserting that Williams lacked standing to sue. The circuit court denied the plea in bar and held that the will and been procured by undue influence and fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that any error in denying the plea in bar as to Williams was harmless. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200695.html" target="_blank">View "Machen v. Williams" on Justia Law</a>
In this appeal arising out of a suit to impeach a will the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying a plea in bar, holding that if the circuit court erred in denying the plea in bar, any error was harmless.
Ten days before the decedent's death, Robert Machen, a lawyer who had befriended the decedent, presented the decedent with copies of a will he had drafted for her signature. The decedent signed the will, which contained a no-contest clause providing that the decedent's family members would get nothing from the estate if they contested the will. All family members except David Williams signed a release form. Williams then brought this suit to impeach the will. Machen filed a plea in bar asserting that Williams lacked standing to sue. The circuit court denied the plea in bar and held that the will and been procured by undue influence and fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that any error in denying the plea in bar as to Williams was harmless.
In this appeal arising out of a suit to impeach a will the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying a plea in bar, holding that if the circuit court erred in denying the plea in bar the error was harmless.
2021-05-27stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaPer Curiam200695https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200222.htmlMerck v. Vincent2021-05-27T05:07:42-08:002021-05-27T05:07:42-08:00
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred by affirming an award of permanent total disability benefits after Employee suffered an injury that was a compensable consequence of an earlier compensable injury.
Merrick Vincent was injured during the course and scope of his employment and was awarded temporary total benefits. Vincent later fell down the stairs of his home and injured his left knee. A deputy commission awarded him benefits on the grounds that the knee injury was a compensable consequence of his previous injuries. Vincent then filed a change-in-condition claim seeking an award of permanent total disability benefits under Va. Code 65.2-503(C)(1). A deputy commission awarded the benefits, and the Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 65.2-503(C)(1) permits an award of permanent total disability only if two disabling injuries occurred "in the same accident"; and (2) because Vincent suffered his original injuries and his knee injury in different accidents, the court of appeals erred by affirming the Commission's ruling. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200222.html" target="_blank">View "Merck v. Vincent" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred by affirming an award of permanent total disability benefits after Employee suffered an injury that was a compensable consequence of an earlier compensable injury.
Merrick Vincent was injured during the course and scope of his employment and was awarded temporary total benefits. Vincent later fell down the stairs of his home and injured his left knee. A deputy commission awarded him benefits on the grounds that the knee injury was a compensable consequence of his previous injuries. Vincent then filed a change-in-condition claim seeking an award of permanent total disability benefits under Va. Code 65.2-503(C)(1). A deputy commission awarded the benefits, and the Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 65.2-503(C)(1) permits an award of permanent total disability only if two disabling injuries occurred "in the same accident"; and (2) because Vincent suffered his original injuries and his knee injury in different accidents, the court of appeals erred by affirming the Commission's ruling.
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred by affirming an award of permanent total disability benefits after Employee suffered an injury that was a compensable consequence of an earlier compensable injury.
2021-05-27stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaWilliam C. Mims200222https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200195.htmlHistoric Alexandria Foundation v. City of Alexandria2021-05-27T05:07:41-08:002021-05-27T05:07:41-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining that the Historic Alexandria Foundation lacked standing to pursue the claims asserted in this case, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's judgment.
Vowell, LLC filed applications to obtain certain permits for the renovation of property located in the Old and Historic District of the City of Alexandria. The Old and Historic Alexandria District Board of Architectural Review (the BAR) approved Vowell's applications, and the City Council affirmed the BAR's decision. The Foundation appealed the City's Council decision. The circuit court dismissed the matter with prejudice, concluding that the petition did not establish that the Foundation was an aggrieved party with standing to pursue the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Foundation lacked standing because the allegations of the petition failed to establish that the Foundation suffered particularized harm that differed from that suffered by the public in general. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200195.html" target="_blank">View "Historic Alexandria Foundation v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining that the Historic Alexandria Foundation lacked standing to pursue the claims asserted in this case, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's judgment.
Vowell, LLC filed applications to obtain certain permits for the renovation of property located in the Old and Historic District of the City of Alexandria. The Old and Historic Alexandria District Board of Architectural Review (the BAR) approved Vowell's applications, and the City Council affirmed the BAR's decision. The Foundation appealed the City's Council decision. The circuit court dismissed the matter with prejudice, concluding that the petition did not establish that the Foundation was an aggrieved party with standing to pursue the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Foundation lacked standing because the allegations of the petition failed to establish that the Foundation suffered particularized harm that differed from that suffered by the public in general.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment determining that the Historic Alexandria Foundation lacked standing to pursue the claims asserted in this case, holding that the circuit court did not err.
2021-05-27stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaPer Curiam200195https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200187.htmlKosko v. Ramser2021-05-20T04:37:35-08:002021-05-20T04:37:35-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding costs to Defendants under Va. Code 8.01-380 after the entry of a nonsuit order, holding that, under Rule 1:1, the written order awarding costs was untimely and must be vacated.
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against Defendants. After the circuit court granted Defendants' motion to disqualify Plaintiff's expert witness, Plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited the case. Twenty days after entry of the nonsuit order, the court stated from the bench that it would award costs to Defendants. However, the court's written order awarding costs was entered more than twenty-one days after entry of the nonsuit order. The Supreme Court held that the order was void because it was entered more than twenty-one days following entry of the nonsuit order. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200187.html" target="_blank">View "Kosko v. Ramser" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding costs to Defendants under Va. Code 8.01-380 after the entry of a nonsuit order, holding that, under Rule 1:1, the written order awarding costs was untimely and must be vacated.
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against Defendants. After the circuit court granted Defendants' motion to disqualify Plaintiff's expert witness, Plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited the case. Twenty days after entry of the nonsuit order, the court stated from the bench that it would award costs to Defendants. However, the court's written order awarding costs was entered more than twenty-one days after entry of the nonsuit order. The Supreme Court held that the order was void because it was entered more than twenty-one days following entry of the nonsuit order.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment awarding costs to Defendants under Va. Code 8.01-380 after the entry of a nonsuit order, holding that, under Rule 1:1, the written order awarding costs was untimely and must be vacated.
2021-05-20stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaMcCullough200187https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200165.htmlMyers v. Commonwealth2021-05-13T04:35:36-08:002021-05-13T04:35:36-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of carrying a concealed weapon, second offense, in violation of Va. Code 18.2-308, holding that the trial court erred by failing to apply the statutory exception to criminal liability recognized in subsection 18.2-308(C)(8).
The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction for violating section 18.2-308(A). On appeal, Defendant argued that the statutory exception to criminal liability recognized by subsection 18.2-308(C)(8) applied to the undisputed facts of this case. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to the protection of subsection (C)(8)'s exception to criminal liability for carrying a concealed weapon because the handgun at issue in this case was secured in a container within Defendant's personal, private vehicle. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2021/200165.html" target="_blank">View "Myers v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of carrying a concealed weapon, second offense, in violation of Va. Code 18.2-308, holding that the trial court erred by failing to apply the statutory exception to criminal liability recognized in subsection 18.2-308(C)(8).
The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction for violating section 18.2-308(A). On appeal, Defendant argued that the statutory exception to criminal liability recognized by subsection 18.2-308(C)(8) applied to the undisputed facts of this case. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to the protection of subsection (C)(8)'s exception to criminal liability for carrying a concealed weapon because the handgun at issue in this case was secured in a container within Defendant's personal, private vehicle.
The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of carrying a concealed weapon, holding that the trial court erred by failing to apply the statutory exception to criminal liability recognized in Va. Code 18.2-308(C)(8).
2021-05-13stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaKelsey200165