Sec. 53a-72. Rape in the first degree: Class B felony. Section 53a-72 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 73; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 125; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-72a. Sexual assault in the third degree: Class D or C felony. (a) A
person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels
another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other
person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person
or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical
injury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with
another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the
degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class D felony or, if the victim of the
offense is under sixteen years of age, a class C felony.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 5; P.A. 80-346, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 33; P.A. 02-138, S. 8.)
History: P.A. 80-346 designated previous Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B) in Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a)
and added Subdiv. (2) re incest; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by amending Subsec. (a)(1)(B) to replace "which
reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person" with "which reasonably causes such other person to
fear physical injury to himself or herself" and amending Subsec. (a)(2) to replace "such person" with "the actor" or "him
or her" as appropriate; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class C felony if the victim is under
sixteen years of age.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 216, 218, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 618. Cited. 192 C. 154,
164. Cited. 194 C. 258, 271. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 352, 353. Cited. Id., 386, 394. Cited. 207 C. 403, 404.
Cited. 214 C. 89, 91. Cited. 224 C. 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Cited. 240 C. 743. Statute encompasses
adopted relatives. 258 C. 779.
Cited. 1 CA 724-726, 735. Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 15, 16. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see
205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. Id., 648, 649. Cited. 10 CA 591. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 35 CA
173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 741. Evidence was sufficient to support conviction and court properly instructed
jury on element of intent for conviction of sexual assault in the third degree. 81 CA 189.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Cited. 205 C. 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 388. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id.,
386, 391, 393. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 209 C. 416-418. Subdiv. (2) cited. 210 C. 244, 246, 247, 265, 266, 272, 274. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. 224 C. 397, 404. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 233 C. 502, 504, 512. Subdiv.
(1)(A) cited. Id., 502, 512, 514. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 237 C. 284-286. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 576. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited.
Id., 694. Court's failure to define "knowledge" or to explain how it pertains to charge of sexual assault in the third degree
did not violate defendant's due process rights where jury instructions, viewed as a whole, adequately informed jury of the
elements of the crime. 258 C. 779.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 734. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 724, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 10 CA
591, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 244, 245, 247.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 694, 695, 697-699. Subdiv. (2) cited.
20 CA 530, 532. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 23 CA 221, 226. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see
200 C. 400 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B)
cited. Id., 725, 726; 26 CA 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 29 CA 724, 725. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 281, 282,
287. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218, 220; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 743,
748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id., 743, 744, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C.
502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 36 CA 228, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 762, 763.
Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 39 CA 657, 658. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 287, 288, 294. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 43 CA 578. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 756.
Sec. 53a-72b. Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm: Class C or B
felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm when
such person commits sexual assault in the third degree as provided in section 53a-72a,
and in the commission of such offense, such person uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person
possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, rifle, shotgun or other firearm. No person
shall be convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and sexual assault in the third
degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and
prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm is a class C felony or, if the
victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person
found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which
two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and
a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together
constitute a sentence of ten years.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 10; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 51; P.A. 02-138, S. 9.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase the penalty from a class D to a class C felony, increase
from one year to two years the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence and add requirement that any person found guilty
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute
a sentence of ten years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the
offense as a class B felony if the victim is under sixteen years of age.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-73. Rape in the second degree: Class C felony. Section 53a-73 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 74; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
Sec. 53a-73a. Sexual assault in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor or
class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when: (1)
Such person intentionally subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) under
fifteen years of age, or (B) mentally defective or mentally incapacitated to the extent
that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual contact, or (C) physically
helpless, or (D) less than eighteen years old and the actor is such other person's guardian
or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such other person's welfare, or
(E) in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has
supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person; or (2) such person subjects
another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent; or (3) such person
engages in sexual contact with an animal or dead body; or (4) such person is a psychotherapist and subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) a patient of the actor and
the sexual contact occurs during the psychotherapy session, or (B) a patient or former
patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon
the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual contact occurs
by means of therapeutic deception; or (5) such person subjects another person to sexual
contact and accomplishes the sexual contact by means of false representation that the
sexual contact is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (6)
such person is a school employee and subjects another person to sexual contact who is
a student enrolled in a school in which the actor works or a school under the jurisdiction
of the local or regional board of education which employs the actor; or (7) such person
is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who provides intensive, ongoing instruction
and subjects another person to sexual contact who is a recipient of coaching or instruction
from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such coaching or
instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of age; or (8)
such person subjects another person to sexual contact and (A) the actor is twenty years
of age or older and stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over such
other person by virtue of the actor's professional, legal, occupational or volunteer status
and such other person's participation in a program or activity, and (B) such other person
is under eighteen years of age.
(b) Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor or, if the victim of
the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class D felony.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 6; P.A. 83-326, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 3; P.A. 94-221, S. 19; P.A. 02-106, S. 2; 02-138, S. 10; P.A. 04-130, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or
mentally incapacitated "to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual contact", redesignated as Subpara. (C) a
victim who is "physically helpless" and relettered the remaining subparagraphs; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (a) to add
Subdiv. (4) re sexual contact by a psychotherapist with a patient or former patient and Subdiv. (5) re sexual contact
accomplished by means of false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec.
(a) to add Subdiv. (6) concerning school employees and students; P.A. 02-106 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical
change in Subdiv. (1)(B) for purposes of gender neutrality and to add Subdiv. (7) re a coach or instructor subjecting another
person to sexual contact who is a recipient of such coaching or instruction and is a secondary school student receiving
such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting or under eighteen years of age; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec.
(a) to make technical changes and amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class D felony if the victim is under
sixteen years of age; P.A. 04-130 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (8) re actor twenty years of age or older who stands
in a position of power, authority or supervision over another person under eighteen years of age and subjects that other
person to sexual contact.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Proof of specific interest required under statute precludes this from being a lesser included
offense under Sec. 53-21. 186 C. 45, 49, 51-53. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 204 C. 683, 685. Cited. 205 C. 386, 394,
396. Cited. 210 C. 396, 397. Cited. Id., 582, 583. Cited. 211 C. 455, 458. Cited. 224 C. 1, 2.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 150. Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 11 CA 80, 81. Cited. Id., 102, 118. Cited. 14 CA
40, 41. Cited. 15 CA 251, 254, 278. Cited. Id., 289, 290. Cited. 18 CA 459, 460. Cited. 25 CA 270, 271; judgment reversed
in part, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Judgment of acquittal in State v. Sirimanochanh, (26 CA 625, 221 C. 917 and 224 C. 656)
reversed and case remanded to trial court with direction to render judgment reinstating conviction under this section. 31
CA 452, 454, 455. Cited. 34 CA 473, 474. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 458. Cited. Id., 715. Reiterated previous
holdings touching bare skin not required for sexual contact in the fourth degree. 59 CA 538.
It is undisputable that Connecticut recognizes a clear public policy against sexual misconduct and sexual harassment.
This public policy is evidenced in state criminal statutes, which provide that "a person is guilty of sexual assault in the
fourth degree when ... (2) such person subjects another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent ...."
Thus, arbitration award reinstating police officer who had engaged in sexual misconduct and harassment while on duty
clearly violates established public policy and must be vacated. 48 CS 574.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 183 C. 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. 192 C. 37, 39. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 154-156, 161, 163. Subdiv.
(1)(B) cited. 200 C. 440, 441. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 734, 735. Subdiv. (1)(C) cited. 205 C. 386, 388, 393, 399. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 386, 388, 409, 410. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 409. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211
C. 555, 582. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582. Subdiv. (1)(D) cited. 215 C. 653, 654. Subdiv. (1)(A): Defendant
waived claim that violation of this section is not a lesser included offense of violation of Sec. 53a-71(a)(1). Judgment of
appellate court in State v. Sirimanochanh, 26 CA 625, reversed and case remanded for determination of evidence sufficiency.
224 C. 656, 658; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 227 C. 207, 210, 211. Subdiv. (1)(A)
cited. 230 C. 43, 47, 48.
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 395, 396. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 395, 396. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 18 CA 297, 298. Subdiv.
(1)(E) cited. Id., 694, 698. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 19 CA 44, 45. Subdiv. (1)(D) cited. 20 CA 115, 117. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 365, 366. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 530, 532. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 26 CA 625, 627, 636, 637; judgment reversed, see
224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 674, 679. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 409,
410, 414. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 31 CA 452, 454. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 205, 207. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 34 CA 428,
429. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 38 CA 125, 126. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 116. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited.
Id., 289. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 512. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 613. Subdiv. (1)(A): This offense and the offense of risk
of injury to a child are not the same offense for double jeopardy. 49 CA 409.
Secs. 53a-74 to 53a-81. Rape in the second degree. Deviate sexual intercourse
in the first and second degree. Sexual contact in the first, second and third degree.
Adultery: Class A misdemeanor. Sections 53a-74 to 53a-81, inclusive, are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 75-82; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 126-129; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 79, 80; P.A. 75-619, S. 7; P.A. 91-19, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-82. Prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with
another person in return for a fee.
(b) Prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 83.)
Meaning of statutory language is clear and is sufficient to warn ordinary person of the prohibited conduct. 37 CS 506-
509, 511-513. Does not violate right to privacy which has never been extended to encompass prostitutes plying their trade
on the street. Id., 515-517.
Sec. 53a-83. Patronizing a prostitute: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of patronizing a prostitute when: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, he pays
a fee to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged
in sexual conduct with him; or (2) he pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person
pursuant to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will
engage in sexual conduct with him; or (3) he solicits or requests another person to engage
in sexual conduct with him in return for a fee.
(b) Patronizing a prostitute is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 84.)
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 4 CA 520, 530.
Subsec. (b):
Section may be harmonized with Sec. 18-100d re determining controlling sentence where prisoner serving concurrent
sentences for crimes committed both on or after October 1, 1994 and before October 1, 1994, with good time credit
applicable to pre-October 1, 1994 sentence under Sec. 18-7a(c). Determination of controlling sentence not a static concept.
261 C. 806.
Sec. 53a-83a. Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle when
he, while occupying a motor vehicle: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, pays a fee
to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged in
sexual conduct with him; or (2) pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person pursuant
to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will engage in
sexual conduct with him; or (3) solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual
conduct with him in return for a fee; or (4) engages in sexual conduct for which a fee
was paid or agreed to be paid.
(b) Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 93-265, S. 2; P.A. 97-279, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 97-279 amended Subsec. (b) to delete provision that subjected any motor vehicle used in the commission
of the offense to forfeiture to the state in accordance with Secs. 54-36j to 54-36l, inclusive.
Sec. 53a-84. Sex of parties immaterial. In any prosecution for prostitution or
patronizing a prostitute, the sex of the two parties or prospective parties to the sexual
conduct engaged in, contemplated or solicited is immaterial, and it shall be no defense
that: (1) Such persons were of the same sex; or (2) the person who received, agreed to
receive or solicited a fee was a male and the person who paid or agreed or offered to
pay such fee was a female.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 85.)
Sec. 53a-85. Promoting prostitution: Definitions. The following definitions are
applicable to sections 53a-86 to 53a-89, inclusive:
(1) A person "advances prostitution" when, acting other than as a prostitute or as a
patron thereof, he knowingly causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution,
procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons or premises for prostitution
purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house of prostitution or a prostitution
enterprise, or engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid or facilitate an act
or enterprise of prostitution.
(2) A person "profits from prostitution" when acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitution services, he accepts or receives
money or other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any person
whereby he participates or is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 86.)
Sec. 53a-86. Promoting prostitution in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A
person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree when he knowingly: (1)
Advances prostitution by compelling a person by force or intimidation to engage in
prostitution, or profits from coercive conduct by another; or (2) advances or profits from
prostitution of a person less than sixteen years old.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the first degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 87.)
Cited. 199 C. 47, 55.
Sentencing under both risk of injury and promoting prostitution statutes not a double jeopardy violation. 53 CA 627.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 185 C. 199, 200; 191 C. 453, 454.
Sec. 53a-87. Promoting prostitution in the second degree: Class C felony. (a)
A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree when he knowingly: (1)
Advances or profits from prostitution by managing, supervising, controlling or owning,
either alone or in association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business
or enterprise involving prostitution activity by two or more prostitutes; or (2) advances
or profits from prostitution of a person less than eighteen years old.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 88; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 81.)
History: 1972 act changed applicable age in Subsec. (a)(2) from nineteen to eighteen, reflecting change in age of
majority.
Cited. 199 C. 47, 55.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 732.
Sec. 53a-88. Promoting prostitution in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A
person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the third degree when he knowingly advances or profits from prostitution.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P. A. 828, S. 89.)
Sec. 53a-89. Permitting prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of permitting prostitution when, having possession or control of premises which
he knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he fails to make reasonable effort to
halt or abate such use.
(b) Permitting prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 90.)
Cited. 185 C. 199, 200.
Sec. 53a-90. Transferred to Chapter 961, Part II, Sec. 54-102a.
Sec. 53a-90a. Enticing a minor. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of enticing a
minor when such person uses an interactive computer service to knowingly persuade,
induce, entice or coerce any person under sixteen years of age to engage in prostitution
or sexual activity for which the actor may be charged with a criminal offense. For purposes of this section, "interactive computer service" means any information service,
system or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access
to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.
(b) Enticing a minor is a class D felony for a first offense, a class C felony for a
second offense and a class B felony for any subsequent offense.
(P.A. 99-113; P.A. 04-139, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 04-139 amended Subsec. (b) to increase penalty for a first offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class
D felony, for a second offense from a class D felony to a class C felony and for any subsequent offense from a class C
felony to a class B felony, effective July 1, 2004.
PART VII*
KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-27 and present part VII of chapter 952:
Cited. 155 C. 592. Evidence produced by this state was sufficient to show proof was evident that defendants were in
danger of being convicted of capital offense under this section, hence bail could be denied under section 8 of article I of
state constitution. 159 C. 285. Prosecution where necessary elements of two or more distinct offenses combined in same
act, when. 164 C. 95. Fraudulent restraint in kidnapping, defined. Id., 95. Restraint for sexual gratification within purview
of kidnapping statute. Id., 95. Cited. 166 C. 96. Cited. 169 C. 38. Cited. 206 C. 40, 55.
Cited. 24 CS 386.
Sec. 53a-91. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully
in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one
place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences
or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent. As used herein "without
consent" means, but is not limited to, (A) deception and (B) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control
or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.
(2) "Abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by
either (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (B)
using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation.
(3) "Relative" means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 92; P.A. 92-260, S. 35.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsecs. (1) and (2) to replace Subdiv. indicators "(a)" and "(b)" with "(A)" and "(B)",
respectively.
Language is clear and does not lend itself to any equivocal interpretation. 173 C. 165, 168. Cited. 191 C. 604, 617.
Cited. 200 C. 586, 590. Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 216 C. 647, 661. Cited. 219 C. 489, 492. Cited. 226 C. 618, 623.
Terms "restrained" and "abducted" interpreted to include frightening victim to remain in bedroom through repeated physical
and verbal abuse. 258 C. 510.
Cited. 20 CA 437-439. Cited. 55 CA 447.
Subsec. (1):
Cited. 177 C. 335, 342; 179 C. 328, 338; 180 C. 565, 566. Cited. 188 C. 406, 416. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254. Subpara. (a)
cited. 198 C. 147, 152, 153. Cited. Id., 430, 434. Cited. Id., 537, 542, 550. Cited. 202 C. 520, 539. Cited. 209 C. 733, 760.
Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 215 C. 173, 178, 180. Cited. Id., 716, 727. Cited. 219 C 489, 502, 503, 510. Cited. 225 C.
347, 350. Cited. 237 C. 284, 313, 314.
Cited. 5 CA 586, 590. Cited. 13 CA 667, 672. Cited. 17 CA 339, 340, 343. Cited. 19 CA 396, 400. Cited. 30 CA 281,
282. Cited. 31 CA 312, 330. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Subsec. (2):
Subdiv. (b): Cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Subdiv. (a): Cited. 177 C. 335, 342. Subdiv. (b): Cited. 177 C. 335, 336, 342; id.,
637, 639, 641; 178 C. 634, 635. Cited. 179 C. 328, 338. Cited. 182 C. 449, 460. Cited. 188 C. 406, 415. Cited. 199 C. 537,
542, 550. Cited. 200 C. 586, 590. Subdiv. (a) cited. Id., 586, 597. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id. Cited. 209 C. 733, 757, 760. Cited.
211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 215 C. 716, 727. Cited. 219 C. 489, 500, 501, 510. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id., 489, 501. Cited. 225 C.
347, 350. Subdiv. (B) cited. 36 CA 190, 196. Cited. 46 CA 486. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id.
To prove unlawful restraint, the state had to prove that defendant abducted alleged victim by restraining her with intent
to prevent her liberation by using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation. 81 CA 320.
Sec. 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is
guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and: (1) His
intent is to compel a third person (A) to pay or deliver money or property as ransom or (B)
to engage in other particular conduct or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or
(2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him
or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a
felony; or (C) terrorize him or a third person; or (D) interfere with the performance of
a government function.
(b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 93, 94; P.A. 73-137, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 36.)
History: P.A. 73-137 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) making kidnapping a first degree offense when abducted person
dies during abduction or before his return to safety and provisions in that Subsec. re circumstances which determine the
presumption of death and provisions in Subsec. (b) re imposition of death penalty and re sentence for Class A felony when
accused enters guilty plea and court and state's attorney consent; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to insert Subpara.
indicators and made other technical changes.
Cited. 173 C. 165-167. Cited. 197 C. 436, 461. Cited. Id., 588, 591. Cited. 198 C. 671, 673. Cited. 200 C. 268, 286.
Cited. 201 C. 276, 284. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673. Cited. 212 C. 31, 32. Cited. 225 C. 347, 349. Cited. 227 C. 677, 679. Cited.
235 C. 711, 713. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114.
Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. 39 CA 632, 633. Cited. 46 CA 691. Cited. Id., 741.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended.
173 C. 165, 168. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 165, 166, 168; 177 C. 335, 343. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 185 C. 339, 340, 354.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 346, 347. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 194 C. 114, 115. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 692, 694, 695. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 197 C. 436, 438. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 588-592. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148, 151. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. Id., 285, 287. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 405, 406. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. Id., 671, 672. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 199 C.
399, 400. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 200 C. 268, 286. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 586, 587, 591; 201 C. 517, 519; Id., 559, 560;
202 C. 259, 260; Id., 509, 510; 203 C. 385, 386. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 204 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 240, 242. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited.
Id., 714, 716. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 205 C. 132, 134. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 673-675. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 206 C. 40,
42, 43, 54. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 733, 735, 761. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 210 C.
110-112. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 199, 200. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 315, 316. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv.
(2)(B) cited. 212 C. 31, 32, 38-40. Subdiv. (2) cited. 213 C. 388, 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 422, 424. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. 214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 89, 91. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 215 C. 173, 174, 177, 178, 180, 181. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. Id., 716, 718, 719, 727; 216 C. 647, 649; 217 C. 243, 244, 248, 250. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; 219 C. 93, 96.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 160, 161. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; Id., 269, 271. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 283, 284. Subdiv.
(2)(C) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 489, 491, 492, 494-496, 500-503. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 489, 491, 494-496;
220 C. 270, 272. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 345, 347, 348. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 487, 489. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 698,
700; 221 C. 264, 265; 222 C. 556, 558. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 347, 348, 350.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 450, 452. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 519, 520. Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 618-620. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. 227 C. 1, 9, 11. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 153, 155. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 228 C. 582, 584,
588. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 229 C. 557, 558. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 231 C. 195, 196. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 403, 408. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 235 C. 145, 147. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to
be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 C. 284-287, 313, 314. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 694.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face.
Id., 784. Cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 242 C. 445. Where defendant also charged with sexual assault, restriction
of movement alone can be basis of kidnapping if defendant, by violent actions, restrained victim with intent to prevent
liberation. 262 C. 179.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 8 CA 177, 178. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 25 CA 428, 430. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 28 CA 195, 196.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 33 CA 457, 458. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 457, 458. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 34 CA 276, 277. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. 36 CA 190, 191, 196. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 216, 217. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 641, 642. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. Id., 718, 720. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 774, 775. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 37 CA 360, 369. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 464, 465. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 38 CA 777, 778, 785. Cited. 39 CA 579, 580. Subdiv. (2)(B)
cited. Id., 579, 600. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 41 CA 317, 318; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 445 et seq. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited.
43 CA 715. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 44 CA 307. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to
firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful
restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under
section. 55 CA 447. Subdiv. (2): Under kidnapping statute, the state had to prove that defendant had abducted and restrained
alleged victim with the intent to inflict physical injury or to sexually attack her. 81 CA 320.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 65.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 674.
Cited. 8 CA 177, 178.
Sec. 53a-92a. Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm: Class A felony:
One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree with
a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the first degree as provided in section 53a-92, and in the commission of said crime he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping
in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm upon the same
transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon
the same information.
(b) Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm is a class A felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 9.)
Cited. 198 C. 671, 673, 676, 678, 679. "Effect of enactment of statute (was) to link a more serious crime with a less
serious penalty"; equal protection rights violated. 200 C. 268, 286, 289. Cited. 204 C. 240, 257. Cited. 205 C. 262, 264.
Cited. Id., 673, 674. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673.
Cited. 40 CA 60, 61.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 679. Cited. 210 C. 110, 111. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
The statute "has created an irreconcilable conflict in the statutes governing mandatory minimum sentences for kidnapping in the first degree ... until the legislature takes corrective action the sentencing provisions of (this statute) govern all
prosecutions for kidnapping in the first degree"; statutory construction discussed. 198 C. 671, 676, 680. Cited. 200 C. 268,
287. Equal protection rights discussed. Id. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-93. Proceeding to determine sentence for kidnapping in first degree.
Section 53a-93 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 95; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-94. Kidnapping in the second degree: Class B felony: Three years not
suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts
another person.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony for which three years of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 96; P.A. 93-148, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re three-year nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 169 C. 242, 243. Cited. 171 C. 47, 48. Cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Cited. 177 C. 335, 336, 342; id., 637, 639, 641.
Cited. 178 C. 549, 550; id., 634, 635. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Cited. 186 C. 179, 180. Cited. 188 C. 406, 407; id., 697, 702,
713. Cited. 190 C. 822, 823. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 617. Cited. 196 C. 430, 431. Cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Cited. Id., 190,
191. Cited. 199 C. 537, 538. Cited. 200 C. 586, 606. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. Id., 520, 521, 523. Cited. 206 C. 40,
53. Cited. Id., 685, 687, 709. Cited. 208 C. 365, 366. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673. Cited. 213 C. 388, 396. Cited. 231 C. 195, 196.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 12 CA 268. Cited. Id., 613. Cited. 20 CA 437. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. 27 CA 786,
787. Cited. 35 CA 740, 744. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 46 CA 486. Cited. Id., 691.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600-602. Cited. 179 C. 328, 329, 338. Cited. 180 C. 565. Cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 460. Cited. 187 C. 681,
683. Cited. 188 C. 406, 415. Cited. 190 C. 327, 329. Cited. 191 C. 604, 605. Cited. 192 C. 166, 167. Cited. 197 C. 485,
486. Cited. 198 C. 314, 315. Cited. 199 C. 537, 550. Cited. 200 C. 586, 588. Cited. 202 C. 520, 523. Cited. 238 C. 784.
There is neither any time requirement for the restraint, nor any distance requirement for the asportation to constitute
the crime of kidnapping. 1 CA 697, 708. By its plain terms, subsec. gives fair warning to the public that if a person abducts
another he is guilty of that offense. 83 CA 142.
Sec. 53a-94a. Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm: Class B felony:
Three years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree
with a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the second degree, as provided in section
53a-94, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of or uses or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a
pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the second degree and kidnapping in the second degree with a
firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for
both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm is a class B felony for which
three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 10; P.A. 92-260, S. 37; P.A. 93-148, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one
year to three years the length of the nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 188 C. 697, 699, 713. Cited. 200 C. 523, 524. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673, 677-679.
Cited. 9 CA 648, 649. Cited. 46 CA 741.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 210 C. 110, 114. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-95. Unlawful restraint in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under
circumstances which expose such other person to a substantial risk of physical injury.
(b) Unlawful restraint in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 97; P.A. 92-260, S. 38.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "the latter" with "such other person".
Cited. 171 C. 395, 397. Cited. 182 C. 353, 354; id., 366, 367, 382. Cited. 187 C. 216, 217; id., 348, 349. Cited. 191 C.
604, 616, 617. Cited. 194 C. 297, 298. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254, 265. Cited. 197 C. 298, 299. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited.
198 C. 430. Cited. 199 C. 193, 194. Cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Cited. 201 C. 659, 660. Cited. 202 C. 676, 677. Cited. 205 C. 352,
353. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 223 C. 180, 182. Cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Cited. 226 C. 601,
603. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 237 C. 284, 309. Cited. 242 C. 689.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 375. Cited. 5 CA 424, 425. Cited. Id., 586, 587, 590. Cited. 6 CA 334, 335. Cited. 7 CA 701, 702.
Cited. 8 CA 620, 621. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Cited. 13
CA 554-556. Cited. 17 CA 234, 236. Cited. Id., 339, 340, 343. Specific intent required. Id. Cited. Id., 391, 392. Cited. Id.,
490, 491. Cited. 22 CA 477, 478. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 20,
21. Cited. Id., 312, 314. Cited. 36 CA 805, 807. Cited. 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 701, 702. Cited. 42 CA 78. Cited.
Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Cited. 43 CS 211, 212.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 174 C. 500, 501; 176 C. 227, 228. Cited. 179 C. 381, 382. Cited. 185 C. 211, 212. Cited. 186 C. 599, 600. Cited.
190 C. 104, 105. Cited. 197 C. 50-52. Cited. Id., 602, 603. Cited. 198 C. 430-432, 434, 435. Cited. Id., 598, 600. Cited.
Id., 617, 618. Cited. 205 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 61, 63. Cited. Id., 437, 439. Cited. Id., 528, 531. Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43,
53, 54. Cited. 209 C. 143, 145. Cited. 222 C. 87, 88. Cited. 227 C. 32, 49. Cited. Id., 153, 155. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114.
Cited. 241 C. 784. Cited. 242 C. 523.
Cited. 6 CA 697, 698. Cited. 8 CA 387, 388. Cited. Id., 491, 493. Cited. Id., 566, 567. Cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Cited. Id.,
208, 209. Cited. 13 CA 667, 668. Cited. 14 CA 710, 712. Cited. 18 CA 134, 137. Cited. Id., 730, 731. Cited. 19 CA 631,
633. Cited. 21 CA 244, 245. Cited. Id., 467, 468. Cited. 25 CA 725, 726. Cited 26 CA 574, 575. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited.
31 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 312, 329. Cited. 32 CA 178, 179. Cited. 38 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 777, 785. Cited. 39 CA 45,
46. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Cited. Id., 832, 833. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257, 279. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. Id., 817, 818. Cited.
42 CA 78. Cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 715. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint is not double jeopardy.
47 CA 117.
Sec. 53a-96. Unlawful restraint in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the second degree when he restrains another
person.
(b) Unlawful restraint in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 98.)
Cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 618. Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Cited. 206 C. 100, 102. Cited. 211 C. 672,
678. Cited. 224 C. 397, 400. Cited. 231 C. 195, 196.
Cited. 9 CA 656, 657. Cited. 19 CA 396, 397. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498.
Cited. 46 CA 486.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600. Cited. 197 C. 413, 415. Cited. Id., 602, 603.
Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 285.
Sec. 53a-97. Custodial interference in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A
person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree when he commits custodial
interference in the second degree as provided in section 53a-98: (1) Under circumstances
which expose the child or person taken or enticed from lawful custody or the child held
after a request by the lawful custodian for his return to a risk that his safety will be
endangered or his health materially impaired; or (2) by taking, enticing or detaining the
child or person out of this state.
(b) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 99; P.A. 81-280, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 39; P.A. 95-206, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a) by including in Subdiv. (1) risk to a child held after a request by the lawful
custodian for his return; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 95-206 amended Subsec. (a) by classifying
the detention of a child or person out of this state as a violation of custodial interference in the first degree.
Cited. 182 C. 353, 355. Cited. 226 C. 652, 661, 663, 666, 668. Joint custodian is not inherently immune from criminal
prosecution under section solely on basis of his or her status as a joint custodian. 251 C. 656.
Cited. 34 CS 219, 221.
Sec. 53a-98. Custodial interference in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree when: (1)
Being a relative of a child who is less than sixteen years old and intending to hold such
child permanently or for a protracted period and knowing that he has no legal right to
do so, he takes or entices such child from his lawful custodian; (2) knowing that he has
no legal right to do so, he takes or entices from lawful custody any incompetent person
or any person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution;
or (3) knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he holds, keeps or otherwise refuses
to return a child who is less than sixteen years old to such child's lawful custodian after
a request by such custodian for the return of such child.
(b) Custodial interference in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 100; P.A. 81-280, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) concerning the failure to return a child to his lawful
custodian after a request by the custodian for the child's return.
Cited. 226 C. 652, 661, 664, 666, 668.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 652, 664.
Sec. 53a-99. Substitution of children: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of
substitution of children when, having been temporarily entrusted with a child less than
one year old and, intending to deceive a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of
such child, he substitutes, produces or returns to such parent, guardian or custodian a
child other than the one entrusted.
(b) Substitution of children is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 101.)
PART VIII*
BURGLARY, CRIMINAL TRESPASS, ARSON,
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Burglary:
Annotations to former section 53-68:
Burglary must be charged to have been committed in night season. 16 C. 33. Larceny not merged in burglary. 24 C.
57. Taking of life to prevent a burglary justifiable. 31 C. 485. Error to charge that when building is left secure at night and
found early in morning broken open, presumption is that it was broken open at night. 35 C. 515. Entering with intent to
commit a felony and breaking out is burglary. 43 C. 493. Night season is when there is not enough daylight to discern
features of another. 47 C. 182; 108 C. 405. This crime is one involving moral turpitude. 121 C. 678. Cited. 132 C. 575;
147 C. 296; 153 C. 40. Definition of "nighttime" discussed. Id., 540, 542. Cited. 161 C. 283.
Cited. 23 CS 41; 25 CS 433; 26 CS 71; 27 CS 42. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective
sentence of not more than five years in reformatory for four counts of burglary under this section, in addition to counts of
breaking and entering, larceny and theft of motor vehicle, should stand. Id., 105-107.
Annotations to former section 53-69:
Evidence that person was armed when he emerged from house sufficient to prove that he was armed when burglary
was committed. 47 C. 181. Cited. 154 C. 302, 303; 160 C. 42.
Annotations to former section 53-71:
Essential elements of crime; evidence admissible. 96 C. 162; 97 C. 261; 146 C. 518. Cited. 153 C. 451. Burglars' tools
jettisoned by defendant while he was being observed by witness and found immediately on his apprehension at place of
crime, held properly admitted into evidence. 155 C. 463. Cited. 161 C. 371.
Discovery of burglar's tools sufficient to allow police to search without warrant. 25 CS 216. Cited. Id., 229; 27 CS
323. Requirement that accused prove lawful excuse for having burglar tools in his possession at night is unconstitutional
as defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty and burden of proof is on state. 28 CS 28.
Annotations to former section 53-73:
Cited. 153 C. 540, 541 (fn). Evidence that defendant, immediately after his niece's house was robbed, had bills on his
person in denomination of those stolen and a cut on his wrist, when entry had been made by breaking glass, and had been
seen on premises before the entry, held ample grounds for conviction on trial by jury. 155 C. 297. It must be established
that crime took place in daytime in order to convict defendant. 161 C. 283. Cited. Id., 303.
Cited. 4 CS 260; 27 CS 65. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective sentence of not
more than five years in reformatory for four counts of violations under this section, in addition to counts of burglary,
larceny and theft of a motor vehicle, should stand. Id., 105-107. Review of sentence. Id., 124-126. Cited. 29 CS 471.
Annotation to former section 53-74:
Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. No legal distinction
between direct or circumstantial evidence so far as its probative force is concerned. 158 C. 124.
Annotations to former section 53-75:
Cited. 153 C. 540, 541 (fn). Trial court properly determined as matter of law that breaking and entering locked fur
storage vault within store otherwise open to public was breaking and entering of building. 156 C. 391.
Cited. 27 CS 392.
Garage held to be a "building ... used as place for the custody of property" within meaning of this statute. 3 Conn. Cir.
Ct. 276. Conviction based on identification by witness who observed defendant after crime at request of police officers
upheld. Rulings in
U. S. v. Wade (388 U. S. 318) and
Gilbert v. California (388 U. S. 263) not retroactive. 5 Conn. Cir.
Ct. 172.
Annotations to former section 53-76:
If one confederate gets inside without breaking and entering and opens door to others, all are guilty of breaking and
entering. 125 C. 213. History of statutes concerning burglary. 132 C. 576. Statute may apply to building partly occupied
as dwelling if it is also occupied for custody of certain property. Id., 579. Cited. 143 C. 559; 149 C. 643, 644; 150 C. 489;
152 C. 627, 633; 153 C. 451; id., 540, 541 (fn). Defendant's appeal from admission in evidence of burglary tools found
immediately after he was observed disposing of them denied as trier of facts could have reasonably determined that articles
were in his possession. 155 C. 463. Jury could have inferred from circumstantial evidence that some part of defendant's
body had entered building. Codefendant's statement that he dropped defendant off at premises and half hour later picked
him up was admissible only as to codefendant. 156 C. 378. Motion to suppress evidence obtained after search of defendant's
person on his arrest for disorderly conduct denied. 157 C. 485. Cited. 158 C. 322; 159 C. 434; 161 C. 283; 371; 404. Cited.
162 C. 442. Cited. 165 C. 163. Cited. 166 C. 81, 83.
Discussion of maximum sentence. 17 CS 367. Cited. 19 CS 267; 22 CS 270; 23 CS 5; id., 41; id., 355; 25 CS 451, 454,
457; id., 489; 26 CS 464; 27 CS 42; id., 65; id., 149; id., 237; id., 244; 27 CS 271; 27 CS 285; id., 290; 27 CS 318; 322;
323; id., 341; id., 347; id., 392. Term of not less than three years nor more than four years on basis of fourth felony conviction
was fair and just after conviction under this section. Id., 371. Cited. 29 CS 471.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 553; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 275; 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 530.
Annotations to former section 53-77:
Cited. 19 CS 267. Defendant found guilty hereunder and sentenced to indefinite term in state reformatory resentenced
to term not to exceed two years. 28 CS 132.
In trial for offense under this statute, court held it not mandatory to order mistrial when, on poll of jury, one juror
announced verdict contrary to that announced by foreman. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 153.
Annotations to former section 53-78:
History and construction of this statute. 125 C. 214. Cited. 132 C. 575. Cited. 166 C. 81, 83.
Annotation to former section 53-80:
Cited. 27 CS 244.
Arson:
Annotations to former section 53-82:
Burning of schoolhouse is arson. 2 R. 516; but see 10 C. 145. A barn eighteen rods from dwelling house and separated
by highway not subject of arson at common law; 6 C. 48; but otherwise under Sec. 53-83. 109 C. 31. That building is
property of another must be alleged and proved. 12 C. 489. An unfinished dwelling not subject of arson at common law.
20 C. 247. House burned should be described as house occupied. 29 C. 344; 63 C. 331. Charge of burning with intent to
defraud insurance company. 105 C. 117; id., 328. State need not prove legal corporate existence of insurance company.
45 C. 273. Evidence reviewed and held sufficient to warrant conviction. 105 C. 117; id., 333. Proofs of loss submitted to
insurance company admissible though made by accused after fire. 105 C. 122. Motive need not be proved; and, while
malice is an essential ingredient of crime of arson, it does not require ill-will but merely deliberation and action without
justification or excuse; so, conviction sustained where accused set fire for excitement it would produce. 107 C. 631.
Dwelling is "burned" if the slightest portion is burned or charred as distinguished from being merely smoked or discolored.
Id., 633. Conviction of accessory to arson. 109 C. 394. Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction. 136 C. 201. Cited.
149 C. 25; 150 C. 169. In re latter case, conviction affirmed; proof of voluntariness of confession prerequisite to its
admissibility if made during illegal detention. 151 C. 246. See 371 U. S. 471.
Annotations to former section 53-83:
Evidence held sufficient to warrant conclusion that defendant set fire wilfully and maliciously. 137 C. 179; 149 C. 25;
150 C. 171; 156 C. 328. Cited. 163 C. 176.
Annotations to former section 53-85:
Plea of nolo contendere for attempted arson, which was subsequently nolled, held bar to prosecution of arson as violation
of double jeopardy. 25 CS 96. The two offenses need not be identical in nature, a similarity being sufficient. Id.
Annotation to former section 53-86:
State need not prove legal corporate existence of insurance company. 45 C. 273.
Trespass and injury to property:
Annotations to former section 53-45:
See Sec. 1-1 for definition of "public buildings". Complaint must set out with particularity the "injury". 62 C. 131.
"Wilfully" means in a spirit of wantonness or with an evil intent or guilty purpose. 71 C. 742. An amendatory act is
presumed not to change the existing law further than is expressly declared or necessarily implied. The word "deface" was
removed from statute and only the word "injury" left. Painting a swastika on building held to be an injury. 149 C. 577,
579. Reversed, 375 U. S. 85. (a) Cited. 153 C. 599.
Cited. 22 CS 203.
Annotation to former section 53-81:
Cited. 27 CS 244.
Evidence of witness who on trial contradicted his prior written statements and testimony by defendant held sufficient
to sustain judgment of defendant's guilt. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 423.
Annotations to former section 53-103:
Cited. 124 C. 313; 319 U. S. 147.
Conviction under this statute not admissible to impeach witness's credibility. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 389. Comparison of this
section and Sec. 53-108 in regard to phrase "without right" in former and absence in latter. Id., 524, 532. Whether proof
of scienter is essential is matter of legislative intent. No proof of specific intent to commit crime of trespass needed under
this section. Id. That defendant thought he had lawful right to be where he was does not negate his trespass; honest mistake
of law does not excuse him from consequences of his act. Id.
Annotation to former section 53-105:
Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536.
Annotation to former section 53-107:
Owner of garden upon which fowls of another trespassed is liable in damages for spreading poison thereon and killing
fowls; force used to repel such trespass must be reasonable; notice to owner of fowls of intent to spread poison no defense.
14 C. 1.
Annotations to former section 53-108:
It is no defense that defendant entered upon lands, etc., for purpose of fishing without guilty intent. 60 C. 229. Cited.
125 C. 214. Prima facie evidence discussed. 148 C. 481.
Comparison of this section and Sec. 53-103 in regard to presence of phrase "without right" in latter and its absence
here. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 524, 532.
Annotations to former section 53-124:
Former statute cited. 66 C. 568; 141 C. 731.
Annotations to former section 53-126:
Cited. 145 C. 124. Cited. 162 C. 53.
Cited. 23 CS 216, 218; 24 CS 378; 27 CS 347. Balance of sentence of defendant suspended by review division where
he had not been represented by counsel at time sentence was imposed and his damage to landlord's property was not more
than one hundred and twenty-five dollars. Id., 387.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 136; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 476.
Annotations to former section 53-127:
Cited. 72 C. 470; 73 C. 117.
Annotation to former section 53-197:
Cited. 23 CS 43.
Sec. 53a-100. Definitions. (a) The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Building" in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any watercraft, aircraft,
trailer, sleeping car, railroad car or other structure or vehicle or any building with a valid
certificate of occupancy. Where a building consists of separate units, such as, but not
limited to separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, any unit not occupied by the
actor is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate building; (2) "dwelling"
means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether
or not a person is actually present; (3) "night" means the period between thirty minutes
after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise.
(b) The following definition is applicable to sections 53a-101 to 53a-106, inclusive:
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises, at the
time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when the actor is not
otherwise licensed or privileged to do so.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 102; P.A. 74-186, S. 10, 12; P.A. 79-570, S. 7; P.A. 92-260, S. 40.)
History: P.A. 74-186 included railroad cars in definition of "building"; P.A. 79-570 included buildings "with a valid
certificate of occupancy" in definition of "building"; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in definition of "building".
Cited. 191 C. 180, 184, 185. Cited. 195 C. 598, 601, 603, 606. Cited. Id., 611, 613. Cited. 209 C. 322, 342, 343. Cited.
210 C. 199, 203, 206. Cited. 216 C. 367, 379, 384.
"... failure of the court to define the phrase 'enters unlawfully,' misled the jury ...". 6 CA 24, 25, 28, 30, 31. Cited. 30
CA 95, 107; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 714, 723-726. Cited. 44 CA 62.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 542, 553. Subdiv. (2) cited. 209 C. 322, 342, 343. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 199, 205, 206.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 218 C. 273, 274, 277-280. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 708. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 523. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 119, 126. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 440, 443, 444. Cited. 34 CA 823, 824. Subdiv. (3) cited.
38 CA 231, 236. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 1, 4. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 488. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Although it is true that
the crime of burglary in the second degree requires the element of a "dwelling" as opposed to "building," our statutes
define "dwelling" as a type of building "which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a
person is actually present ...." 76 CA 779. An individual apartment, within an apartment home, while a dwelling, also is
a separate building. Id. Subdiv. (1): Under the ordinary definition of a "building", one's home is clearly a building. 78
CA 610.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 210 C. 199, 203, 206, 207. Cited. 216 C. 367, 379, 380.
Cited. 8 CA 528, 540. Cited. 19 CA 179, 188, 192. Cited. 24 CA 563, 571. Cited. 39 CA 1, 4. Cited. 42 CA 507.
Defendant's presence in an apartment that was not his own, his attempts to evade police and his flight were sufficient
evidence from which jury could infer that he had entered apartment unlawfully. 66 CA 357. Restaurant was not open to
the public at time defendant entered and management office was a separate area not open to public and defendant was not
licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon premises. 74 CA 607.
Sec. 53a-101. Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty
of burglary in the first degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with
intent to commit a crime therein and: (1) He is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon
or dangerous instrument, or (2) in the course of committing the offense, he intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone.
(b) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing" the offense if it occurs in
an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission.
(c) Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty
under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 103; P.A. 80-442, S. 21, 28.)
History: P.A. 80-442 specified in Subsec. (c) that five years of imposed sentence may not be suspended or reduced
when person is guilty under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981.
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 172 C. 74, 75. Cited. 174 C. 500, 506. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500, 509. Cited. 205 C. 456, 463,
467. Cited. 210 C. 199. Cited. 216 C. 563, 565. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 227 C. 32, 48. Cited.
229 C. 691, 694.
1 CA 724, 725, 735. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. 19 CA 245, 254, 255. Cited. 24 CA 563, 568. Cited.
29 CA 704, 705, 712. Cited. 30 CA 416, 418, 424. Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 714, 726. Cited. 46 CA 118. There
was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that defendants took steak knives to arm themselves during the burglary and
thus committed burglary in the first degree. 52 CA 149.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 170 C. 162. Cited. 174 C. 500, 501. Subdiv. (1) cited. 175 C. 398, 399. Subdiv. (1): Presence of a
tire iron used to break into an apartment is insufficient by itself to satisfy statutory definition in section 53a-3(7) to support
finding of attempted burglary in first degree; potential for injury considered only in conjunction with circumstances of
actual or threatened use. 177 C. 140, 141, 146. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 564, 565; 180 C. 481, 482; id., 557, 560. Subdiv.
(2): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599, 600. Cited. 182 C. 366, 367, 382. Subdiv. (1) cited. 185 C. 211,
212, Subdiv. (2) cited. 186 C. 599, 600. Subdiv. (1) cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 574, 576; 189 C. 383,
384, 398. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 611, 612. Cited. Id., 611, 625, 627, 628. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C. 104, 105. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 496, 497, 500, 505-509. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 496, 507, 509. Subdiv. (2) cited. 194 C. 241, 244. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 196 C. 157, 158, 169. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 225-227. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 413, 415. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C.
62, 63. Subdiv. (1) cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Cited. Id., 586, 596. Subdiv. (1) cited. 203 C. 159, 160. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C.
714, 716. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 485, 486. Cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210
C. 199, 200. Cited. Id., 199, 203, 205-207. Subdiv. (2) cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 282, 284. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (1) cited. 217 C. 419, 420; 219 C. 269, 271; 221 C. 430, 431. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.; Id.,
447, 449; Id., 685, 687. Subdiv. (1) cited. 223 C. 41, 42. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 243, 245, 257, 263, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 99, 301. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 524, 526. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 32, 48. Cited. Id., 616, 622. Subdiv. (1) cited.
228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 455, 457. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 802, 804.
Cited. 241 C. 702. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 784. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 445. Cited. Id., 523. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id. Utility room in rear of gas station convenience store in which defendant sexually assaulted and murdered
victim, being a separate room and structurally distinct from the convenience store that could be reached only through gas
station's garage bay area and not open to the public, reasonably could have been found to be a separate "building" under
statute. 252 C. 274.
Cited. 6 CA 667-669, 674, 675. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 667, 670, 675. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 667, 670, 675. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 697, 698. Cited. Id., 701, 706. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 631, 632. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 208, 209. Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 176. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA
662, 663. Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 554-556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 14 CA 67, 68. Subdiv. (1) cited. id., 657, 658. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 15 CA 342, 343. Subdiv. (2) cited. 16 CA 184, 186. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 318, 319. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 455, 456.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 391, 392. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 179-181, 187. Cited. Id., 179, 192. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 245-
247, 250, 253-255. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 244, 245. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 692, 693.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 556, 557, 559. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 556, 559. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 563, 565, 567, 569. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 563, 567, 569. Cited. Id., 563, 568. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 428-430. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 565-567. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 26 CA 641, 642. Subdiv. (2) cited. 27 CA 73, 75; Id., 786, 787; Id., 794, 795. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 402, 403.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 704, 705, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited.
31 CA 312, 313, 327. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35
CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 774, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited 38 CA 481, 482. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited.
39 CA 45, 50. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 45, 46, 51. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Cited. 41 CA 255, 273. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 255, 257, 276, 277. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 255, 270, 276. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 317, 318. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 817,
818, 825. Cited. Id., 817, 825. Subdiv. (2) cited. 42 CA 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 307. Cited. 45 CA 187. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 261. Direct evidence of an entry is not required when evidence is such that the trier of fact
reasonably could infer that something the defendant did inside the building could not have been done without first entering
the building. 78 CA 646.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 190 C. 496, 509.
Cited. 29 CA 704, 711.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. 19 CA 245, 255. Cited. 30 CA 416, 418.
Sec. 53a-102. Burglary in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is
guilty of burglary in the second degree when such person (1) enters or remains unlawfully
in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein, or (2) enters or remains
unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually
present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein.
(b) Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 104; P.A. 01-83, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 01-83 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, designate existing
provisions re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein as Subdiv. (1)
and add Subdiv. (2) re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime
is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein.
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. Id., 556, 567. Cited. 175 C. 315. Cited. 184 C. 258, 259. Instruction
characterizing burglary as a crime against the person likely to involve danger to life was not in error. 188 C. 542, 553.
Cited. Id., 715, 716. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited. 195 C. 611, 612. Cited. 197 C. 574, 575, 581. Cited. 198 C. 671, 672.
Cited. 204 C. 1-3. Cited. 205 C. 456, 463, 467. Cited. 215 C. 257, 259. Cited. 216 C. 273, 274. Cited. 220 C. 417, 426.
Cited. 229 C. 285, 287. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Cited. 242 C. 523. Cited. Id., 689.
Cited. 5 CA 113, 114. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 9 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 349-351. Cited. Id., 656, 657. Cited. 11 CA
575, 576, 583. Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 34, 57. Cited. 16 CA 333, 334. Cited. 19 CA
396, 397, 401. Cited. 20 CA 369, 370. Cited. Id., 586, 587. Cited. 23 CA 201, 202. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803, 812; judgment
reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 94, 103. Cited. Id., 370, 376. Cited. 34 CA 599, 600, 606. Cited. 35 CA 714,
726. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 231, 236. Cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited. 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 169, 170. Cited.
Id., 255, 277. The crime proscribed by section is complete once there has been an unlawful entering or remaining in a
dwelling, at night, with intent to commit a crime in that dwelling. 76 CA 779.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 181 C. 172, 173, 177. Cited. 182 C. 207, 208. Cited. 188 C. 542, 543. Cited. 189 C. 631, 633. Cited. 190 C. 440,
442. Cited. 199 C. 88, 89. Cited. 200 C. 523, 525, 538. Cited. 202 C. 676, 677. Cited. 204 C. 377, 378. Cited. 205 C. 456,
459. Cited. 214 C. 493, 495. Cited. 216 C. 699, 701. Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. 223 C. 635, 637, 638. Cited. 241 C. 784.
Cited. 1 CA 260, 262. Cited. 6 CA 697. Cited. 14 CA 710, 712, 715. Cited. 21 CA 260, 261. Cited. 23 CA 564, 565;
judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803; judgment reversed, see
229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 606, 607. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371, 376. Cited. 35 CA 262, 263. Cited 36 CA 774, 775.
Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 231, 232. Cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited. Id., 643, 645. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257. Cited. 42 CA
78. Defendant's right to fair trial and unanimous verdict not violated when court made it clear that the jury had to find
each element of crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt and there was ample evidence to support conviction under both
alternate theories of liability. 59 CA 305.
Sec. 53a-102a. Burglary in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony:
One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree with
a firearm when he commits burglary in the second degree as provided in section 53a-102, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the
use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of
burglary in the second degree and burglary in the second degree with a firearm upon
the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such
offenses upon the same information.
(b) Burglary in the second degree with a firearm is a class C felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 11; P.A. 76-435, S. 4, 68, 82; P.A. 92-260, S. 41.)
History: P.A. 76-435 made technical corrections, adding simple burglary in the second degree in Subsec. (a) and
specifying in Subsec. (b) that burglary in second degree with a firearm is a Class C, rather than Class B, felony; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 188 C. 697, 699. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited. 199 C. 255, 275.
Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-103. Burglary in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of burglary in the third degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with
intent to commit a crime therein.
(b) Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 105.)
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 173 C. 317, 318. Cited. 174 C. 253, 254. Cited. 176 C. 299, 300. Cited. 182 C. 52, 53; id.,
176, 177; id., 242, 243. Cited. 183 C. 225; id., 444, 445. Cited. 184 C. 95, 96; id., 215, 216; id., 369, 377. Cited. 186 C.
648, 649. Cited. 187 C. 6, 8; id., 292, 293; id., 444, 447. Cited. 189 C. 364; id., 717, 718. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited.
191 C. 146; id., 180, 182, 185. Cited. 193 C. 35-37. Cited. 194 C. 198, 199, 204, 205. Cited. Id., 210. Cited. Id., 213, 214.
Cited. Id., 361, 362. Cited. Id., 438, 439. Cited. Id., 623, 624. Cited. 196 C. 185. Cited. 197 C. 247, 261. Cited. 198 C. 1,
2. Cited. 199 C. 30-32. Cited. Id., 308, 309. Cited. 202 C. 615, 617. Cited. 216 C. 814. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275-277. Cited.
219 C. 489, 491. Cited. 220 C. 417, 418, 429. Cited. 223 C. 731, 733. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458, 459. Cited. 235 C. 679, 682.
Cited. 237 C. 390, 392. Cited. 239 C. 235. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 2 CA 537, 538. Cited. 3 CA 132, 133. Cited. Id., 359, 362. Cited. Id., 503. Cited. 5 CA 599, 600, 604. Cited. 6
CA 24, 25. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. 8 CA 478, 479, 481, 490. Cited. 9 CA 141, 142, 144. Cited. 10 CA 258, 259. Cited.
Id., 279, 280. Cited. Id., 447, 448, 451. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. 11 CA 805. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3, 19. Cited. Id., 196, 197.
Cited. Id., 375, 376, 383. Cited. 13 CA 214, 215. Cited. Id., 220, 221. Cited. 14 CA 119, 120, 126. Cited. Id., 526, 527.
Cited. 16 CA 184. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 18 CA 368, 369. Cited. 19 CA 48, 50, 52, 60. Cited. 20 CA 205, 207. Cited.
Id., 721, 722. Cited. 22 CA 440, 441. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited. Id., 151, 152. Cited. Id., 201, 202. Cited. 24 CA 295,
296. Cited. 25 CA 503, 505. Cited. 30 CA 190, 192. Cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq.
Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 405, 406, 409, 412, 420. Cited. Id., 714, 716, 726. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. Id.,
364, 372, 373. Cited. 37 CA 40, 42. Cited. Id., 228, 229, 231, 234. Cited. 38 CA 225, 226. Cited. Id., 481, 482. Cited. 39
CA 1, 2, 4. Cited. Id., 579, 580, 599. Cited. 42 CA 507. Cited. 44 CA 162. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Cited. 33 CS 706. Cited. Id., 750. Cited. 38 CS 407.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 177 C. 140, 147. Cited. 181 C. 254, 255. Cited. 184 C. 369, 370. Cited. 189 C. 461, 462. Cited. 191 C. 180, 181,
184. Cited. 194 C. 213, 216. Cited. Id., 665, 666, 672, 675. Cited. 197 C. 247, 248. Cited. 198 C. 369, 370. Cited. 212 C.
50, 52. Cited. 218 C. 447-449.
Cited. 4 CA 514. Cited. 6 CA 24, 25. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 75, 76. Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. Id., 528, 540.
Cited. 9 CA 121, 122. Cited. 10 CA 279, 280. Cited. Id., 503, 511. Cited. 13 CA 438, 439. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment
reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Cited. 15 CA 531, 532. Cited. 17 CA 490, 492. Cited. 22 CA 440, 443. Cited. 23 CA 151,
155. Cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 405, 412.
Cited. Id., 699, 700. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. 37 CA 40, 42. Cited. Id., 228, 229, 233. Cited. 38 CA 225, 226. Cited.
Id., 481, 482. Cited. 39 CA 579, 594. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 184 C. 369, 377.
Sec. 53a-103a. Burglary in the third degree with a firearm: Class D felony:
One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree with
a firearm when he commits burglary in the third degree as provided in section 53a-103,
and in the commission of such offense, he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of burglary
in the third degree and burglary in the third degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the
same information.
(b) Burglary in the third degree with a firearm is a class D felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 12.)
Cited. 177 C. 335, 336; id., 637, 639. Cited. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500.
Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 14 CA 710, 717. Cited. 28 CA 369, 370. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 219 C. 93, 95.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-104. Affirmative defense to burglary. It shall be an affirmative defense
to prosecution for burglary that the building was abandoned.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 106.)
Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Sec. 53a-105. Conviction for burglary and other offense authorized, when.
Section 53a-105 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 107; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
Sec. 53a-106. Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools when
he manufactures or has in his possession any tool, instrument or other thing adapted,
designed or commonly used for advancing or facilitating offenses involving unlawful
entry into premises, or offenses involving forcible breaking of safes or other containers
or depositories of property, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the commission of an offense of such
character.
(b) Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 108; P.A. 92-260, S. 42.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the name of the offense.
Cited. 181 C. 172, 180. Cited. 182 C. 242, 243, 250.
Cited. 5 CA 599, 600, 604. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 11 CA 805. Cited. 28 CA 369, 370. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726. Cited.
37 CA 228, 229.
Cited. 33 CS 706.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 182 C. 366, 367, 382.
Cited. 5 CA 599, 606.
Sec. 53a-107. Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a)
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when: (1) Knowing that such
person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains in a building
or any other premises after an order to leave or not to enter personally communicated
to such person by the owner of the premises or other authorized person; or (2) such
person enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a restraining
order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section
46b-38c, 54-1k or 54-82r by the Superior Court; or (3) such person enters or remains
in a building or any other premises in violation of a foreign order of protection, as
defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person, after notice and
an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, in a case involving the
use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person.
(b) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 109; P.A. 80-58; P.A. 91-381, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 43; P.A. 95-214, S. 4; P.A. 99-240, S. 5; P.A.
03-98, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 80-58 added Subdiv. (2) in Subsec. (a) specifying that entering or remaining in building or other premises
in violation of a restraining order is criminal trespass in the first degree; P.A. 91-381 amended Subsec. (a) by adding
"pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-38c" after "issued"; P.A. 92-260 made
technical changes in Subsec. (a) by replacing references to "such person" with "he" or "him" as appropriate; P.A. 95-214
amended Subsec. (a) to include in Subdiv. (2) a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-1k; P.A. 99-240 amended
Subsec. (a) to include in Subdiv. (2) a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-82r and to make provisions gender
neutral; P.A. 03-98 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re entry or remaining in a building or other premises in
violation of a foreign order of protection.
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 204 C. 441, 442.
Cited. 12 CA 172, 173, 175, 177, 178. Cited. 18 CA 303, 310. Cited. 19 CA 245, 254, 255. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606,
607. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726. Cited. 43 CA 1. Conviction reversed; evidence was insufficient to
convict defendant under section. 55 CA 475.
Word "owner" must be given broad meaning so statute serves its legislative purpose to protect any possessor of land
from unwanted intrusions; proof of title not essential element. 35 CS 555, 556, 558, 559. Cited. 37 CS 853.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 647, 649. Subdiv. (2) cited. 236 C. 342, 343.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 24, 25; 12 CA 258, 261. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 303, 304, 306; 19 CA 245, 249, 250, 253,
254. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 45, 46. Cited. 35 CA 262, 263, 267. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 262, 267. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 448, 449; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342 et seq.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 19 CA 245, 255.
Sec. 53a-108. Criminal trespass in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when, knowing that he
is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in a building.
(b) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 110.)
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 215 C. 257, 259. Section not applicable based on defendant's
knowledge. 245 C. 657.
Cited. 12 CA 375, 383, 384. Cited. 19 CA 245, 256. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606, 607. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 24 CA
489. Cited. 31 CA 370, 376. Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 558. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 24 CA 541, 542. Cited. 31 CA 370, 376.
Sec. 53a-109. Criminal trespass in the third degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a)
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when, knowing that he is not
licensed or privileged to do so: (1) He enters or remains in premises which are posted
in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders,
or fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, or which
belong to the state and are appurtenant to any state institution; or (2) he enters or remains
in any premises for the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing.
(b) Criminal trespass in the third degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 111; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 20; P.A. 92-260, S. 44.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (2) in Subsec. (a) specifying that person's entering or remaining in premises for purpose
of hunting, trapping or fishing although he knows he is not licensed or privileged to do so is criminal trespass in the third
degree; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes and deleted redundant language in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 20 CA 599, 606, 607. Cited. 24 CA 195, 203. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 558.
Subsec. (a):
Evidence that defendant entered building by not using main entrance but instead forcing open a locked door labeled
with a no trespassing sign was sufficient to support conviction under section. 83 CA 377.
Sec. 53a-110. Affirmative defenses to criminal trespass. It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution for criminal trespass that: (1) The building involved in the
offense was abandoned; or (2) the premises, at the time of the entry or remaining, were
open to the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access
to or remaining in the premises; or (3) the actor reasonably believed that the owner of
the premises, or a person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him
to enter or remain, or that he was licensed to do so.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 112.)
Cited. 202 C. 86, 91. Cited. 215 C. 82, 101. Cited. Id., 257, 273.
Cited. 18 CA 303, 311. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606-608. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 563.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 215 C. 257, 273.
Sec. 53a-110a. Simple trespass: Infraction. (a) A person is guilty of simple trespass when, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters any premises
without intent to harm any property.
(b) Simple trespass is an infraction.
(P.A. 83-276, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 45.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Cited. 12 CA 258-262. Cited. 20 CA 599-608. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. 30 CA 45, 46, 50. Cited. 31 CA 370, 378.
Sec. 53a-110b. Transferred to Part XXI, Sec. 53a-223.
Sec. 53a-110c. Transferred to Part XXI, Sec. 53a-223a.
Sec. 53a-110d. Simple trespass of railroad property: Infraction. (a) A person
is guilty of simple trespass of railroad property when, knowing that such person is not
licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains on railroad property without
lawful authority or the consent of the railroad carrier.
(b) Simple trespass of railroad property is an infraction.
(P.A. 00-149, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-111. Arson in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of
arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined
in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and (1) the building is inhabited
or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; or (2) any other person is injured, either directly or indirectly; or (3) such fire or
explosion was caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant
loss; or (4) at the scene of such fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected
to a substantial risk of bodily injury.
(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 113; P.A. 79-570, S. 3; P.A. 80-229, S. 1; P.A. 82-290, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 79-570 restated Subsec. (a) in greater detail, replacing general language re actor's awareness that person
is in or near building or his lack of knowledge or indifference as to whether another is in or near building; P.A. 80-229
clarified Subsec. (a), adding reference to "building" definition of Sec. 53a-100 and replacing reference to peace officer's
or firefighter's closeness to building with reference to their being at the scene of a fire or explosion; P.A. 82-290 amended
Subsec. (a) to include fire or explosion caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds.
See also annotations to part V.
Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 174 C. 135, 136. Cited. 178 C. 67, 68. Cited. 194 C. 279, 281, 283-286. Cited. 197 C. 158,
162-164. Cited. 198 C. 92, 105. Cited. 200 C. 685, 686, 693. Cited. 204 C. 4, 5. Cited. Id., 769, 770. Cited. 210 C. 519-
521. Cited. 216 C. 678, 679. Cited. 219 C. 605, 606. Cited. 220 C. 796, 798. Cited. 222 C. 469, 470. Cited. 227 C. 829,
832. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681, 683. Cited. 236 C. 31, 33. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 828.
Cited. 8 CA 581, 597. Cited. 12 CA 32, 34. Cited. 35 CA 527, 528. Cited. Id., 714, 715, 717, 724. Cited. 36 CA 454,
456-458. Cited. 40 CA 789, 791. Cited. 46 CA 350. Provisions applicable to firefighters on truck injured in accident en
route to fire. Injuries not required to be substantial or foreseeable. 59 CA 507.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 183 C. 1, 2, 5. Subdiv. (1) cited. 187 C. 109, 111. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 513, 514. Subdiv. (1) cited.
191 C. 412, 413. Cited. Id., 636, 638, 645. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 1, 2. Cited. 200 C. 30, 31. Trial court's failure to
consider a suspended sentence violated equal protection because it resulted in a harsher penalty for a defendant who acted
with less culpable intent and caused a less serious result than arson murder. Id., 268, 279, 280. Cited. 202 C. 93, 98. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 204 C. 377, 378. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 769, 775-777, 785. Subdiv. (1) cited. 205 C. 201, 202. Cited. 207 C. 118,
120. Subdiv. (1) cited. 213 C. 161, 162. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 161, 162; Id., 752, 753; 215 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (2) cited.
216 C. 585-587, 595; 218 C. 747, 748. Subdiv. (4) cited. 219 C. 605, 606, 608, 615, 618, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 605,
606, 608, 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 221 C. 713, 715. Subdiv. (4) cited. 227 C. 1, 2, 6-12. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 1, 2, 6-
12, 16. Subdiv. (3) cited. 229 C. 10-12. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681. Subdiv. (4) cited. 240 C. 708. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 241 C. 57. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Motive not an ultimate issue or element of Sec. 53a-111(a)(4), therefore state is
not collaterally estopped from admitting evidence of insurance despite earlier acquittal of Sec. 53a-111(a)(3). Evidence
supported finding that firefighters were exposed to risk of substantial injury. 243 C. 282.
Cited. 10 CA 147, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 343, 344. Cited. 28 CA 9, 11. Subdiv. (4) cited. 30 CA 164, 165, 168,
179; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 164, 168; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10 et seq.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 823-826, 829. Subdiv. (3) cited. 36 CA 454-456. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 753,
755, 762. Subdiv. (3) cited. 37 CA 360, 369. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 39 CA 800, 801, 803, 805. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 800, 805. Defendant was not deprived of right to fair trial for violation of section because evidence was
sufficient to establish that she possessed requisite intent. Although the prosecutor improperly asked defendant to comment
on other witnesses' veracity, the questioning occurred just once and was not prejudicial; prosecutor's closing statements,
even if found improper, were isolated and not prejudicial. 75 CA 163. Jury instructions were proper. Id.