Transportation Law - Justia Case Law Summarieshttps://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/transportation-law/2024-03-28T12:46:39-08:00Justia Inchttps://www.justia.com/Justia Lawhttps://justatic.com/v/20240327151121/shared/images/social-media/law.pngCopyright 2024 Justia Inchttps://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2024/23-ap-086.htmlZeno-Ethridge v. Comcast Corporation2024-03-22T06:30:59-08:002024-03-22T06:30:59-08:00
The plaintiffs, Jennifer Zeno-Ethridge and Dennis Ethridge, appealed from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Comcast Corporation, Eustis Cable, and Green Mountain Flagging. The suit arose from an incident in which Jennifer witnessed a fatal accident involving a utility truck and a flagger while she was driving. Following the incident, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.
Jennifer sued the defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and negligence, while Dennis filed a loss-of-consortium claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining that Jennifer's contact with the flagger’s blood and brain matter did not constitute a "physical impact from external force" necessary for a NIED claim. It also concluded that Jennifer's PTSD diagnosis did not satisfy the "actual injury" requirement for a negligence claim.
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the act of Jennifer stepping in the flagger's blood and brain matter was not a physical impact from an external force. Furthermore, the court clarified that a PTSD diagnosis alone is insufficient to satisfy the “actual injury” requirement of a negligence claim, as it is a mental or emotional harm, rather than a physical one. Consequently, Jennifer's NIED and negligence claims failed as a matter of law. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Dennis's loss-of-consortium claim, which was dependent upon the success of Jennifer's claims. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2024/23-ap-086.html" target="_blank">View "Zeno-Ethridge v. Comcast Corporation" on Justia Law</a>
The plaintiffs, Jennifer Zeno-Ethridge and Dennis Ethridge, appealed from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Comcast Corporation, Eustis Cable, and Green Mountain Flagging. The suit arose from an incident in which Jennifer witnessed a fatal accident involving a utility truck and a flagger while she was driving. Following the incident, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.
Jennifer sued the defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and negligence, while Dennis filed a loss-of-consortium claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining that Jennifer's contact with the flagger’s blood and brain matter did not constitute a "physical impact from external force" necessary for a NIED claim. It also concluded that Jennifer's PTSD diagnosis did not satisfy the "actual injury" requirement for a negligence claim.
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the act of Jennifer stepping in the flagger's blood and brain matter was not a physical impact from an external force. Furthermore, the court clarified that a PTSD diagnosis alone is insufficient to satisfy the “actual injury” requirement of a negligence claim, as it is a mental or emotional harm, rather than a physical one. Consequently, Jennifer's NIED and negligence claims failed as a matter of law. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Dennis's loss-of-consortium claim, which was dependent upon the success of Jennifer's claims.
2024-03-22stateVermontVermont Supreme CourtEATONhttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0356.htmlState v. Fork2024-03-21T05:30:43-08:002024-03-21T05:30:43-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio was called upon to interpret the definition of "motor vehicle" as it applied to the crime of aggravated vehicular assault. The defendant, Joshua Fork, was charged with multiple counts, including aggravated vehicular assault, after driving a Polaris under the influence of alcohol and injuring his passengers. At issue was whether the Polaris should be classified as a "motor vehicle" or a "utility vehicle."
The Court ruled that the definition of "motor vehicle" in R.C. 4501.01(B), which applies to penal laws, should be used in the context of aggravated vehicular assault. It also held that the Polaris should be classified as a "utility vehicle," as defined by R.C. 4501.01(VV), based on its principal purpose, not its use at the time of the incident.
The Court reasoned that the principal purpose of the Polaris, as shown by evidence and testimony, was for farm-related activities, such as hauling rocks and bags of seed, removing limbs, pulling a sprayer, and trimming trees. The Polaris's ancillary use for recreation did not affect its principal purpose.
The Court concluded that, since the Polaris fit the definition of a "utility vehicle" under R.C. 4501.01(VV), the evidence admitted at trial was legally insufficient to support Fork’s convictions for aggravated vehicular assault. Consequently, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, which had reversed the trial court's judgment and vacated Fork’s convictions for aggravated vehicular assault. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0356.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Fork" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio was called upon to interpret the definition of "motor vehicle" as it applied to the crime of aggravated vehicular assault. The defendant, Joshua Fork, was charged with multiple counts, including aggravated vehicular assault, after driving a Polaris under the influence of alcohol and injuring his passengers. At issue was whether the Polaris should be classified as a "motor vehicle" or a "utility vehicle."
The Court ruled that the definition of "motor vehicle" in R.C. 4501.01(B), which applies to penal laws, should be used in the context of aggravated vehicular assault. It also held that the Polaris should be classified as a "utility vehicle," as defined by R.C. 4501.01(VV), based on its principal purpose, not its use at the time of the incident.
The Court reasoned that the principal purpose of the Polaris, as shown by evidence and testimony, was for farm-related activities, such as hauling rocks and bags of seed, removing limbs, pulling a sprayer, and trimming trees. The Polaris's ancillary use for recreation did not affect its principal purpose.
The Court concluded that, since the Polaris fit the definition of a "utility vehicle" under R.C. 4501.01(VV), the evidence admitted at trial was legally insufficient to support Fork’s convictions for aggravated vehicular assault. Consequently, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, which had reversed the trial court's judgment and vacated Fork’s convictions for aggravated vehicular assault.
2024-03-21stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioKennedyhttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-2214/21-2214-2024-03-20.htmlDaulatzai v. Maryland2024-03-20T11:00:47-08:002024-03-20T11:00:47-08:00
In this case, the plaintiff, Anila Daulatzai, was removed from a Southwest Airlines flight after the captain received information about her dog allergy and the presence of two dogs on board. Daulatzai insisted on remaining in her seat despite the captain’s decision, leading to her physical removal by Maryland Transportation Authority police officers. She was later charged with various offenses, including disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.
Daulatzai filed an action against Southwest Airlines and the State of Maryland, alleging various grounds to challenge her removal from the plane and her arrest. The district court dismissed Daulatzai’s complaint for failure to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. Daulatzai appealed that judgment and, while her appeal was pending, she also filed a motion in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), seeking to file a fourth version of her complaint with the district court.
The court denied her request, finding that her efforts were pursued in bad faith, that her repeated failures to cure defects in her pleadings had been prejudicial to the defendants, and that the fourth complaint would, in any event, be futile. Daulatzai appealed that ruling as well.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Daulatzai had failed to establish any of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daulatzai leave to file her proposed third amended complaint. The court also found that Daulatzai had waived her challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her second amended complaint by failing to preserve it below.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-2214/21-2214-2024-03-20.html" target="_blank">View "Daulatzai v. Maryland" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the plaintiff, Anila Daulatzai, was removed from a Southwest Airlines flight after the captain received information about her dog allergy and the presence of two dogs on board. Daulatzai insisted on remaining in her seat despite the captain’s decision, leading to her physical removal by Maryland Transportation Authority police officers. She was later charged with various offenses, including disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.
Daulatzai filed an action against Southwest Airlines and the State of Maryland, alleging various grounds to challenge her removal from the plane and her arrest. The district court dismissed Daulatzai’s complaint for failure to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. Daulatzai appealed that judgment and, while her appeal was pending, she also filed a motion in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), seeking to file a fourth version of her complaint with the district court.
The court denied her request, finding that her efforts were pursued in bad faith, that her repeated failures to cure defects in her pleadings had been prejudicial to the defendants, and that the fourth complaint would, in any event, be futile. Daulatzai appealed that ruling as well.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Daulatzai had failed to establish any of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daulatzai leave to file her proposed third amended complaint. The court also found that Daulatzai had waived her challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her second amended complaint by failing to preserve it below.
2024-03-20federalUS Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitNIEMEYERhttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-1777/23-1777-2024-03-18.htmlTillman Transp., LLC v. MI Bus. Inc.2024-03-18T13:00:29-08:002024-03-18T13:00:29-08:00
The plaintiff, Tillman Transportation, LLC, and the defendant, MI Business, Inc. (operating as affiliate companies RDT and RDF) entered into three trucking contracts, each of which included arbitration clauses. After the contracts were terminated, disputes arose between the parties, leading to this lawsuit and a separate ongoing arbitration. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires enforcement of the arbitration clauses. Tillman contended that it was exempt from compulsory arbitration under Section 1 of the FAA.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, ruling that Section 1 of the FAA, which exempts "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" from the FAA's general policy favoring arbitration, did not apply to the arbitration clauses in the contracts because Tillman, as a limited liability company in contract with another corporate entity, did not qualify for the Section 1 exemption.
Tillman appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the Section 1 exemption did not apply to an agreement between two corporate entities. Thus, the exemption did not apply to Tillman, a limited liability company. The court also noted that Tillman had waived certain arguments by failing to raise them in its initial brief on appeal. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-1777/23-1777-2024-03-18.html" target="_blank">View "Tillman Transp., LLC v. MI Bus. Inc." on Justia Law</a>
The plaintiff, Tillman Transportation, LLC, and the defendant, MI Business, Inc. (operating as affiliate companies RDT and RDF) entered into three trucking contracts, each of which included arbitration clauses. After the contracts were terminated, disputes arose between the parties, leading to this lawsuit and a separate ongoing arbitration. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires enforcement of the arbitration clauses. Tillman contended that it was exempt from compulsory arbitration under Section 1 of the FAA.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, ruling that Section 1 of the FAA, which exempts "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" from the FAA's general policy favoring arbitration, did not apply to the arbitration clauses in the contracts because Tillman, as a limited liability company in contract with another corporate entity, did not qualify for the Section 1 exemption.
Tillman appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the Section 1 exemption did not apply to an agreement between two corporate entities. Thus, the exemption did not apply to Tillman, a limited liability company. The court also noted that Tillman had waived certain arguments by failing to raise them in its initial brief on appeal.
2024-03-18federalUS Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitColehttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-55498/22-55498-2024-03-13.htmlSOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY V. ORANGE COUNTY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY2024-03-13T08:30:52-08:002024-03-13T08:30:52-08:00
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) in a case brought by two utilities, Southern California Edison Company and Southern California Gas Company. The utilities claimed they were entitled to compensation under the Takings Clause or under state law for having to relocate their equipment from public streets to allow for the construction of a streetcar line.
The court held that the utilities did not have a property interest under California law in maintaining their facilities at their specific locations in the face of OCTA’s efforts to construct a streetcar line. The California Supreme Court recognized in a previous case that a public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its own expense when necessary to make way for a proper governmental use of the streets.
The court rejected the utilities’ argument that constructing rail lines is per se a proprietary activity, not a governmental one. California common law has traditionally required utilities to bear relocation costs when governments construct subways, and there is no reason why above-ground rail lines should be treated differently.
Finally, the court rejected the utilities’ supplemental state-law claim that California Public Utilities Code section 40162 places the costs of relocation on OCTA. That provision says nothing about imposing the costs of relocation on OCTA. Thus, section 40162 does not apply to OCTA’s project.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-55498/22-55498-2024-03-13.html" target="_blank">View "SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY V. ORANGE COUNTY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY" on Justia Law</a>
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) in a case brought by two utilities, Southern California Edison Company and Southern California Gas Company. The utilities claimed they were entitled to compensation under the Takings Clause or under state law for having to relocate their equipment from public streets to allow for the construction of a streetcar line.
The court held that the utilities did not have a property interest under California law in maintaining their facilities at their specific locations in the face of OCTA’s efforts to construct a streetcar line. The California Supreme Court recognized in a previous case that a public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its own expense when necessary to make way for a proper governmental use of the streets.
The court rejected the utilities’ argument that constructing rail lines is per se a proprietary activity, not a governmental one. California common law has traditionally required utilities to bear relocation costs when governments construct subways, and there is no reason why above-ground rail lines should be treated differently.
Finally, the court rejected the utilities’ supplemental state-law claim that California Public Utilities Code section 40162 places the costs of relocation on OCTA. That provision says nothing about imposing the costs of relocation on OCTA. Thus, section 40162 does not apply to OCTA’s project.
2024-03-13federalUS Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMillerhttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-3561/22-3561-2024-03-12.htmlBradford v. Team Pizza, Inc.2024-03-12T11:30:19-08:002024-03-12T11:30:19-08:00
This case involves two consolidated appeals from the Western District of Michigan and the Southern District of Ohio. The dispute revolves around how pizza delivery drivers should be reimbursed for the cost of using their personal vehicles for work. The delivery drivers argued that they should be reimbursed according to a mileage rate published by the IRS, while the employers contended that a “reasonable approximation” of the drivers’ expenses sufficed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with both parties. The court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay each employee a wage of not less than $7.25 an hour. If the employer requires an employee to provide tools for work, the employer violates the Act if the cost of these tools cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to be paid under the Act.
Applying these standards, the court rejected the employers' argument that a “reasonable approximation” of a delivery driver’s cost of providing his vehicle is always sufficient reimbursement. Similarly, the court also rejected the drivers' argument that they should be reimbursed using the IRS standard-mileage rate for business deductions, as this rate is a nationwide average and does not accurately reflect an individual employee's actual costs.
The court vacated the district courts’ decisions and remanded for further proceedings, suggesting that a potential solution could be a burden-shifting regime similar to those in Title VII cases.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-3561/22-3561-2024-03-12.html" target="_blank">View "Bradford v. Team Pizza, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
This case involves two consolidated appeals from the Western District of Michigan and the Southern District of Ohio. The dispute revolves around how pizza delivery drivers should be reimbursed for the cost of using their personal vehicles for work. The delivery drivers argued that they should be reimbursed according to a mileage rate published by the IRS, while the employers contended that a “reasonable approximation” of the drivers’ expenses sufficed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with both parties. The court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay each employee a wage of not less than $7.25 an hour. If the employer requires an employee to provide tools for work, the employer violates the Act if the cost of these tools cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to be paid under the Act.
Applying these standards, the court rejected the employers' argument that a “reasonable approximation” of a delivery driver’s cost of providing his vehicle is always sufficient reimbursement. Similarly, the court also rejected the drivers' argument that they should be reimbursed using the IRS standard-mileage rate for business deductions, as this rate is a nationwide average and does not accurately reflect an individual employee's actual costs.
The court vacated the district courts’ decisions and remanded for further proceedings, suggesting that a potential solution could be a burden-shifting regime similar to those in Title VII cases.
2024-03-12federalUS Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitKETHLEDGEhttps://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2024/121.htmlSCHIEWE v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO2024-03-12T10:36:01-08:002024-03-12T10:36:01-08:00
This case involves Jade P. Schiewe and Zachary Pfaff, who filed a lawsuit against the Cessna Aircraft Company, alleging negligence after a plane crash in September 2010. The plaintiffs were flying a Cessna 172RG when a fire erupted in the cockpit, leading to a crash landing. They claimed that Cessna was negligent in not updating its service manual to include a new part and its installation instructions. Cessna, however, filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an act that limits liability for aircraft manufacturers 18 years after the delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser.
The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Cessna. The court held that the service manual was created by Cessna in its capacity as a manufacturer, and thus, was included within the limitation period provided in GARA. The court further found that Cessna had not added or omitted anything to the service manual that was a proximate cause of the accident, and thus, the GARA statute of repose did not restart. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were barred by GARA as the statute of repose had expired. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2024/121.html" target="_blank">View "SCHIEWE v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO" on Justia Law</a>
This case involves Jade P. Schiewe and Zachary Pfaff, who filed a lawsuit against the Cessna Aircraft Company, alleging negligence after a plane crash in September 2010. The plaintiffs were flying a Cessna 172RG when a fire erupted in the cockpit, leading to a crash landing. They claimed that Cessna was negligent in not updating its service manual to include a new part and its installation instructions. Cessna, however, filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an act that limits liability for aircraft manufacturers 18 years after the delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser.
The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Cessna. The court held that the service manual was created by Cessna in its capacity as a manufacturer, and thus, was included within the limitation period provided in GARA. The court further found that Cessna had not added or omitted anything to the service manual that was a proximate cause of the accident, and thus, the GARA statute of repose did not restart. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were barred by GARA as the statute of repose had expired.
2024-03-12stateOklahomaOklahoma Supreme CourtDarbyhttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-1921/22-1921-2024-02-27.htmlKowalchuck v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority2024-02-27T08:00:17-08:002024-02-27T08:00:17-08:00
In this case, plaintiff-appellant John Kowalchuck sued his former employer, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries he sustained while clearing snow at an MTA property. The MTA requested a pre-motion conference to discuss its anticipated motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the request, and at the pre-motion conference, it deemed the MTA's motion as having been made and denied it. However, two years later, and only four days before the trial was set to begin, the district court reconsidered its previous denial of the motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the MTA, dismissing the complaint. Kowalchuck was not given an opportunity to submit papers in opposition to the motion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court erred when it sua sponte reconsidered its denial of summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the MTA, without giving Kowalchuck notice or an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals emphasized the need for procedural safeguards such as notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court can grant summary judgment sua sponte. The court also noted that Kowalchuck was procedurally prejudiced by the district court's use of a truncated or expedited procedure, as he was surprised by the district court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment and that surprise resulted in his failure to present evidence in support of his position. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-1921/22-1921-2024-02-27.html" target="_blank">View "Kowalchuck v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, plaintiff-appellant John Kowalchuck sued his former employer, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries he sustained while clearing snow at an MTA property. The MTA requested a pre-motion conference to discuss its anticipated motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the request, and at the pre-motion conference, it deemed the MTA's motion as having been made and denied it. However, two years later, and only four days before the trial was set to begin, the district court reconsidered its previous denial of the motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the MTA, dismissing the complaint. Kowalchuck was not given an opportunity to submit papers in opposition to the motion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court erred when it sua sponte reconsidered its denial of summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the MTA, without giving Kowalchuck notice or an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals emphasized the need for procedural safeguards such as notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court can grant summary judgment sua sponte. The court also noted that Kowalchuck was procedurally prejudiced by the district court's use of a truncated or expedited procedure, as he was surprised by the district court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment and that surprise resulted in his failure to present evidence in support of his position.
2024-02-27federalUS Court of Appeals for the Second CircuitChinhttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-4037/22-4037-2024-02-26.htmlNorfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Dille Road Recycling, LLC2024-02-26T13:30:18-08:002024-02-26T13:30:18-08:00
In this case, Norfolk Southern Railway Company and Dille Road Recycling, LLC disputed over a narrow parcel of land adjacent to Norfolk’s active rail line in Euclid, Ohio. Although Norfolk owned the land, Dille had been using it for nearly two decades. The parties took the matter to federal court after negotiations failed. Dille sought to claim the parcel through adverse possession or a prescriptive easement, while Norfolk argued that Dille’s property claims were preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). The district court held that Dille’s prescriptive-easement claim was not preempted and granted Dille the easement.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, ruling that federal law preempted Dille’s state-law prescriptive-easement claim. The court determined that the easement Dille sought was so exclusive and conflicting that it was essentially adverse possession by another name. The court noted that while Dille claimed the easement was nonexclusive, the reality was that Dille's use of the parcel did not allow for shared use with Norfolk. The court also found that Dille's proposed use of the parcel was much closer to the complete taking of the property, which would unreasonably interfere with rail transportation and therefore was preempted by the ICCTA. The court reasoned that the possession or conflicting use of railroad property can be burdensome even if the railroad is not currently using the contested property. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-4037/22-4037-2024-02-26.html" target="_blank">View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Dille Road Recycling, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, Norfolk Southern Railway Company and Dille Road Recycling, LLC disputed over a narrow parcel of land adjacent to Norfolk’s active rail line in Euclid, Ohio. Although Norfolk owned the land, Dille had been using it for nearly two decades. The parties took the matter to federal court after negotiations failed. Dille sought to claim the parcel through adverse possession or a prescriptive easement, while Norfolk argued that Dille’s property claims were preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). The district court held that Dille’s prescriptive-easement claim was not preempted and granted Dille the easement.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, ruling that federal law preempted Dille’s state-law prescriptive-easement claim. The court determined that the easement Dille sought was so exclusive and conflicting that it was essentially adverse possession by another name. The court noted that while Dille claimed the easement was nonexclusive, the reality was that Dille's use of the parcel did not allow for shared use with Norfolk. The court also found that Dille's proposed use of the parcel was much closer to the complete taking of the property, which would unreasonably interfere with rail transportation and therefore was preempted by the ICCTA. The court reasoned that the possession or conflicting use of railroad property can be burdensome even if the railroad is not currently using the contested property. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
2024-02-26federalUS Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitBOGGShttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-60603/22-60603-2024-02-23.htmlPace v. Cirrus Design Corp2024-02-23T10:31:18-08:002024-02-23T10:31:18-08:00
In this case, Glen Pace, a Mississippi resident, appealed the dismissal of his claims against multiple corporate defendants over personal injuries he suffered in a Texas airplane crash. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the claims against the out-of-state defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and held that the two Mississippi defendants were improperly joined, which allowed removal to federal court.
Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court agreed that Pace failed to state a claim against either in-state defendant, and thus, they were improperly joined. As for the out-of-state defendants, the court found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The court reasoned that the aircraft crash, any equipment failure, and the injuries all occurred in Texas, and Pace's subsequent medical treatment and damages in Mississippi did not constitute an actual injury felt in the state for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction. The court held that Pace's injuries from the crash occurred in Texas and his subsequent medical treatment in Mississippi were "consequences stemming from the actual tort injury," which do not confer personal jurisdiction.
The court also denied Pace's request for jurisdictional discovery, stating that Pace failed to present specific facts or reasonable particularity regarding jurisdictional facts. The court stressed that its decision should not be interpreted as implying a view on the merits of Pace’s claims. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-60603/22-60603-2024-02-23.html" target="_blank">View "Pace v. Cirrus Design Corp" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, Glen Pace, a Mississippi resident, appealed the dismissal of his claims against multiple corporate defendants over personal injuries he suffered in a Texas airplane crash. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the claims against the out-of-state defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and held that the two Mississippi defendants were improperly joined, which allowed removal to federal court.
Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court agreed that Pace failed to state a claim against either in-state defendant, and thus, they were improperly joined. As for the out-of-state defendants, the court found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The court reasoned that the aircraft crash, any equipment failure, and the injuries all occurred in Texas, and Pace's subsequent medical treatment and damages in Mississippi did not constitute an actual injury felt in the state for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction. The court held that Pace's injuries from the crash occurred in Texas and his subsequent medical treatment in Mississippi were "consequences stemming from the actual tort injury," which do not confer personal jurisdiction.
The court also denied Pace's request for jurisdictional discovery, stating that Pace failed to present specific facts or reasonable particularity regarding jurisdictional facts. The court stressed that its decision should not be interpreted as implying a view on the merits of Pace’s claims.
2024-02-23federalUS Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitSouthwickhttps://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2024/22-0431.htmlUNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. PRADO2024-02-23T07:58:37-08:002024-02-23T07:58:37-08:00
The case involves a fatal accident that occurred at a private railroad crossing owned by Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc. and operated by Union Pacific Railroad Company. Rolando Prado, Jr. died when his vehicle was struck by a Union Pacific train at the crossing. His family members (the Prados) sued both Union Pacific and Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc. for negligence. The central issue before the Supreme Court of Texas was whether the evidence was sufficient to create a fact issue on whether the railroad crossing, which was protected by both a stop sign and a crossbuck sign, was "extra-hazardous" and whether the landowner knew it was "unreasonably dangerous."
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the crossing was extra-hazardous. The court reasoned that the crossing had a stop sign in addition to the usual crossbuck sign, and anyone who actually stopped at the sign could clearly see a train coming from either direction. The expert testimony that suggested drivers would not stop at a particular stop sign because it "lacks credibility" did not establish that all reasonably prudent drivers would not, much less could not, stop at the sign.
The court also held that there was no evidence to support a finding that the landowner, Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc., had actual knowledge that the crossing was unreasonably dangerous. The court determined that the evidence indicated that the landowner knew of the high volume of traffic at the crossing, but it did not establish that the landowner had actual knowledge that the crossing was unreasonably dangerous.
The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court in favor of Union Pacific and Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2024/22-0431.html" target="_blank">View "UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. PRADO" on Justia Law</a>
The case involves a fatal accident that occurred at a private railroad crossing owned by Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc. and operated by Union Pacific Railroad Company. Rolando Prado, Jr. died when his vehicle was struck by a Union Pacific train at the crossing. His family members (the Prados) sued both Union Pacific and Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc. for negligence. The central issue before the Supreme Court of Texas was whether the evidence was sufficient to create a fact issue on whether the railroad crossing, which was protected by both a stop sign and a crossbuck sign, was "extra-hazardous" and whether the landowner knew it was "unreasonably dangerous."
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the crossing was extra-hazardous. The court reasoned that the crossing had a stop sign in addition to the usual crossbuck sign, and anyone who actually stopped at the sign could clearly see a train coming from either direction. The expert testimony that suggested drivers would not stop at a particular stop sign because it "lacks credibility" did not establish that all reasonably prudent drivers would not, much less could not, stop at the sign.
The court also held that there was no evidence to support a finding that the landowner, Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc., had actual knowledge that the crossing was unreasonably dangerous. The court determined that the evidence indicated that the landowner knew of the high volume of traffic at the crossing, but it did not establish that the landowner had actual knowledge that the crossing was unreasonably dangerous.
The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court in favor of Union Pacific and Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc.
2024-02-23stateTexasSupreme Court of TexasBoydhttps://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2024/b327413m.htmlCity of Norwalk v. City of Cerritos2024-02-22T13:01:19-08:002024-02-22T13:01:19-08:00
The City of Norwalk sued the City of Cerritos, alleging that Cerritos' ordinance limiting commercial and heavy truck traffic to certain major arteries caused extra truck traffic to be diverted through Norwalk, constituting a public nuisance. The City of Cerritos demurred, arguing that it was immune from liability as the ordinance was enacted under the express authority of the Vehicle Code sections 35701 and 21101. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and Norwalk appealed this decision. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the public nuisance alleged by Norwalk, namely, the diversion of heavy truck traffic and its adverse effects, necessarily and inescapably flowed from the enactment of the Cerritos ordinance, which was expressly authorized by the Vehicle Code. As such, Cerritos was immune from liability for public nuisance under Civil Code section 3482. In addition, the court found no merit in Norwalk's arguments that the ordinance was unreasonable and that Cerritos failed to obtain the state's permission to regulate certain streets. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2024/b327413m.html" target="_blank">View "City of Norwalk v. City of Cerritos" on Justia Law</a>
The City of Norwalk sued the City of Cerritos, alleging that Cerritos' ordinance limiting commercial and heavy truck traffic to certain major arteries caused extra truck traffic to be diverted through Norwalk, constituting a public nuisance. The City of Cerritos demurred, arguing that it was immune from liability as the ordinance was enacted under the express authority of the Vehicle Code sections 35701 and 21101. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and Norwalk appealed this decision. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the public nuisance alleged by Norwalk, namely, the diversion of heavy truck traffic and its adverse effects, necessarily and inescapably flowed from the enactment of the Cerritos ordinance, which was expressly authorized by the Vehicle Code. As such, Cerritos was immune from liability for public nuisance under Civil Code section 3482. In addition, the court found no merit in Norwalk's arguments that the ordinance was unreasonable and that Cerritos failed to obtain the state's permission to regulate certain streets.
2024-02-22stateCaliforniaCalifornia Courts of AppealHOFFSTADThttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0987.htmlState v. Palmer2024-02-15T06:07:34-08:002024-02-15T06:07:34-08:00
In December 2019, a taxicab driver, Phillip Palmer, shot a heavily intoxicated passenger, Nicholas Young, following a dispute over cab fare. The incident escalated into a physical altercation at a gas station, where Young shoved Palmer twice, causing him to fear for his life. Palmer, who had begun carrying a gun in his cab after hearing about a driver who had been shot by a passenger, fired two shots at Young, hitting him in the neck. Young survived his injuries. At trial, Palmer admitted to the shooting but claimed self-defense. The trial court denied Palmer's request for a self-defense jury instruction, finding Palmer's statements about his means of escape not credible and determining that a reasonable person would not have believed they were in danger of being killed by Young under the circumstances. Palmer was acquitted of attempted murder but found guilty of felonious assault and a firearm specification.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the trial court had improperly weighed the evidence when performing a sufficiency analysis. The court found that Palmer had presented legally sufficient evidence for each element of self-defense and was therefore entitled to a self-defense jury instruction. The evidence presented, if believed, could convince a trier of fact that Palmer was acting in self-defense. Therefore, the case was remanded for a new trial on the felonious-assault charge and accompanying firearm specification. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0987.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Palmer" on Justia Law</a>
In December 2019, a taxicab driver, Phillip Palmer, shot a heavily intoxicated passenger, Nicholas Young, following a dispute over cab fare. The incident escalated into a physical altercation at a gas station, where Young shoved Palmer twice, causing him to fear for his life. Palmer, who had begun carrying a gun in his cab after hearing about a driver who had been shot by a passenger, fired two shots at Young, hitting him in the neck. Young survived his injuries. At trial, Palmer admitted to the shooting but claimed self-defense. The trial court denied Palmer's request for a self-defense jury instruction, finding Palmer's statements about his means of escape not credible and determining that a reasonable person would not have believed they were in danger of being killed by Young under the circumstances. Palmer was acquitted of attempted murder but found guilty of felonious assault and a firearm specification.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the trial court had improperly weighed the evidence when performing a sufficiency analysis. The court found that Palmer had presented legally sufficient evidence for each element of self-defense and was therefore entitled to a self-defense jury instruction. The evidence presented, if believed, could convince a trier of fact that Palmer was acting in self-defense. Therefore, the case was remanded for a new trial on the felonious-assault charge and accompanying firearm specification.
2024-02-15stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioKennedyhttps://law.justia.com/cases/texas/court-of-criminal-appeals/2024/pd-0037-22.htmlDaniel v. State2024-02-14T05:28:10-08:002024-02-14T05:28:10-08:00
In Texas, the appellant was stopped by an officer for failing to remain in a single lane of traffic. After the officer smelled alcohol on the appellant's breath and observed signs of intoxication, he obtained a warrant for a blood sample, which showed a blood alcohol content of .174. The appellant was subsequently indicted for felony driving while intoxicated. The appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellant was convicted. The appellant appealed, and the Third Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the stop was unlawful because the appellant's failure to maintain a single lane was not unsafe.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas considered whether a mistake of law should apply when an officer conducts a search or seizure under an ambiguous law. The court held that the officer's reasonable misinterpretation of the law did not undermine the reasonable suspicion required to conduct the traffic stop. The court noted that at the time of the stop, there was no controlling interpretation of the relevant section of the Texas transportation code from the Court of Criminal Appeals and the intermediate courts were split in their interpretations. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/court-of-criminal-appeals/2024/pd-0037-22.html" target="_blank">View "Daniel v. State" on Justia Law</a>
In Texas, the appellant was stopped by an officer for failing to remain in a single lane of traffic. After the officer smelled alcohol on the appellant's breath and observed signs of intoxication, he obtained a warrant for a blood sample, which showed a blood alcohol content of .174. The appellant was subsequently indicted for felony driving while intoxicated. The appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellant was convicted. The appellant appealed, and the Third Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the stop was unlawful because the appellant's failure to maintain a single lane was not unsafe.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas considered whether a mistake of law should apply when an officer conducts a search or seizure under an ambiguous law. The court held that the officer's reasonable misinterpretation of the law did not undermine the reasonable suspicion required to conduct the traffic stop. The court noted that at the time of the stop, there was no controlling interpretation of the relevant section of the Texas transportation code from the Court of Criminal Appeals and the intermediate courts were split in their interpretations. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
2024-02-14stateTexasTexas Court of Criminal AppealsMcClurehttps://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2024/b327413.htmlCity of Norwalk v. City of Cerritos2024-02-01T12:01:19-08:002024-02-01T12:01:19-08:00
The case revolves around a dispute between two cities, Norwalk and Cerritos, both located in California. In 1974, Cerritos enacted an ordinance restricting commercial and heavy truck traffic to certain major arteries within the city. The ordinance was amended in 2019 and 2020, resulting in the removal of one of these arteries. Consequently, Norwalk sued Cerritos, arguing that the ordinance created a public nuisance by diverting extra truck traffic through Norwalk and thus causing various "adverse effects" linked to heavier traffic flow. Cerritos claimed immunity under Civil Code section 3482, which shields a city from public nuisance liability for actions "done or maintained under the express authority of a statute". The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District found that the Vehicle Code explicitly authorized cities to regulate the use of their streets by commercial or heavy vehicles. Therefore, the court held that Cerritos was immune from liability for the public nuisance of diverting traffic into Norwalk. The court stated that the immunity conferred by Civil Code section 3482 applied not only to the specific act expressly authorized by the statute, but also to the consequences that necessarily stemmed from that act. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Cerritos. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2024/b327413.html" target="_blank">View "City of Norwalk v. City of Cerritos" on Justia Law</a>
The case revolves around a dispute between two cities, Norwalk and Cerritos, both located in California. In 1974, Cerritos enacted an ordinance restricting commercial and heavy truck traffic to certain major arteries within the city. The ordinance was amended in 2019 and 2020, resulting in the removal of one of these arteries. Consequently, Norwalk sued Cerritos, arguing that the ordinance created a public nuisance by diverting extra truck traffic through Norwalk and thus causing various "adverse effects" linked to heavier traffic flow. Cerritos claimed immunity under Civil Code section 3482, which shields a city from public nuisance liability for actions "done or maintained under the express authority of a statute". The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District found that the Vehicle Code explicitly authorized cities to regulate the use of their streets by commercial or heavy vehicles. Therefore, the court held that Cerritos was immune from liability for the public nuisance of diverting traffic into Norwalk. The court stated that the immunity conferred by Civil Code section 3482 applied not only to the specific act expressly authorized by the statute, but also to the consequences that necessarily stemmed from that act. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Cerritos.
2024-02-01stateCaliforniaCalifornia Courts of AppealHOFFSTADThttps://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2024/s-18462.htmlThompson v. United Services Automobile Association2024-01-26T10:31:02-08:002024-01-26T10:31:02-08:00
In this case, a woman was severely injured while moving an inoperable airplane owned by her husband. She sought recovery from her husband's homeowner's insurance policy. The insurance policy, however, excluded injuries "arising out of" the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of an aircraft. The woman argued that the policy should cover her injury because, in her view, the aircraft had become mere "parts" after her husband removed the wings, elevators, and tail rudder. The lower court disagreed and concluded that her injuries were not covered by the policy. The woman appealed this decision.
The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska agreed with the lower court’s interpretation of the homeowner's insurance policy exclusion. The court maintained that regardless of whether the airplane was considered an aircraft or a collection of airplane “parts” when it injured the woman, the injury arose out of the husband’s ownership of the airplane. This interpretation was supported by the clear language of the policy which excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of ownership or maintenance of an aircraft. As a result, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2024/s-18462.html" target="_blank">View "Thompson v. United Services Automobile Association" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, a woman was severely injured while moving an inoperable airplane owned by her husband. She sought recovery from her husband's homeowner's insurance policy. The insurance policy, however, excluded injuries "arising out of" the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of an aircraft. The woman argued that the policy should cover her injury because, in her view, the aircraft had become mere "parts" after her husband removed the wings, elevators, and tail rudder. The lower court disagreed and concluded that her injuries were not covered by the policy. The woman appealed this decision.
The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska agreed with the lower court’s interpretation of the homeowner's insurance policy exclusion. The court maintained that regardless of whether the airplane was considered an aircraft or a collection of airplane “parts” when it injured the woman, the injury arose out of the husband’s ownership of the airplane. This interpretation was supported by the clear language of the policy which excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of ownership or maintenance of an aircraft. As a result, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
2024-01-26stateAlaskaAlaska Supreme CourtHENDERSONhttps://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2024/6-23.htmlMotor Vehicle Admin. v. Usan2024-01-25T11:34:50-08:002024-01-25T11:34:50-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not err in concluding that law enforcement had reasonable grounds to believe that Rahq Deika Montana Usan was driving a vehicle while impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both. The ALJ found substantial evidence to support this belief, including Usan's erratic driving, red and glassy eyes, slow and sluggish movement, and failure to perform three Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) successfully. The court also affirmed the ALJ's finding that law enforcement, having reasonable suspicion of a driver impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both, may request testing pursuant to the Maryland Transportation Article § 16-205.1. The court further held that Usan violated the statute by refusing to submit to the requested testing. As a result, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the decision of the Circuit Court for Charles County, which had overturned the ALJ's decision to suspend Usan's driver's license.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2024/6-23.html" target="_blank">View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Usan" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not err in concluding that law enforcement had reasonable grounds to believe that Rahq Deika Montana Usan was driving a vehicle while impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both. The ALJ found substantial evidence to support this belief, including Usan's erratic driving, red and glassy eyes, slow and sluggish movement, and failure to perform three Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) successfully. The court also affirmed the ALJ's finding that law enforcement, having reasonable suspicion of a driver impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both, may request testing pursuant to the Maryland Transportation Article § 16-205.1. The court further held that Usan violated the statute by refusing to submit to the requested testing. As a result, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the decision of the Circuit Court for Charles County, which had overturned the ALJ's decision to suspend Usan's driver's license.
2024-01-25stateMarylandMaryland Supreme CourtHottenhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2024/s-22-901.htmlState v. Tvrdy2024-01-19T06:34:50-08:002024-01-19T06:34:50-08:00
In this case, Patrick Tvrdy was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 12 to 16 years' imprisonment following a vehicle-motorcycle collision that resulted in the death of the motorcycle driver, Brady Sweetser. Tvrdy appealed on three grounds: that the district court used erroneous jury instructions relating to motor vehicle homicide instead of manslaughter, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the jury instructions correctly stated the law and were not misleading. The court noted that the law in Nebraska does not consider a victim's negligence as a defense to manslaughter unless that negligence is the sole proximate cause of the death. This principle was correctly reflected in the jury instructions.
Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court found that there was enough evidence to support Tvrdy's conviction. The court emphasized that an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. The court found that there was sufficient evidence of Tvrdy's intoxication and that there was never enough time for Tvrdy to complete his left turn without causing Sweetser, who had the right of way, to collide with him.
As to the sentence, the court found no abuse of discretion by the district court. Tvrdy's sentence was within the statutory limits for his offense, and the court noted his criminal history of multiple speeding and possession of marijuana offenses, as well as a driving under the influence offense. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2024/s-22-901.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Tvrdy" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, Patrick Tvrdy was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 12 to 16 years' imprisonment following a vehicle-motorcycle collision that resulted in the death of the motorcycle driver, Brady Sweetser. Tvrdy appealed on three grounds: that the district court used erroneous jury instructions relating to motor vehicle homicide instead of manslaughter, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the jury instructions correctly stated the law and were not misleading. The court noted that the law in Nebraska does not consider a victim's negligence as a defense to manslaughter unless that negligence is the sole proximate cause of the death. This principle was correctly reflected in the jury instructions.
Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court found that there was enough evidence to support Tvrdy's conviction. The court emphasized that an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. The court found that there was sufficient evidence of Tvrdy's intoxication and that there was never enough time for Tvrdy to complete his left turn without causing Sweetser, who had the right of way, to collide with him.
As to the sentence, the court found no abuse of discretion by the district court. Tvrdy's sentence was within the statutory limits for his offense, and the court noted his criminal history of multiple speeding and possession of marijuana offenses, as well as a driving under the influence offense.
2024-01-19stateNebraskaNebraska Supreme Courthttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/22-1965/22-1965-2024-01-04.htmlTrenton Threatened Skies Inc v. FAA2024-01-04T10:00:19-08:002024-01-04T10:00:19-08:00
A group of petitioners, including several municipalities, private individuals, and organizations, challenged the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) approval of a new terminal for the Trenton-Mercer Airport. The petitioners alleged that the FAA’s decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to fully consider the environmental impact of the new terminal, among other things. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the FAA had adequately considered the environmental impact of the new terminal and had not violated NEPA. The court found that the FAA reasonably concluded that the new terminal would not induce additional air traffic, and therefore, would not result in increased noise or air pollution. The court also found that the FAA had conducted a reasonable environmental justice analysis and did not need to perform a health risk assessment. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners' request to review the FAA's decision. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/22-1965/22-1965-2024-01-04.html" target="_blank">View "Trenton Threatened Skies Inc v. FAA" on Justia Law</a>
A group of petitioners, including several municipalities, private individuals, and organizations, challenged the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) approval of a new terminal for the Trenton-Mercer Airport. The petitioners alleged that the FAA’s decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to fully consider the environmental impact of the new terminal, among other things. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the FAA had adequately considered the environmental impact of the new terminal and had not violated NEPA. The court found that the FAA reasonably concluded that the new terminal would not induce additional air traffic, and therefore, would not result in increased noise or air pollution. The court also found that the FAA had conducted a reasonable environmental justice analysis and did not need to perform a health risk assessment. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners' request to review the FAA's decision.
2024-01-04federalUS Court of Appeals for the Third Circuithttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-5794/22-5794-2024-01-03.htmlMattingly v. R.J. Corman R.R. Grp., LLC2024-01-03T11:01:04-08:002024-01-03T11:01:04-08:00
Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Brent Mattingly, an employee of R.J. Corman Railroad Services, LLC (“Corman Services”), suffered injuries while repairing a bridge owned and operated by Memphis Line Railroad (“Memphis Line”). Mattingly filed a lawsuit seeking recovery under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), which covers employees of common carriers by railroad. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that Mattingly was not employed by a common carrier, a prerequisite for FELA coverage.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court rejected Mattingly’s argument that Corman Services, his employer, was a common carrier because it was part of a “unitary” railroad system managed by Corman Group. The court held that Corman Services' bridge repair and construction services did not provide an inextricable function for Memphis Line’s common carrier services and thus, did not qualify as a common carrier under FELA. The court further rejected Mattingly’s assertion that he was a “subservant” of a common carrier. The court found that Mattingly failed to demonstrate that Memphis Line, a common carrier, controlled or had the right to control the daily operations of Corman Services, as required to establish a master-servant relationship under common law.
The court also held that Mattingly's claims regarding discovery issues were unpreserved for appeal, as he did not adequately inform the district court of his need for discovery in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-5794/22-5794-2024-01-03.html" target="_blank">View "Mattingly v. R.J. Corman R.R. Grp., LLC" on Justia Law</a>
Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Brent Mattingly, an employee of R.J. Corman Railroad Services, LLC (“Corman Services”), suffered injuries while repairing a bridge owned and operated by Memphis Line Railroad (“Memphis Line”). Mattingly filed a lawsuit seeking recovery under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), which covers employees of common carriers by railroad. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that Mattingly was not employed by a common carrier, a prerequisite for FELA coverage.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court rejected Mattingly’s argument that Corman Services, his employer, was a common carrier because it was part of a “unitary” railroad system managed by Corman Group. The court held that Corman Services' bridge repair and construction services did not provide an inextricable function for Memphis Line’s common carrier services and thus, did not qualify as a common carrier under FELA. The court further rejected Mattingly’s assertion that he was a “subservant” of a common carrier. The court found that Mattingly failed to demonstrate that Memphis Line, a common carrier, controlled or had the right to control the daily operations of Corman Services, as required to establish a master-servant relationship under common law.
The court also held that Mattingly's claims regarding discovery issues were unpreserved for appeal, as he did not adequately inform the district court of his need for discovery in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).
2024-01-03federalUS Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuithttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-7154/22-7154-2023-12-29.htmlWhiteru v. WMATA2023-12-29T07:31:53-08:002023-12-29T07:31:53-08:00
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is faced with deciding if a passenger on a train station platform, who involuntarily falls into a non-public area (a trough housing electrical and lighting equipment) and sustains severe injuries, becomes a trespasser due to his fall. The injured party, Okiemute C. Whiteru, was intoxicated and fell into the trough after attempting to sit on the station platform ledge. The fall resulted in a fractured vertebra, which led to his eventual death by asphyxiation. Whiteru's parents and estate filed claims of negligence and wrongful death against the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), arguing that WMATA failed in its duty as a common carrier to render aid to Whiteru.
In a previous decision, the court held that Whiteru's contributory negligence did not preclude liability for WMATA's failure to aid. However, on remand, WMATA argued that Whiteru's status changed from passenger to trespasser when he fell into the non-public area, thus reducing WMATA's duty of care. The district court granted WMATA's motion for summary judgment, accepting the argument that Whiteru became a trespasser upon his fall.
The Appeals Court, however, found uncertainty in how to determine Whiteru's status under District of Columbia law as either a passenger or a trespasser, which in turn would determine WMATA's duty of care. The court found no controlling precedent from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on this matter and thus certified the question to that court. The certified question asks if, under District of Columbia law, a passenger of a common carrier who involuntarily falls into a non-public area, sustaining immobilizing injuries, may recover for the exacerbation of the injuries due to the common carrier's failure to aid him, if the common carrier knew or had reason to know of the injuries. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-7154/22-7154-2023-12-29.html" target="_blank">View "Whiteru v. WMATA" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is faced with deciding if a passenger on a train station platform, who involuntarily falls into a non-public area (a trough housing electrical and lighting equipment) and sustains severe injuries, becomes a trespasser due to his fall. The injured party, Okiemute C. Whiteru, was intoxicated and fell into the trough after attempting to sit on the station platform ledge. The fall resulted in a fractured vertebra, which led to his eventual death by asphyxiation. Whiteru's parents and estate filed claims of negligence and wrongful death against the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), arguing that WMATA failed in its duty as a common carrier to render aid to Whiteru.
In a previous decision, the court held that Whiteru's contributory negligence did not preclude liability for WMATA's failure to aid. However, on remand, WMATA argued that Whiteru's status changed from passenger to trespasser when he fell into the non-public area, thus reducing WMATA's duty of care. The district court granted WMATA's motion for summary judgment, accepting the argument that Whiteru became a trespasser upon his fall.
The Appeals Court, however, found uncertainty in how to determine Whiteru's status under District of Columbia law as either a passenger or a trespasser, which in turn would determine WMATA's duty of care. The court found no controlling precedent from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on this matter and thus certified the question to that court. The certified question asks if, under District of Columbia law, a passenger of a common carrier who involuntarily falls into a non-public area, sustaining immobilizing injuries, may recover for the exacerbation of the injuries due to the common carrier's failure to aid him, if the common carrier knew or had reason to know of the injuries.
2023-12-29federalUS Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuithttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-9506/23-9506-2023-12-20.htmlMcWhorter v. FAA2023-12-20T12:33:19-08:002023-12-20T12:33:19-08:00
In a case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Bruce McWhorter, a mechanic, had his certification revoked by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) after it was discovered that he had not replaced certain components of an aircraft's engine despite claiming to have performed a major overhaul. McWhorter appealed the decision to an administrative law judge who affirmed the FAA's decision. McWhorter then sought to appeal this decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), but failed to serve the FAA with his notice of appeal in a timely manner. The NTSB dismissed McWhorter's appeal on these grounds. McWhorter subsequently petitioned for a review of the NTSB’s dismissal, but did so 111 days after the NTSB issued its final order, exceeding the 60-day limit prescribed by law.
The court clarified that the 60-day limit for seeking appellate review stipulated in 49 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather a claim-processing rule. This means that a petitioner’s failure to comply with this time limit does not affect the court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal. However, the court found that McWhorter had not established reasonable grounds for the delay in filing his petition for review, as required by the same statute for petitions filed after the 60-day limit. The court determined that the primary blame for the delay was on McWhorter, not on any confusion created by the FAA or the NTSB. Therefore, the court denied McWhorter's petition as untimely. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-9506/23-9506-2023-12-20.html" target="_blank">View "McWhorter v. FAA" on Justia Law</a>
In a case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Bruce McWhorter, a mechanic, had his certification revoked by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) after it was discovered that he had not replaced certain components of an aircraft's engine despite claiming to have performed a major overhaul. McWhorter appealed the decision to an administrative law judge who affirmed the FAA's decision. McWhorter then sought to appeal this decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), but failed to serve the FAA with his notice of appeal in a timely manner. The NTSB dismissed McWhorter's appeal on these grounds. McWhorter subsequently petitioned for a review of the NTSB’s dismissal, but did so 111 days after the NTSB issued its final order, exceeding the 60-day limit prescribed by law.
The court clarified that the 60-day limit for seeking appellate review stipulated in 49 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather a claim-processing rule. This means that a petitioner’s failure to comply with this time limit does not affect the court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal. However, the court found that McWhorter had not established reasonable grounds for the delay in filing his petition for review, as required by the same statute for petitions filed after the 60-day limit. The court determined that the primary blame for the delay was on McWhorter, not on any confusion created by the FAA or the NTSB. Therefore, the court denied McWhorter's petition as untimely.
2023-12-20federalUS Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuithttps://law.justia.com/cases/texas/court-of-criminal-appeals/2023/pd-0056-23-0.htmlJOHNSON v. STATE OF TEXAS2023-12-20T05:26:39-08:002023-12-20T05:26:39-08:00
In Bowie County, Texas, Zimbabwe Raymond Johnson was involved in a car accident where he collided with a utility pole and an antique truck. He continued to drive away from the scene until his vehicle was no longer operational. Upon the arrival of the police, Johnson provided identification information but did not have insurance. Consequently, he was charged with failure to comply with duties to provide information after an accident and was convicted of attempting to commit those offenses. The trial judge imposed a $200 fine for each offense and ordered Johnson to pay restitution of $200 for the utility pole damage and $10,000 for the vehicle damage.
On appeal, Johnson contested the restitution order, arguing that the offenses for which he was convicted did not cause the pole and truck damage. The court of appeals agreed and deleted the restitution awards. The State of Texas petitioned for a discretionary review of the decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court held that, under Article 42.037 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, restitution could be ordered only when the offense for which the defendant was convicted caused the damage. The court stated that there was no evidence to suggest that Johnson's failure to comply with his duties of providing information after the accident caused any of the damage. Although the court acknowledged that in some situations, a failure to provide information could cause damage (such as by delaying necessary medical help), such was not the case here. The court dismissed the State's concern that limiting restitution might motivate overcharging just to obtain restitution, stating that such concern could not dictate the resolution of the issue. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/court-of-criminal-appeals/2023/pd-0056-23-0.html" target="_blank">View "JOHNSON v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law</a>
In Bowie County, Texas, Zimbabwe Raymond Johnson was involved in a car accident where he collided with a utility pole and an antique truck. He continued to drive away from the scene until his vehicle was no longer operational. Upon the arrival of the police, Johnson provided identification information but did not have insurance. Consequently, he was charged with failure to comply with duties to provide information after an accident and was convicted of attempting to commit those offenses. The trial judge imposed a $200 fine for each offense and ordered Johnson to pay restitution of $200 for the utility pole damage and $10,000 for the vehicle damage.
On appeal, Johnson contested the restitution order, arguing that the offenses for which he was convicted did not cause the pole and truck damage. The court of appeals agreed and deleted the restitution awards. The State of Texas petitioned for a discretionary review of the decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court held that, under Article 42.037 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, restitution could be ordered only when the offense for which the defendant was convicted caused the damage. The court stated that there was no evidence to suggest that Johnson's failure to comply with his duties of providing information after the accident caused any of the damage. Although the court acknowledged that in some situations, a failure to provide information could cause damage (such as by delaying necessary medical help), such was not the case here. The court dismissed the State's concern that limiting restitution might motivate overcharging just to obtain restitution, stating that such concern could not dictate the resolution of the issue.
2023-12-20stateTexasTexas Court of Criminal Appealshttps://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2023/121252.htmlFRANK BARTEL TRANSPORTATION v. STATE2023-12-19T12:07:55-08:002023-12-19T12:07:55-08:00
In a collision involving a sedan owned by Murray State College and a semi truck and trailer owned by Frank Bartel Transportation (FBT), the college employee driving the sedan was killed and the FBT vehicle was destroyed. FBT submitted a claim under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) to the State of Oklahoma Risk Management Department of the Office of Management and Enterprise Services (OMES), which offered to settle for $25,000. FBT refused the offer, arguing that it sustained additional consequential damages of $68,636.61 for towing, vehicle storage, and vehicle rental. In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that these consequential damages fell within the "any other loss" provision of Section 154(A)(2) of the GTCA, and thus FBT's recovery was subject to that statute's $125,000 cap. The court reversed the trial court's decision which found that FBT's damages were all for loss of property and subject to the Section 154(A)(1) cap of $25,000. The case was remanded for further proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2023/121252.html" target="_blank">View "FRANK BARTEL TRANSPORTATION v. STATE" on Justia Law</a>
In a collision involving a sedan owned by Murray State College and a semi truck and trailer owned by Frank Bartel Transportation (FBT), the college employee driving the sedan was killed and the FBT vehicle was destroyed. FBT submitted a claim under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) to the State of Oklahoma Risk Management Department of the Office of Management and Enterprise Services (OMES), which offered to settle for $25,000. FBT refused the offer, arguing that it sustained additional consequential damages of $68,636.61 for towing, vehicle storage, and vehicle rental. In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that these consequential damages fell within the "any other loss" provision of Section 154(A)(2) of the GTCA, and thus FBT's recovery was subject to that statute's $125,000 cap. The court reversed the trial court's decision which found that FBT's damages were all for loss of property and subject to the Section 154(A)(1) cap of $25,000. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
2023-12-19stateOklahomaOklahoma Supreme Courthttps://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/h049983.htmlGutierrez v. Tostado2023-12-01T15:31:35-08:002023-12-01T15:31:35-08:00
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, Francisco Gutierrez appealed a judgment granting summary judgment to Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, in a personal injury case. Gutierrez was injured when his vehicle was hit by an ambulance driven by Tostado, an emergency medical technician employed by ProTransport-1, during a patient transport. Nearly two years after the accident, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gutierrez's claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act's (MICRA) one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, a decision Gutierrez appealed.
In considering Gutierrez's appeal, the appellate court held that because Tostado was providing professional medical services at the time of the incident, MICRA's one-year statute of limitations applied, despite Gutierrez not being the recipient of those services. The court reasoned that the act of driving the ambulance was an integral part of the provision of medical care, and it was foreseeable that third parties could be injured during the provision of such care. The court rejected Gutierrez's argument that MICRA only applied where the defendant owed a professional duty to the plaintiff, holding instead that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services, and their injuries were foreseeable. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/h049983.html" target="_blank">View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law</a>
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, Francisco Gutierrez appealed a judgment granting summary judgment to Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, in a personal injury case. Gutierrez was injured when his vehicle was hit by an ambulance driven by Tostado, an emergency medical technician employed by ProTransport-1, during a patient transport. Nearly two years after the accident, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gutierrez's claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act's (MICRA) one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, a decision Gutierrez appealed.
In considering Gutierrez's appeal, the appellate court held that because Tostado was providing professional medical services at the time of the incident, MICRA's one-year statute of limitations applied, despite Gutierrez not being the recipient of those services. The court reasoned that the act of driving the ambulance was an integral part of the provision of medical care, and it was foreseeable that third parties could be injured during the provision of such care. The court rejected Gutierrez's argument that MICRA only applied where the defendant owed a professional duty to the plaintiff, holding instead that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services, and their injuries were foreseeable. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
2023-12-01stateCaliforniaCalifornia Courts of AppealGreenwoodhttps://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1521/22-1521-2023-11-30.htmlMilton, MA v. FAA2023-12-01T11:00:05-08:002023-12-01T11:00:05-08:00
In this case, the Town of Milton, Massachusetts, petitioned for a judicial review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) final order authorizing a new flight procedure at Boston's Logan International Airport. The new procedure, aimed at increasing safety and efficiency, covers a narrower swath of airspace over the Town of Milton. The Town argued that the FAA's environmental analysis of the noise impacts failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). However, the United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit dismissed the Town's petition, ruling that the Town does not have standing to challenge the FAA's final order. The court concluded that the harms the Town asserted, including the impact of noise on its residents and the time and money spent addressing these issues, were not legally cognizable harms to the Town itself. The court agreed with other courts of appeals that have dismissed municipal NEPA challenges to FAA orders for lack of Article III standing because those challenges failed to show cognizable injury to the municipalities themselves. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1521/22-1521-2023-11-30.html" target="_blank">View "Milton, MA v. FAA" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Town of Milton, Massachusetts, petitioned for a judicial review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) final order authorizing a new flight procedure at Boston's Logan International Airport. The new procedure, aimed at increasing safety and efficiency, covers a narrower swath of airspace over the Town of Milton. The Town argued that the FAA's environmental analysis of the noise impacts failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). However, the United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit dismissed the Town's petition, ruling that the Town does not have standing to challenge the FAA's final order. The court concluded that the harms the Town asserted, including the impact of noise on its residents and the time and money spent addressing these issues, were not legally cognizable harms to the Town itself. The court agreed with other courts of appeals that have dismissed municipal NEPA challenges to FAA orders for lack of Article III standing because those challenges failed to show cognizable injury to the municipalities themselves.
2023-11-30federalUS Court of Appeals for the First Circuithttps://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2023/23-0388.htmlSANDERS v. THE BOEING COMPANY (U.S. Fifth Circuit 22-20317)2023-12-01T08:09:15-08:002023-12-01T08:09:15-08:00
The Supreme Court of Texas, in this case, addressed two questions relating to the interpretation of Section 16.064(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The questions pertained to the application of this statute when a case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the court could have had jurisdiction had the claimants properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts and when the subsequent action is to be filed within 60 days after the dismissal becomes final.
The first question was whether Section 16.064(a) applies when the prior court dismissed the action because of lack of jurisdiction, but the court would have had jurisdiction if the claimants had properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts. The Supreme Court of Texas answered in the affirmative, concluding that the statute applies even if the prior court could have had jurisdiction, as long as it dismissed the action due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction.
The second question was whether the subsequent action was filed within sixty days after the dismissal became final. The Supreme Court of Texas also answered this question in the affirmative, holding that a dismissal or other disposition becomes final under Section 16.064(a)(2) when the parties have exhausted their appellate remedies and the courts' power to alter the dismissal has ended.
The factual background of the case involved two flight attendants who alleged that they were injured when a smoke detector on a flight malfunctioned. They initially filed a suit against The Boeing Company in a federal district court in Houston, then refiled their claims in a federal district court in Dallas. After the Dallas district court dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction (based on inadequate pleading of diversity jurisdiction), the flight attendants appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the flight attendants subsequently refiled their claims in state court. Boeing then moved to dismiss the action based on the two-year statute of limitations. The Houston district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit, leading to the certified questions. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2023/23-0388.html" target="_blank">View "SANDERS v. THE BOEING COMPANY (U.S. Fifth Circuit 22-20317)" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Texas, in this case, addressed two questions relating to the interpretation of Section 16.064(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The questions pertained to the application of this statute when a case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the court could have had jurisdiction had the claimants properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts and when the subsequent action is to be filed within 60 days after the dismissal becomes final.
The first question was whether Section 16.064(a) applies when the prior court dismissed the action because of lack of jurisdiction, but the court would have had jurisdiction if the claimants had properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts. The Supreme Court of Texas answered in the affirmative, concluding that the statute applies even if the prior court could have had jurisdiction, as long as it dismissed the action due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction.
The second question was whether the subsequent action was filed within sixty days after the dismissal became final. The Supreme Court of Texas also answered this question in the affirmative, holding that a dismissal or other disposition becomes final under Section 16.064(a)(2) when the parties have exhausted their appellate remedies and the courts' power to alter the dismissal has ended.
The factual background of the case involved two flight attendants who alleged that they were injured when a smoke detector on a flight malfunctioned. They initially filed a suit against The Boeing Company in a federal district court in Houston, then refiled their claims in a federal district court in Dallas. After the Dallas district court dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction (based on inadequate pleading of diversity jurisdiction), the flight attendants appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the flight attendants subsequently refiled their claims in state court. Boeing then moved to dismiss the action based on the two-year statute of limitations. The Houston district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit, leading to the certified questions.
2023-12-01stateTexasSupreme Court of Texashttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85007.htmlHighroller Transportation, LLC v. Nev. Transportation Authority2023-11-30T12:06:03-08:002023-11-30T12:06:03-08:00
The Supreme Court held that in contested cases before the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA), arguments not raised during the administrative proceedings are generally waived and that the NTA need not consider arguments raised for the first time at the general session.
Appellant received two administrative citations for improperly staging its vehicles at its casino without a charter order, in violation of Appellant's certificate restriction and NAC 706.360. Appellant agreed to the fines, and a hearing officer recommended that the NTA accept Appellant's stipulations and enter the fines against Appellant. Appellant petitioned for judicial review, arguing that its certificate restriction was federally preempted. The district court concluded that the certificate was related to safety and thus not federally preempted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's conclusory assertion of preemption at the NTA general session was insufficient to establish that the NTA lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce Appellant's certification restriction; and (2) Appellant waived its preemption argument by entering into the stipulation. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85007.html" target="_blank">View "Highroller Transportation, LLC v. Nev. Transportation Authority" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that in contested cases before the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA), arguments not raised during the administrative proceedings are generally waived and that the NTA need not consider arguments raised for the first time at the general session.
Appellant received two administrative citations for improperly staging its vehicles at its casino without a charter order, in violation of Appellant's certificate restriction and NAC 706.360. Appellant agreed to the fines, and a hearing officer recommended that the NTA accept Appellant's stipulations and enter the fines against Appellant. Appellant petitioned for judicial review, arguing that its certificate restriction was federally preempted. The district court concluded that the certificate was related to safety and thus not federally preempted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's conclusory assertion of preemption at the NTA general session was insufficient to establish that the NTA lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce Appellant's certification restriction; and (2) Appellant waived its preemption argument by entering into the stipulation.
The Supreme Court held that arguments not raised during administrative proceedings before the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA) are generally waived and that the NTA need not consider arguments raised for the first time at the general session.
2023-11-30stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaWestbrook85007https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/230400.htmlVerizon Virginia LLC v. SCC2023-11-30T05:10:05-08:002023-11-30T05:10:05-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State Corporation Commission dismissing Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821.
Verizon, a telecommunications company, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the Commission requesting a declaration that either Capital Beltway Express LLC (CBE) or The Lane Construction Corporation was responsible for costs pursuant to section 33.2-1815(B) to relocate some of Verizon's utility facilities, as required by the Virginia Department of Transportation in the underlying project to extend portions of the I-495 express lanes. The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Verizon appealed, arguing that sections 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821 granted the Commission jurisdiction to resolve which party was responsible for the costs of the utility relocations necessitated by the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2023/230400.html" target="_blank">View "Verizon Virginia LLC v. SCC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State Corporation Commission dismissing Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821.
Verizon, a telecommunications company, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the Commission requesting a declaration that either Capital Beltway Express LLC (CBE) or The Lane Construction Corporation was responsible for costs pursuant to section 33.2-1815(B) to relocate some of Verizon's utility facilities, as required by the Virginia Department of Transportation in the underlying project to extend portions of the I-495 express lanes. The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Verizon appealed, arguing that sections 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821 granted the Commission jurisdiction to resolve which party was responsible for the costs of the utility relocations necessitated by the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the State Corporation Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition.
2023-11-30stateVirginiaSupreme Court of VirginiaCharles S. Russell230400https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/15-12095/15-12095-2023-10-05.htmlCSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc.2023-10-05T13:01:54-08:002023-10-05T13:01:54-08:00
CSX Transportation, Inc. is a freight railroad company. General Mills, Inc. operates a cereal processing plant in Georgia near one of CSX’s rail lines. A small connecting railroad connects CSX’s main rail line to General Mills’s plant. A contract between CSX and General Mills governs the use of the sidetrack.
A General Mills employee suffered severe injuries while working on the sidetrack and then sued CSX for negligence. A jury found CSX liable, and CSX sought indemnification from General Mills, citing a contractual provision providing General Mills was required to indemnify CSX—regardless of whether CSX alone was responsible. The district court dismissed one of CSX’s breach-of-contract claims and granted General Mills summary judgment on the other.
The Eleventh Circuit found that, under the parties’ agreement, General Mills was not required to indemnify CSX if CSX was solely
negligent. However, the court disagreed with the district court that Georgia's vouchment doctrine barred CSX from litigating the issue of
General Mills’s negligence. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit remanded for the district court to determine if General Mills was at
least partially at fault for the injury. If so, then General Mills must indemnify CSX for at least a portion of the settlement and related expenses. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/15-12095/15-12095-2023-10-05.html" target="_blank">View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
CSX Transportation, Inc. is a freight railroad company. General Mills, Inc. operates a cereal processing plant in Georgia near one of CSX’s rail lines. A small connecting railroad connects CSX’s main rail line to General Mills’s plant. A contract between CSX and General Mills governs the use of the sidetrack.
A General Mills employee suffered severe injuries while working on the sidetrack and then sued CSX for negligence. A jury found CSX liable, and CSX sought indemnification from General Mills, citing a contractual provision providing General Mills was required to indemnify CSX—regardless of whether CSX alone was responsible. The district court dismissed one of CSX’s breach-of-contract claims and granted General Mills summary judgment on the other.
The Eleventh Circuit found that, under the parties’ agreement, General Mills was not required to indemnify CSX if CSX was solely
negligent. However, the court disagreed with the district court that Georgia's vouchment doctrine barred CSX from litigating the issue of
General Mills’s negligence. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit remanded for the district court to determine if General Mills was at
least partially at fault for the injury. If so, then General Mills must indemnify CSX for at least a portion of the settlement and related expenses.
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that General Mills was not required to indemnify CSX if CSX was solely
negligent; however, the court disagreed that Georgia's vouchment doctrine barred CSX from litigating the issue of General Mills’s negligence. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further fact finding.
2023-10-05federalUS Court of Appeals for the Eleventh CircuitJILL PRYOR22-10922https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1201/22-1201-2023-10-02.htmlStimson Lumber Co. v. United States2023-10-02T05:31:56-08:002023-10-02T05:31:56-08:00
In 1907, the then-owner executed the “Stimson deed,” transferring to the Railroad “its successors and assigns, the right to cross said right of way at any point or points where such crossing is desired” the land at issue. POTB later took ownership of the railroad. A 2007 storm caused severe damage to the railroad tracks. POTB did not repair the damage, resulting in the disbandment of the Oregon Tillamook Railroad Authority. POTB, with governmental entities, established the Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency, to construct “a new multi-use trail” that would “connect[] to a wide network of existing recreation[al] trails and parks, educational opportunities, and heritage sites” over portions of the railroad line. In 2016, POTB filed a notice of intent to abandon service of the portions of the railroad line at issue with the Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking under the National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d).
The Claims Court and Federal Circuit rejected Stimson’s claim that the creation of the trail constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Railbanking and interim trail use are within the scope of the easement. Stimson failed to show abandonment for all purposes and had no compensable property interest in the land to which the deed pertained. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1201/22-1201-2023-10-02.html" target="_blank">View "Stimson Lumber Co. v. United States" on Justia Law</a>
In 1907, the then-owner executed the “Stimson deed,” transferring to the Railroad “its successors and assigns, the right to cross said right of way at any point or points where such crossing is desired” the land at issue. POTB later took ownership of the railroad. A 2007 storm caused severe damage to the railroad tracks. POTB did not repair the damage, resulting in the disbandment of the Oregon Tillamook Railroad Authority. POTB, with governmental entities, established the Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency, to construct “a new multi-use trail” that would “connect[] to a wide network of existing recreation[al] trails and parks, educational opportunities, and heritage sites” over portions of the railroad line. In 2016, POTB filed a notice of intent to abandon service of the portions of the railroad line at issue with the Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking under the National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d).
The Claims Court and Federal Circuit rejected Stimson’s claim that the creation of the trail constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Railbanking and interim trail use are within the scope of the easement. Stimson failed to show abandonment for all purposes and had no compensable property interest in the land to which the deed pertained.
Federal Circuit rejects takings claims arising out of a rails-to-trails conversion.
2023-10-02federalUS Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitCunningham22-1201https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2023/2023-me-63.htmlState v. Santerre2023-09-12T07:04:21-08:002023-09-12T07:04:21-08:00
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court interpreting Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, 2413-A to permit a determination that Defendant had committed three civil violations and to authorize the trial court to impose consecutive license suspensions, holding that the trial court did not err.
Defendant admitted to three counts of committing a motor vehicle violation resulting in death pursuant to section 2413-A(1). After a penalty hearing, the trial court imposed a $5,000 fine and a three-year license suspension for each of the counts, with the fines being cumulative and the suspensions to be imposed consecutively. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the penalties, holding (1) section 2413-A(1) authorizes separate violations for each death that occurs as a result of a driving violation and authorizes trial courts to impose consecutive license suspensions under their discretion; and (2) the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the consecutive suspensions. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2023/2023-me-63.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Santerre" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court interpreting Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, 2413-A to permit a determination that Defendant had committed three civil violations and to authorize the trial court to impose consecutive license suspensions, holding that the trial court did not err.
Defendant admitted to three counts of committing a motor vehicle violation resulting in death pursuant to section 2413-A(1). After a penalty hearing, the trial court imposed a $5,000 fine and a three-year license suspension for each of the counts, with the fines being cumulative and the suspensions to be imposed consecutively. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the penalties, holding (1) section 2413-A(1) authorizes separate violations for each death that occurs as a result of a driving violation and authorizes trial courts to impose consecutive license suspensions under their discretion; and (2) the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the consecutive suspensions.
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's judgment interpreting Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, 2413-A to permit a determination that Defendant had committed three civil violations and to authorize the trial court to impose consecutive license suspensions, holding that there was no error..
2023-09-12stateMaineMaine Supreme Judicial CourtJoseph Jabar2023 ME 63https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1137/21-1137-2023-08-15.htmlMatson Navigation Company, Inc. v. DOT2023-08-15T07:34:21-08:002023-08-15T07:34:21-08:00
The United States Maritime Administration (“MARAD”) approved a shipping company’s request to replace two vessels operating in the Pacific trade within the Maritime Security Program. Matson Navigation Co., a competitor in the Pacific, petitions for review of the replacements. As a source of jurisdiction, Matson points to the Hobbs Act, under which the DC Circuit had original jurisdiction over some acts of MARAD.
The DC Circuit reversed two orders of the district court, consolidated with these petitions, that held jurisdiction over Matson’s claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and was exclusive in the court of appeals. The court wrote that Matson was not a “party” to the replacement proceedings for either vessel, therefore, the court denied the petitions for direct review. The court explained that whether a case begins in district court or is eligible for direct review in the court is a policy decision that is for “Congress rather than us to determine.” The court wrote that as Matson’s counsel stated at oral argument, the company is just “trying to get review.” Because sending limited comments based on limited information to an informal agency proceeding does not confer “party” status under the Hobbs Act, that review starts in the district court. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1137/21-1137-2023-08-15.html" target="_blank">View "Matson Navigation Company, Inc. v. DOT" on Justia Law</a>
The United States Maritime Administration (“MARAD”) approved a shipping company’s request to replace two vessels operating in the Pacific trade within the Maritime Security Program. Matson Navigation Co., a competitor in the Pacific, petitions for review of the replacements. As a source of jurisdiction, Matson points to the Hobbs Act, under which the DC Circuit had original jurisdiction over some acts of MARAD.
The DC Circuit reversed two orders of the district court, consolidated with these petitions, that held jurisdiction over Matson’s claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and was exclusive in the court of appeals. The court wrote that Matson was not a “party” to the replacement proceedings for either vessel, therefore, the court denied the petitions for direct review. The court explained that whether a case begins in district court or is eligible for direct review in the court is a policy decision that is for “Congress rather than us to determine.” The court wrote that as Matson’s counsel stated at oral argument, the company is just “trying to get review.” Because sending limited comments based on limited information to an informal agency proceeding does not confer “party” status under the Hobbs Act, that review starts in the district court.
The DC Circuit reversed two orders of the district court, consolidated with these petitions, that held jurisdiction over Matson’s claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) was exclusive in the court of appeals. Further, the court remanded holding that Matson’s APA claims were appropriately brought to the district court in the first instance.
2023-08-15federalUS Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitRao21-1137https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/21-3366/21-3366-2023-08-02.htmlRebecca Lancaster v. BNSF Railway Company2023-08-02T07:30:51-08:002023-08-02T07:30:51-08:00
A former BNSF Railway Company employee died from lung cancer in 2018. Plaintiff, on behalf of her late husband’s estate, brought this wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that her husband’s cancer was caused by his exposure to toxins at work. The district court excluded Plaintiff’s expert witness testimony and granted summary judgment to BNSF.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that there is no direct evidence that Plaintiff’s husband was exposed to asbestos or diesel combustion fumes. Even if a jury could infer that Plaintiff’s husband had been exposed, there is no evidence of the level of exposure. The court explained that while a quantifiable amount of exposure is not required to find causation between toxic exposure and injury, there must be, at a minimum, “evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of that agent that are known to cause the kind of harm that the plaintiff claims to have suffered,” There is no such evidence here. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion by determining that the expert’s opinion lacked a sufficient foundation and that, in turn, his methodology for proving causation was unreliable. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/21-3366/21-3366-2023-08-02.html" target="_blank">View "Rebecca Lancaster v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law</a>
A former BNSF Railway Company employee died from lung cancer in 2018. Plaintiff, on behalf of her late husband’s estate, brought this wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that her husband’s cancer was caused by his exposure to toxins at work. The district court excluded Plaintiff’s expert witness testimony and granted summary judgment to BNSF.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that there is no direct evidence that Plaintiff’s husband was exposed to asbestos or diesel combustion fumes. Even if a jury could infer that Plaintiff’s husband had been exposed, there is no evidence of the level of exposure. The court explained that while a quantifiable amount of exposure is not required to find causation between toxic exposure and injury, there must be, at a minimum, “evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of that agent that are known to cause the kind of harm that the plaintiff claims to have suffered,” There is no such evidence here. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion by determining that the expert’s opinion lacked a sufficient foundation and that, in turn, his methodology for proving causation was unreliable.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling excluding Plaintiff’s expert witness testimony in her wrongful death action and granting summary judgment to the BNSF Railway Company.
2023-08-02federalUS Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitKOBES21-3366https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1466/22-1466-2023-08-01.htmlNational Wildlife Federation v. United States Army Corps of Engineers2023-08-01T11:31:30-08:002023-08-01T11:31:30-08:00
The Middle Mississippi is the 195-mile-long stretch from St. Louis, Missouri, where the Missouri River flows into the Mississippi, to Cairo, Illinois, where the Ohio River flows into the Mississippi and doubles its flow. The 1910 Rivers and Harbors Act authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to construct permanent river training structures in the Middle Mississippi and perform supplemental dredging to maintain a channel sufficient for commercial traffic. The Corps has for decades built and maintained structures—dikes, jetties, and chevrons—along the Middle Mississippi to ensure that the channel is at least nine feet deep and 300 feet wide for commercial navigation. In 1976, under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Corps prepared an environmental impact statement (EIS) assessing the project's ecological impacts. In 2013, the Corps decided to supplement its 1976 EIS, based on newly designated threatened and endangered species, and new information on the effects of river training structures and dredging. In the final supplemental EIS and record of decision, the Corps chose the “Continue Construction Alternative.” Because the exact locations and types of future river training structures are unknown, the supplemental statement studied environmental impacts at a programmatic level and will perform site-specific environmental assessments before actually building additional river training structures.
In a challenge brought by environmental groups, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government, rejecting arguments that the supplemental EIS did not comply with the Water Resources Development Act of 2007, 121 Stat. 1041, or the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1466/22-1466-2023-08-01.html" target="_blank">View "National Wildlife Federation v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law</a>
The Middle Mississippi is the 195-mile-long stretch from St. Louis, Missouri, where the Missouri River flows into the Mississippi, to Cairo, Illinois, where the Ohio River flows into the Mississippi and doubles its flow. The 1910 Rivers and Harbors Act authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to construct permanent river training structures in the Middle Mississippi and perform supplemental dredging to maintain a channel sufficient for commercial traffic. The Corps has for decades built and maintained structures—dikes, jetties, and chevrons—along the Middle Mississippi to ensure that the channel is at least nine feet deep and 300 feet wide for commercial navigation. In 1976, under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Corps prepared an environmental impact statement (EIS) assessing the project's ecological impacts. In 2013, the Corps decided to supplement its 1976 EIS, based on newly designated threatened and endangered species, and new information on the effects of river training structures and dredging. In the final supplemental EIS and record of decision, the Corps chose the “Continue Construction Alternative.” Because the exact locations and types of future river training structures are unknown, the supplemental statement studied environmental impacts at a programmatic level and will perform site-specific environmental assessments before actually building additional river training structures.
In a challenge brought by environmental groups, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government, rejecting arguments that the supplemental EIS did not comply with the Water Resources Development Act of 2007, 121 Stat. 1041, or the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321.
Seventh Circuit rejects challenges to an environmental impact statement prepared by the Army Corps of Engineers in connection with river training structures and dredging in the Middle Mississippi.
2023-08-01federalUS Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitHAMILTON22-1466https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1445/22-1445-2023-07-26.htmlUnion Pacific Railroad Co. v. Regional Transportation Authority2023-07-26T10:02:33-08:002023-07-26T10:02:33-08:00
An Illinois state agency oversees Metra, a railroad with passenger service over lines radiating from Chicago. For three lines, Metra owns the rolling stock, while Union Pacific supplies the track, the workforce, and ticket sales. Ticket revenue goes to Metra, which pays UP for its services. UP notified Metra that it would discontinue its services. Metra replied that UP cannot drop the service unless relieved of its obligations by the Surface Transportation Board. Metra argued that UP is locked into its relationship with Metra because the 1995 ICC Termination Act repealed 49 U.S.C. 10908, 10909, the only statutes giving the Board authority over the discontinuation of passenger service. UP argued that the repeal deregulated passenger rail service so that railroads can end passenger service when business considerations dictate. Federal law requires the Board’s permission to abandon all service over a line of track but UP will continue freight service; the lines will not be abandoned.
The district court declined to defer to the Board’s primary jurisdiction because the dispute does not require any findings of fact by an agency. The Board agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in favor of UP. The controlling contract has long expired. Any reduction in service, therefore, depends on “compliance with all applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.” To the extent that UP is a common carrier—rather than an independent contractor of Metra—it has unfettered authority to discontinue any service without the Board’s approval if it keeps the rails in place and continues running some trains. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1445/22-1445-2023-07-26.html" target="_blank">View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Regional Transportation Authority" on Justia Law</a>
An Illinois state agency oversees Metra, a railroad with passenger service over lines radiating from Chicago. For three lines, Metra owns the rolling stock, while Union Pacific supplies the track, the workforce, and ticket sales. Ticket revenue goes to Metra, which pays UP for its services. UP notified Metra that it would discontinue its services. Metra replied that UP cannot drop the service unless relieved of its obligations by the Surface Transportation Board. Metra argued that UP is locked into its relationship with Metra because the 1995 ICC Termination Act repealed 49 U.S.C. 10908, 10909, the only statutes giving the Board authority over the discontinuation of passenger service. UP argued that the repeal deregulated passenger rail service so that railroads can end passenger service when business considerations dictate. Federal law requires the Board’s permission to abandon all service over a line of track but UP will continue freight service; the lines will not be abandoned.
The district court declined to defer to the Board’s primary jurisdiction because the dispute does not require any findings of fact by an agency. The Board agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in favor of UP. The controlling contract has long expired. Any reduction in service, therefore, depends on “compliance with all applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.” To the extent that UP is a common carrier—rather than an independent contractor of Metra—it has unfettered authority to discontinue any service without the Board’s approval if it keeps the rails in place and continues running some trains.
Seventh Circuit holds that a railroad, acting as a contractor for a government agency providing commuter service in Chicago, has the unfettered right to discontinue its services.
2023-07-26federalUS Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitFrank Hoover Easterbrook22-1445https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2021-1469.htmlState ex rel. Balunek v. Marchbanks2023-07-25T05:05:30-08:002023-07-25T05:05:30-08:00
The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department Transportation and its director (collectively, ODOT) to begin appropriation proceedings for the taking of real property owned by Relator, holding that appropriation proceedings were necessary.
ODOT's roadway construction project resulted in Relator's property being inaccessible from any road. Relator filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 163. ODOT argued in response that Relator could obtain a permit from the city of Cleveland to connect the property to a road and that Relator must apply for and be denied such a permit before he was entitled to mandamus. The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus and ordered ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings, holding that Relator was entitled to a writ compelling ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2021-1469.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Balunek v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department Transportation and its director (collectively, ODOT) to begin appropriation proceedings for the taking of real property owned by Relator, holding that appropriation proceedings were necessary.
ODOT's roadway construction project resulted in Relator's property being inaccessible from any road. Relator filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 163. ODOT argued in response that Relator could obtain a permit from the city of Cleveland to connect the property to a road and that Relator must apply for and be denied such a permit before he was entitled to mandamus. The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus and ordered ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings, holding that Relator was entitled to a writ compelling ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings.
The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department Transportation and its director to begin appropriation proceedings for the taking of Relators' real property, holding that appropriation proceedings were necessary.
2023-07-25stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2021-1469https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/22-3134/22-3134-2023-07-21.htmlButler, et al. v. Daimler Trucks North America2023-07-21T13:33:04-08:002023-07-21T13:33:04-08:00
Five people were killed when a commercial truck rear-ended a line of traffic on an interstate highway. The truck driver was prosecuted and sentenced to prison for his misconduct. The issue on this appeal was the liability, if any, of the manufacturer of the truck. Plaintiffs, suing on behalf of the heirs and estates of the decedents, contended the manufacturer, Daimler Trucks North America, should have been held liable in tort under design-defect and warning-defect theories of products liability because it failed to equip the truck with two collision-mitigation systems—forward-collision warning and automatic emergency braking—and did not warn of the dangers caused by that failure. The district court granted summary judgment to Daimler. After its review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding many of the arguments made by Plaintiffs on appeal were inadequately preserved for appellate review, and the remaining arguments lacked merit. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/22-3134/22-3134-2023-07-21.html" target="_blank">View "Butler, et al. v. Daimler Trucks North America" on Justia Law</a>
Five people were killed when a commercial truck rear-ended a line of traffic on an interstate highway. The truck driver was prosecuted and sentenced to prison for his misconduct. The issue on this appeal was the liability, if any, of the manufacturer of the truck. Plaintiffs, suing on behalf of the heirs and estates of the decedents, contended the manufacturer, Daimler Trucks North America, should have been held liable in tort under design-defect and warning-defect theories of products liability because it failed to equip the truck with two collision-mitigation systems—forward-collision warning and automatic emergency braking—and did not warn of the dangers caused by that failure. The district court granted summary judgment to Daimler. After its review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding many of the arguments made by Plaintiffs on appeal were inadequately preserved for appellate review, and the remaining arguments lacked merit.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding many of the arguments made by Plaintiffs on appeal were inadequately preserved for appellate review, and the remaining arguments lacked merit.
2023-07-21federalUS Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitHarris L. Hartz22-3134https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/a164180.htmlCoalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco2023-07-21T11:01:23-08:002023-07-21T11:01:23-08:00
In a challenge to the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency’s policy of towing safely and lawfully parked vehicles without a warrant based solely on the accrual of unpaid parking tickets, the Coalition argued that the warrantless tows are unreasonable seizures within the meaning of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The trial court denied a motion for a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief.
The court of appeal reversed. The challenged warrantless tows are not permissible under the vehicular community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The defendants have not shown that legally parked cars with unpaid parking tickets that present no threat to “public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic” may be towed under that exception. The court rejected an argument that the governmental interest in deterring parking violations and nonpayment of parking fines justifies warrantless tows under the vehicular community caretaking exception. The tows at issue may not be justified by analogy to warrantless property seizures in the forfeiture context. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/a164180.html" target="_blank">View "Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law</a>
In a challenge to the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency’s policy of towing safely and lawfully parked vehicles without a warrant based solely on the accrual of unpaid parking tickets, the Coalition argued that the warrantless tows are unreasonable seizures within the meaning of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The trial court denied a motion for a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief.
The court of appeal reversed. The challenged warrantless tows are not permissible under the vehicular community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The defendants have not shown that legally parked cars with unpaid parking tickets that present no threat to “public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic” may be towed under that exception. The court rejected an argument that the governmental interest in deterring parking violations and nonpayment of parking fines justifies warrantless tows under the vehicular community caretaking exception. The tows at issue may not be justified by analogy to warrantless property seizures in the forfeiture context.
Court of appeal holds that San Francisco's policy of towing safely, lawfully parked vehicles without a warrant based solely on the accrual of unpaid parking tickets is not exempt from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
2023-07-21stateCaliforniaCalifornia Courts of AppealSimonsA164180https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1805/22-1805-2023-07-18.htmlYe v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.2023-07-18T07:01:11-08:002023-07-18T07:01:11-08:00
Ye sought to recover against GlobalTranz, a freight broker, following the death of her husband in a highway accident. Ye claimed, under Illinois law, that GlobalTranz negligently hired the motor carrier (Sunrise) that employed the driver of the truck that caused the accident. Ye obtained a $10 million default judgment against Sunrise.
The district court concluded that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s express preemption provision in 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) bars Ye’s claim against GlobalTranz and that the Act’s safety exception in 14501(c)(2)(A) does not save the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the significant economic effects that would result from imposing state negligence standards on brokers. Congress broadly disallowed state laws that impede its deregulatory goals, with a specific carveout for laws within a state’s “safety regulatory authority." Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz falls within 14501(c)(1)’s express prohibition on the enforcement of state laws “related to a ... service of any ... broker ... with respect to the transportation of property.” Rejecting the "safety exception" claim, the court reasoned that a common law negligence claim enforced against a broker is not a law that is “with respect to motor vehicles." <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1805/22-1805-2023-07-18.html" target="_blank">View "Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
Ye sought to recover against GlobalTranz, a freight broker, following the death of her husband in a highway accident. Ye claimed, under Illinois law, that GlobalTranz negligently hired the motor carrier (Sunrise) that employed the driver of the truck that caused the accident. Ye obtained a $10 million default judgment against Sunrise.
The district court concluded that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s express preemption provision in 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) bars Ye’s claim against GlobalTranz and that the Act’s safety exception in 14501(c)(2)(A) does not save the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the significant economic effects that would result from imposing state negligence standards on brokers. Congress broadly disallowed state laws that impede its deregulatory goals, with a specific carveout for laws within a state’s “safety regulatory authority." Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz falls within 14501(c)(1)’s express prohibition on the enforcement of state laws “related to a ... service of any ... broker ... with respect to the transportation of property.” Rejecting the "safety exception" claim, the court reasoned that a common law negligence claim enforced against a broker is not a law that is “with respect to motor vehicles."
Seventh Circuit holds that the Federal Aviation Amendments Act preempts a suit under state tort law against a freight broker.
2023-07-18federalUS Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitScudder22-1805https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1829/22-1829-2023-07-12.htmlFinancial Oversight & Management Bd. v. Vazquez-Velazquez Group2023-07-12T13:31:07-08:002023-07-12T13:31:07-08:00
The First Circuit affirmed the determination of the Title III court, during the course of its confirmation of the Modified Fifth Amended Title III Plan of Adjustment (Plan) for the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA), that the Vazquez-Valezquez Group's claims for additional compensation made in a separate federal lawsuit were dischargeable, holding that there was no error.
The Group, which was composed of sixty-nine current and former PRHTA employees who received extra compensation under PRHTA Regulation 12-2017, with which the PRHTA later broke. At issue was the Group's objection to the Title III court's determination that the Group's claims for additional compensation were dischargeable under the Plan. After the Title III court entered an order and judgment confirming the plan the Group appealed, arguing that its members' claims were nondischargeable. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims for additional compensation were not exempt from discharge. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1829/22-1829-2023-07-12.html" target="_blank">View "Financial Oversight & Management Bd. v. Vazquez-Velazquez Group" on Justia Law</a>
The First Circuit affirmed the determination of the Title III court, during the course of its confirmation of the Modified Fifth Amended Title III Plan of Adjustment (Plan) for the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA), that the Vazquez-Valezquez Group's claims for additional compensation made in a separate federal lawsuit were dischargeable, holding that there was no error.
The Group, which was composed of sixty-nine current and former PRHTA employees who received extra compensation under PRHTA Regulation 12-2017, with which the PRHTA later broke. At issue was the Group's objection to the Title III court's determination that the Group's claims for additional compensation were dischargeable under the Plan. After the Title III court entered an order and judgment confirming the plan the Group appealed, arguing that its members' claims were nondischargeable. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims for additional compensation were not exempt from discharge.
The First Circuit affirmed the determination of the Title III court that the Vazquez-Valezquez Group's claims for additional compensation made in a separate federal lawsuit were dischargeable, holding that there was no error.
2023-07-12federalUS Court of Appeals for the First CircuitSandra Lea Lynch22-1829https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/21-1739/21-1739-2023-07-12.htmlVazquez-Velazquez v. P.R. Highway & Transportation Authority2023-07-12T13:30:48-08:002023-07-12T13:30:48-08:00
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA) and its executive directors (collectively, Appellees) and dismissing this complaint brought by sixty-nine current and former employees of the PRHTA (collectively, Appellants), holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.
Appellants brought this action challenging the PRHTA's decision no longer to give effect to a regulation providing Appellants with additional compensation. Specifically, Appellants claimed that the decision was contrary to P.R. Act No. 66-2014, giving rise to violations of the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the PRHTA on the federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants' claims under Puerto Rico law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that Appellants could not establish their federal constitutional claims; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over Appellants' remaining Puerto Rico law claims. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/21-1739/21-1739-2023-07-12.html" target="_blank">View "Vazquez-Velazquez v. P.R. Highway & Transportation Authority" on Justia Law</a>
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA) and its executive directors (collectively, Appellees) and dismissing this complaint brought by sixty-nine current and former employees of the PRHTA (collectively, Appellants), holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.
Appellants brought this action challenging the PRHTA's decision no longer to give effect to a regulation providing Appellants with additional compensation. Specifically, Appellants claimed that the decision was contrary to P.R. Act No. 66-2014, giving rise to violations of the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the PRHTA on the federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants' claims under Puerto Rico law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that Appellants could not establish their federal constitutional claims; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over Appellants' remaining Puerto Rico law claims.
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA) in this action brought by PRHTA employees, holding that the district court did not err.
2023-07-12federalUS Court of Appeals for the First CircuitSandra Lea Lynch21-1739https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-2437/22-2437-2023-07-05.htmlJaranowski v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co.2023-07-05T08:31:04-08:002023-07-05T08:31:04-08:00
Jaranowski worked as a conductor for the Railroad for 22 years. While operating a railroad switch in 2020, he seriously injured his neck. He sued the railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging that he was injured because the railroad failed to maintain the switch properly. He accused the railroad of ordinary negligence and negligence per se based on alleged violations of Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Track Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. 213. The district court concluded that Jaranowski had failed to present evidence that would support a finding that the railroad had actual or constructive notice of any defect in the switch before he was injured and granted the Railroad summary judgment.
The Seventh Circuit reversed. Actual or constructive notice is required to violate the federal Track Safety Standards, however, Jaranowski presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether the railroad at least should have known that the switch was defective before he was injured. A reasonable jury could accept Jaranowski’s account of the facts and the report of his expert, who examined the switch, to conclude that the Railroad’s prior inspection was performed without due care. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-2437/22-2437-2023-07-05.html" target="_blank">View "Jaranowski v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co." on Justia Law</a>
Jaranowski worked as a conductor for the Railroad for 22 years. While operating a railroad switch in 2020, he seriously injured his neck. He sued the railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging that he was injured because the railroad failed to maintain the switch properly. He accused the railroad of ordinary negligence and negligence per se based on alleged violations of Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Track Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. 213. The district court concluded that Jaranowski had failed to present evidence that would support a finding that the railroad had actual or constructive notice of any defect in the switch before he was injured and granted the Railroad summary judgment.
The Seventh Circuit reversed. Actual or constructive notice is required to violate the federal Track Safety Standards, however, Jaranowski presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether the railroad at least should have known that the switch was defective before he was injured. A reasonable jury could accept Jaranowski’s account of the facts and the report of his expert, who examined the switch, to conclude that the Railroad’s prior inspection was performed without due care.
Seventh Circuit reinstates a claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act; a railroad worker, injured while working on a defective switch, presented sufficient evidence that the railroad should have known that the switch was defective before he was injured.
2023-07-05federalUS Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitHAMILTON22-2437https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-1209/22-1209-2023-06-30.htmlNorfolk Southern Railway Company v. STB2023-06-30T07:04:44-08:002023-06-30T07:04:44-08:00
Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) petitioned for review of a decision of the Surface Transportation Board (STB or Board), the successor agency to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) charged with authorizing certain rail carrier transactions under the Interstate Commerce Act. Norfolk Southern is a rail carrier that owns a 57.14 percent share of the Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company (Belt Line), the operator of a major switching terminal in Norfolk, Virginia. Norfolk Southern’s majority interest goes back to 1982, when its corporate family acquired and consolidated various rail carriers with smaller ownership interests in the Belt Line. Norfolk Southern’s competitor, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), owns the remainder of the Belt Line’s shares (42.86 percent). This case involves a different question raised before the Board for the first time: whether the ICC/Board approvals of Norfolk Southern’s subsequent corporate-family consolidations in 1991 and 1998 authorized Norfolk Southern to control the Belt Line. The Board again answered no. Norfolk Southern petitioned for review.
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Board’s decision regarding the 1991 and 1998 transactions is neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Board reasonably sought to avoid an absurd interpretation of 49 C.F.R. Section 1180.2(d)(3)’s corporate-family exemption that would allow a carrier to gain control of a new entity without following the Board’s review requirements and then “cure that unauthorized acquisition by reorganizing the corporate family.” The Board reasonably rejected Norfolk Southern’s claim that, by reshuffling the pieces of its corporate family, it acquired control authority of the Belt Line sub silentio. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-1209/22-1209-2023-06-30.html" target="_blank">View "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. STB" on Justia Law</a>
Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) petitioned for review of a decision of the Surface Transportation Board (STB or Board), the successor agency to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) charged with authorizing certain rail carrier transactions under the Interstate Commerce Act. Norfolk Southern is a rail carrier that owns a 57.14 percent share of the Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company (Belt Line), the operator of a major switching terminal in Norfolk, Virginia. Norfolk Southern’s majority interest goes back to 1982, when its corporate family acquired and consolidated various rail carriers with smaller ownership interests in the Belt Line. Norfolk Southern’s competitor, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), owns the remainder of the Belt Line’s shares (42.86 percent). This case involves a different question raised before the Board for the first time: whether the ICC/Board approvals of Norfolk Southern’s subsequent corporate-family consolidations in 1991 and 1998 authorized Norfolk Southern to control the Belt Line. The Board again answered no. Norfolk Southern petitioned for review.
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Board’s decision regarding the 1991 and 1998 transactions is neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Board reasonably sought to avoid an absurd interpretation of 49 C.F.R. Section 1180.2(d)(3)’s corporate-family exemption that would allow a carrier to gain control of a new entity without following the Board’s review requirements and then “cure that unauthorized acquisition by reorganizing the corporate family.” The Board reasonably rejected Norfolk Southern’s claim that, by reshuffling the pieces of its corporate family, it acquired control authority of the Belt Line sub silentio.
The DC Circuit denied Norfolk Southern’s petition for review of the Surface Transportation Board’s decision regarding the 1991 and 1998 consolidations. The court held that the Board reasonably rejected Norfolk Southern’s claim that, by reshuffling the pieces of its corporate family, it acquired control authority of the Belt Line sub silentio.
2023-06-30federalUS Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitKAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON22-1209https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1158/22-1158-2023-06-29.htmlCamara de Mercadeo v. Emanuelli Hernandez2023-06-29T13:30:38-08:002023-06-29T13:30:38-08:00
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint in its entirety, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the challenged regulations in this case were not null and remained enforceable and that there is no private right of action to enforce the Puerto Rico Oversight Management Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U.S.C. 2101.
Plaintiff, Camara de Mercadeo, Industria y Distribución de Alimentos, Inc., filed the underlying complaint on behalf of its members - businesses in the food industry - seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from certain regulations related to freight tariffs and implementing circular letters promulgated by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Transportation and other Public Services Bureau. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the challenged regulations were unlawful under PROMESA. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1158/22-1158-2023-06-29.html" target="_blank">View "Camara de Mercadeo v. Emanuelli Hernandez" on Justia Law</a>
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint in its entirety, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the challenged regulations in this case were not null and remained enforceable and that there is no private right of action to enforce the Puerto Rico Oversight Management Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U.S.C. 2101.
Plaintiff, Camara de Mercadeo, Industria y Distribución de Alimentos, Inc., filed the underlying complaint on behalf of its members - businesses in the food industry - seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from certain regulations related to freight tariffs and implementing circular letters promulgated by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Transportation and other Public Services Bureau. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the challenged regulations were unlawful under PROMESA. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.
The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of this case, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the challenged regulations in this case were not null and remained enforceable and that there is no private right of action to enforce the Puerto Rico Oversight Management Stability Act.
2023-06-29federalUS Court of Appeals for the First CircuitBurroughs22-1158https://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2023/2022ap001233.htmlWis. Property Taxpayers, Inc. v. Town of Buchanan2023-06-29T05:11:58-08:002023-06-29T05:11:58-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court declaring the Town of Buchanan's transportation utility fee (TUF) to be a property tax subject to the Town's levy limit, holding that funds raised for utility districts under Wis. Stat. 66.0827 are property taxes subject to municipal levy limits.
After the circuit court concluded that the money raised for the district fund was subject to the Town's property tax limit Appellants appealed, arguing that the TUF was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Town did not follow the lawful procedures that a municipality must follow for funding public improvements because the imposition of property taxes over the Town's levy limits required the consent of the Town's voters and because nothing in the statutes permitted the Town to bypass those levy limits for the purpose of imposing a TUF on property owners in the municipality. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2023/2022ap001233.html" target="_blank">View "Wis. Property Taxpayers, Inc. v. Town of Buchanan" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court declaring the Town of Buchanan's transportation utility fee (TUF) to be a property tax subject to the Town's levy limit, holding that funds raised for utility districts under Wis. Stat. 66.0827 are property taxes subject to municipal levy limits.
After the circuit court concluded that the money raised for the district fund was subject to the Town's property tax limit Appellants appealed, arguing that the TUF was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Town did not follow the lawful procedures that a municipality must follow for funding public improvements because the imposition of property taxes over the Town's levy limits required the consent of the Town's voters and because nothing in the statutes permitted the Town to bypass those levy limits for the purpose of imposing a TUF on property owners in the municipality.
The Supreme Court held that funds raised for utility districts under Wis. Stat. 66.0827 are property taxes subject to municipal levy limits.
2023-06-29stateWisconsinWisconsin Supreme CourtAnn Walsh Bradley2022AP001233https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/a163550.htmlVisitacion Investment LLC v. 424 Jessie Historic Properties LLC2023-06-28T10:01:34-08:002023-06-28T10:01:34-08:00
Part of Visitacion’s land in San Francisco’s Visitacion Valley was formerly owned by Southern Pacific, which was, at the time of conveyance (1990), conducting railroad-related business on part of the property. The land subject to an easement is bounded by the right-of-way for mainline railroad tracks. At some point, railroad activities on the dominant tenement ceased. In 2015, the railroad sold the dominant tenement and an adjacent parcel (JHP property) and expressly conveyed to JHP its rights under the easement, although the deed contained no warranty regarding the continued existence of such rights. Visitacion, planning a large, mixed-use residential development and hoping to use the land that was encumbered by the easement, brought a quiet title action, alleging that the easement has been extinguished under the doctrine of abandonment. JHP denied abandonment and sought to establish its “full and complete legal and equitable ownership.”
The court of appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment to JHP. Given the ambiguity of the easement deed and the uncertain state of the evidence bearing on its origination and use, the trial court erred in construing the deed in the context of these cross-motions for summary judgment. Visitacion’s evidence, if accepted, could establish abandonment. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/a163550.html" target="_blank">View "Visitacion Investment LLC v. 424 Jessie Historic Properties LLC" on Justia Law</a>
Part of Visitacion’s land in San Francisco’s Visitacion Valley was formerly owned by Southern Pacific, which was, at the time of conveyance (1990), conducting railroad-related business on part of the property. The land subject to an easement is bounded by the right-of-way for mainline railroad tracks. At some point, railroad activities on the dominant tenement ceased. In 2015, the railroad sold the dominant tenement and an adjacent parcel (JHP property) and expressly conveyed to JHP its rights under the easement, although the deed contained no warranty regarding the continued existence of such rights. Visitacion, planning a large, mixed-use residential development and hoping to use the land that was encumbered by the easement, brought a quiet title action, alleging that the easement has been extinguished under the doctrine of abandonment. JHP denied abandonment and sought to establish its “full and complete legal and equitable ownership.”
The court of appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment to JHP. Given the ambiguity of the easement deed and the uncertain state of the evidence bearing on its origination and use, the trial court erred in construing the deed in the context of these cross-motions for summary judgment. Visitacion’s evidence, if accepted, could establish abandonment.
Court of appeal reinstates a quiet title action concerning a railroad-related easement.
2023-06-28stateCaliforniaCalifornia Courts of AppealStewartA163550https://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2023/da-22-0622.htmlState v. Akhmedli2023-06-20T13:35:05-08:002023-06-20T13:35:05-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss a complaint citing him with violating 49 C.F.R. 393.11, incorporated by Mont. Code Ann. 61-10-154, which required a red light to be affixed to protruding loads, holding that the district court did not err by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss for unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
After Appellant was convicted in justice court he appealed de novo to the district court, arguing that section 61-10-154, which authorizes the Montana Department of Transportation to adopt rules and regulations, and Mont. Code Ann. 61-9-512, which criminalizes violations of regulations adopted pursuant to section 61-10-154, constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative body. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature did not delegate the lawmaking function, as argued by Appellant. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2023/da-22-0622.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Akhmedli" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss a complaint citing him with violating 49 C.F.R. 393.11, incorporated by Mont. Code Ann. 61-10-154, which required a red light to be affixed to protruding loads, holding that the district court did not err by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss for unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
After Appellant was convicted in justice court he appealed de novo to the district court, arguing that section 61-10-154, which authorizes the Montana Department of Transportation to adopt rules and regulations, and Mont. Code Ann. 61-9-512, which criminalizes violations of regulations adopted pursuant to section 61-10-154, constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative body. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature did not delegate the lawmaking function, as argued by Appellant.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant's motion to dismiss a complaint citing him with violating Mont. Code Ann. 61-10-154, holding that the district court did not err by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss for unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
2023-06-20stateMontanaMontana Supreme CourtJames A. RiceDA 22-0622https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2023/21-0991-0.htmlFrazier v. Briscoe2023-06-15T11:11:43-08:002023-06-15T11:11:43-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Defendant had not been lawfully arrested without a warrant and thus reversing the decisions of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to revoke Defendant's driver's license, holding that the circuit court did not err.
A law enforcement officer arrested Defendant in his home without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed elsewhere. Rhe officer articulated no urgent need to arrest Defendant and admitted that he could have obtained a warrant from an impartial magistrate. The DMV applied evidence suggesting that Defendant might have driven while intoxicated from the scene of the misdemeanor to his home in three separate decisions revoking Defendant's driver's license. The circuit court reversed the revocation decisions, concluding that they were clearly wrong in light of the now-repealed W. Va. Code 17C-5A-2(f)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the DMV's suspension orders were founded upon an unlawful arrest. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2023/21-0991-0.html" target="_blank">View "Frazier v. Briscoe" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Defendant had not been lawfully arrested without a warrant and thus reversing the decisions of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to revoke Defendant's driver's license, holding that the circuit court did not err.
A law enforcement officer arrested Defendant in his home without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed elsewhere. Rhe officer articulated no urgent need to arrest Defendant and admitted that he could have obtained a warrant from an impartial magistrate. The DMV applied evidence suggesting that Defendant might have driven while intoxicated from the scene of the misdemeanor to his home in three separate decisions revoking Defendant's driver's license. The circuit court reversed the revocation decisions, concluding that they were clearly wrong in light of the now-repealed W. Va. Code 17C-5A-2(f)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the DMV's suspension orders were founded upon an unlawful arrest.
2023-06-15stateWest VirginiaSupreme Court of Appeals of West VirginiaHutchison21-099121-0990https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2023/21-0371-0.htmlCasto v. Frazier2023-06-15T11:11:36-08:002023-06-15T11:11:36-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court affirming the order entered by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding the administrative revocation of Petitioner's driver's license for driving under the influence of controlled substances or drugs, holding that the evidence was not sufficient to support Defendant's license revocation.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the record did not support the OAH's finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner had consumed alcohol, drugs, and/or controlled substances because the Department of Motor Vehicles offered no evidence that Defendant used or ingested controlled substances or drugs. Therefore, the Court remanded the case for entry of an order rescinding Defendant's revocation and reinstating his driver's license. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2023/21-0371-0.html" target="_blank">View "Casto v. Frazier" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court affirming the order entered by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding the administrative revocation of Petitioner's driver's license for driving under the influence of controlled substances or drugs, holding that the evidence was not sufficient to support Defendant's license revocation.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the record did not support the OAH's finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner had consumed alcohol, drugs, and/or controlled substances because the Department of Motor Vehicles offered no evidence that Defendant used or ingested controlled substances or drugs. Therefore, the Court remanded the case for entry of an order rescinding Defendant's revocation and reinstating his driver's license.
2023-06-15stateWest VirginiaSupreme Court of Appeals of West VirginiaBunn21-0371https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2023/21-0726.htmlFrazier v. Gaither2023-06-14T11:12:23-08:002023-06-14T11:12:23-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming an order entered by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reinstating Respondent's personal driver's license and commercial driver's license after Defendant challenged the finding of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) that Respondent drove under the influence of alcohol, holding that there was no error.
In 2017, the DMV revoked Respondent's personal driver's license and disqualified him from holding a commercial driver's license. Following an administrative hearing in 2019, the OAH rescinded the DMV's revocation and disqualification orders. The OAH reinstated both of Respondent's licenses, finding that the DMV had not proven that Respondent drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DMV did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent drove a motor vehicle while he was under the influence of alcohol. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2023/21-0726.html" target="_blank">View "Frazier v. Gaither" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming an order entered by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reinstating Respondent's personal driver's license and commercial driver's license after Defendant challenged the finding of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) that Respondent drove under the influence of alcohol, holding that there was no error.
In 2017, the DMV revoked Respondent's personal driver's license and disqualified him from holding a commercial driver's license. Following an administrative hearing in 2019, the OAH rescinded the DMV's revocation and disqualification orders. The OAH reinstated both of Respondent's licenses, finding that the DMV had not proven that Respondent drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DMV did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent drove a motor vehicle while he was under the influence of alcohol.
2023-06-14stateWest VirginiaSupreme Court of Appeals of West VirginiaBunn21-0726https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2023/45.htmlOwner Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. N.Y. State Dep't of Transportation2023-06-13T06:07:05-08:002023-06-13T06:07:05-08:00
The Court of Appeals held that warrantless inspections authorized by New York regulations adopting a rule promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) requiring the installation of electronic logging devices (ELD) in commercial motor vehicles fell within the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement.
The FMCSA promgulated the rules at issue in 2015, and the rules were permanently incorporated into New York law in 2019. Petitioner commenced this combined N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action challenging New York's adoption of the rule. Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that the searches authorized by the rule were valid under the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the lower courts properly determined that the ELD rule is constitutional; but (2) Supreme Court should have declared the rights of the parties rather than dismissing the complaint. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2023/45.html" target="_blank">View "Owner Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. N.Y. State Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law</a>
The Court of Appeals held that warrantless inspections authorized by New York regulations adopting a rule promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) requiring the installation of electronic logging devices (ELD) in commercial motor vehicles fell within the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement.
The FMCSA promgulated the rules at issue in 2015, and the rules were permanently incorporated into New York law in 2019. Petitioner commenced this combined N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action challenging New York's adoption of the rule. Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that the searches authorized by the rule were valid under the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the lower courts properly determined that the ELD rule is constitutional; but (2) Supreme Court should have declared the rights of the parties rather than dismissing the complaint.
The Court of Appeals held that warrantless inspections authorized by New York regulations adopting a rule promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration requiring the installation of electronic logging devices (ELD) in commercial motor vehicles fell within the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement.
2023-06-13stateNew YorkNew York Court of AppealsTroutman45https://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2023/22-0536.htmlLivingood v. City of Des Moines2023-06-09T06:04:51-08:002023-06-09T06:04:51-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying three plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this suit brought to challenge the City of Des Moines' use of the state's income offset program to collect automated traffic citation penalties and granting summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to a preemption claim and a claim for unjust enrichment.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims that, among other things, the City's use of the income offset program amounted to an unconstitutional taking and that their right to procedural due process was violated. As to Plaintiffs' contention that the City's use of the program was preempted by state law, however, the district court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing one plaintiff's preemption claim with respect to his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and in dismissing two plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2023/22-0536.html" target="_blank">View "Livingood v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying three plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this suit brought to challenge the City of Des Moines' use of the state's income offset program to collect automated traffic citation penalties and granting summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to a preemption claim and a claim for unjust enrichment.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims that, among other things, the City's use of the income offset program amounted to an unconstitutional taking and that their right to procedural due process was violated. As to Plaintiffs' contention that the City's use of the program was preempted by state law, however, the district court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing one plaintiff's preemption claim with respect to his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and in dismissing two plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's order in this lawsuit challenging the City of Des Moines' use of the state's income offset program to collect automated traffic citation penalties granting summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to preemption and unjust enrichment claims.
2023-06-09stateIowaIowa Supreme CourtMcDonald22-0536https://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2023/21-1015.htmlStogdill v. City of Windsor Heights2023-06-09T06:04:47-08:002023-06-09T06:04:47-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit challenging the City of Windsor Heights's attempts to collect automated traffic citation fines not reduced to a judgment in a municipal infraction proceeding, holding that the district court erred in part.
At issue was an income offset program authorized pursuant to Iowa Code 8A.504 allowing the department of administrative services to "establish a debt collection setoff procedure for collection of debts owed to the public agency." Plaintiffs brought this action against the City and the City's collection agent challenging the program to enforce civil penalties issued pursuant to the automated traffic enforcement system. The district court dismissed all claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the district court erred in dismissing some claims against the City as time-barred. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2023/21-1015.html" target="_blank">View "Stogdill v. City of Windsor Heights" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit challenging the City of Windsor Heights's attempts to collect automated traffic citation fines not reduced to a judgment in a municipal infraction proceeding, holding that the district court erred in part.
At issue was an income offset program authorized pursuant to Iowa Code 8A.504 allowing the department of administrative services to "establish a debt collection setoff procedure for collection of debts owed to the public agency." Plaintiffs brought this action against the City and the City's collection agent challenging the program to enforce civil penalties issued pursuant to the automated traffic enforcement system. The district court dismissed all claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the district court erred in dismissing some claims against the City as time-barred.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part the district court's judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit challenging the City of Windsor Heights's attempts to collect automated traffic citation fines not reduced to a judgment in a municipal infraction proceeding, holding that the district court erred in dismissing some claims against the City as time-barred.
2023-06-09stateIowaIowa Supreme CourtMcDonald21-1015https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2023/sjc-13300.htmlSmiley First, LLC v. Dep't of Transportation2023-05-24T04:04:35-08:002023-05-24T04:04:35-08:00
In this case considering whether an easement (2018 easement) taken by eminent domain by the Department of Transportation (MassDOT) exceeded the scope of an easement taken in 1991 by the Department of Public Works (DPW), MassDOT's predecessor in interest, with respect to Plaintiff's land in South Boston (burdened land), the Supreme Judicial Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for MassDOT.
DPW's 1991 order of taking created an easement over the burdened land for purposes of constructing a haul road. In 2017, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority began planning the construction of a test track on a portion of Plaintiff's land burdened by the 1991 easement. MassDOT recorded the 2018 confirmatory order of taking and then, contending that the taking merely confirmed that rights it held under the 1991 taking, refused to pay Plaintiff any compensation. Plaintiff responded with this litigation, and the superior court judge entered summary judgment in favor of MassDOT. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) while the intent of the parties should not be considered when an easement is taken by eminent domain, the ordinary rules of interpretation for easements otherwise apply; and (2) because the 1991 easement was more limited in scope than the 2018 easement, summary judgment for MassDOT must be reversed. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2023/sjc-13300.html" target="_blank">View "Smiley First, LLC v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law</a>
In this case considering whether an easement (2018 easement) taken by eminent domain by the Department of Transportation (MassDOT) exceeded the scope of an easement taken in 1991 by the Department of Public Works (DPW), MassDOT's predecessor in interest, with respect to Plaintiff's land in South Boston (burdened land), the Supreme Judicial Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for MassDOT.
DPW's 1991 order of taking created an easement over the burdened land for purposes of constructing a haul road. In 2017, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority began planning the construction of a test track on a portion of Plaintiff's land burdened by the 1991 easement. MassDOT recorded the 2018 confirmatory order of taking and then, contending that the taking merely confirmed that rights it held under the 1991 taking, refused to pay Plaintiff any compensation. Plaintiff responded with this litigation, and the superior court judge entered summary judgment in favor of MassDOT. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) while the intent of the parties should not be considered when an easement is taken by eminent domain, the ordinary rules of interpretation for easements otherwise apply; and (2) because the 1991 easement was more limited in scope than the 2018 easement, summary judgment for MassDOT must be reversed.
In this case considering whether an easement taken by eminent domain by the Department of Transportation exceeded the scope of an easement taken by the Department' s predecessor in interest, with respect to Plaintiff's land, the Supreme Judicial Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for the Department.
2023-05-23stateMassachusettsMassachusetts Supreme Judicial CourtGeorgesSJC-13300https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-55149/21-55149-2023-05-22.htmlSUSAN PORTER V. KELLY MARTINEZ, ET AL2023-05-22T08:31:49-08:002023-05-22T08:31:49-08:00
Plaintiff was cited for misuse of a vehicle horn under Section 27001 after she honked in support of protestors gathered outside a government official’s office. Although the citation was dismissed, Plaintiff filed suit to block future enforcement of 27001 against any expressive horn use―including honks not only to “support candidates or causes” but also to “greet friends or neighbors, summon children or co-workers, or celebrate weddings or victories.” She asserted that Section 27001 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Alternatively, she argued that even if the law is not content-based, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the State of California. The first held that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the law because, ever since she received a citation for impermissible horn use, she has refrained from honking in support of political protests to avoid being cited again. The panel determined that, at least in some circumstances, a honk can carry a message that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the listener to be communicative. The panel noted that Plaintiff had not alleged that the State has a policy or practice of improper selective enforcement of Section 27001, so the panel had no occasion to address that possibility here. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-55149/21-55149-2023-05-22.html" target="_blank">View "SUSAN PORTER V. KELLY MARTINEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law</a>
Plaintiff was cited for misuse of a vehicle horn under Section 27001 after she honked in support of protestors gathered outside a government official’s office. Although the citation was dismissed, Plaintiff filed suit to block future enforcement of 27001 against any expressive horn use―including honks not only to “support candidates or causes” but also to “greet friends or neighbors, summon children or co-workers, or celebrate weddings or victories.” She asserted that Section 27001 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Alternatively, she argued that even if the law is not content-based, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the State of California. The first held that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the law because, ever since she received a citation for impermissible horn use, she has refrained from honking in support of political protests to avoid being cited again. The panel determined that, at least in some circumstances, a honk can carry a message that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the listener to be communicative. The panel noted that Plaintiff had not alleged that the State has a policy or practice of improper selective enforcement of Section 27001, so the panel had no occasion to address that possibility here.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the State of California in an action challenging a California law that prohibits honking a vehicle’s horn except when reasonably necessary to warn of a safety hazard.
2023-05-22federalUS Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitFriedland21-55149https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-60312/21-60312-2023-05-10.htmlJackson Muni Airport v. Harkins2023-05-10T09:30:15-08:002023-05-10T09:30:15-08:00
The Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport is a major airport located in Jackson, Mississippi. Since 1960, the airport has been operated by the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, whose five commissioners are selected by the city government. In 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed, and the governor signed into law SB 2162, which abolishes the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority and replaces it with a regional authority composed of nine commissioners, only two of whom are selected by Jackson city government.
A Jackson citizen filed a suit seeking to enjoin the law. The mayor, the city council, the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, its board of commissioners, and the commissioners in their individual capacities intervened in that lawsuit. The intervenors contend that SB 2162 violates the Equal Protection rights of the citizens of Jackson by eliminating the locally controlled Jackson Municipal Airport Authority for racially discriminatory reasons. The intervenors served subpoenas on eight nonparty state legislators who participated in SB 2162’s drafting and passage. The Legislators refused to comply with Request #3 in the subpoena, which sought documents and communications related to SB 2162, asserting that any responsive discovery would either be irrelevant or protected by legislative privilege. The magistrate judge, and later the district court, rejected this position.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the Legislators to produce a privilege log. But the district court erred in broadly holding that legislative privilege was automatically waived for any documents that have been shared with third parties. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-60312/21-60312-2023-05-10.html" target="_blank">View "Jackson Muni Airport v. Harkins" on Justia Law</a>
The Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport is a major airport located in Jackson, Mississippi. Since 1960, the airport has been operated by the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, whose five commissioners are selected by the city government. In 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed, and the governor signed into law SB 2162, which abolishes the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority and replaces it with a regional authority composed of nine commissioners, only two of whom are selected by Jackson city government.
A Jackson citizen filed a suit seeking to enjoin the law. The mayor, the city council, the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, its board of commissioners, and the commissioners in their individual capacities intervened in that lawsuit. The intervenors contend that SB 2162 violates the Equal Protection rights of the citizens of Jackson by eliminating the locally controlled Jackson Municipal Airport Authority for racially discriminatory reasons. The intervenors served subpoenas on eight nonparty state legislators who participated in SB 2162’s drafting and passage. The Legislators refused to comply with Request #3 in the subpoena, which sought documents and communications related to SB 2162, asserting that any responsive discovery would either be irrelevant or protected by legislative privilege. The magistrate judge, and later the district court, rejected this position.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the Legislators to produce a privilege log. But the district court erred in broadly holding that legislative privilege was automatically waived for any documents that have been shared with third parties.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in ordering the Legislators to produce a privilege log. However, the court held that the district court erred in broadly holding that legislative privilege was automatically waived for any documents that have been shared with third parties.
2023-05-10federalUS Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitJennifer Walker Elrod21-60312https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2023/22.htmlSingh v. City of New York2023-04-27T06:06:30-08:002023-04-27T06:06:30-08:00
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that Taxi and Limousine Commission and New York City breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and engaged in deceptive business practices under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim.
Plaintiffs, entities that purchased government licenses to operate taxis at an auction, brought this action alleging that Defendants (1) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to enforce certain licensing requirements against smartphone applicate-based competitors such as Uber Technologies, Inc. and Lyft, Inc.; and (2) engaged in deceptive business practices in their promotion of the auction. Supreme Court granted in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed in part and concluded that both claims should be dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs did not adequately plead a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to plead the type of conduct covered by N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2023/22.html" target="_blank">View "Singh v. City of New York" on Justia Law</a>
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that Taxi and Limousine Commission and New York City breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and engaged in deceptive business practices under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim.
Plaintiffs, entities that purchased government licenses to operate taxis at an auction, brought this action alleging that Defendants (1) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to enforce certain licensing requirements against smartphone applicate-based competitors such as Uber Technologies, Inc. and Lyft, Inc.; and (2) engaged in deceptive business practices in their promotion of the auction. Supreme Court granted in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed in part and concluded that both claims should be dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs did not adequately plead a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to plead the type of conduct covered by N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that Taxi and Limousine Commission and New York City breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and engaged in deceptive business practices, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim.
2023-04-27stateNew YorkNew York Court of AppealsCannataro22https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-1912/22-1912-2023-04-26.htmlDawn Polk v. Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation2023-04-26T11:30:49-08:002023-04-26T11:30:49-08:00
Plaintiff, an African American woman, worked as a conductor for Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). During her employment, she belonged to a division of the Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART) union, which maintained a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Amtrak. Plaintiff brought the instant lawsuit pro se. She named Amtrak and the company’s director of employee relations as Defendants, along with three other Amtrak colleagues. Plaintiff asserted state-law claims of breach of contract and tort, as well as a federal claim of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. Defendants moved to dismiss, and Plaintiff moved for summary judgment as well as for leave to amend her complaint. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and denied Plaintiff’s two motions. The district court held that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to arbitration under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it declines to unwind a statutory scheme without a clear congressional directive to do so. Plaintiff argued that at least her particular claim is not a minor dispute. The mere fact that Plaintiff’s claim arises under Title VII does not disqualify that claim from being a minor dispute within the RLA’s ambit. The thrust of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is that Amtrak deviated from its policies when dealing with her. While Plaintiff’s allegations as to her own treatment are factual, those concerning Amtrak’s policies directly implicate the relevant CBA between Plaintiff’s union, SMART, and Amtrak. That some of Plaintiff’s interpretive disagreements concern the Drug-Free Program does not alter the character of her claim. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-1912/22-1912-2023-04-26.html" target="_blank">View "Dawn Polk v. Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation" on Justia Law</a>
Plaintiff, an African American woman, worked as a conductor for Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). During her employment, she belonged to a division of the Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART) union, which maintained a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Amtrak. Plaintiff brought the instant lawsuit pro se. She named Amtrak and the company’s director of employee relations as Defendants, along with three other Amtrak colleagues. Plaintiff asserted state-law claims of breach of contract and tort, as well as a federal claim of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. Defendants moved to dismiss, and Plaintiff moved for summary judgment as well as for leave to amend her complaint. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and denied Plaintiff’s two motions. The district court held that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to arbitration under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it declines to unwind a statutory scheme without a clear congressional directive to do so. Plaintiff argued that at least her particular claim is not a minor dispute. The mere fact that Plaintiff’s claim arises under Title VII does not disqualify that claim from being a minor dispute within the RLA’s ambit. The thrust of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is that Amtrak deviated from its policies when dealing with her. While Plaintiff’s allegations as to her own treatment are factual, those concerning Amtrak’s policies directly implicate the relevant CBA between Plaintiff’s union, SMART, and Amtrak. That some of Plaintiff’s interpretive disagreements concern the Drug-Free Program does not alter the character of her claim.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment finding that Plaintiff’s claims against her employer were subject to arbitration under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).
2023-04-26federalUS Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitWILKINSON22-1912https://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2023/sc20623.htmlDobie v. City of New Haven2023-04-20T04:01:13-08:002023-04-20T04:01:13-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiff in this negligence action, holding that the appellate court properly concluded that the "highway defect statute," Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149, was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
Plaintiff was traveling behind a snowplow when the snowplow hit a manhole cover and knocked it off. Plaintiff's vehicle fell into the open manhole, rendering his vehicle inoperable and injuring him. Plaintiff brought this civil action alleging that Defendant's snowplow operator was negligent under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff's sole remedy was an action pursuant to section 13a-149. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court correctly concluded that the highway defect statute was the exclusive remedy by which Defendant could recover for his injuries. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2023/sc20623.html" target="_blank">View "Dobie v. City of New Haven" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiff in this negligence action, holding that the appellate court properly concluded that the "highway defect statute," Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149, was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
Plaintiff was traveling behind a snowplow when the snowplow hit a manhole cover and knocked it off. Plaintiff's vehicle fell into the open manhole, rendering his vehicle inoperable and injuring him. Plaintiff brought this civil action alleging that Defendant's snowplow operator was negligent under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff's sole remedy was an action pursuant to section 13a-149. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court correctly concluded that the highway defect statute was the exclusive remedy by which Defendant could recover for his injuries.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of the judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this negligence action, holding that the appellate court properly concluded that the highway defect statute was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
2023-04-18stateConnecticutConnecticut Supreme CourtD’AuriaSC20623https://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2023/21-272.htmlFinnimore & Fisher Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham2023-04-18T08:39:29-08:002023-04-18T08:39:29-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court entering a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of certain amendments to the New Shoreham General Ordinance, entitled Motorized Cycle Rental, holding that the hearing justice did not err in her decision granting in part Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction.
Plaintiffs, businesses in the Town of New Shoreham that rented mopeds, filed a complaint against the Town requesting declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that the Town had attempted to amend the ordinance at issue in contravention of a settlement agreement reached by the parties and in contravention of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31-19.3-5. the hearing justice granted Plaintiffs' motion to enjoin preliminarily enforcement of the amendments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2023/21-272.html" target="_blank">View "Finnimore & Fisher Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court entering a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of certain amendments to the New Shoreham General Ordinance, entitled Motorized Cycle Rental, holding that the hearing justice did not err in her decision granting in part Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction.
Plaintiffs, businesses in the Town of New Shoreham that rented mopeds, filed a complaint against the Town requesting declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that the Town had attempted to amend the ordinance at issue in contravention of a settlement agreement reached by the parties and in contravention of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31-19.3-5. the hearing justice granted Plaintiffs' motion to enjoin preliminarily enforcement of the amendments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error.
The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of certain amendments to the New Shoreham General Ordinance, holding that there was no error.
2023-04-18stateRhode IslandRhode Island Supreme CourtPaul A. Suttell21-272https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-5125/22-5125-2023-04-18.htmlAir Excursions LLC v. Janet Yellen2023-04-18T06:31:22-08:002023-04-18T06:31:22-08:00
Air Excursions, LLC provides air transportation services in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. It claims that the United States Department of Treasury (Treasury) erroneously disbursed pandemic relief funds to a competitor airline and challenges that disbursement as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The DC Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint on the merits and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the competitor standing doctrine supplies the link between increased competition and tangible injury but does not, by itself, supply the link between the challenged conduct and increased competition. The latter must be apparent from the nature of the challenged action itself—as in U.S. Telecom Association—or from the well-pleaded allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the complaint failed to establish that Air Excursions has suffered a competitive injury satisfying Article III’s injury in fact requirement. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-5125/22-5125-2023-04-18.html" target="_blank">View "Air Excursions LLC v. Janet Yellen" on Justia Law</a>
Air Excursions, LLC provides air transportation services in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. It claims that the United States Department of Treasury (Treasury) erroneously disbursed pandemic relief funds to a competitor airline and challenges that disbursement as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The DC Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint on the merits and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the competitor standing doctrine supplies the link between increased competition and tangible injury but does not, by itself, supply the link between the challenged conduct and increased competition. The latter must be apparent from the nature of the challenged action itself—as in U.S. Telecom Association—or from the well-pleaded allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the complaint failed to establish that Air Excursions has suffered a competitive injury satisfying Article III’s injury in fact requirement.
The DC Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing Air Excursions’ Administrative Procedure Act complaint against the United States Department of Treasury. The court held that the complaint failed to establish that Air Excursions suffered a competitive injury. The court remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
2023-04-18federalUS Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitHENDERSON22-5125https://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2023/2020ap002146.htmlDEKK Property Development, LLC v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transportation2023-04-18T06:09:31-08:002023-04-18T06:09:31-08:00
In this lawsuit stemming from the Wisconsin Department of Transportation's (DOT's) closure of a driveway connecting DEKK Property Development, LLC's property to State Trunk Highway (STH) 50, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court granting DEKK motion for summary judgment, holding that summary judgment should be granted in DOT's favor.
DEKK filed an action under Wis. Stat. 32.05(5) challenging DOT's right to remove DEKK's rights of access to STH 50. The circuit court granted summary judgment for DEKK, reasoning that DEKK had "some sort of right of access" to the driveway, entitling it to compensation from the closure. The court of appeals reversed and held for DOT on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEKK was not permitted to recover damages for the driveway closure under section 32.05(5) because the access rights allegedly lost by DEKK were distinct from the taking described in DOT's jurisdictional offer. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2023/2020ap002146.html" target="_blank">View "DEKK Property Development, LLC v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law</a>
In this lawsuit stemming from the Wisconsin Department of Transportation's (DOT's) closure of a driveway connecting DEKK Property Development, LLC's property to State Trunk Highway (STH) 50, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court granting DEKK motion for summary judgment, holding that summary judgment should be granted in DOT's favor.
DEKK filed an action under Wis. Stat. 32.05(5) challenging DOT's right to remove DEKK's rights of access to STH 50. The circuit court granted summary judgment for DEKK, reasoning that DEKK had "some sort of right of access" to the driveway, entitling it to compensation from the closure. The court of appeals reversed and held for DOT on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEKK was not permitted to recover damages for the driveway closure under section 32.05(5) because the access rights allegedly lost by DEKK were distinct from the taking described in DOT's jurisdictional offer.
In this lawsuit stemming from the Wisconsin Department of Transportation's (DOT's) closure of a driveway connecting Plaintiff's property to State Trunk Highway 50, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment for DEKK, holding that summary judgment should be granted in DOT's favor.
2023-04-18stateWisconsinWisconsin Supreme CourtKarofsky2020AP002146https://law.justia.com/cases/kansas/supreme-court/2023/124169.htmlFisher v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue2023-03-31T06:38:44-08:002023-03-31T06:38:44-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the court of appeals and district court affirming the decision of the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) to suspend Appellant's driving privileges, holding that, contrary to Appellant's arguments on appeal, the KDOR had subject matter jurisdiction to act.
On appeal, Appellant argued that the KDOR lacked subject matter jurisdiction to suspend his driving privileges because the law enforcement officer who pulled him over made a mistake in entering the date on his officer's certification and notice of suspension form (DC-27). The court of appeals disagreed and sided with out cases that "refused to treat strict compliance with Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1002 as jurisdictional." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the DC-27 contained mistakes, it satisfied the requirements of section 8-1002(a); and (2) therefore, the KDOR continued to have the authority to take action in this case. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/kansas/supreme-court/2023/124169.html" target="_blank">View "Fisher v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the court of appeals and district court affirming the decision of the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) to suspend Appellant's driving privileges, holding that, contrary to Appellant's arguments on appeal, the KDOR had subject matter jurisdiction to act.
On appeal, Appellant argued that the KDOR lacked subject matter jurisdiction to suspend his driving privileges because the law enforcement officer who pulled him over made a mistake in entering the date on his officer's certification and notice of suspension form (DC-27). The court of appeals disagreed and sided with out cases that "refused to treat strict compliance with Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1002 as jurisdictional." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the DC-27 contained mistakes, it satisfied the requirements of section 8-1002(a); and (2) therefore, the KDOR continued to have the authority to take action in this case.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' opinions affirming the decision of the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) to suspend Appellant's driving privileges, holding that the KDOR had subject matter jurisdiction to act.
2023-03-31stateKansasKansas Supreme CourtCory T. Wilson124169https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-71170/21-71170-2023-03-29.htmlCITY OF LOS ANGELES V. FAA, ET AL2023-03-29T09:03:06-08:002023-03-29T09:03:06-08:00
The passenger terminal at the Bob Hope “Hollywood Burbank” Airport is more than fifty years old and violates safety standards set by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). So the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, which owns and operates the Airport, reached an agreement with the City of Burbank to build a new terminal. In 2016, Burbank voters approved that agreement as required by local law. But before FAA could sign off on the project, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Sections 4321 et seq., required the agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). In May 2021, the FAA issued a Final EIS (FEIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) that let the Authority start constructing the replacement terminal, and shortly after, the City of Los Angeles petitioned for review.
The Ninth Circuit granted the petition in part and remanded for FAA to redo the deficient parts of its analysis. The panel held that contrary to Los Angeles’s argument—that the FAA improperly eliminated certain alternatives because they were not approved pursuant to Measure B—the FAA properly eliminated the new airport, remote landside facility, and southeast terminal alternatives based on rational considerations that were independent of Measure B. In addition, the panel held that even if the Measure B criteria foreclosed consideration of alternatives other than the Project, that would not be enough to establish an irreversible commitment to the Project. The panel considered the rest of Los Angeles’s objections to the FAA’s impact analysis and found them meritless. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-71170/21-71170-2023-03-29.html" target="_blank">View "CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. FAA, ET AL" on Justia Law</a>
The passenger terminal at the Bob Hope “Hollywood Burbank” Airport is more than fifty years old and violates safety standards set by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). So the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, which owns and operates the Airport, reached an agreement with the City of Burbank to build a new terminal. In 2016, Burbank voters approved that agreement as required by local law. But before FAA could sign off on the project, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Sections 4321 et seq., required the agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). In May 2021, the FAA issued a Final EIS (FEIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) that let the Authority start constructing the replacement terminal, and shortly after, the City of Los Angeles petitioned for review.
The Ninth Circuit granted the petition in part and remanded for FAA to redo the deficient parts of its analysis. The panel held that contrary to Los Angeles’s argument—that the FAA improperly eliminated certain alternatives because they were not approved pursuant to Measure B—the FAA properly eliminated the new airport, remote landside facility, and southeast terminal alternatives based on rational considerations that were independent of Measure B. In addition, the panel held that even if the Measure B criteria foreclosed consideration of alternatives other than the Project, that would not be enough to establish an irreversible commitment to the Project. The panel considered the rest of Los Angeles’s objections to the FAA’s impact analysis and found them meritless.
The Ninth Circuit granted in part the City of Los Angeles’s petition for review challenging the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)’s issuance of a Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) that let the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority start constructing a replacement terminal at the Bob Hope “Hollywood Burbank” Airport (the “Project”).
2023-03-29federalUS Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitHigginson21-71170https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/b302925.htmlGregg v. Uber Technologies, Inc.2023-03-24T14:31:34-08:002023-03-24T14:31:34-08:00
Plaintiff sued Uber under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), claiming Uber willfully misclassified him as an independent contractor rather than an employee, which led to numerous other Labor Code violations. In response, Uber moved to compel
arbitration under the “Arbitration Provision” in the “Technology Services Agreement” (TSA).
The trial court denied Uber's motion and the Second Appellate District affirmed. However, in June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision when it granted Uber's petition for certiorari in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) ___ U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906, 213 L.Ed.2d 179] (Viking River).
Following this posture, the Second Appellate District held 1.) the TSA’s PAGA Waiver is invalid and must be severed from the Arbitration
Provision; 2.) under the Arbitration Provision’s remaining terms, Plaintiff must resolve his claim for civil penalties based on Labor Code violations he allegedly suffered in arbitration, and his claims for penalties based on violations allegedly suffered by other current and former employees must be litigated in court; and 3.) under California law, Plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue his non-individual claims in court simply because his individual claim must be arbitrated. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/b302925.html" target="_blank">View "Gregg v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
Plaintiff sued Uber under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), claiming Uber willfully misclassified him as an independent contractor rather than an employee, which led to numerous other Labor Code violations. In response, Uber moved to compel
arbitration under the “Arbitration Provision” in the “Technology Services Agreement” (TSA).
The trial court denied Uber's motion and the Second Appellate District affirmed. However, in June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision when it granted Uber's petition for certiorari in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) ___ U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906, 213 L.Ed.2d 179] (Viking River).
Following this posture, the Second Appellate District held 1.) the TSA’s PAGA Waiver is invalid and must be severed from the Arbitration
Provision; 2.) under the Arbitration Provision’s remaining terms, Plaintiff must resolve his claim for civil penalties based on Labor Code violations he allegedly suffered in arbitration, and his claims for penalties based on violations allegedly suffered by other current and former employees must be litigated in court; and 3.) under California law, Plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue his non-individual claims in court simply because his individual claim must be arbitrated.
The Second Appellate District affirmed in part and reversed part the trial court's order denying Uber’s motion to compel arbitration in Plaintiff's claim under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.
2023-03-24stateCaliforniaCalifornia Courts of AppealCurreyB302925https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-30416/22-30416-2023-03-22.htmlNewbold v. Kinder Morgan SNG Operator2023-03-22T15:31:02-08:002023-03-22T15:31:02-08:00
Two years after an unfortunate single-boat accident, one of the boat’s two occupants died as a result of his injuries. The boat in which he was a passenger had struck a warning sign that was totally submerged at the time of the allision between the boat and sign. His estate and survivors sued the companies responsible for the sign in question. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the incident occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal. The parties agree that if Louisiana law governs, the claims are barred. At issue in this appeal is whether or not the allision occurred in “navigable” waters such that federal law governs.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the allision occurred on non-navigable waters. The first ground on which the Plaintiffs claim that the allision took place on navigable water is that the “navigational servitude” for the Refuge is alleged to be 65 feet above the mean sea level (“MSL”). The court explained that the parties agree that the Corps has not in fact permanently flooded the refuge; the water may not be said to be navigable under this theory. Further, the unvegetated channel establishes the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou; water outside of that channel is not navigable. Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs here fail to present even slight evidence concerning a commercial purpose for the channel in question. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-30416/22-30416-2023-03-22.html" target="_blank">View "Newbold v. Kinder Morgan SNG Operator" on Justia Law</a>
Two years after an unfortunate single-boat accident, one of the boat’s two occupants died as a result of his injuries. The boat in which he was a passenger had struck a warning sign that was totally submerged at the time of the allision between the boat and sign. His estate and survivors sued the companies responsible for the sign in question. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the incident occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal. The parties agree that if Louisiana law governs, the claims are barred. At issue in this appeal is whether or not the allision occurred in “navigable” waters such that federal law governs.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the allision occurred on non-navigable waters. The first ground on which the Plaintiffs claim that the allision took place on navigable water is that the “navigational servitude” for the Refuge is alleged to be 65 feet above the mean sea level (“MSL”). The court explained that the parties agree that the Corps has not in fact permanently flooded the refuge; the water may not be said to be navigable under this theory. Further, the unvegetated channel establishes the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou; water outside of that channel is not navigable. Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs here fail to present even slight evidence concerning a commercial purpose for the channel in question.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to Defendants, in Plaintiff’s lawsuit stemming from a single-boat accident, on the ground that the incident occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal.
2023-03-22federalUS Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitKurt D. Engelhardt22-30416https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-60217/22-60217-2023-03-15.htmlBNSF Railway v. FRA2023-03-15T09:31:03-08:002023-03-15T09:31:03-08:00
BNSF Railway Co. (“BNSF”) petitions for review, contending that the refusal of the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) to grant a waiver of standard track-inspection regulations so that BNSF could test a new technology was arbitrary and capricious.
The Fifth Circuit granted review, vacated, and remanded for reconsideration. The court explained that “Agency action must be reasonable and reasonably explained.” The agency must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Here, the court found that the FRA’s letter lacking in this regard. Therefore, on limited remand, the court directed the FRA to enter its decision no later than one hundred days from the announcement of the court’s opinion. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-60217/22-60217-2023-03-15.html" target="_blank">View "BNSF Railway v. FRA" on Justia Law</a>
BNSF Railway Co. (“BNSF”) petitions for review, contending that the refusal of the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) to grant a waiver of standard track-inspection regulations so that BNSF could test a new technology was arbitrary and capricious.
The Fifth Circuit granted review, vacated, and remanded for reconsideration. The court explained that “Agency action must be reasonable and reasonably explained.” The agency must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Here, the court found that the FRA’s letter lacking in this regard. Therefore, on limited remand, the court directed the FRA to enter its decision no later than one hundred days from the announcement of the court’s opinion.
The Fifth Circuit granted BNSF Railway Co.’s (“BNSF”) petition for review of the Federal Railroad Administration’s (“FRA”) refusal to grant a waiver of standard track-inspection regulations so that BNSF could test a new technology. The court vacated the decision and directed the FRA to enter its decision no later than one hundred days from the announcement of the court’s opinion.
2023-03-15federalUS Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitJerry E. Smith22-60217https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-11341/22-11341-2023-03-08.htmlProfessional Airline Flight Control Association v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.2023-03-08T14:02:05-08:002023-03-08T14:02:05-08:00
The Professional Airline Flight Control Association complained that Spirit is attempting to change its agreement. Spirit responded that its unilateral decision to open a second operations control center is permitted by the parties’ agreement. The district court agreed with Spirit that this dispute is minor and dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 151 et seq., divides labor disputes into two categories: disputes over the interpretation of an existing agreement are “minor” and resolved exclusively through binding arbitration, and disputes over proposed changes to an agreement or over a new agreement are “major” and addressed through bargaining and mediation. During a major dispute, district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the status quo. But district courts ordinarily lack jurisdiction over minor disputes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-11341/22-11341-2023-03-08.html" target="_blank">View "Professional Airline Flight Control Association v. Spirit Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
The Professional Airline Flight Control Association complained that Spirit is attempting to change its agreement. Spirit responded that its unilateral decision to open a second operations control center is permitted by the parties’ agreement. The district court agreed with Spirit that this dispute is minor and dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 151 et seq., divides labor disputes into two categories: disputes over the interpretation of an existing agreement are “minor” and resolved exclusively through binding arbitration, and disputes over proposed changes to an agreement or over a new agreement are “major” and addressed through bargaining and mediation. During a major dispute, district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the status quo. But district courts ordinarily lack jurisdiction over minor disputes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Professional Airline Flight Control Association’s claims against Spirit Airlines is minor. Accordingly, the court agreed with the district court and affirmed the court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
2023-03-08federalUS Court of Appeals for the Eleventh CircuitWILLIAM PRYOR22-11341https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/f082588.htmlRamirez v. Super. Ct.2023-03-08T11:31:14-08:002023-03-08T11:31:14-08:00
Appellant California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed from a judgment granting Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate (judgment). DMV contends the issues presented on appeal are whether the trial court erred in overturning the suspension of Plaintiff’s driver’s license (1) “by applying [former] Government Code section 11440.30.
The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the “Judgment Granting Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Awarding Costs And Attorney Fees To Petitioner” and remanded the cause to the court below, with directions to modify the judgment to provide that the matter shall thereafter be remanded to the DMV for further proceedings. The court concluded that former Government Code section 11440.30 was applicable to Plaintiff’s DMV driver’s license suspension hearing. Said former statute is fully consistent with other relevant statutes, including, without limitation, Vehicle Code sections 14100 through 14112 and Government Code section 11501. Further, the court concluded that both CCR section 115.07 and former Government Code section 11440.30 were mandatory and not merely directory. Moreover, substantial evidence supports an implied finding that Plaintiff was prejudiced by DMV’s failure to adhere to former government code section 11440.30. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/f082588.html" target="_blank">View "Ramirez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law</a>
Appellant California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed from a judgment granting Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate (judgment). DMV contends the issues presented on appeal are whether the trial court erred in overturning the suspension of Plaintiff’s driver’s license (1) “by applying [former] Government Code section 11440.30.
The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the “Judgment Granting Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Awarding Costs And Attorney Fees To Petitioner” and remanded the cause to the court below, with directions to modify the judgment to provide that the matter shall thereafter be remanded to the DMV for further proceedings. The court concluded that former Government Code section 11440.30 was applicable to Plaintiff’s DMV driver’s license suspension hearing. Said former statute is fully consistent with other relevant statutes, including, without limitation, Vehicle Code sections 14100 through 14112 and Government Code section 11501. Further, the court concluded that both CCR section 115.07 and former Government Code section 11440.30 were mandatory and not merely directory. Moreover, substantial evidence supports an implied finding that Plaintiff was prejudiced by DMV’s failure to adhere to former government code section 11440.30.
The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the judgment granting Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate and awarding costs and attorney fees following the DMV’s suspension of his driver’s license. The court remanded to the court below, with directions to modify the judgment to provide that the matter shall thereafter be remanded to the DMV.
2023-03-08stateCaliforniaCalifornia Courts of AppealPOOCHIGIANF082588https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-1004/22-1004-2023-03-03.htmlIn re: Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc.2023-03-03T08:03:31-08:002023-03-03T08:03:31-08:00
Flyers Rights and its current president have taken aim at the small size of airline seats. In their view, small seats slow emergency evacuations and cause medical problems like blood clots. They have petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the FAA “to commence rulemaking to establish minimum seat size and spacing requirements for commercial aircraft and to issue a final rule by a date certain.”
The DC Circuit denied Flyers Rights’ petition. The court held that Flyers Rights lacks a clear and indisputable right to relief. That’s because the FAA Reauthorization Act speaks only of seat-size regulations that “are necessary for the safety of passengers,” and on the record before the court, the necessity of those regulations is neither clear nor indisputable. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-1004/22-1004-2023-03-03.html" target="_blank">View "In re: Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
Flyers Rights and its current president have taken aim at the small size of airline seats. In their view, small seats slow emergency evacuations and cause medical problems like blood clots. They have petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the FAA “to commence rulemaking to establish minimum seat size and spacing requirements for commercial aircraft and to issue a final rule by a date certain.”
The DC Circuit denied Flyers Rights’ petition. The court held that Flyers Rights lacks a clear and indisputable right to relief. That’s because the FAA Reauthorization Act speaks only of seat-size regulations that “are necessary for the safety of passengers,” and on the record before the court, the necessity of those regulations is neither clear nor indisputable.
The DC Circuit denied Flyers Rights’ petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the FAA “to commence rulemaking to establish minimum seat size and spacing requirements for commercial aircraft and to issue a final rule by a date certain.” The court held that Flyers Rights lacks a clear and indisputable right to relief.
2023-03-03federalUS Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitWALKER22-1004https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-2238/22-2238-2023-03-01.htmlCity of Carthage, Missouri v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.2023-03-01T08:01:55-08:002023-03-01T08:01:55-08:00
The City of Carthage sued Union Pacific Railroad Co. for breach of contract, claiming UP failed to maintain several bridges. On summary judgment, the district court ruled that the City’s breach-of-contract claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations. The City argues that the ten-year statute of limitations applies here because its claim seeks an equitable remedy.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the City’s claim accrued in February 2013, at the latest. On February 15, 2013, the City wrote UP demanding the repair of the bridges—establishing that the City was on notice of a potentially actionable injury. The City waited until 2019—over five years later—to sue UP. The City’s claim is barred by the five-year statute of limitations. Further, here, UP did not engage in any affirmative act during the limitations period. Without more, a failure to act does not justify the continuing wrong rule. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-2238/22-2238-2023-03-01.html" target="_blank">View "City of Carthage, Missouri v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law</a>
The City of Carthage sued Union Pacific Railroad Co. for breach of contract, claiming UP failed to maintain several bridges. On summary judgment, the district court ruled that the City’s breach-of-contract claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations. The City argues that the ten-year statute of limitations applies here because its claim seeks an equitable remedy.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the City’s claim accrued in February 2013, at the latest. On February 15, 2013, the City wrote UP demanding the repair of the bridges—establishing that the City was on notice of a potentially actionable injury. The City waited until 2019—over five years later—to sue UP. The City’s claim is barred by the five-year statute of limitations. Further, here, UP did not engage in any affirmative act during the limitations period. Without more, a failure to act does not justify the continuing wrong rule.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the City of Carthage’s breach-of-contract claim against Union Pacific Railroad Co. was barred by the five-year statute of limitations.
2023-03-01federalUS Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitBENTON22-2238https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-15464/21-15464-2023-02-28.htmlANNA GALAZA V. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS2023-02-28T09:31:33-08:002023-02-28T09:31:33-08:00
Plaintiff brought an action against the TSA, alleging discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act when she was terminated from her limited-duty position. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, she suffered two injuries while working for the TSA. She alleged that she was terminated due to her disability, and despite the availability of limited duty positions that she could fill, such as “exit lane monitor,” “secondary ticket checker,” or “bypass door monitor.” Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her Rehabilitation Act claim for the second time.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing, as preempted by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”), Plaintiff’s claim against the TSA. The panel joined the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the ATSA, as applicable to security screeners, preempts the Rehabilitation Act. The ATSA authorized the Administrator of the TSA to set aside employment standards for security screeners as necessary to fulfill the TSA’s screening functions under the ATSA. A statutory note to the ATSA provides that the Administrator is authorized to do so notwithstanding any other provision of law. The panel held that use of the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” reflected legislative intent to preempt the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.
Plaintiff contended that preemption was unnecessary because the two statutes could be harmonized, and preemption was foreclosed by explicit language in the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPEA”). The panel declined to address the issue of whether the WPEA made the Rehabilitation Act generally applicable to security screeners because this issue was not raised in the district court. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-15464/21-15464-2023-02-28.html" target="_blank">View "ANNA GALAZA V. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS" on Justia Law</a>
Plaintiff brought an action against the TSA, alleging discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act when she was terminated from her limited-duty position. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, she suffered two injuries while working for the TSA. She alleged that she was terminated due to her disability, and despite the availability of limited duty positions that she could fill, such as “exit lane monitor,” “secondary ticket checker,” or “bypass door monitor.” Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her Rehabilitation Act claim for the second time.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing, as preempted by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”), Plaintiff’s claim against the TSA. The panel joined the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the ATSA, as applicable to security screeners, preempts the Rehabilitation Act. The ATSA authorized the Administrator of the TSA to set aside employment standards for security screeners as necessary to fulfill the TSA’s screening functions under the ATSA. A statutory note to the ATSA provides that the Administrator is authorized to do so notwithstanding any other provision of law. The panel held that use of the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” reflected legislative intent to preempt the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.
Plaintiff contended that preemption was unnecessary because the two statutes could be harmonized, and preemption was foreclosed by explicit language in the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPEA”). The panel declined to address the issue of whether the WPEA made the Rehabilitation Act generally applicable to security screeners because this issue was not raised in the district court.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing, as preempted by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”), Plaintiff’s claim against the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”), alleging discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
2023-02-28federalUS Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitPer Curiam21-15464https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-70272/20-70272-2023-02-24.htmlCENTER FOR COMMUNITY ACTION, ET AL V. FAA, ET AL2023-02-24T09:34:02-08:002023-02-24T09:34:02-08:00
To comply with their duties under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the FAA issued an Environmental Assessment (EA) that evaluated the environmental effects of the construction and operation of an Amazon air cargo facility at the San Bernardino International Airport (the “Project”). In evaluating the environmental consequences of the Project, the FAA generally utilized two “study areas” – the General Study Area and the Detailed Study Area. Petitioners are the Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice and others (collectively “CCA”) and the State of California. In attacking the parameters of the study areas, the CCA asserted that the FAA did not conform its study areas to the FAA’s Order 1050.1F Desk Reference.
The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order amending the opinion initially filed on November 18, 2021, and amended on October 11, 2022; and (2) an amended opinion denying a petition for review challenging the FAA’s Record of Decision, which found no significant environmental impact stemming from the Project. The panel held that the FAA’s nonadherence to the Desk Reference could not alone serve as the basis for holding that the FAA did not take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the Project. Instead, the CCA must show that the FAA’s nonadherence to the Desk Reference had some sort of EA significance aside from simply failing to follow certain Desk Reference instructions. The panel held that the CCA had not done so here. The panel rejected Petitioners’ argument that the EA failed to assess whether the Project met California’s greenhouse gas emissions standards. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-70272/20-70272-2023-02-24.html" target="_blank">View "CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ACTION, ET AL V. FAA, ET AL" on Justia Law</a>
To comply with their duties under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the FAA issued an Environmental Assessment (EA) that evaluated the environmental effects of the construction and operation of an Amazon air cargo facility at the San Bernardino International Airport (the “Project”). In evaluating the environmental consequences of the Project, the FAA generally utilized two “study areas” – the General Study Area and the Detailed Study Area. Petitioners are the Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice and others (collectively “CCA”) and the State of California. In attacking the parameters of the study areas, the CCA asserted that the FAA did not conform its study areas to the FAA’s Order 1050.1F Desk Reference.
The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order amending the opinion initially filed on November 18, 2021, and amended on October 11, 2022; and (2) an amended opinion denying a petition for review challenging the FAA’s Record of Decision, which found no significant environmental impact stemming from the Project. The panel held that the FAA’s nonadherence to the Desk Reference could not alone serve as the basis for holding that the FAA did not take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the Project. Instead, the CCA must show that the FAA’s nonadherence to the Desk Reference had some sort of EA significance aside from simply failing to follow certain Desk Reference instructions. The panel held that the CCA had not done so here. The panel rejected Petitioners’ argument that the EA failed to assess whether the Project met California’s greenhouse gas emissions standards.
The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion denying a petition for review challenging the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)’s Record of Decision, which found no significant environmental impact stemming from the construction and operation of an Amazon air cargo facility at the San Bernardino International Airport (the “Project”).
2023-02-24federalUS Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitSiler20-70272https://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2023/22-0468.htmlCity of Ames v. Iowa Public Employment Relations Bd.2023-02-24T07:08:13-08:002023-02-24T07:08:13-08:00
The Supreme Court held that the Iowa Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) and the district court misinterpreted Iowa Code 20.32 by extending broader bargaining rights to nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit as public transit employees, holding that the plain meaning of the statute protects only transit employees, not nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit.
The City of Ames sought guidance as to whether section 20.32 requires broader bargaining rights for nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit. PERB concluded that broader bargaining rights must be extended under the statute to nontransit employees in a bargaining unit consisting of at least thirty percent transit employees, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City was not required to provide broader bargaining rights to nontransit employees, regardless of the percentage of transit employees in the bargaining unit. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2023/22-0468.html" target="_blank">View "City of Ames v. Iowa Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that the Iowa Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) and the district court misinterpreted Iowa Code 20.32 by extending broader bargaining rights to nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit as public transit employees, holding that the plain meaning of the statute protects only transit employees, not nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit.
The City of Ames sought guidance as to whether section 20.32 requires broader bargaining rights for nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit. PERB concluded that broader bargaining rights must be extended under the statute to nontransit employees in a bargaining unit consisting of at least thirty percent transit employees, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City was not required to provide broader bargaining rights to nontransit employees, regardless of the percentage of transit employees in the bargaining unit.
The Supreme Court held that the Iowa Public Employee Relations Board and the district court misinterpreted Iowa Code 20.32 by extending broader bargaining rights to nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit as transit employees, holding that the plain meaning of the statute protects only transit employees..
2023-02-24stateIowaIowa Supreme CourtThomas D. Waterman22-0468https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/a161844.htmlMarin v. Department of Transportation2023-02-23T14:02:48-08:002023-02-23T14:02:48-08:00
Decedent was employed by Jones as a construction worker. Jones was under contract with DOT to perform construction work on I-580 in Oakland. Much of this work was performed at night because it required lane closures. A car operated by a drunk driver entered the closed lanes of the project site and struck Decedent, who died on the scene.
A wrongful death lawsuit against DOT asserted vicarious liability for the negligence of its employees; failure to discharge a mandatory duty; and dangerous condition on public property. The court dismissed the mandatory duty claim. DOT offered evidence that it did not instruct or control Jones as to how to comply with its safety obligations but that Jones complied with its safety plan on the night in question and that the contract between DOT and Jones delegated to Jones the responsibility for selecting the means for performing, including ensuring worker safety.
The trial court concluded DOT was not liable for Decedent’s death as a matter of law because DOT delegated to Jones its duty to provide a safe work environment and the conduct of the drunk driver was not reasonably foreseeable. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that admissible evidence was wrongfully excluded. Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that DOT retained control over the construction site and actually exercised that control in such a way as to affirmatively contribute to Decedent's injuries, as required under California law. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/a161844.html" target="_blank">View "Marin v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law</a>
Decedent was employed by Jones as a construction worker. Jones was under contract with DOT to perform construction work on I-580 in Oakland. Much of this work was performed at night because it required lane closures. A car operated by a drunk driver entered the closed lanes of the project site and struck Decedent, who died on the scene.
A wrongful death lawsuit against DOT asserted vicarious liability for the negligence of its employees; failure to discharge a mandatory duty; and dangerous condition on public property. The court dismissed the mandatory duty claim. DOT offered evidence that it did not instruct or control Jones as to how to comply with its safety obligations but that Jones complied with its safety plan on the night in question and that the contract between DOT and Jones delegated to Jones the responsibility for selecting the means for performing, including ensuring worker safety.
The trial court concluded DOT was not liable for Decedent’s death as a matter of law because DOT delegated to Jones its duty to provide a safe work environment and the conduct of the drunk driver was not reasonably foreseeable. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that admissible evidence was wrongfully excluded. Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that DOT retained control over the construction site and actually exercised that control in such a way as to affirmatively contribute to Decedent's injuries, as required under California law.
Court of appeal affirms the dismissal of a suit against the Department of Transportation by the estate of a deceased worker, killed by a drunk driver while working on a road construction project.
2023-02-23stateCaliforniaCalifornia Courts of AppealJacksonA161844https://law.justia.com/cases/utah/supreme-court/2023/20200290.htmlLarson v. Pleasant Grove City2023-02-23T08:51:23-08:002023-02-23T08:51:23-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court concluding that Pleasant Grover (City) had the power to enact a three-tiered "transportation utility fee" (TUF) but reversed the court's ruling that the TUF was actually a tax, holding that remand was required.
The subject TUF charged local property owners a monthly fee corresponding to the "intensity" with which they used City roads, as determined by a study of user demand on the City's roadways, and the generated funds were to be used to repair and maintain city roadways only. At issue was whether the City had the authority to enact the TUF and whether the City properly characterized the TUF as a fee or if it was in fact a tax requiring the City to follow specific enactment procedures. The district court held that the TUF was actually a tax based on its purpose. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the City acted within its discretion in enacting the TUF; but (2) the purpose of the TUF was characteristic of a fee because it was a specific charge for a specific purpose. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/utah/supreme-court/2023/20200290.html" target="_blank">View "Larson v. Pleasant Grove City" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court concluding that Pleasant Grover (City) had the power to enact a three-tiered "transportation utility fee" (TUF) but reversed the court's ruling that the TUF was actually a tax, holding that remand was required.
The subject TUF charged local property owners a monthly fee corresponding to the "intensity" with which they used City roads, as determined by a study of user demand on the City's roadways, and the generated funds were to be used to repair and maintain city roadways only. At issue was whether the City had the authority to enact the TUF and whether the City properly characterized the TUF as a fee or if it was in fact a tax requiring the City to follow specific enactment procedures. The district court held that the TUF was actually a tax based on its purpose. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the City acted within its discretion in enacting the TUF; but (2) the purpose of the TUF was characteristic of a fee because it was a specific charge for a specific purpose.
The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's judgment concluding that Pleasant Grover had the power to enact a three-tiered "Transportation Utility Fee" (TUF) but reversed the court's ruling that the TUF was actually a tax, holding that remand was required.
2023-02-23stateUtahUtah Supreme CourtPeterson20200290https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/21-3330/21-3330-2023-02-16.htmlEdward Blackorby v. BNSF Railway Company2023-02-16T08:30:51-08:002023-02-16T08:30:51-08:00
After Plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded $58,240 in damages, plus post-judgment interest, Plaintiff sought attorneys’ fees in the amount of $701,706, litigation costs in the amount of $43,089.48, and additional filing and transcript-preparation fees in the amount of $1,620.45. The district court ultimately awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $570,771 and filing and transcript-preparation fees in the amount of $1,620.45 but denied the request for litigation costs. Defendant BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion with respect to the award of attorneys’ fees.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reduced the award of fees by $103,642.50. BNSF first argued that the award of fees is unreasonable because Plaintiff only achieved limited success. The court reasoned that Plaintiff undisputedly prevailed at trial on his FRSA claim. As this claim was at the heart of Plaintiff’s case, his degree of success is significant, regardless of the fate of his FELA claim or another theory of liability underlying his FRSA claim.
However, the court found that BNSF’s request for the reduction of fees related to the first trial, however, has merit. The court wrote that Plaintiff undisputedly offered the jury instruction that contained a legal error based on Eighth Circuit precedent, which required vacatur of the judgment. The court agreed with BNSF that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees that were unreasonably caused by his own legal error. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/21-3330/21-3330-2023-02-16.html" target="_blank">View "Edward Blackorby v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law</a>
After Plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded $58,240 in damages, plus post-judgment interest, Plaintiff sought attorneys’ fees in the amount of $701,706, litigation costs in the amount of $43,089.48, and additional filing and transcript-preparation fees in the amount of $1,620.45. The district court ultimately awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $570,771 and filing and transcript-preparation fees in the amount of $1,620.45 but denied the request for litigation costs. Defendant BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion with respect to the award of attorneys’ fees.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reduced the award of fees by $103,642.50. BNSF first argued that the award of fees is unreasonable because Plaintiff only achieved limited success. The court reasoned that Plaintiff undisputedly prevailed at trial on his FRSA claim. As this claim was at the heart of Plaintiff’s case, his degree of success is significant, regardless of the fate of his FELA claim or another theory of liability underlying his FRSA claim.
However, the court found that BNSF’s request for the reduction of fees related to the first trial, however, has merit. The court wrote that Plaintiff undisputedly offered the jury instruction that contained a legal error based on Eighth Circuit precedent, which required vacatur of the judgment. The court agreed with BNSF that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees that were unreasonably caused by his own legal error.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reduced the award of fees to Plaintiff after Plaintiff prevailed in his lawsuit under Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The court held that the district court abused its discretion by not reducing the fee award by the amount expended on the first trial—$103,642.50.
2023-02-16federalUS Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitSHEPHERD21-3330https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2023/21-0728.htmlChrist v. Tex. Dep't of Transportation2023-02-10T07:44:03-08:002023-02-10T07:44:03-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Plaintiffs' claim against the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) alleging premises liability based on the condition of a construction zone, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Tort Claims Act.
On a late while traveling through a roadway construction site, Plaintiffs - a motorcyclist and his wife - collided with a vehicle that crossed into their lane. Plaintiffs sued several parties, including TxDOT, alleging that the demarcation of opposing travel lanes with painted yellow stripes and buttons instead of concrete barriers, a condition called for in the project's traffic-control plan, created an unreasonably dangerous condition, causing their injuries. TxDOT filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed for want of jurisdiction, ruling that TxDOT retained its immunity from suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to create a fact issue regarding an essential element of their premises-defect claim: the existence of an unreasonably dangerous condition. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2023/21-0728.html" target="_blank">View "Christ v. Tex. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Plaintiffs' claim against the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) alleging premises liability based on the condition of a construction zone, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Tort Claims Act.
On a late while traveling through a roadway construction site, Plaintiffs - a motorcyclist and his wife - collided with a vehicle that crossed into their lane. Plaintiffs sued several parties, including TxDOT, alleging that the demarcation of opposing travel lanes with painted yellow stripes and buttons instead of concrete barriers, a condition called for in the project's traffic-control plan, created an unreasonably dangerous condition, causing their injuries. TxDOT filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed for want of jurisdiction, ruling that TxDOT retained its immunity from suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to create a fact issue regarding an essential element of their premises-defect claim: the existence of an unreasonably dangerous condition.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Plaintiffs' premises liability action against the Texas Department of Transportation, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Tort Claims Act.
2023-02-10stateTexasSupreme Court of TexasHuddle21-0728https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/21-1446/21-1446-2023-01-24.htmlSerna v. Denver Police Department, et al.2023-01-24T10:07:04-08:002023-01-24T10:07:04-08:00
Plaintiff-appellant Francisco Serna sued a police officer and local police department that allegedly prevented him from transporting hemp plants on a flight from Colorado to Texas. In the complaint, he asserted a single claim under § 10114(b) of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (the 2018 Farm Bill), a statute that authorized states to legalize hemp and regulate its production within their borders, but generally precluded states from interfering with the interstate transportation of hemp. The district court dismissed Serna’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Serna failed to state a viable claim because § 10114(b) did not create a private cause of action to sue state officials who allegedly violate that provision. Serna appealed, arguing that § 10114(b) impliedly authorized a private cause of action and that even if it didn't, the district court should have allowed him to amend the complaint to add other potentially viable claims rather than dismissing the case altogether. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that contrary to Serna’s view, the language in § 10114(b) did not suggest that Congress intended to grant hemp farmers a right to freely transport their product from one jurisdiction to another, with no interference from state officials. Because courts could not read a private cause of action into a statute that lacked such rights-creating language, the Court held the district court properly dismissed Serna’s § 10114(b) claim. The Court also concluded the trial court properly declined to allow Serna to amend his complaint. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/21-1446/21-1446-2023-01-24.html" target="_blank">View "Serna v. Denver Police Department, et al." on Justia Law</a>
Plaintiff-appellant Francisco Serna sued a police officer and local police department that allegedly prevented him from transporting hemp plants on a flight from Colorado to Texas. In the complaint, he asserted a single claim under § 10114(b) of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (the 2018 Farm Bill), a statute that authorized states to legalize hemp and regulate its production within their borders, but generally precluded states from interfering with the interstate transportation of hemp. The district court dismissed Serna’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Serna failed to state a viable claim because § 10114(b) did not create a private cause of action to sue state officials who allegedly violate that provision. Serna appealed, arguing that § 10114(b) impliedly authorized a private cause of action and that even if it didn't, the district court should have allowed him to amend the complaint to add other potentially viable claims rather than dismissing the case altogether. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that contrary to Serna’s view, the language in § 10114(b) did not suggest that Congress intended to grant hemp farmers a right to freely transport their product from one jurisdiction to another, with no interference from state officials. Because courts could not read a private cause of action into a statute that lacked such rights-creating language, the Court held the district court properly dismissed Serna’s § 10114(b) claim. The Court also concluded the trial court properly declined to allow Serna to amend his complaint.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that contrary to plaintiff's view, the language in § 10114(b) did not suggest that Congress intended to grant hemp farmers a right to freely transport their product from one jurisdiction to another, with no interference from state officials.
2023-01-24federalUS Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitMoritz21-1446https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1002/22-1002-2023-01-13.htmlPrime Insurance Co. v. Wright2023-01-13T14:30:28-08:002023-01-13T14:30:28-08:00
Humphrey was a Riteway driver. His trips began in Illinois, often ending in another state. In 2013 Humphrey drove a truck to Indiana. After he delivered the freight, Riteway directed him to another site in Fort Wayne. While driving to the pickup site, Humphrey’s truck collided with Wright's car. After cooperating with the police, Humphrey picked up his load and delivered it to Illinois. Wright sued Riteway in Indiana state court and obtained a default judgment. Riteway's Prime Insurance policy contained an endorsement that provides payments to an injured party even when the insurer need not defend or indemnify its client. A federal court determined that Riteway had forfeited the benefit of Prime’s policy but reserved questions about whether Wright could recover under the endorsement. The Indiana judiciary declined to allow Prime to attack the default judgment.
Prime sought a declaratory judgment that the endorsement did not apply. The endorsement applies to any judgment “resulting from negligence ... subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.” Those statutes have been repealed but the parties stipulated that 49 U.S.C. 31139(b)(1) applies and provides that all motor freight transportation from a place in one state to a place in another is covered. The district court ordered Prime to pay. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Humphrey was engaged in interstate freight transportation under the statutory definition regardless of intent, whether a truck was carrying freight, or the “totality” of the circumstances. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1002/22-1002-2023-01-13.html" target="_blank">View "Prime Insurance Co. v. Wright" on Justia Law</a>
Humphrey was a Riteway driver. His trips began in Illinois, often ending in another state. In 2013 Humphrey drove a truck to Indiana. After he delivered the freight, Riteway directed him to another site in Fort Wayne. While driving to the pickup site, Humphrey’s truck collided with Wright's car. After cooperating with the police, Humphrey picked up his load and delivered it to Illinois. Wright sued Riteway in Indiana state court and obtained a default judgment. Riteway's Prime Insurance policy contained an endorsement that provides payments to an injured party even when the insurer need not defend or indemnify its client. A federal court determined that Riteway had forfeited the benefit of Prime’s policy but reserved questions about whether Wright could recover under the endorsement. The Indiana judiciary declined to allow Prime to attack the default judgment.
Prime sought a declaratory judgment that the endorsement did not apply. The endorsement applies to any judgment “resulting from negligence ... subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.” Those statutes have been repealed but the parties stipulated that 49 U.S.C. 31139(b)(1) applies and provides that all motor freight transportation from a place in one state to a place in another is covered. The district court ordered Prime to pay. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Humphrey was engaged in interstate freight transportation under the statutory definition regardless of intent, whether a truck was carrying freight, or the “totality” of the circumstances.
Seventh Circuit holds that an endorsement in an insurance policy covering a trucking company requires payment for an accident that occurred when its driver was engaged in interstate freight transportation, regardless of intent or whether the truck was carrying freight.
2023-01-13federalUS Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitFrank Hoover Easterbrook22-1002https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-1230/21-1230-2023-01-06.htmlBlazine Monaco v. WV Parkways Authority2023-01-06T12:02:15-08:002023-01-06T12:02:15-08:00
Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of her putative class action against the West Virginia Parkways Authority, in which she alleges that the Parkways Authority improperly collected fees. And the Parkways Authority appeals the district court’s holding that it was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the United States or West Virginia Constitutions.
Plaintiff relied on the Class Action Fairness Act for jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss without prejudice. The court concluded that here, Section 1332(d)(5)(A) bars jurisdiction under Section 1332(d)(2) of the Class Action Fairness Act. The court explained that the Parkways Authority is the only, and thus “primary,” defendant. And it is a “governmental entity.” The Parkways Authority’s sovereign-immunity claim is strong enough to conclude that the district court “may be foreclosed from ordering relief” against it. So Section 1332(d)(2)’s jurisdictional grant “shall not apply.” Since that is the only provision that Plaintiff relies on to establish jurisdiction over her putative class action, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-1230/21-1230-2023-01-06.html" target="_blank">View "Blazine Monaco v. WV Parkways Authority" on Justia Law</a>
Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of her putative class action against the West Virginia Parkways Authority, in which she alleges that the Parkways Authority improperly collected fees. And the Parkways Authority appeals the district court’s holding that it was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the United States or West Virginia Constitutions.
Plaintiff relied on the Class Action Fairness Act for jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss without prejudice. The court concluded that here, Section 1332(d)(5)(A) bars jurisdiction under Section 1332(d)(2) of the Class Action Fairness Act. The court explained that the Parkways Authority is the only, and thus “primary,” defendant. And it is a “governmental entity.” The Parkways Authority’s sovereign-immunity claim is strong enough to conclude that the district court “may be foreclosed from ordering relief” against it. So Section 1332(d)(2)’s jurisdictional grant “shall not apply.” Since that is the only provision that Plaintiff relies on to establish jurisdiction over her putative class action, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it.
The Fourth Circuit, in Plaintiff’s putative class action against the West Virginia Parkways Authority, vacated and remanded to the district court’s judgment with directions to dismiss without prejudice. The court concluded that Section 1332(d)(5)(A) bars jurisdiction under Section 1332(d)(2) of the Class Action Fairness Act.
2023-01-06federalUS Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitRICHARDSON21-1230https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-7021/21-7021-2022-12-30.htmlNational Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority2022-12-30T07:31:46-08:002022-12-30T07:31:46-08:00
The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") operates local commuter trains in Philadelphia and its suburbs. Amtrak and SEPTA dispute ownership of the Commuter Easement that grants access to Amtrak’s Philadelphia-area rail lines and stations. The original owner of the Easement was the now-defunct Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”).
SEPTA claimed that a series of federal rail statutes gave it the option to acquire the Easement from Conrail and that it exercised that right in 1982. Amtrak claims that when SEPTA tried to acquire the Easement, Amtrak exercised a contractual right of first refusal and purchased the Easement, and therefore SEPTA has no right to access Amtrak’s lines and stations.
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's decision holding that an easement was not effectively conveyed to SEPTA, finding that SEPTA had a public right to acquire the easment and Amtrak had no authority to block Conrail from conveying it to SEPTA. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-7021/21-7021-2022-12-30.html" target="_blank">View "National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority" on Justia Law</a>
The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") operates local commuter trains in Philadelphia and its suburbs. Amtrak and SEPTA dispute ownership of the Commuter Easement that grants access to Amtrak’s Philadelphia-area rail lines and stations. The original owner of the Easement was the now-defunct Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”).
SEPTA claimed that a series of federal rail statutes gave it the option to acquire the Easement from Conrail and that it exercised that right in 1982. Amtrak claims that when SEPTA tried to acquire the Easement, Amtrak exercised a contractual right of first refusal and purchased the Easement, and therefore SEPTA has no right to access Amtrak’s lines and stations.
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's decision holding that an easement was not effectively conveyed to SEPTA, finding that SEPTA had a public right to acquire the easment and Amtrak had no authority to block Conrail from conveying it to SEPTA.
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's decision holding that an easement was not effectively conveyed to SEPTA, finding that SEPTA had a public right to acquire the easment and Amtrak had no authority to block Conrail from conveying it to SEPTA.
2022-12-30federalUS Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitPaul Peter Rao21-7021https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-55456/21-55456-2022-11-23.htmlJOHEL VALIENTE, ET AL V. SWIFT TRANSP. CO. OF ARIZ.2022-11-23T09:01:12-08:002022-11-23T09:01:12-08:00
In 2018, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) decided to preempt California’s MRB rules with respect to truck drivers subject to federal regulations. Swift Transportation (Plaintiffs) argued that the presumption against retroactive application of laws operates here to allow their lawsuit to proceed despite the FMSCA’s preemption of California’s meal and rest break (MRB) rules.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC in a class action brought by former hourly truck drivers for (“Plaintiffs”) alleging violations of California’s MRB rules and derivative state-law claims. The panel applied the retroactivity test set forth in Landgraf v. USI FilmProducts, 511 U.S. 244, 263-64, 280 (1994). Under step one of the twostep test, the panel held that because Congress clearly intended for the FMSCA to have the power to halt enforcement of state laws, and because the FMSCA intended for this particular preemption determination to apply to pending lawsuits, the FMSCA’s decision prohibits present enforcement of California’s MRB rules regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred. The panel held that it need not reach the second step of the Landgraf analysis. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-55456/21-55456-2022-11-23.html" target="_blank">View "JOHEL VALIENTE, ET AL V. SWIFT TRANSP. CO. OF ARIZ." on Justia Law</a>
In 2018, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) decided to preempt California’s MRB rules with respect to truck drivers subject to federal regulations. Swift Transportation (Plaintiffs) argued that the presumption against retroactive application of laws operates here to allow their lawsuit to proceed despite the FMSCA’s preemption of California’s meal and rest break (MRB) rules.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC in a class action brought by former hourly truck drivers for (“Plaintiffs”) alleging violations of California’s MRB rules and derivative state-law claims. The panel applied the retroactivity test set forth in Landgraf v. USI FilmProducts, 511 U.S. 244, 263-64, 280 (1994). Under step one of the twostep test, the panel held that because Congress clearly intended for the FMSCA to have the power to halt enforcement of state laws, and because the FMSCA intended for this particular preemption determination to apply to pending lawsuits, the FMSCA’s decision prohibits present enforcement of California’s MRB rules regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred. The panel held that it need not reach the second step of the Landgraf analysis.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC in a class action brought by former hourly truck drivers for Swift Transportation (“Plaintiffs”) alleging violations of California’s meal and rest break (“MRB”) rules and derivative state-law claims.
2022-11-23federalUS Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitH.A. Thomas21-55456https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-30193/20-30193-2022-11-22.htmlUSA V. FOREST KIRST2022-11-22T09:03:49-08:002022-11-22T09:03:49-08:00
Defendant crashed his plane when he attempted to fly over Atigun Pass in the Brooks Range in Alaska. During both the investigation and Defendant’s appeal of the revocation of his airman certificate, Defendant claimed that the plane was climbing through 5,500 to 5,700 feet with a target altitude of 6,000 feet as it approached the pass. GPS data showed that the plane was flying at an altitude more than 1,000 feet lower than what Defendant claimed. The proceeding in Count One was the NTSB investigation. The proceeding in Count Two was the appeal before the NTSB of the FAA’s revocation of his airman certificate. Challenging his conviction on Count One, Defendant argued that the NTSB’s accident investigation was not a pending “proceeding” within the meaning of Section 1505.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction on two counts of obstructing a pending proceeding and affirmed the district court’s assessment of a $5,000 fine. The panel wrote that even if it were not reviewing for plain error, it would affirm, holding that the NTSB’s investigation of Defendant’s plane crash was a “proceeding” within the meaning of Section 1505. The panel held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the materiality element. The panel held that the district court did not commit clear error in finding Defendant able to pay the $5,000 fine, as there was no evidence before the district court showing that Defendant was unable to pay the fine, or was likely become unable to pay it. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-30193/20-30193-2022-11-22.html" target="_blank">View "USA V. FOREST KIRST" on Justia Law</a>
Defendant crashed his plane when he attempted to fly over Atigun Pass in the Brooks Range in Alaska. During both the investigation and Defendant’s appeal of the revocation of his airman certificate, Defendant claimed that the plane was climbing through 5,500 to 5,700 feet with a target altitude of 6,000 feet as it approached the pass. GPS data showed that the plane was flying at an altitude more than 1,000 feet lower than what Defendant claimed. The proceeding in Count One was the NTSB investigation. The proceeding in Count Two was the appeal before the NTSB of the FAA’s revocation of his airman certificate. Challenging his conviction on Count One, Defendant argued that the NTSB’s accident investigation was not a pending “proceeding” within the meaning of Section 1505.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction on two counts of obstructing a pending proceeding and affirmed the district court’s assessment of a $5,000 fine. The panel wrote that even if it were not reviewing for plain error, it would affirm, holding that the NTSB’s investigation of Defendant’s plane crash was a “proceeding” within the meaning of Section 1505. The panel held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the materiality element. The panel held that the district court did not commit clear error in finding Defendant able to pay the $5,000 fine, as there was no evidence before the district court showing that Defendant was unable to pay the fine, or was likely become unable to pay it.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction on two counts of obstructing a pending proceeding and affirmed the district court’s assessment of a $5,000 fine, in a case in which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the crash of a small plane that Defendant piloted and in which the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revoked Defendant’s airman certificate.
2022-11-22federalUS Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitW. Fletcher20-30193https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/21-10771/21-10771-2022-11-18.htmlPalm Beach County, et al. v. Federal Aviation Administration2022-11-18T10:36:25-08:002022-11-18T10:36:25-08:00
Intervenor is a former commercial pilot who now flies a small Cessna jet for his own personal use. The intervenor landed his Cessna at the Lantana Airport. A Palm Beach County ordinance prohibits “pure turbo-jet aircraft” and cargo-carrying aircraft that weigh more than 12,500 pounds from using Lantana Airport, and Palm Beach County enforces the ordinance in a way that actually bans all jets, not just the “pure turbo” variety. The intervenor complained to the Federal Aviation Administration that the ordinance’s jet restriction violated a grant assurance the County had made to the FAA in exchange for federal airport improvement money. The FAA agreed with the Intervenor and ordered the County to rescind the restriction. The County and the City of Atlantis, which borders Lantana Airport, have petitioned us for review of the FAA’s final agency decision.
The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review. The court explained that the FAA has exclusive authority over our national navigable airspace, which means it’s responsible for “developing plans and policy . . . necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use” of that space. It “may modify or revoke an assignment of airspace when required in the public interest.” As long as any change in the FAA’s position on an airport restriction isn’t based on an impermissible bias, it has the authority to make that change. The Associate Administrator’s conclusion that Lantana Airport’s jet restriction violates Grant Assurance wasn’t arbitrary and capricious but instead was supported by substantial evidence. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/21-10771/21-10771-2022-11-18.html" target="_blank">View "Palm Beach County, et al. v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law</a>
Intervenor is a former commercial pilot who now flies a small Cessna jet for his own personal use. The intervenor landed his Cessna at the Lantana Airport. A Palm Beach County ordinance prohibits “pure turbo-jet aircraft” and cargo-carrying aircraft that weigh more than 12,500 pounds from using Lantana Airport, and Palm Beach County enforces the ordinance in a way that actually bans all jets, not just the “pure turbo” variety. The intervenor complained to the Federal Aviation Administration that the ordinance’s jet restriction violated a grant assurance the County had made to the FAA in exchange for federal airport improvement money. The FAA agreed with the Intervenor and ordered the County to rescind the restriction. The County and the City of Atlantis, which borders Lantana Airport, have petitioned us for review of the FAA’s final agency decision.
The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review. The court explained that the FAA has exclusive authority over our national navigable airspace, which means it’s responsible for “developing plans and policy . . . necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use” of that space. It “may modify or revoke an assignment of airspace when required in the public interest.” As long as any change in the FAA’s position on an airport restriction isn’t based on an impermissible bias, it has the authority to make that change. The Associate Administrator’s conclusion that Lantana Airport’s jet restriction violates Grant Assurance wasn’t arbitrary and capricious but instead was supported by substantial evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit denied Palm Beach County, Florida’s (County) petition for review of the Federal Aviation Administration's final agency decision ordering the County to rescind a restriction that prohibits “pure turbo-jet aircraft” and cargo-carrying aircraft that weigh more than 12,500 pounds from using Lantana Airport.
2022-11-18federalUS Court of Appeals for the Eleventh CircuitED CARNES21-10771https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1198/22-1198-2022-10-12.htmlMaine Forest Products Council v. Cormier2022-11-02T13:17:34-08:002022-11-02T13:17:34-08:00
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court issuing a preliminary injunction preliminarily enjoining enforcement of a state law before it took effect, holding that the district court properly entered the preliminary injunction.
The law at issue was enacted by the Maine legislature in 2021 to prevent Canadian truck drivers from hauling logs within the state under the auspices of the federal H-2A visa program. Just a few days before the law was to take effect Plaintiffs jointly filed suit in federal district court against the Director of the Maine Bureau of Forestry and the Attorney General of Maine (collectively, the State). Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the law was preempted under federal law. Plaintiffs then moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the law. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs carried their burden of showing that the H-2A restriction imposed by the law was likely preempted by federal law; and (2) therefore, the district court properly entered the preliminary injunction. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1198/22-1198-2022-10-12.html" target="_blank">View "Maine Forest Products Council v. Cormier" on Justia Law</a>
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court issuing a preliminary injunction preliminarily enjoining enforcement of a state law before it took effect, holding that the district court properly entered the preliminary injunction.
The law at issue was enacted by the Maine legislature in 2021 to prevent Canadian truck drivers from hauling logs within the state under the auspices of the federal H-2A visa program. Just a few days before the law was to take effect Plaintiffs jointly filed suit in federal district court against the Director of the Maine Bureau of Forestry and the Attorney General of Maine (collectively, the State). Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the law was preempted under federal law. Plaintiffs then moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the law. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs carried their burden of showing that the H-2A restriction imposed by the law was likely preempted by federal law; and (2) therefore, the district court properly entered the preliminary injunction.
The First Circuit affirmed the preliminarily enjoining enforcement of a state law before it took effect, holding that the district court properly entered the preliminary injunction.
2022-10-12federalUS Court of Appeals for the First CircuitSelya22-1198https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/20-3569/20-3569-2022-10-05.htmlGeorge E. Warren LLC v. Colonial Pipeline Co2022-10-05T09:01:45-08:002022-10-05T09:01:45-08:00
Warren tenders gasoline products to Colonial (a common carrier) for shipment on Colonial’s pipeline from Texas to New Jersey, where Warren has a gasoline-blending operation. The rates and conditions for the transportation services are specified in tariffs approved by the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC). The tariff recognizes that the gasoline batches Colonial transports for Warren are fungible and allows Colonial to comingle gasoline from many shippers during transport. Colonial must deliver gasoline of the same volume and grade as the gasoline that was entrusted to it, with the same characteristics that influence the gasoline’s combustion performance (octane rating and distillation value), and its environmental impact, such as volatility. The tariff does not state whether “on specification” gasoline includes any “blend margin.” In 2016, FERC determined that the regulation of in-pipeline blending was outside its jurisdiction. Colonial continued giving Warren gasoline that complies with the relevant tariff but Warren claims that Colonial’s in-line blending of the gasoline with butane diminishes Warren’s ability to blend cheaper blendstocks into the gasoline. Warren regularly blends cheaper gasoline with more expensive gasoline to increase the amount of on-specification gasoline that it can sell,
Warren sued for loss of profits (Carmack Amendment 49 U.S.C. 1590), conversion, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference. The Third Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claims. Warren’s request seeks an enlargement of its rights under the FERC-approved tariff and violates the filed-rate doctrine’s nondiscrimination principle. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/20-3569/20-3569-2022-10-05.html" target="_blank">View "George E. Warren LLC v. Colonial Pipeline Co" on Justia Law</a>
Warren tenders gasoline products to Colonial (a common carrier) for shipment on Colonial’s pipeline from Texas to New Jersey, where Warren has a gasoline-blending operation. The rates and conditions for the transportation services are specified in tariffs approved by the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC). The tariff recognizes that the gasoline batches Colonial transports for Warren are fungible and allows Colonial to comingle gasoline from many shippers during transport. Colonial must deliver gasoline of the same volume and grade as the gasoline that was entrusted to it, with the same characteristics that influence the gasoline’s combustion performance (octane rating and distillation value), and its environmental impact, such as volatility. The tariff does not state whether “on specification” gasoline includes any “blend margin.” In 2016, FERC determined that the regulation of in-pipeline blending was outside its jurisdiction. Colonial continued giving Warren gasoline that complies with the relevant tariff but Warren claims that Colonial’s in-line blending of the gasoline with butane diminishes Warren’s ability to blend cheaper blendstocks into the gasoline. Warren regularly blends cheaper gasoline with more expensive gasoline to increase the amount of on-specification gasoline that it can sell,
Warren sued for loss of profits (Carmack Amendment 49 U.S.C. 1590), conversion, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference. The Third Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claims. Warren’s request seeks an enlargement of its rights under the FERC-approved tariff and violates the filed-rate doctrine’s nondiscrimination principle.
Third Circuit rejects claims concerning the in-pipeline blending of gasoline products with butane as an attempt to enlarge a gasoline shipper's rights under the FERC-approved tariff for the pipeline.
2022-10-05federalUS Court of Appeals for the Third CircuitRoth20-3569https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2133/21-2133-2022-09-28.htmlMemmer v. United States2022-09-28T06:03:34-08:002022-09-28T06:03:34-08:00
The Indiana Southwestern Railway Company sought to abandon railway easements, in which the owners had reversionary interests. The Surface Transportation Board (49 U.S.C. 10903) issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use and Abandonment (NITU). Negotiations with potential railbanking sponsors failed. Eventually, the NITU expired, Railway abandoned its easements without entering into a trail use agreement, and the landowners’ fee simple interests became unencumbered by any easements.
The landowners sought compensation for an alleged taking arising under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d), claiming that the government had permanently taken their property in April 2001, when the NITU became effective. The Claims Court found that the government had taken the property but that the taking lasted only from the date the NITU went into effect until it expired. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The landowner’s property was temporarily taken under the Trails Act. The NITU delayed the reversion of the owners’ interests. The Railway would have otherwise relinquished its rights to its right-of-way during the NITU period. The court remanded for a determination as to the compensation and interest to which the owners are entitled. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2133/21-2133-2022-09-28.html" target="_blank">View "Memmer v. United States" on Justia Law</a>
The Indiana Southwestern Railway Company sought to abandon railway easements, in which the owners had reversionary interests. The Surface Transportation Board (49 U.S.C. 10903) issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use and Abandonment (NITU). Negotiations with potential railbanking sponsors failed. Eventually, the NITU expired, Railway abandoned its easements without entering into a trail use agreement, and the landowners’ fee simple interests became unencumbered by any easements.
The landowners sought compensation for an alleged taking arising under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d), claiming that the government had permanently taken their property in April 2001, when the NITU became effective. The Claims Court found that the government had taken the property but that the taking lasted only from the date the NITU went into effect until it expired. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The landowner’s property was temporarily taken under the Trails Act. The NITU delayed the reversion of the owners’ interests. The Railway would have otherwise relinquished its rights to its right-of-way during the NITU period. The court remanded for a determination as to the compensation and interest to which the owners are entitled.
The owners of reversionary interests in railway rights-of-way suffered a temporary taking during the period covered by a Notice of Interim Trail Use and Abandonment under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983.
2022-09-28federalUS Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitAlvin Anthony Schall21-2133https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-4129/20-4129-2022-08-22.htmlDay v. SkyWest Airlines2022-08-22T08:30:58-08:002022-08-22T08:30:58-08:00
Kelly Day appealed the district court’s dismissal of the diversity action she filed against SkyWest Airlines for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when a SkyWest flight attendant carelessly struck her with a beverage cart. The district court granted SkyWest’s motion to dismiss the action as preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), which preempted state laws “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with sister circuits that personal-injury claims arising out of an airline employee’s failure to exercise due care were not “related to” a deregulated price, route, or service. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Day’s action and remanded for further proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-4129/20-4129-2022-08-22.html" target="_blank">View "Day v. SkyWest Airlines" on Justia Law</a>
Kelly Day appealed the district court’s dismissal of the diversity action she filed against SkyWest Airlines for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when a SkyWest flight attendant carelessly struck her with a beverage cart. The district court granted SkyWest’s motion to dismiss the action as preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), which preempted state laws “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with sister circuits that personal-injury claims arising out of an airline employee’s failure to exercise due care were not “related to” a deregulated price, route, or service. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Day’s action and remanded for further proceedings.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with sister circuits that personal-injury claims arising out of an airline employee’s failure to exercise due care were not “related to” a deregulated price, route, or service.
2022-08-22federalUS Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitMichael R. Murphy20-4129https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2886/21-2886-2022-08-17.htmlTimothy Johnson v. Diakon Logistics, Inc.2022-08-17T13:30:14-08:002022-08-17T13:30:14-08:00
Innovel hired Diakon to take furniture from warehouses to customers’ homes. Plaintiffs, two of Diakon's drivers, were citizens of Illinois who drove out of Innovel’s Illinois warehouses and made deliveries to customers in Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri. They signed “Service Agreements” that classify the drivers as independent contractors yet include detailed expectations for the drivers, covering uniforms, business cards, truck decals, and how to perform deliveries and installations. The Agreements select Virginia law to govern the parties’ relations and authorize Diakon to deduct fees and penalties from the drivers’ pay for truck rental fees, insurance, workers’ compensation coverage, damaged merchandise, and customers’ refused deliveries.
Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Diakon misclassified them as independent contractors when they were employees under Illinois law. Illinois courts apply a three-part test to determine employee status, which is more likely to classify workers as employees than is Virginia law, which would treat the plaintiffs as contractors. The Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act allows deductions from pay only if the employee consents in writing at the time of the deduction.
The district judge certified a class but ruled in favor of Diakon. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiffs’ claims arise from their work in Illinois, not from their contracts. The Illinois Act governs payment for work in Illinois regardless of what state’s law governs other aspects of the parties' relations. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2886/21-2886-2022-08-17.html" target="_blank">View "Timothy Johnson v. Diakon Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
Innovel hired Diakon to take furniture from warehouses to customers’ homes. Plaintiffs, two of Diakon's drivers, were citizens of Illinois who drove out of Innovel’s Illinois warehouses and made deliveries to customers in Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri. They signed “Service Agreements” that classify the drivers as independent contractors yet include detailed expectations for the drivers, covering uniforms, business cards, truck decals, and how to perform deliveries and installations. The Agreements select Virginia law to govern the parties’ relations and authorize Diakon to deduct fees and penalties from the drivers’ pay for truck rental fees, insurance, workers’ compensation coverage, damaged merchandise, and customers’ refused deliveries.
Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Diakon misclassified them as independent contractors when they were employees under Illinois law. Illinois courts apply a three-part test to determine employee status, which is more likely to classify workers as employees than is Virginia law, which would treat the plaintiffs as contractors. The Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act allows deductions from pay only if the employee consents in writing at the time of the deduction.
The district judge certified a class but ruled in favor of Diakon. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiffs’ claims arise from their work in Illinois, not from their contracts. The Illinois Act governs payment for work in Illinois regardless of what state’s law governs other aspects of the parties' relations.
Drivers, conducting deliveries in Illinois, are subject to the Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act, regardless of a choice of law provision in a contract between the drivers and the employer.
2022-08-17federalUS Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitFrank Hoover Easterbrook21-2886https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2022/2020-0608.htmlState v. CSX Transportation, Inc.2022-08-17T05:06:23-08:002022-08-17T05:06:23-08:00
The Supreme Court held that Ohio's antiblocking statute, Ohio Rev. Code 5589.21, which prohibits a stopped train from blocking a railroad crossing for more than five minutes, is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., and that the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq., does not exempt section 5589.21 from the Termination Act's preemptive force.
The State charged CSX Transportation, Inc. with violating section 5589.21 on five occasions. The trial court dismissed the charges, concluding that the Termination Act and the Safety Act preempted section 5589.21. The court of appeals reversed, holding that federal law did not preempt the antiblocking statute. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's dismissal of the charges brought against CSX, holding that section 5589.21 is preempted by federal law and therefore may not be enforced against CSX. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2022/2020-0608.html" target="_blank">View "State v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that Ohio's antiblocking statute, Ohio Rev. Code 5589.21, which prohibits a stopped train from blocking a railroad crossing for more than five minutes, is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., and that the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq., does not exempt section 5589.21 from the Termination Act's preemptive force.
The State charged CSX Transportation, Inc. with violating section 5589.21 on five occasions. The trial court dismissed the charges, concluding that the Termination Act and the Safety Act preempted section 5589.21. The court of appeals reversed, holding that federal law did not preempt the antiblocking statute. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's dismissal of the charges brought against CSX, holding that section 5589.21 is preempted by federal law and therefore may not be enforced against CSX.
The Supreme Court held that Ohio's antiblocking statute, Ohio Rev. Code 5589.21, which prohibits a stopped train from blocking a railroad crossing for more than five minutes, is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.
2022-08-17stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioSharon L. Kennedy2020-0608https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-1532/21-1532-2022-08-09.htmlBrousil v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Administrative Review Board2022-08-09T11:30:15-08:002022-08-09T11:30:15-08:00
The Seventh Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the judgment of the Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board (ARB) affirming an administrative law judge's (ALJ) determination that BNSF Railway Company had a valid same-action affirmative defense to Plaintiff's retaliation claim, holding that substantial evidence supported the decision.
Plaintiff, a train engineer, brought an administrative complaint with the Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA) alleging that BNSF, his employer, violated the Federal Railroad Safety Act by retaliating against him for raising safety concerns and refusing to engage in unsafe practices. OSHA dismissed the complaint. A Department of Labor ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim based on the statutory same-action affirmative defense. The ARB affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review, holding that substantial evidence supported the ARB's decision that the same-action defense applied to BNSF's discipline of Plaintiff. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-1532/21-1532-2022-08-09.html" target="_blank">View "Brousil v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Administrative Review Board" on Justia Law</a>
The Seventh Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the judgment of the Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board (ARB) affirming an administrative law judge's (ALJ) determination that BNSF Railway Company had a valid same-action affirmative defense to Plaintiff's retaliation claim, holding that substantial evidence supported the decision.
Plaintiff, a train engineer, brought an administrative complaint with the Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA) alleging that BNSF, his employer, violated the Federal Railroad Safety Act by retaliating against him for raising safety concerns and refusing to engage in unsafe practices. OSHA dismissed the complaint. A Department of Labor ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim based on the statutory same-action affirmative defense. The ARB affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review, holding that substantial evidence supported the ARB's decision that the same-action defense applied to BNSF's discipline of Plaintiff.
The Seventh Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the judgment of the Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board affirming an administrative law judge's determination that BNSF Railway Company had a valid same-action affirmative defense to Plaintiff's retaliation claim, holding that substantial evidence supported the decision.
2022-08-09federalUS Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitKirsch21-1532https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-8000/20-8000-2022-07-26.htmlFrey v. Town of Jackson, WY, et al.2022-07-26T11:02:31-08:002022-07-26T11:02:31-08:00
As Plaintiff William Frey proceeded through the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) checkpoint at Jackson Hole Airport in Teton County, Wyoming, the body scanner alerted TSA screeners to a potentially suspicious area on Plaintiff’s person. When the security screeners informed Plaintiff that they would have to conduct a pat down, Plaintiff became agitated and repeatedly refused to cooperate. So the security screeners summoned a police officer, Defendant Nathan Karnes, who arrested Plaintiff. After being transported to the Teton County Jail for booking, Plaintiff continued his noncooperation, refusing to participate in the booking process and demanding that jail officials allow him to have an attorney present. Jail officials detained Plaintiff for about three hours before releasing him. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging many violations of his rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, denied leave to file a second amended complaint, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, awarded attorney’s fees to the Municipal Defendants, and sanctioned Plaintiff’s attorneys. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that some of his claims should have survived dismissal, that the district court should have permitted him to add some of his new proposed claims in a second amended complaint, and that the district court should not have awarded any attorney’s fees. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-8000/20-8000-2022-07-26.html" target="_blank">View "Frey v. Town of Jackson, WY, et al." on Justia Law</a>
As Plaintiff William Frey proceeded through the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) checkpoint at Jackson Hole Airport in Teton County, Wyoming, the body scanner alerted TSA screeners to a potentially suspicious area on Plaintiff’s person. When the security screeners informed Plaintiff that they would have to conduct a pat down, Plaintiff became agitated and repeatedly refused to cooperate. So the security screeners summoned a police officer, Defendant Nathan Karnes, who arrested Plaintiff. After being transported to the Teton County Jail for booking, Plaintiff continued his noncooperation, refusing to participate in the booking process and demanding that jail officials allow him to have an attorney present. Jail officials detained Plaintiff for about three hours before releasing him. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging many violations of his rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, denied leave to file a second amended complaint, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, awarded attorney’s fees to the Municipal Defendants, and sanctioned Plaintiff’s attorneys. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that some of his claims should have survived dismissal, that the district court should have permitted him to add some of his new proposed claims in a second amended complaint, and that the district court should not have awarded any attorney’s fees. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.
Litigation arose from a contentious encounter between a passenger attempting to go through the security checkpoint at the Jackson Hole Airport in Teton County, Wyoming.
2022-07-26federalUS Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitCarson20-8000https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1520/20-1520-2022-07-26.htmlArcher Western Contractors. LLC v. U.S. Department of Transportation2022-07-26T07:01:00-08:002022-07-26T07:01:00-08:00
The Federal Aviation Administration hired Archer Western Contractors to build air traffic structures for an airport in Las Vegas. Archer challenged the FAA’s resolution of three contract disputes.
On the first dispute, the FAA said that Archer waited too long to challenge the FAA’s failure to provide an equitable adjustment for a modification to the contract. For the second dispute, the FAA said that Archer’s claim regarding contract modifications’ “cumulative impact” was also untimely. As for the third dispute, the FAA found that Archer had failed to install proper rectangular air ducts.
The DC Circuit granted Petitioners’ petition in part and denied it in part. The court vacated the FAA’s order only as to its dismissal of Archer’s first claim for failure to provide an equitable adjustment. The other challenged aspects of the FAA’s order are not arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the FAA erred in dismissing as untimely Archer’s failure-to-provide-an-equitable-adjustment claim. The court agreed with the FAA on the other two issues.
The court explained that it is reviewing a failure-to-provide-an-equitable-adjustment claim. And that claim was timely filed only one year and four months after it accrued — well within the two-year window for Archer to file a claim. However, Archer needed to separately allege a claim for cumulative impact within two years of that claim’s accrual. Instead, the ODRA did not receive notice of Archer’s cumulative impact until well past the contract’s two-year limit for filing a claim. The FAA was therefore correct to dismiss Archer’s cumulative-impact claim as untimely. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1520/20-1520-2022-07-26.html" target="_blank">View "Archer Western Contractors. LLC v. U.S. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law</a>
The Federal Aviation Administration hired Archer Western Contractors to build air traffic structures for an airport in Las Vegas. Archer challenged the FAA’s resolution of three contract disputes.
On the first dispute, the FAA said that Archer waited too long to challenge the FAA’s failure to provide an equitable adjustment for a modification to the contract. For the second dispute, the FAA said that Archer’s claim regarding contract modifications’ “cumulative impact” was also untimely. As for the third dispute, the FAA found that Archer had failed to install proper rectangular air ducts.
The DC Circuit granted Petitioners’ petition in part and denied it in part. The court vacated the FAA’s order only as to its dismissal of Archer’s first claim for failure to provide an equitable adjustment. The other challenged aspects of the FAA’s order are not arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the FAA erred in dismissing as untimely Archer’s failure-to-provide-an-equitable-adjustment claim. The court agreed with the FAA on the other two issues.
The court explained that it is reviewing a failure-to-provide-an-equitable-adjustment claim. And that claim was timely filed only one year and four months after it accrued — well within the two-year window for Archer to file a claim. However, Archer needed to separately allege a claim for cumulative impact within two years of that claim’s accrual. Instead, the ODRA did not receive notice of Archer’s cumulative impact until well past the contract’s two-year limit for filing a claim. The FAA was therefore correct to dismiss Archer’s cumulative-impact claim as untimely.
The DC Circuit granted Petitioners, Archer Western Contractors, petition in part and denied it in part. The court vacated the FAA’s order only as to its dismissal of Archer’s first claim for failure to provide an equitable adjustment. The other challenged aspects of the FAA’s order are not arbitrary and capricious.
2022-07-26federalUS Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitWALKER20-1520https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1370/20-1370-2022-07-26.htmlAdvocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FMCSA2022-07-26T07:00:59-08:002022-07-26T07:00:59-08:00
In 2020, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) modified its regulations governing the maximum hours that commercial motor vehicle operators may drive or operate within a certain timeframe. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a labor union representing commercial truck drivers, and three national nonprofit organizations petitioned for review. They argued that the Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious for failing to grapple with the safety and driver health consequences of changes to record-keeping rules for short-haul commercial vehicle drivers and break requirements for long-haul drivers.
The DC Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the modifications to the hours-of-service rules were sufficiently explained and grounded in the administrative record. The court explained that the Administration not only directly tackled the issue of driver health but also reasonably explained why the health benefits estimated in the 2011 Rule would continue under the modified 30-minute break rule. That met the APA’s requirements. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1370/20-1370-2022-07-26.html" target="_blank">View "Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FMCSA" on Justia Law</a>
In 2020, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) modified its regulations governing the maximum hours that commercial motor vehicle operators may drive or operate within a certain timeframe. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a labor union representing commercial truck drivers, and three national nonprofit organizations petitioned for review. They argued that the Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious for failing to grapple with the safety and driver health consequences of changes to record-keeping rules for short-haul commercial vehicle drivers and break requirements for long-haul drivers.
The DC Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the modifications to the hours-of-service rules were sufficiently explained and grounded in the administrative record. The court explained that the Administration not only directly tackled the issue of driver health but also reasonably explained why the health benefits estimated in the 2011 Rule would continue under the modified 30-minute break rule. That met the APA’s requirements.
The DC Circuit denied The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a labor union representing commercial truck drivers, and three national nonprofit organizations' petition for review of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration regulations governing the maximum hours that commercial motor vehicle operators may drive or operate within a certain timeframe.
2022-07-26federalUS Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitMILLETT20-1370https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-40445/21-40445-2022-07-22.htmlUnion Pac. RR v. City of Palestine2022-07-22T09:31:24-08:002022-07-22T09:31:24-08:00
Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”) sought to end its operations in Palestine, Texas but has been unable to do so because of a 1954 Agreement between its predecessor and Defendants City of Palestine (“Palestine”) and Anderson County, Texas (“Anderson County”) has prevented it from leaving.
Union Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted, holding that the 1954 Agreement was expressly and impliedly preempted. After the district court entered judgment, Palestine and Anderson County filed suit in Texas state court seeking to enforce the 1955 Judgment which had approved the 1954 Agreement.
Defendants appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Union Pacific and the denials of their motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party, motion for judgment on the pleadings, and cross-motion for summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment for Union Pacific after determining that federal law preempts the statutorily mandated contractual agreements between the parties, both expressly and as applied. The court explained that there is no requirement for contemporaneous movement of property related to the rails for the regulation to be preempted. If the facilities or services—in any non-incidental way—relate to the movement of property by rail, they are preempted by the ICCTA. Further, the court held that the district court properly determined that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar Union Pacific from seeking declaratory relief. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-40445/21-40445-2022-07-22.html" target="_blank">View "Union Pac. RR v. City of Palestine" on Justia Law</a>
Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”) sought to end its operations in Palestine, Texas but has been unable to do so because of a 1954 Agreement between its predecessor and Defendants City of Palestine (“Palestine”) and Anderson County, Texas (“Anderson County”) has prevented it from leaving.
Union Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted, holding that the 1954 Agreement was expressly and impliedly preempted. After the district court entered judgment, Palestine and Anderson County filed suit in Texas state court seeking to enforce the 1955 Judgment which had approved the 1954 Agreement.
Defendants appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Union Pacific and the denials of their motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party, motion for judgment on the pleadings, and cross-motion for summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment for Union Pacific after determining that federal law preempts the statutorily mandated contractual agreements between the parties, both expressly and as applied. The court explained that there is no requirement for contemporaneous movement of property related to the rails for the regulation to be preempted. If the facilities or services—in any non-incidental way—relate to the movement of property by rail, they are preempted by the ICCTA. Further, the court held that the district court properly determined that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar Union Pacific from seeking declaratory relief.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment for Union Pacific after determining that federal law preempts the statutorily mandated contractual agreements between the parties, both expressly and as applied.
2022-07-22federalUS Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitJames Earl Graves, Jr.21-40445https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2022/b308354.htmlEvenskaas v. California Transit, Inc.2022-07-15T11:31:02-08:002022-07-15T11:31:02-08:00
Plaintiff worked as a driver for California Transit. After California Transit terminated his employment, Evenskaas filed this wage and hour class action against California Transit; its owner, and the company that administered California Transit’s payroll, Personnel Staffing Group, LLC (collectively, the California Transit defendants).
Because Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement, in which he agreed to arbitrate all claims arising from his employment and waived his right to seek class-wide relief, the California Transit defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. The California Transit defendants appealed, contending the FAA applies to the arbitration agreement.
The Second Appellate District reversed the order denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is reversed. The court directed the trial court to enter a new order granting the motion and dismissing Plaintiff’s class claims. The court explained that because the paratransit services California Transit hired Plaintiff to provide involve interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA, the FAA applies to the arbitration agreement and preempts the Gentry rule that certain class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are unenforceable. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2022/b308354.html" target="_blank">View "Evenskaas v. California Transit, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
Plaintiff worked as a driver for California Transit. After California Transit terminated his employment, Evenskaas filed this wage and hour class action against California Transit; its owner, and the company that administered California Transit’s payroll, Personnel Staffing Group, LLC (collectively, the California Transit defendants).
Because Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement, in which he agreed to arbitrate all claims arising from his employment and waived his right to seek class-wide relief, the California Transit defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. The California Transit defendants appealed, contending the FAA applies to the arbitration agreement.
The Second Appellate District reversed the order denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is reversed. The court directed the trial court to enter a new order granting the motion and dismissing Plaintiff’s class claims. The court explained that because the paratransit services California Transit hired Plaintiff to provide involve interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA, the FAA applies to the arbitration agreement and preempts the Gentry rule that certain class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are unenforceable.
The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order denying California Transit Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the FAA applies to the arbitration agreement and preempts the Gentry rule that certain class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are unenforceable.
2022-07-15stateCaliforniaCalifornia Courts of AppealSEGALB308354https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1049/21-1049-2022-07-15.htmlTransportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers v. FRA2022-07-15T07:31:38-08:002022-07-15T07:31:38-08:00
The Federal Railroad Administration (“Administration”) issued a broad-ranging rule revising the regulations governing freight railroad safety (“Final Rule”). Two unions representing employees of freight railroads—the Transportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (together, “Unions”)—petitioned for review. The Unions principally argue that the Administration fell short in numerous respects in its statutory obligation to prioritize safety in regulatory decision-making. They also contend that the Administration impermissibly denied them an opportunity to seek reconsideration, and that the Final Rule was untimely issued.
The DC Circuit agreed with Unions that the portion of the Final Rule lifting calibration requirements for certain telemetry devices did not grapple with the Administration’s safety obligation. But the court found that all Petitioner’s other challenges fail either on the merits or for lack of jurisdiction. As a result, the court granted the petition in part, denied the petition in part, dismissed the petition in part, and remanded part of the Final Rule.
The court stated that it agrees that the Administration acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address the safety consequences of its decision for end-of-train devices that lack self-calibration technology. The court explained that nothing in the Administration’s explanation amounts to an “express and considered conclusion” regarding this safety issue, let alone a reasonable one. And the Administration offered no other explanation for how jettisoning a safety rule in favor of manufacturers’ self-regulation promotes safe rail operations. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1049/21-1049-2022-07-15.html" target="_blank">View "Transportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers v. FRA" on Justia Law</a>
The Federal Railroad Administration (“Administration”) issued a broad-ranging rule revising the regulations governing freight railroad safety (“Final Rule”). Two unions representing employees of freight railroads—the Transportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (together, “Unions”)—petitioned for review. The Unions principally argue that the Administration fell short in numerous respects in its statutory obligation to prioritize safety in regulatory decision-making. They also contend that the Administration impermissibly denied them an opportunity to seek reconsideration, and that the Final Rule was untimely issued.
The DC Circuit agreed with Unions that the portion of the Final Rule lifting calibration requirements for certain telemetry devices did not grapple with the Administration’s safety obligation. But the court found that all Petitioner’s other challenges fail either on the merits or for lack of jurisdiction. As a result, the court granted the petition in part, denied the petition in part, dismissed the petition in part, and remanded part of the Final Rule.
The court stated that it agrees that the Administration acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address the safety consequences of its decision for end-of-train devices that lack self-calibration technology. The court explained that nothing in the Administration’s explanation amounts to an “express and considered conclusion” regarding this safety issue, let alone a reasonable one. And the Administration offered no other explanation for how jettisoning a safety rule in favor of manufacturers’ self-regulation promotes safe rail operations.
The DC Circuit granted in part and denied in part, Petitioner’s petition for review of the Federal Railroad Administration broad-ranging rule revising the regulations governing freight railroad safety.
2022-07-15federalUS Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitMILLETT21-1049https://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2022/38-21.htmlAnne Arundel County v. 808 Bestgate Realty, LLC2022-07-07T12:03:41-08:002022-07-07T12:03:41-08:00
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of special appeals denying a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's judgment reversing the decision of the County Board of Appeals of Anne Arundel County denying 808 Bestgate Realty, LLC's request for transportation impact fee credits, holding that remand was required.
The transportation impact fee credits Bestgate sought was in connection with road improvements it made to a county road as part of a redevelopment project. The County's engineer administrator determined that the improvements provided transportation capacity that met the requirements of the County's standards applicable to roads, but the Board denied Bestgate's request for transportation impact fee credits. The circuit court reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) under the plain language of Md. Code Ann. 17-11-207(c), Bestgate was entitled to receive the requested transportation impact fee credits; and (2) the Board erred in its interpretation of the Code. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2022/38-21.html" target="_blank">View "Anne Arundel County v. 808 Bestgate Realty, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of special appeals denying a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's judgment reversing the decision of the County Board of Appeals of Anne Arundel County denying 808 Bestgate Realty, LLC's request for transportation impact fee credits, holding that remand was required.
The transportation impact fee credits Bestgate sought was in connection with road improvements it made to a county road as part of a redevelopment project. The County's engineer administrator determined that the improvements provided transportation capacity that met the requirements of the County's standards applicable to roads, but the Board denied Bestgate's request for transportation impact fee credits. The circuit court reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) under the plain language of Md. Code Ann. 17-11-207(c), Bestgate was entitled to receive the requested transportation impact fee credits; and (2) the Board erred in its interpretation of the Code.
The Court of Appeals reversed in part the court of special appeals' decision denying a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's judgment reversing the County Board of Appeals of Anne Arundel County's decision denying a request for transportation impact fee credits, holding that remand was required.
2022-07-07stateMarylandMaryland Supreme CourtBooth38/21