Supreme Court of Nevada - Justia Case Law Summarieshttps://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/nevada-supreme-court/2024-03-28T17:27:48-08:00Justia Inchttps://www.justia.com/Justia Lawhttps://justatic.com/v/20240328145339/shared/images/social-media/law.pngCopyright 2024 Justia Inchttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/86035.htmlIn re I.S.2024-03-28T10:27:59-08:002024-03-28T10:27:59-08:00
The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed whether the provision under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine. This provision requires the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court may dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile to informal supervision. The appellant, a juvenile referred to as I.S., was adjudicated a delinquent and placed on formal probation. I.S. appealed, arguing that the provision infringed upon the court's sentencing discretion, essentially granting an unconstitutional prosecutorial veto.
The court concluded that I.S.'s appeal was not moot, despite the completion of his juvenile supervision, due to the presumption of collateral consequences of such an adjudication until the juvenile reaches age 18 and/or their juvenile record is sealed.
On the main issue, the court held that the requirement under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) does not contravene the separation of powers doctrine. The court reasoned that this provision does not involve a sentencing decision. Rather, the court perceived it as akin to a charging decision, which is within the executive realm. The court further noted that, unlike adult courts, the juvenile court's authority is not derived from the constitution but is limited to the authority expressly prescribed to it by statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order, holding that the requirement for the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court can dismiss a petition does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/86035.html" target="_blank">View "In re I.S." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed whether the provision under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine. This provision requires the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court may dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile to informal supervision. The appellant, a juvenile referred to as I.S., was adjudicated a delinquent and placed on formal probation. I.S. appealed, arguing that the provision infringed upon the court's sentencing discretion, essentially granting an unconstitutional prosecutorial veto.
The court concluded that I.S.'s appeal was not moot, despite the completion of his juvenile supervision, due to the presumption of collateral consequences of such an adjudication until the juvenile reaches age 18 and/or their juvenile record is sealed.
On the main issue, the court held that the requirement under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) does not contravene the separation of powers doctrine. The court reasoned that this provision does not involve a sentencing decision. Rather, the court perceived it as akin to a charging decision, which is within the executive realm. The court further noted that, unlike adult courts, the juvenile court's authority is not derived from the constitution but is limited to the authority expressly prescribed to it by statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order, holding that the requirement for the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court can dismiss a petition does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
2024-03-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadishhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/86156.htmlSmith v. State2024-03-28T10:27:56-08:002024-03-28T10:27:56-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada dealt with the issue of the scope of a valid search warrant and its implications under the Fourth Amendment. The appellant, Deva One Smith, was convicted of two counts of possession of a visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a person under sixteen years of age. The case centered on the validity of a search warrant that officers used to seize and conduct a forensic search of Smith's cell phone.
The court clarified that under Nevada law, an affidavit may be incorporated into a warrant to establish probable cause, but that affidavit cannot expand the scope of the search and seizure permitted under the warrant's specific language. Officers must search only the places authorized on the face of the warrant. In Smith's case, the officers had a valid warrant for his residence only; however, they seized his cell phone while he was outside his residence.
The court found that the imminent destruction of evidence exigency justified the seizure of the cell phone. However, no other exigent circumstance allowed for the subsequent forensic search of the cell phone. The court concluded that because officers failed to obtain a warrant to search the cell phone, the search of that device violated Smith's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Smith's motion to suppress the evidence found on the phone. As a result, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reversed the judgment of conviction. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/86156.html" target="_blank">View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada dealt with the issue of the scope of a valid search warrant and its implications under the Fourth Amendment. The appellant, Deva One Smith, was convicted of two counts of possession of a visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a person under sixteen years of age. The case centered on the validity of a search warrant that officers used to seize and conduct a forensic search of Smith's cell phone.
The court clarified that under Nevada law, an affidavit may be incorporated into a warrant to establish probable cause, but that affidavit cannot expand the scope of the search and seizure permitted under the warrant's specific language. Officers must search only the places authorized on the face of the warrant. In Smith's case, the officers had a valid warrant for his residence only; however, they seized his cell phone while he was outside his residence.
The court found that the imminent destruction of evidence exigency justified the seizure of the cell phone. However, no other exigent circumstance allowed for the subsequent forensic search of the cell phone. The court concluded that because officers failed to obtain a warrant to search the cell phone, the search of that device violated Smith's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Smith's motion to suppress the evidence found on the phone. As a result, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reversed the judgment of conviction.
2024-03-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBellhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/86982.htmlKabew v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.2024-03-28T10:27:51-08:002024-03-28T10:27:51-08:00
The case involves Christopher Kabew, who pleaded guilty to attempted residential burglary, his first felony conviction. His sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation with the condition that he complete a substance abuse treatment program. After successfully completing the program, Kabew petitioned the district court to set aside his conviction under NRS 176A.240(6)(a), which states that upon completing the terms and conditions of a drug court program, a court "shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings or set aside the judgment of conviction" unless the defendant has a prior felony conviction or previously failed to complete a specialty court program. The district court denied the motion, and Kabew petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada.
The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the district court improperly denied Kabew's motion. The court held that NRS 176A.240(6)(a) is mandatory and does not afford district courts any discretion to deny a motion to set aside a judgment of conviction when the defendant meets the statutory requirements. The court further held that the statute does not intrude on judicial functions, as it is within the legislature's power to define crimes and determine punishments. The court concluded that the district court failed to perform a duty required by law by denying Kabew's motion, and ordered the district court to set aside Kabew's conviction. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/86982.html" target="_blank">View "Kabew v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law</a>
The case involves Christopher Kabew, who pleaded guilty to attempted residential burglary, his first felony conviction. His sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation with the condition that he complete a substance abuse treatment program. After successfully completing the program, Kabew petitioned the district court to set aside his conviction under NRS 176A.240(6)(a), which states that upon completing the terms and conditions of a drug court program, a court "shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings or set aside the judgment of conviction" unless the defendant has a prior felony conviction or previously failed to complete a specialty court program. The district court denied the motion, and Kabew petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada.
The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the district court improperly denied Kabew's motion. The court held that NRS 176A.240(6)(a) is mandatory and does not afford district courts any discretion to deny a motion to set aside a judgment of conviction when the defendant meets the statutory requirements. The court further held that the statute does not intrude on judicial functions, as it is within the legislature's power to define crimes and determine punishments. The court concluded that the district court failed to perform a duty required by law by denying Kabew's motion, and ordered the district court to set aside Kabew's conviction.
2024-03-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglichhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85734.htmlJudd v. State2024-03-28T10:27:46-08:002024-03-28T10:27:46-08:00
In a case tried in the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, the appellant, Kim A. Judd, was charged with one count of felony injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle and one count of felony coercion. This came after an altercation where Judd struck a 1957 Chevrolet truck several times with a sledgehammer following a disagreement with the owner of the vehicle, Scott Reber, over payment for repairs.
The key issue addressed by the court was the interpretation of the phrase "physical force" in NRS 207.190(2), which distinguishes between coercion being punished as a felony versus as a misdemeanor. The court needed to determine whether "physical force" should be limited to physical force against a person, and not merely against property.
The court concluded that the Nevada Legislature intended for the distinguishing statutory element of "physical force" to be limited to force against a person. As such, the jury should have been instructed accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of giving proper jury instructions for the essential elements of a crime and ruled that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the definition of physical force as being limited to force against a person necessitated the reversal of this conviction.
However, the court affirmed the felony conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle, concluding that the jury was correctly instructed on the proper measure of damages for the partial destruction of property. The conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle was based on the uncontroverted expert testimony at trial, which provided a replacement cost for the damaged parts of the vehicle. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85734.html" target="_blank">View "Judd v. State" on Justia Law</a>
In a case tried in the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, the appellant, Kim A. Judd, was charged with one count of felony injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle and one count of felony coercion. This came after an altercation where Judd struck a 1957 Chevrolet truck several times with a sledgehammer following a disagreement with the owner of the vehicle, Scott Reber, over payment for repairs.
The key issue addressed by the court was the interpretation of the phrase "physical force" in NRS 207.190(2), which distinguishes between coercion being punished as a felony versus as a misdemeanor. The court needed to determine whether "physical force" should be limited to physical force against a person, and not merely against property.
The court concluded that the Nevada Legislature intended for the distinguishing statutory element of "physical force" to be limited to force against a person. As such, the jury should have been instructed accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of giving proper jury instructions for the essential elements of a crime and ruled that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the definition of physical force as being limited to force against a person necessitated the reversal of this conviction.
However, the court affirmed the felony conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle, concluding that the jury was correctly instructed on the proper measure of damages for the partial destruction of property. The conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle was based on the uncontroverted expert testimony at trial, which provided a replacement cost for the damaged parts of the vehicle.
2024-03-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBullahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85987.htmlGee v. State2024-03-21T10:28:36-08:002024-03-21T10:28:36-08:00
The appellant, Demitri Gee, was convicted for driving under the influence resulting in substantial bodily harm. He appealed the judgment of conviction, challenging the restitution amount of $9,940 that was awarded to the State of Nevada Victims of Crime Program. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada found two main issues: whether an order of restitution must be based on competent evidence and whether a defendant’s restitution obligation should be offset by the amount the defendant’s insurance provider paid to the victim for the same losses.
Gee had been driving while intoxicated when he lost control of his vehicle and collided with another car, severely injuring the occupants. He subsequently fled the scene. As a result of the collision, Gee was charged with two counts of driving under the influence resulting in substantial bodily harm among other charges. A civil settlement agreement was reached with the victims, and they received compensation through Gee's insurance.
The court found that the restitution amount of $9,940 was not supported by competent evidence as the state failed to present evidence to support it. The court also found that the district court had not evaluated whether the restitution should be offset by the insurance payment made by Gee to the victims. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that the district court had abused its discretion by ordering restitution not supported by competent evidence and by failing to evaluate whether the award needed to be offset by the compensation provided to the victim through Gee’s insurance. The court then vacated the $9,940 in restitution, affirmed the rest of the conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the restitution amount. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85987.html" target="_blank">View "Gee v. State" on Justia Law</a>
The appellant, Demitri Gee, was convicted for driving under the influence resulting in substantial bodily harm. He appealed the judgment of conviction, challenging the restitution amount of $9,940 that was awarded to the State of Nevada Victims of Crime Program. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada found two main issues: whether an order of restitution must be based on competent evidence and whether a defendant’s restitution obligation should be offset by the amount the defendant’s insurance provider paid to the victim for the same losses.
Gee had been driving while intoxicated when he lost control of his vehicle and collided with another car, severely injuring the occupants. He subsequently fled the scene. As a result of the collision, Gee was charged with two counts of driving under the influence resulting in substantial bodily harm among other charges. A civil settlement agreement was reached with the victims, and they received compensation through Gee's insurance.
The court found that the restitution amount of $9,940 was not supported by competent evidence as the state failed to present evidence to support it. The court also found that the district court had not evaluated whether the restitution should be offset by the insurance payment made by Gee to the victims. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that the district court had abused its discretion by ordering restitution not supported by competent evidence and by failing to evaluate whether the award needed to be offset by the compensation provided to the victim through Gee’s insurance. The court then vacated the $9,940 in restitution, affirmed the rest of the conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the restitution amount.
2024-03-21stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglichhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84998.htmlDraskovich v. Draskovich2024-03-21T10:28:33-08:002024-03-21T10:28:33-08:00
In a divorce case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was asked to consider whether a law firm, established by one spouse before the marriage and incorporated under a different name during the marriage, constitutes that spouse’s separate property. Robert Draskovich, a practicing criminal lawyer since 1997, married Laurinda Draskovich in 2012, at which point he had a 65% ownership stake in a firm. In 2018, that firm dissolved, and Robert incorporated the Draskovich Law Group (DLG) as his wholly owned corporation.
During their divorce proceedings in 2022, DLG was the primary asset in dispute. The district court concluded that DLG was community property, based on the fact that DLG was incorporated during the marriage. The district court also rejected Laurinda’s request for alimony, in part because it determined that the share of community assets distributed to Laurinda would provide sufficient support through passive income.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court erred in determining that the law firm was entirely community property. The court found that the law firm was a continuation of the spouse’s original, separate property law practice, and thus, the presumption of community property does not properly apply. Therefore, the Court reversed the portion of the divorce decree pertaining to the DLG interests and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also vacated the district court’s alimony determination to be reconsidered in light of the changed circumstances surrounding DLG.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84998.html" target="_blank">View "Draskovich v. Draskovich" on Justia Law</a>
In a divorce case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was asked to consider whether a law firm, established by one spouse before the marriage and incorporated under a different name during the marriage, constitutes that spouse’s separate property. Robert Draskovich, a practicing criminal lawyer since 1997, married Laurinda Draskovich in 2012, at which point he had a 65% ownership stake in a firm. In 2018, that firm dissolved, and Robert incorporated the Draskovich Law Group (DLG) as his wholly owned corporation.
During their divorce proceedings in 2022, DLG was the primary asset in dispute. The district court concluded that DLG was community property, based on the fact that DLG was incorporated during the marriage. The district court also rejected Laurinda’s request for alimony, in part because it determined that the share of community assets distributed to Laurinda would provide sufficient support through passive income.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court erred in determining that the law firm was entirely community property. The court found that the law firm was a continuation of the spouse’s original, separate property law practice, and thus, the presumption of community property does not properly apply. Therefore, the Court reversed the portion of the divorce decree pertaining to the DLG interests and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also vacated the district court’s alimony determination to be reconsidered in light of the changed circumstances surrounding DLG.
2024-03-21stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadishhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/79658.htmlValley Health Sys., LLC v. Murray2024-03-14T08:32:42-08:002024-03-14T08:32:42-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada ruled on the constitutionality of assigning senior justices to temporarily serve on the Supreme Court in the event of a disqualified justice. The appellant, Valley Health System, LLC, argued that only the governor has the authority to replace a disqualified justice based on Article 6, Section 4(2) of the Nevada Constitution. However, the court disagreed, noting that Article 6, Section 19(1) authorizes the chief justice to recall any consenting retired state court justice or judge not removed or retired for cause or defeated for retention of office, and assign them to appropriate temporary duty within the court system.
The court thus concluded that the Nevada Constitution authorizes both the governor's designation of lower court judges and the chief justice's temporary assignment of senior justices to replace disqualified justices. Therefore, the chief justice's assignment of senior justices to the case was constitutionally authorized, and the appellant's objection was overruled and its motion to designate lower court judges was denied. The court noted that this dual-method system is not completely unique and is also present in other states such as Tennessee. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/79658.html" target="_blank">View "Valley Health Sys., LLC v. Murray" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada ruled on the constitutionality of assigning senior justices to temporarily serve on the Supreme Court in the event of a disqualified justice. The appellant, Valley Health System, LLC, argued that only the governor has the authority to replace a disqualified justice based on Article 6, Section 4(2) of the Nevada Constitution. However, the court disagreed, noting that Article 6, Section 19(1) authorizes the chief justice to recall any consenting retired state court justice or judge not removed or retired for cause or defeated for retention of office, and assign them to appropriate temporary duty within the court system.
The court thus concluded that the Nevada Constitution authorizes both the governor's designation of lower court judges and the chief justice's temporary assignment of senior justices to replace disqualified justices. Therefore, the chief justice's assignment of senior justices to the case was constitutionally authorized, and the appellant's objection was overruled and its motion to designate lower court judges was denied. The court noted that this dual-method system is not completely unique and is also present in other states such as Tennessee.
2024-03-14stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglichhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85185.htmlClark County v. 6635 W Oquenda LLC2024-03-14T08:32:39-08:002024-03-14T08:32:39-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was tasked with determining whether a government entity, in this case Clark County, qualifies as a "person" under Nevada's anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. This arose from a dispute where a property owner, 6635 W Oquendo LLC, claimed Clark County lacked the authority to impose civil penalties and to record liens against its property. Clark County, in response, filed an anti-SLAPP motion arguing that the actions forming the basis of Oquendo's claims were protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute. The district court ruled in favor of Oquendo, stating that Clark County was not a "person" for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed this decision, concluding that a government entity is not a "person" under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court rejected Clark County's arguments, stating that the statutory definition of "person" in Nevada law does not include a government, governmental agency or political subdivision of a government. The court also clarified that an earlier decision, John v. Douglas County School District, did not establish that a governmental entity is a "person" for the purpose of anti-SLAPP protections. The court concluded that Clark County was not entitled to file an anti-SLAPP motion, affirming the lower court's decision. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85185.html" target="_blank">View "Clark County v. 6635 W Oquenda LLC" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was tasked with determining whether a government entity, in this case Clark County, qualifies as a "person" under Nevada's anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. This arose from a dispute where a property owner, 6635 W Oquendo LLC, claimed Clark County lacked the authority to impose civil penalties and to record liens against its property. Clark County, in response, filed an anti-SLAPP motion arguing that the actions forming the basis of Oquendo's claims were protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute. The district court ruled in favor of Oquendo, stating that Clark County was not a "person" for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed this decision, concluding that a government entity is not a "person" under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court rejected Clark County's arguments, stating that the statutory definition of "person" in Nevada law does not include a government, governmental agency or political subdivision of a government. The court also clarified that an earlier decision, John v. Douglas County School District, did not establish that a governmental entity is a "person" for the purpose of anti-SLAPP protections. The court concluded that Clark County was not entitled to file an anti-SLAPP motion, affirming the lower court's decision.
2024-03-14stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaPARRAGUIRREhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84492.htmlTaylor v. Brill2024-03-08T15:30:00-08:002024-03-08T15:30:00-08:00
In a medical malpractice case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Kimberly D. Taylor, sued Dr. Keith Brill and Women’s Health Associates of Southern Nevada-Martin PLLC for professional negligence. Taylor alleged that Dr. Brill breached the standard of care by perforating her uterus and bowel during a surgical procedure and failed to inform her of these complications. The jury ruled in favor of Dr. Brill and denied all of Taylor’s claims.
The Supreme Court of Nevada held that in a professional negligence action, evidence of informed consent and assumption of the risk are irrelevant and inadmissible when the plaintiff does not challenge consent. The court stated that even if a plaintiff gave informed consent, it would not vitiate the medical provider’s duty to provide treatment according to the ordinary standard of care. Furthermore, evidence of a procedure’s risks must still fall within Nevada's professional negligence statute, and a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether the evidence should be excluded due to its potential to confuse the jury.
The court also held that expert or physician testimony is not required to demonstrate the reasonableness of the billing amount of special damages. The court found that the district court had abused its discretion by prohibiting non-expert evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the charges for medical treatment received by Taylor.
Finally, the court ruled that evidence of insurance write-downs is not admissible under NRS 42.021(1), as it only contemplates evidence of actual benefits paid to the plaintiff by collateral sources.
Based on these errors, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84492.html" target="_blank">View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law</a>
In a medical malpractice case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Kimberly D. Taylor, sued Dr. Keith Brill and Women’s Health Associates of Southern Nevada-Martin PLLC for professional negligence. Taylor alleged that Dr. Brill breached the standard of care by perforating her uterus and bowel during a surgical procedure and failed to inform her of these complications. The jury ruled in favor of Dr. Brill and denied all of Taylor’s claims.
The Supreme Court of Nevada held that in a professional negligence action, evidence of informed consent and assumption of the risk are irrelevant and inadmissible when the plaintiff does not challenge consent. The court stated that even if a plaintiff gave informed consent, it would not vitiate the medical provider’s duty to provide treatment according to the ordinary standard of care. Furthermore, evidence of a procedure’s risks must still fall within Nevada's professional negligence statute, and a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether the evidence should be excluded due to its potential to confuse the jury.
The court also held that expert or physician testimony is not required to demonstrate the reasonableness of the billing amount of special damages. The court found that the district court had abused its discretion by prohibiting non-expert evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the charges for medical treatment received by Taylor.
Finally, the court ruled that evidence of insurance write-downs is not admissible under NRS 42.021(1), as it only contemplates evidence of actual benefits paid to the plaintiff by collateral sources.
Based on these errors, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial.
2024-03-07stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndonhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/83847.htmlTaylor v. Brill2024-03-07T17:40:56-08:002024-03-07T17:40:56-08:00
The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled on a motion for disqualification of a supreme court justice in a medical malpractice action appeal. The appellant argued that Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11(A)(6)(d) required disqualification of Justice Douglas Herndon, who had been assigned the case when he was a district judge, but had not heard or decided any matters in the case before it was reassigned. The appellant argued that the rule required disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter, regardless of the level of involvement.
Justice Herndon and the respondents countered that he had seen no documents and performed no work on the case at the district court level, and therefore his impartiality could not be questioned. They argued that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not require disqualification in such circumstances, and that a judge has a general duty to hear and decide cases where disqualification is not required.
After considering the language and context of the Code of Judicial Conduct, along with similar cases from other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that to "preside" over a matter within the meaning of the disqualification rule, a judge must have exercised some control or authority over the matter in the lower court. Given that Justice Herndon had simply been administratively assigned the case and took no action during his assignment, he did not "preside" over the case in a way that mandated disqualification. The court therefore denied the motion for disqualification. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/83847.html" target="_blank">View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled on a motion for disqualification of a supreme court justice in a medical malpractice action appeal. The appellant argued that Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11(A)(6)(d) required disqualification of Justice Douglas Herndon, who had been assigned the case when he was a district judge, but had not heard or decided any matters in the case before it was reassigned. The appellant argued that the rule required disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter, regardless of the level of involvement.
Justice Herndon and the respondents countered that he had seen no documents and performed no work on the case at the district court level, and therefore his impartiality could not be questioned. They argued that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not require disqualification in such circumstances, and that a judge has a general duty to hear and decide cases where disqualification is not required.
After considering the language and context of the Code of Judicial Conduct, along with similar cases from other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that to "preside" over a matter within the meaning of the disqualification rule, a judge must have exercised some control or authority over the matter in the lower court. Given that Justice Herndon had simply been administratively assigned the case and took no action during his assignment, he did not "preside" over the case in a way that mandated disqualification. The court therefore denied the motion for disqualification.
2024-03-07stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHardestyhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84655.htmlIn re Guardianship of Jones2024-03-07T17:40:48-08:002024-03-07T17:40:48-08:00
This case arose from a contentious guardianship dispute over Kathleen June Jones. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division in Clark County, Nevada appointed an attorney to act as a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for Jones to help determine her best interests. The GAL sought fees at her standard hourly rate for legal services, which the district court granted over Jones' objections. Jones argued against the fee award, asserting that the GAL had no right to fees when the appointment order did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the GAL should be compensated at the rate of a fiduciary, not an attorney.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that Jones had waived her right to argue about the form of the GAL's appointment order by failing to raise the issue earlier. The Supreme Court found that the district court did err in interpreting the law as requiring the appointment of an attorney as a GAL where there is no court-approved volunteer program. However, this error was deemed harmless because the district court had expressly appointed an experienced attorney due to the complexity of the guardianship case.
The court concluded that GALs in Nevada act as fiduciaries, not as attorneys for the protected person, but if they perform services also performed by attorneys and have commensurate experience as an attorney, GALs may be compensated at an attorney rate for their work. The court determined that the GAL's requested fees were appropriate for her work as a fiduciary in this case, given her legal experience and the complexity of the guardianship dispute. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84655.html" target="_blank">View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law</a>
This case arose from a contentious guardianship dispute over Kathleen June Jones. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division in Clark County, Nevada appointed an attorney to act as a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for Jones to help determine her best interests. The GAL sought fees at her standard hourly rate for legal services, which the district court granted over Jones' objections. Jones argued against the fee award, asserting that the GAL had no right to fees when the appointment order did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the GAL should be compensated at the rate of a fiduciary, not an attorney.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that Jones had waived her right to argue about the form of the GAL's appointment order by failing to raise the issue earlier. The Supreme Court found that the district court did err in interpreting the law as requiring the appointment of an attorney as a GAL where there is no court-approved volunteer program. However, this error was deemed harmless because the district court had expressly appointed an experienced attorney due to the complexity of the guardianship case.
The court concluded that GALs in Nevada act as fiduciaries, not as attorneys for the protected person, but if they perform services also performed by attorneys and have commensurate experience as an attorney, GALs may be compensated at an attorney rate for their work. The court determined that the GAL's requested fees were appropriate for her work as a fiduciary in this case, given her legal experience and the complexity of the guardianship dispute.
2024-03-07stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndonhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85056.htmlLaMont's Wild W. Buffalo, LLC v. Terry2024-03-07T09:32:58-08:002024-03-07T09:32:58-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered a dispute between LaMont’s Wild West Buffalo, LLC and Nathanial Terry. LaMont’s had acted as an order-buyer to procure 517 bison for Terry’s Montana ranch under an oral agreement. After the bison were delivered, Terry ceased communication and did not pay LaMont’s finder’s fee. LaMont’s sued Terry for breach of contract and related claims. In response, Terry filed frivolous counterclaims, which were later dismissed.
After winning the case, LaMont’s sought attorney fees as sanctions under Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 11 and Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 18.010(2)(b) and 7.085. However, the district court denied these motions, finding that LaMont’s had not complied with NRCP 11's safe harbor provision, a procedural requirement for seeking sanctions.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's decision. The Court agreed that LaMont’s had not complied with NRCP 11's procedural requirements, and thus was not entitled to attorney fees under this rule. However, the Court held that these procedural requirements did not apply to NRS 18.010(2)(b) and 7.085. The Court concluded that these statutes provided independent mechanisms for sanctions, and as such, the district court had erred in applying NRCP 11's procedural requirements to them. The case was remanded with instructions for the district court to determine whether LaMont’s was entitled to attorney fees under these statutes. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85056.html" target="_blank">View "LaMont's Wild W. Buffalo, LLC v. Terry" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered a dispute between LaMont’s Wild West Buffalo, LLC and Nathanial Terry. LaMont’s had acted as an order-buyer to procure 517 bison for Terry’s Montana ranch under an oral agreement. After the bison were delivered, Terry ceased communication and did not pay LaMont’s finder’s fee. LaMont’s sued Terry for breach of contract and related claims. In response, Terry filed frivolous counterclaims, which were later dismissed.
After winning the case, LaMont’s sought attorney fees as sanctions under Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 11 and Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 18.010(2)(b) and 7.085. However, the district court denied these motions, finding that LaMont’s had not complied with NRCP 11's safe harbor provision, a procedural requirement for seeking sanctions.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's decision. The Court agreed that LaMont’s had not complied with NRCP 11's procedural requirements, and thus was not entitled to attorney fees under this rule. However, the Court held that these procedural requirements did not apply to NRS 18.010(2)(b) and 7.085. The Court concluded that these statutes provided independent mechanisms for sanctions, and as such, the district court had erred in applying NRCP 11's procedural requirements to them. The case was remanded with instructions for the district court to determine whether LaMont’s was entitled to attorney fees under these statutes.
2024-03-07stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndonhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85844.htmlSunrise Hospital v. Eighth Judicial District Court2024-03-07T09:32:55-08:002024-03-07T09:32:55-08:00
This case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Tiffiny Grace, legal guardian of E.G., against Sunrise Hospital and Nurse Cord Olsen for professional negligence. E.G. was born prematurely at Sunrise Hospital and suffered permanent developmental damage following a cardiac arrest in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. The hospital's Patient Safety Committee investigated the incident, which Grace sought to examine during discovery. However, Sunrise Hospital objected, asserting that the information was privileged under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA) and Nevada law. The district court compelled the testimony, ruling that Sunrise Hospital had waived any privilege by allowing testimony on certain privileged topics.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, however, disagreed with the lower court's interpretation. It ruled that the PSQIA provides an absolute privilege for patient safety work products that is not subject to waiver. The court explained that this privilege aims to encourage healthcare providers to identify and learn from errors without fear of legal repercussions. The court concluded that the district court erred by interpreting the PSQIA to allow for waiver of privilege and by failing to determine whether the testimony sought constituted identifiable or non-identifiable patient safety work product. Therefore, the court granted a writ of prohibition, vacated the district court's order, and directed the lower court to reconsider Grace's motion to compel in light of its interpretation of the PSQIA. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85844.html" target="_blank">View "Sunrise Hospital v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law</a>
This case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Tiffiny Grace, legal guardian of E.G., against Sunrise Hospital and Nurse Cord Olsen for professional negligence. E.G. was born prematurely at Sunrise Hospital and suffered permanent developmental damage following a cardiac arrest in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. The hospital's Patient Safety Committee investigated the incident, which Grace sought to examine during discovery. However, Sunrise Hospital objected, asserting that the information was privileged under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA) and Nevada law. The district court compelled the testimony, ruling that Sunrise Hospital had waived any privilege by allowing testimony on certain privileged topics.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, however, disagreed with the lower court's interpretation. It ruled that the PSQIA provides an absolute privilege for patient safety work products that is not subject to waiver. The court explained that this privilege aims to encourage healthcare providers to identify and learn from errors without fear of legal repercussions. The court concluded that the district court erred by interpreting the PSQIA to allow for waiver of privilege and by failing to determine whether the testimony sought constituted identifiable or non-identifiable patient safety work product. Therefore, the court granted a writ of prohibition, vacated the district court's order, and directed the lower court to reconsider Grace's motion to compel in light of its interpretation of the PSQIA.
2024-03-07stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndonhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/83672.htmlGibbs v. State2024-03-07T09:32:46-08:002024-03-07T09:32:46-08:00
This case involves an appeal from a judgment of conviction for second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. The appellant, Jamel Gibbs, was convicted following a trial during which a recorded phone call between him and a defense investigator was admitted as evidence. Gibbs was in pretrial detention at the time of the call, which was made on a recorded line using another inmate's phone access code and a three-way calling system.
Gibbs argued that the recorded phone call was protected by attorney-client privilege and should not have been admitted into evidence. The district court ruled against him, reasoning that the conversation was not privileged because Gibbs violated jail policy by using another inmate's phone access code and making a three-way call.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the district court's ruling. The court held that a defendant’s call to a defense investigator, even if made through a three-way call, does not, on its own, amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege unless it can be shown that the third party remained present during the conversation. The court also found that violating jail telephone policies does not automatically result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. As such, the district court erred in admitting the recorded phone call into evidence.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the recorded phone call directly undermined Gibbs's planned defense strategy and necessitated a change in strategy at the start of trial. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/83672.html" target="_blank">View "Gibbs v. State" on Justia Law</a>
This case involves an appeal from a judgment of conviction for second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. The appellant, Jamel Gibbs, was convicted following a trial during which a recorded phone call between him and a defense investigator was admitted as evidence. Gibbs was in pretrial detention at the time of the call, which was made on a recorded line using another inmate's phone access code and a three-way calling system.
Gibbs argued that the recorded phone call was protected by attorney-client privilege and should not have been admitted into evidence. The district court ruled against him, reasoning that the conversation was not privileged because Gibbs violated jail policy by using another inmate's phone access code and making a three-way call.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the district court's ruling. The court held that a defendant’s call to a defense investigator, even if made through a three-way call, does not, on its own, amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege unless it can be shown that the third party remained present during the conversation. The court also found that violating jail telephone policies does not automatically result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. As such, the district court erred in admitting the recorded phone call into evidence.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the recorded phone call directly undermined Gibbs's planned defense strategy and necessitated a change in strategy at the start of trial. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
2024-03-07stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBellhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/86161.htmlChadwick v. State2024-02-29T09:28:58-08:002024-02-29T09:28:58-08:00
In an appeal from a judgment of conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident after he hit a child with his vehicle and did not stop or return to the scene. He appealed on the grounds that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his alcohol consumption prior to the accident and his apparent intoxication, and his threat to a witness and gang affiliation. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the appellant's alcohol consumption and intoxication, as it was relevant to his motive to flee the scene of the accident. The court also ruled that when the defendant directly introduces evidence of bad acts, it is the defendant's responsibility to request an instruction limiting the consideration of that evidence. The court concluded that the defendant had failed to establish any grounds for reversing his conviction, and thus affirmed the lower court's decision. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/86161.html" target="_blank">View "Chadwick v. State" on Justia Law</a>
In an appeal from a judgment of conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident after he hit a child with his vehicle and did not stop or return to the scene. He appealed on the grounds that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his alcohol consumption prior to the accident and his apparent intoxication, and his threat to a witness and gang affiliation. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the appellant's alcohol consumption and intoxication, as it was relevant to his motive to flee the scene of the accident. The court also ruled that when the defendant directly introduces evidence of bad acts, it is the defendant's responsibility to request an instruction limiting the consideration of that evidence. The court concluded that the defendant had failed to establish any grounds for reversing his conviction, and thus affirmed the lower court's decision.
2024-02-29stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaWestbrookhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/86567.htmlIgtiben v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.2024-02-22T09:26:42-08:002024-02-22T09:26:42-08:00
This case arose from a wrongful death and professional negligence action brought by Linda F. Smith, the mother of Kamario Mantrell Smith, an inmate who died after unsuccessful heart surgery and subsequent complications. The defendants were Christopher L. Igtiben, M.D., Dignity Health, and related entities. Smith filed her complaint on November 22, 2022, alleging that the defendants' failure to recognize her son's sickle cell anemia before ordering a CT scan with contrast ultimately led to his death. Dr. Igtiben filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations under NRS 41A.097(2) had expired. The district court denied the dismissal motion.
The Court of Appeals of Nevada found that Smith had been placed on inquiry notice of potential professional negligence and wrongful death claims when she received her son's medical records in January 2020. Accordingly, NRS 41A.097(2) required her to file any professional negligence or wrongful death action within one year from that date. Because Smith did not file her complaint until November 2022, the statute of limitations had expired, and the district court should have dismissed the complaint as untimely. As a result, the court granted the writ of mandamus and directed the clerk to issue a writ instructing the district court to dismiss the complaint. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/86567.html" target="_blank">View "Igtiben v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law</a>
This case arose from a wrongful death and professional negligence action brought by Linda F. Smith, the mother of Kamario Mantrell Smith, an inmate who died after unsuccessful heart surgery and subsequent complications. The defendants were Christopher L. Igtiben, M.D., Dignity Health, and related entities. Smith filed her complaint on November 22, 2022, alleging that the defendants' failure to recognize her son's sickle cell anemia before ordering a CT scan with contrast ultimately led to his death. Dr. Igtiben filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations under NRS 41A.097(2) had expired. The district court denied the dismissal motion.
The Court of Appeals of Nevada found that Smith had been placed on inquiry notice of potential professional negligence and wrongful death claims when she received her son's medical records in January 2020. Accordingly, NRS 41A.097(2) required her to file any professional negligence or wrongful death action within one year from that date. Because Smith did not file her complaint until November 2022, the statute of limitations had expired, and the district court should have dismissed the complaint as untimely. As a result, the court granted the writ of mandamus and directed the clerk to issue a writ instructing the district court to dismiss the complaint.
2024-02-22stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBullahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85804.htmlWynn v. The Associated Press2024-02-15T16:02:42-08:002024-02-15T16:02:42-08:00
In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Steve Wynn, a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics, filed a defamation claim against the defendants, The Associated Press and its reporter, Regina Garcia Cano. The claim arose from an article that reported on two separate citizens' complaints alleging sexual assault by Wynn in the 1970s. The defendants responded with a special motion to dismiss the claim under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, which aim to protect the right to free speech and prevent meritless lawsuits intended to chill the exercise of these rights.
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in connection with an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim. Wynn appealed this decision, arguing that the district court erred in its analysis under the two-prong anti-SLAPP framework.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. Under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court found that the defendants had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim was based on a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.
Under the second prong, the court clarified that a public figure defamation plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. In this case, the court determined that Wynn failed to meet this burden. Hence, he could not establish with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claim, leading to the affirmation of the district court's order granting the defendants' special motion to dismiss the complaint. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85804.html" target="_blank">View "Wynn v. The Associated Press" on Justia Law</a>
In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Steve Wynn, a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics, filed a defamation claim against the defendants, The Associated Press and its reporter, Regina Garcia Cano. The claim arose from an article that reported on two separate citizens' complaints alleging sexual assault by Wynn in the 1970s. The defendants responded with a special motion to dismiss the claim under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, which aim to protect the right to free speech and prevent meritless lawsuits intended to chill the exercise of these rights.
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in connection with an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim. Wynn appealed this decision, arguing that the district court erred in its analysis under the two-prong anti-SLAPP framework.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. Under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court found that the defendants had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim was based on a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.
Under the second prong, the court clarified that a public figure defamation plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. In this case, the court determined that Wynn failed to meet this burden. Hence, he could not establish with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claim, leading to the affirmation of the district court's order granting the defendants' special motion to dismiss the complaint.
2024-02-08stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaPARRAGUIRREhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84353.htmlWillson v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.2024-02-15T16:01:12-08:002024-02-15T16:01:12-08:00
The Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada was reviewing a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging an order from the district court. Petitioner Lina Marie Willson had been convicted of obstructing a public officer. This conviction arose from an incident where Willson had yelled at police officers from her front yard while they were attending to a separate incident involving a potentially suicidal juvenile. Willson appealed her conviction, arguing that the law under which she was convicted, NRS 197.190, was unconstitutionally vague or overly broad.
The court held that NRS 197.190 was not unconstitutionally vague or overly broad, either on its face or as applied to Willson. The court interpreted the law to apply only to physical conduct or fighting words that are specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the performance of their duties. Although the court found that Willson's claims failed, it did acknowledge that her claims implicated the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to the court's interpretation of NRS 197.190.
The court therefore granted the petition and directed the clerk of the court to issue a writ of certiorari upholding the constitutionality of NRS 197.190 and instructing the district court to reconsider Willson's direct appeal. The purpose of this reconsideration was to determine whether, given the court's interpretation of NRS 197.190, sufficient evidence existed to support Willson's conviction. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84353.html" target="_blank">View "Willson v. First Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law</a>
The Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada was reviewing a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging an order from the district court. Petitioner Lina Marie Willson had been convicted of obstructing a public officer. This conviction arose from an incident where Willson had yelled at police officers from her front yard while they were attending to a separate incident involving a potentially suicidal juvenile. Willson appealed her conviction, arguing that the law under which she was convicted, NRS 197.190, was unconstitutionally vague or overly broad.
The court held that NRS 197.190 was not unconstitutionally vague or overly broad, either on its face or as applied to Willson. The court interpreted the law to apply only to physical conduct or fighting words that are specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the performance of their duties. Although the court found that Willson's claims failed, it did acknowledge that her claims implicated the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to the court's interpretation of NRS 197.190.
The court therefore granted the petition and directed the clerk of the court to issue a writ of certiorari upholding the constitutionality of NRS 197.190 and instructing the district court to reconsider Willson's direct appeal. The purpose of this reconsideration was to determine whether, given the court's interpretation of NRS 197.190, sufficient evidence existed to support Willson's conviction.
2024-02-08stateNevadaSupreme Court of Nevadahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85195.htmlFalconi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.2024-02-15T15:59:42-08:002024-02-15T15:59:42-08:00
In the State of Nevada, Alexander M. Falconi, operating as the press organization Our Nevada Judges, petitioned against the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Charles J. Hoskin, District Judge, and parties in interest, Troy A. Minter and Jennifer R. Easler. Falconi challenged local rules and a statute that required certain court proceedings to be closed to the public.
Falconi filed a media request for camera access in a child custody proceeding between Minter and Easler. Minter opposed the request, arguing it was not in the child's best interest to have his personal information publicly available. The district court denied Falconi's request, citing that the case was sealed and thus required to be private according to local rules.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the public has a constitutional right to access court proceedings. The local rules and the statute, NRS 125.080, requiring the district court to close proceedings, bypassed the exercise of judicial discretion and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Thus, the court held that these local rules and NRS 125.080 were unconstitutional to the extent they permitted closed family court proceedings without exercising judicial discretion.
The court instructed the district court to reverse its order denying media access in the underlying child custody case. The court emphasized the importance of public access to court proceedings, including family court proceedings, which historically have been open to the public. The court rejected the automatic closure of such proceedings and emphasized the necessity of case-by-case judicial discretion in deciding whether to close proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85195.html" target="_blank">View "Falconi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law</a>
In the State of Nevada, Alexander M. Falconi, operating as the press organization Our Nevada Judges, petitioned against the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Charles J. Hoskin, District Judge, and parties in interest, Troy A. Minter and Jennifer R. Easler. Falconi challenged local rules and a statute that required certain court proceedings to be closed to the public.
Falconi filed a media request for camera access in a child custody proceeding between Minter and Easler. Minter opposed the request, arguing it was not in the child's best interest to have his personal information publicly available. The district court denied Falconi's request, citing that the case was sealed and thus required to be private according to local rules.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the public has a constitutional right to access court proceedings. The local rules and the statute, NRS 125.080, requiring the district court to close proceedings, bypassed the exercise of judicial discretion and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Thus, the court held that these local rules and NRS 125.080 were unconstitutional to the extent they permitted closed family court proceedings without exercising judicial discretion.
The court instructed the district court to reverse its order denying media access in the underlying child custody case. The court emphasized the importance of public access to court proceedings, including family court proceedings, which historically have been open to the public. The court rejected the automatic closure of such proceedings and emphasized the necessity of case-by-case judicial discretion in deciding whether to close proceedings.
2024-02-15stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndonhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84439.htmlAbbott v. City of Henderson2024-01-26T13:05:30-08:002024-01-26T13:05:30-08:00
In September 2019, Kathryn Abbott was assisting her child on a slide at Vivaldi Park in Henderson when she slipped and fractured her leg in multiple places. Abbott and her husband, Andrew Dodgson-Field, sued the City of Henderson, alleging negligence arising from premises liability and loss of consortium, respectively. The City of Henderson claimed immunity under Nevada's recreational use statute, NRS 41.510, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding the City of Henderson immune from suit.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that NRS 41.510's protections can apply to any premises, superseding a previous ruling that limited the statute's application to "rural, semi-rural, or nonresidential" property. The court determined that Abbott was engaged in a "recreational activity" as defined by the statute when she was injured, as walking and assisting a child playing on a playground is similar to the enumerated activities listed in the statute. The court also concluded that Abbott failed to present evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the City of Henderson willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. Therefore, the City of Henderson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84439.html" target="_blank">View "Abbott v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law</a>
In September 2019, Kathryn Abbott was assisting her child on a slide at Vivaldi Park in Henderson when she slipped and fractured her leg in multiple places. Abbott and her husband, Andrew Dodgson-Field, sued the City of Henderson, alleging negligence arising from premises liability and loss of consortium, respectively. The City of Henderson claimed immunity under Nevada's recreational use statute, NRS 41.510, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding the City of Henderson immune from suit.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that NRS 41.510's protections can apply to any premises, superseding a previous ruling that limited the statute's application to "rural, semi-rural, or nonresidential" property. The court determined that Abbott was engaged in a "recreational activity" as defined by the statute when she was injured, as walking and assisting a child playing on a playground is similar to the enumerated activities listed in the statute. The court also concluded that Abbott failed to present evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the City of Henderson willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. Therefore, the City of Henderson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor.
2024-01-25stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBellhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84739.htmlSullivan v. Lincoln County Water District2024-01-26T13:04:39-08:002024-01-26T13:04:39-08:00
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the Nevada State Engineer had the authority to combine multiple existing hydrographic basins into one "superbasin" for the purposes of water administration and management based on a shared source of water. The State Engineer had combined seven basins into one superbasin, the Lower White River Flow System (LWRFS), after determining that the waters of these basins were interconnected such that withdrawals from one basin affected the amount of water in the other basins. The State Engineer also found that the previously granted appropriations of water exceeded the rate of recharge in the LWRFS. Various entities who owned water rights throughout the new superbasin challenged the State Engineer's decision, claiming that he lacked the authority to manage surface waters and groundwater jointly and that his decision violated their due process rights.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the State Engineer indeed had the authority to manage surface waters and groundwater conjunctively and to jointly administer multiple basins. The court also found that the State Engineer did not violate the rights holders' due process rights because they received notice and had an opportunity to be heard. The court reversed the lower court's decision that had granted the rights holders' petitions for judicial review and remanded the matter back to the lower court for further proceedings to determine whether substantial evidence supported the State Engineer's factual determinations. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/84739.html" target="_blank">View "Sullivan v. Lincoln County Water District" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the Nevada State Engineer had the authority to combine multiple existing hydrographic basins into one "superbasin" for the purposes of water administration and management based on a shared source of water. The State Engineer had combined seven basins into one superbasin, the Lower White River Flow System (LWRFS), after determining that the waters of these basins were interconnected such that withdrawals from one basin affected the amount of water in the other basins. The State Engineer also found that the previously granted appropriations of water exceeded the rate of recharge in the LWRFS. Various entities who owned water rights throughout the new superbasin challenged the State Engineer's decision, claiming that he lacked the authority to manage surface waters and groundwater jointly and that his decision violated their due process rights.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the State Engineer indeed had the authority to manage surface waters and groundwater conjunctively and to jointly administer multiple basins. The court also found that the State Engineer did not violate the rights holders' due process rights because they received notice and had an opportunity to be heard. The court reversed the lower court's decision that had granted the rights holders' petitions for judicial review and remanded the matter back to the lower court for further proceedings to determine whether substantial evidence supported the State Engineer's factual determinations.
2024-01-25stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaLeehttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85383.htmlChittenden v. Justice Court of Pahrump Township2024-01-26T13:04:29-08:002024-01-26T13:04:29-08:00
A criminal defendant in Nevada, Jamie Marie Chittenden, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court, seeking the dismissal of charges against her because her preliminary hearing was scheduled 76 days after her initial appearance, while she remained in custody. The district court denied the petition because it found that good cause existed for this delay. Chittenden appealed this decision, arguing that the delay violated her statutory right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days. The Court of Appeals of Nevada concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it found good cause for the extreme delay in scheduling Chittenden’s preliminary hearing. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Chittenden’s petition for a writ of mandamus on other grounds. The court held that when deciding whether good cause exists to delay a preliminary hearing, the justice court must balance the defendant’s constitutional right to conditional pretrial liberty against the interests of the State and the needs of the court. The court also must make findings on the record to justify any delay of the preliminary hearing and undertake efforts to ensure that the hearing is held as soon as practicable. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85383.html" target="_blank">View "Chittenden v. Justice Court of Pahrump Township" on Justia Law</a>
A criminal defendant in Nevada, Jamie Marie Chittenden, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court, seeking the dismissal of charges against her because her preliminary hearing was scheduled 76 days after her initial appearance, while she remained in custody. The district court denied the petition because it found that good cause existed for this delay. Chittenden appealed this decision, arguing that the delay violated her statutory right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days. The Court of Appeals of Nevada concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it found good cause for the extreme delay in scheduling Chittenden’s preliminary hearing. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Chittenden’s petition for a writ of mandamus on other grounds. The court held that when deciding whether good cause exists to delay a preliminary hearing, the justice court must balance the defendant’s constitutional right to conditional pretrial liberty against the interests of the State and the needs of the court. The court also must make findings on the record to justify any delay of the preliminary hearing and undertake efforts to ensure that the hearing is held as soon as practicable.
2024-01-25stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaWestbrookhttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85538.htmlAguilar v. Lucky Cab Co.2024-01-04T09:05:21-08:002024-01-04T09:05:21-08:00
In a personal injury case, Alejandro Lopez Aguilar, the appellant, had filed a lawsuit against Lucky Cab Co. and Adugna Demesash, the respondents. Before trial, Lucky Cab made an offer of judgment to Aguilar for a lump sum of $150,001, explicitly stating that this amount did not include prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs incurred to date. Aguilar accepted the offer. Lucky Cab sent Aguilar both a check for $150,001 and a stipulation and order for dismissal. However, Aguilar did not process the check or consent to the dismissal, arguing that Lucky Cab had not fully paid the offer amount as it had not yet paid any costs or prejudgment interest. The district court granted dismissal with prejudice, concluding that Lucky Cab was entitled to dismissal once it tendered payment within the stipulated window. Aguilar appealed.
The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s decision. The high court clarified that when an offer of judgment explicitly excludes costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees, it promises two sums if accepted: (1) the principal amount for the claim(s), specified in the offer; and (2) a separate amount for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees that would be recoverable if a judgment were entered based on that offer. Consequently, under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 68(d)(2), an offeror cannot obtain dismissal unless they pay both the principal offer and the additional allowance for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees. In this case, Lucky Cab did not pay the pre-offer costs and interest that were promised and that Aguilar would be entitled to as a prevailing party. The case was remanded for the district court to determine the amount of awardable pre-offer costs and interest that Lucky Cab must pay to obtain dismissal. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85538.html" target="_blank">View "Aguilar v. Lucky Cab Co." on Justia Law</a>
In a personal injury case, Alejandro Lopez Aguilar, the appellant, had filed a lawsuit against Lucky Cab Co. and Adugna Demesash, the respondents. Before trial, Lucky Cab made an offer of judgment to Aguilar for a lump sum of $150,001, explicitly stating that this amount did not include prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs incurred to date. Aguilar accepted the offer. Lucky Cab sent Aguilar both a check for $150,001 and a stipulation and order for dismissal. However, Aguilar did not process the check or consent to the dismissal, arguing that Lucky Cab had not fully paid the offer amount as it had not yet paid any costs or prejudgment interest. The district court granted dismissal with prejudice, concluding that Lucky Cab was entitled to dismissal once it tendered payment within the stipulated window. Aguilar appealed.
The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s decision. The high court clarified that when an offer of judgment explicitly excludes costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees, it promises two sums if accepted: (1) the principal amount for the claim(s), specified in the offer; and (2) a separate amount for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees that would be recoverable if a judgment were entered based on that offer. Consequently, under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 68(d)(2), an offeror cannot obtain dismissal unless they pay both the principal offer and the additional allowance for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees. In this case, Lucky Cab did not pay the pre-offer costs and interest that were promised and that Aguilar would be entitled to as a prevailing party. The case was remanded for the district court to determine the amount of awardable pre-offer costs and interest that Lucky Cab must pay to obtain dismissal.
2024-01-04stateNevadaSupreme Court of Nevadahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85331.htmlDickey v. State2024-01-04T09:05:18-08:002024-01-04T09:05:18-08:00
This is a criminal appeal of a murder and sexual assault conviction. The appellant, Bryce Edward Dickey, was convicted for the murder and sexual assault of sixteen-year-old Gabrielle Ujlaky. He claimed that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimonies and evidence. The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court found that the trial court's admission of testimony from Dickey's ex-girlfriend, who testified that Dickey choked her during otherwise consensual sex, was not error because it was relevant to Dickey's intent. The court also concluded that the trial court's failure to conduct a complete analysis regarding the qualification of a witness as an expert was harmless. Additionally, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Dickey's sexual assault conviction, despite Dickey's argument that there was insufficient evidence of forced penetration. The court concluded that the cumulative impact of the identified errors did not warrant reversal since they did not deprive Dickey of a fair trial. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2024/85331.html" target="_blank">View "Dickey v. State" on Justia Law</a>
This is a criminal appeal of a murder and sexual assault conviction. The appellant, Bryce Edward Dickey, was convicted for the murder and sexual assault of sixteen-year-old Gabrielle Ujlaky. He claimed that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimonies and evidence. The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court found that the trial court's admission of testimony from Dickey's ex-girlfriend, who testified that Dickey choked her during otherwise consensual sex, was not error because it was relevant to Dickey's intent. The court also concluded that the trial court's failure to conduct a complete analysis regarding the qualification of a witness as an expert was harmless. Additionally, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Dickey's sexual assault conviction, despite Dickey's argument that there was insufficient evidence of forced penetration. The court concluded that the cumulative impact of the identified errors did not warrant reversal since they did not deprive Dickey of a fair trial.
2024-01-04stateNevadaSupreme Court of Nevadahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84978.htmlEngelson v. Dignity Health2023-12-28T10:09:04-08:002023-12-28T10:09:04-08:00
In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada reversed and remanded a district court order that had dismissed a professional negligence action for being time-barred. The case was brought by Gina Engelson, as the special administrator of the estate of Lenore Meyer, against Dignity Health (doing business as St. Rose Dominican Hospital-Siena Campus) and Grape Holdings LLC (doing business as Sage Creek Post-Acute). Lenore Meyer had developed a severe bedsore while being treated at these facilities. Meyer's family alleged that the care provided by the facilities fell below the standard of care in multiple ways, including failing to timely and adequately treat the bedsore. Meyer eventually died, and exactly one year after her death, Engelson filed a professional negligence complaint against the facilities. The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, finding that the complaint was filed more than a year after the estate and its special administrator knew or should have known about the relevant legal injury.
Upon review, the Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred. The Court of Appeals clarified that an affidavit of merit, which is required to support a professional negligence-based wrongful death claim, need not opine as to the element of causation. The Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence did not irrefutably demonstrate that the estate or its special administrator discovered or should have discovered the legal injury more than a year before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84978.html" target="_blank">View "Engelson v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law</a>
In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada reversed and remanded a district court order that had dismissed a professional negligence action for being time-barred. The case was brought by Gina Engelson, as the special administrator of the estate of Lenore Meyer, against Dignity Health (doing business as St. Rose Dominican Hospital-Siena Campus) and Grape Holdings LLC (doing business as Sage Creek Post-Acute). Lenore Meyer had developed a severe bedsore while being treated at these facilities. Meyer's family alleged that the care provided by the facilities fell below the standard of care in multiple ways, including failing to timely and adequately treat the bedsore. Meyer eventually died, and exactly one year after her death, Engelson filed a professional negligence complaint against the facilities. The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, finding that the complaint was filed more than a year after the estate and its special administrator knew or should have known about the relevant legal injury.
Upon review, the Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred. The Court of Appeals clarified that an affidavit of merit, which is required to support a professional negligence-based wrongful death claim, need not opine as to the element of causation. The Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence did not irrefutably demonstrate that the estate or its special administrator discovered or should have discovered the legal injury more than a year before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings.
2023-12-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of Nevadahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85271.htmlMCCORD VS. STATE2023-12-28T10:09:02-08:002023-12-28T10:09:02-08:00
The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed a case involving appellant David McCord, who was stopped by law enforcement due to a license plate frame partially covering the word "NEVADA." Law enforcement subsequently found contraband in McCord's car, leading to his conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance. McCord contested the legality of the traffic stop, arguing that the license plate frame did not constitute "foreign materials" as outlined in NRS 482.275(4), and that his license plate was "clearly legible" as the statute requires.
The court held that a license plate frame does not constitute "foreign materials" under NRS 482.275(4), and that a license plate is "clearly legible" if the required registration information is readily identifiable. The court reasoned that the term "foreign materials" should not be interpreted to include all license plate frames, as this could potentially lead to arbitrary or pretextual traffic stops. It also determined that even though the license plate frame partially covered the word "NEVADA," the license plate was still legible as the essential information was readily identifiable.
The court concluded that the law enforcement officer lacked probable cause to justify the traffic stop for a violation of NRS 482.275(4). Consequently, the district court had erred in finding that the traffic stop was reasonable and in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized during the stop. The court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85271.html" target="_blank">View "MCCORD VS. STATE" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed a case involving appellant David McCord, who was stopped by law enforcement due to a license plate frame partially covering the word "NEVADA." Law enforcement subsequently found contraband in McCord's car, leading to his conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance. McCord contested the legality of the traffic stop, arguing that the license plate frame did not constitute "foreign materials" as outlined in NRS 482.275(4), and that his license plate was "clearly legible" as the statute requires.
The court held that a license plate frame does not constitute "foreign materials" under NRS 482.275(4), and that a license plate is "clearly legible" if the required registration information is readily identifiable. The court reasoned that the term "foreign materials" should not be interpreted to include all license plate frames, as this could potentially lead to arbitrary or pretextual traffic stops. It also determined that even though the license plate frame partially covered the word "NEVADA," the license plate was still legible as the essential information was readily identifiable.
The court concluded that the law enforcement officer lacked probable cause to justify the traffic stop for a violation of NRS 482.275(4). Consequently, the district court had erred in finding that the traffic stop was reasonable and in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized during the stop. The court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.
2023-12-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of Nevadahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85214.htmlBLIGE VS. TERRY2023-12-28T10:08:58-08:002023-12-28T10:08:58-08:00
The Supreme Court of Nevada upheld a judgment from a lower court in a case involving extortion claims related to cryptocurrency. The case involves Christopher Terry, who sued Ava Blige, alleging she extorted cryptocurrency and money from him under threat of publishing his personal information. Blige failed to respond to court-ordered discovery requests, leading the district court to enter a default judgment in favor of Terry. The court found that Terry had established a prima facie case for conversion, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, awarding him damages accordingly. The court also found that the factual allegations supported a claim for extortion, even though it was not specifically pleaded in the complaint. On appeal, Blige argued that the district court erroneously determined that she had impliedly consented to being sued under the unpleaded legal theory of extortion. The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed with Blige on this issue, stating that a defaulting party cannot be found to have impliedly consented to try claims that were not pleaded in the complaint. However, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that Blige wrongfully dispossessed Terry of the cryptocurrency and money for cars through extortive acts under the theories of conversion, unjust enrichment, and caused him emotional distress. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85214.html" target="_blank">View "BLIGE VS. TERRY" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court of Nevada upheld a judgment from a lower court in a case involving extortion claims related to cryptocurrency. The case involves Christopher Terry, who sued Ava Blige, alleging she extorted cryptocurrency and money from him under threat of publishing his personal information. Blige failed to respond to court-ordered discovery requests, leading the district court to enter a default judgment in favor of Terry. The court found that Terry had established a prima facie case for conversion, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, awarding him damages accordingly. The court also found that the factual allegations supported a claim for extortion, even though it was not specifically pleaded in the complaint. On appeal, Blige argued that the district court erroneously determined that she had impliedly consented to being sued under the unpleaded legal theory of extortion. The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed with Blige on this issue, stating that a defaulting party cannot be found to have impliedly consented to try claims that were not pleaded in the complaint. However, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that Blige wrongfully dispossessed Terry of the cryptocurrency and money for cars through extortive acts under the theories of conversion, unjust enrichment, and caused him emotional distress.
2023-12-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of Nevadahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84492.htmlTaylor v. Brill2023-12-21T10:10:50-08:002023-12-21T10:10:50-08:00
In a medical malpractice lawsuit, Kimberly Taylor claimed that Dr. Keith Brill breached the accepted standard of medical care by causing damage during her surgery. The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the lower court had made several errors during the trial. Firstly, the lower court should not have allowed any evidence or argument regarding Taylor's informed consent or assumption of risk, as Taylor's consent was uncontested and such information was irrelevant to determining whether Dr. Brill had conformed to the accepted standard of care. Secondly, the lower court should not have prohibited Taylor from presenting non-expert evidence to show that the costs of her medical damages were reasonable. The Supreme Court also found that the lower court should not have allowed evidence of insurance write-downs, as these did not create any payable benefit to Taylor. Finally, the lower court was wrong to limit the scope of Taylor's closing argument. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84492.html" target="_blank">View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law</a>
In a medical malpractice lawsuit, Kimberly Taylor claimed that Dr. Keith Brill breached the accepted standard of medical care by causing damage during her surgery. The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the lower court had made several errors during the trial. Firstly, the lower court should not have allowed any evidence or argument regarding Taylor's informed consent or assumption of risk, as Taylor's consent was uncontested and such information was irrelevant to determining whether Dr. Brill had conformed to the accepted standard of care. Secondly, the lower court should not have prohibited Taylor from presenting non-expert evidence to show that the costs of her medical damages were reasonable. The Supreme Court also found that the lower court should not have allowed evidence of insurance write-downs, as these did not create any payable benefit to Taylor. Finally, the lower court was wrong to limit the scope of Taylor's closing argument. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial.
2023-12-21stateNevadaSupreme Court of Nevadahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84655.htmlIn re Guardianship of Jones2023-12-21T10:10:46-08:002023-12-21T10:10:46-08:00
In a contentious guardianship case involving Kathleen June Jones, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), attorney Elizabeth Brickfield, to aid in determining Jones's best interests. The GAL filed a notice of intent to seek fees and costs at her standard hourly rate. The court awarded her those fees over Jones's objection. Jones appealed, arguing that the GAL had no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of a fiduciary, not an attorney.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that Jones waived any argument pertaining to the form of the district court’s order by failing to raise the issue below. The court also held that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program, but this error was harmless because the district court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due to the complexity of this matter. Lastly, the court held that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the GAL’s fee request and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount of her requested fees. The court affirmed the district court’s order awarding the GAL fees. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84655.html" target="_blank">View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law</a>
In a contentious guardianship case involving Kathleen June Jones, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), attorney Elizabeth Brickfield, to aid in determining Jones's best interests. The GAL filed a notice of intent to seek fees and costs at her standard hourly rate. The court awarded her those fees over Jones's objection. Jones appealed, arguing that the GAL had no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of a fiduciary, not an attorney.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that Jones waived any argument pertaining to the form of the district court’s order by failing to raise the issue below. The court also held that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program, but this error was harmless because the district court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due to the complexity of this matter. Lastly, the court held that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the GAL’s fee request and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount of her requested fees. The court affirmed the district court’s order awarding the GAL fees.
2023-12-21stateNevadaSupreme Court of Nevadahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84904.htmlSims v. State2023-12-07T10:13:52-08:002023-12-07T10:13:52-08:00
In this case, Tashami J. Sims, the appellant, had pleaded guilty to assault with the use of a deadly weapon in the Eighth Judicial District Court. At one of his sentencing hearings, Sims expressed a desire to represent himself, stating, "I'll go pro per." However, the district court did not allow him to do so at that time. Sims did not reiterate his request at subsequent hearings, and he was eventually sentenced to 20 to 72 months in prison.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, Sims argued that the district court erred by not conducting a canvass to determine whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California. The Court of Appeals, in a decision of first impression, held that a defendant can abandon an unequivocal request to represent themselves where the district court has not conclusively denied the request and the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's conduct, demonstrates that the defendant has abandoned their request.
Applying this standard, the court found that Sims had abandoned his request to represent himself. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered factors such as Sims' failure to reassert his request at subsequent hearings, his collaboration with his counsel to obtain his mental health records, and the fact that he waited until after his conviction to raise the issue. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84904.html" target="_blank">View "Sims v. State" on Justia Law</a>
In this case, Tashami J. Sims, the appellant, had pleaded guilty to assault with the use of a deadly weapon in the Eighth Judicial District Court. At one of his sentencing hearings, Sims expressed a desire to represent himself, stating, "I'll go pro per." However, the district court did not allow him to do so at that time. Sims did not reiterate his request at subsequent hearings, and he was eventually sentenced to 20 to 72 months in prison.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, Sims argued that the district court erred by not conducting a canvass to determine whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California. The Court of Appeals, in a decision of first impression, held that a defendant can abandon an unequivocal request to represent themselves where the district court has not conclusively denied the request and the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's conduct, demonstrates that the defendant has abandoned their request.
Applying this standard, the court found that Sims had abandoned his request to represent himself. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered factors such as Sims' failure to reassert his request at subsequent hearings, his collaboration with his counsel to obtain his mental health records, and the fact that he waited until after his conviction to raise the issue. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
2023-12-07stateNevadaSupreme Court of Nevadahttps://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85007.htmlHighroller Transportation, LLC v. Nev. Transportation Authority2023-11-30T12:06:03-08:002023-11-30T12:06:03-08:00
The Supreme Court held that in contested cases before the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA), arguments not raised during the administrative proceedings are generally waived and that the NTA need not consider arguments raised for the first time at the general session.
Appellant received two administrative citations for improperly staging its vehicles at its casino without a charter order, in violation of Appellant's certificate restriction and NAC 706.360. Appellant agreed to the fines, and a hearing officer recommended that the NTA accept Appellant's stipulations and enter the fines against Appellant. Appellant petitioned for judicial review, arguing that its certificate restriction was federally preempted. The district court concluded that the certificate was related to safety and thus not federally preempted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's conclusory assertion of preemption at the NTA general session was insufficient to establish that the NTA lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce Appellant's certification restriction; and (2) Appellant waived its preemption argument by entering into the stipulation. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85007.html" target="_blank">View "Highroller Transportation, LLC v. Nev. Transportation Authority" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that in contested cases before the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA), arguments not raised during the administrative proceedings are generally waived and that the NTA need not consider arguments raised for the first time at the general session.
Appellant received two administrative citations for improperly staging its vehicles at its casino without a charter order, in violation of Appellant's certificate restriction and NAC 706.360. Appellant agreed to the fines, and a hearing officer recommended that the NTA accept Appellant's stipulations and enter the fines against Appellant. Appellant petitioned for judicial review, arguing that its certificate restriction was federally preempted. The district court concluded that the certificate was related to safety and thus not federally preempted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's conclusory assertion of preemption at the NTA general session was insufficient to establish that the NTA lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce Appellant's certification restriction; and (2) Appellant waived its preemption argument by entering into the stipulation.
The Supreme Court held that arguments not raised during administrative proceedings before the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA) are generally waived and that the NTA need not consider arguments raised for the first time at the general session.
2023-11-30stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaWestbrook85007https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84848.htmlWillard v. Berry-Hinckley Industries2023-11-30T12:05:59-08:002023-11-30T12:05:59-08:00
In the underlying breach of contract action the Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court denying Appellants relief under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) after the district court granted Respondents' motion for sanctions and dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that there was no error.
Appellants sued Respondents on claims sounding in breach of contract. After three years of Appellants failed to comply with various discovery requirements and court orders Respondents moved for sanctions seeking dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted the motion. Appellants moved to set aside the sanctions order, and the district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as to the denial of Appellants' Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) motion, the district court's decision was supported by substantial evidence; (2) as to the denial of Appellants' Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) motion, this rule was not an appropriate vehicle by which Appellants could obtain relief; and (3) as to the denial of Appellants' Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84848.html" target="_blank">View "Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Industries" on Justia Law</a>
In the underlying breach of contract action the Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court denying Appellants relief under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) after the district court granted Respondents' motion for sanctions and dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that there was no error.
Appellants sued Respondents on claims sounding in breach of contract. After three years of Appellants failed to comply with various discovery requirements and court orders Respondents moved for sanctions seeking dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted the motion. Appellants moved to set aside the sanctions order, and the district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as to the denial of Appellants' Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) motion, the district court's decision was supported by substantial evidence; (2) as to the denial of Appellants' Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) motion, this rule was not an appropriate vehicle by which Appellants could obtain relief; and (3) as to the denial of Appellants' Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
In the underlying breach of contract action the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellants' motions filed under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), holding that there was no error.
2023-11-30stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich8484883640https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84679.htmlPanik v. TMM, Inc.2023-11-30T12:05:57-08:002023-11-30T12:05:57-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court concluding that the claims against Appellant did not fall within the categories of claims subject to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes without further analysis, holding that remand was required.
In the underlying lawsuit, TMM, Inc. (TMMI) filed a third-party complaint against Appellant asserting claims for trade libel, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, injunctive relief, abuse of process, and alter ego liability. Appellant filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the district court erred in finding that the subject claims did not fall within the categories of claims subject to the anti-SLAPP statute; (2) Appellant met his burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis; and (3) the district court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating TMMI's claims under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84679.html" target="_blank">View "Panik v. TMM, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court concluding that the claims against Appellant did not fall within the categories of claims subject to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes without further analysis, holding that remand was required.
In the underlying lawsuit, TMM, Inc. (TMMI) filed a third-party complaint against Appellant asserting claims for trade libel, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, injunctive relief, abuse of process, and alter ego liability. Appellant filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the district court erred in finding that the subject claims did not fall within the categories of claims subject to the anti-SLAPP statute; (2) Appellant met his burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis; and (3) the district court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating TMMI's claims under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's conclusion that the claims against Appellant did not fall within the categories of claims subject to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, holding that remand was required.
2023-11-30stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich84679https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84950.htmlLopez v. Lopez2023-11-30T12:05:53-08:002023-11-30T12:05:53-08:00
The Supreme Court upheld the distribution decisions of the district court in the underlying divorce action to resolve community property disputes over property held in a revocable inter vivos trust and affirmed its decree of divorce, holding that there was no error.
At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the revocable inter vivos family trust was not a necessary party to the divorce action and that the district court had the authority to distribute the trust's assets; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the trust's assets between the parties as community property. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84950.html" target="_blank">View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court upheld the distribution decisions of the district court in the underlying divorce action to resolve community property disputes over property held in a revocable inter vivos trust and affirmed its decree of divorce, holding that there was no error.
At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the revocable inter vivos family trust was not a necessary party to the divorce action and that the district court had the authority to distribute the trust's assets; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the trust's assets between the parties as community property.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decree of divorce, holding that there was no error.
2023-11-30stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaMark Gibbons84950https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84908.htmlHolland v. Barney2023-11-22T09:05:08-08:002023-11-22T09:05:08-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment by substituting other remedies in place of an equitable lien placed by the bankruptcy court on real property located at 10512 Loma Portal Avenue, holding that, based on the preclusive effect of prior court orders, an equitable lien was the only available remedy to satisfy Respondent's interest concerning the property.
At issue before the Supreme Court was the preclusive effect of the multiple court orders in this case and the equitable remedies available under those orders. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) an equitable lien placed on property to satisfy a debt permits the lien holder to enforce the value of the equitable lien against the debtor's property even where that property has been subsequently transferred to a nondebtor spouse during divorce proceedings; (2) the district court erred by substituting other remedies in place of the equitable lien; and (3) genuine issues of material fact remained as to the value of the equitable lien placed on the property, as well as the value of the property itself. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84908.html" target="_blank">View "Holland v. Barney" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment by substituting other remedies in place of an equitable lien placed by the bankruptcy court on real property located at 10512 Loma Portal Avenue, holding that, based on the preclusive effect of prior court orders, an equitable lien was the only available remedy to satisfy Respondent's interest concerning the property.
At issue before the Supreme Court was the preclusive effect of the multiple court orders in this case and the equitable remedies available under those orders. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) an equitable lien placed on property to satisfy a debt permits the lien holder to enforce the value of the equitable lien against the debtor's property even where that property has been subsequently transferred to a nondebtor spouse during divorce proceedings; (2) the district court erred by substituting other remedies in place of the equitable lien; and (3) genuine issues of material fact remained as to the value of the equitable lien placed on the property, as well as the value of the property itself.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's summary judgment by substituting other remedies in place of an equitable lien placed by the bankruptcy court on certain real property, holding that, based on the preclusive effect of prior court orders, an equitable lien was the only available remedy to satisfy Respondent's interest concerning the property.
2023-11-22stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBulla84908https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85161.htmlSabater v. Razmy2023-11-22T09:05:06-08:002023-11-22T09:05:06-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing the underlying tort action for failure to timely effect service of process, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request for enlargement of time to serve and dismissing the action.
Appellants sued Respondent for personal injuries following a car collision. Because Appellants failed to serve the summons and complaint on Respondent within 120 days the district court issued an order to show cause, and the summons and complaint were served. Respondent moved to quash the service of process and to dismiss the complaint. The district court denied Appellants' untimely motion for an extension of time to serve process and granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Appellants' untimely motion for an extension of time and properly dismissed the case under Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85161.html" target="_blank">View "Sabater v. Razmy" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing the underlying tort action for failure to timely effect service of process, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request for enlargement of time to serve and dismissing the action.
Appellants sued Respondent for personal injuries following a car collision. Because Appellants failed to serve the summons and complaint on Respondent within 120 days the district court issued an order to show cause, and the summons and complaint were served. Respondent moved to quash the service of process and to dismiss the complaint. The district court denied Appellants' untimely motion for an extension of time to serve process and granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Appellants' untimely motion for an extension of time and properly dismissed the case under Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2).
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the underlying tort action for failure to timely effect service of process, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action.
2023-11-22stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBell85161https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84142.htmlRUAG Ammotec GmbH v. Archon Firearms, Inc.2023-11-16T10:11:07-08:002023-11-16T10:11:07-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court as to Appellants' motions to compel arbitration and remanded the case, holding that "where the nonsignatory seeking to compel arbitration demonstrates both the right to enforce the contract and that compelling another nonsignatory to arbitration is warranted under standard principles of contract law or estoppel, compelling arbitration is appropriate."
At issue was whether a nonsignatory to a contract containing an arbitration clause can be compelled to participate in arbitration by another signatory. The district court denied both Appellants' first and second motions to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed as to Appellants' first and second motions to compel arbitration, holding where a nonsignatory to a contract containing an arbitration provision moves to compel another nonsignatory to arbitrate, the nonsignatory seeking to compel arbitration must demonstrate the right to enforce the arbitration agreement and show that compelling the other nonsignatory to arbitration is warranted. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84142.html" target="_blank">View "RUAG Ammotec GmbH v. Archon Firearms, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court as to Appellants' motions to compel arbitration and remanded the case, holding that "where the nonsignatory seeking to compel arbitration demonstrates both the right to enforce the contract and that compelling another nonsignatory to arbitration is warranted under standard principles of contract law or estoppel, compelling arbitration is appropriate."
At issue was whether a nonsignatory to a contract containing an arbitration clause can be compelled to participate in arbitration by another signatory. The district court denied both Appellants' first and second motions to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed as to Appellants' first and second motions to compel arbitration, holding where a nonsignatory to a contract containing an arbitration provision moves to compel another nonsignatory to arbitrate, the nonsignatory seeking to compel arbitration must demonstrate the right to enforce the arbitration agreement and show that compelling the other nonsignatory to arbitration is warranted.
The Supreme Court held that "where the nonsignatory seeking to compel arbitration demonstrates both the right to enforce the contract and that compelling another nonsignatory to arbitration is warranted under standard principles of contract law or estoppel, compelling arbitration is appropriate."
2023-11-16stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaLee84142https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85249.htmlTough Turtle Turf, LLC v. Scott2023-11-02T09:12:11-08:002023-11-02T09:12:11-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court enforcing a noncompete covenant against three of its former employees (collectively, Respondents) on the basis that the covenant was unenforceable due to procedural unconscionability, holding that the court erred in invalidating the covenant based on procedural unconscionability and in failing adequately to consider whether the overbroad scope of the covenant could be modified.
In determining that the noncompete agreement was unenforceable, the district court called into question whether employees could readily ascertain its terms and found that the noncompete covenant was overbroad. The court, however, declined to modify the covenant, stating that it could be redrafted in a manner to allow for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order denying injunctive relief as to the noncompete provision, holding that the district court (1) erred in invalidating the noncompete covenant as procedurally unconscionable and therefore unenforceable as a matter of law; and (2) failed properly to analyze whether the noncompete covenant could be revised under Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.195(6). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85249.html" target="_blank">View "Tough Turtle Turf, LLC v. Scott" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court enforcing a noncompete covenant against three of its former employees (collectively, Respondents) on the basis that the covenant was unenforceable due to procedural unconscionability, holding that the court erred in invalidating the covenant based on procedural unconscionability and in failing adequately to consider whether the overbroad scope of the covenant could be modified.
In determining that the noncompete agreement was unenforceable, the district court called into question whether employees could readily ascertain its terms and found that the noncompete covenant was overbroad. The court, however, declined to modify the covenant, stating that it could be redrafted in a manner to allow for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order denying injunctive relief as to the noncompete provision, holding that the district court (1) erred in invalidating the noncompete covenant as procedurally unconscionable and therefore unenforceable as a matter of law; and (2) failed properly to analyze whether the noncompete covenant could be revised under Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.195(6).
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order enforcing a noncompete covenant against three of its former employees on the basis that the covenant was unenforceable, holding that the court erred in invalidating the covenant based on procedural unconscionability and in failing adequately to consider whether the overbroad scope of the covenant could be modified.
2023-11-02stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaKristina Pickering85249https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85099.htmlBolden v. State2023-10-19T10:05:11-08:002023-10-19T10:05:11-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence as to restitution and the cost of a psychosexual evaluation and remanded this case for resentencing, holding that the district court erred by not undertaking an investigative inquiry prior to ordering Defendant to pay extradition restitution and by not addressing Defendant's alleged inability to pay the psychosexual evaluation cost.
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen years. At the sentencing hearing, the State requested that the court impose restitution for the cost of having Defendant extradited from Michigan to Nevada as well as the cost of Defendant's psychosexual evaluation, to which he agreed in plea negotiations. Defendant objected to both the extradition restitution and psychosexual evaluation cost on the grounds of his inability to pay. The district court imposed both the extradition restitution and psychosexual evaluation cost in full. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred by imposing extradition restitution without conducting the investigate inquiry required under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.225(2); and (2) abused its discretion by imposing the cost of the psychosexual evaluation in full before making findings as to Defendant's ability to pay. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85099.html" target="_blank">View "Bolden v. State" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence as to restitution and the cost of a psychosexual evaluation and remanded this case for resentencing, holding that the district court erred by not undertaking an investigative inquiry prior to ordering Defendant to pay extradition restitution and by not addressing Defendant's alleged inability to pay the psychosexual evaluation cost.
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen years. At the sentencing hearing, the State requested that the court impose restitution for the cost of having Defendant extradited from Michigan to Nevada as well as the cost of Defendant's psychosexual evaluation, to which he agreed in plea negotiations. Defendant objected to both the extradition restitution and psychosexual evaluation cost on the grounds of his inability to pay. The district court imposed both the extradition restitution and psychosexual evaluation cost in full. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred by imposing extradition restitution without conducting the investigate inquiry required under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.225(2); and (2) abused its discretion by imposing the cost of the psychosexual evaluation in full before making findings as to Defendant's ability to pay.
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence as to restitution and the cost of a psychosexual evaluation, holding that the district court erred in sentencing Defendant.
2023-10-19stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaWestbrook85099https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84161.htmlDeutsche Bank National Trust v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.2023-10-12T09:10:16-08:002023-10-12T09:10:16-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint brought by a first deed of trust holder against its title insurance company for breach of contract and related claims, holding that there was no error.
The insurer in this case denied coverage to a first deed of trust holder for its loss of interest in property following a foreclosed upon a "superpriority piece." At issue was whether the first deed of trust holder could recover for its loss of interest in the subject property by making a claim on its title insurance policy. The district court granted the title insurance company's motion to dismiss as to all claims, concluding that no coverage existed under the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the claims for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were properly dismissed; and (2) the first deed of trust holder was not entitled to relief on its remaining allegations of error. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84161.html" target="_blank">View "Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint brought by a first deed of trust holder against its title insurance company for breach of contract and related claims, holding that there was no error.
The insurer in this case denied coverage to a first deed of trust holder for its loss of interest in property following a foreclosed upon a "superpriority piece." At issue was whether the first deed of trust holder could recover for its loss of interest in the subject property by making a claim on its title insurance policy. The district court granted the title insurance company's motion to dismiss as to all claims, concluding that no coverage existed under the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the claims for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were properly dismissed; and (2) the first deed of trust holder was not entitled to relief on its remaining allegations of error.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint brought by a first deed of trust holder against its title insurance company for breach of contract and related claims, holding that there was no error.
2023-10-12stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadish84161https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84427.htmlEivazi v. Eivazi2023-10-05T11:04:39-08:002023-10-05T11:04:39-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in the underlying divorce action, holding that while parts of the decree were legally and factually supportable, other portions contained numerous legal and factual deficiencies.
Following lengthy divorce proceedings the district court summarily adopted Respondent's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce without making any modifications. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court committed reversible error in doing so. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) utilizing a party's proposed order does not in and of itself constitute an abuse of discretion; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it granted financial awards for alimony, attorney fees, and expert fees and when it unequally distributed the parties' community property and debt. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84427.html" target="_blank">View "Eivazi v. Eivazi" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in the underlying divorce action, holding that while parts of the decree were legally and factually supportable, other portions contained numerous legal and factual deficiencies.
Following lengthy divorce proceedings the district court summarily adopted Respondent's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce without making any modifications. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court committed reversible error in doing so. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) utilizing a party's proposed order does not in and of itself constitute an abuse of discretion; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it granted financial awards for alimony, attorney fees, and expert fees and when it unequally distributed the parties' community property and debt.
The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's in the underlying divorce action, holding portions of the decree contained numerous legal and factual deficiencies.
2023-10-05stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaWestbrook84427https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84081.htmlFloyd v. State, Dep't of Correction2023-09-28T13:07:19-08:002023-09-28T13:07:19-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint alleging that Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.355, Nevada's statute providing that an execution must be effectuated by injection of a lethal drug, is unconstitutional because it gives the Director of the Nevada Department of Corrections discretion to determine the process by which a lethal injection is administered, holding that there was no error.
Appellant, a death-row inmate, argued that section 176.355 lacked suitable standards because it afforded the Director complete discretion to determine the types, dosages, and sequencing of drugs to be used in the execution. The district court dismissed the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute, combined with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, provided the Director with suitable standards to determine the process by which a lethal injection is to be administered. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84081.html" target="_blank">View "Floyd v. State, Dep't of Correction" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint alleging that Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.355, Nevada's statute providing that an execution must be effectuated by injection of a lethal drug, is unconstitutional because it gives the Director of the Nevada Department of Corrections discretion to determine the process by which a lethal injection is administered, holding that there was no error.
Appellant, a death-row inmate, argued that section 176.355 lacked suitable standards because it afforded the Director complete discretion to determine the types, dosages, and sequencing of drugs to be used in the execution. The district court dismissed the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute, combined with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, provided the Director with suitable standards to determine the process by which a lethal injection is to be administered.
The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in dismissing Appellant's complaint alleging that Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.355, Nevada's statute providing that an execution must be effectuated by injection of a lethal drug, is unconstitutional.
2023-09-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaRon D. Parraguirre84081https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84274.htmlIn re D.M.F.2023-09-28T13:07:09-08:002023-09-28T13:07:09-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court sua sponte deciding to remove a protected minor's guardian and terminate the minor's guardianship based upon an ex parte communication, holding that the proceedings and resulting order did not comport with due process.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) has authority to sua sponte remove a guardian and terminate a guardianship even in the absence of a petition seeking removal and termination; (2) violated Defendant's right to due process by failing to give proper notice that it was contemplating removal and termination; (3) abused its discretion by failing to apply the applicable statutes and factors for removal and termination; and (4) made unsupported and clearly erroneous factual determinations in reaching its decision. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84274.html" target="_blank">View "In re D.M.F." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court sua sponte deciding to remove a protected minor's guardian and terminate the minor's guardianship based upon an ex parte communication, holding that the proceedings and resulting order did not comport with due process.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) has authority to sua sponte remove a guardian and terminate a guardianship even in the absence of a petition seeking removal and termination; (2) violated Defendant's right to due process by failing to give proper notice that it was contemplating removal and termination; (3) abused its discretion by failing to apply the applicable statutes and factors for removal and termination; and (4) made unsupported and clearly erroneous factual determinations in reaching its decision.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment sua sponte deciding to remove a protected minor's guardian and terminate the minor's guardianship based upon an ex parte communication, holding that the proceedings and order did not comport with due process.
2023-09-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadish84274https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84685.htmlKelley v. Kelley2023-09-28T13:06:59-08:002023-09-28T13:06:59-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this child custody matter, holding that when parents with court-ordered joint legal custody of a minor child disagree on medical decisions concerning that child, the district court breaks the tie by determining which course of action is in the child's best interest.
The divorced parents in this case, who had joint legal custody of their eleven-year-old child, disagreed whether the child should be vaccinated against COVID-19. The court took note of government and professional groups' guidelines and research results regarding the safety of the COVID-19, accepted the child's pediatrician's recommendation, and found that vaccination was in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's finding of best interest aligned with the factors adopted in this opinion. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84685.html" target="_blank">View "Kelley v. Kelley" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this child custody matter, holding that when parents with court-ordered joint legal custody of a minor child disagree on medical decisions concerning that child, the district court breaks the tie by determining which course of action is in the child's best interest.
The divorced parents in this case, who had joint legal custody of their eleven-year-old child, disagreed whether the child should be vaccinated against COVID-19. The court took note of government and professional groups' guidelines and research results regarding the safety of the COVID-19, accepted the child's pediatrician's recommendation, and found that vaccination was in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's finding of best interest aligned with the factors adopted in this opinion.
The Supreme Court held that when parents with court-ordered joint legal custody of a minor child disagree on medical decisions concerning that child, the district court breaks the tie by determining which course of action is in the child's best interest.
2023-09-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich84685https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85111.htmlOrbitz Worldwide v. Eighth Judicial District Court2023-09-28T13:06:49-08:002023-09-28T13:06:49-08:00
The Supreme Court denied writ relief in this writ proceeding, holding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the law requires the district court to dismiss this private action such that writ relief is warranted.
At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 357.080(3)(b), which prevents a private plaintiff from maintaining an action under the Nevada False Claims Act (NFCA) if the action is based on the same allegations or transactions that are the subject of a civil action to which the State or a political subdivision is already a party. The Supreme Court held (1) section 357.080(3)(b) does not contain a sequencing requirement and therefore requires dismissal of a private action brought under the NFCA even if the civil action was filed after the private action; (2) section 357.080(3)(b) does not bar a separate private action on behalf of a different governmental entity even where the two suits involve the same allegations or transactions; and (3) Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the law requires the district court to dismiss this private action such that writ relief is warranted. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85111.html" target="_blank">View "Orbitz Worldwide v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied writ relief in this writ proceeding, holding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the law requires the district court to dismiss this private action such that writ relief is warranted.
At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 357.080(3)(b), which prevents a private plaintiff from maintaining an action under the Nevada False Claims Act (NFCA) if the action is based on the same allegations or transactions that are the subject of a civil action to which the State or a political subdivision is already a party. The Supreme Court held (1) section 357.080(3)(b) does not contain a sequencing requirement and therefore requires dismissal of a private action brought under the NFCA even if the civil action was filed after the private action; (2) section 357.080(3)(b) does not bar a separate private action on behalf of a different governmental entity even where the two suits involve the same allegations or transactions; and (3) Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the law requires the district court to dismiss this private action such that writ relief is warranted.
The Supreme Court denied writ relief in this writ proceeding, holding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate that they were entitled to the writ.
2023-09-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadish85111https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85122.htmlOlvera v. Wynn Las Vegas2023-09-28T13:06:38-08:002023-09-28T13:06:38-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals officer limiting the reopening of Appellant's claim to the lumbar spine and affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review, holding that the appeals officer properly determined that the reopening of Appellant's claim was warranted only as to the lumbar spine.
Although Appellant was previously treated for injuries to several parts of her body, including her head and back, she sought to reopen her claim due to the worsening condition of her lumbar spine. The appeals officer ordered that Appellant's claim be reopened for the lumbar spine only, and Appellant sought judicial review. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer properly limited the reopening of the claim to the lumbar spine. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85122.html" target="_blank">View "Olvera v. Wynn Las Vegas" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals officer limiting the reopening of Appellant's claim to the lumbar spine and affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review, holding that the appeals officer properly determined that the reopening of Appellant's claim was warranted only as to the lumbar spine.
Although Appellant was previously treated for injuries to several parts of her body, including her head and back, she sought to reopen her claim due to the worsening condition of her lumbar spine. The appeals officer ordered that Appellant's claim be reopened for the lumbar spine only, and Appellant sought judicial review. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer properly limited the reopening of the claim to the lumbar spine.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals officer limiting the reopening of Appellant's claim to the lumbar spine and affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review, holding that the appeals officer properly determined that the reopening of Appellant's claim was warranted only as to the lumbar spine.
2023-09-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBulla85122https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83622.htmlAldape v. State2023-09-28T13:06:28-08:002023-09-28T13:06:28-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court accepting Appellant's plea of no contest to two counts of attempted lewdness with a child and imposed the special condition of probation mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q), holding subsection (q) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Upon accepting Appellant's no contest plea the district court placed him on probation and imposed the special condition mandated by subsection (q), which prohibits a defendant on probation for a sexual offense from accessing the internet without his probation officer's permission. On appeal, Appellant argued that the mandatory internet ban failed intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the mandatory internet ban and otherwise affirmed, holding that because Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q) is both mandatory and restricts more speech than necessary to serve the government's interest with no tailoring mechanism it is facially unconstitutional. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83622.html" target="_blank">View "Aldape v. State" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court accepting Appellant's plea of no contest to two counts of attempted lewdness with a child and imposed the special condition of probation mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q), holding subsection (q) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Upon accepting Appellant's no contest plea the district court placed him on probation and imposed the special condition mandated by subsection (q), which prohibits a defendant on probation for a sexual offense from accessing the internet without his probation officer's permission. On appeal, Appellant argued that the mandatory internet ban failed intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the mandatory internet ban and otherwise affirmed, holding that because Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q) is both mandatory and restricts more speech than necessary to serve the government's interest with no tailoring mechanism it is facially unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the special condition of probation mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q) is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
2023-09-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaKristina Pickering83622https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83830.htmlKillebrew v. Donohue2023-09-28T13:06:18-08:002023-09-28T13:06:18-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Administrator of the Division of State Lands of the State Department of Conservation and Natural Resources and dismissing Appellants' petition under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.110 for a declaratory judgment that a fee-setting regulation was invalid, holding that there was no error.
At issue was NAC 322.190, a regulation that sets permit fees for the residential use of piers and buoys on navigable waters in Nevada. Appellants petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the fee-setting regulation was invalid. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Division. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Division did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating NAC 322.195, and Appellants failed to overcome the presumption that the regulation is valid. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83830.html" target="_blank">View "Killebrew v. Donohue" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Administrator of the Division of State Lands of the State Department of Conservation and Natural Resources and dismissing Appellants' petition under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.110 for a declaratory judgment that a fee-setting regulation was invalid, holding that there was no error.
At issue was NAC 322.190, a regulation that sets permit fees for the residential use of piers and buoys on navigable waters in Nevada. Appellants petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the fee-setting regulation was invalid. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Division. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Division did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating NAC 322.195, and Appellants failed to overcome the presumption that the regulation is valid.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellants' petition under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.110 for a declaratory judgment that a fee-setting regulation was invalid, holding that there was no error.
2023-09-28stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaLee83830https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83942.htmlKassebaum v. State, Dep't of Corrections2023-09-21T13:06:07-08:002023-09-21T13:06:07-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review of the denial of her appeal of her suspension from her position as a correctional officer, holding that when an employee requests a hearing to challenge a state employer's disciplinary decision pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) 284.390 and fails to comply with the attachment requirement set forth in Nev. Admin. Code (NAC) 284.6562, the appeal is defective and must be dismissed.
At issue was whether the requirement in NAC 284.6562(2)(b) that a state employee requesting a hearing to challenge the reasonableness of a disciplinary action under NRS 284.390 attach a copy of the written notification of the discipline to the appeal form is jurisdictional or procedural. A hearing officer with the State of Nevada Department of Corrections found that NAC 284.6562(2)(b) was a jurisdictional requirement that could not be cured because the deadline for Appellant to file an appeal had passed. The district court agreed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) NAC 284.6562(2)(b) is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, but compliance with the rule is mandatory; and (2) while the hearing officer had jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant's disciplinary appeal, the hearing officer reached the right result by dismissing the appeal. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83942.html" target="_blank">View "Kassebaum v. State, Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review of the denial of her appeal of her suspension from her position as a correctional officer, holding that when an employee requests a hearing to challenge a state employer's disciplinary decision pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) 284.390 and fails to comply with the attachment requirement set forth in Nev. Admin. Code (NAC) 284.6562, the appeal is defective and must be dismissed.
At issue was whether the requirement in NAC 284.6562(2)(b) that a state employee requesting a hearing to challenge the reasonableness of a disciplinary action under NRS 284.390 attach a copy of the written notification of the discipline to the appeal form is jurisdictional or procedural. A hearing officer with the State of Nevada Department of Corrections found that NAC 284.6562(2)(b) was a jurisdictional requirement that could not be cured because the deadline for Appellant to file an appeal had passed. The district court agreed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) NAC 284.6562(2)(b) is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, but compliance with the rule is mandatory; and (2) while the hearing officer had jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant's disciplinary appeal, the hearing officer reached the right result by dismissing the appeal.
The Supreme Court held that when an employee requests a hearing to challenge a state employer's disciplinary decision pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 284.390 and fails to comply with the attachment requirement set forth in Nev. Admin. Code 284.6562, the appeal is defective and must be dismissed.
2023-09-21stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich83942https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/86108.htmlPatterson v. Las Vegas Municipal Court2023-09-21T13:05:56-08:002023-09-21T13:05:56-08:00
The Supreme Court denied the writ petition filed by Petitioner challenging the decision of the Las Vegas Municipal Court denying Petitioner's request for attorney fees and litigation expenses after criminal charges against him were dismissed and withdrawn, holding that the municipal court correctly determined that it lacked authority to award attorney fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioner was arrested and charged with obstructing a police officer and a traffic violation. Petitioner successfully moved to dismiss the obstruction charge, and the traffic violation charge was subsequently withdrawn. Petitioner then filed an application for attorney fees and litigation expenses pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.0393. The municipal court denied the request for lack of authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that municipal courts lack authority under section 41.0393 to award attorney fees and litigation expenses to the prevailing party in a criminal action. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/86108.html" target="_blank">View "Patterson v. Las Vegas Municipal Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied the writ petition filed by Petitioner challenging the decision of the Las Vegas Municipal Court denying Petitioner's request for attorney fees and litigation expenses after criminal charges against him were dismissed and withdrawn, holding that the municipal court correctly determined that it lacked authority to award attorney fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioner was arrested and charged with obstructing a police officer and a traffic violation. Petitioner successfully moved to dismiss the obstruction charge, and the traffic violation charge was subsequently withdrawn. Petitioner then filed an application for attorney fees and litigation expenses pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.0393. The municipal court denied the request for lack of authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that municipal courts lack authority under section 41.0393 to award attorney fees and litigation expenses to the prevailing party in a criminal action.
The Supreme Court held that the municipal court correctly determined that it lacked authority to award attorney fees and litigation expenses to Petitioner in this case.
2023-09-21stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich86108https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83945.htmlEl Jen Medical Hospital, Inc. v. Tyler2023-09-21T13:05:46-08:002023-09-21T13:05:46-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court compelling an estate's claims to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement signed during the decedent's admission to El Jen Convalescent Hospital and Retirement Center (El Jen), holding that a nonsignatory heir's wrongful death claim is not bound to an agreement like the arbitration agreement in his case that does not implicate the viability of the underlying personal injury claim.
Following the death of her husband, Gary Tyler, Stacy Tyler brought this action against El Jen, asserting negligence, wrongful death, and survivorship claims individually and on behalf of Gary's estate and their minor child, and was joined by two adult statutory heirs. The district court (1) compelled the estate's claims to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration signed during Gary's admission to El Jen; and (2) concluded that the statutory heirs were not bound by the agreement because they did not sign it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly rejected Plaintiffs' challenge to the arbitration agreement's validity; and (2) did not err in holding that the heirs were not bound by the agreement because they were nonsignatories who were pursuing their own individual claims. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83945.html" target="_blank">View "El Jen Medical Hospital, Inc. v. Tyler" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court compelling an estate's claims to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement signed during the decedent's admission to El Jen Convalescent Hospital and Retirement Center (El Jen), holding that a nonsignatory heir's wrongful death claim is not bound to an agreement like the arbitration agreement in his case that does not implicate the viability of the underlying personal injury claim.
Following the death of her husband, Gary Tyler, Stacy Tyler brought this action against El Jen, asserting negligence, wrongful death, and survivorship claims individually and on behalf of Gary's estate and their minor child, and was joined by two adult statutory heirs. The district court (1) compelled the estate's claims to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration signed during Gary's admission to El Jen; and (2) concluded that the statutory heirs were not bound by the agreement because they did not sign it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly rejected Plaintiffs' challenge to the arbitration agreement's validity; and (2) did not err in holding that the heirs were not bound by the agreement because they were nonsignatories who were pursuing their own individual claims.
The Supreme Court held that a nonsignatory heir's wrongful death claim is not bound to an agreement like the arbitration agreement in his case that does not implicate the viability of the underlying personal injury claim.
2023-09-21stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaKristina Pickering83945https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83859.htmlCandelaria v. Kelly2023-09-14T15:06:11-08:002023-09-14T15:06:11-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court declining to backdate the parties' marriage in this case to the date they would have been married but for Nevada's unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage, holding that "the effective date of a marriage will not predate the solemnized marriage itself for property division purposes in a divorce,
even if a party asserts that the couple would have married earlier but for the later-held-to-be-unconstitutional ban on marriage between same-sex couples."
Appellant and Respondent formally married in California in 2008, when Nevada did not permit same-sex marriages or recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. In 2021, in seeking a divorce, Appellant argued that the district court should backdate the start of his marriage to Respondent to the date their relationship became serious. The district court refused to backdate the marriage and relied on 2008 as the date of the marriage. At issue was the retroactive effect of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Obergefell does not require Nevada courts to backdate a marriage before the couple solemnized their union; and (2) the district court's order accorded with this Court's holdings. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83859.html" target="_blank">View "Candelaria v. Kelly" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court declining to backdate the parties' marriage in this case to the date they would have been married but for Nevada's unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage, holding that "the effective date of a marriage will not predate the solemnized marriage itself for property division purposes in a divorce,
even if a party asserts that the couple would have married earlier but for the later-held-to-be-unconstitutional ban on marriage between same-sex couples."
Appellant and Respondent formally married in California in 2008, when Nevada did not permit same-sex marriages or recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. In 2021, in seeking a divorce, Appellant argued that the district court should backdate the start of his marriage to Respondent to the date their relationship became serious. The district court refused to backdate the marriage and relied on 2008 as the date of the marriage. At issue was the retroactive effect of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Obergefell does not require Nevada courts to backdate a marriage before the couple solemnized their union; and (2) the district court's order accorded with this Court's holdings.
The Supreme Court held that the effective date of a marriage will not predate the solemnized marriage itself for property division purposes in a divorce, even if a party asserts that the couple would have married earlier but for the later-held-to-be-unconstitutional ban on marriage between same-sex couples.
2023-09-14stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich83859https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84304.htmlBMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Whittemore2023-09-14T15:06:01-08:002023-09-14T15:06:01-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court that Appellant, a bank, did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.214(3) in seeking to collect on a renewed judgment, holding that the district court did not err.
In 2015, Appellant obtained a judgment against Respondents and recorded the judgment. Appellant later sued Respondents in a separate suit alleging that they fraudulently transferred assets to avoid liability. Because Appellant had not collected on the 2015 judgment, Appellant filed an affidavit of renewal of judgment, recorded the affidavit, and electronically served Respondents' counsel. Because Appellant notified Respondents by certified mail of the affidavit of renewal after the 2015 judgment expired Respondents moved to vacate the affidavit of renewal and declare the judgment void. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.214(3). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a judgment creditor must follow section 17.214(3) to renew a judgment and that a judgment creditor must strictly comply with section 17.214(3)'s certified mail method-of-notice requirement. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84304.html" target="_blank">View "BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Whittemore" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court that Appellant, a bank, did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.214(3) in seeking to collect on a renewed judgment, holding that the district court did not err.
In 2015, Appellant obtained a judgment against Respondents and recorded the judgment. Appellant later sued Respondents in a separate suit alleging that they fraudulently transferred assets to avoid liability. Because Appellant had not collected on the 2015 judgment, Appellant filed an affidavit of renewal of judgment, recorded the affidavit, and electronically served Respondents' counsel. Because Appellant notified Respondents by certified mail of the affidavit of renewal after the 2015 judgment expired Respondents moved to vacate the affidavit of renewal and declare the judgment void. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.214(3). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a judgment creditor must follow section 17.214(3) to renew a judgment and that a judgment creditor must strictly comply with section 17.214(3)'s certified mail method-of-notice requirement.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that Appellant did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.214(3) in seeking to collect on a renewed judgment, holding that there was no error.
2023-09-14stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich84304https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84986.htmlStarr Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. District Court2023-09-14T15:05:51-08:002023-09-14T15:05:51-08:00
The Supreme Court held that a commercial property insurance policy did not provide coverage for the economic losses JGB Vegas Retail Lessee, LLC suffered when COVID-19 forced JGB to shut down abruptly.
JGB was insured under a policy with Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Co. amidst the closures and accompanying financial troubles of the COVID-19 pandemic, JGB filed a claim with Starr seeking coverage for lost business income, extra expenses, and other applicable coverage. When Starr did not respond JGB brought suit, claiming that the presence of COVID-19 on the property created the requisite "direct physical loss or damage" covered under the policy. Starr moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part. Thereafter, Starr filed the instant petition seeking a writ of mandamus challenging the denial of summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court erred in denying summary judgment because JGB's claims for losses resulting from COVID-19 were excluded from coverage. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84986.html" target="_blank">View "Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. District Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that a commercial property insurance policy did not provide coverage for the economic losses JGB Vegas Retail Lessee, LLC suffered when COVID-19 forced JGB to shut down abruptly.
JGB was insured under a policy with Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Co. amidst the closures and accompanying financial troubles of the COVID-19 pandemic, JGB filed a claim with Starr seeking coverage for lost business income, extra expenses, and other applicable coverage. When Starr did not respond JGB brought suit, claiming that the presence of COVID-19 on the property created the requisite "direct physical loss or damage" covered under the policy. Starr moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part. Thereafter, Starr filed the instant petition seeking a writ of mandamus challenging the denial of summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court erred in denying summary judgment because JGB's claims for losses resulting from COVID-19 were excluded from coverage.
The Supreme Court held that a commercial property insurance policy did not provide coverage for the economic losses a business suffered when COVID-19 forced it to shut down abruptly.
2023-09-14stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadish84986https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85399.htmlState v. Gonzalez2023-09-14T15:05:30-08:002023-09-14T15:05:30-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge against him for violation of his due process rights, holding that Defendant's due process rights were violated, but the district court abused its discretion in granting the extreme remedy of dismissal under the facts of this case.
After Defendant was charged with sexual assault the district court found him to be incompetent to stand trial and ordered him remanded to a psychiatric hospital for competency restoration treatment. After a delay of over 160 days during which he remained in jail, Defendant was transferred to the hospital. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that his continued detention in jail violated his due process rights. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court's precedent did not support the district court's conclusion that aggravated circumstances warranted dismissing the complaint against Defendant with prejudice; and (2) the district court neglected to balance the deterrent objectives of dismissal against society's interest in prosecuting criminal acts. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85399.html" target="_blank">View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge against him for violation of his due process rights, holding that Defendant's due process rights were violated, but the district court abused its discretion in granting the extreme remedy of dismissal under the facts of this case.
After Defendant was charged with sexual assault the district court found him to be incompetent to stand trial and ordered him remanded to a psychiatric hospital for competency restoration treatment. After a delay of over 160 days during which he remained in jail, Defendant was transferred to the hospital. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that his continued detention in jail violated his due process rights. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court's precedent did not support the district court's conclusion that aggravated circumstances warranted dismissing the complaint against Defendant with prejudice; and (2) the district court neglected to balance the deterrent objectives of dismissal against society's interest in prosecuting criminal acts.
The Supreme Court reversed the grant of Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that Defendant's due process rights were violated, but the district court abused its discretion in granting the extreme remedy of dismissal.
2023-09-14stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich8539985400https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85155.htmlJorrin v. State, Employment Security Division2023-09-07T09:15:32-08:002023-09-07T09:15:32-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing a petition for judicial review challenging a decision by the Nevada Employment Security Division's (NESD) Board of Review, holding that, based on its plain language, Nev. R. Civ. P. 6(d)'s three-day mailing rule does not apply to extend the time period for filing a petition for judicial review under Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.531(1).
After she was denied unemployment benefits Appellant filed a petition for judicial review in the district court. The district court granted NESD's motion to dismiss, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition because Appellant had filed it a day late. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rule 6(d) did not apply in this case, and the district court correctly dismissed the untimely petition for lack of jurisdiction. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85155.html" target="_blank">View "Jorrin v. State, Employment Security Division" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing a petition for judicial review challenging a decision by the Nevada Employment Security Division's (NESD) Board of Review, holding that, based on its plain language, Nev. R. Civ. P. 6(d)'s three-day mailing rule does not apply to extend the time period for filing a petition for judicial review under Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.531(1).
After she was denied unemployment benefits Appellant filed a petition for judicial review in the district court. The district court granted NESD's motion to dismiss, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition because Appellant had filed it a day late. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rule 6(d) did not apply in this case, and the district court correctly dismissed the untimely petition for lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held that, based on its plain language, Nev. R. Civ. P. 6(d)'s three-day mailing rule does not apply to extend the time period for filing a petition for judicial review under Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.531(1).
2023-09-07stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaPer Curiam85155https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84086.htmlDavitian-Kostanian v. Kostanian2023-08-31T10:05:01-08:002023-08-31T10:05:01-08:00
In this appeal from a district court order denying a motion to modify alimony and to reinstate child support the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in finding the it did not have jurisdiction to reinstate support as to a handicapped child beyond the age of majority but that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to modify alimony in this case.
Citing Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.0045(1)(a), the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to award support for the parties' adult handicapped child because he had reached the age of majority and because support payments had already ceased. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court has jurisdiction to award adult child support after the age of majority under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125B.110; (2) the district court failed to make the necessary findings under section 125B.110; and (3) Appellant did not demonstrate that there was a change in circumstances to warrant modifying the parties' alimony agreement. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84086.html" target="_blank">View "Davitian-Kostanian v. Kostanian" on Justia Law</a>
In this appeal from a district court order denying a motion to modify alimony and to reinstate child support the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in finding the it did not have jurisdiction to reinstate support as to a handicapped child beyond the age of majority but that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to modify alimony in this case.
Citing Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.0045(1)(a), the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to award support for the parties' adult handicapped child because he had reached the age of majority and because support payments had already ceased. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court has jurisdiction to award adult child support after the age of majority under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125B.110; (2) the district court failed to make the necessary findings under section 125B.110; and (3) Appellant did not demonstrate that there was a change in circumstances to warrant modifying the parties' alimony agreement.
The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction to reinstate support as to a handicapped child beyond the age of majority but that the court correctly denied the request to modify alimony in this case.
2023-08-31stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndon84086https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85554.htmlState, Dep't of Health v. District Court2023-08-31T10:04:51-08:002023-08-31T10:04:51-08:00
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus in this matter arising from district court orders holding Petitioner, the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health, in contempt for vacating competency court orders, holding that Petitioner failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the need for extraordinary relief.
The competency orders were issued in relation to eleven criminal defendants in Nevada who were all deemed incompetent to assist in their own defense and ordered to psychiatric treatment (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss their cases or, alternatively, for Petitioner to show cause as to why it should not be held in contempt after significant delays in accepting Defendants for treatment. The district court found Petitioner in contempt for failing to comply with the court orders and issued sanctions. Petitioner then filed the instant petition. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hold Petitioner in contempt and did not manifestly or capriciously abuse its discretion in doing so. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/85554.html" target="_blank">View "State, Dep't of Health v. District Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus in this matter arising from district court orders holding Petitioner, the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health, in contempt for vacating competency court orders, holding that Petitioner failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the need for extraordinary relief.
The competency orders were issued in relation to eleven criminal defendants in Nevada who were all deemed incompetent to assist in their own defense and ordered to psychiatric treatment (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss their cases or, alternatively, for Petitioner to show cause as to why it should not be held in contempt after significant delays in accepting Defendants for treatment. The district court found Petitioner in contempt for failing to comply with the court orders and issued sanctions. Petitioner then filed the instant petition. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hold Petitioner in contempt and did not manifestly or capriciously abuse its discretion in doing so.
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus in this matter arising from district court orders holding Petitioner in contempt for vacating competency court orders, holding that Petitioner failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the need for extraordinary relief.
2023-08-31stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBell85554https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84931.htmlIn re Search Warrants re Seizure of Documents2023-08-24T15:06:48-08:002023-08-24T15:06:48-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' return-of-property motion and Appellants' request to quash and unseal search warrants, holding that Nevada's return-of-property statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.085, allows a property owner to seek the return of privileged materials that were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant even when the government has an ongoing investigation.
Appellants moved under section 179.085 for the return of the various documents and electronic devices seized at Appellants' business establishments on the basis that the property contained privileged materials. Appellant also sought to quash and unseal the warrants. The district court denied the motion, determining that it was not unreasonable for LVMPD to retain the property during an ongoing investigation and that the search protocol proposed by LVMPD was a reasonable resolution of the privilege issue. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) properly denied Appellants' request to quash and unseal the warrants; (2) erred when it denied Appellants' return-of-property motion without giving Appellants an opportunity to demonstrate privilege; and (3) erred by adopting LVMPD's proposed search protocol. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84931.html" target="_blank">View "In re Search Warrants re Seizure of Documents" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' return-of-property motion and Appellants' request to quash and unseal search warrants, holding that Nevada's return-of-property statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.085, allows a property owner to seek the return of privileged materials that were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant even when the government has an ongoing investigation.
Appellants moved under section 179.085 for the return of the various documents and electronic devices seized at Appellants' business establishments on the basis that the property contained privileged materials. Appellant also sought to quash and unseal the warrants. The district court denied the motion, determining that it was not unreasonable for LVMPD to retain the property during an ongoing investigation and that the search protocol proposed by LVMPD was a reasonable resolution of the privilege issue. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) properly denied Appellants' request to quash and unseal the warrants; (2) erred when it denied Appellants' return-of-property motion without giving Appellants an opportunity to demonstrate privilege; and (3) erred by adopting LVMPD's proposed search protocol.
The Supreme Court held that Nevada's return-of-property statute allows a property owner to seek the return of privileged materials that were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant even when the government has an ongoing investigation.
2023-08-24stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaWestbrook84931https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83316.htmlAlfaro v. State2023-08-24T15:06:37-08:002023-08-24T15:06:37-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction on one lewdness count as redundant to sexual assault involving the same episode but otherwise affirmed his convictions, holding that the two other errors identified by Defendant on appeal were harmless.
Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of seven counts of sexual assault against a child under fourteen and three counts of lewdness with a child under fourteen. The district court imposed the maximum sentence allowed by law for an aggregate total of 275 years to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the lewdness convictions must be reversed as redundant to a sexual assault involving the same episode; (2) the district court erred in admitting two uncharged bad acts, but the error was harmless; (3) the district court erred in issuing a jury instruction defining "lewdness" separate from the statutory definition provided by Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.230, but the error was harmless; (4) the sentence imposed was within statutory limits and was not constitutionally disproportionate; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his cumulative error claim. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83316.html" target="_blank">View "Alfaro v. State" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction on one lewdness count as redundant to sexual assault involving the same episode but otherwise affirmed his convictions, holding that the two other errors identified by Defendant on appeal were harmless.
Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of seven counts of sexual assault against a child under fourteen and three counts of lewdness with a child under fourteen. The district court imposed the maximum sentence allowed by law for an aggregate total of 275 years to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the lewdness convictions must be reversed as redundant to a sexual assault involving the same episode; (2) the district court erred in admitting two uncharged bad acts, but the error was harmless; (3) the district court erred in issuing a jury instruction defining "lewdness" separate from the statutory definition provided by Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.230, but the error was harmless; (4) the sentence imposed was within statutory limits and was not constitutionally disproportionate; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his cumulative error claim.
The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction on one lewdness count as redundant to sexual assault involving the same episode but otherwise affirmed, holding that any other error was harmless.
2023-08-24stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaKristina Pickering83316https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84174.htmlLV Debt Collect, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon2023-08-24T15:06:27-08:002023-08-24T15:06:27-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that a deed of trust on real property continued to encumber the property, holding that there was no error.
LV Debt Collect, which acquired title to the subject property in 2013, filed this quiet title action in 2016 seeking a declaration that a home homeowners' association's foreclosure sale extinguished Bank of New York Mellon's (BNYM) deed of trust and that LV Debt Collect held an unencumbered ownership interest in the property. The district court granted summary judgment for BNYM, determining that the deed of trust continued to encumber the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a loan secured by real property does not become "wholly due" for purposes of Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240 when a notice of default is recorded as to the secured loan. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84174.html" target="_blank">View "LV Debt Collect, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that a deed of trust on real property continued to encumber the property, holding that there was no error.
LV Debt Collect, which acquired title to the subject property in 2013, filed this quiet title action in 2016 seeking a declaration that a home homeowners' association's foreclosure sale extinguished Bank of New York Mellon's (BNYM) deed of trust and that LV Debt Collect held an unencumbered ownership interest in the property. The district court granted summary judgment for BNYM, determining that the deed of trust continued to encumber the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a loan secured by real property does not become "wholly due" for purposes of Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240 when a notice of default is recorded as to the secured loan.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that a deed of trust on certain real property continued to encumber the property, holding that there was no error.
2023-08-24stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadish84174https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83833.htmlLucky Lucy D LLC v. LGS Casino LLC2023-08-24T15:06:07-08:002023-08-24T15:06:07-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Buyer in this dispute arising from an ordinary course covenant in an asset purchase agreement, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Buyer.
In April 2019, Seller entered into an agreement to sell a casino and hotel to Buyer. The agreement contained an ordinary course covenant requiring Seller to operate its business in the usual manner between the time the agreement was signed and closing. In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Seller complied with the Governor's emergency directive mandating closure of all nonessential businesses. The pandemic also affected Buyer's duties under the agreement. Buyer subsequently terminated the agreement and sued Seller for return of the deposit, alleging various contract claims. Seller counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Buyer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Seller did not violate the agreement's ordinary course covenant by closing the casino and hotel as mandated by the Governor's emergency directive and was entitled to retain the earnest money deposit. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83833.html" target="_blank">View "Lucky Lucy D LLC v. LGS Casino LLC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Buyer in this dispute arising from an ordinary course covenant in an asset purchase agreement, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Buyer.
In April 2019, Seller entered into an agreement to sell a casino and hotel to Buyer. The agreement contained an ordinary course covenant requiring Seller to operate its business in the usual manner between the time the agreement was signed and closing. In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Seller complied with the Governor's emergency directive mandating closure of all nonessential businesses. The pandemic also affected Buyer's duties under the agreement. Buyer subsequently terminated the agreement and sued Seller for return of the deposit, alleging various contract claims. Seller counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Buyer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Seller did not violate the agreement's ordinary course covenant by closing the casino and hotel as mandated by the Governor's emergency directive and was entitled to retain the earnest money deposit.
The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Buyer in this dispute arising from an ordinary course covenant in an asset purchase agreement.
2023-08-24stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBell8383384257https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/79658.htmlValley Health System, LLC v. Murray2023-08-17T10:05:26-08:002023-08-17T10:05:26-08:00
The Supreme Court held that, under the Nevada Constitution, both the governor and the Chief Justice may designate temporary substitutes for disqualified justices on the Supreme Court, thus rejecting Appellant's argument that only the governor has authority to temporarily replace a disqualified justice on the Supreme Court.
At issue was Nev. Const. art. VI, 19(1)(c), under which the Chief Justice "may assigned [the recalled senior justice or judge] to appropriate temporary duty within the court system." In the forty-five years since the effective date of the amendment, article 6 section 19(1)(c), successive chief justices had assigned senior justices to temporary duty when a Supreme Court sitting justice is disqualified. In this action, Appellant objected to the chief justice's orders assigning senior justices to participate in disqualified justices' places, arguing that replacement justices must be designated in accordance with Nev. Const. art. VI, 4(2), thus authorizing the governor to designate court of appeals or district judges to sit in the place of the disqualified Supreme Court justices. The Supreme Court overruled Appellant's objection, holding that the senior justice assignments in this case were constitutionally permissible. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/79658.html" target="_blank">View "Valley Health System, LLC v. Murray" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that, under the Nevada Constitution, both the governor and the Chief Justice may designate temporary substitutes for disqualified justices on the Supreme Court, thus rejecting Appellant's argument that only the governor has authority to temporarily replace a disqualified justice on the Supreme Court.
At issue was Nev. Const. art. VI, 19(1)(c), under which the Chief Justice "may assigned [the recalled senior justice or judge] to appropriate temporary duty within the court system." In the forty-five years since the effective date of the amendment, article 6 section 19(1)(c), successive chief justices had assigned senior justices to temporary duty when a Supreme Court sitting justice is disqualified. In this action, Appellant objected to the chief justice's orders assigning senior justices to participate in disqualified justices' places, arguing that replacement justices must be designated in accordance with Nev. Const. art. VI, 4(2), thus authorizing the governor to designate court of appeals or district judges to sit in the place of the disqualified Supreme Court justices. The Supreme Court overruled Appellant's objection, holding that the senior justice assignments in this case were constitutionally permissible.
The Supreme Court held that both the governor and the Chief Justice may designate temporary substitutes for disqualified justices on the Supreme Court.
2023-08-17stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich796588011380968https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84893.htmlRoe v. Roe2023-07-27T11:04:21-08:002023-07-27T11:04:21-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's modification of physical custody in this custodial action but reversed the court's parenting time allocation and vacated its award of attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court abused its discretion in part.
In this opinion, the Supreme Court (1) provided a definition of sole physical custody to ensure custodial orders are properly characterized; (2) directed district courts to retain their substantive decision-making authority over custodial modifications and parenting time allocations; and (3) clarified when reassignment of a case to a different judge on remand is appropriate due to the requisite fairness demanded in ongoing child custody proceedings. As to the case before it, the Court held (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's decision to modify physical custody; (2) the district court abused its discretion by improperly characterizing its custodial award as primary physical custody when it was in fact sole physical custody. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84893.html" target="_blank">View "Roe v. Roe" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's modification of physical custody in this custodial action but reversed the court's parenting time allocation and vacated its award of attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court abused its discretion in part.
In this opinion, the Supreme Court (1) provided a definition of sole physical custody to ensure custodial orders are properly characterized; (2) directed district courts to retain their substantive decision-making authority over custodial modifications and parenting time allocations; and (3) clarified when reassignment of a case to a different judge on remand is appropriate due to the requisite fairness demanded in ongoing child custody proceedings. As to the case before it, the Court held (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's decision to modify physical custody; (2) the district court abused its discretion by improperly characterizing its custodial award as primary physical custody when it was in fact sole physical custody.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's modification of physical custody but reversed the court's parenting time allocation, holding that the district court abused its discretion in part.
2023-07-27stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaMark Gibbons84893https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83243.htmlYoung v. State2023-07-20T09:10:11-08:002023-07-20T09:10:11-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction as to all counts except count two and reversed and remanded for the district court to strike count two from the judgment and enter an amended judgment, holding that the district court gave an incorrect jury instruction as to the larceny-from-the-person charges, and therefore, Defendant's conviction under count two must be reversed.
Defendant was convicted of twenty counts of burglary, larceny, and fraudulent use of a credit or debit card. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not erroneously admit evidence of uncharged bad acts; (2) erred in admitting a certain detective's statement, but the error was not reversible; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial and by not excusing a seated juror for his expression of sympathy to victims who testified during trial; and (4) misstated the law in instruction number ten, and therefore, the conviction for count two should be reversed. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83243.html" target="_blank">View "Young v. State" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction as to all counts except count two and reversed and remanded for the district court to strike count two from the judgment and enter an amended judgment, holding that the district court gave an incorrect jury instruction as to the larceny-from-the-person charges, and therefore, Defendant's conviction under count two must be reversed.
Defendant was convicted of twenty counts of burglary, larceny, and fraudulent use of a credit or debit card. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not erroneously admit evidence of uncharged bad acts; (2) erred in admitting a certain detective's statement, but the error was not reversible; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial and by not excusing a seated juror for his expression of sympathy to victims who testified during trial; and (4) misstated the law in instruction number ten, and therefore, the conviction for count two should be reversed.
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions except as to count two, holding that the district court gave an incorrect jury instruction as to the larceny-from-the-person charges.
2023-07-20stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaMark Gibbons83243https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84111.htmlProvidence Corp. Development v. Buma2023-07-13T08:05:02-08:002023-07-13T08:05:02-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that an appeals officer erred in denying benefits to the widow and child of an employee who died while on a work trip, holding that there is no requirement that an employee's activities be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits.
Jason Buma died when he traveled from Nevada to Texas for a work conference and had an accident one evening while riding an ATV around a ranch owned by his coworker. Plaintiffs, Buma's wife and child, requested workers' compensation benefits, but the request was denied. An appeals officer upheld the denial. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the appeals officer failed to apply the traveling employee rule. On remand, the appeals officer again denied benefits on the grounds that there was no evidence in the record that Jason's employer could have foreseen that Jason would be riding ATVs. The district court granted Plaintiffs' petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer misinterpreted this Court's decision in Buma I and that this Court did not impose a requirement that an employee's activities need be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84111.html" target="_blank">View "Providence Corp. Development v. Buma" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that an appeals officer erred in denying benefits to the widow and child of an employee who died while on a work trip, holding that there is no requirement that an employee's activities be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits.
Jason Buma died when he traveled from Nevada to Texas for a work conference and had an accident one evening while riding an ATV around a ranch owned by his coworker. Plaintiffs, Buma's wife and child, requested workers' compensation benefits, but the request was denied. An appeals officer upheld the denial. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the appeals officer failed to apply the traveling employee rule. On remand, the appeals officer again denied benefits on the grounds that there was no evidence in the record that Jason's employer could have foreseen that Jason would be riding ATVs. The district court granted Plaintiffs' petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer misinterpreted this Court's decision in Buma I and that this Court did not impose a requirement that an employee's activities need be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits.
The Supreme Court held that there is no requirement that an employee's activities be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits.
2023-07-13stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich84111https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84370.htmlFederal Housing Finance Agency v. Saticoy Bay LLC2023-07-06T10:05:04-08:002023-07-06T10:05:04-08:00
The Supreme Court answered a certified question by concluding that a series LLC created pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.296 must be sued in its own name for the court to obtain jurisdiction over it, so long as the series LLC has observed the corporate formalities provided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.296(3).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether, under Nevada law, a series LLC created pursuant to section 86.296 must be sued in its own name for the court to obtain jurisdiction over it, or whether the master LLC under which the series is created may be sued instead. The Supreme Court answered the question as set forth above, holding that the master LLC may not be legally responsible for the acts of the series LLC and that if a series LLC has observed corporate formalities, it should be the named entity in a lawsuit against the series LLC. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84370.html" target="_blank">View "Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Saticoy Bay LLC" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court answered a certified question by concluding that a series LLC created pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.296 must be sued in its own name for the court to obtain jurisdiction over it, so long as the series LLC has observed the corporate formalities provided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.296(3).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether, under Nevada law, a series LLC created pursuant to section 86.296 must be sued in its own name for the court to obtain jurisdiction over it, or whether the master LLC under which the series is created may be sued instead. The Supreme Court answered the question as set forth above, holding that the master LLC may not be legally responsible for the acts of the series LLC and that if a series LLC has observed corporate formalities, it should be the named entity in a lawsuit against the series LLC.
The Supreme Court held that a series LLC created pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.296 must be sued in its own name for the court to obtain jurisdiction over it, so long as the series LLC has observed the corporate formalities provided for in section 86.296(3).
2023-07-06stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBell84370https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83605.htmlIn re Parental Rights as to G.R.S.2023-07-06T10:04:54-08:002023-07-06T10:04:54-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to Child, holding that the record did not support the district court's findings of parental fault or that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest.
Father was abusing prescription drugs and illegal substances when Child was removed from his care. For the first sixteen months of the protective custody action, Father consistently visited child and completed the required parenting classes. By the time of the trial on the Department of Family Service's (DFS) motion to terminate Father's parental rights Father had been sober for several months and successfully participating in the drug court program. After learning that successful completion of the program would take Father at least another eight months the district court proceeded with the termination trial and subsequently terminated Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when there is evidence that a parent has been successfully attempting to overcome an addiction to substances, the district court can lawfully continue the termination proceedings to allow the parent to make further progress and complete their case plan; and (2) substantial evidence did not support the district court's findings in this case. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83605.html" target="_blank">View "In re Parental Rights as to G.R.S." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to Child, holding that the record did not support the district court's findings of parental fault or that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest.
Father was abusing prescription drugs and illegal substances when Child was removed from his care. For the first sixteen months of the protective custody action, Father consistently visited child and completed the required parenting classes. By the time of the trial on the Department of Family Service's (DFS) motion to terminate Father's parental rights Father had been sober for several months and successfully participating in the drug court program. After learning that successful completion of the program would take Father at least another eight months the district court proceeded with the termination trial and subsequently terminated Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when there is evidence that a parent has been successfully attempting to overcome an addiction to substances, the district court can lawfully continue the termination proceedings to allow the parent to make further progress and complete their case plan; and (2) substantial evidence did not support the district court's findings in this case.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order terminating Father's parental rights to Child, holding that the record did not support the district court's findings of parental fault or that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest.
2023-07-06stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndon83605https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83967.htmlIn re Guardianship of Jones2023-07-06T10:04:43-08:002023-07-06T10:04:43-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the proposed schedule of June, an adult protected person, in this appeal challenging the court's rulings concerning June's ability to manage familial relationships, holding that there was insufficient evidentiary support for June's schedule.
Also at issue in this case was the process for removing June's guardian and appointing a successor guardian and June's standing to challenge certain issues on appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) June had standing to challenge on appeal both the removal or her guardian and the appointment of the successor guardian; (2) the district court has authority to remove a guardian and appoint a successor guardian with the filing of a formal, written petition for removal, and a protected person is entitled to prior notice of and opportunity to be heard on such actions; (3) the district court did not improperly remove June's guardian and appoint a successor guardian, and June was afforded adequate due process; and (4) although the district court erred by improperly shifting the burden to June to file a communication and visitation petition under Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.332-.338, the court properly denied June's proposed schedule. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83967.html" target="_blank">View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the proposed schedule of June, an adult protected person, in this appeal challenging the court's rulings concerning June's ability to manage familial relationships, holding that there was insufficient evidentiary support for June's schedule.
Also at issue in this case was the process for removing June's guardian and appointing a successor guardian and June's standing to challenge certain issues on appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) June had standing to challenge on appeal both the removal or her guardian and the appointment of the successor guardian; (2) the district court has authority to remove a guardian and appoint a successor guardian with the filing of a formal, written petition for removal, and a protected person is entitled to prior notice of and opportunity to be heard on such actions; (3) the district court did not improperly remove June's guardian and appoint a successor guardian, and June was afforded adequate due process; and (4) although the district court erred by improperly shifting the burden to June to file a communication and visitation petition under Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.332-.338, the court properly denied June's proposed schedule.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the proposed schedule of June, an adult protected person, in this appeal challenging the court's rulings concerning June's ability to manage familial relationships, holding that there was insufficient evidentiary support for June's schedule.
2023-07-06stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndon83967https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/82898.htmlMonk v. Ching2023-07-06T10:04:33-08:002023-07-06T10:04:33-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court, certified as final under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b), partially dismissing a medical malpractice action for failure to meet the affidavit-of-merit requirement set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 as to three of the named defendants, holding that there was no error.
Appellant, as special administrator of the estate of Sharon Monk, sued University Medical Center and Sharon's other healthcare providers, including the three physicians who were the respondents to this appeal, alleging negligence. Monk supported the complaint with a declaration from Nurse Jamescia Hambrick. The district court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss on the grounds that Nurse Hambrick lacked the qualifications necessary to establish Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 as to Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims against Respondents was not exempted from section 41A.071's affidavit-of-merit requirement. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/82898.html" target="_blank">View "Monk v. Ching" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court, certified as final under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b), partially dismissing a medical malpractice action for failure to meet the affidavit-of-merit requirement set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 as to three of the named defendants, holding that there was no error.
Appellant, as special administrator of the estate of Sharon Monk, sued University Medical Center and Sharon's other healthcare providers, including the three physicians who were the respondents to this appeal, alleging negligence. Monk supported the complaint with a declaration from Nurse Jamescia Hambrick. The district court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss on the grounds that Nurse Hambrick lacked the qualifications necessary to establish Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 as to Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims against Respondents was not exempted from section 41A.071's affidavit-of-merit requirement.
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court partially dismissing a medical malpractice action for failure to meet the affidavit-of-merit requirement set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 as to three of the named defendants, holding that there was no error.
2023-07-06stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaKristina Pickering82898https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84389.htmlConrad v. Reno Police Dep't2023-06-15T10:06:32-08:002023-06-15T10:06:32-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court to deny Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) challenging the failure of the Reno Police Department (RPD) to disclose certain records, holding that the district court erred in part.
At issue on appeal was RPD's refusal to disclose an investigative report to Appellant, who owned and operated an online news website, and RPD's redaction to officers' faces before disclosing body-worn camera footage. The district court denied Appellant's mandamus petition as to both issues. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part regarding the investigative report, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's petition with respect to the report without individualized findings regarding the redacted material; and (2) affirmed the district court's decision regarding the redactions to the body-worn camera footage, holding that the district court correctly denied this portion of the petition. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84389.html" target="_blank">View "Conrad v. Reno Police Dep't" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court to deny Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) challenging the failure of the Reno Police Department (RPD) to disclose certain records, holding that the district court erred in part.
At issue on appeal was RPD's refusal to disclose an investigative report to Appellant, who owned and operated an online news website, and RPD's redaction to officers' faces before disclosing body-worn camera footage. The district court denied Appellant's mandamus petition as to both issues. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part regarding the investigative report, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's petition with respect to the report without individualized findings regarding the redacted material; and (2) affirmed the district court's decision regarding the redactions to the body-worn camera footage, holding that the district court correctly denied this portion of the petition.
The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's judgment denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the failure of the Reno Police Department to disclose certain records, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's petition with respect to an investigative report.
2023-06-15stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBell84389https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83176.htmlWishengrad v. Carrington Mortgage Services2023-05-18T08:05:46-08:002023-05-18T08:05:46-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissal in favor of a loan servicer and trustee in this case involving a home equity line of credit agreement (HELOC) with a defined maturity date and closed draw period, holding that there was no error.
At issue before the Court was whether a loan servicer and trustee were entitled to foreclose upon Borrowers' residence due to Borrowers' failure to repay the funds provided to them under the terms of their HELOC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Borrowers' HELOC was both a negotiable instrument under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3104(1) and a promissory note under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3104(5), entitling the loan servicer and trustee to enforce the document under Nev. Rev. Code chapter 104 due to Borrowers' default; and (2) erred in finding that Borrowers' property was not owner-occupied and thus not subject to statutory requirements pertaining to foreclosures affecting owner-occupied housing, but the error was harmless. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83176.html" target="_blank">View "Wishengrad v. Carrington Mortgage Services" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissal in favor of a loan servicer and trustee in this case involving a home equity line of credit agreement (HELOC) with a defined maturity date and closed draw period, holding that there was no error.
At issue before the Court was whether a loan servicer and trustee were entitled to foreclose upon Borrowers' residence due to Borrowers' failure to repay the funds provided to them under the terms of their HELOC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Borrowers' HELOC was both a negotiable instrument under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3104(1) and a promissory note under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3104(5), entitling the loan servicer and trustee to enforce the document under Nev. Rev. Code chapter 104 due to Borrowers' default; and (2) erred in finding that Borrowers' property was not owner-occupied and thus not subject to statutory requirements pertaining to foreclosures affecting owner-occupied housing, but the error was harmless.
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissal in favor of a loan servicer and trustee in this case involving a home equity line of credit agreement, holding that there was no error.
2023-05-18stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaRon D. Parraguirre83176https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83481.htmlClark County Ass'n of School Administrators v. Clark County School District2023-05-11T08:06:01-08:002023-05-11T08:06:01-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Clark County Association of School Administrators and Professional-Technical Employees (CCASAPE)'s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus challenging a so-called "teacher lottery," holding that the district court properly rejected CCASAPE's interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 388G.610.
CCASAPE, a school administrators' union, filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief alleging that Clark County School District (CCSD) violated section 388G.610 by implementing a policy under which certain teachers were unilaterally assigned to local school precincts without the consent of each precinct. The district court denied relief because CCASAPE failed to demonstrate that any assignment was inconsistent with statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complained-of policy did not run afoul of section 388G.610 because it was implemented to ensure compliance with collective bargaining agreements and allow for as much selection authority as the school district held. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83481.html" target="_blank">View "Clark County Ass'n of School Administrators v. Clark County School District" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Clark County Association of School Administrators and Professional-Technical Employees (CCASAPE)'s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus challenging a so-called "teacher lottery," holding that the district court properly rejected CCASAPE's interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 388G.610.
CCASAPE, a school administrators' union, filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief alleging that Clark County School District (CCSD) violated section 388G.610 by implementing a policy under which certain teachers were unilaterally assigned to local school precincts without the consent of each precinct. The district court denied relief because CCASAPE failed to demonstrate that any assignment was inconsistent with statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complained-of policy did not run afoul of section 388G.610 because it was implemented to ensure compliance with collective bargaining agreements and allow for as much selection authority as the school district held.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus challenging a so-called "teacher lottery," holding that the district court did not err in its interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 388G.610.
2023-05-11stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich83481https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84009.htmlPepper v. C.R. England2023-05-04T16:06:23-08:002023-05-04T16:06:23-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing a complaint for forum non conveniens, holding that the district court abused its discretion by granting the motion because the moving parties failed to meet their evidentiary burden by not including a supporting affidavit.
C.R. England, Inc., a trucking company incorporated and headquartered in Utah, hired Tesfaye Alamin, a Nevada resident, as a driver. Eric Pepper, a Texas resident, collided with Alamin's semitruck, and his family members (collectively, Pepper) brought a wrongful death lawsuit in Nevada against C.R. England and Alamin. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, arguing that Texas was a more appropriate forum. The motion, however, failed to include any supporting attachments or exhibits. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the underlying motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens lacked a supporting affidavit, the district court abused its discretion in granting the motion. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84009.html" target="_blank">View "Pepper v. C.R. England" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing a complaint for forum non conveniens, holding that the district court abused its discretion by granting the motion because the moving parties failed to meet their evidentiary burden by not including a supporting affidavit.
C.R. England, Inc., a trucking company incorporated and headquartered in Utah, hired Tesfaye Alamin, a Nevada resident, as a driver. Eric Pepper, a Texas resident, collided with Alamin's semitruck, and his family members (collectively, Pepper) brought a wrongful death lawsuit in Nevada against C.R. England and Alamin. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, arguing that Texas was a more appropriate forum. The motion, however, failed to include any supporting attachments or exhibits. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the underlying motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens lacked a supporting affidavit, the district court abused its discretion in granting the motion.
The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in dismissing a complaint for forum non conveniens because the moving parties failed to include a supporting affidavit.
2023-05-04stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndon84009https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/82460.htmlLas Vegas Review-Journal v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't2023-03-30T08:06:14-08:002023-03-30T08:06:14-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the denial of a records request made pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), holding that holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the petition.
A reporter for Las Vegas Review-Journal, Inc. (LVRJ) made an NPRA request concerning an investigation into potential criminal activity by a law enforcement officer. After denying the request several times, the police department conducting the investigation, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) ultimately released heavily redacted portions of the investigative files. Metro sought relief, but the district court denied the petition on the grounds that the investigative files contained confidential and private information not subject to public release. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Metro failed to meet its burden to establish under the NPRA that the requested records were confidential in their entirety under either a statutory or caselaw exemption. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/82460.html" target="_blank">View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the denial of a records request made pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), holding that holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the petition.
A reporter for Las Vegas Review-Journal, Inc. (LVRJ) made an NPRA request concerning an investigation into potential criminal activity by a law enforcement officer. After denying the request several times, the police department conducting the investigation, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) ultimately released heavily redacted portions of the investigative files. Metro sought relief, but the district court denied the petition on the grounds that the investigative files contained confidential and private information not subject to public release. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Metro failed to meet its burden to establish under the NPRA that the requested records were confidential in their entirety under either a statutory or caselaw exemption.
The Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking records pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act.
2023-03-30stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadish82460https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83335.htmlNewson v. State2023-03-30T08:06:03-08:002023-03-30T08:06:03-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, holding that a district court's invocation of general, as opposed to case-specific, concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic does not justify dispensing with a defendant's right to in-person confrontation.
Appellant fatally shot his girlfriend in a car in which two children were present. During the jury trial, the district court permitted two witnesses to testify remotely via video. On appeal, Defendant argued that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated because the witnesses' convenience did not justify permitting remote testimony and that the district court should have made case-specific findings before summarily ordering that the witnesses may appear remotely. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the court did not make the required findings of necessity before allowing the two witnesses to testify remotely Defendant's right to confrontation was violated, but the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83335.html" target="_blank">View "Newson v. State" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, holding that a district court's invocation of general, as opposed to case-specific, concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic does not justify dispensing with a defendant's right to in-person confrontation.
Appellant fatally shot his girlfriend in a car in which two children were present. During the jury trial, the district court permitted two witnesses to testify remotely via video. On appeal, Defendant argued that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated because the witnesses' convenience did not justify permitting remote testimony and that the district court should have made case-specific findings before summarily ordering that the witnesses may appear remotely. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the court did not make the required findings of necessity before allowing the two witnesses to testify remotely Defendant's right to confrontation was violated, but the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, holding that Defendant's right to confrontation was violated but that the error was harmless.
2023-03-30stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich83335https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83257.htmlNorth Las Vegas Infrastructure Investment & Construction, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas2023-03-16T11:08:36-08:002023-03-16T11:08:36-08:00
The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify that the district court's discretion to determine which costs were necessarily incurred by a prevailing party in awarding expenses the party incurred in its efforts to comply with a district court discovery order and held that the district court abused its discretion in part in awarding costs.
In the underlying case, the district court entered judgment in favor of the prevailing party on its underlying breach of contract claims and then issued a post-judgment order denying the prevailing party's motion for attorney fees and relaxing costs. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and held that the district court (1) did not err in entering judgment in favor of the prevailing party on the breach of contract claims; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying the prevailing party's motion for attorney fees; but (3) abused its discretion in denying the prevailing party's requests for costs incurred for trial technology services. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83257.html" target="_blank">View "North Las Vegas Infrastructure Investment & Construction, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify that the district court's discretion to determine which costs were necessarily incurred by a prevailing party in awarding expenses the party incurred in its efforts to comply with a district court discovery order and held that the district court abused its discretion in part in awarding costs.
In the underlying case, the district court entered judgment in favor of the prevailing party on its underlying breach of contract claims and then issued a post-judgment order denying the prevailing party's motion for attorney fees and relaxing costs. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and held that the district court (1) did not err in entering judgment in favor of the prevailing party on the breach of contract claims; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying the prevailing party's motion for attorney fees; but (3) abused its discretion in denying the prevailing party's requests for costs incurred for trial technology services.
In this dispute over attorneys fees and costs, the Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the prevailing party's requests for costs incurred for trial technology services.
2023-03-16stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich8361783617https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84520.htmlRamos v. Franklin2023-03-16T11:08:26-08:002023-03-16T11:08:26-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Grandparents' petition for visitation after concluding that one of the parents provided them with reasonable visitation, holding that the district court properly denied the petition for visitation.
On appeal, Grandparents argued that the requirement set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.050 that "a parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child" was satisfied in this case because one parent denied them visitation entirely and that the district court's finding that the visitation they received was reasonable was incorrect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Grandparents' visits with the children must have been denied or unreasonably restricted to warrant relief in a petition for visitation; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Grandparents' visits with the children in this case were not denied or unreasonably restricted. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84520.html" target="_blank">View "Ramos v. Franklin" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Grandparents' petition for visitation after concluding that one of the parents provided them with reasonable visitation, holding that the district court properly denied the petition for visitation.
On appeal, Grandparents argued that the requirement set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.050 that "a parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child" was satisfied in this case because one parent denied them visitation entirely and that the district court's finding that the visitation they received was reasonable was incorrect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Grandparents' visits with the children must have been denied or unreasonably restricted to warrant relief in a petition for visitation; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Grandparents' visits with the children in this case were not denied or unreasonably restricted.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Grandparents' petition for visitation after concluding that one of the parents provided Grandparents with reasonable visitation, holding that the district court properly denied the petition.
2023-03-16stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich84520https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84703.htmlGilman v. Clark County School District2023-03-16T11:08:15-08:002023-03-16T11:08:15-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appeals officer denying Claimant's request to reopen his industrial claim, holding that the appeals officer misapplied Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.065(7) and failed to properly consider whether Claimant satisfied the requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390.
Claimant, a high school teacher, was injured while diverting a student altercation and requested workers' compensation from the school district's industrial insurer (Insurer). Insurer's acceptance of coverage was restricted to Claimant's cervical strain and thoracic sprain. Insurer, however, did not expressly deny coverage for treatment to Claimant's lumber spine. Claimant later sought the reopening of his industrial claim under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390 for treatment to his lumbar spine. Insurer denied the request, and a hearing officer affirmed. The appeals officer also affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appeals officer misapplied section 616C.065(7) to find that the lumbar spine was not within the scope of Claimant's accepted industrial claim; and (2) Claimant's failure to appeal after receiving Insurer's determination of claim acceptance or closure did not preclude him from subsequently seeking to reopen his claim under section 616.390. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84703.html" target="_blank">View "Gilman v. Clark County School District" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appeals officer denying Claimant's request to reopen his industrial claim, holding that the appeals officer misapplied Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.065(7) and failed to properly consider whether Claimant satisfied the requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390.
Claimant, a high school teacher, was injured while diverting a student altercation and requested workers' compensation from the school district's industrial insurer (Insurer). Insurer's acceptance of coverage was restricted to Claimant's cervical strain and thoracic sprain. Insurer, however, did not expressly deny coverage for treatment to Claimant's lumber spine. Claimant later sought the reopening of his industrial claim under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390 for treatment to his lumbar spine. Insurer denied the request, and a hearing officer affirmed. The appeals officer also affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appeals officer misapplied section 616C.065(7) to find that the lumbar spine was not within the scope of Claimant's accepted industrial claim; and (2) Claimant's failure to appeal after receiving Insurer's determination of claim acceptance or closure did not preclude him from subsequently seeking to reopen his claim under section 616.390.
The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Claimant's request to reopen his industrial claim, holding that the appeals officer misapplied Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.065(7) and failed to properly consider whether Claimant satisfied the requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390.
2023-03-16stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaBulla84703https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84233.htmlReggio v. Eighth Judicial District Court2023-03-09T09:05:07-08:002023-03-09T09:05:07-08:00
The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging a district court order striking a peremptory challenge of a judge, holding that if a party waives their right to a peremptory challenge under Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 48.1(5), that waiver also applies to any other party on the same side of a later consolidated action.
Defendants in a second-filed case filed a peremptory challenge after their case was consolidated with an earlier-filed case. The district court found that the second-case defendants (Petitioners) were barred from filing a peremptory challenge post-consolidation because the first-case defendants had already waiver their right to a peremptory challenge under SCR 48.1(5). Petitioners challenged that ruling, seeking extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that parties in consolidated cases are entitled to an additional peremptory challenge under SCR 48.1(9) only if their first case is reassigned and not when the second case is transferred to be heard with the first. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84233.html" target="_blank">View "Reggio v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging a district court order striking a peremptory challenge of a judge, holding that if a party waives their right to a peremptory challenge under Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 48.1(5), that waiver also applies to any other party on the same side of a later consolidated action.
Defendants in a second-filed case filed a peremptory challenge after their case was consolidated with an earlier-filed case. The district court found that the second-case defendants (Petitioners) were barred from filing a peremptory challenge post-consolidation because the first-case defendants had already waiver their right to a peremptory challenge under SCR 48.1(5). Petitioners challenged that ruling, seeking extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that parties in consolidated cases are entitled to an additional peremptory challenge under SCR 48.1(9) only if their first case is reassigned and not when the second case is transferred to be heard with the first.
The Supreme Court held that if a party waives their right to a peremptory challenge under Supreme Court Rule 48.1(5), that waiver also applies to any other party on the same side of a later consolidated action.
2023-03-09stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich84233https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/82951.htmlNat'l Ass'n of Mutual Insurance Cos.2023-02-16T15:13:02-08:002023-02-16T15:13:02-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court enjoining a regulation to the extent it required insurers to give retroactive premium refunds but otherwise rejecting the lawsuit brought by National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC), holding that the Nevada Division of Insurance (Division) had the statutory and constitutional authority to promulgate R087-20.
While the Nevada Insurance Code permits insurers to use customer credit information when underwriting and rating personal property and casualty insurance, the Division promulgated a regulation, R087-20, after the governor's COVID-19 declaration of emergency led to mass unemployment across the state. R087-20 prohibited insurers from adversely using consumer credit information changes that occurred during the emergency declaration, plus two years. On behalf of itself and its members, NAMIC sued to invalidate the regulation. The district court largely rejected NAMIC's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Division did not exceed its authority in promulgating R087-20. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/82951.html" target="_blank">View "Nat'l Ass'n of Mutual Insurance Cos." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court enjoining a regulation to the extent it required insurers to give retroactive premium refunds but otherwise rejecting the lawsuit brought by National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC), holding that the Nevada Division of Insurance (Division) had the statutory and constitutional authority to promulgate R087-20.
While the Nevada Insurance Code permits insurers to use customer credit information when underwriting and rating personal property and casualty insurance, the Division promulgated a regulation, R087-20, after the governor's COVID-19 declaration of emergency led to mass unemployment across the state. R087-20 prohibited insurers from adversely using consumer credit information changes that occurred during the emergency declaration, plus two years. On behalf of itself and its members, NAMIC sued to invalidate the regulation. The district court largely rejected NAMIC's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Division did not exceed its authority in promulgating R087-20.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court enjoining a regulation to the extent it required insurers to give retroactive premium refunds but otherwise rejecting the lawsuit brought by National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, holding that the Nevada Division of Insurance had the statutory and constitutional authority to promulgate the regulation.
2023-02-16stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaKristina Pickering82951https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84352.htmlTahican, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court2023-02-03T15:39:12-08:002023-02-03T15:39:12-08:00
The Supreme Court denied Tahican LLC's petition seeking a writ of mandamus affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Tahican LLC's second motion seeking to expunge a lis pendens, holding that the district court did not err in denying Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens.
Max Joly and Bydoo, LLC formed a partnership. Joly later transferred his shares in the partnership to Bydoo but Bydoo did not make the payments required under the parties' agreement. Joly sued Bydoo and Jean Francois Rigollet, alleging breach of contract. Bydoo later transferred real property to Tahican by quitclaim deed. When Joly recorded a notice of lis pendens against the property Rigollet sought to expunge the lis pendens. Joly amended his complaint to add Tahican as a defendant and allege fraudulent transfer. The district court denied the motion to expunge and granted summary judgment in favor of Joly on the majority of his claims. Tahican brought this petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that there was no error in the denial of Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens because a fraudulent transfer claim seeking avoidance of the transfer of real property is an "action...affecting the title or possession of real property" within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 14.010(1). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84352.html" target="_blank">View "Tahican, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied Tahican LLC's petition seeking a writ of mandamus affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Tahican LLC's second motion seeking to expunge a lis pendens, holding that the district court did not err in denying Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens.
Max Joly and Bydoo, LLC formed a partnership. Joly later transferred his shares in the partnership to Bydoo but Bydoo did not make the payments required under the parties' agreement. Joly sued Bydoo and Jean Francois Rigollet, alleging breach of contract. Bydoo later transferred real property to Tahican by quitclaim deed. When Joly recorded a notice of lis pendens against the property Rigollet sought to expunge the lis pendens. Joly amended his complaint to add Tahican as a defendant and allege fraudulent transfer. The district court denied the motion to expunge and granted summary judgment in favor of Joly on the majority of his claims. Tahican brought this petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that there was no error in the denial of Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens because a fraudulent transfer claim seeking avoidance of the transfer of real property is an "action...affecting the title or possession of real property" within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 14.010(1).
The Supreme Court denied Tahican, LLC's petition seeking a writ of mandamus affirming the judgment of the district court denying Tahican LLC's second motion seeking to expunge a lis pendens, holding that the district court did not err in denying Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens.
2023-02-02stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadish84352https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83621.htmlIn re B.J.W.-A.2023-01-17T12:38:12-08:002023-01-17T12:38:12-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court certifying Appellant, a juvenile defendant, to stand trial as an adult, holding that nothing in the 2015 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.230 limited the juvenile court's authority to certify Appellant charged with violating section 201.230 to be tried as an adult.
The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that B.J. committed five counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. The State filed a certification asking the juvenile court to transfer the case to criminal court. After a hearing, the juvenile court certified B.J. for criminal proceedings as an adult. B.J. appealed, arguing that under section 201.230(5), juveniles who commit lewd acts on children under the age of fourteen cannot be certified as adults for criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nothing in the 2015 amendments expressly barred the juvenile court from certifying B.J. charged under section 201.230 as an adult; and (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by certifying B.J. as an adult. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/83621.html" target="_blank">View "In re B.J.W.-A." on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court certifying Appellant, a juvenile defendant, to stand trial as an adult, holding that nothing in the 2015 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.230 limited the juvenile court's authority to certify Appellant charged with violating section 201.230 to be tried as an adult.
The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that B.J. committed five counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. The State filed a certification asking the juvenile court to transfer the case to criminal court. After a hearing, the juvenile court certified B.J. for criminal proceedings as an adult. B.J. appealed, arguing that under section 201.230(5), juveniles who commit lewd acts on children under the age of fourteen cannot be certified as adults for criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nothing in the 2015 amendments expressly barred the juvenile court from certifying B.J. charged under section 201.230 as an adult; and (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by certifying B.J. as an adult.
The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's judgment certifying Appellant to stand trial as an adult, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
2023-01-12stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndon8362184276https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/81456.htmlNelson v. Burr2022-12-30T02:18:53-08:002022-12-30T02:18:53-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Wife's complaint alleging legal malpractice arising from legal advice given in the course of drafting an estate plan, holding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
After a decree of divorce issued divorcing Husband and Wife Husband appealed. The Supreme Court partly reversed the divorce decree, determining that assets in the parties' spendthrift trusts created in a separate property agreement could not be levied against through court order, that the separate property agreement was valid, and that the parties' property was avidly separated into their respective separate property trusts when it was executed. Wife subsequently filed a legal malpractice complaint against Attorney, who previously assisted the parties in creating their estate plan, seeking $5 million in damages. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the legal malpractice claim was transactional and that that the statute of limitations barred the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no need to toll commencement of the limitations period for transactional malpractice claims; and (2) Wife's legal malpractice claim was transactional, and therefore, the litigation-malpractice tolling rule did not apply. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/81456.html" target="_blank">View "Nelson v. Burr" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Wife's complaint alleging legal malpractice arising from legal advice given in the course of drafting an estate plan, holding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
After a decree of divorce issued divorcing Husband and Wife Husband appealed. The Supreme Court partly reversed the divorce decree, determining that assets in the parties' spendthrift trusts created in a separate property agreement could not be levied against through court order, that the separate property agreement was valid, and that the parties' property was avidly separated into their respective separate property trusts when it was executed. Wife subsequently filed a legal malpractice complaint against Attorney, who previously assisted the parties in creating their estate plan, seeking $5 million in damages. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the legal malpractice claim was transactional and that that the statute of limitations barred the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no need to toll commencement of the limitations period for transactional malpractice claims; and (2) Wife's legal malpractice claim was transactional, and therefore, the litigation-malpractice tolling rule did not apply.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order dismissing Wife's complaint alleging legal malpractice arising from legal advice given in the course of drafting an estate plan, holding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
2022-12-29stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaJames W. Hardesty81456https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/81513.htmlMack v. Williams2022-12-30T02:18:43-08:002022-12-30T02:18:43-08:00
The Supreme Court held that a private right of action for money damages exists to vindicate questions of search-and-seizure rights under the Nevada Constitution but that a qualified immunity defense does not apply to such an action.
Appellant filed a civil rights action in federal district court against Respondents, the warden and then-director of the Nevada Department of Corrections, asserting that her federal and state constitutional rights were violated when she went to High Desert State Prison to visit an inmate and was strip searched and interrogated and refused visitation. The district court denied summary judgment on the state law claims. Upon reconsideration, the district court reconsidered its order and certified four questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Court elected to reframe and answer some of the certified questions, holding (1) Nev. Const. art. I, 18 contains an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief; and (2) qualified immunity is not a defense to an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief under Nev. Const. art. I, 18. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/81513.html" target="_blank">View "Mack v. Williams" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that a private right of action for money damages exists to vindicate questions of search-and-seizure rights under the Nevada Constitution but that a qualified immunity defense does not apply to such an action.
Appellant filed a civil rights action in federal district court against Respondents, the warden and then-director of the Nevada Department of Corrections, asserting that her federal and state constitutional rights were violated when she went to High Desert State Prison to visit an inmate and was strip searched and interrogated and refused visitation. The district court denied summary judgment on the state law claims. Upon reconsideration, the district court reconsidered its order and certified four questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Court elected to reframe and answer some of the certified questions, holding (1) Nev. Const. art. I, 18 contains an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief; and (2) qualified immunity is not a defense to an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief under Nev. Const. art. I, 18.
The Supreme Court held that a private right of action for money damages exists to vindicate questions of search-and-seizure rights but that a qualified immunity defense does not apply to such an action.
2022-12-29stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadish81513https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83422.htmlWashoe County Human Services v. District Court2022-12-30T02:18:33-08:002022-12-30T02:18:33-08:00
The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court finding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B.393(3)(c) violates due process, holding that the statute does not infringe on the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in the care and custody of his or her child and thus does not violate due process.
Section 432B.393(3)(c) relieves a child welfare services agency from its duty to provide reasonable efforts to reunify a child with his or her parent if a court finds that the parents' parental rights were involuntarily terminated with respect to the child's sibling. A court master recommended that the district court find section 432B.393(3)(c) unconstitutional because, for purposes of terminating the parent-child relationship, it could lead to a presumption that the parent is unfit without any consideration of present circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding (1) insofar as section 432B.393(3)(c) relieves an agency of making reunification efforts it does not infringe on a parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his or her child and therefore does not violate due process; and (2) although the district court erred, the petition must be denied as moot. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83422.html" target="_blank">View "Washoe County Human Services v. District Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court finding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B.393(3)(c) violates due process, holding that the statute does not infringe on the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in the care and custody of his or her child and thus does not violate due process.
Section 432B.393(3)(c) relieves a child welfare services agency from its duty to provide reasonable efforts to reunify a child with his or her parent if a court finds that the parents' parental rights were involuntarily terminated with respect to the child's sibling. A court master recommended that the district court find section 432B.393(3)(c) unconstitutional because, for purposes of terminating the parent-child relationship, it could lead to a presumption that the parent is unfit without any consideration of present circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding (1) insofar as section 432B.393(3)(c) relieves an agency of making reunification efforts it does not infringe on a parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his or her child and therefore does not violate due process; and (2) although the district court erred, the petition must be denied as moot.
The Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B.393(3)(c) does not infringe on the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in the care and custody of his or her child and thus does not violate due process.
2022-12-29stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaJames W. Hardesty83422https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/85604.htmlRepublican Nat'l Committee v. Eighth Judicial District Court2022-12-30T02:18:22-08:002022-12-30T02:18:22-08:00
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision denying a request for mandamus or injunctive relief related to the political composition of the persons verifying signatures used for mail ballots in Clark County, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief.
The Republican National Committee (RNC) brought a petition asserting that the composition of the temporary workers hired from employment agencies to verify signatures on returned mail ballots disproportionately excluded Republicans, and therefore, the Clark County Registrar violated his duty under Nev. Rev. Stat. 293B.360(2) to ensure that the members of each special election board represent all political parties "as equally as possible." The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that RNC failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/85604.html" target="_blank">View "Republican Nat'l Committee v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision denying a request for mandamus or injunctive relief related to the political composition of the persons verifying signatures used for mail ballots in Clark County, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief.
The Republican National Committee (RNC) brought a petition asserting that the composition of the temporary workers hired from employment agencies to verify signatures on returned mail ballots disproportionately excluded Republicans, and therefore, the Clark County Registrar violated his duty under Nev. Rev. Stat. 293B.360(2) to ensure that the members of each special election board represent all political parties "as equally as possible." The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that RNC failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief.
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision denying a request for mandamus or injunctive relief related to the political composition of the persons verifying signatures used for mail ballots in Clark County, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief.
2022-12-29stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaPer Curiam85604https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83581.htmlIn re Trust Agreement of Davies2022-12-30T02:18:12-08:002022-12-30T02:18:12-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court holding that a revocable living trust agreement signed by the decedent and the named trustee sufficiently established the decedent's house as trust property, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.
At issue was whether the revocable living trust agreement was effective to establish the decedent's house, his only real property, as an asset of the trust under Nevada law and to the satisfaction of the relevant statute of frauds. The district court confirmed the trustee and the house as trust property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trust agreement effectively funded the decedent's house to the trust; (2) the agreement satisfied the common law statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.205(1); and (3) the decedent's living trust agreement funded the trust with his house. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83581.html" target="_blank">View "In re Trust Agreement of Davies" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court holding that a revocable living trust agreement signed by the decedent and the named trustee sufficiently established the decedent's house as trust property, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.
At issue was whether the revocable living trust agreement was effective to establish the decedent's house, his only real property, as an asset of the trust under Nevada law and to the satisfaction of the relevant statute of frauds. The district court confirmed the trustee and the house as trust property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trust agreement effectively funded the decedent's house to the trust; (2) the agreement satisfied the common law statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.205(1); and (3) the decedent's living trust agreement funded the trust with his house.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision holding that a revocable living trust agreement signed by the decedent and the named trustee sufficiently established the decedent's house as trust property, holding that there was no error.
2022-12-29stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaKristina Pickering83581https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/81862.htmlArce v. Sanchez2022-12-22T14:08:12-08:002022-12-22T14:08:12-08:00
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court setting aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (NRCP 60(b)), holding that Nevada Arbitration Rule (NAR) 19(C) bars a district court from setting aside a judgment confirming gan arbitration award under NRCP 60(b).
On appeal from a district court judgment confirming an arbitration award under NRCP 60(b), Appellant argued that NAR 19(C) barred the district court from applying NRCP 60(b) to set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the judgment, holding that NAR 19(C) barred post-judgment relief under NRCP 60(b). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/81862.html" target="_blank">View "Arce v. Sanchez" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court setting aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (NRCP 60(b)), holding that Nevada Arbitration Rule (NAR) 19(C) bars a district court from setting aside a judgment confirming gan arbitration award under NRCP 60(b).
On appeal from a district court judgment confirming an arbitration award under NRCP 60(b), Appellant argued that NAR 19(C) barred the district court from applying NRCP 60(b) to set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the judgment, holding that NAR 19(C) barred post-judgment relief under NRCP 60(b).
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order setting aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b), holding that Nevada Arbitration Rule 19(C) bars a district court from setting aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award under NRCP 60(b).
2022-12-17stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich81862https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/82991.htmlIn re Trust Agreement, 23 Partners Trust I2022-12-22T14:08:02-08:002022-12-22T14:08:02-08:00
In these appeals relating several statutes and issues regarding the administration of a discretionary trust the Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.1207(1)(b)(5) does not provide a beneficiary whose only distribution in a trust is discretionary with a right to an accounting and that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.180 does not provide a district court with an independent basis on which to order an accounting.
At issue on appeal was what disclosures must be made by the trustees to the beneficiaries in the administration of the trust. The district court concluded that the beneficiaries were not entitled to an accounting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nevada's trust statutes did not require the trustees to provide the beneficiaries with an accounting because the beneficiaries' sole distribution interests were discretionary; and (2) because the beneficiaries constituted "present" and "vested" beneficiaries, they were entitled to request and receive copies of certain trust instruments, may inspect the books of account and records of financial transactions and may receive an annual tax return, inventory, and accounting under the terms of the trust. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/82991.html" target="_blank">View "In re Trust Agreement, 23 Partners Trust I" on Justia Law</a>
In these appeals relating several statutes and issues regarding the administration of a discretionary trust the Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.1207(1)(b)(5) does not provide a beneficiary whose only distribution in a trust is discretionary with a right to an accounting and that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.180 does not provide a district court with an independent basis on which to order an accounting.
At issue on appeal was what disclosures must be made by the trustees to the beneficiaries in the administration of the trust. The district court concluded that the beneficiaries were not entitled to an accounting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nevada's trust statutes did not require the trustees to provide the beneficiaries with an accounting because the beneficiaries' sole distribution interests were discretionary; and (2) because the beneficiaries constituted "present" and "vested" beneficiaries, they were entitled to request and receive copies of certain trust instruments, may inspect the books of account and records of financial transactions and may receive an annual tax return, inventory, and accounting under the terms of the trust.
The Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.1207(1)(b)(5) does not provide a beneficiary whose only distribution in a trust is discretionary with a right to an accounting and that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.180 does not provide a district court with an independent basis on which to order an accounting.
2022-12-21stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich82991https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/84006.htmlNelson v. Eighth Judicial District Court2022-12-22T14:07:52-08:002022-12-22T14:07:52-08:00
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner Jane Nelson's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying her motion to disqualify McBride Hall from representing real parties in interest Dr. Muhammad Said Sabir and Pioneer Health Care, LLC (collectively, Sabir) in her medical malpractice action, holding that Nelson failed to establish that she was entitled to the writ.
Nelson's attorney, Adam Breeden, owned a solo practice and employed Kristy Johnson as his paralegal. While Johnson was employed at Breeden's practice Breeden represented Plaintiffs in two cases for which McBride Hall acted as defense counsel. Nelson moved to disqualify McBride Hall from representing Sabir due to Johnson's purported knowledge of Breeden's legal conclusions on Nelson's case. The district court denied the motion to disqualify. Nelson then sought a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its ruling. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that automatic disqualification was not necessary. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/84006.html" target="_blank">View "Nelson v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied Petitioner Jane Nelson's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying her motion to disqualify McBride Hall from representing real parties in interest Dr. Muhammad Said Sabir and Pioneer Health Care, LLC (collectively, Sabir) in her medical malpractice action, holding that Nelson failed to establish that she was entitled to the writ.
Nelson's attorney, Adam Breeden, owned a solo practice and employed Kristy Johnson as his paralegal. While Johnson was employed at Breeden's practice Breeden represented Plaintiffs in two cases for which McBride Hall acted as defense counsel. Nelson moved to disqualify McBride Hall from representing Sabir due to Johnson's purported knowledge of Breeden's legal conclusions on Nelson's case. The district court denied the motion to disqualify. Nelson then sought a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its ruling. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that automatic disqualification was not necessary.
The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying Petitioner's motion to disqualify McBride Hall from representing real parties in interest Dr. Muhammad Said Sabir and Pioneer Health Care, LLC in her medical malpractice action, holding that Nelson failed to establish that she was entitled to the writ.
2022-12-22stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadish84006https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/82908.htmlLas Vegas Review-Journal v. Clark County Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner2022-12-15T14:12:14-08:002022-12-15T14:12:14-08:00
The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court awarding the Las Vegas Review-Journal (LVRJ) costs and attorney fees in proceedings under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), holding that the district court abused its discretion by imposing such a substantial discount from the amount requested without explaining its reasons for doing so.
The award at issue in this case discounted the costs and fees requested by the LVRJ by almost forty percent. When the LVRJ asked the judge to explain the reduction, the judge did not elaborate on his reasons for the reduction. The Supreme Court vacated so much of the order as discounted the fees and costs requested by the LVRJ and otherwise affirmed, holding that, without specific reasons for the discount, this Court could not determine whether the district court's order was an abuse of discretion. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/82908.html" target="_blank">View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. Clark County Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court awarding the Las Vegas Review-Journal (LVRJ) costs and attorney fees in proceedings under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), holding that the district court abused its discretion by imposing such a substantial discount from the amount requested without explaining its reasons for doing so.
The award at issue in this case discounted the costs and fees requested by the LVRJ by almost forty percent. When the LVRJ asked the judge to explain the reduction, the judge did not elaborate on his reasons for the reduction. The Supreme Court vacated so much of the order as discounted the fees and costs requested by the LVRJ and otherwise affirmed, holding that, without specific reasons for the discount, this Court could not determine whether the district court's order was an abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order awarding the Las Vegas Review-Journal costs and attorney fees in proceedings under the Nevada Public Records Act, holding that the district court abused its discretion by imposing such a substantial discount from the amount requested without explaining its reasons for doing so.
2022-12-15stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaKristina Pickering82908https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83847.htmlTaylor v. Brill2022-12-15T14:12:03-08:002022-12-15T14:12:03-08:00
The Supreme Court denied Appellant's motion to disqualify Justice Douglas Herndon after Justice Herndon filed a notice of voluntary disclosure informing the parties that he had inherited the underlying matter while serving as a district judge and that he had retained it until he left the bench, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.
While Justice Herndon's disclosure stated that the underlying matter never appeared on his calendar and that he had no knowledge of the case before the instant appeal, Appellant sought disqualification, arguing that N.C.J.C. 2.11(A)(6)(d) is a mechanical rule that requires disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that because Judge Herndon did not "preside" over this matter in the district court within the meaning of the disqualification rule, his disqualification was not required. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83847.html" target="_blank">View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied Appellant's motion to disqualify Justice Douglas Herndon after Justice Herndon filed a notice of voluntary disclosure informing the parties that he had inherited the underlying matter while serving as a district judge and that he had retained it until he left the bench, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.
While Justice Herndon's disclosure stated that the underlying matter never appeared on his calendar and that he had no knowledge of the case before the instant appeal, Appellant sought disqualification, arguing that N.C.J.C. 2.11(A)(6)(d) is a mechanical rule that requires disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that because Judge Herndon did not "preside" over this matter in the district court within the meaning of the disqualification rule, his disqualification was not required.
The Supreme Court denied Appellant's motion to disqualify Justice Douglas Herndon from this matter, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.
2022-12-15stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaJames W. Hardesty83847https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/80466.htmlIn re Trust of Burgauer2022-12-15T13:10:13-08:002022-12-15T13:10:13-08:00
The Supreme Court granted a trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition and reversed the order of the district court concluding that a nonresident trustee sued in a trust administration case was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee.
Plaintiff filed the underlying petition requesting that the district court assume jurisdiction over the trust at issue, remove the trustee and appoint a successor trustee. The trustee sought dismissal of the petition based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction and granted a petition to distribute the trust property on Plaintiff's behalf. The court then held the trustee in contempt for violating a temporary restraining order. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/80466.html" target="_blank">View "In re Trust of Burgauer" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted a trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition and reversed the order of the district court concluding that a nonresident trustee sued in a trust administration case was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee.
Plaintiff filed the underlying petition requesting that the district court assume jurisdiction over the trust at issue, remove the trustee and appoint a successor trustee. The trustee sought dismissal of the petition based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction and granted a petition to distribute the trust property on Plaintiff's behalf. The court then held the trustee in contempt for violating a temporary restraining order. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee.
The Supreme Court granted a trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition and reversed the district court's order concluding that a nonresident trustee sued in a trust administration case was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee.
2022-12-15stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaCadish8046682067https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83172.htmlFreeman Expositions, LLC v. District Court2022-12-01T10:12:58-08:002022-12-01T10:12:58-08:00
The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part this petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 678C.850(3) provides an employee with a private right of action where an employer does not attempt to provide reasonable accommodations for the use of medical cannabis off-site and outside of working hours.
Roushkolb was terminated after he took a drug test and tested positive for cannabis. Roushkolb filed suit, asserting five claims against Petitioner. The district court dismissed the claim for deceptive trade practices but allowed the others to proceed. Petitioner petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking dismissal of the remaining claims. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding that the district court properly declined to dismiss real party in interest James Roushkolb's claim under Nev. Rev. Stat. 678C.850(3) but erred by not dismissing his claims for tortious discharge, unlawful employment practices, and negligent hiring, training, or supervision. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83172.html" target="_blank">View "Freeman Expositions, LLC v. District Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part this petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 678C.850(3) provides an employee with a private right of action where an employer does not attempt to provide reasonable accommodations for the use of medical cannabis off-site and outside of working hours.
Roushkolb was terminated after he took a drug test and tested positive for cannabis. Roushkolb filed suit, asserting five claims against Petitioner. The district court dismissed the claim for deceptive trade practices but allowed the others to proceed. Petitioner petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking dismissal of the remaining claims. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding that the district court properly declined to dismiss real party in interest James Roushkolb's claim under Nev. Rev. Stat. 678C.850(3) but erred by not dismissing his claims for tortious discharge, unlawful employment practices, and negligent hiring, training, or supervision.
The Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 678C.850(3) provides an employee with a private right of action where an employer does not attempt to provide reasonable accommodations for the use of medical cannabis off-site and outside of working hours.
2022-12-01stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich83172https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/81810.htmlMartin v. Martin2022-12-01T10:12:37-08:002022-12-01T10:12:37-08:00
In this opinion considering whether an indemnification provision in a property settlement incident to a divorce decree was enforceable where the divorcing veteran agreed to reimburse his or her spouse if the veteran elected to receive military disability pay rather than retirement benefits, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the spouse's motion to enforce the reimbursement provision of the divorce decree, holding that there was no error.
After noting that federal law precludes state courts from dividing disability pay as community property in allocating each party's separate pay, the Supreme Court held (1) even if the parties agreed on a reimbursement provision that the state court would lack authority to otherwise mandate, state courts do not improperly divide disability pay when they enforce the terms of a negotiated property settlement as res judicata; and (2) a court does not abuse its discretion by awarding pendente lite attorney fees under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.040 without analyzing the factors set forth in Burnzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969). <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/81810.html" target="_blank">View "Martin v. Martin" on Justia Law</a>
In this opinion considering whether an indemnification provision in a property settlement incident to a divorce decree was enforceable where the divorcing veteran agreed to reimburse his or her spouse if the veteran elected to receive military disability pay rather than retirement benefits, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the spouse's motion to enforce the reimbursement provision of the divorce decree, holding that there was no error.
After noting that federal law precludes state courts from dividing disability pay as community property in allocating each party's separate pay, the Supreme Court held (1) even if the parties agreed on a reimbursement provision that the state court would lack authority to otherwise mandate, state courts do not improperly divide disability pay when they enforce the terms of a negotiated property settlement as res judicata; and (2) a court does not abuse its discretion by awarding pendente lite attorney fees under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.040 without analyzing the factors set forth in Burnzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969).
The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in granting a spouse's motion to enforce a reimbursement provision in a property settlement incident to a divorce decree.
2022-12-01stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaStiglich8181082517https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83723.htmlSeibel v. Eighth Judicial District Court2022-11-23T12:08:10-08:002022-11-23T12:08:10-08:00
The Supreme Court denied a petition for extraordinary relief to address a matter of first impression before the Court regarding the procedures and burden of proof required to establish the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that extraordinary relief was warranted in the form of a petition for a writ of prohibition.
At issue before the Supreme Court was the procedures and burden of proof required to establish the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Petitioner petitioned the Court for a writ of prohibition or mandamus prohibiting the district court from compelling disclosure of documents from Petitioner's attorney-client privilege log under Nevada's crime-fraud exception and ordering the district court to find the documents undiscoverable. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the district court properly granted disclosure of the privileged documents after conducting an in camera review under Nevada's crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83723.html" target="_blank">View "Seibel v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court denied a petition for extraordinary relief to address a matter of first impression before the Court regarding the procedures and burden of proof required to establish the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that extraordinary relief was warranted in the form of a petition for a writ of prohibition.
At issue before the Supreme Court was the procedures and burden of proof required to establish the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Petitioner petitioned the Court for a writ of prohibition or mandamus prohibiting the district court from compelling disclosure of documents from Petitioner's attorney-client privilege log under Nevada's crime-fraud exception and ordering the district court to find the documents undiscoverable. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the district court properly granted disclosure of the privileged documents after conducting an in camera review under Nevada's crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.
The Supreme Court denied a petition for extraordinary relief to address a matter of first impression before the Court regarding the procedures and burden of proof required to establish the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that extraordinary relief was warranted.
2022-11-23stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaJames W. Hardesty83723https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83334.htmlZalyaul v. State2022-11-23T12:08:00-08:002022-11-23T12:08:00-08:00
The Supreme Court vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the district court's judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of attempted sexual assault, holding that when a child under the age of sixteen commits a delinquent act but is not charged until after turning twenty-one, no court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
After he turned the age of twenty-one, Appellant was charged with committing delinquent acts as a fourteen-year-old. Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that while the juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over children under twenty-one years of age who are alleged to have committed a delinquent act when the person was at least sixteen but less than eighteen years of age, the juvenile court loses jurisdiction once a child turns twenty-one, and, absent certain exceptions, the district court lacks jurisdiction over any charges of delinquent acts. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/83334.html" target="_blank">View "Zalyaul v. State" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the district court's judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of attempted sexual assault, holding that when a child under the age of sixteen commits a delinquent act but is not charged until after turning twenty-one, no court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
After he turned the age of twenty-one, Appellant was charged with committing delinquent acts as a fourteen-year-old. Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that while the juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over children under twenty-one years of age who are alleged to have committed a delinquent act when the person was at least sixteen but less than eighteen years of age, the juvenile court loses jurisdiction once a child turns twenty-one, and, absent certain exceptions, the district court lacks jurisdiction over any charges of delinquent acts.
The Supreme Court vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the district court's judgment of conviction of attempted sexual assault, holding that when a child under the age of sixteen commits a delinquent act but is not charged until after turning twenty-one, no court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
2022-11-23stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaJames W. Hardesty83334https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/84623.htmlClark NMSD, LLC v. Goldstein2022-11-23T12:07:50-08:002022-11-23T12:07:50-08:00
The Supreme Court held that a third-party entity in a post-judgment collection action has party standing to appeal from an order of the district court resolving its petition to return property levied pursuant to a writ of execution.
Jennifer Goldstein obtained a judgment against NuVeda, LLC for over $2.5 million. In post-judgment collection proceedings, Goldstein had a writ of execution serviced on Clark NMSD, LLC, and cash was seized. Clark NMSD filed a third-party claimant petition, which NuVeda joined, seeking return of the seized cash and requesting that Goldstein be prohibited from further collection activity. The district court denied the petition. Goldstein then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Clark NMSD was not a party to the proceedings below it had not standing to appeal. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that Clark NMSD had party standing to challenge the district court's order, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/84623.html" target="_blank">View "Clark NMSD, LLC v. Goldstein" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court held that a third-party entity in a post-judgment collection action has party standing to appeal from an order of the district court resolving its petition to return property levied pursuant to a writ of execution.
Jennifer Goldstein obtained a judgment against NuVeda, LLC for over $2.5 million. In post-judgment collection proceedings, Goldstein had a writ of execution serviced on Clark NMSD, LLC, and cash was seized. Clark NMSD filed a third-party claimant petition, which NuVeda joined, seeking return of the seized cash and requesting that Goldstein be prohibited from further collection activity. The district court denied the petition. Goldstein then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Clark NMSD was not a party to the proceedings below it had not standing to appeal. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that Clark NMSD had party standing to challenge the district court's order, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal.
The Supreme Court held that a third-party entity in a post-judgment collection action has party standing to appeal from an order of the district court resolving its petition to return property levied pursuant to a writ of execution.
2022-11-23stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaJames W. Hardesty84623https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/82948.htmlMoroney v. Young2022-11-23T12:07:39-08:002022-11-23T12:07:39-08:00
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed by Plaintiff because the statute of limitations had expired and because Defendant had not timely served him, holding that there was no error.
At issue was recently-amended Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(3), which requires that a district court extend the service period where a plaintiff timely moves for an extension and demonstrates that good cause for an extension exists. The Supreme Court held (1) in determining whether the plaintiff has made a good cause showing for extension of the service period exists, the district court must apply the factors set forth in Saavedra-Sandolva v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 P.3d 1198 (Nev. 2010), and Scrimer v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 998 P.2d 1190 (Nev. 2000), to the extent those factors bear on tempted service/or whether circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control resulted in the failure timely to serve; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion to extend the service period. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2022/82948.html" target="_blank">View "Moroney v. Young" on Justia Law</a>
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed by Plaintiff because the statute of limitations had expired and because Defendant had not timely served him, holding that there was no error.
At issue was recently-amended Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(3), which requires that a district court extend the service period where a plaintiff timely moves for an extension and demonstrates that good cause for an extension exists. The Supreme Court held (1) in determining whether the plaintiff has made a good cause showing for extension of the service period exists, the district court must apply the factors set forth in Saavedra-Sandolva v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 P.3d 1198 (Nev. 2010), and Scrimer v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 998 P.2d 1190 (Nev. 2000), to the extent those factors bear on tempted service/or whether circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control resulted in the failure timely to serve; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion to extend the service period.
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint, holding that there was no error.
2022-11-23stateNevadaSupreme Court of NevadaHerndon82948