Supreme Court of Ohio - Justia Case Law Summarieshttps://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/ohio-supreme-court-of-ohio/2024-03-28T13:28:38-08:00Justia Inchttps://www.justia.com/Justia Lawhttps://justatic.com/v/20240327151121/shared/images/social-media/law.pngCopyright 2024 Justia Inchttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-1049.htmlState v. Jones2024-03-27T05:26:30-08:002024-03-27T05:26:30-08:00
The case involves James W. Jones, who was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 60 months for offenses under three separate indictments. These convictions included trafficking marijuana, having weapons while under a disability, and operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The trial court imposed two 30-month prison sentences to be served consecutively for his convictions on trafficking marijuana and having weapons while under a disability. Jones appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the trial court had made the necessary findings for imposing consecutive prison sentences, as required by Ohio law. Specifically, the court cited Jones's extensive criminal history and evidence that he continued to commit crimes while awaiting trial or sentencing for previous crimes. The court also noted that the harm caused by Jones's crimes was so great that no single prison term adequately reflected the seriousness of his conduct. Furthermore, the court found that Jones posed a danger to the public, making consecutive sentences necessary to protect the public from future crime.
The court concluded that the trial court's findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record, in line with the review standard set by Ohio law. Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision to impose consecutive sentences. The court emphasized that the trial court was not required to state reasons to support its findings, nor was it required to recite the statutory language verbatim, provided the necessary findings could be found in the record and were incorporated into the sentencing entry. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-1049.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law</a>
The case involves James W. Jones, who was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 60 months for offenses under three separate indictments. These convictions included trafficking marijuana, having weapons while under a disability, and operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The trial court imposed two 30-month prison sentences to be served consecutively for his convictions on trafficking marijuana and having weapons while under a disability. Jones appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the trial court had made the necessary findings for imposing consecutive prison sentences, as required by Ohio law. Specifically, the court cited Jones's extensive criminal history and evidence that he continued to commit crimes while awaiting trial or sentencing for previous crimes. The court also noted that the harm caused by Jones's crimes was so great that no single prison term adequately reflected the seriousness of his conduct. Furthermore, the court found that Jones posed a danger to the public, making consecutive sentences necessary to protect the public from future crime.
The court concluded that the trial court's findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record, in line with the review standard set by Ohio law. Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision to impose consecutive sentences. The court emphasized that the trial court was not required to state reasons to support its findings, nor was it required to recite the statutory language verbatim, provided the necessary findings could be found in the record and were incorporated into the sentencing entry.
2024-03-27stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioBRUNNERhttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0230.htmlEstate of Tomlinson v. Mega Pool Warehouse, Inc.2024-03-26T05:26:29-08:002024-03-26T05:26:29-08:00
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed a decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeals concerning the right to a jury trial in a civil case. The case arose from a dispute between the Estate of Tomlinson and Mega Pool Warehouse, Inc., regarding the installation of a swimming pool and a deck. The plaintiff, Tomlinson, filed a lawsuit and demanded a jury trial, paying a $500 jury deposit as required by a local rule. Later, Tomlinson withdrew her request for a jury trial, but Mega Pool still wanted a jury trial.
The trial court and the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that Mega Pool had waived its right to a jury trial because it had not paid a $500 jury deposit, as required by the local rule. The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed, ruling that the local rule did not require each party seeking a jury trial to pay a separate deposit. The court also held that, under Civ.R. 38(D), a party may not unilaterally withdraw a jury demand without the consent of all the parties.
The court noted that Tomlinson's attempt to withdraw her jury demand without Mega Pool's consent violated Civ.R. 38(D). As such, the court reversed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0230.html" target="_blank">View "Estate of Tomlinson v. Mega Pool Warehouse, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed a decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeals concerning the right to a jury trial in a civil case. The case arose from a dispute between the Estate of Tomlinson and Mega Pool Warehouse, Inc., regarding the installation of a swimming pool and a deck. The plaintiff, Tomlinson, filed a lawsuit and demanded a jury trial, paying a $500 jury deposit as required by a local rule. Later, Tomlinson withdrew her request for a jury trial, but Mega Pool still wanted a jury trial.
The trial court and the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that Mega Pool had waived its right to a jury trial because it had not paid a $500 jury deposit, as required by the local rule. The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed, ruling that the local rule did not require each party seeking a jury trial to pay a separate deposit. The court also held that, under Civ.R. 38(D), a party may not unilaterally withdraw a jury demand without the consent of all the parties.
The court noted that Tomlinson's attempt to withdraw her jury demand without Mega Pool's consent violated Civ.R. 38(D). As such, the court reversed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.
2024-03-26stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioDetershttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0356.htmlState v. Fork2024-03-21T05:30:43-08:002024-03-21T05:30:43-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio was called upon to interpret the definition of "motor vehicle" as it applied to the crime of aggravated vehicular assault. The defendant, Joshua Fork, was charged with multiple counts, including aggravated vehicular assault, after driving a Polaris under the influence of alcohol and injuring his passengers. At issue was whether the Polaris should be classified as a "motor vehicle" or a "utility vehicle."
The Court ruled that the definition of "motor vehicle" in R.C. 4501.01(B), which applies to penal laws, should be used in the context of aggravated vehicular assault. It also held that the Polaris should be classified as a "utility vehicle," as defined by R.C. 4501.01(VV), based on its principal purpose, not its use at the time of the incident.
The Court reasoned that the principal purpose of the Polaris, as shown by evidence and testimony, was for farm-related activities, such as hauling rocks and bags of seed, removing limbs, pulling a sprayer, and trimming trees. The Polaris's ancillary use for recreation did not affect its principal purpose.
The Court concluded that, since the Polaris fit the definition of a "utility vehicle" under R.C. 4501.01(VV), the evidence admitted at trial was legally insufficient to support Fork’s convictions for aggravated vehicular assault. Consequently, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, which had reversed the trial court's judgment and vacated Fork’s convictions for aggravated vehicular assault. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0356.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Fork" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio was called upon to interpret the definition of "motor vehicle" as it applied to the crime of aggravated vehicular assault. The defendant, Joshua Fork, was charged with multiple counts, including aggravated vehicular assault, after driving a Polaris under the influence of alcohol and injuring his passengers. At issue was whether the Polaris should be classified as a "motor vehicle" or a "utility vehicle."
The Court ruled that the definition of "motor vehicle" in R.C. 4501.01(B), which applies to penal laws, should be used in the context of aggravated vehicular assault. It also held that the Polaris should be classified as a "utility vehicle," as defined by R.C. 4501.01(VV), based on its principal purpose, not its use at the time of the incident.
The Court reasoned that the principal purpose of the Polaris, as shown by evidence and testimony, was for farm-related activities, such as hauling rocks and bags of seed, removing limbs, pulling a sprayer, and trimming trees. The Polaris's ancillary use for recreation did not affect its principal purpose.
The Court concluded that, since the Polaris fit the definition of a "utility vehicle" under R.C. 4501.01(VV), the evidence admitted at trial was legally insufficient to support Fork’s convictions for aggravated vehicular assault. Consequently, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, which had reversed the trial court's judgment and vacated Fork’s convictions for aggravated vehicular assault.
2024-03-21stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioKennedyhttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0090.htmlState ex rel. Ware v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.2024-03-21T05:30:42-08:002024-03-21T05:30:42-08:00
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the relator, Kimani Ware, an inmate, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), Trumbull Correctional Institution (“TCI”), and several of its employees, to respond to six of his public-records requests, and to award him statutory damages and court costs.
Concerning each of the six requests, the respondents argued that they were not required to provide the requested records because Ware did not identify them as formal public-records requests. The court disagreed, stating that the Public Records Act does not require a requester to formally label a request as a “formal public records request”.
Regarding the May 29, 2021 and October 6, 2021 requests, the court denied Ware's writ and the request for statutory damages, as the respondents had provided evidence that they provided the requested records. However, for the June 3, 2022 and June 19, 2022 requests, the court granted the writ and awarded Ware $1,000 in statutory damages for each request, as the respondents did not provide the requested documents.
As for the June 5, 2022 and July 23, 2022 requests, the writ and the request for statutory damages were denied since Ware did not submit these two requests to the proper records custodians.
Lastly, the court denied respondents’ motion to declare Ware a vexatious litigator, stating that respondents had not shown that Ware has “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause engage[d] in frivolous conduct". <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0090.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Ware v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law</a>
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the relator, Kimani Ware, an inmate, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), Trumbull Correctional Institution (“TCI”), and several of its employees, to respond to six of his public-records requests, and to award him statutory damages and court costs.
Concerning each of the six requests, the respondents argued that they were not required to provide the requested records because Ware did not identify them as formal public-records requests. The court disagreed, stating that the Public Records Act does not require a requester to formally label a request as a “formal public records request”.
Regarding the May 29, 2021 and October 6, 2021 requests, the court denied Ware's writ and the request for statutory damages, as the respondents had provided evidence that they provided the requested records. However, for the June 3, 2022 and June 19, 2022 requests, the court granted the writ and awarded Ware $1,000 in statutory damages for each request, as the respondents did not provide the requested documents.
As for the June 5, 2022 and July 23, 2022 requests, the writ and the request for statutory damages were denied since Ware did not submit these two requests to the proper records custodians.
Lastly, the court denied respondents’ motion to declare Ware a vexatious litigator, stating that respondents had not shown that Ware has “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause engage[d] in frivolous conduct".
2024-03-21stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2019-1323.htmlState v. Knuff2024-03-14T05:27:33-08:002024-03-14T05:27:33-08:00
Thomas E. Knuff Jr. was convicted on two counts of aggravated murder with death specifications for killing John Mann and Regina Capobianco. Knuff was released from prison and arranged to stay with Mann. After his release, he began staying at a motel, paid for by a former prison employee, Alicia Stoner, with whom he had a relationship while incarcerated. When his parole officer discovered he was not living at the motel as he claimed, he moved in with Mann. Mann was not living alone; Regina Capobianco also lived there. Knuff and Capobianco had a complicated relationship, and conflict arose between them, which led to the murders.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed Knuff's convictions and the imposition of the death sentences, finding that none of the 24 arguments that he presented justified a reversal. Among other things, the court found that the trial court did not err in denying Knuff’s motion for self-representation, which was made just eight days before jury selection began. The court also rejected Knuff’s claim that the trial court improperly restricted his counsel’s voir dire questioning, thereby denying him a meaningful, constitutionally adequate voir dire. The court additionally found that the trial court did not err in overruling Knuff’s challenges for cause of various jurors, or in granting the prosecution's for-cause challenges.
The court also found that the trial court's error in giving the jury a duty-to-retreat instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected Knuff’s claim that the jury’s finding of guilt for the aggravated-murder counts, felony-murder specifications, and underlying felony offenses was based on insufficient evidence and that his convictions for those offenses were against the manifest weight of the evidence. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2019-1323.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Knuff" on Justia Law</a>
Thomas E. Knuff Jr. was convicted on two counts of aggravated murder with death specifications for killing John Mann and Regina Capobianco. Knuff was released from prison and arranged to stay with Mann. After his release, he began staying at a motel, paid for by a former prison employee, Alicia Stoner, with whom he had a relationship while incarcerated. When his parole officer discovered he was not living at the motel as he claimed, he moved in with Mann. Mann was not living alone; Regina Capobianco also lived there. Knuff and Capobianco had a complicated relationship, and conflict arose between them, which led to the murders.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed Knuff's convictions and the imposition of the death sentences, finding that none of the 24 arguments that he presented justified a reversal. Among other things, the court found that the trial court did not err in denying Knuff’s motion for self-representation, which was made just eight days before jury selection began. The court also rejected Knuff’s claim that the trial court improperly restricted his counsel’s voir dire questioning, thereby denying him a meaningful, constitutionally adequate voir dire. The court additionally found that the trial court did not err in overruling Knuff’s challenges for cause of various jurors, or in granting the prosecution's for-cause challenges.
The court also found that the trial court's error in giving the jury a duty-to-retreat instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected Knuff’s claim that the jury’s finding of guilt for the aggravated-murder counts, felony-murder specifications, and underlying felony offenses was based on insufficient evidence and that his convictions for those offenses were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
2024-03-14stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioDetershttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0762.htmlPlaza v. Black2024-03-12T05:03:47-08:002024-03-12T05:03:47-08:00
In this case, Robert Plaza, a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence, appealed the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Ninth District Court of Appeals. Plaza's petition related to the Adult Parole Authority's decision to revoke his parole. He argued that he was denied a preliminary hearing to determine if there was probable cause to believe he had violated parole conditions, that he was denied due process of law, and that he should be immediately released.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition based on territorial jurisdiction, as Plaza had been moved to a different correctional institution outside of its jurisdiction during the proceedings. However, Plaza argued that he had been transferred back to the original jurisdiction before the dismissal of his petition, and therefore, the Court of Appeals had erred.
The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with Plaza that the dismissal based on territorial jurisdiction was incorrect. However, the court found that Plaza's allegations did not state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. The court noted that habeas corpus is a remedy for a due-process violation only in extreme circumstances involving unreasonable delay, which was not alleged by Plaza. The court stated that the usual remedy for such a violation is a writ of mandamus compelling a second hearing, not a release from custody. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of Plaza's petition on alternative grounds. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0762.html" target="_blank">View "Plaza v. Black" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, Robert Plaza, a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence, appealed the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Ninth District Court of Appeals. Plaza's petition related to the Adult Parole Authority's decision to revoke his parole. He argued that he was denied a preliminary hearing to determine if there was probable cause to believe he had violated parole conditions, that he was denied due process of law, and that he should be immediately released.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition based on territorial jurisdiction, as Plaza had been moved to a different correctional institution outside of its jurisdiction during the proceedings. However, Plaza argued that he had been transferred back to the original jurisdiction before the dismissal of his petition, and therefore, the Court of Appeals had erred.
The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with Plaza that the dismissal based on territorial jurisdiction was incorrect. However, the court found that Plaza's allegations did not state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. The court noted that habeas corpus is a remedy for a due-process violation only in extreme circumstances involving unreasonable delay, which was not alleged by Plaza. The court stated that the usual remedy for such a violation is a writ of mandamus compelling a second hearing, not a release from custody. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of Plaza's petition on alternative grounds.
2024-03-12stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-1482.htmlState v. Wilson2024-03-07T06:05:44-08:002024-03-07T06:05:44-08:00
This case originates from the Supreme Court of Ohio and concerns a defendant, Tyler Wilson, who was charged with attempted murder and felonious assault. The charges stemmed from an altercation at a gas station where Wilson fired a gun out his car window to scare off the other party involved in the dispute. Wilson claimed he acted in self-defense, but the trial court determined that he was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction because he did not intend to harm or kill the other party. Wilson was found guilty of felonious assault, but not attempted murder.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court’s decision, ruling that an individual does not need to intend to harm or kill another person to be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction in a criminal trial. The court found that Wilson’s testimony supported the intent element for self-defense and that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a self-defense jury instruction. As such, the court vacated Wilson’s conviction and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-1482.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law</a>
This case originates from the Supreme Court of Ohio and concerns a defendant, Tyler Wilson, who was charged with attempted murder and felonious assault. The charges stemmed from an altercation at a gas station where Wilson fired a gun out his car window to scare off the other party involved in the dispute. Wilson claimed he acted in self-defense, but the trial court determined that he was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction because he did not intend to harm or kill the other party. Wilson was found guilty of felonious assault, but not attempted murder.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court’s decision, ruling that an individual does not need to intend to harm or kill another person to be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction in a criminal trial. The court found that Wilson’s testimony supported the intent element for self-defense and that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a self-defense jury instruction. As such, the court vacated Wilson’s conviction and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.
2024-03-07stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioSTEWARThttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0393.htmlState v. Dudas2024-03-07T06:05:43-08:002024-03-07T06:05:43-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the issue of the filing deadline for a petition for postconviction relief following a delayed appeal. The defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes, did not file a direct appeal within the required 30 days but later filed a motion for a delayed appeal, which was granted. He filed a petition for postconviction relief within 365 days of the trial transcript being filed in the court of appeals.
The court of appeals had affirmed the trial court's judgment, asserting that the defendant's petition was untimely. They argued that in the case of a delayed appeal, the applicable deadline was not the direct-appeal deadline of 365 days from the date of the filing of the trial transcript but rather the no-appeal-taken deadline of 365 days from the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal.
The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed, holding that under Ohio law, a delayed appeal of a conviction is a direct appeal, and the same postconviction-relief deadline applies for a delayed appeal as applies to any other type of direct appeal. The court found that the defendant had timely filed his postconviction petition within 365 days after the transcript was filed in the court of appeals in his delayed appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and remanded the matter to that court for further consideration. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0393.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Dudas" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the issue of the filing deadline for a petition for postconviction relief following a delayed appeal. The defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes, did not file a direct appeal within the required 30 days but later filed a motion for a delayed appeal, which was granted. He filed a petition for postconviction relief within 365 days of the trial transcript being filed in the court of appeals.
The court of appeals had affirmed the trial court's judgment, asserting that the defendant's petition was untimely. They argued that in the case of a delayed appeal, the applicable deadline was not the direct-appeal deadline of 365 days from the date of the filing of the trial transcript but rather the no-appeal-taken deadline of 365 days from the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal.
The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed, holding that under Ohio law, a delayed appeal of a conviction is a direct appeal, and the same postconviction-relief deadline applies for a delayed appeal as applies to any other type of direct appeal. The court found that the defendant had timely filed his postconviction petition within 365 days after the transcript was filed in the court of appeals in his delayed appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and remanded the matter to that court for further consideration.
2024-03-07stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioDeWinehttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0387.htmlState ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.2024-03-06T06:01:29-08:002024-03-06T06:01:29-08:00
This case involves a dispute over a public records request made by the relator, Thomas Clark, an inmate at Lebanon Correctional Institution. Clark sent a request to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) for an up-to-date paper copy of the commissary price list for each commissary window at the prison. After several failed attempts to obtain the information through internal procedures, and despite an assurance from an inspector that he would provide the requested lists, Clark had still not received the paper copies. He therefore filed a mandamus action to compel the ODRC to provide the records.
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus as moot because the ODRC had already provided Clark with the records he requested. However, the court found that the ODRC had failed to comply with its obligations under Ohio's Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, for 11 business days starting from the day Clark filed the mandamus action. Accordingly, the court awarded Clark $1,000 in statutory damages, the maximum amount allowed under the statute. The court declined to award court costs, finding no evidence of bad faith on the part of the ODRC. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0387.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law</a>
This case involves a dispute over a public records request made by the relator, Thomas Clark, an inmate at Lebanon Correctional Institution. Clark sent a request to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) for an up-to-date paper copy of the commissary price list for each commissary window at the prison. After several failed attempts to obtain the information through internal procedures, and despite an assurance from an inspector that he would provide the requested lists, Clark had still not received the paper copies. He therefore filed a mandamus action to compel the ODRC to provide the records.
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus as moot because the ODRC had already provided Clark with the records he requested. However, the court found that the ODRC had failed to comply with its obligations under Ohio's Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, for 11 business days starting from the day Clark filed the mandamus action. Accordingly, the court awarded Clark $1,000 in statutory damages, the maximum amount allowed under the statute. The court declined to award court costs, finding no evidence of bad faith on the part of the ODRC.
2024-03-06stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0009.htmlSmith v. Ohio State Univ.2024-03-06T06:01:28-08:002024-03-06T06:01:28-08:00
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Ohio State University suspended in-person instruction, transitioned to virtual learning, restricted campus access, and provided limited refunds to students. Brooke Smith, a student at the university, filed a class-action lawsuit against the university, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Smith argued that students had lost the benefits of their education without sufficient refunds.
The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether discretionary immunity, which shields the state from lawsuits for certain highly discretionary decisions, was a jurisdictional bar or an affirmative defense to suits brought against the state. The court held that discretionary immunity was indeed a jurisdictional bar, not an affirmative defense. This means that when the state makes highly discretionary decisions, such as its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction as the state has not waived its sovereign immunity for those decisions.
However, the court noted that discretionary immunity is not absolute and does not extend to the negligent actions of the state's employees and agents in the performance of these activities. The court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which had found that discretionary immunity was an affirmative defense, and remanded the case back to that court to determine whether Ohio State University was protected by discretionary immunity in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0009.html" target="_blank">View "Smith v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law</a>
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Ohio State University suspended in-person instruction, transitioned to virtual learning, restricted campus access, and provided limited refunds to students. Brooke Smith, a student at the university, filed a class-action lawsuit against the university, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Smith argued that students had lost the benefits of their education without sufficient refunds.
The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether discretionary immunity, which shields the state from lawsuits for certain highly discretionary decisions, was a jurisdictional bar or an affirmative defense to suits brought against the state. The court held that discretionary immunity was indeed a jurisdictional bar, not an affirmative defense. This means that when the state makes highly discretionary decisions, such as its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction as the state has not waived its sovereign immunity for those decisions.
However, the court noted that discretionary immunity is not absolute and does not extend to the negligent actions of the state's employees and agents in the performance of these activities. The court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which had found that discretionary immunity was an affirmative defense, and remanded the case back to that court to determine whether Ohio State University was protected by discretionary immunity in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
2024-03-06stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioKENNEDYhttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-1182.htmlState v. Brown2024-03-05T06:25:56-08:002024-03-05T06:25:56-08:00
In a case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the defendant was accused of setting up a fake car sale, during which he threatened two women with a gun and stole money. The defendant was convicted of robbing both women and illegally possessing a firearm. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals overturned these convictions, arguing that the defendant could not be convicted of robbing the woman who was not directly holding the money. Furthermore, the court held that the defendant's rights were violated when the state used information at trial that was not previously disclosed to the defense.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court's decision. Firstly, the court clarified that under the state's robbery statute, a person can be convicted of robbery if they commit a theft offense and threaten physical harm to another person, even if the person threatened is not the same as the theft victim. As such, both women were properly considered as victims of robbery. Secondly, the court determined that the defendant had forfeited his claim to a violation of his rights, as he failed to raise the issue of undisclosed evidence at the trial level.
The case was remanded back to the First District Court of Appeals to consider the defendant's remaining assignments of error.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-1182.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law</a>
In a case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the defendant was accused of setting up a fake car sale, during which he threatened two women with a gun and stole money. The defendant was convicted of robbing both women and illegally possessing a firearm. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals overturned these convictions, arguing that the defendant could not be convicted of robbing the woman who was not directly holding the money. Furthermore, the court held that the defendant's rights were violated when the state used information at trial that was not previously disclosed to the defense.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court's decision. Firstly, the court clarified that under the state's robbery statute, a person can be convicted of robbery if they commit a theft offense and threaten physical harm to another person, even if the person threatened is not the same as the theft victim. As such, both women were properly considered as victims of robbery. Secondly, the court determined that the defendant had forfeited his claim to a violation of his rights, as he failed to raise the issue of undisclosed evidence at the trial level.
The case was remanded back to the First District Court of Appeals to consider the defendant's remaining assignments of error.
2024-03-05stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioDeWinehttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0152.htmlState ex rel. Dillon v. Indus. Comm.2024-03-05T06:25:55-08:002024-03-05T06:25:55-08:00
The case revolves around a worker's compensation claim by appellant, Loretta Dillon, against the Industrial Commission of Ohio and others. Dillon had received temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation for a work-related back injury, which was subsequently reversed on appeal after it was determined that she had reached maximum medical improvement and was no longer temporarily disabled. As a result, R.C. 4123.511(K) required the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to recoup the overpayment of compensation that Dillon had received after she had reached maximum medical improvement.
Dillon appealed this determination to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate the order that declared an overpayment of TTD compensation and to issue a new order dissolving the overpayment. The court of appeals denied the writ, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed this decision.
The Supreme Court held that the plain language of R.C. 4123.511(K) required the bureau to recoup the overpayment of TTD compensation payments that Dillon received after she reached maximum medical improvement from any future benefits she might receive. It further overruled a previous case, State ex rel. Russell v. Indus. Comm, which Dillon relied on for her argument that recoupment was not warranted, stating that the reasoning in that case ran counter to the plain language of R.C. 4123.511(K) and R.C. 4123.56(A). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0152.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Dillon v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law</a>
The case revolves around a worker's compensation claim by appellant, Loretta Dillon, against the Industrial Commission of Ohio and others. Dillon had received temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation for a work-related back injury, which was subsequently reversed on appeal after it was determined that she had reached maximum medical improvement and was no longer temporarily disabled. As a result, R.C. 4123.511(K) required the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to recoup the overpayment of compensation that Dillon had received after she had reached maximum medical improvement.
Dillon appealed this determination to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate the order that declared an overpayment of TTD compensation and to issue a new order dissolving the overpayment. The court of appeals denied the writ, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed this decision.
The Supreme Court held that the plain language of R.C. 4123.511(K) required the bureau to recoup the overpayment of TTD compensation payments that Dillon received after she reached maximum medical improvement from any future benefits she might receive. It further overruled a previous case, State ex rel. Russell v. Indus. Comm, which Dillon relied on for her argument that recoupment was not warranted, stating that the reasoning in that case ran counter to the plain language of R.C. 4123.511(K) and R.C. 4123.56(A).
2024-03-05stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioKennedyhttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0176.htmlState ex rel. Ware v. Galonski2024-02-22T06:26:35-08:002024-02-22T06:26:35-08:00
The case in discussion was brought before the Supreme Court of Ohio and involved an inmate, Kimani E. Ware, who filed an original action in mandamus under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. Ware sought to compel the Summit County Clerk of Courts, Tavia Galonski, to provide documents in response to a public-records request and sought an award of statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Ware alleged that he sent the request by certified mail in May 2022 and that the clerk’s office received the request in June 2022. The clerk asserted that her office did not receive Ware’s public-records request and that her office sent the requested records to Ware only after he filed his complaint in February 2023.
The court denied Ware's motions, denied the mandamus claim as moot, and denied the request for statutory damages. The court found that Ware's mandamus claim was moot as the requested records had been provided. The court also found that Ware had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he delivered his public-records request to the clerk by certified mail and that the clerk failed to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B). Therefore, Ware was not entitled to statutory damages. Further, the court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the clerk.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0176.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Ware v. Galonski" on Justia Law</a>
The case in discussion was brought before the Supreme Court of Ohio and involved an inmate, Kimani E. Ware, who filed an original action in mandamus under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. Ware sought to compel the Summit County Clerk of Courts, Tavia Galonski, to provide documents in response to a public-records request and sought an award of statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Ware alleged that he sent the request by certified mail in May 2022 and that the clerk’s office received the request in June 2022. The clerk asserted that her office did not receive Ware’s public-records request and that her office sent the requested records to Ware only after he filed his complaint in February 2023.
The court denied Ware's motions, denied the mandamus claim as moot, and denied the request for statutory damages. The court found that Ware's mandamus claim was moot as the requested records had been provided. The court also found that Ware had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he delivered his public-records request to the clerk by certified mail and that the clerk failed to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B). Therefore, Ware was not entitled to statutory damages. Further, the court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the clerk.
2024-02-22stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0138.htmlState ex rel. Ware v. Beggs2024-02-22T06:26:34-08:002024-02-22T06:26:34-08:00
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied a writ of mandamus brought by Kimani E. Ware, an inmate at the Trumbull Correctional Institution (TCI), against Lori Beggs, the manager of TCI's cashier’s office, and TCI itself. Ware had requested certain public records related to his personal account at TCI, and claimed that he had not received the requested documents. Beggs, however, provided evidence that she had printed and mailed the requested records. The court found that Ware did not provide clear and convincing evidence that Beggs failed to send the requested records, and concluded that the mandamus claim was moot because Beggs had fulfilled her duty by mailing the records. The court also denied Ware's request for statutory damages because he did not meet the necessary burden of proof to demonstrate that Beggs failed to comply with her obligations under the Public Records Act at the time he filed the action. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0138.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Ware v. Beggs" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied a writ of mandamus brought by Kimani E. Ware, an inmate at the Trumbull Correctional Institution (TCI), against Lori Beggs, the manager of TCI's cashier’s office, and TCI itself. Ware had requested certain public records related to his personal account at TCI, and claimed that he had not received the requested documents. Beggs, however, provided evidence that she had printed and mailed the requested records. The court found that Ware did not provide clear and convincing evidence that Beggs failed to send the requested records, and concluded that the mandamus claim was moot because Beggs had fulfilled her duty by mailing the records. The court also denied Ware's request for statutory damages because he did not meet the necessary burden of proof to demonstrate that Beggs failed to comply with her obligations under the Public Records Act at the time he filed the action.
2024-02-22stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2019-1787.htmlState v. Nicholson2024-02-22T06:26:33-08:002024-02-22T06:26:33-08:00
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the defendant's convictions and death sentences for the aggravated murders of two individuals. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, that the state adequately proved that he was not acting in self-defense, and that his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It further found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior threats and physical violence.
The Court also rejected the defendant's arguments related to the loss of certain photographic evidence that he claimed would have been exculpatory, as well as the introduction of gruesome videos and photographs. Furthermore, it found that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, that the jury instruction on self-defense was adequate, and that certain challenged testimony was not improper victim impact evidence. The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that the voir dire procedure was constitutionally inadequate.
In addition, the Court found that the trial court did not plainly err in allowing testimony from witnesses who were allegedly not timely disclosed to the defense and that it did not abuse its discretion in readmitting culpability phase evidence during the mitigation phase of the trial. It also rejected the defendant's arguments that the jury and the trial court improperly weighed aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors, and that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors that the defendant raised during both phases of the trial. The Court further rejected various Eighth Amendment challenges, constitutional challenges to the Ohio death penalty statutes, and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court also found that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's requested jury instruction that mercy should be considered a mitigating factor.
Finally, the Court undertook an independent sentence evaluation. It ultimately concluded that the death sentences were appropriate and proportionate. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2019-1787.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Nicholson" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the defendant's convictions and death sentences for the aggravated murders of two individuals. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, that the state adequately proved that he was not acting in self-defense, and that his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It further found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior threats and physical violence.
The Court also rejected the defendant's arguments related to the loss of certain photographic evidence that he claimed would have been exculpatory, as well as the introduction of gruesome videos and photographs. Furthermore, it found that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, that the jury instruction on self-defense was adequate, and that certain challenged testimony was not improper victim impact evidence. The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that the voir dire procedure was constitutionally inadequate.
In addition, the Court found that the trial court did not plainly err in allowing testimony from witnesses who were allegedly not timely disclosed to the defense and that it did not abuse its discretion in readmitting culpability phase evidence during the mitigation phase of the trial. It also rejected the defendant's arguments that the jury and the trial court improperly weighed aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors, and that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors that the defendant raised during both phases of the trial. The Court further rejected various Eighth Amendment challenges, constitutional challenges to the Ohio death penalty statutes, and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court also found that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's requested jury instruction that mercy should be considered a mitigating factor.
Finally, the Court undertook an independent sentence evaluation. It ultimately concluded that the death sentences were appropriate and proportionate.
2024-02-22stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioFischerhttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2024-0155.htmlState ex rel. Peterson v. Licking County Board of Elections2024-02-21T10:41:13-08:002024-02-21T10:41:13-08:00
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied a request from Jeryne Peterson, the mayor of Buckeye Lake, for writs of prohibition and mandamus against the Licking County Board of Elections and its members, the Fairfield County Board of Elections and its members, and the village of Buckeye Lake and its council president, Linda Goodman. Peterson was seeking to prevent a scheduled recall election from taking place.
The court found that Peterson failed to show that she was entitled to a writ of prohibition preventing the village from setting the recall-election date or preventing the respondent boards of elections from conducting that election. She also failed to show that she was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the respondent boards of elections to remove the recall election from the ballot. The court also denied Peterson’s motion to disqualify the village’s attorney. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2024-0155.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Peterson v. Licking County Board of Elections" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied a request from Jeryne Peterson, the mayor of Buckeye Lake, for writs of prohibition and mandamus against the Licking County Board of Elections and its members, the Fairfield County Board of Elections and its members, and the village of Buckeye Lake and its council president, Linda Goodman. Peterson was seeking to prevent a scheduled recall election from taking place.
The court found that Peterson failed to show that she was entitled to a writ of prohibition preventing the village from setting the recall-election date or preventing the respondent boards of elections from conducting that election. She also failed to show that she was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the respondent boards of elections to remove the recall election from the ballot. The court also denied Peterson’s motion to disqualify the village’s attorney.
2024-02-21stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0359.htmlIn re T.D.S.2024-02-21T06:06:46-08:002024-02-21T06:06:46-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a juvenile, T.D.S., knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before providing statements to the police. The statements related to a homicide investigation involving another juvenile.
The case originated from an incident in 2019, where the Police responded to a report of shots fired in an apartment building and discovered a male juvenile, S.G., with gunshot wounds. The police investigation led them to T.D.S., who was then 15 years old. During questioning at T.D.S.'s mother’s house, T.D.S. initially denied involvement in the shooting but later admitted to accidentally shooting S.G. while playing with a gun. After these statements, T.D.S. was read his Miranda rights and questioned further. He was subsequently charged with several offenses including murder and felonious assault.
T.D.S. argued that the juvenile court should have granted a motion to suppress all the statements he made to the police officers, contending that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. After considering the totality of the circumstances, including T.D.S.'s age, prior criminal experience, and the nature of the police interrogation, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower courts' decisions that T.D.S. had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The court found that the police did not engage in coercion and that T.D.S.'s waiver was not involuntary.
T.D.S. also argued that his post-Miranda statements should be presumed inadmissible under the court's previous reasoning in a case called State v. Farris. However, the court found that T.D.S. had not properly raised this argument in the lower courts, so it was forfeited. Even if he had preserved the argument, the court found that the record did not support his claims under the Farris case.
Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts, finding that T.D.S.'s post-Miranda statements were properly admitted at trial. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0359.html" target="_blank">View "In re T.D.S." on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a juvenile, T.D.S., knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before providing statements to the police. The statements related to a homicide investigation involving another juvenile.
The case originated from an incident in 2019, where the Police responded to a report of shots fired in an apartment building and discovered a male juvenile, S.G., with gunshot wounds. The police investigation led them to T.D.S., who was then 15 years old. During questioning at T.D.S.'s mother’s house, T.D.S. initially denied involvement in the shooting but later admitted to accidentally shooting S.G. while playing with a gun. After these statements, T.D.S. was read his Miranda rights and questioned further. He was subsequently charged with several offenses including murder and felonious assault.
T.D.S. argued that the juvenile court should have granted a motion to suppress all the statements he made to the police officers, contending that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. After considering the totality of the circumstances, including T.D.S.'s age, prior criminal experience, and the nature of the police interrogation, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower courts' decisions that T.D.S. had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The court found that the police did not engage in coercion and that T.D.S.'s waiver was not involuntary.
T.D.S. also argued that his post-Miranda statements should be presumed inadmissible under the court's previous reasoning in a case called State v. Farris. However, the court found that T.D.S. had not properly raised this argument in the lower courts, so it was forfeited. Even if he had preserved the argument, the court found that the record did not support his claims under the Farris case.
Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts, finding that T.D.S.'s post-Miranda statements were properly admitted at trial.
2024-02-21stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioDETERShttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0987.htmlState v. Palmer2024-02-15T06:07:34-08:002024-02-15T06:07:34-08:00
In December 2019, a taxicab driver, Phillip Palmer, shot a heavily intoxicated passenger, Nicholas Young, following a dispute over cab fare. The incident escalated into a physical altercation at a gas station, where Young shoved Palmer twice, causing him to fear for his life. Palmer, who had begun carrying a gun in his cab after hearing about a driver who had been shot by a passenger, fired two shots at Young, hitting him in the neck. Young survived his injuries. At trial, Palmer admitted to the shooting but claimed self-defense. The trial court denied Palmer's request for a self-defense jury instruction, finding Palmer's statements about his means of escape not credible and determining that a reasonable person would not have believed they were in danger of being killed by Young under the circumstances. Palmer was acquitted of attempted murder but found guilty of felonious assault and a firearm specification.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the trial court had improperly weighed the evidence when performing a sufficiency analysis. The court found that Palmer had presented legally sufficient evidence for each element of self-defense and was therefore entitled to a self-defense jury instruction. The evidence presented, if believed, could convince a trier of fact that Palmer was acting in self-defense. Therefore, the case was remanded for a new trial on the felonious-assault charge and accompanying firearm specification. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0987.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Palmer" on Justia Law</a>
In December 2019, a taxicab driver, Phillip Palmer, shot a heavily intoxicated passenger, Nicholas Young, following a dispute over cab fare. The incident escalated into a physical altercation at a gas station, where Young shoved Palmer twice, causing him to fear for his life. Palmer, who had begun carrying a gun in his cab after hearing about a driver who had been shot by a passenger, fired two shots at Young, hitting him in the neck. Young survived his injuries. At trial, Palmer admitted to the shooting but claimed self-defense. The trial court denied Palmer's request for a self-defense jury instruction, finding Palmer's statements about his means of escape not credible and determining that a reasonable person would not have believed they were in danger of being killed by Young under the circumstances. Palmer was acquitted of attempted murder but found guilty of felonious assault and a firearm specification.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the trial court had improperly weighed the evidence when performing a sufficiency analysis. The court found that Palmer had presented legally sufficient evidence for each element of self-defense and was therefore entitled to a self-defense jury instruction. The evidence presented, if believed, could convince a trier of fact that Palmer was acting in self-defense. Therefore, the case was remanded for a new trial on the felonious-assault charge and accompanying firearm specification.
2024-02-15stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioKennedyhttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-1208.htmlState ex rel. Cassens Corp. v. Indus. Comm.2024-02-14T06:07:36-08:002024-02-14T06:07:36-08:00
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision of the lower court, granting a writ of mandamus to Cassens Corp., a self-insuring employer, against the Industrial Commission of Ohio. The case involved an employee, Luis Ybarra, who was injured on the job when he was struck by a vehicle driven by a coworker who had failed to clear the snow and ice from the windshield. The Commission had found that Cassens Corp. violated a specific safety requirement (VSSR) and granted an application for an additional workers' compensation award. Cassens Corp. sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Commission to vacate its order. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Commission erred in finding that the outdoor yard where Ybarra was injured constituted a "workshop" under the applicable administrative code. Therefore, the company could not have committed a VSSR under the code. As a result, Cassens Corp. was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its decision and refund all additional compensation paid by Cassens Corp. in accordance with the Commission's order. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-1208.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Cassens Corp. v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision of the lower court, granting a writ of mandamus to Cassens Corp., a self-insuring employer, against the Industrial Commission of Ohio. The case involved an employee, Luis Ybarra, who was injured on the job when he was struck by a vehicle driven by a coworker who had failed to clear the snow and ice from the windshield. The Commission had found that Cassens Corp. violated a specific safety requirement (VSSR) and granted an application for an additional workers' compensation award. Cassens Corp. sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Commission to vacate its order. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Commission erred in finding that the outdoor yard where Ybarra was injured constituted a "workshop" under the applicable administrative code. Therefore, the company could not have committed a VSSR under the code. As a result, Cassens Corp. was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its decision and refund all additional compensation paid by Cassens Corp. in accordance with the Commission's order.
2024-02-14stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0316.htmlSchaad v. Alder2024-02-14T06:07:36-08:002024-02-14T06:07:36-08:00
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ohio General Assembly passed a temporary law (H.B. 197) stating that for a limited time, Ohio workers would be taxed by the municipality that was their “principal place of work” rather than the municipality where they actually performed their work. Josh Schaad, who primarily worked from his home in Blue Ash during the pandemic, challenged this law after his employer withheld municipal taxes from his wages and forwarded them to Cincinnati, the location of his employer's business. Schaad's principal argument was that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids an Ohio municipality from taxing a nonresident for work performed outside of that municipality. The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Schaad's argument and affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals, holding that the Due Process Clause did not prohibit the General Assembly from directing that an Ohio citizen pay taxes to the municipality where the employee’s principal place of work was located rather than to the subdivision of the state where the employee actually worked. The court also held that the General Assembly's power to pass emergency legislation did not expand its substantive constitutional powers. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0316.html" target="_blank">View "Schaad v. Alder" on Justia Law</a>
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ohio General Assembly passed a temporary law (H.B. 197) stating that for a limited time, Ohio workers would be taxed by the municipality that was their “principal place of work” rather than the municipality where they actually performed their work. Josh Schaad, who primarily worked from his home in Blue Ash during the pandemic, challenged this law after his employer withheld municipal taxes from his wages and forwarded them to Cincinnati, the location of his employer's business. Schaad's principal argument was that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids an Ohio municipality from taxing a nonresident for work performed outside of that municipality. The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Schaad's argument and affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals, holding that the Due Process Clause did not prohibit the General Assembly from directing that an Ohio citizen pay taxes to the municipality where the employee’s principal place of work was located rather than to the subdivision of the state where the employee actually worked. The court also held that the General Assembly's power to pass emergency legislation did not expand its substantive constitutional powers.
2024-02-14stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioDeWinehttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2024-0052.htmlState ex rel. Schreiner v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections2024-01-29T12:25:29-08:002024-01-29T12:25:29-08:00
In this case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, Dennis Schreiner petitioned for a writ of prohibition against the Erie County Board of Elections and its members. Schreiner sought to remove Steven Kraus, a candidate for the Ohio House of Representatives, from the March 2024 primary election ballot. Schreiner's argument was based on Kraus' previous conviction of a disqualifying offense and his subsequent claim that the office of state representative involves substantial management or control over the property of a state agency, political subdivision, or private entity, as defined by R.C. 2961.02(B).
However, the court found that a state representative does not have direct management or control over the property of any state agency, political subdivision, or private entity. Schreiner failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the office of state representative involves substantial management or control over such property. The court, therefore, ruled that the board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable law in keeping Kraus on the primary-election ballot. Consequently, the court denied Schreiner's petition for a writ of prohibition. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2024-0052.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Schreiner v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law</a>
In this case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, Dennis Schreiner petitioned for a writ of prohibition against the Erie County Board of Elections and its members. Schreiner sought to remove Steven Kraus, a candidate for the Ohio House of Representatives, from the March 2024 primary election ballot. Schreiner's argument was based on Kraus' previous conviction of a disqualifying offense and his subsequent claim that the office of state representative involves substantial management or control over the property of a state agency, political subdivision, or private entity, as defined by R.C. 2961.02(B).
However, the court found that a state representative does not have direct management or control over the property of any state agency, political subdivision, or private entity. Schreiner failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the office of state representative involves substantial management or control over such property. The court, therefore, ruled that the board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable law in keeping Kraus on the primary-election ballot. Consequently, the court denied Schreiner's petition for a writ of prohibition.
2024-01-29stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0369.htmlState ex rel. Mobarak v. Brown2024-01-25T06:05:28-08:002024-01-25T06:05:28-08:00
The case involves appellant Soleiman Mobarak, who appealed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus against appellee, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Jeffrey M. Brown. Mobarak had sought to vacate his criminal convictions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court. The court of appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case and that Mobarak had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
In 2012, Mobarak was indicted on charges of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, aggravated trafficking in drugs, and aggravated possession of drugs. The charges alleged that Mobarak had possessed and sold a controlled-substance analog commonly known as bath salts. In his petition, Mobarak asserted that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his criminal case on several grounds including that there was no statute prohibiting the possession or sale of bath salts at the time his offenses were alleged to have occurred, and that the controlled-substance-analogs law was unconstitutionally vague.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District Court of Appeals' judgment dismissing Mobarak’s petition. The court held that Mobarak’s petition failed to state a mandamus claim because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and failed to show that the trial court had patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case. The court found that by virtue of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2931.03, the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case. The court also noted that Mobarak’s arguments were similar to those raised and rejected in his prior appeals. The court stated that extraordinary writs may not be used as a substitute for an otherwise barred second appeal or to gain successive appellate reviews of the same issue. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0369.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Mobarak v. Brown" on Justia Law</a>
The case involves appellant Soleiman Mobarak, who appealed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus against appellee, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Jeffrey M. Brown. Mobarak had sought to vacate his criminal convictions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court. The court of appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case and that Mobarak had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
In 2012, Mobarak was indicted on charges of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, aggravated trafficking in drugs, and aggravated possession of drugs. The charges alleged that Mobarak had possessed and sold a controlled-substance analog commonly known as bath salts. In his petition, Mobarak asserted that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his criminal case on several grounds including that there was no statute prohibiting the possession or sale of bath salts at the time his offenses were alleged to have occurred, and that the controlled-substance-analogs law was unconstitutionally vague.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District Court of Appeals' judgment dismissing Mobarak’s petition. The court held that Mobarak’s petition failed to state a mandamus claim because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and failed to show that the trial court had patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case. The court found that by virtue of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2931.03, the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case. The court also noted that Mobarak’s arguments were similar to those raised and rejected in his prior appeals. The court stated that extraordinary writs may not be used as a substitute for an otherwise barred second appeal or to gain successive appellate reviews of the same issue.
2024-01-25stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioMassahttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0125.htmlState ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C. v. Mertz2024-01-24T06:05:59-08:002024-01-24T06:05:59-08:00
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision of the lower court in a case involving AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C., et al. (AWMS) and the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR). AWMS sought a writ of mandamus to compel the ODNR to initiate property appropriation proceedings, arguing that the state had effectuated a regulatory taking of AWMS’s property by suspending operations at its saltwater-injection well. The court of appeals initially granted summary judgment in favor of the state, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision and remanded the case, directing the court of appeals to weigh the parties' evidence related to AWMS’s total and partial takings claims.
On remand, the court of appeals denied the writ, arguing that AWMS did not have a cognizable property interest for purposes of a takings analysis. AWMS appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals had failed to comply with its remand order to weigh the parties' evidence and had violated the law-of-the-case doctrine by revisiting whether AWMS had a cognizable property interest.
The Supreme Court ruled that AWMS did possess a cognizable property interest in its leasehold right to operate the saltwater-injection well, a point that had been established in the previous appeal and was thus the law of the case. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case once again, instructing the lower court to weigh the evidence to determine whether a total or partial regulatory taking had occurred. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0125.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C. v. Mertz" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision of the lower court in a case involving AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C., et al. (AWMS) and the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR). AWMS sought a writ of mandamus to compel the ODNR to initiate property appropriation proceedings, arguing that the state had effectuated a regulatory taking of AWMS’s property by suspending operations at its saltwater-injection well. The court of appeals initially granted summary judgment in favor of the state, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision and remanded the case, directing the court of appeals to weigh the parties' evidence related to AWMS’s total and partial takings claims.
On remand, the court of appeals denied the writ, arguing that AWMS did not have a cognizable property interest for purposes of a takings analysis. AWMS appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals had failed to comply with its remand order to weigh the parties' evidence and had violated the law-of-the-case doctrine by revisiting whether AWMS had a cognizable property interest.
The Supreme Court ruled that AWMS did possess a cognizable property interest in its leasehold right to operate the saltwater-injection well, a point that had been established in the previous appeal and was thus the law of the case. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case once again, instructing the lower court to weigh the evidence to determine whether a total or partial regulatory taking had occurred.
2024-01-24stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0425.htmlState ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Wilson2024-01-23T06:05:58-08:002024-01-23T06:05:58-08:00
The Cincinnati Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel Andy Wilson, the director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety, to produce records related to the travel and expenses of Ohio State Highway Patrol troopers and staff who attended the 2022 Super Bowl in Los Angeles, California, with Governor Mike DeWine. The department withheld the requested records, claiming they were "security records" and therefore exempt from disclosure.
The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the requested records did qualify as "security records" under R.C. 149.433(A)(1), which defines a security record as any record that contains information directly used for protecting or maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, or sabotage. The court found that the records contained information that the department used for protecting and maintaining the safety of the governor's office. The department's evidence showed that release of the requested records would pose a substantial risk to the governor’s safety by revealing the security detail’s planning, techniques, and patterns, and by exposing security limitations and vulnerabilities.
The court also rejected the Cincinnati Enquirer's argument that the department violated the Public Records Act by failing to produce redacted versions of the requested records. The court explained that under R.C. 149.433(B)(1), a security record is not a public record and is consequently not subject to mandatory release or disclosure.
Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus, as well as the Cincinnati Enquirer's requests for statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0425.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Wilson" on Justia Law</a>
The Cincinnati Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel Andy Wilson, the director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety, to produce records related to the travel and expenses of Ohio State Highway Patrol troopers and staff who attended the 2022 Super Bowl in Los Angeles, California, with Governor Mike DeWine. The department withheld the requested records, claiming they were "security records" and therefore exempt from disclosure.
The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the requested records did qualify as "security records" under R.C. 149.433(A)(1), which defines a security record as any record that contains information directly used for protecting or maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, or sabotage. The court found that the records contained information that the department used for protecting and maintaining the safety of the governor's office. The department's evidence showed that release of the requested records would pose a substantial risk to the governor’s safety by revealing the security detail’s planning, techniques, and patterns, and by exposing security limitations and vulnerabilities.
The court also rejected the Cincinnati Enquirer's argument that the department violated the Public Records Act by failing to produce redacted versions of the requested records. The court explained that under R.C. 149.433(B)(1), a security record is not a public record and is consequently not subject to mandatory release or disclosure.
Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus, as well as the Cincinnati Enquirer's requests for statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees.
2024-01-23stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0663.htmlState ex rel. Walker v. Ballinger2024-01-23T06:05:57-08:002024-01-23T06:05:57-08:00
The case involves an appeal by an inmate, Keith Walker, against the Third District Court of Appeals' dismissal of his request for a writ of mandamus. Walker had been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence in 2020, for which he received the maximum sentence allowed by law. He later filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that the plea and the judgment of conviction were void due to the absence of a judge at his plea hearing, and the prosecutor's alleged role in accepting his plea and sentencing him. The municipal court judge, Teresa Ballinger, denied his motion. Walker then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, asking that his conviction be vacated as an illegal and void judgment. This was dismissed by the Third District Court of Appeals, who agreed with Judge Ballinger's argument that Walker had failed to submit an affidavit required by R.C. 2969.25(A), and that his claim was not cognizable in mandamus.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Third District Court of Appeals was incorrect to dismiss the action based on a failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A)’s affidavit requirement, as the statute does not require a statement that the inmate has filed no such civil action or appeal. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's determination that Walker's claim was not cognizable in mandamus, as his argument essentially raised a nonjurisdictional defect for which he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals dismissing Walker's complaint. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0663.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Walker v. Ballinger" on Justia Law</a>
The case involves an appeal by an inmate, Keith Walker, against the Third District Court of Appeals' dismissal of his request for a writ of mandamus. Walker had been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence in 2020, for which he received the maximum sentence allowed by law. He later filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that the plea and the judgment of conviction were void due to the absence of a judge at his plea hearing, and the prosecutor's alleged role in accepting his plea and sentencing him. The municipal court judge, Teresa Ballinger, denied his motion. Walker then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, asking that his conviction be vacated as an illegal and void judgment. This was dismissed by the Third District Court of Appeals, who agreed with Judge Ballinger's argument that Walker had failed to submit an affidavit required by R.C. 2969.25(A), and that his claim was not cognizable in mandamus.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Third District Court of Appeals was incorrect to dismiss the action based on a failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A)’s affidavit requirement, as the statute does not require a statement that the inmate has filed no such civil action or appeal. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's determination that Walker's claim was not cognizable in mandamus, as his argument essentially raised a nonjurisdictional defect for which he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals dismissing Walker's complaint.
2024-01-23stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0488.htmlState v. Johnson2024-01-18T06:05:41-08:002024-01-18T06:05:41-08:00
In this case, the appellant, Eric Johnson, filed a third, untimely, and successive petition for postconviction relief based on an affidavit from the victim, James Keith, who recanted his identification of Johnson as the assailant. Johnson argued that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering Keith's recantation before the statutory deadline and that, but for constitutional error at trial, he would not have been convicted. However, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the decisions of the lower courts, denying Johnson's petition for postconviction relief. The court held that Johnson failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering Keith's recantation within the statutory deadline. The court also held that Johnson failed to show that a constitutional error occurred at trial that led to his conviction. Specifically, the court stated that a conviction based on false testimony is not a constitutional violation unless the state had knowledge of the testimony’s falsity. The court therefore concluded that Johnson did not satisfy the requirements for filing an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0488.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the appellant, Eric Johnson, filed a third, untimely, and successive petition for postconviction relief based on an affidavit from the victim, James Keith, who recanted his identification of Johnson as the assailant. Johnson argued that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering Keith's recantation before the statutory deadline and that, but for constitutional error at trial, he would not have been convicted. However, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the decisions of the lower courts, denying Johnson's petition for postconviction relief. The court held that Johnson failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering Keith's recantation within the statutory deadline. The court also held that Johnson failed to show that a constitutional error occurred at trial that led to his conviction. Specifically, the court stated that a conviction based on false testimony is not a constitutional violation unless the state had knowledge of the testimony’s falsity. The court therefore concluded that Johnson did not satisfy the requirements for filing an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1).
2024-01-18stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0501.htmlState ex rel. Mobley v. Powers2024-01-17T06:05:50-08:002024-01-17T06:05:50-08:00
Alphonso Mobley Jr. filed an original action in mandamus under Ohio’s Public Records Act against Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney Melissa A. Powers, seeking records related to former R.C. 309.16 and a records-retention schedule. He also requested awards of statutory damages and costs. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a limited writ of mandamus in part and denied in part. The court denied the writ as moot concerning some of the requested records, granted a limited writ regarding others, deferred ruling on the request for an award of statutory damages, and denied the request for an award of costs.
The court determined that the prosecutor had provided Mobley with the records-retention schedule and the records created to meet the requirements of former R.C. 309.16(A)(2) for the years 2016 through 2020. However, the court found a genuine question of fact regarding whether the prosecutor provided Mobley with all the records that her office created to meet the requirements of former R.C. 309.16(A)(1) for the years 2016 through 2020. The court thus ordered the prosecutor to provide these records or certify that they do not exist. The court deferred ruling on Mobley’s request for statutory damages until the prosecutor has complied with the limited writ. Mobley’s request for an award of court costs was denied as he had filed an affidavit of indigency. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2023-0501.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Mobley v. Powers" on Justia Law</a>
Alphonso Mobley Jr. filed an original action in mandamus under Ohio’s Public Records Act against Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney Melissa A. Powers, seeking records related to former R.C. 309.16 and a records-retention schedule. He also requested awards of statutory damages and costs. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a limited writ of mandamus in part and denied in part. The court denied the writ as moot concerning some of the requested records, granted a limited writ regarding others, deferred ruling on the request for an award of statutory damages, and denied the request for an award of costs.
The court determined that the prosecutor had provided Mobley with the records-retention schedule and the records created to meet the requirements of former R.C. 309.16(A)(2) for the years 2016 through 2020. However, the court found a genuine question of fact regarding whether the prosecutor provided Mobley with all the records that her office created to meet the requirements of former R.C. 309.16(A)(1) for the years 2016 through 2020. The court thus ordered the prosecutor to provide these records or certify that they do not exist. The court deferred ruling on Mobley’s request for statutory damages until the prosecutor has complied with the limited writ. Mobley’s request for an award of court costs was denied as he had filed an affidavit of indigency.
2024-01-17stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0824.htmlState ex rel. Gilreath v. Cuyahoga Job & Family Services2024-01-17T06:05:49-08:002024-01-17T06:05:49-08:00
This case pertains to a public records request made by Marcellus Gilreath to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) and its director, Matt Damschroder. Gilreath sought access to specific records related to him, including his case history in the Client Registry Information System Enhanced (CRIS-E), his Ohio Benefits case history, his overpayment records, and records of any investigation into his alleged theft of food stamps.
After not receiving a response from ODJFS or Damschroder for several months, Gilreath filed a mandamus action, following which ODJFS provided him with some of the requested records. Gilreath then requested that the court issue a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and Damschroder to allow him to inspect the provided documents in their native electronic format, to search for additional records, and to organize and maintain their emails in a manner that they can be made available for inspection. He also sought an award of statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees.
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Gilreath's request for a writ of mandamus, finding that ODJFS and Damschroder had no obligation to allow him to inspect the records in their native electronic format. The court also found that ODJFS and Damschroder did not possess or control the county emails Gilreath sought, and that his request for these emails was not sufficiently clear. Furthermore, the court determined that Gilreath had not requested ODJFS and Damschroder to organize and maintain their emails in his original complaint.
However, the court did grant Gilreath's request for an award of statutory damages, awarding him $1,000 due to the significant delay in ODJFS's response to his public records request. The court denied his requests for court costs and attorney fees.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-0824.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Gilreath v. Cuyahoga Job & Family Services" on Justia Law</a>
This case pertains to a public records request made by Marcellus Gilreath to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) and its director, Matt Damschroder. Gilreath sought access to specific records related to him, including his case history in the Client Registry Information System Enhanced (CRIS-E), his Ohio Benefits case history, his overpayment records, and records of any investigation into his alleged theft of food stamps.
After not receiving a response from ODJFS or Damschroder for several months, Gilreath filed a mandamus action, following which ODJFS provided him with some of the requested records. Gilreath then requested that the court issue a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and Damschroder to allow him to inspect the provided documents in their native electronic format, to search for additional records, and to organize and maintain their emails in a manner that they can be made available for inspection. He also sought an award of statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees.
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Gilreath's request for a writ of mandamus, finding that ODJFS and Damschroder had no obligation to allow him to inspect the records in their native electronic format. The court also found that ODJFS and Damschroder did not possess or control the county emails Gilreath sought, and that his request for these emails was not sufficiently clear. Furthermore, the court determined that Gilreath had not requested ODJFS and Damschroder to organize and maintain their emails in his original complaint.
However, the court did grant Gilreath's request for an award of statutory damages, awarding him $1,000 due to the significant delay in ODJFS's response to his public records request. The court denied his requests for court costs and attorney fees.
2024-01-17stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-1286.htmlState ex rel. Yost v. FirstEnergy Corp.2024-01-16T06:35:45-08:002024-01-16T06:35:45-08:00
This case involves an appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals of Ohio. The appellant is the State of Ohio, represented by the Attorney General, and the appellees are FirstEnergy Corporation, Samuel Randazzo, and a consulting company controlled by Randazzo. Randazzo, the former chairman of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), allegedly received a $4.3 million bribe from FirstEnergy Corporation. The state of Ohio filed a civil action against Randazzo and his consulting company to recover the proceeds of the bribe. The state sought attachment orders to prevent Randazzo from draining his bank and brokerage accounts. The trial court granted the state’s motion ex parte, without notice to Randazzo and his attorneys. After learning about the court's decision, Randazzo requested a hearing and moved to vacate the orders. The court held a hearing with both sides present and declined to discharge the orders of attachment. Randazzo appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which found the orders of attachment had been improperly granted. The Court of Appeals determined that the state had failed to meet its burden at the ex parte hearing to establish the irreparable injury requirement.
Upon appeal by the state, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the orders of the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by basing its decision on the ex parte requirements. The Supreme Court ruled that the court of appeals should have reviewed the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate the attachment rather than the irreparable injury requirement for an ex parte order. The Supreme Court concluded that the proper remedy for a party dissatisfied with an ex parte attachment order is to request a hearing on the order at which both parties may be heard. It also concluded that Randazzo failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the use of improper garnishment forms. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2024/2022-1286.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Yost v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law</a>
This case involves an appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals of Ohio. The appellant is the State of Ohio, represented by the Attorney General, and the appellees are FirstEnergy Corporation, Samuel Randazzo, and a consulting company controlled by Randazzo. Randazzo, the former chairman of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), allegedly received a $4.3 million bribe from FirstEnergy Corporation. The state of Ohio filed a civil action against Randazzo and his consulting company to recover the proceeds of the bribe. The state sought attachment orders to prevent Randazzo from draining his bank and brokerage accounts. The trial court granted the state’s motion ex parte, without notice to Randazzo and his attorneys. After learning about the court's decision, Randazzo requested a hearing and moved to vacate the orders. The court held a hearing with both sides present and declined to discharge the orders of attachment. Randazzo appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which found the orders of attachment had been improperly granted. The Court of Appeals determined that the state had failed to meet its burden at the ex parte hearing to establish the irreparable injury requirement.
Upon appeal by the state, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the orders of the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by basing its decision on the ex parte requirements. The Supreme Court ruled that the court of appeals should have reviewed the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate the attachment rather than the irreparable injury requirement for an ex parte order. The Supreme Court concluded that the proper remedy for a party dissatisfied with an ex parte attachment order is to request a hearing on the order at which both parties may be heard. It also concluded that Randazzo failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the use of improper garnishment forms.
2024-01-16stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1082.htmlState v. Randolph2023-12-29T06:06:24-08:002023-12-29T06:06:24-08:00
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue concerned whether a landlord or landlord's agent can prohibit a person from entering leased premises, even if that person has received permission from a tenant. The case arose when Antonio Randolph was banned from an apartment complex by the property manager and was then later arrested and charged with criminal trespass after he was discovered in his uncle's apartment at the complex, which his uncle had invited him to. The trial court found Randolph guilty of criminal trespass. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the city had to prove that Randolph had entered the premises without privilege, and that his uncle's invitation to the apartment contradicted this.
Upon review, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the Sixth District's decision. The court held that a landlord or landlord's agent generally may not exclude a person from rented premises such that the excluded person is considered a trespasser when on the premises even if the person received permission to enter the premises from a tenant of the property. The court noted that Ohio law provides that a landlord cedes his or her possessory interests in leased property to the tenant and therefore may not prohibit the tenant from inviting guests onto the property.
However, the court also highlighted that a landlord can maintain control over access to a property if the landlord so desires, provided that this authority is reserved in the lease agreement. In the absence of such a provision in the lease agreement, a tenant may invite onto the property a person whom the landlord has sought to ban from the premises. The judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals was affirmed. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1082.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Randolph" on Justia Law</a>
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue concerned whether a landlord or landlord's agent can prohibit a person from entering leased premises, even if that person has received permission from a tenant. The case arose when Antonio Randolph was banned from an apartment complex by the property manager and was then later arrested and charged with criminal trespass after he was discovered in his uncle's apartment at the complex, which his uncle had invited him to. The trial court found Randolph guilty of criminal trespass. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the city had to prove that Randolph had entered the premises without privilege, and that his uncle's invitation to the apartment contradicted this.
Upon review, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the Sixth District's decision. The court held that a landlord or landlord's agent generally may not exclude a person from rented premises such that the excluded person is considered a trespasser when on the premises even if the person received permission to enter the premises from a tenant of the property. The court noted that Ohio law provides that a landlord cedes his or her possessory interests in leased property to the tenant and therefore may not prohibit the tenant from inviting guests onto the property.
However, the court also highlighted that a landlord can maintain control over access to a property if the landlord so desires, provided that this authority is reserved in the lease agreement. In the absence of such a provision in the lease agreement, a tenant may invite onto the property a person whom the landlord has sought to ban from the premises. The judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals was affirmed.
2023-12-29stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0460.htmlDavis v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr.2023-12-28T06:05:56-08:002023-12-28T06:05:56-08:00
The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with a case involving the plaintiff, who was acting both individually and as the executor of an estate, and the defendants, which included a medical center and various medical professionals. However, the opinion provides very little information about the specific facts of the case or the legal issues at stake. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, relying on the authority of a prior case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. The case was then remanded back to the Court of Appeals to consider arguments that it had previously declined to address. The specific nature of these arguments, and the reasons for the Court of Appeals' initial refusal to consider them, are not provided in the opinion. As such, the precise holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio in this case cannot be determined from the available information. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0460.html" target="_blank">View "Davis v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with a case involving the plaintiff, who was acting both individually and as the executor of an estate, and the defendants, which included a medical center and various medical professionals. However, the opinion provides very little information about the specific facts of the case or the legal issues at stake. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, relying on the authority of a prior case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. The case was then remanded back to the Court of Appeals to consider arguments that it had previously declined to address. The specific nature of these arguments, and the reasons for the Court of Appeals' initial refusal to consider them, are not provided in the opinion. As such, the precise holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio in this case cannot be determined from the available information.
2023-12-28stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0779.htmlState v. Mills2023-12-28T06:05:56-08:002023-12-28T06:05:56-08:00
In this case, an appellant challenged his criminal convictions, arguing that the trial court had erred by failing to hold a competency hearing. The appellant's counsel had requested a competency evaluation prior to the trial, but the appellant refused to be transported to the treatment center for the evaluation. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that while the trial court should have held a competency hearing, the error was harmless because the record, when viewed as a whole, did not demonstrate sufficient indicia of incompetency. The court noted that the appellant had demonstrated understanding of the proceedings and had been able to articulate what his counsel had told him about the proceedings. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court, upholding the appellant's convictions. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0779.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Mills" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, an appellant challenged his criminal convictions, arguing that the trial court had erred by failing to hold a competency hearing. The appellant's counsel had requested a competency evaluation prior to the trial, but the appellant refused to be transported to the treatment center for the evaluation. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that while the trial court should have held a competency hearing, the error was harmless because the record, when viewed as a whole, did not demonstrate sufficient indicia of incompetency. The court noted that the appellant had demonstrated understanding of the proceedings and had been able to articulate what his counsel had told him about the proceedings. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court, upholding the appellant's convictions.
2023-12-28stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1121.htmlEwing v. UC Health2023-12-28T06:05:55-08:002023-12-28T06:05:55-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. The case involved a dispute between Ewing, in her capacity as executor of an estate and personal representative of the deceased's next of kin and beneficiaries, and UC Health along with other defendants. The court did not provide detailed facts or legal conclusions in its decision. Instead, it simply stated that it was reversing the judgment of the lower court based on the authority of a separate case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. Since the court does not elaborate on the details of the case nor the reasons for its decision, the exact holding in this case isn't clear from the opinion provided. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1121.html" target="_blank">View "Ewing v. UC Health" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. The case involved a dispute between Ewing, in her capacity as executor of an estate and personal representative of the deceased's next of kin and beneficiaries, and UC Health along with other defendants. The court did not provide detailed facts or legal conclusions in its decision. Instead, it simply stated that it was reversing the judgment of the lower court based on the authority of a separate case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. Since the court does not elaborate on the details of the case nor the reasons for its decision, the exact holding in this case isn't clear from the opinion provided.
2023-12-28stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0717.htmlMcCarthy v. Lee2023-12-28T06:05:54-08:002023-12-28T06:05:54-08:00
In this case from the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court considered whether a derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could proceed even when the primary medical negligence claim, on which it was based, was barred by the statute of repose. The appellants, Mr. and Mrs. McCarthy, had filed a medical negligence claim against Dr. Lee and associated medical practices, alleging negligent care in the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The claim was dismissed due to the statute of repose. Subsequently, the McCarthys filed a separate claim on behalf of their three minor children for loss of consortium due to the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The medical providers moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it could not stand alone as it was a derivative claim of the previously dismissed medical claim. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could not exist when the principal claim on which it was based was extinguished by the statute of repose. The court explained that the statute of repose operates as a substantive bar to a claim, extinguishing both the remedy and the right. Therefore, when a principal claim is extinguished, no other claim derived from it can exist. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0717.html" target="_blank">View "McCarthy v. Lee" on Justia Law</a>
In this case from the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court considered whether a derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could proceed even when the primary medical negligence claim, on which it was based, was barred by the statute of repose. The appellants, Mr. and Mrs. McCarthy, had filed a medical negligence claim against Dr. Lee and associated medical practices, alleging negligent care in the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The claim was dismissed due to the statute of repose. Subsequently, the McCarthys filed a separate claim on behalf of their three minor children for loss of consortium due to the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The medical providers moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it could not stand alone as it was a derivative claim of the previously dismissed medical claim. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could not exist when the principal claim on which it was based was extinguished by the statute of repose. The court explained that the statute of repose operates as a substantive bar to a claim, extinguishing both the remedy and the right. Therefore, when a principal claim is extinguished, no other claim derived from it can exist. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium.
2023-12-28stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0407.htmlEverhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp.2023-12-28T06:05:53-08:002023-12-28T06:05:53-08:00
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the main issue was whether the four-year medical-claims statute of repose, set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C), applies to wrongful-death claims based on medical care. The facts of the case involved Todd Everhart, who had been involved in a car accident in 2003 and was subsequently transferred to Coshocton County Memorial Hospital. Despite finding an abnormality in his chest x-rays, the doctors did not inform him about it. Nearly three years later, Everhart was diagnosed with advanced-stage lung cancer and died two months later. His wife, Machelle Everhart, filed a lawsuit against the hospital and the doctors involved, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death due to their failure to inform Mr. Everhart of his lung condition.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the broad definition of "medical claim" clearly and unambiguously includes wrongful-death claims based on medical care. Therefore, the four-year medical-claims statute of repose applies to such claims. The court ruled that the Tenth District Court of Appeals erroneously held otherwise and thus reversed its decision. The court remanded the case to the Tenth District Court of Appeals to address Mrs. Everhart's remaining assignment of error. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0407.html" target="_blank">View "Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp." on Justia Law</a>
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the main issue was whether the four-year medical-claims statute of repose, set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C), applies to wrongful-death claims based on medical care. The facts of the case involved Todd Everhart, who had been involved in a car accident in 2003 and was subsequently transferred to Coshocton County Memorial Hospital. Despite finding an abnormality in his chest x-rays, the doctors did not inform him about it. Nearly three years later, Everhart was diagnosed with advanced-stage lung cancer and died two months later. His wife, Machelle Everhart, filed a lawsuit against the hospital and the doctors involved, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death due to their failure to inform Mr. Everhart of his lung condition.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the broad definition of "medical claim" clearly and unambiguously includes wrongful-death claims based on medical care. Therefore, the four-year medical-claims statute of repose applies to such claims. The court ruled that the Tenth District Court of Appeals erroneously held otherwise and thus reversed its decision. The court remanded the case to the Tenth District Court of Appeals to address Mrs. Everhart's remaining assignment of error.
2023-12-28stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1251.htmlIn re Z.C.2023-12-27T06:06:07-08:002023-12-27T06:06:07-08:00
The Supreme Court of Ohio examined the appropriate standard of review for cases involving a juvenile court’s decision to award permanent custody of a child and to terminate parental rights. The case stemmed from a dispute surrounding the custody of a minor child, Z.C., with the Ashtabula County Children Services Board (ACCSB) granted permanent custody. The father, D.C., appealed this decision, resulting in a conflict between the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and other appellate districts regarding the correct standard of review. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to its review, while other courts applied a sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the correct appellate standards of review in these cases are the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, depending on the arguments presented by the parties. The Court found that the Eleventh District Court of Appeals erred in applying an abuse-of-discretion standard and remanded the case for review under the correct standard. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1251.html" target="_blank">View "In re Z.C." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Ohio examined the appropriate standard of review for cases involving a juvenile court’s decision to award permanent custody of a child and to terminate parental rights. The case stemmed from a dispute surrounding the custody of a minor child, Z.C., with the Ashtabula County Children Services Board (ACCSB) granted permanent custody. The father, D.C., appealed this decision, resulting in a conflict between the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and other appellate districts regarding the correct standard of review. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to its review, while other courts applied a sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the correct appellate standards of review in these cases are the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, depending on the arguments presented by the parties. The Court found that the Eleventh District Court of Appeals erred in applying an abuse-of-discretion standard and remanded the case for review under the correct standard.
2023-12-27stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0382.htmlState v. Swazey2023-12-22T06:06:11-08:002023-12-22T06:06:11-08:00
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, Michael Swazey Jr. was indicted for failing to pay child support. He filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment under Rule 12(C)(2) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the statutes he allegedly violated did not apply to him. The trial court declined to consider Swazey's motion on the merits, holding that the arguments raised were not permitted under Rule 12(C)(2) but should instead be presented at the close of the state’s case at trial. Swazey subsequently pleaded guilty to all counts.
On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals held that Swazey’s Rule 12(C)(2) motion was proper and should have been considered on the merits. It also held that by entering a guilty plea, Swazey did not waive his right to raise a constitutional challenge on appeal.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals' decision, stating that Swazey's motion to dismiss was appropriate under Rule 12(C)(2), and that his guilty plea did not waive his right to raise his constitutional challenge on appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio remanded the case back to the trial court to consider Swazey's pretrial motion. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0382.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Swazey" on Justia Law</a>
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, Michael Swazey Jr. was indicted for failing to pay child support. He filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment under Rule 12(C)(2) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the statutes he allegedly violated did not apply to him. The trial court declined to consider Swazey's motion on the merits, holding that the arguments raised were not permitted under Rule 12(C)(2) but should instead be presented at the close of the state’s case at trial. Swazey subsequently pleaded guilty to all counts.
On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals held that Swazey’s Rule 12(C)(2) motion was proper and should have been considered on the merits. It also held that by entering a guilty plea, Swazey did not waive his right to raise a constitutional challenge on appeal.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals' decision, stating that Swazey's motion to dismiss was appropriate under Rule 12(C)(2), and that his guilty plea did not waive his right to raise his constitutional challenge on appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio remanded the case back to the trial court to consider Swazey's pretrial motion.
2023-12-22stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0914.htmlState ex rel. WTOL Television, L.L.C. v. Cedar Fair, L.P.2023-12-20T06:06:38-08:002023-12-20T06:06:38-08:00
The Supreme Court of Ohio found that the Cedar Point Police Department (CPPD), which provides security, policing, and law-enforcement services at the Cedar Point amusement park, is required to respond to valid public-records requests related to those duties. The court concluded that the CPPD is the functional equivalent of a public institution for purposes of the Public Records Act. The court ordered the CPPD to produce any records responsive to the public-records requests by relators WTOL Television, L.L.C., WKYC-TV, L.L.C., and WBNS-TV, Inc. Although the court awarded court costs to the relators, it denied their requests for statutory damages and attorney fees. The case arose after the relators, who are media companies broadcasting news in Ohio, requested records related to a guest injury at Cedar Point and alleged sexual assaults at Cedar Point employee housing. The CPPD, Cedar Fair, and Ronald E. Gilson (the director of security at Cedar Point and the chief of police of the CPPD) failed to provide the requested records, leading to the relators filing a mandamus action.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0914.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. WTOL Television, L.L.C. v. Cedar Fair, L.P." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Ohio found that the Cedar Point Police Department (CPPD), which provides security, policing, and law-enforcement services at the Cedar Point amusement park, is required to respond to valid public-records requests related to those duties. The court concluded that the CPPD is the functional equivalent of a public institution for purposes of the Public Records Act. The court ordered the CPPD to produce any records responsive to the public-records requests by relators WTOL Television, L.L.C., WKYC-TV, L.L.C., and WBNS-TV, Inc. Although the court awarded court costs to the relators, it denied their requests for statutory damages and attorney fees. The case arose after the relators, who are media companies broadcasting news in Ohio, requested records related to a guest injury at Cedar Point and alleged sexual assaults at Cedar Point employee housing. The CPPD, Cedar Fair, and Ronald E. Gilson (the director of security at Cedar Point and the chief of police of the CPPD) failed to provide the requested records, leading to the relators filing a mandamus action.
2023-12-20stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0465.htmlState ex rel. Spencer v. Forshey2023-12-19T06:06:45-08:002023-12-19T06:06:45-08:00
In 2016, Brian N. Spencer was convicted of possession of heroin and marijuana with a firearm specification, and having a weapon while under disability by a Franklin County Court of Common Pleas jury. On the day of the trial, Spencer requested a new attorney, claiming that his appointed counsel was colluding with the prosecutor. When the court refused, Spencer decided to represent himself, despite warnings about the risks. Following his conviction, Spencer appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, arguing that his right to counsel was violated, but the court affirmed the lower court's ruling.
In 2022, Spencer filed a habeas corpus complaint in the Seventh District Court of Appeals, arguing that his convictions and sentence are void because the trial court violated his right to counsel. The court dismissed the complaint and Spencer appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh District's dismissal of the complaint. The Supreme Court held that even if the trial court had violated Spencer’s right to counsel, it did not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. A violation of the defendant’s right to counsel is a structural error that is reversible on appeal, but it does not result in a sentence that is void for the court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court further noted that Spencer had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through direct appeal of his convictions and sentence, which he had already pursued. Thus, his convictions and sentences were not void and he was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0465.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Spencer v. Forshey" on Justia Law</a>
In 2016, Brian N. Spencer was convicted of possession of heroin and marijuana with a firearm specification, and having a weapon while under disability by a Franklin County Court of Common Pleas jury. On the day of the trial, Spencer requested a new attorney, claiming that his appointed counsel was colluding with the prosecutor. When the court refused, Spencer decided to represent himself, despite warnings about the risks. Following his conviction, Spencer appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, arguing that his right to counsel was violated, but the court affirmed the lower court's ruling.
In 2022, Spencer filed a habeas corpus complaint in the Seventh District Court of Appeals, arguing that his convictions and sentence are void because the trial court violated his right to counsel. The court dismissed the complaint and Spencer appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh District's dismissal of the complaint. The Supreme Court held that even if the trial court had violated Spencer’s right to counsel, it did not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. A violation of the defendant’s right to counsel is a structural error that is reversible on appeal, but it does not result in a sentence that is void for the court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court further noted that Spencer had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through direct appeal of his convictions and sentence, which he had already pursued. Thus, his convictions and sentences were not void and he was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
2023-12-19stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0993.htmlIn re E.S.2023-12-01T06:06:10-08:002023-12-01T06:06:10-08:00
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue was the quantum of evidence required to satisfy the probable-cause standard for determining whether a juvenile-court offender may be bound over to adult court. The case arose from an incident where a juvenile, E.S., was in a stolen car during a police chase, with his friend E.M., who was driving. After the car crashed, E.M. was found dead from a gunshot wound. A gun was found under the car’s passenger seat where E.S. had been seated, and E.S.'s DNA was found on the trigger and the grip of the gun. A bullet that had been fired from the gun was found in the driver's side front door. E.S. was charged in juvenile court with multiple offenses relating to the stolen car, the gun, and E.M.’s death.
The juvenile court found probable cause for some charges but not for involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide. The state appealed the juvenile court's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment. The state then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the state had presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that E.S. had committed the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The court found that the state’s evidence, both circumstantial and direct, was sufficient to establish probable cause. The court held that the juvenile court and the Court of Appeals had erroneously held the state to a higher burden than required for establishing probable cause in a bindover proceeding. The case was remanded back to the juvenile court for further proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0993.html" target="_blank">View "In re E.S." on Justia Law</a>
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue was the quantum of evidence required to satisfy the probable-cause standard for determining whether a juvenile-court offender may be bound over to adult court. The case arose from an incident where a juvenile, E.S., was in a stolen car during a police chase, with his friend E.M., who was driving. After the car crashed, E.M. was found dead from a gunshot wound. A gun was found under the car’s passenger seat where E.S. had been seated, and E.S.'s DNA was found on the trigger and the grip of the gun. A bullet that had been fired from the gun was found in the driver's side front door. E.S. was charged in juvenile court with multiple offenses relating to the stolen car, the gun, and E.M.’s death.
The juvenile court found probable cause for some charges but not for involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide. The state appealed the juvenile court's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment. The state then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the state had presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that E.S. had committed the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The court found that the state’s evidence, both circumstantial and direct, was sufficient to establish probable cause. The court held that the juvenile court and the Court of Appeals had erroneously held the state to a higher burden than required for establishing probable cause in a bindover proceeding. The case was remanded back to the juvenile court for further proceedings.
2023-12-01stateOhioSupreme Court of Ohiohttps://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0402.htmlState ex rel. Stokes v. Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction2023-11-29T06:06:47-08:002023-11-29T06:06:47-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and the Bureau of Sentence Computation (collectively, DRC) to calculate his minimum sentence to be fifteen years, holding that the court of appeals did not err.
In 1996, Appellant was convicted on three counts of rape, one count of kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to three life sentences and two sentences of ten to twenty-five years, to be served consecutively. DRC calculated Defendant's sentence to be forty-five years to life. Appellant later brought this mandamus action, arguing that DRC erroneously calculated his minimum sentence by adding three ten-year minimum sentences associated with his life sentence. The court of appeals granted DRC's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in deciding that DRC correctly calculated Appellant's parole eligibility under Ohio Rev. Code 2967.13(F). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0402.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Stokes v. Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and the Bureau of Sentence Computation (collectively, DRC) to calculate his minimum sentence to be fifteen years, holding that the court of appeals did not err.
In 1996, Appellant was convicted on three counts of rape, one count of kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to three life sentences and two sentences of ten to twenty-five years, to be served consecutively. DRC calculated Defendant's sentence to be forty-five years to life. Appellant later brought this mandamus action, arguing that DRC erroneously calculated his minimum sentence by adding three ten-year minimum sentences associated with his life sentence. The court of appeals granted DRC's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in deciding that DRC correctly calculated Appellant's parole eligibility under Ohio Rev. Code 2967.13(F).
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and the Bureau of Sentence Computation to calculate his minimum sentence to be fifteen years, holding that the court of appeals did not err.
2023-11-29stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0402https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0323.htmlState ex rel. King v. Watson2023-11-28T06:06:43-08:002023-11-28T06:06:43-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Warden Tom Watson of the North Central Correctional Institution, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.
Appellant was convicted on sixty-one counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor and sentenced to thirty-six and one-half years in prison. Appellant later filed this habeas petition alleging that he was being unlawfully imprisoned. The court of appeals granted the warden's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant's motion for judicial notice, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because he did not show that his maximum prison sentence had expired or that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to later resentence him. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0323.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. King v. Watson" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Warden Tom Watson of the North Central Correctional Institution, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.
Appellant was convicted on sixty-one counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor and sentenced to thirty-six and one-half years in prison. Appellant later filed this habeas petition alleging that he was being unlawfully imprisoned. The court of appeals granted the warden's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant's motion for judicial notice, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because he did not show that his maximum prison sentence had expired or that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to later resentence him.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.
2023-11-28stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0323https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0254.htmlState ex rel. Ames v. Ondrey2023-11-28T06:06:42-08:002023-11-28T06:06:42-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition seeking a writ of prohibition to bar Judge David M. Ondrey of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas from exercising jurisdiction over a hearing to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees that Appellant owed based on conduct he committed that the judge found frivolous, holding that there was no error.
Appellant sued the Geauga County Republican Central Committee seeking an injunction. Judge Ondrey granted the committee's motion to dismiss. The committee then filed a motion seeking fees it incurred in defending against Appellant's "frivolous" lawsuit. Thereafter, Appellant filed an original action seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from conducting the hearing on the question of attorney fees. In granting Judge Ondrey's motion to dismiss the court of appeals rejected Appellant's contention that Judge Ondrey exceeded his subject matter jurisdiction by failing strictly to comply with the procedures prescribed by Ohio Rev. Code 2323.51. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge Ondrey did not patently or unambiguously exceed his jurisdiction. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0254.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Ames v. Ondrey" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition seeking a writ of prohibition to bar Judge David M. Ondrey of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas from exercising jurisdiction over a hearing to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees that Appellant owed based on conduct he committed that the judge found frivolous, holding that there was no error.
Appellant sued the Geauga County Republican Central Committee seeking an injunction. Judge Ondrey granted the committee's motion to dismiss. The committee then filed a motion seeking fees it incurred in defending against Appellant's "frivolous" lawsuit. Thereafter, Appellant filed an original action seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from conducting the hearing on the question of attorney fees. In granting Judge Ondrey's motion to dismiss the court of appeals rejected Appellant's contention that Judge Ondrey exceeded his subject matter jurisdiction by failing strictly to comply with the procedures prescribed by Ohio Rev. Code 2323.51. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge Ondrey did not patently or unambiguously exceed his jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's petition seeking a writ of prohibition to bar Judge David M. Ondrey from exercising jurisdiction over a hearing, holding that there was no error.
2023-11-28stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0254https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2021-1193.htmlLeague of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm'n2023-11-27T14:36:37-08:002023-11-27T14:36:37-08:00
In this case addressing the General Assembly districting plan adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission in September 2023 the Supreme Court granted motions to dismiss brought by Petitioners, who filed motions for leave to file objections instanter to the plan and denied motions to vacate and for leave to file objections, holding that dismissal was warranted.
The Commission adopted a new redistricting plan in September 2023 by a unanimous vote. Petitioners moved for leave to file objections. Respondents, members of the Commission, moved to dismiss the cases and to vacate the court's orders declaring the districting plan adopted by the General Assembly in September 2021 as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the motions to dismiss, denied the motions to vacate as moot, and denied the motions for leave to file objections to the September 2023 plan, holding that now that the Commission has adopted a plan with bipartisan support, the facts before the Court bore no resemblance to the allegations in Petitioners' complaints. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2021-1193.html" target="_blank">View "League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law</a>
In this case addressing the General Assembly districting plan adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission in September 2023 the Supreme Court granted motions to dismiss brought by Petitioners, who filed motions for leave to file objections instanter to the plan and denied motions to vacate and for leave to file objections, holding that dismissal was warranted.
The Commission adopted a new redistricting plan in September 2023 by a unanimous vote. Petitioners moved for leave to file objections. Respondents, members of the Commission, moved to dismiss the cases and to vacate the court's orders declaring the districting plan adopted by the General Assembly in September 2021 as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the motions to dismiss, denied the motions to vacate as moot, and denied the motions for leave to file objections to the September 2023 plan, holding that now that the Commission has adopted a plan with bipartisan support, the facts before the Court bore no resemblance to the allegations in Petitioners' complaints.
In this case addressing the General Assembly districting plan adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission in September 2023 the Supreme Court held that dismissal was warranted.
2023-11-27stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2021-11932021-11982021-1210https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0907.htmlH.R. v. P.J.E.2023-11-22T06:36:12-08:002023-11-22T06:36:12-08:00
The Supreme Court declined to accept this discretionary appeal filed on behalf of H.R. and sanctioned the three attorneys representing H.R. for instituting a frivolous appeal.
The underlying dispute involved two motions filed by H.R. to modify a divorce decree regarding a spousal support obligation payable by P.J.E. to H.R. The trial court denied H.R.'s motion to continue the hearing on her motions to modify, and the court of appeal dismissed H.R.'s appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed H.R.'s appeal and sanctioned H.R.'s attorneys with paying P.J.E.'s reasonable attorney fees and declaring them to be vexatious litigators, holding that the three attorneys had repeatedly engaged in frivolous conduct. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0907.html" target="_blank">View "H.R. v. P.J.E." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court declined to accept this discretionary appeal filed on behalf of H.R. and sanctioned the three attorneys representing H.R. for instituting a frivolous appeal.
The underlying dispute involved two motions filed by H.R. to modify a divorce decree regarding a spousal support obligation payable by P.J.E. to H.R. The trial court denied H.R.'s motion to continue the hearing on her motions to modify, and the court of appeal dismissed H.R.'s appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed H.R.'s appeal and sanctioned H.R.'s attorneys with paying P.J.E.'s reasonable attorney fees and declaring them to be vexatious litigators, holding that the three attorneys had repeatedly engaged in frivolous conduct.
The Supreme Court declined to accept this discretionary appeal filed on behalf of H.R. and sanctioned the three attorneys representing H.R. for instituting a frivolous appeal.
2023-11-22stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0907https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0080.htmlState ex rel. Block v. Industrial Commission of Ohio2023-11-22T06:36:12-08:002023-11-22T06:36:12-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus requiring the Industrial Commission of Ohio to award him a scheduled award of permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B) for the loss of the use of his right hand, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.
Appellant was injured during the course of his employment as a laborer when he fell from a roof onto concrete below. A district hearing officer granted Appellant's request for scheduled-loss compensation, but a staff hearing officer vacated that order on appeal. The court of appeals denied Appellant's ensuing complaint for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence supported the commission's decision denying Appellant's request for compensation for the loss of the use of his right hand, and the commission did not abuse its discretion. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0080.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Block v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus requiring the Industrial Commission of Ohio to award him a scheduled award of permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B) for the loss of the use of his right hand, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.
Appellant was injured during the course of his employment as a laborer when he fell from a roof onto concrete below. A district hearing officer granted Appellant's request for scheduled-loss compensation, but a staff hearing officer vacated that order on appeal. The court of appeals denied Appellant's ensuing complaint for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence supported the commission's decision denying Appellant's request for compensation for the loss of the use of his right hand, and the commission did not abuse its discretion.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus requiring the Industrial Commission of Ohio to award him a scheduled award of permanent partial disability compensation, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.
2023-11-22stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0080https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1070.htmlState ex rel. Clark v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction2023-11-22T06:36:11-08:002023-11-22T06:36:11-08:00
The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to produce a copy of a kite that he alleged he had exchanged with the "cashier" of the North Central Correctional Complex (NCCC), where Relator was incarcerated, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.
According to Relator, an NCCC inspector denied Relator's kite request on the ground that she was not responsible for printing kites. After the department denied Relator's grievance Relator brought this mandamus action seeking production of the kite. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) Relator showed that he had a clear legal right to the requested relief and that the department had a clear legal duty to provide it; and (2) Relator was not entitled to statutory damages. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1070.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Clark v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to produce a copy of a kite that he alleged he had exchanged with the "cashier" of the North Central Correctional Complex (NCCC), where Relator was incarcerated, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.
According to Relator, an NCCC inspector denied Relator's kite request on the ground that she was not responsible for printing kites. After the department denied Relator's grievance Relator brought this mandamus action seeking production of the kite. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) Relator showed that he had a clear legal right to the requested relief and that the department had a clear legal duty to provide it; and (2) Relator was not entitled to statutory damages.
The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to produce a copy of a kite, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.
2023-11-22stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1070https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0603.htmlState v. Daniel2023-11-09T06:06:10-08:002023-11-09T06:06:10-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this criminal case, holding that it does not violate the separation of powers doctrine to tie the judge's ability to reduce the registration period for a person convicted of arson to a recommendation from executive branch officials.
In 2012, the General Assembly passed a law codified at Ohio Rev. Code 2909.13(A) establishing a registry of people convicted of arson-related crimes that applied to those convicted of arson or aggravated arson, as well as those convicted of a related attempt or conspiracy or complicity offense. At issue was Ohio Rev. Code 2909.15(D)(2)(b), which provides a limited exception for the lifetime-registration requirement. Defendant in this case pleaded guilty to a single count of arson, for which he was required to register annually for life. At sentencing, challenged the constitutionality of the reduced-registration provision. The trial court denied the challenge, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there is no separation of powers violation within Ohio's arson offender registration scheme. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0603.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Daniel" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this criminal case, holding that it does not violate the separation of powers doctrine to tie the judge's ability to reduce the registration period for a person convicted of arson to a recommendation from executive branch officials.
In 2012, the General Assembly passed a law codified at Ohio Rev. Code 2909.13(A) establishing a registry of people convicted of arson-related crimes that applied to those convicted of arson or aggravated arson, as well as those convicted of a related attempt or conspiracy or complicity offense. At issue was Ohio Rev. Code 2909.15(D)(2)(b), which provides a limited exception for the lifetime-registration requirement. Defendant in this case pleaded guilty to a single count of arson, for which he was required to register annually for life. At sentencing, challenged the constitutionality of the reduced-registration provision. The trial court denied the challenge, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there is no separation of powers violation within Ohio's arson offender registration scheme.
The Supreme Court held that it does not violate the separation of powers doctrine to tie a judge's ability to reduce the registration period for a person convicted of arson to a recommendation from executive branch officials.
2023-11-09stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioDeWine2022-0603https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0311.htmlDriggins v. Bracy2023-11-08T06:07:18-08:002023-11-08T06:07:18-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's writ of habeas corpus arguing that the sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant's case after it issued a final judgment in 2007, holding that the court of appeals did not err.
Pursuant to a plea agreement in which Appellant agreed to testify against a potential codefendant, Appellant pleaded guilty to murder with a firearm specification and aggravated robbery. The convictions were vacated based on Appellant's failure to cooperate with prosecutors. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary and three-year firearm specifications. On appeal, Appellant argued that the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case pursuant to State v. Gilbert, 35 N.E.3d 493 (Ohio 2014), after it issued final judgment in 2007. The court of appeals agreed but dismissed the petition because Appellant's 2007 convictions and sentence were still valid and his maximum sentence had not expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in dismissing the petition because Appellant was not subject to immediate release from prison or confinement. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0311.html" target="_blank">View "Driggins v. Bracy" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's writ of habeas corpus arguing that the sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant's case after it issued a final judgment in 2007, holding that the court of appeals did not err.
Pursuant to a plea agreement in which Appellant agreed to testify against a potential codefendant, Appellant pleaded guilty to murder with a firearm specification and aggravated robbery. The convictions were vacated based on Appellant's failure to cooperate with prosecutors. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary and three-year firearm specifications. On appeal, Appellant argued that the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case pursuant to State v. Gilbert, 35 N.E.3d 493 (Ohio 2014), after it issued final judgment in 2007. The court of appeals agreed but dismissed the petition because Appellant's 2007 convictions and sentence were still valid and his maximum sentence had not expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in dismissing the petition because Appellant was not subject to immediate release from prison or confinement.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's writ of habeas corpus arguing that the sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his case after it issued a final judgment in 2007, holding that the court of appeals did not err.
2023-11-08stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0311https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0197.htmlState ex rel. Mobley v. Franklin County Bd. of Commissioners2023-11-07T06:06:08-08:002023-11-07T06:06:08-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Petitioner's mandamus action after recognizing his status as a vexatious litigator as declared in an earlier, separate matter, holding that Petitioner did not "continue" his proceeding as a vexatious litigator in this case.
Appellant filed a mandamus action against the Franklin County Board of Commissioners and mailed his objections to a magistrate's decision to the court of appeals. The court in a separate matter subsequently declared Appellant to be a vexatious litigator. Upon filing Appellant's objections in this case, the court of appeals recognized Appellant's status as a vexatious litigator and sua sponte dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when Appellant mailed his objections and filed his motion for leave, he did not "continue" the proceeding as a vexatious litigator under Ohio Rev. Code 2323.52; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals' dismissal was incorrect. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0197.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Mobley v. Franklin County Bd. of Commissioners" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Petitioner's mandamus action after recognizing his status as a vexatious litigator as declared in an earlier, separate matter, holding that Petitioner did not "continue" his proceeding as a vexatious litigator in this case.
Appellant filed a mandamus action against the Franklin County Board of Commissioners and mailed his objections to a magistrate's decision to the court of appeals. The court in a separate matter subsequently declared Appellant to be a vexatious litigator. Upon filing Appellant's objections in this case, the court of appeals recognized Appellant's status as a vexatious litigator and sua sponte dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when Appellant mailed his objections and filed his motion for leave, he did not "continue" the proceeding as a vexatious litigator under Ohio Rev. Code 2323.52; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals' dismissal was incorrect.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Petitioner's mandamus action after recognizing his status as a vexatious litigator, holding that Petitioner did not "continue" his proceeding as a vexatious litigator in this case.
2023-11-07stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioSharon L. Kennedy2023-0197https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1463.htmlState ex rel. Repp v. Best2023-11-02T05:06:15-08:002023-11-02T05:06:15-08:00
The Supreme Court dismissed Relator Mark Repp's quo warranto claim he sought to oust Rhonda Best from judicial office and to declare him the rightful holder of the office and dismissed all other claims sua sponte, holding that Repp was not entitled to relief.
In 2019, Repp was elected to a six-year term as judge of a municipal court. Less than two years into his term, the Supreme Court found that Repp had engaged in professional misconduct and suspended him for one year from the practice of law. Because Repp failed to perform his official duties for more than six months, the judicial office he held was declared vacant, and Governor Mike DeWine appointed Best to fill the vacancy. After Repp was reinstated to the practice of law he filed this original action seeking a writ of quo warranto to oust Best from officer and also sought a writ of prohibition, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court denied all forms of relief, holding (1) if a judge is absent from his official duties for at least six months, the appropriate legislative authority is allow to declare the judicial office vacant under Ohio Rev. Code 1901.10(B); and (2) Repp's remaining requests either failed to state a claim, or this Court lacked jurisdiction over his claims. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1463.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Repp v. Best" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court dismissed Relator Mark Repp's quo warranto claim he sought to oust Rhonda Best from judicial office and to declare him the rightful holder of the office and dismissed all other claims sua sponte, holding that Repp was not entitled to relief.
In 2019, Repp was elected to a six-year term as judge of a municipal court. Less than two years into his term, the Supreme Court found that Repp had engaged in professional misconduct and suspended him for one year from the practice of law. Because Repp failed to perform his official duties for more than six months, the judicial office he held was declared vacant, and Governor Mike DeWine appointed Best to fill the vacancy. After Repp was reinstated to the practice of law he filed this original action seeking a writ of quo warranto to oust Best from officer and also sought a writ of prohibition, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court denied all forms of relief, holding (1) if a judge is absent from his official duties for at least six months, the appropriate legislative authority is allow to declare the judicial office vacant under Ohio Rev. Code 1901.10(B); and (2) Repp's remaining requests either failed to state a claim, or this Court lacked jurisdiction over his claims.
The Supreme Court dismissed Relator Mark Repp's quo warranto claim seeking to oust Rhonda Best from judicial office and to declare him the rightful holder of the office, holding that Repp was not entitled to relief.
2023-11-02stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1463https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1322.htmlState ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections2023-11-01T12:07:26-08:002023-11-01T12:07:26-08:00
The Supreme Court denied relief in this expedited election action brought by Brandon King, mayor of East Cleveland, seeking extraordinary writs to compel the removal of a proposed East Cleveland city-charter amendment from the November 7, 2023 general election ballot and to prevent the December 5, 2023 special mayoral-recall election, holding that King was not entitled to relief.
On August 9, 2023, the East Cleveland City Council passed resolution submitting to city electors a proposed revision to the city charter that would change the mayoral election from a partisan to a nonpartisan contest. The Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and its individual members (collectively, the board) voted unanimously to approve the proposed city-charter amendment for placement on the November 7 ballot as Issue 48. A city resident later submitted a petition for King's recall as mayor, and the board scheduled a December 5, 2023 special election. King submitted a written protest challenging the placement of Issue 48 on the general election ballot and placement of the mayoral-recall issue on the December 5 special-election ballot. The protest was dismissed. King subsequently filed this action seeking extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in dismissing King's protest. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1322.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied relief in this expedited election action brought by Brandon King, mayor of East Cleveland, seeking extraordinary writs to compel the removal of a proposed East Cleveland city-charter amendment from the November 7, 2023 general election ballot and to prevent the December 5, 2023 special mayoral-recall election, holding that King was not entitled to relief.
On August 9, 2023, the East Cleveland City Council passed resolution submitting to city electors a proposed revision to the city charter that would change the mayoral election from a partisan to a nonpartisan contest. The Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and its individual members (collectively, the board) voted unanimously to approve the proposed city-charter amendment for placement on the November 7 ballot as Issue 48. A city resident later submitted a petition for King's recall as mayor, and the board scheduled a December 5, 2023 special election. King submitted a written protest challenging the placement of Issue 48 on the general election ballot and placement of the mayoral-recall issue on the December 5 special-election ballot. The protest was dismissed. King subsequently filed this action seeking extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in dismissing King's protest.
The Supreme Court denied relief in this expedited election action brought by the mayor of East Cleveland seeking extraordinary writs to compel the removal of a proposed East Cleveland city-charter amendment from the general election ballot and to prevent ta special mayoral-recall election, holding that King was not entitled to relief.
2023-11-01stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-1322https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0595.htmlScott Fetzer Co. v. American Home Assurance Co.2023-11-01T05:06:27-08:002023-11-01T05:06:27-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this dispute arising out of environmental-cleanup and remediation work at two Superfund sites in Bronson, Michigan, holding that Restatement (Second) 193 does not govern the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims.
Scott Fetzer Company filed this action asserting a breach of contract claim against certain insurance companies, including Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, alleging breaches of certain insurance contracts. Fetzer also asserted a tort claim against each company, arguing that they had acted in bad faith when handling his claims. As to Travelers, an administrative judge concluded that Ohio law applied to a discovery dispute concerning Scott Fetzer's bad faith claim. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Ohio law governed the bad-faith discovery dispute because the cause of action was a tort. In affirming, the court applied the choice-of-law rules set forth in section 145 of the Restatement. Travelers appealed, arguing that section 193 governs the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims because they arise out of insurance contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly ruled that the choice-of-law analysis applicable to a bad-faith claim as provided by section 145. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0595.html" target="_blank">View "Scott Fetzer Co. v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this dispute arising out of environmental-cleanup and remediation work at two Superfund sites in Bronson, Michigan, holding that Restatement (Second) 193 does not govern the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims.
Scott Fetzer Company filed this action asserting a breach of contract claim against certain insurance companies, including Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, alleging breaches of certain insurance contracts. Fetzer also asserted a tort claim against each company, arguing that they had acted in bad faith when handling his claims. As to Travelers, an administrative judge concluded that Ohio law applied to a discovery dispute concerning Scott Fetzer's bad faith claim. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Ohio law governed the bad-faith discovery dispute because the cause of action was a tort. In affirming, the court applied the choice-of-law rules set forth in section 145 of the Restatement. Travelers appealed, arguing that section 193 governs the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims because they arise out of insurance contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly ruled that the choice-of-law analysis applicable to a bad-faith claim as provided by section 145.
The Supreme Court held that Restatement (Second) 193 does not govern the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims.
2023-11-01stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioBrunner2022-0595https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1242.htmlState ex rel. Mather v. Oda2023-10-31T05:07:08-08:002023-10-31T05:07:08-08:00
The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition in this original action, holding that the trial court in this case lost jurisdiction to proceed on a request for attorney fees after entering final judgment.
After a limited remand in this case stemming from a real estate dispute the trial court entered final judgment, and the judgment was subsequently paid. Thereafter, the prevailing parties filed a motion seeking more than $167,000 in additional attorney fees. Petitioner filed this original action seeking a writ of prohibition alleging that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the court of appeals' mandate did not give the trial court jurisdiction to entertain an attorney fees request that accrued after the final judgment. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1242.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Mather v. Oda" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition in this original action, holding that the trial court in this case lost jurisdiction to proceed on a request for attorney fees after entering final judgment.
After a limited remand in this case stemming from a real estate dispute the trial court entered final judgment, and the judgment was subsequently paid. Thereafter, the prevailing parties filed a motion seeking more than $167,000 in additional attorney fees. Petitioner filed this original action seeking a writ of prohibition alleging that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the court of appeals' mandate did not give the trial court jurisdiction to entertain an attorney fees request that accrued after the final judgment.
The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the trial court in this case lost jurisdiction to proceed on a request for attorney fees after entering final judgment.
2023-10-31stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1242https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0504.htmlState ex rel. Simpson v. Melnick2023-10-26T05:08:25-08:002023-10-26T05:08:25-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals rejecting Charles Simpson's peremptory prohibition claim and mandamus claim, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying the prohibition claim and that Simpson failed to state a valid claim for mandamus relief.
Grande Voiture in a separate case filed a motion for an order finding Simpson, the defendant in that case, in contempt of the trial court's order granting declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of Grande Voiture. Common Pleas Court Judge Kimberly Melnick granted Grande Voiture's motion to strike Simpson's answer and counterclaim on the grounds that Grande Voiture's contempt motion was not a pleading. Simpson then filed an original action seeking a peremptory writ of prohibition forbidding the judge from proceeding with the contempt hearing without allowing a jury trial and without considering the answer and counterclaim. Simpson also requested a writ of mandamus compelling the judge to proceed by jury trial on the issues before her. The court of appeals granted the judge's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Simpson failed to state a valid claim for the writs. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0504.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Simpson v. Melnick" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals rejecting Charles Simpson's peremptory prohibition claim and mandamus claim, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying the prohibition claim and that Simpson failed to state a valid claim for mandamus relief.
Grande Voiture in a separate case filed a motion for an order finding Simpson, the defendant in that case, in contempt of the trial court's order granting declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of Grande Voiture. Common Pleas Court Judge Kimberly Melnick granted Grande Voiture's motion to strike Simpson's answer and counterclaim on the grounds that Grande Voiture's contempt motion was not a pleading. Simpson then filed an original action seeking a peremptory writ of prohibition forbidding the judge from proceeding with the contempt hearing without allowing a jury trial and without considering the answer and counterclaim. Simpson also requested a writ of mandamus compelling the judge to proceed by jury trial on the issues before her. The court of appeals granted the judge's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Simpson failed to state a valid claim for the writs.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Charles Simpson's peremptory prohibition claim and mandamus claim, holding that Simpson failed to state a valid claim for mandamus relief.
2023-10-26stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0504https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0249.htmlState ex rel. Boyd v. Tone2023-10-25T05:07:21-08:002023-10-25T05:07:21-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing two complaints Appellant filed seeking writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that Appellant was not entitled to writs of mandamus or prohibition vacating his convictions and sentence.
Appellant filed both a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the trial court to vacate his criminal convictions and sentence and a complaint for a writ of prohibition against the trial court raising the same underlying issues. The court of appeals denied the writs, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to challenge any violation of his right to counsel; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a writ requiring the trial court to review issues related to the withdrawal of his counsel on direct appeal. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0249.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing two complaints Appellant filed seeking writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that Appellant was not entitled to writs of mandamus or prohibition vacating his convictions and sentence.
Appellant filed both a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the trial court to vacate his criminal convictions and sentence and a complaint for a writ of prohibition against the trial court raising the same underlying issues. The court of appeals denied the writs, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to challenge any violation of his right to counsel; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a writ requiring the trial court to review issues related to the withdrawal of his counsel on direct appeal.
The Supreme Court held Appellant was not entitled to writs of mandamus or prohibition vacating his convictions and sentence.
2023-10-25stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-02492023-0375https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2021-1033.htmlState v. Gwynne2023-10-25T05:07:20-08:002023-10-25T05:07:20-08:00
The Supreme Court vacated its decision in State v. Gwynne, __ N.E.3d __ (Ohio 2022) (Gwynne IV) and affirmed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in this sentencing dispute, holding that the court of appeals properly applied the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) in concluding that the record supported the trial court's consecutive sentence findings.
Appellant pleaded guilty to seventeen counts of second-degree burglary, among other offenses. The trial court made the findings required under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(C)(4) for imposing consecutive sentences and ordered the felony sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of sixty-five years. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in Gwynne IV, holding on de novo review that the findings required by section 2929.14(C)(4) to impose consecutive prison sentences on an offender must be made in consideration of the aggregate term. The Supreme Court then granted the State's motion for reconsideration, vacated its decision in Gwynne IV and affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court's consecutive sentence findings, and those findings must be upheld unless they are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record; and (2) the appellate court properly applied that standard. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2021-1033.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Gwynne" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court vacated its decision in State v. Gwynne, __ N.E.3d __ (Ohio 2022) (Gwynne IV) and affirmed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in this sentencing dispute, holding that the court of appeals properly applied the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) in concluding that the record supported the trial court's consecutive sentence findings.
Appellant pleaded guilty to seventeen counts of second-degree burglary, among other offenses. The trial court made the findings required under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(C)(4) for imposing consecutive sentences and ordered the felony sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of sixty-five years. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in Gwynne IV, holding on de novo review that the findings required by section 2929.14(C)(4) to impose consecutive prison sentences on an offender must be made in consideration of the aggregate term. The Supreme Court then granted the State's motion for reconsideration, vacated its decision in Gwynne IV and affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court's consecutive sentence findings, and those findings must be upheld unless they are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record; and (2) the appellate court properly applied that standard.
The Supreme Court vacated its earlier decision and affirmed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in this sentencing dispute, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court's consecutive sentence findings.
2023-10-25stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioSharon L. Kennedy2021-1033https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1548.htmlState ex rel. Payne v. Rose2023-10-24T05:06:24-08:002023-10-24T05:06:24-08:00
The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this action brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Kevin Payne against Kelly Rose, an inspector at the Richland Correctional Institution (RCI), holding that Payne did not have a cognizable claim in mandamus.
Payne, an inmate at RCI, sent a public-records request to Rose for a copy of, among other things, JPay support ticket number MACI 1220002928. Rose responded that she obtained the requested record and provided a copy of it to Payne. Payne brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Rose to produce the requested record and statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) because Payne received his requested record before instituting this action he never had a cognizable claim in mandamus; and (2) statutory damages did not accrue. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1548.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Payne v. Rose" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this action brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Kevin Payne against Kelly Rose, an inspector at the Richland Correctional Institution (RCI), holding that Payne did not have a cognizable claim in mandamus.
Payne, an inmate at RCI, sent a public-records request to Rose for a copy of, among other things, JPay support ticket number MACI 1220002928. Rose responded that she obtained the requested record and provided a copy of it to Payne. Payne brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Rose to produce the requested record and statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) because Payne received his requested record before instituting this action he never had a cognizable claim in mandamus; and (2) statutory damages did not accrue.
The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this action brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, holding that Relator did not have a cognizable claim in mandamus.
2023-10-24stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1548https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0736.htmlState v. Jordan2023-10-24T05:06:23-08:002023-10-24T05:06:23-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for violating Ohio Rev. Code 2907.06(A)(2), holding that a jury can reasonably infer that a defendant knew a victim to be substantially impaired so as to convict him of sexual imposition under the statute.
Defendant was charged with violating Ohio Rev. Code 2907.06(A)(1) and (2) for his sexual contact with woman who was blind and suffered from unspecified developmental disabilities. The jury found Defendant guilty of both counts of sexual imposition. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction for violating section 2907.06(A)(2), concluding that the victim was not substantially impaired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) knowledge of a victim's "substantial impairment" can be proved both by the defendant's knowledge of the victim's blindness and evidence of the nature of the interactions between the defendant and the developmentally disabled victim; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to find that Defendant knew that the victim's blindness, together with her developmental disabilities, substantially impaired her ability to appraise the nature of and control of Defendant's conduct. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0736.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Jordan" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for violating Ohio Rev. Code 2907.06(A)(2), holding that a jury can reasonably infer that a defendant knew a victim to be substantially impaired so as to convict him of sexual imposition under the statute.
Defendant was charged with violating Ohio Rev. Code 2907.06(A)(1) and (2) for his sexual contact with woman who was blind and suffered from unspecified developmental disabilities. The jury found Defendant guilty of both counts of sexual imposition. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction for violating section 2907.06(A)(2), concluding that the victim was not substantially impaired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) knowledge of a victim's "substantial impairment" can be proved both by the defendant's knowledge of the victim's blindness and evidence of the nature of the interactions between the defendant and the developmentally disabled victim; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to find that Defendant knew that the victim's blindness, together with her developmental disabilities, substantially impaired her ability to appraise the nature of and control of Defendant's conduct.
The Supreme Court held that a jury can reasonably infer that a defendant knew a victim to be substantially impaired so as to convict him of sexual imposition under Ohio Rev. Code 2907.06(A)(2).
2023-10-24stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioSharon L. Kennedy2022-0736https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0863.htmlAcuity, A Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co.2023-10-19T05:07:35-08:002023-10-19T05:07:35-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Acuity was not required to provide coverage for the car accident in this case, holding that Acuity must provide coverage for the accident.
Ashton Smith, who was insured by Acuity and had borrowed a friend's car, was involved in an accident. The car's owner was insured by Progressive Speciality Insurance Company. Under the Progressive policy, Smith was not an "insured person" when he was driving his friend's car, but he was covered by the plain language of the Acuity policy. The trial court found Acuity responsible for providing liability coverage. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the plain language of the two policies at issue, Acuity was responsible for providing coverage. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0863.html" target="_blank">View "Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Acuity was not required to provide coverage for the car accident in this case, holding that Acuity must provide coverage for the accident.
Ashton Smith, who was insured by Acuity and had borrowed a friend's car, was involved in an accident. The car's owner was insured by Progressive Speciality Insurance Company. Under the Progressive policy, Smith was not an "insured person" when he was driving his friend's car, but he was covered by the plain language of the Acuity policy. The trial court found Acuity responsible for providing liability coverage. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the plain language of the two policies at issue, Acuity was responsible for providing coverage.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment concluding that Acuity was not required to provide coverage for a car accident, holding that the court of appeals erred.
2023-10-19stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioDeWine2022-0863https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0053.htmlIn re Application of Alamo Solar I, LLC2023-10-18T05:05:53-08:002023-10-18T05:05:53-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Ohio Power Siting Board approving two large solar farms that were proposed to be built in Preble County, holding that the Board's order was neither unlawful nor unreasonable.
The General Assembly authorized commercial solar farms in Ohio but made their construction conditional on the Board's approval. The Board approved the solar farms after its staff agreed to stipulations imposing a number of conditions on the construction and operation of the facilities. Certain citizens appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was nothing unlawful about the Board's adherence to its own regulations and that the Board did not act unreasonably in making the determinations required by Ohio Rev. Code 4906.10(A). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0053.html" target="_blank">View "In re Application of Alamo Solar I, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Ohio Power Siting Board approving two large solar farms that were proposed to be built in Preble County, holding that the Board's order was neither unlawful nor unreasonable.
The General Assembly authorized commercial solar farms in Ohio but made their construction conditional on the Board's approval. The Board approved the solar farms after its staff agreed to stipulations imposing a number of conditions on the construction and operation of the facilities. Certain citizens appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was nothing unlawful about the Board's adherence to its own regulations and that the Board did not act unreasonably in making the determinations required by Ohio Rev. Code 4906.10(A).
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Ohio Power Siting Board approving two large solar farms, holding that the Board's order was neither unlawful nor unreasonable.
2023-10-18stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioDeWine2022-00532022-0054https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1390.htmlState ex rel. Rarden v. Butler County Common Pleas Court2023-10-17T05:06:14-08:002023-10-17T05:06:14-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition ordering the trial court to vacate his criminal sentence, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus or prohibition.
Appellant was convicted of escape, retaliation, and other offenses and sentenced to 26.5 years in prison. Appellant later brought the current action seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate his sentencing entries and to grant any other relief to which he was "entitled." The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to raise his claim that the Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant be expressly informed of his right to counsel at each critical stage of the proceeding and that the trial court's failure to do so in his case rendered his sentence void. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1390.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Rarden v. Butler County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition ordering the trial court to vacate his criminal sentence, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus or prohibition.
Appellant was convicted of escape, retaliation, and other offenses and sentenced to 26.5 years in prison. Appellant later brought the current action seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate his sentencing entries and to grant any other relief to which he was "entitled." The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to raise his claim that the Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant be expressly informed of his right to counsel at each critical stage of the proceeding and that the trial court's failure to do so in his case rendered his sentence void.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition ordering the trial court to vacate his criminal sentence, holding that there was no error.
2023-10-17stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1390https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0573.htmlHanneman Family Funeral Home & Crematorium v. Orians2023-10-12T05:05:50-08:002023-10-12T05:05:50-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this complaint alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with business contacts, tortious interference with business relationships, and conversion, holding that there was no error.
Plaintiff, Hanneman Family Funeral Home and Crematorium, purchased a funeral home but did not retain the funeral home's director, Patrick Orians. Orians accepted employment at another funeral home, Chiles-Laman Funeral & Cremation Services, and used Plaintiff's customer information to solicit business for Chiles-Laman. Plaintiff sued Orians and Chiles-Laman (collectively, Defendants). The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the information at issue was not protected by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act as a trade secret; and (2) Plaintiff's tort claims were preempted by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0573.html" target="_blank">View "Hanneman Family Funeral Home & Crematorium v. Orians" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this complaint alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with business contacts, tortious interference with business relationships, and conversion, holding that there was no error.
Plaintiff, Hanneman Family Funeral Home and Crematorium, purchased a funeral home but did not retain the funeral home's director, Patrick Orians. Orians accepted employment at another funeral home, Chiles-Laman Funeral & Cremation Services, and used Plaintiff's customer information to solicit business for Chiles-Laman. Plaintiff sued Orians and Chiles-Laman (collectively, Defendants). The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the information at issue was not protected by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act as a trade secret; and (2) Plaintiff's tort claims were preempted by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this complaint alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with business contacts, tortious interference with business relationships, and conversion, holding that there was no error.
2023-10-12stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioSharon L. Kennedy2022-0573https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0314.htmlState ex rel. Mobley v. Tyack2023-10-11T05:05:05-08:002023-10-11T05:05:05-08:00
The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal challenging the decision of the court of appeals denying his motion for leave to continue a mandamus action, holding that Appellant's appeal was prohibited under Ohio Rev. Code 2323.52(G).
Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that he made a public-records request to Appellee, Franklin County Prosecutor G. Gary Tyack, under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, for certain documents, and that Tyack had failed to answer his request. Thereafter, in a separate case, Mobley was declared a vexatious litigator. Mobley filed a motion for leave to continue his mandamus action as a vexatious litigator, but the court of appeals denied the motion and dismissed the mandamus action. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0314.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Mobley v. Tyack" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal challenging the decision of the court of appeals denying his motion for leave to continue a mandamus action, holding that Appellant's appeal was prohibited under Ohio Rev. Code 2323.52(G).
Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that he made a public-records request to Appellee, Franklin County Prosecutor G. Gary Tyack, under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, for certain documents, and that Tyack had failed to answer his request. Thereafter, in a separate case, Mobley was declared a vexatious litigator. Mobley filed a motion for leave to continue his mandamus action as a vexatious litigator, but the court of appeals denied the motion and dismissed the mandamus action. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal challenging the appellate court's denial of his motion for leave to continue a mandamus action, holding that Appellant's appeal was prohibited under Ohio Rev. Code 2323.52(G).
2023-10-11stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0314https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0253.htmlGrinnell v. Cool2023-10-11T05:05:05-08:002023-10-11T05:05:05-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the trial court in which he was convicted lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the petition for Appellant's failure to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C).
Appellant was convicted on two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to two concurrent life sentences. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and failed properly to journalize his sentencing entry. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for Appellant's failure to comply with section 2969.25(C). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petition was properly dismissed due to Appellant's failure to submit a certified statement of his inmate account, as required by section 2969.25(C)(1). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0253.html" target="_blank">View "Grinnell v. Cool" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the trial court in which he was convicted lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the petition for Appellant's failure to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C).
Appellant was convicted on two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to two concurrent life sentences. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and failed properly to journalize his sentencing entry. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for Appellant's failure to comply with section 2969.25(C). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petition was properly dismissed due to Appellant's failure to submit a certified statement of his inmate account, as required by section 2969.25(C)(1).
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the petition for Appellant's failure to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C).
2023-10-11stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0253https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0113.htmlState ex rel. Barr v. Wesson2023-10-10T05:05:45-08:002023-10-10T05:05:45-08:00
The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering Respondent James Wesson, the warden's assistant at the Grafton Correctional Institution (CGI), to, within fourteen days, either produce records in response to a December 2022 public-records request or show cause why the records could not be produced, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.
Relator, an inmate at CGI, sent a public-records request by electronic kite to Wesson requesting three records. Relator subsequently commenced this mandamus action asking the Court to order Wesson to provide the requested records. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ ordering Wesson to produce a copy of a mental-health kite with reference number GCI0422002492 from April 21, 2022 or to show cause why it could not be produced, holding that Relator established that he was entitled to the writ. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0113.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering Respondent James Wesson, the warden's assistant at the Grafton Correctional Institution (CGI), to, within fourteen days, either produce records in response to a December 2022 public-records request or show cause why the records could not be produced, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.
Relator, an inmate at CGI, sent a public-records request by electronic kite to Wesson requesting three records. Relator subsequently commenced this mandamus action asking the Court to order Wesson to provide the requested records. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ ordering Wesson to produce a copy of a mental-health kite with reference number GCI0422002492 from April 21, 2022 or to show cause why it could not be produced, holding that Relator established that he was entitled to the writ.
The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering Respondent to either produce records in response to a December 2022 public-records request or show cause why the records could not be produced, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.
2023-10-10stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0113https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0121.htmlState v. Williams2023-10-10T05:05:45-08:002023-10-10T05:05:45-08:00
In this case concerning how an Ohio prisoner is to enforce his constitutional right to a speedy trial on an untried indictment the Supreme Court held that a prisoner satisfies the "causes to be delivered" requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.401 when he delivers the written notice and the request to the warden where he is imprisoned, even if the warden fails to deliver the notice and the request to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court.
Appellant, who was indicted on counts of aggravated robbery and robbery, moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant had strictly complied with section 2941.401 when he provided written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition and that the 180-day speedy trial time was not tolled by the warden's failure to comply with his duty to send out Appellant's written notices and requests to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant had not strictly complied with the requirements of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant caused to be delivered his written notice and request for final disposition under the statute when he provided them to the warden. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0121.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law</a>
In this case concerning how an Ohio prisoner is to enforce his constitutional right to a speedy trial on an untried indictment the Supreme Court held that a prisoner satisfies the "causes to be delivered" requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.401 when he delivers the written notice and the request to the warden where he is imprisoned, even if the warden fails to deliver the notice and the request to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court.
Appellant, who was indicted on counts of aggravated robbery and robbery, moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant had strictly complied with section 2941.401 when he provided written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition and that the 180-day speedy trial time was not tolled by the warden's failure to comply with his duty to send out Appellant's written notices and requests to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant had not strictly complied with the requirements of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant caused to be delivered his written notice and request for final disposition under the statute when he provided them to the warden.
The Supreme Court held that a prisoner satisfies the "causes to be delivered" requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.401 when he delivers the written notice and the request to the warden where he is imprisoned, even if the warden fails to deliver the notice and the request to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court.
2023-10-10stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioDonnelly2022-0121https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1227.htmlState ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections2023-10-08T13:16:35-08:002023-10-08T13:16:35-08:00
The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Relator ordering Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and its individual members to remove a proposed East Cleveland city-charter amendment from the November 7, 2023 general election ballot and refrain from going forward with a special mayoral-recall election, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writ.
Relator, the mayor of East Cleveland, sought a writ of prohibition ordering Respondents - the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and its individual members - to remove a proposed city-charter amendment from the November 2023 general election ballot and refrain from proceeding with a May 5, 2023 mayoral-recall election. Relator further sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction asking that the elections and the mayoral recall not go forward. The Supreme Court denied the writ and denied as moot Relator's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writ of prohibition. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1227.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Relator ordering Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and its individual members to remove a proposed East Cleveland city-charter amendment from the November 7, 2023 general election ballot and refrain from going forward with a special mayoral-recall election, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writ.
Relator, the mayor of East Cleveland, sought a writ of prohibition ordering Respondents - the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and its individual members - to remove a proposed city-charter amendment from the November 2023 general election ballot and refrain from proceeding with a May 5, 2023 mayoral-recall election. Relator further sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction asking that the elections and the mayoral recall not go forward. The Supreme Court denied the writ and denied as moot Relator's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writ of prohibition.
The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Relator ordering Cuyahoga County Board of Elections to remove a proposed East Cleveland city-charter amendment from the November 7, 2023 general election ballot and refrain from going forward with a special mayoral-recall election, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writ.
2023-10-08stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-1227https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1213.htmlState ex rel. Hildreth v. LaRose2023-10-08T13:16:34-08:002023-10-08T13:16:34-08:00
In this expedited election case, the Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents to sustain a protest compelling Secretary of State Frank LaRose and the Logan County Board of Elections to sustain a protest and remove an initiative from the November 2023 general election ballot, holding that LaRose and the board abused its discretion and disregarded the law in overruling Relators' protest.
Petitioners collected signatures for an initiative petition concerning a proposed ordinance regarding drag artists and drag shows. The part-petitions that were filed, however, differed from the circulated part-petitions. The board found that the petition contained a sufficient number of valid signatures. Relators filed a protest, but Secretary LaRose voted against the protest. Relators then filed this mandamus action seeking to compel Respondents to sustain their protest. The Supreme Court sustained the writ, holding that the petition as filed did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 731.31 because each filed part-petition included a title that was not presented to the electors who signed it. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1213.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Hildreth v. LaRose" on Justia Law</a>
In this expedited election case, the Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents to sustain a protest compelling Secretary of State Frank LaRose and the Logan County Board of Elections to sustain a protest and remove an initiative from the November 2023 general election ballot, holding that LaRose and the board abused its discretion and disregarded the law in overruling Relators' protest.
Petitioners collected signatures for an initiative petition concerning a proposed ordinance regarding drag artists and drag shows. The part-petitions that were filed, however, differed from the circulated part-petitions. The board found that the petition contained a sufficient number of valid signatures. Relators filed a protest, but Secretary LaRose voted against the protest. Relators then filed this mandamus action seeking to compel Respondents to sustain their protest. The Supreme Court sustained the writ, holding that the petition as filed did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 731.31 because each filed part-petition included a title that was not presented to the electors who signed it.
In this expedited election case, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State and Logan County Board of Elections abused their discretion and disregarded the law in overruling Relators' protest seeking to remove an initiative from the November 2023 general election ballot.
2023-10-08stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-1213https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1180.htmlState ex rel. Miller v. Union County Bd. of Elections2023-10-07T16:16:37-08:002023-10-07T16:16:37-08:00
The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Union County Board of Elections to place a referendum on the November 7, 2023 general election ballot in this expedited election case, holding that the Union County Board of Elections and Secretary of State based their discretion and acted in clear disregard of the applicable law when they removed the referendum from the ballot.
On the same day that the Marysville City Council passed an ordinance to annex 263.25 acres adjoining Marysville it passed an ordinance to rezone the territory from agricultural use to a planned-unit development. Relators circulated referendum petitions for the annexation ordinance, and the board certified the referendum to the ballot. Respondent filed an election protest to the referendum. The Secretary of State sustained the protest and excluded the referendum from the ballot. Relators then brought this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to place the referendum on the November 2023 general election ballot. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that it was an abuse of discretion to remove the referendum from the ballot. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1180.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Miller v. Union County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Union County Board of Elections to place a referendum on the November 7, 2023 general election ballot in this expedited election case, holding that the Union County Board of Elections and Secretary of State based their discretion and acted in clear disregard of the applicable law when they removed the referendum from the ballot.
On the same day that the Marysville City Council passed an ordinance to annex 263.25 acres adjoining Marysville it passed an ordinance to rezone the territory from agricultural use to a planned-unit development. Relators circulated referendum petitions for the annexation ordinance, and the board certified the referendum to the ballot. Respondent filed an election protest to the referendum. The Secretary of State sustained the protest and excluded the referendum from the ballot. Relators then brought this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to place the referendum on the November 2023 general election ballot. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that it was an abuse of discretion to remove the referendum from the ballot.
The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus in this expedited election case, holding that the Union County Board of Elections and Secretary of State abused their discretion and acted in clear disregard of the applicable law when they removed a referendum from the November 7, 2023 ballot.
2023-10-07stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-1180https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1469.htmlState ex rel. Cogan v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio2023-10-05T05:05:40-08:002023-10-05T05:05:40-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals issuing a limited writ of mandamus and ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to determine Appellee's appropriate pre-injury visual baseline and to apply that baseline to his request for compensation, holding that the Commission has discretion to use a claimant's vision as corrected by a hard contact lens as the claimant's pre-injury visual baseline.
Appellee sustained an industrial injury to his right eye and underwent three surgical procedures to address the conditions allowed under his workers' compensation claim. Appellee then sought scheduled-loss compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57. After staff hearing officer denied Appellee's request Appellee filed a mandamus action arguing that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the writ was appropriate to determine Appellee's pre-injury visual baseline and to then use that baseline to determine whether the medical evidence supports an award for total loss of sight under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1469.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Cogan v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals issuing a limited writ of mandamus and ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to determine Appellee's appropriate pre-injury visual baseline and to apply that baseline to his request for compensation, holding that the Commission has discretion to use a claimant's vision as corrected by a hard contact lens as the claimant's pre-injury visual baseline.
Appellee sustained an industrial injury to his right eye and underwent three surgical procedures to address the conditions allowed under his workers' compensation claim. Appellee then sought scheduled-loss compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57. After staff hearing officer denied Appellee's request Appellee filed a mandamus action arguing that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the writ was appropriate to determine Appellee's pre-injury visual baseline and to then use that baseline to determine whether the medical evidence supports an award for total loss of sight under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B).
The Supreme Court held that the Industrial Commission of Ohio has discretion to use a claimant's vision as corrected by a hard contact lens as the claimant's pre-injury visual baseline.
2023-10-05stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1469https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1203.htmlState v. Toran2023-10-04T05:07:19-08:002023-10-04T05:07:19-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions for felony charges stemming from an inventory search of an impounded truck that Defendant was driving when he was pulled over by a law enforcement officer, holding that the search was reasonable and lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Law enforcement performed an inventory search as to the truck at issue and found a handgun in the truck's right door panel. After Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence of the gun the trial court found him guilty. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the search was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the state's evidence was insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the inventory search was lawful. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1203.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Toran" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions for felony charges stemming from an inventory search of an impounded truck that Defendant was driving when he was pulled over by a law enforcement officer, holding that the search was reasonable and lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Law enforcement performed an inventory search as to the truck at issue and found a handgun in the truck's right door panel. After Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence of the gun the trial court found him guilty. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the search was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the state's evidence was insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the inventory search was lawful.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions, holding that the underlying search was not unreasonable.
2023-10-04stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioSharon L. Kennedy2022-1203https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1187.htmlState ex rel. Levitin v. Industrial Commission2023-10-04T05:07:18-08:002023-10-04T05:07:18-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the Industrial Commission of Ohio did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's request for a violation of specific safety requirements (VSSR) award, holding that there was no error.
Appellant suffered a work-related hand injury while working for Employer and requested an award in addition to her workers' compensation benefits, alleging that her injury was a result of Employer's VSSR violation. The Commission found that Appellant did not commit a VSSR and denied the request for an additional award. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant's motion for an oral argument, holding that some evidence in the record supported the Commission's decision. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1187.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Levitin v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the Industrial Commission of Ohio did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's request for a violation of specific safety requirements (VSSR) award, holding that there was no error.
Appellant suffered a work-related hand injury while working for Employer and requested an award in addition to her workers' compensation benefits, alleging that her injury was a result of Employer's VSSR violation. The Commission found that Appellant did not commit a VSSR and denied the request for an additional award. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant's motion for an oral argument, holding that some evidence in the record supported the Commission's decision.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' conclusion that the Industrial Commission of Ohio did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's request for a violation of specific safety requirements award, holding that there was no error.
2023-10-04stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1187https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1052.htmlState ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking County Common Pleas Court2023-10-03T05:06:31-08:002023-10-03T05:06:31-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment in favor of the Hocking County Common Pleas Court and Judge Dale Crawford in Appellant's action for writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims.
Appellant was found guilty of assaulting a peace officer. The court of appeals affirmed. About seven years later, Appellant filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition alleging that the trial court deprived her of her constitutional right to counsel and lacked jurisdiction to hold the sentencing hearing. The court of appeals concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that res judicata barred this mandamus and prohibition action. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1052.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment in favor of the Hocking County Common Pleas Court and Judge Dale Crawford in Appellant's action for writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims.
Appellant was found guilty of assaulting a peace officer. The court of appeals affirmed. About seven years later, Appellant filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition alleging that the trial court deprived her of her constitutional right to counsel and lacked jurisdiction to hold the sentencing hearing. The court of appeals concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that res judicata barred this mandamus and prohibition action.
The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissing Appellant's action for writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that res judicata barred Appellant's claims.
2023-10-03stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioSharon L. Kennedy2022-1052https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0787.htmlThomas v. Logue2023-10-03T05:06:30-08:002023-10-03T05:06:30-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the court of claims seeking to recover a portion of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC)'s subrogated award in this case, holding that the BWC's attempted expansion of subrogation was unlawful.
The BWC allowed Lamar Thomas's workers' compensation claim for some conditions he received in an industrial accident caused by a third party but disallowed an additional claim for other conditions linked to the workplace accident based on a second opinion rendered during a medical review. When Thomas settled his personal injury case against a third-party tortfeasor, the BWC recouped through subrogation the cost of the medical review it had used to deny Thomas's additional claim. Thomas brought suit against the BWC. The court of claims denied the complaint via judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the medical review the BWC obtained was not an expense recoverable in subrogation. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0787.html" target="_blank">View "Thomas v. Logue" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the court of claims seeking to recover a portion of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC)'s subrogated award in this case, holding that the BWC's attempted expansion of subrogation was unlawful.
The BWC allowed Lamar Thomas's workers' compensation claim for some conditions he received in an industrial accident caused by a third party but disallowed an additional claim for other conditions linked to the workplace accident based on a second opinion rendered during a medical review. When Thomas settled his personal injury case against a third-party tortfeasor, the BWC recouped through subrogation the cost of the medical review it had used to deny Thomas's additional claim. Thomas brought suit against the BWC. The court of claims denied the complaint via judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the medical review the BWC obtained was not an expense recoverable in subrogation.
The Supreme Court held that the Bureau of Workers' Compensation's attempted expansion of subrogation was unlawful in this case.
2023-10-03stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioBrunner2022-0787https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1154.htmlState ex rel. Howard v. Watson2023-09-27T05:05:28-08:002023-09-27T05:05:28-08:00
The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus ordering Respondents to provide records responsive to request numbers 2, 3, and 4 from Jeffrey Howard's August 2022 public records request and denied the writ as to the remaining public records requests, holding that Howard was entitled to mandamus in part.
Howard, an inmate, brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus to produce records and documents in response to several records requests. Howard sought an award of statutory damages as to each request. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ ordering Respondents to provide records responsive to three public records requests; and (2) denied the writ as to the remaining requests because Howard no longer sought mandamus relief as to those public records requests. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1154.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Howard v. Watson" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus ordering Respondents to provide records responsive to request numbers 2, 3, and 4 from Jeffrey Howard's August 2022 public records request and denied the writ as to the remaining public records requests, holding that Howard was entitled to mandamus in part.
Howard, an inmate, brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus to produce records and documents in response to several records requests. Howard sought an award of statutory damages as to each request. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ ordering Respondents to provide records responsive to three public records requests; and (2) denied the writ as to the remaining requests because Howard no longer sought mandamus relief as to those public records requests.
The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus ordering Respondents to provide records responsive to Jeffrey Howard's public records requests, holding that Howard was entitled to mandamus in part.
2023-09-27stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1154https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0596.htmlWildcat Drilling, LLC v. Discovery Oil & Gas, LLC2023-09-27T05:05:27-08:002023-09-27T05:05:27-08:00
In this discretionary appeal brought by Discovery Oil and Gas, LLC to determine whether an express indemnification provision in its contract with Wildcat Drilling, LLC evinced a clear intent by the parties to abrogate the common-law notice requirements for indemnification set forth in Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 53 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1944), the Supreme Court held that the requirements announced in Globe Indemnity did not apply.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) when the parties have entered into a contract containing an express indemnification provision, the common-law notice requirements set forth in Globe Indemnity do not apply, and the parties are bound by the terms of their contract because the provision evinces a clear intent by the parties to abrogate the common law; and (2) the language of the contract in this case evicted the parties' clear intent to abrogate the common-law notice requirements for indemnification. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0596.html" target="_blank">View "Wildcat Drilling, LLC v. Discovery Oil & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
In this discretionary appeal brought by Discovery Oil and Gas, LLC to determine whether an express indemnification provision in its contract with Wildcat Drilling, LLC evinced a clear intent by the parties to abrogate the common-law notice requirements for indemnification set forth in Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 53 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1944), the Supreme Court held that the requirements announced in Globe Indemnity did not apply.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) when the parties have entered into a contract containing an express indemnification provision, the common-law notice requirements set forth in Globe Indemnity do not apply, and the parties are bound by the terms of their contract because the provision evinces a clear intent by the parties to abrogate the common law; and (2) the language of the contract in this case evicted the parties' clear intent to abrogate the common-law notice requirements for indemnification.
In this discretionary appeal brought to determine whether an express indemnification provision in a contract evinced a clear intent by the parties to abrogate the common-law notice requirements for indemnification set forth in Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 53 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1944), the Supreme Court held that the requirements announced in Globe Indemnity did not apply.
2023-09-27stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioFischer2022-0596https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0148.htmlState ex rel. Ames v. Portage County Bd. of Commissioners2023-09-26T05:05:41-08:002023-09-26T05:05:41-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under the Open Meetings Act, Ohio Rev. Code 121.22 and denying Plaintiff's request for an award of statutory damages under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(C)(2), holding that the court of appeals erred in its analysis of the statutory damages issue.
In an earlier appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' grant of summary judgment for the Portage County Board of Commissioners, the Portage County Solid Waste Management District Board of Commissioners (SWMD) and the Portage County Court of Common Pleas and remanded the case with instructions that the court of appeals to determine whether Plaintiff was entitled to relief under the Open Meetings Act and Public Records Act. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for the board and the SWMD and denied statutory damages. The Supreme Court remanded the matter, holding that Plaintiff was entitled to an award of statutory damages. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0148.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Ames v. Portage County Bd. of Commissioners" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under the Open Meetings Act, Ohio Rev. Code 121.22 and denying Plaintiff's request for an award of statutory damages under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(C)(2), holding that the court of appeals erred in its analysis of the statutory damages issue.
In an earlier appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' grant of summary judgment for the Portage County Board of Commissioners, the Portage County Solid Waste Management District Board of Commissioners (SWMD) and the Portage County Court of Common Pleas and remanded the case with instructions that the court of appeals to determine whether Plaintiff was entitled to relief under the Open Meetings Act and Public Records Act. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for the board and the SWMD and denied statutory damages. The Supreme Court remanded the matter, holding that Plaintiff was entitled to an award of statutory damages.
The Supreme Court reversed in part the court of appeals' decision granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under the Open Meetings Act and denying Plaintiff's request for statutory damages under the Public Records Act, holding that the court of appeals erred in its analysis of the statutory damages issue.
2023-09-26stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioSharon L. Kennedy2022-0148https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1136.htmlState ex rel. Robinson v. Crawford County Bd. of Elections2023-09-21T13:07:26-08:002023-09-21T13:07:26-08:00
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus ordering the Crawford County Board of Elections to certify Relator's name as a candidate for a seat on the Galion City Council on the November 7 general election ballot, holding that the Board properly invalidated a part-petition in its entirety.
The Board notified Relator by letter that it would not certify her name as a candidate for a seat on the Galion City Council after determining that one of the part-petitions circulated by Relator contained two signatures that were signed by the same person and invalidating the part-petition in its entirety. Relator subsequently commenced this mandamus action, arguing that the Board should not have invalidated the entire part-petition containing the forged signature. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Board properly invalidated the part-petition on which one signatory signed both her name and her husband's name. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1136.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Crawford County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus ordering the Crawford County Board of Elections to certify Relator's name as a candidate for a seat on the Galion City Council on the November 7 general election ballot, holding that the Board properly invalidated a part-petition in its entirety.
The Board notified Relator by letter that it would not certify her name as a candidate for a seat on the Galion City Council after determining that one of the part-petitions circulated by Relator contained two signatures that were signed by the same person and invalidating the part-petition in its entirety. Relator subsequently commenced this mandamus action, arguing that the Board should not have invalidated the entire part-petition containing the forged signature. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Board properly invalidated the part-petition on which one signatory signed both her name and her husband's name.
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus ordering the Crawford County Board of Elections to certify Relator's name as a candidate for a seat on the Galion City Council on the November 7 general election ballot, holding that the Board properly invalidated a part-petition in its entirety.
2023-09-21stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-1136https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1118.htmlState ex rel. Crenshaw v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections2023-09-21T13:07:25-08:002023-09-21T13:07:25-08:00
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus and dismissed declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims sought by Mariah Crenshaw to force the removal of every candidate for the offices of judge and clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court from the November 2023 ballot, holding that Crenshaw failed to establish that she was entitled to the writ.
In this original action, Crenshaw argued that each candidate in question failed to file a nominating petition signed by the requisite number of electors and that one candidate did not meet the residency requirements and sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prevent the board of elections from permitting future candidates for the offices of judge and clerk to appear on the ballot without complying with section 5 of the Cleveland City Charter. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) the signature and residency requirements of section 5 of the city charter do not apply to candidates for the offices of judge or clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court; and (2) the declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1118.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Crenshaw v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus and dismissed declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims sought by Mariah Crenshaw to force the removal of every candidate for the offices of judge and clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court from the November 2023 ballot, holding that Crenshaw failed to establish that she was entitled to the writ.
In this original action, Crenshaw argued that each candidate in question failed to file a nominating petition signed by the requisite number of electors and that one candidate did not meet the residency requirements and sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prevent the board of elections from permitting future candidates for the offices of judge and clerk to appear on the ballot without complying with section 5 of the Cleveland City Charter. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) the signature and residency requirements of section 5 of the city charter do not apply to candidates for the offices of judge or clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court; and (2) the declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus and dismissed declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims sought by Mariah Crenshaw to force the removal of every candidate for the offices of judge and clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court from the November 2023 ballot, holding that Crenshaw was not entitled to the writ.
2023-09-21stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-1118https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1097.htmlState ex rel. Lambert v. Medina County Bd. of Elections2023-09-20T13:05:55-08:002023-09-20T13:05:55-08:00
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request seeking writ of mandamus compelling the Medina County Board of Elections to place a local liquor option on the November 7, 2023 general election ballot in this expedited election case, holding that Petitioner's petition was invalid in its entirety under Ohio Rev. Code 4301.333(C)(2).
Petitioner sought from the board of elections a petition for the purpose of obtaining a permit that would allow him to serve liquor on Sundays. The board of elections denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner's failure to attach the affidavit required under section 4301.333 meant that his petition was invalid under section 4301.333(C)(2). Petitioner subsequently sought mandamus relief seeking an order compelling the board to place a local liquor option on the ballot or, alternatively, an order compelling the board to provide him with certain information. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Petitioner did not advance a compelling reason as to why the local option should be placed on the ballot; and (2) Petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief based on any failure of the board of elections to follow the procedure set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4301.33. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1097.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Lambert v. Medina County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request seeking writ of mandamus compelling the Medina County Board of Elections to place a local liquor option on the November 7, 2023 general election ballot in this expedited election case, holding that Petitioner's petition was invalid in its entirety under Ohio Rev. Code 4301.333(C)(2).
Petitioner sought from the board of elections a petition for the purpose of obtaining a permit that would allow him to serve liquor on Sundays. The board of elections denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner's failure to attach the affidavit required under section 4301.333 meant that his petition was invalid under section 4301.333(C)(2). Petitioner subsequently sought mandamus relief seeking an order compelling the board to place a local liquor option on the ballot or, alternatively, an order compelling the board to provide him with certain information. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Petitioner did not advance a compelling reason as to why the local option should be placed on the ballot; and (2) Petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief based on any failure of the board of elections to follow the procedure set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4301.33.
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's mandamus request in this expedited election case, holding that Petitioner's petition was invalid in its entirety under Ohio Rev. Code 4301.333(C)(2).
2023-09-20stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-1097https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0458.htmlIn re Application of East Ohio Gas Co.2023-09-20T05:05:20-08:002023-09-20T05:05:20-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio approving a stipulation that authorized Dominion Energy Ohio to implement its capital expenditure program rider (CEP Rider), holding that the Commission's orders were not unlawful or unreasonable.
Dominion filed an application to recover the costs of its capital expenditure program by establishing the CEP Rider at issue. Dominion and the Commission jointly filed a stipulation asking the Commission to approve the application subject to the staff's recommendations. The Commission modified and approved the stipulation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not violate an important regulatory principle in adopting the 9.91 percent rate of return; (2) the Commission did not inconsistently apply its precedent; (3) the Commission did not violate Ohio Rev. Code 4903.09; and (4) Appellants' manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument failed. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0458.html" target="_blank">View "In re Application of East Ohio Gas Co." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio approving a stipulation that authorized Dominion Energy Ohio to implement its capital expenditure program rider (CEP Rider), holding that the Commission's orders were not unlawful or unreasonable.
Dominion filed an application to recover the costs of its capital expenditure program by establishing the CEP Rider at issue. Dominion and the Commission jointly filed a stipulation asking the Commission to approve the application subject to the staff's recommendations. The Commission modified and approved the stipulation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not violate an important regulatory principle in adopting the 9.91 percent rate of return; (2) the Commission did not inconsistently apply its precedent; (3) the Commission did not violate Ohio Rev. Code 4903.09; and (4) Appellants' manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument failed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio's decision approving a stipulation that authorized Dominion Energy Ohio to implement its capital expenditure program rider, holding that the Commission's orders were not unlawful or unreasonable.
2023-09-20stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioStewart2022-0458https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1088.htmlState ex rel. Ohioans for Reproductive Rights v. Ohio Ballot Bd.2023-09-19T14:35:30-08:002023-09-19T14:35:30-08:00
The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State Frank LaRose to reconvene the Ohio Ballot Board and directed the ballot board to adopt ballot language that accurately described a proposed amendment regulating actions of the "State," holding that the term "citizens of the State" in the ballot language was misleading.
At issue was a constitutional amendment proposed by initiative petition titled "The Right to Reproductive Freedom with protections for Health and Safety" and the ballot language adopted by the ballot board for the November 7, 2023 election. Relators sought a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ ordering the ballot board and LaRose to reconvene and adopt ballot language that accurately conveyed that the proposed amendment limited the ability of the state, as defined by the amendment, to burden, penalize, or prohibit abortion. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1088.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Ohioans for Reproductive Rights v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State Frank LaRose to reconvene the Ohio Ballot Board and directed the ballot board to adopt ballot language that accurately described a proposed amendment regulating actions of the "State," holding that the term "citizens of the State" in the ballot language was misleading.
At issue was a constitutional amendment proposed by initiative petition titled "The Right to Reproductive Freedom with protections for Health and Safety" and the ballot language adopted by the ballot board for the November 7, 2023 election. Relators sought a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ ordering the ballot board and LaRose to reconvene and adopt ballot language that accurately conveyed that the proposed amendment limited the ability of the state, as defined by the amendment, to burden, penalize, or prohibit abortion.
The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State Frank LaRose to reconvene the Ohio Ballot Board and directing the ballot board to adopt ballot language that accurately described a proposed amendment regulating actions of the "State," holding that the term "citizens of the State" in the ballot language was misleading.
2023-09-19stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-1088https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2021-1250.htmlState ex rel. Fluty v. Raiff2023-09-19T05:06:22-08:002023-09-19T05:06:22-08:00
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Ashley Fluty against the City of Broadview Heights as well as Fluty's requests for statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs, holding that Fluty was not entitled to any of the requested relief.
Fluty brought this action seeking to compel Broadview Heights to produce records related to an incident of suspected child abuse and also requested awards of statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs. The Supreme Court denied all requested relief, holding (1) Fluty failed to show that she had a clear legal right to the requested writ of mandamus and that Broadview Heights had a clear legal duty to provide it; (2) Fluty's arguments supporting her claim for an award of statutory damages were unavailing; and (3) attorney fees and court costs were improper because Broadview Heights did not engage in bad faith. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2021-1250.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Fluty v. Raiff" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Ashley Fluty against the City of Broadview Heights as well as Fluty's requests for statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs, holding that Fluty was not entitled to any of the requested relief.
Fluty brought this action seeking to compel Broadview Heights to produce records related to an incident of suspected child abuse and also requested awards of statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs. The Supreme Court denied all requested relief, holding (1) Fluty failed to show that she had a clear legal right to the requested writ of mandamus and that Broadview Heights had a clear legal duty to provide it; (2) Fluty's arguments supporting her claim for an award of statutory damages were unavailing; and (3) attorney fees and court costs were improper because Broadview Heights did not engage in bad faith.
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought under Ohio's Public Records Act, holding that Relator was not entitled to relief.
2023-09-19stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2021-1250https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1081.htmlState ex rel. Ottawa Hills Local School District Bd. of Education v. Lucas County Bd. of Elections2023-09-15T13:37:18-08:002023-09-15T13:37:18-08:00
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by the Board of Education of the Ottawa Hills Local School District ordering the Lucas County Board of Elections to place a tax levy on the November 7, 2023 general election ballot, holding that the Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or act in disregard of applicable legal provisions when it refused to place the levy on the ballot.
On August 28, 2023, the Board of Education brought this original action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the Board of Elections to certify the levy at issue and place it on the November 2023 general election ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the Board of Education failed to certify an accurate resolution to proceed to the Board of Elections "not later than four p.m. of the ninetieth day before the day of the election," as required by Ohio Rev. Code 35.01.02(F); and (2) the Board of Education's error was not a technical violation that did not affect the public interest. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-1081.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Ottawa Hills Local School District Bd. of Education v. Lucas County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by the Board of Education of the Ottawa Hills Local School District ordering the Lucas County Board of Elections to place a tax levy on the November 7, 2023 general election ballot, holding that the Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or act in disregard of applicable legal provisions when it refused to place the levy on the ballot.
On August 28, 2023, the Board of Education brought this original action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the Board of Elections to certify the levy at issue and place it on the November 2023 general election ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the Board of Education failed to certify an accurate resolution to proceed to the Board of Elections "not later than four p.m. of the ninetieth day before the day of the election," as required by Ohio Rev. Code 35.01.02(F); and (2) the Board of Education's error was not a technical violation that did not affect the public interest.
The Supreme Court held that the Lucas County Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or act in disregard of applicable legal provisions when it refused to place a tax levy on the November 7, 2023 general election ballot.
2023-09-15stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-1081https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0336.htmlState ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor2023-09-07T05:05:43-08:002023-09-07T05:05:43-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this complaint brought by Appellant requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Mentor to commence appropriation proceedings for an alleged taking of Appellant's property, holding that the court of appeals did not err in granting the City's motion to dismiss.
Appellant brought this complaint alleging that the decision of the City to deny a permit that would allow him to place a houseboat on a pond that he owned constituted a taking of his property. The court of appeals granted the City's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the City to commence appropriation proceedings; and (2) the court of appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant's remaining claims. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0336.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this complaint brought by Appellant requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Mentor to commence appropriation proceedings for an alleged taking of Appellant's property, holding that the court of appeals did not err in granting the City's motion to dismiss.
Appellant brought this complaint alleging that the decision of the City to deny a permit that would allow him to place a houseboat on a pond that he owned constituted a taking of his property. The court of appeals granted the City's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the City to commence appropriation proceedings; and (2) the court of appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant's remaining claims.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's mandamus complaint, holding that there was no error.
2023-09-07stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0336https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0051.htmlState ex rel. Mitchell v. Pittman2023-09-07T05:05:43-08:002023-09-07T05:05:43-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting the trial court's motion to dismiss this complaint brought by Appellant seeking an order requiring the trial court to issue a final, appealable order regarding two criminal convictions, holding that the court of appeals did not err.
Appellant, who pleaded guilty to the lesser offenses of gross sexual imposition and burglary, brought a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that because there was no entry that disposed of the original charges of rape and aggravated burglary, no final, appealable order had been issued, and seeking a final appealable order that complied with Crim.R. 32(C). The court of appeals dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, and therefore, he was not entitled to relief in mandamus. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0051.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Mitchell v. Pittman" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting the trial court's motion to dismiss this complaint brought by Appellant seeking an order requiring the trial court to issue a final, appealable order regarding two criminal convictions, holding that the court of appeals did not err.
Appellant, who pleaded guilty to the lesser offenses of gross sexual imposition and burglary, brought a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that because there was no entry that disposed of the original charges of rape and aggravated burglary, no final, appealable order had been issued, and seeking a final appealable order that complied with Crim.R. 32(C). The court of appeals dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, and therefore, he was not entitled to relief in mandamus.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus, holding that there was no error.
2023-09-07stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0051https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0027.htmlState ex rel. Duncan v. Driscoll2023-09-07T05:05:43-08:002023-09-07T05:05:43-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus sought by Appellant to compelling the Clark County Prosecuting Attorney to join in the filing of a motion to vacate guilty pleas Appellant had entered in two criminal cases, holding that Appellant's claim was not cognizable in mandamus.
In his writ of mandamus, Appellant sought to compel the Clark County prosecuting attorney to join in the filing of a motion to vacate the guilty pleas that Appellant entered in two criminal cases. The court of appeals denied the writ on the grounds that Appellant had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law and that his claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that Appellant's claim seeking to enforce an alleged contractual duty was not cognizable in mandamus. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2023-0027.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Duncan v. Driscoll" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus sought by Appellant to compelling the Clark County Prosecuting Attorney to join in the filing of a motion to vacate guilty pleas Appellant had entered in two criminal cases, holding that Appellant's claim was not cognizable in mandamus.
In his writ of mandamus, Appellant sought to compel the Clark County prosecuting attorney to join in the filing of a motion to vacate the guilty pleas that Appellant entered in two criminal cases. The court of appeals denied the writ on the grounds that Appellant had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law and that his claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that Appellant's claim seeking to enforce an alleged contractual duty was not cognizable in mandamus.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a writ of mandamus sought by Appellant compelling the Clark County Prosecuting Attorney to join in the filing of a motion to vacate guilty pleas, holding that Appellant's claim was not cognizable in mandamus.
2023-09-07stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2023-0027https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1091.htmlState ex rel. Cleveland Ass'n of Rescue Employees v. City of Cleveland2023-09-07T05:05:42-08:002023-09-07T05:05:42-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting in part and denying in part a writ of mandamus, affirmed the court's award of statutory damages and court costs, and reversed the award of attorney fees, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the City of Cleveland acted in bad faith in this case.
Cleveland Association of Rescue Employees and its president (collectively, the Union) submitted two public records requests to the City, which denied the requests. The Union then filed a complaint for writ of mandamus to compel production of the records and also sought statutory damages and attorney fees for the City's alleged violation of Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B). The Union later notified the court of appeals that the City had sufficiently produced the requested records and sought summary judgment with respect to statutory damages and attorney fees. The court of appeals awarded the Union statutory damages of $1,000 and attorney fees of $4,672. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the City's refusal to accept a certified-mail service of the complaint was not a legitimate basis on which to award attorney fees. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1091.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Cleveland Ass'n of Rescue Employees v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting in part and denying in part a writ of mandamus, affirmed the court's award of statutory damages and court costs, and reversed the award of attorney fees, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the City of Cleveland acted in bad faith in this case.
Cleveland Association of Rescue Employees and its president (collectively, the Union) submitted two public records requests to the City, which denied the requests. The Union then filed a complaint for writ of mandamus to compel production of the records and also sought statutory damages and attorney fees for the City's alleged violation of Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B). The Union later notified the court of appeals that the City had sufficiently produced the requested records and sought summary judgment with respect to statutory damages and attorney fees. The court of appeals awarded the Union statutory damages of $1,000 and attorney fees of $4,672. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the City's refusal to accept a certified-mail service of the complaint was not a legitimate basis on which to award attorney fees.
The Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney fees in this case and otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the City of Cleveland acted in bad faith.
2023-09-07stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1091https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1632.htmlState ex rel. Smith v. Triggs2023-09-06T05:06:32-08:002023-09-06T05:06:32-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Relator's petition seeking a writ of prohibition to vacate his conviction and sentence for certain felony offenses, holding that Relator failed to show that he was entitled to the writ.
In his petition, Relator sought a writ of prohibition to, among other things, prohibit and vacate the transfer of his criminal case from one judge to another. The court of appeals granted the judges' motion to dismiss the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Relator failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to a writ of prohibition, as he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, and the trial court did not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1632.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Smith v. Triggs" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Relator's petition seeking a writ of prohibition to vacate his conviction and sentence for certain felony offenses, holding that Relator failed to show that he was entitled to the writ.
In his petition, Relator sought a writ of prohibition to, among other things, prohibit and vacate the transfer of his criminal case from one judge to another. The court of appeals granted the judges' motion to dismiss the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Relator failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to a writ of prohibition, as he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, and the trial court did not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held that Relator was not entitled to relief on his petition seeking a writ of prohibition to vacate his conviction and sentence for certain felony offenses.
2023-09-06stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1632https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0750.htmlAJZ Hauling, LLC v. TruNorth Warranty Program of N. America2023-09-06T05:06:31-08:002023-09-06T05:06:31-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this second lawsuit brought by AJZ's Hauling, LLC against TruNorth Warranty Programs of North American (TruNorth) affirming the decision of the trial court denying TruNorth's motion to stay and compel arbitration, holding that the claims filed by AJZ's Hauling against TruNorth were subject to arbitration.
AJZ's Hauling purchased a truck that came with a TruNorth warranty. AJZ's Hauling later sued TruNorth, and the trial court granted TruNorth's motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. AJZ's then filed a second lawsuit raising the same claims it had alleged against TruNorth in the first lawsuit. TruNorth again filed a motion to stay and to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that application of the doctrine of res judicata would be unreasonable or unjust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) AJZ's Hauling's claims filed against TruNorth in the second lawsuit were subject to arbitration; and (2) an exception to application of the doctrine of res judicata to avoid unjust results does not apply when the parties had a full opportunity to litigate the issue and chose not to do so. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0750.html" target="_blank">View "AJZ Hauling, LLC v. TruNorth Warranty Program of N. America" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this second lawsuit brought by AJZ's Hauling, LLC against TruNorth Warranty Programs of North American (TruNorth) affirming the decision of the trial court denying TruNorth's motion to stay and compel arbitration, holding that the claims filed by AJZ's Hauling against TruNorth were subject to arbitration.
AJZ's Hauling purchased a truck that came with a TruNorth warranty. AJZ's Hauling later sued TruNorth, and the trial court granted TruNorth's motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. AJZ's then filed a second lawsuit raising the same claims it had alleged against TruNorth in the first lawsuit. TruNorth again filed a motion to stay and to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that application of the doctrine of res judicata would be unreasonable or unjust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) AJZ's Hauling's claims filed against TruNorth in the second lawsuit were subject to arbitration; and (2) an exception to application of the doctrine of res judicata to avoid unjust results does not apply when the parties had a full opportunity to litigate the issue and chose not to do so.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of TruNorth's motion to stay and compel arbitration, holding that the claims in this case were subject to arbitration.
2023-09-06stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioFischer2022-0750https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1523.htmlState ex rel. Griffin v. Szoke2023-09-06T05:06:30-08:002023-09-06T05:06:30-08:00
The Supreme Court denied as moot Mark Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus and also denied Griffin's request for statutory damages, holding that Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus was moot.
Griffin, an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institution, submitted a public-records request to Allan Szoke, a warden's assistant at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Griffin later brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling production of the records and an award of statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) because Griffin had received the requested records, his request for a writ of mandamus was moot; and (2) Griffin was not entitled to statutory damages because he did not clearly and convincingly show that Szoke denied his public-records request or otherwise failed to fulfill his duties under the Public Records Act. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1523.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Griffin v. Szoke" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied as moot Mark Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus and also denied Griffin's request for statutory damages, holding that Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus was moot.
Griffin, an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institution, submitted a public-records request to Allan Szoke, a warden's assistant at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Griffin later brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling production of the records and an award of statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) because Griffin had received the requested records, his request for a writ of mandamus was moot; and (2) Griffin was not entitled to statutory damages because he did not clearly and convincingly show that Szoke denied his public-records request or otherwise failed to fulfill his duties under the Public Records Act.
The Supreme Court denied Mark Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus, holding that the request was moot.
2023-09-06stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1523https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1288.htmlState ex rel. Harris v. Industrial Comm'n2023-09-05T05:05:43-08:002023-09-05T05:05:43-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ of mandamus sought by Stephen Harris to order the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision denying Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation for the permanent partial loss of sight of both eyes, holding that there were no grounds for the writ.
After the Commission denied Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation a district hearing officer determined that the medical evidence failed to establish that Harris had sustained any loss of vision in either eye as a result of the industrial injury. Harris filed a mandamus action requesting an order directing the Commission to reverse its decision. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence existed to support the Commission's decision. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1288.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Harris v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ of mandamus sought by Stephen Harris to order the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision denying Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation for the permanent partial loss of sight of both eyes, holding that there were no grounds for the writ.
After the Commission denied Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation a district hearing officer determined that the medical evidence failed to establish that Harris had sustained any loss of vision in either eye as a result of the industrial injury. Harris filed a mandamus action requesting an order directing the Commission to reverse its decision. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence existed to support the Commission's decision.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ of mandamus sought by Appellant, holding that there were no grounds for the writ.
2023-09-05stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1288https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1450.htmlState ex rel. Barr v. Wesson2023-09-05T05:05:43-08:002023-09-05T05:05:43-08:00
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Harry Barr, an inmate at the Grafton Correctional Institution (GCII), seeking to compel the warden's assistant at GCI to produce the job description for, and the certification or license held by, Jennifer Whitten, a GCI employee, holding that Barr was not entitled to the writ.
In addition to the writ of mandamus, Barr sought statutory damages and also filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction and other motions. The Supreme Court dismissed Barr's complaint for a TRO and a preliminary injunction, granted Barr's motion to amend the evidence and deemed the record supplemented, granted his motion to withdraw his motion for an order pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R.4.01(A), and denied the writ of mandamus and his request for statutory damages, holding that Barr was entitled to some relief. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1450.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Harry Barr, an inmate at the Grafton Correctional Institution (GCII), seeking to compel the warden's assistant at GCI to produce the job description for, and the certification or license held by, Jennifer Whitten, a GCI employee, holding that Barr was not entitled to the writ.
In addition to the writ of mandamus, Barr sought statutory damages and also filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction and other motions. The Supreme Court dismissed Barr's complaint for a TRO and a preliminary injunction, granted Barr's motion to amend the evidence and deemed the record supplemented, granted his motion to withdraw his motion for an order pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R.4.01(A), and denied the writ of mandamus and his request for statutory damages, holding that Barr was entitled to some relief.
The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writ.
2023-09-05stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1450https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1044.htmlState ex rel. Barr v. Wesson2023-08-31T05:06:44-08:002023-08-31T05:06:44-08:00
The Supreme Court granted Harry Barr a limited writ of mandamus, holding that Barr was entitled to relief on his request for certain inmate records predating State ex rel. Mobley v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 201 N.E.3d 853 (Ohio 2022).
Barr, an inmate, sought certain documents from James Wesson, the institutional public information officer at Grafton Correctional Institution (GCI), pursuant to Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43. Wesson produced some records and, as to the remaining, claimed that Barr failed sufficiently to specify which records he wanted and that Barr's requests predated Mobley, thus rendering them unenforceable. The Supreme Court granted Barr a limited writ of mandamus as to prison-kite logs predating Mobley, ordered Wesson to produce the email messages that Barr requested if they exist, denied the writ as to Barr's request for a list of cross-gender employees, dismissed his complaint for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and denied his motion to strike a certain affidavit, holding that Barr demonstrated that he had a clear legal right to access the prison-kite logs and specified email messages if they existed. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-1044.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted Harry Barr a limited writ of mandamus, holding that Barr was entitled to relief on his request for certain inmate records predating State ex rel. Mobley v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 201 N.E.3d 853 (Ohio 2022).
Barr, an inmate, sought certain documents from James Wesson, the institutional public information officer at Grafton Correctional Institution (GCI), pursuant to Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43. Wesson produced some records and, as to the remaining, claimed that Barr failed sufficiently to specify which records he wanted and that Barr's requests predated Mobley, thus rendering them unenforceable. The Supreme Court granted Barr a limited writ of mandamus as to prison-kite logs predating Mobley, ordered Wesson to produce the email messages that Barr requested if they exist, denied the writ as to Barr's request for a list of cross-gender employees, dismissed his complaint for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and denied his motion to strike a certain affidavit, holding that Barr demonstrated that he had a clear legal right to access the prison-kite logs and specified email messages if they existed.
The Supreme Court held that Harry Barr was entitled to relief on his request for certain inmate records predating State ex rel. Mobley v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 201 N.E.3d 853 (Ohio 2022).
2023-08-31stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-1044https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0782.htmlState v. Schilling2023-08-31T05:06:43-08:002023-08-31T05:06:43-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals in this case involving Ohio's sex-offender registration and reporting laws, holding that Appellant had completed his Ohio sex-offender registration and reporting obligations.
Specifically, the Court held (1) the holding in State v. Henderson, 162 N.E.3d 776 (Ohio 2020), that when a court has jurisdiction to act, any errors in the court's judgment are voidable and subject to res judicata if they are not timely appealed, does not apply to a trial court's erroneous classification of a defendant as a Tier I sex offender subject to the registration and reporting requirements of Ohio's Adam Walsh Act (AWA), 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, when the date on which the defendant committed the offense rendered the defendant subject to the registration and reporting requirements of Ohio's Megan's Law, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, and Ohio's sex-offender registration and reporting scheme that predated the AWA, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5; and (2) a person's obligation to register and report as a sex offender in Ohio for a specific duration is not tolled when the person was convicted of a sexually-oriented offense in Ohio but resides in a different state and reports as a sex offender regarding the out-of-state offense. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0782.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Schilling" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals in this case involving Ohio's sex-offender registration and reporting laws, holding that Appellant had completed his Ohio sex-offender registration and reporting obligations.
Specifically, the Court held (1) the holding in State v. Henderson, 162 N.E.3d 776 (Ohio 2020), that when a court has jurisdiction to act, any errors in the court's judgment are voidable and subject to res judicata if they are not timely appealed, does not apply to a trial court's erroneous classification of a defendant as a Tier I sex offender subject to the registration and reporting requirements of Ohio's Adam Walsh Act (AWA), 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, when the date on which the defendant committed the offense rendered the defendant subject to the registration and reporting requirements of Ohio's Megan's Law, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, and Ohio's sex-offender registration and reporting scheme that predated the AWA, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5; and (2) a person's obligation to register and report as a sex offender in Ohio for a specific duration is not tolled when the person was convicted of a sexually-oriented offense in Ohio but resides in a different state and reports as a sex offender regarding the out-of-state offense.
The Supreme Courtheld that Appellant had completed his Ohio sex-offender registration and reporting obligations.
2023-08-31stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioStewart2022-0782https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0802.htmlState ex rel. Youngstown Civil Service Commission v. Sweeney2023-08-30T05:06:43-08:002023-08-30T05:06:43-08:00
The Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of prohibition sought by Youngstown Civil Service Commission, the City of Youngstown and Youngstown Mayor Jamael Tito Brown (collectively, Youngstown) to prevent Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas Judge Maureen Sweeney from exercising jurisdiction over an administrative appeal commenced by Michael Cox and to require her to vacate all orders issued in the appeal, holding that Youngstown was not entitled to the writ.
Youngstown commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition prohibiting Judge Sweeney from exercising any judicial authority over the underlying action and vacating all orders and journal entires issued in that case.
As grounds for the writ, Youngstown argued that Judge Sweeney patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over it because the pending underlying action was an untimely administrative appeal. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Judge Sweeney did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the matter at issue. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0802.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Youngstown Civil Service Commission v. Sweeney" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of prohibition sought by Youngstown Civil Service Commission, the City of Youngstown and Youngstown Mayor Jamael Tito Brown (collectively, Youngstown) to prevent Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas Judge Maureen Sweeney from exercising jurisdiction over an administrative appeal commenced by Michael Cox and to require her to vacate all orders issued in the appeal, holding that Youngstown was not entitled to the writ.
Youngstown commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition prohibiting Judge Sweeney from exercising any judicial authority over the underlying action and vacating all orders and journal entires issued in that case.
As grounds for the writ, Youngstown argued that Judge Sweeney patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over it because the pending underlying action was an untimely administrative appeal. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Judge Sweeney did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the matter at issue.
The Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of prohibition Judge Maureen Sweeney from exercising jurisdiction over an administrative appeal, holding that the writ was not warranted.
2023-08-30stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-0802https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0784.htmlHarris v. Hilderbrand2023-08-30T05:06:42-08:002023-08-30T05:06:42-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's partial denial of Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this dog bite case, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment.
Defendant in this case was a deputy sheriff and K-9 handler who hosted a cookout for friends at his home. Plaintiff, who attended the cookout, was bitten by Defendant's canine partner, Xyrem. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting a common-law negligence claim and a claim under Ohio Rev. Code 955.28, which imposes strict liability for injuries caused by a dog in certain situations. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment in part, determining that Defendant was immune from liability under section 955.28(B). Defendant appealed the denial of summary judgment on the negligence claim. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, Defendant was not manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities during the evening of the dog bite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Defendant was manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment during the events leading up to Plaintiff's injury. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0784.html" target="_blank">View "Harris v. Hilderbrand" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's partial denial of Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this dog bite case, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment.
Defendant in this case was a deputy sheriff and K-9 handler who hosted a cookout for friends at his home. Plaintiff, who attended the cookout, was bitten by Defendant's canine partner, Xyrem. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting a common-law negligence claim and a claim under Ohio Rev. Code 955.28, which imposes strict liability for injuries caused by a dog in certain situations. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment in part, determining that Defendant was immune from liability under section 955.28(B). Defendant appealed the denial of summary judgment on the negligence claim. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, Defendant was not manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities during the evening of the dog bite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Defendant was manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment during the events leading up to Plaintiff's injury.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision reversing the trial court's partial denial of Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this dog bite case, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed.
2023-08-30stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioSharon L. Kennedy2022-0784https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0988.htmlState ex rel. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1536, AFL-CIO v. Sakacs2023-08-29T05:35:53-08:002023-08-29T05:35:53-08:00
In this employment action, the Supreme Court held that under the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 124.48, a "vacancy" occurs for competitive promotional examination purposes when the incumbent in the promoted-rank position in the fire department retires and therefore the position must be filled through the process set forth in section 124.48.
Specifically at issue was whether a position is rendered vacant for purposes of section 148.48 when the incumbent in that position retires but is rehired for the same position the next day. The court of appeals concluded that the retirement in question did not create a vacancy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that whether an incumbent intends to permanently leave a position or to leave with the expectation of immediately returning to that position is irrelevant to the determination of whether the incumbent's leaving creates a vacancy under the terms of section 149.48. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0988.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1536, AFL-CIO v. Sakacs" on Justia Law</a>
In this employment action, the Supreme Court held that under the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 124.48, a "vacancy" occurs for competitive promotional examination purposes when the incumbent in the promoted-rank position in the fire department retires and therefore the position must be filled through the process set forth in section 124.48.
Specifically at issue was whether a position is rendered vacant for purposes of section 148.48 when the incumbent in that position retires but is rehired for the same position the next day. The court of appeals concluded that the retirement in question did not create a vacancy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that whether an incumbent intends to permanently leave a position or to leave with the expectation of immediately returning to that position is irrelevant to the determination of whether the incumbent's leaving creates a vacancy under the terms of section 149.48.
The Supreme Court held that a "vacancy" occurs for competitive promotional examination purposes when the incumbent in the promoted-rank position retires and therefore the position must be filled through the process set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 124.48.
2023-08-29stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioStewart2022-0988https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0340.htmlState ex rel. Kidd v. Industrial Commission2023-08-29T05:35:52-08:002023-08-29T05:35:52-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting Donna Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Kidd's application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation.
In denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation the commission concluded that Kidd was capable of sustained remunerative employment at a sedentary level. The Tenth District granted Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the Commission exceeded its discretion by relying on a medical report that outlined limitations on Kidd's capabilities that were "seemingly inconsistent" with the definition of "sedentary work" in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding that the commission did not abuse its discretion by considering "prevalent workplace accommodations to determine whether Kidd could return to 'sustained remunerative employment' with her medical restrictions." <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2023/2022-0340.html" target="_blank">View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting Donna Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Kidd's application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation.
In denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation the commission concluded that Kidd was capable of sustained remunerative employment at a sedentary level. The Tenth District granted Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the Commission exceeded its discretion by relying on a medical report that outlined limitations on Kidd's capabilities that were "seemingly inconsistent" with the definition of "sedentary work" in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding that the commission did not abuse its discretion by considering "prevalent workplace accommodations to determine whether Kidd could return to 'sustained remunerative employment' with her medical restrictions."
The Supreme Court held that the Industrial Commission of Ohio did not abuse its discretion in denying Donna Kidd's application for permanent-total-disability compensation.
2023-08-29stateOhioSupreme Court of OhioPer Curiam2022-0340