The Requirements of Due Process

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: CIVIL

Generally

Due process requires that the procedures by which laws are applied must be evenhanded, so that individuals are not subjected to the arbitrary exercise of government power.683 Exactly what procedures are needed to satisfy due process, however, will vary depending on the circumstances and subject matter involved.684 One of the basic criteria used to establish if due process is satisfied is whether such procedure was historically required in like circumstance.

Relevance of Historical Use.—The requirements of due process are determined in part by an examination of the settled usages and modes of proceedings of the common and statutory law of England during pre-colonial times and in the early years of this country.685 In other words, the antiquity of a legal procedure is a factor weighing in its favor. However, it does not follow that a procedure settled in English law and adopted in this country is, or remains, an essential element of due process of law. If that were so, the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth century would be "fastened upon American jurisprudence like a strait jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional amendment."686 Fortunately, the States are not tied down by any provision of the Constitution to the practice and procedure which existed at the common law, but may avail themselves of the wisdom gathered by the experience of the country to make changes deemed to be necessary.687

682 A passing reference by Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion in Glucksberg and its companion case Vacco v. Quill may, however, portend a liberty interest in seeking pain relief, or "palliative" care. Glucksberg and Vacco, 521 U.S. at 736-37 (Justice O'Connor, concurring).

683 Thus, where a litigant had the benefit of a full and fair trial in the state courts, and his rights are measured, not by laws made to affect him individually, but by general provisions of law applicable to all those in like condition, he is not deprived of property without due process of law, even if he can be regarded as deprived of his property by an adverse result. Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).

684 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884). "Due process of law is [process which], following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to the parties affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by law; it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and whenever necessary to the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." Id. at 708; Accord, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).

685 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899). "A process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and this country." Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 529.

686 Twining, 211 U.S. at 101.

687 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944).

Non-Judicial Proceedings.—A court proceeding is not a requisite of due process.688 Administrative and executive proceedings are not judicial, yet they may satisfy the due process clause.689 Moreover, the due process clause does not require de novo judicial review of the factual conclusions of state regulatory agencies,690 and may not require judicial review at all.691 Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit a State from conferring judicial functions upon non-judicial bodies, or from delegating powers to a court that are legislative in nature.692 Further, it is up to a State to determine to what extent its legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be kept distinct and separate.693

The Requirements of Due Process.—Although due process tolerates variances in procedure "appropriate to the nature of the case,"694 it is nonetheless possible to identify its core goals and requirements. First, "[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property."695 Thus, the required elements of due process are those that "minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations" by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them of protected interests.696 The core of these requirements is notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Due process may also require an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and for discovery; that a decision be made based on the record, and that a party be allowed to be represented by counsel.

688 Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 668 (1890).

689 For instance, proceedings to raise revenue by levying and collecting taxes are not necessarily judicial proceedings, yet their validity is not thereby impaired. McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 41 (1877).

690 Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941) (oil field proration order). See also Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940) (courts should not second-guess regulatory commissions in evaluating expert testimony).

691 See, e.g., Moore v. Johnson, 582 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding the preclusion of judicial review of decisions of the Veterans Administration regarding veteran's benefits).

692 State statutes vesting in a parole board certain judicial functions, Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902), or conferring discretionary power upon administrative boards to grant or withhold permission to carry on a trade, New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 562 (1905), or vesting in a probate court authority to appoint park commissioners and establish park districts, Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79 (1930), are not in conflict with the due process clause and present no federal question.

693 Carfer v. Caldwell, 200 U.S. 293, 297 (1906).

694 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).

695 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). "[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).

696 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). At times, the Court has also stressed the dignitary importance of procedural rights, the worth of being able to defend one's interests even if one cannot change the result. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Nelson v. Adams, 120 S. Ct. 1579 (2000) (amendment of judgement to impose attorney fees and costs to sole shareholder of liable corporate structure invalid without notice or opportunity to dispute).

(1) Notice. "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."697 This may include an obligation, upon learning that an attempt at notice has failed, to take “reasonable followup measures” that may be available.29 The notice must be sufficient to enable the recipient to determine what is being proposed and what he must do to prevent the deprivation of his interest.698 Ordinarily, service of the notice must be reasonably structured to assure that the person to whom it is directed receives it.699 Such notice, however, need not describe the legal procedures necessary to protect one's interest if such procedures are otherwise set out in published, generally available public sources.700

(2) Hearing. "[S]ome form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property [or liberty] interest."701 This right is a "basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment …"702 Thus, the notice of hearing and the opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."703

697 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See also Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (res judicata may not apply where taxpayer who challenged a county's occupation tax was not informed of prior case and where taxpayer interests were not adequately protected).

29 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 235 (2006) (state’s certified letter, intended to notify a property owner that his property would be sold unless he satisfied a tax delinquency, was returned by the post office marked “unclaimed”; the state should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify the property owner, as it would have been practicable for it to have done so.)

698 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).

699 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1974); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).

700 City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999).

701 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard." Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).

702 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972). See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-71 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter concurring).

703 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)

(3) Impartial Tribunal. Just as in criminal and quasi-criminal cases,704 an impartial decision maker is an essential right in civil proceedings as well.705 "The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law… At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness . . . by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him."706 Thus, a showing of bias or of strong implications of bias was deemed made where a state optometry board, made up of only private practitioners, was proceeding against other licensed optometrists for unprofessional conduct because they were employed by corporations. Since success in the board's effort would redound to the personal benefit of private practitioners, the Court thought the interest of the board members to be sufficient to disqualify them.707

There is, however, a "presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators,"708 so that the burden is on the objecting party to show a conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification of a specific officer or for disapproval of the system. Thus, combining functions within an agency, such as by allowing members of a State Medical Examining Board to both investigate and adjudicate a physician's suspension, may raise substantial concerns, but does not by itself establish a violation of due process.709 The Court has also held that the official or personal stake that school board members had in a decision to fire teachers who had engaged in a strike against the school system in violation of state law was not such so as to disqualify them.710 Sometimes, to ensure an impartial tribunal, the Due Process Clause requires a judge to recuse himself from a case. In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., the Court noted that “most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level,” and that “matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.”30 The Court added, however, that “[t]he early and leading case on the subject” had “concluded that the Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule that a judge must recuse himself when he has ‘a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in a case.”31 In addition, although “[p]ersonal bias or prejudice ‘alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause,’” there “are circumstances ‘in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’”32 These circumstances include “where a judge had a financial interest in the outcome of a case” or “a conflict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding.”33 In such cases, “[t]he inquiry is an objective one. The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”34 In Caperton, a company appealed a jury verdict of $50 million, and its chairman spent $3 million to elect a justice to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia at a time when “[i]t was reasonably foreseeable . . . that the pending case would be before the newly elected justice.”35 This $3 million was more than the total amount spent by all other supporters of the justice and three times the amount spent by the justice’s own committee. The justice was elected, declined to recuse himself, and joined a 3-to-2 decision overturning the jury verdict. The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, “conclude[d] that there is a serious risk of actual bias — based on objective and reasonable perceptions — when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”36

704 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).

705 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).

706 Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).

707 Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Or, the conduct of deportation hearings by a person who, while he had not investigated the case heard, was also an investigator who must judge the results of others' investigations just as one of them would some day judge his, raised a substantial problem which was resolved through statutory construction). Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).

708 Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).

709 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). Where an administrative officer is acting in a prosecutorial, rather than judicial or quasi-judicial role, an even lesser standard of impartiality applies. Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 248-50 (1980) (regional administrator assessing fines for child labor violations, with penalties going into fund to reimburse cost of system of enforcing child labor laws). But "traditions of prosecutorial discretion do not immunize from judicial scrutiny cases in which enforcement decisions of an administrator were motivated by improper factors or were otherwise contrary to law." Id. at 249.

710 Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976). Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170 n.5 (1974) (Justice Powell), with id. at 196-99 (Justice White), and 216 (Justice Marshall).

30 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (citations omitted).

31 129 S. Ct. at 2259, quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).

32 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (citations omitted).

33 129 S. Ct. at 2259-60, 2261.

34 129 S. Ct. at 2262 (citations omitted).

35 129 S. Ct. at 2264.

36 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, dissented, asserting that “a ‘probability of bias’ cannot be defined in any limited way,” “provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required,” and “will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be.” Id. at 2267. The majority countered that “[t]he facts now before us are extreme in any measure.” Id. at 2265.

(4) Confrontation and Cross-Examination. "In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."711 Where the "evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealously," the individual's right to show that it is untrue depends on the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. "This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, . . . but also in all types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under scrutiny."712

(5) Discovery. The Court has never directly confronted this issue, but in one case it did observe in dictum that "where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue."713 Some federal agencies have adopted discovery rules modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Administrative Conference has recommended that all do so.714 There appear to be no cases, however, holding they must, and there is some authority that they cannot absent congressional authorization.715

(6) Decision on the Record. While this issue arises principally in the administrative law area,716 it is applicable generally. "[T]he decisionmaker's conclusion . . . must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing… To demonstrate compliance with this elementary requirement, the decisionmaker should state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on . . . though his statement need not amount to a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law."717

711 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). See also ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1913). Cf. § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).

712 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959). But see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (where authors of documentary evidence are known to petitioner and he did not subpoena them, he may not complain that agency relied on that evidence). Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-45 (1976).

713 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959), quoted with approval in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).

714 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 571 (1968-1970).

715 FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964).

716 The exclusiveness of the record is fundamental in administrative law. See §7(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e). However, one must show not only that the agency used ex parte evidence but that he was prejudiced thereby. Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945) (agency decision supported by evidence in record, its decision sustained, disregarding ex parte evidence).

717 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).

(7) Counsel. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court held that an agency must permit a welfare recipient who has been denied benefits to be represented by and assisted by counsel.718 In the years since, the Court has struggled with whether civil litigants in court and persons before agencies who could not afford retained counsel should have counsel appointed and paid for, and the matter seems far from settled. The Court has established the presumption that an indigent does not have the right to an appointed counsel unless his "physical liberty" is threatened.719 However, where other liberty or property interests are threatened, a litigant may overcome this presumption, so that the right of an indigent to appointed counsel is to be determined on a case-by-case basis using a balancing standard.720

For instance, in a case involving a state proceeding to terminate the parental rights of an indigent without providing her counsel, the Court recognized the parent's interest as "an extremely important one." The Court, however, also noted the State's strong interest in protecting the welfare of children. Thus, as the interest in correct fact-finding was strong on both sides, the proceeding was relatively simple, no features were present raising a risk of criminal liability, no expert witnesses were present, and no "specially troublesome" substantive or procedural issues had been raised, the litigant did not have a right to appointed counsel.721 In other due process cases involving parental rights, the Court has held that due process requires special state attention to parental rights.722 Thus, it would appear likely that in other parental right cases, a right to appointed counsel could be established.

718 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).

719 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The Court purported to draw this rule from Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no per se right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings). To introduce this presumption into the balancing, however, appears to disregard the fact that the first factor of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), upon which the Court (and dissent) relied, relates to the importance of the interest to the person claiming the right. Thus, at least in this context, the value of the first Eldridge factor is diminished. The Court noted, however, that the Mathews v. Eldridge standards were drafted in the context of the generality of cases and were not intended for case-by-case application. Cf. 424 U.S. at 344 (1976)

720 452 U.S. at 31-32. The balancing decision is to be made initially by the trial judge, subject to appellate review. Id. at 32

721 452 U.S. at 27-31. The decision was a five-to-four, with Justices Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in the majority, and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in dissent. Id. at 35, 59.

722 See e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (indigent entitled to state-funded blood testing in a paternity action the State required to be instituted); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (imposition of higher standard of proof in case involving state termination of parental rights).

Pages: 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46