Sec. 53a-66. Lack of consent. Section 53a-66 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 67; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-67. Affirmative defenses. (a) In any prosecution for an offense under this
part based on the victim's being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this part, except an offense under section
53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, it shall be an affirmative defense
that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, living
together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal status
of their relationship.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 68; P.A. 75-619, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 3; P.A. 90-162.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed as affirmative defense the actor's belief that alleged
victim was above the specified age in cases where age is an element of offense unless victim is under fourteen, relettering
Subsec. (c) accordingly; P.A. 81-27 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70b;
P.A. 90-162 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a
or 53a-72b.
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 202 C. 86, 91.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388.
Subsec. (b):
Discussion of "cohabitation" and burden of producing evidence thereof for entitlement to a charge on the affirmative
defense under statute. 181 C. 426, 432-434. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191, 193, 195, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 739-741, 752. Cited.
233 C. 813, 850.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 730. Cited. 10 CA 709, 712, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 116. Sec. 53a-67(c) (Revised to 1972) cited. Id.
Cited. 25 CA 384, 389. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.
Secs. 53a-68 and 53a-69. Corroboration; exceptions. Time limitation for complaint. Sections 53a-68 and 53a-69 are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 69, 70; P.A. 74-131; P.A. 76-216; P.A. 87-223.)
Sec. 53a-70. Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony. (a) A person
is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another
person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or
a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a
third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person
or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such
other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older
than such person, or (3) commits sexual assault in the second degree as provided in
section 53a-71 and in the commission of such offense is aided by two or more other
persons actually present, or (4) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and
such other person is mentally incapacitated to the extent that such other person is unable
to consent to such sexual intercourse.
(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, sexual assault in
the first degree is a class B felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not
be suspended or reduced by the court or, if the victim of the offense is under ten years
of age, for which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced
by the court.
(2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the offense is a violation
of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the victim of the offense is under
sixteen years of age or the offense is a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of
this section. Any person found guilty under said subdivision (1) or (2) shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be
suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under ten years of age or of which
five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the
victim is under sixteen years of age.
(3) Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which
together constitute a sentence of at least ten years.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 71; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 19; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 78; P.A. 75-619, S. 3; P.A. 82-428, S. 2; P.A. 89-359;
P.A. 92-87, S. 3; P.A. 93-340, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 13; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 49; P.A. 00-161, S. 1; P.A. 02-138,
S. 5.)
History: 1971 act replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators in Subsec. (a) with numeric indicators; 1972 act changed
applicable age in Subsec. (a)(1) from twenty-one to eighteen reflecting lowered age of majority; P.A. 75-619 reworded
section to reflect changes in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, substituted sexual "assault" for sexual "misconduct" and made the
offense a Class B rather than Class D felony; P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that one year of sentence may
not be suspended or reduced by the court; P.A. 89-359 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (2) re engaging in sexual
intercourse with a person under thirteen years of age; P.A. 92-87 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re committing
sexual assault in the second degree while aided by two or more other persons actually present; P.A. 93-340 amended
Subsec. (a) by specifying in Subdiv. (2) that the actor be more than two years older than the other person; P.A. 95-142
amended Subsec. (b) to provide that ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if
the victim is under ten years of age; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one year to two years
the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence imposed when the victim is other than a victim under ten years of age and to
add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant
to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of at least ten years; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a) by adding
Subdiv. (4) re engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was formerly
classified as sexual assault in the second degree under Sec. 53a-71(a)(2) but was deleted from said section by same
public act; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re classification of offense and length of
nonsuspendable sentence as Subdiv. (1) and amending said Subdiv. to add exception re Subdiv. (2), adding new Subdiv.
(2) to classify the offense as a class A felony for a violation of Subsec. (a)(1) when the victim is under sixteen years of
age and for a violation of Subsec. (a)(2) and establish a nonsuspendable sentence for said violations of ten years if the
victim is under ten years of age and five years if the victim is under sixteen years of age and designating existing provisions
re minimum length of a combined sentence of imprisonment and special parole as Subdiv. (3).
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317; id., 398, 399. Repealed section 53a-72 cited. Id., 512, 513, 516. Cited. 182 C. 412, 413. Cited.
184 C. 258, 259. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52; id., 449, 450; id., 521, 522. Cited. 187 C. 216, 217, 218, 220, 221. Cited. 190 C.
20, 21. Cited. 191 C. 604, 615, 616. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 194 C. 114, 115. Cited. Id., 297, 298. Cited. Id., 692-
696, 698. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254. 265. Cited. 197 C. 280, 281. Cited. Id., 298, 299. "Does not include sexual intercourse
with a victim whom the assailant finds unconscious" but does not apply when assailant strangled victim into a state of
unconsciousness. 198 C. 53, 60, 61. Cited. Id., 190, 193. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 281, 282.
Cited. Id., 481, 494. Cited. Id., 693-695, 711. Cited. 200 C. 465, 466. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 659, 660. Cited.
202 C. 343, 344. Cited. Id., 676, 677. Cited. 204 C. 98, 99. Cited. Id., 441, 442. Cited. Id., 571, 572. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63.
Cited. 207 C. 646, 652. Cited. 209 C. 733, 735, 738-741, 743, 744, 747, 748, 750, 752-757. Cited. 210 C. 110, 117, 127,
128. Section not void for vagueness in context of circumstances of case. Id., 132-134, 136, 139, 143, 144. Cited. 211 C.
672, 674. Cited 212 C. 31, 33. Cited. 215 C. 257, 258. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, reversed. Id., 538,
542, 543. Cited. 219 C. 489, 491. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. Id., 345, 347, 348. Cited. 222 C. 556, 558. Cited. 223 C.
180-182. Cited. Id., 731, 733. Cited. 224 C. 397, 399, 403, 414. Cited. Id., 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452
et seq. Cited. 226 C. 601, 602, 610. Cited. Id., 618, 646. Cited. 227 C. 207, 209, 210. Cited. Id., 616, 623. Cited. Id., 677,
679. Cited. 228 C. 456, 458. Cited. 230 C. 43, 47. Cited. 235 C. 711, 713. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242
C. 409. Cited. Id., 689. Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when
alleged victim is compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the
mouth. 256 C. 517.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 345; id., 378, 379. Cited. Id., 724, 725, 735. Cited. 3 CA 148, 149. Cited. Id., 374, 375, 388. Cited.
Id., 650, 652. Cited. 5 CA 424, 425. Cited. Id., 556. Cited. Id., 586, 587, 589. Cited. 7 CA 257, 258, 261-263. Cited. Id.,
701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 44, 45. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 216, 218. Cited. Id., 345, 346. Cited. Id., 399. Cited. Id., 528,
529, 538. Cited. Id., 620, 621, 626. Cited. 10 CA 457, 458. Cited. Id., 520, 521. Cited. Id., 709, 711, 714. Court concluded
the absence of a marital relationship between defendant and victim is not an essential element. 11 CA 102, 112, 118. Cited.
Id., 236. Cited. Id., 238, 239. Cited. Id., 316, 319, 321. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 14 CA 333,
334. Cited. Id., 688, 693. Cited. 15 CA 251, 274. Cited. 16 CA 75, 76, 78, 80. Cited. 17 CA 391, 392. Cited. 18 CA 134,
135, 146. Cited. 19 CA 111, 116, 140, 142, 145. Cited. 20 CA 737, 738. Cited. 22 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 562, 563. Cited.
23 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 221, 222. Cited. Id., 564, 567; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 13,
14. Cited. Id., 24, 25. Cited. Id., 295, 296. Cited. 25 CA 334, 335. Cited. Id., 503, 505. Cited. Id., 653, 654; judgment
reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 151, 152. Cited. Id., 433, 434. Cited. Id., 674, 676, 678, 680. Cited. 28 CA
548, 551, 556. Cited. Id., 581, 583, 589, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 642, 643. Cited. 32
CA 773, 775. Cited. 34 CA 276, 278. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. Id., 754, 755. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. 38 CA
56, 60. Cited. Id., 777, 779. Cited. 39 CA 267, 268. Cited 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619, 620. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Cited. 44 CA 548. Cited. 46 CA 741. Intent or motive of sexual assault perpetrators, discussed. 47 CA 159. Age of victim
not an element of crime for which jury makes a factual determination but a sentencing factor determined by the courts. 74
CA 376. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual
intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447.
Because the necessary elements of this section and Sec. 53-21 are distinct, court's respective findings of not guilty and
guilty of these distinct crimes was not legally inconsistent. 78 CA 25.
Cited. 41 CS 229, 231, 232, 236. Cited 43 CS 46, 66, 67.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 179 C. 328, 329; 180 C. 101, 102; Id., 565. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 455. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 403. Cited. 186 C. 757, 758, 763, 766. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 372,
373. Cited. Id., 565, 566. Cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 697, 703, 713. Cited. 189 C. 106, 107; id., 611,
612, 625, 628-630; id., 631, 633. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 631, 645. Cited. 190 C. 104, 105, 108; id., 327, 329. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 440, 441. Cited. Id., 496, 498. Cited. 191 C. 604, 605. Subdiv. (1) cited. 192 C. 166, 167. Cited. 193 C. 457,
459. Cited. 194 C. 258, 259, 274. Cited. Id., 594, 595. Cited. Id., 692, 694, 696-698. Cited. 197 C. 50-52. Cited. Id., 485,
486. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54, 60. Cited. Id., 190, 191, 200. Cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 314, 315. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited.
Id., 430, 432. Cited. Id., 598, 600. Cited. Id., 617, 618. Cited. 199 C. 62, 63. Cited. Id., 399, 400. Cited. Id., 481, 482, 488.
Cited. 201 C. 559, 560. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 509-511, 514. Cited. 203 C. 385, 386. Cited. 204 C. 714, 716.
Cited. 206 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 132, 134, 151. Cited. Id., 437, 439. Cited. Id., 528, 531, 532. Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43.
Cited. 207 C. 646, 647. Cited. 209 C. 143-145. Cited. Id., 416-418. Cited. 210 C. 51, 53. Cited. Id., 110, 112, 115, 123,
127. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. Id., 359, 382. Cited. 211 C. 18, 20, 25. Cited. 212 C. 31-33. Cited. 213 C. 593, 602. Cited.
214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (2) Cited. Id., 717, 719. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, reversed. 215 C. 538, 540.
Cited. 216 C. 563, 565. Cited. 218 C. 447, 448. Cited. 219 C. 269, 271. Cited. Id., 283, 284. Cited. Id., 489, 510. Cited.
220 C. 400, 402. Cited. Id., 487, 489. Cited. Id., 698, 700. Cited. 221 C. 264, 265. Cited. 222 C. 87, 88. Cited. 223 C. 52,
53. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 450, 452. Cited. Id., 519, 520. Cited. 226 C. 601, 602, 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 601,
610, 611. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 611. Cited. Id., 618-620, 644. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 618, 644, 645, 649, 650. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 227 C. 616, 617, 619, 620, 624. Cited. Id., 616, 622. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 393, 395. Cited. Id., 456, 469.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 456, 469. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 456, 472. Cited. Id., 552, 554, 570. Cited. Id., 582, 584. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 756, 757. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 529, 530, 536. Cited. Id., 580, 581. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 580, 584, 586. Cited. 230 C. 43, 46, 47, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 195, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 707,
708. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 403, 409. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 145, 146. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 502, 517. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 659, 661. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 284-286. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 576. Cited. Id., 694. Cited. 241 C. 784. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 823. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 445. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 523. Medical treatment exception
to the hearsay rule applies to a child sexual assault victim's statements made to a social worker acting in the chain of
medical care if statements were made to obtain medical treatment and were pertinent to the treatment sought. 260 C. 1.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 346. Cited. Id., 724, 735. Cited. 4 CA 514. Cited. Id., 672. Cited. 7 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 489, 493.
Cited. Id., 653. Cited. 8 CA 35. Cited. Id., 148, 149. Cited. Id., 177, 178. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 528, 538, 539,
541. Cited. Id., 620, 625, 626. Cited. 9 CA 208, 209. Cited. Id., 340, 341. Cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Cited. Id., 709, 711, 712,
716, 717. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103, 110, 112. Cited. Id., 316, 320, 322, 323. Cited. Id., 673, 674. Cited. 13 CA 60, 61. Cited.
Id., 67. Cited. Id., 76, 85. Cited. 14 CA 40. Cited. Id., 451, 452. Cited. Id., 657, 658. Cited. Id., 688, 689, 692. Cited. Id.,
710, 712. Cited. 15 CA 222, 225. Cited. 16 CA 75, 80. Cited. 17 CA 525, 526. Cited. 18 CA 134, 135, 137. Cited. Id., 273,
274. Cited. Id., 643, 644. Cited. Id., 730. Cited. 19 CA 111, 116, 140; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id.,
618, 619. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. 20 CA 101, 102. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 737, 753. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412.
Cited. Id., 467, 468. Cited. 22 CA 329, 330. Cited. Id., 477, 478. Cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see
220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 243, 245, 251. Cited. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 653, 654; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et
seq. Cited. Id., 725, 726. Subdiv. (2) cited. 26 CA 81, 82. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 434,
436. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. 27 CA 279, 280. Cited. Id., 705, 706. Cited. 28 CA 91, 92. Cited. Id., 195, 196. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 360, 361, 363, 366; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 529 et seq. Cited. Id., 402, 404. Cited. Id., 581, 591;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 409, 414. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 724, 725. Cited. 30 CA 56. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 281, 282, 285, 287. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 915. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 178,
179. Cited. Id., 217, 218; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 217, 220; judgment reversed,
see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 485. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 773, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 184, 185;
judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Cited. Id., 457, 458. Cited. 34 CA 276, 278. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 173, 175.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 728-730. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 190, 191, 196, 202. Cited. Id., 216, 217.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 228, 229. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 56, 58.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 125, 126, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 231, 232. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
531, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777, 785, 790. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 45, 46. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 617, 618. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 832, 833. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 132. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 132, 133, 142,
146, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 233, 234. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 250, 252. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 204, 205. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 255, 257. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 287, 288, 296. Cited. Id., 317, 318. Cited. 42
CA 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 186; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 552.
Cited. Id., 680. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 715. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 785.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 457. Cited. Id., 548. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 66. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 116. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 756. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 810. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint
is not double jeopardy. 47 CA 117. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in commenting on testimony of state's expert
witness concerning inconsistencies in results of victim's rape kit tests, that court having also instructed jury to base findings
on recollection of all evidence presented; defendant's challenge to other aspects of instructions on scientific evidence were
not properly preserved for appellate review. Trial court properly admitted victim's written statement to police as constancy
of accusation evidence; defendant failed to establish that court abused its discretion or that he was prejudiced by admission
of that evidence, and his claim that victim's statement is admissible only if tape recorded was incorrect. 48 CA 135. Subdiv.
(1): Trier of fact reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant compelled victim to engage
in sexual intercourse by use of force. 52 CA 466. Subdiv. (1): Defendant could not succeed in argument that the evidence
did not support a guilty verdict under section; jury could reasonably have concluded that the facts and inferences established
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 55 CA 412. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. 57 CA 736. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 58 CA 585. Evidence was sufficient
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 CA 201.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 23 CA 564, 567; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq.
Sec. 53a-70a. Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony.
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree when such person
commits sexual assault in the first degree as provided in section 53a-70, and in the
commission of such offense (1) such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses
a deadly weapon, (2) with intent to disfigure the victim seriously and permanently, or
to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of the victim's body,
such person causes such injury to such victim, (3) under circumstances evincing an
extreme indifference to human life such person recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a risk of death to the victim, and thereby causes serious physical injury to such
victim, or (4) such person is aided by two or more other persons actually present. No
person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and aggravated sexual
assault in the first degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged
and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony or, if the victim
of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class A felony. Any person found guilty
under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of
the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, except that, if
such person committed sexual assault in the first degree by violating subdivision (1) of
subsection (a) of section 53a-70, and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of
age, twenty years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the
court. Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a period of special
parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 of at least five years.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 9; P.A. 80-442, S. 20, 28; P.A. 87-246; P.A. 92-87, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 50; P.A. 02-138,
S. 6.)
History: P.A. 80-442 substituted "deadly weapon" for "firearm" and reference to specific firearms where occurring
and increased portion of sentence which may not be suspended or reduced from one year to five years in Subsec. (b),
effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 87-246 changed the name of the offense from sexual assault in the first degree with a deadly
weapon to aggravated sexual assault in the first degree and amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (2) re disfiguring the
victim or destroying, amputating or disabling a member or organ of the victim and Subdiv. (3) re recklessly engaging in
conduct creating a risk of death to the victim and thereby causing serious physical injury to the victim; P.A. 92-87 amended
Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re commission of the offense while aided by two or more other persons actually present;
June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of twenty
years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class
A felony if the victim is under sixteen years of age, add exception re twenty-year nonsuspendable sentence if the violation
is of Sec. 53a-70(a)(1) and the victim is under sixteen years of age and replace provision that a person found guilty shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole "which together constitute a sentence of twenty
years" with provision that a person found guilty shall be sentenced to a period of special parole "of at least five years".
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 188 C. 697, 699, 713. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242, 257. Cited. 207
C. 412, 416. Cited. 210 C. 110, 117, 127. Cited. Id., 315-317. Cited. 211 C. 672, 674. Judgment of appellate court in State
v. Horne, 19 CA 111, reversed. 215 C. 538, 542, 543. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 118. Cited. 12 CA 179, 180, 187. Cited. 19 CA 111, 113, 116, 139, 140, 145;
judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 36 CA 805, 807. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Cited. 43 CS 211, 212.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43. Cited. 210 C. 110, 112, 115, 123, 128. Cited. Id., 315, 317. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 235
C. 502, 517. Five-week-old fetus constitutes a part of the mother's body and, therefore, is a "member" of her body for
purposes of subdiv. (2). 263 C. 524.
Cited. 19 CA 111, 142, 143; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 725, 726. For purposes of the
offense described in subdiv. (4), it is victim's objective and subjective awareness, and not perpetrator's physical proximity,
that controls the factual determination as to whether perpetrator is "actually present". 75 CA 578.
Sec. 53a-70b. Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B
felony. (a) For the purposes of this section:
(1) "Sexual intercourse" means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or
cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient
to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission
of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the
genital or anal opening of the victim's body; and
(2) "Use of force" means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual
physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.
(b) No spouse or cohabitor shall compel the other spouse or cohabitor to engage in
sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other spouse or cohabitor, or by the
threat of the use of force against such other spouse or cohabitor which reasonably causes
such other spouse or cohabitor to fear physical injury.
(c) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class
B felony.
(P.A. 81-27, S. 1.)
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 193, 195, 196, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 735, 738-741, 743-745, 747, 748,
750, 752-757. Cited. 210 C. 110, 125. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 10 CA 709, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 112. Cited. 31 CA 20, 21, 29. Cited. Id., 497, 498,
501, 503, 506. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 36 CA 718, 720. Cited. 41 CA 604, 620.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 497, 503. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 497, 506.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 209 C. 733, 735.
Cited. 10 CA 709-714. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498, 503,
506. Cited. 36 CA 718, 720. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.
Sec. 53a-71. Sexual assault in the second degree: Class C or B felony. (a) A
person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in
sexual intercourse with another person and: (1) Such other person is thirteen years of
age or older but under sixteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older
than such person; or (2) such other person is mentally defective to the extent that such
other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse; or (3) such other person is
physically helpless; or (4) such other person is less than eighteen years old and the actor
is such person's guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such
person's welfare; or (5) such other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital
or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such
other person; or (6) the actor is a psychotherapist and such other person is (A) a patient
of the actor and the sexual intercourse occurs during the psychotherapy session, (B) a
patient or former patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally
dependent upon the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual
intercourse occurs by means of therapeutic deception; or (7) the actor accomplishes the
sexual intercourse by means of false representation that the sexual intercourse is for a
bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (8) the actor is a school
employee and such other person is a student enrolled in a school in which the actor
works or a school under the jurisdiction of the local or regional board of education which
employs the actor; or (9) the actor is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who
provides intensive, ongoing instruction and such other person is a recipient of coaching
or instruction from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such
coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of
age; or (10) the actor is twenty years of age or older and stands in a position of power,
authority or supervision over such other person by virtue of the actor's professional,
legal, occupational or volunteer status and such other person's participation in a program
or activity, and such other person is under eighteen years of age.
(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony or, if the victim of the
offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person found guilty under
this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which nine months of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 72; P.A. 75-619, S. 4; P.A. 82-428, S. 3; P.A. 83-326, S. 1; P.A. 85-341, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 2;
P.A. 94-221, S. 18; P.A. 00-161, S. 2; P.A. 02-106, S. 1; 02-138, S. 7; P.A. 04-130, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 75-619 restated Subsec. (a) to conform with changes made in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, referred to sexual
"assault" rather than to sexual "misconduct" and made the offense a Class C felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor;
P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that nine months of sentence may not be suspended or reduced by the court;
P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated "to
the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse", redesignated as Subdiv. (3) a victim who is "physically
helpless" and renumbered the remaining Subdivs.; P.A. 85-341 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to increase the applicable
age from fifteen to sixteen years; P.A. 93-340 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to specify that the other person be thirteen
years of age or older and the actor be more than two years older than such person, added Subdiv. (6) re sexual intercourse
between a psychotherapist and a patient or former patient and added Subdiv. (7) re sexual intercourse accomplished by
false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (8) concerning
school employees and students; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by deleting provision re the act of engaging in sexual
intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was reclassified as sexual assault in the first degree
under Sec. 53a-70 by same public act, and by making a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 02-106
amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (9) re sexual intercourse between a coach or instructor and a person who is a recipient
of such coaching or instruction and is a secondary school student receiving such coaching or instruction in a secondary
school setting or under eighteen years of age; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class B felony
if the victim is under sixteen years of age; P.A. 04-130 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (10) re actor twenty years of
age or older who stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over another person under eighteen years of age
and engages in sexual intercourse with such other person.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 180 C. 54, 56. Cited. 185 C. 199, 200. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 73, 74, 91;
id., 348, 349. Cited. 189 C. 321, 325. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Cited. 199 C. 47, 55. Cited. 201 C. 211,
212, 214, 216. Cited. 207 C. 374, 378. Cited. 209 C. 225, 230. Cited. 211 C. 455, 457. Cited. 224 C. 1, 2. Cited. 228 C.
393, 396. P.A. 93-340, Sec. 2 cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 118. Cited. 13 CA 378, 379. Cited. 14 CA 688, 693. Cited. 15 CA 251, 254,
278. Cited. Id., 289, 290. Cited. 25 CA 270-272; judgment reversed in part, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 527, 534,
535. Cited. 33 CA 133, 134, 139. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. Id., 754, 756. Cited. 36 CA 383, 384. Cited. 38 CA 56,
60. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 45 CA 116. Term "years" in Subsec. (a)(1) means periods of 365 or 356 days, not calendar
years. Subsec. (a)(1) not void for vagueness as applied to defendant in this case despite lack of judicial gloss on meaning
of "years" and does not violate defendant's right to equal protection. 47 CA 68. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 57 CA 736. Pursuant to. Sec. 53-21 (2), risk of injury to or impairing the
morals of a child involves sexual contact with a child younger than the age of sixteen years "in a sexual and indecent
manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child ...." This section contains no such similar provision. Risk of
injury to a child, therefore, contains elements lacking in sexual assault in the second degree. 79 CA 591.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 175 C. 315, 324; 180 C. 167, 168; 181 C. 426, 427, 430. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 382, 383; 187 C.
73, 91; 188 C. 565, 566; id., 644, 645. Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 321, 327. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3): The terms
"responsibility" and "general supervision" discussed; dissent regarded construction of those terms by majority as much
narrower than origin warranted. Id., 321, 322, 324-328, 330-332. Subdiv. (1) cited. 190 C. 84, 85; 191 C. 453, 454, 463;
192 C. 154, 155, 163. Cited. Id., 154, 164. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 666, 667. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 481, 493, 494. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 440, 441. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 734, 735. Cited.
201 C. 211, 215. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 187, 189. Subdiv. (3) cited. 205 C. 386, 388. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 528, 531,
532. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 51, 53. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 244-246, 250, 265-268, 272, 274, 275. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
359, 362. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 185, 186. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 455, 462. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 215 C. 653, 654; 219 C. 283, 284; 220 C. 345-348, 360. Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 656, 658; judgment reversed,
see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 207, 210, 211. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 393, 396. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
552, 554. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610, 612, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 839, 840. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 230 C. 43, 46-48, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 321, 322. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 296. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
409. Court determined defendant was more than two years older than victim by calculating the difference in age based on
birthdates rather than calendar years. 248 C. 543. Statute not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate defendant's
right to equal protection under the law. Id. Statute does not require physical violence as element of the crime. 260 C. 486.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 46, 48. Cited. 8 CA 190, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 313. Subdiv. (4) cited. 9 CA 426-428.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 591, 592; 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 493, 496. Subdiv. (4) cited. 14 CA 244, 245.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 244, 245, 247. Subdiv. (1) cited. 15 CA 222, 224-227. Cited. Id., 222, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 17 CA
174, 175. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 186, 187. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 447, 448. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 525, 526. Subdiv. (1) cited.
18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 44, 45. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445, 446. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 646, 647. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 20 CA 40, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 115, 116. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 263, 264.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 288, 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 530, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 737, 738. Cited. Id., 737, 753. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 23 CA 241, 242; Id., 712, 713; 24 CA 146, 147; 25 CA 235, 238. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 243,
245, 251; 26 CA 625, 626, 635, 637; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq;
Id., 674, 676, 679, 680; Id., 758, 759. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 91, 92. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 527, 528, 531, 533, 534,
536, 539, 540. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 120, 121. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580
et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 773-775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 205, 206. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 46, 48. Cited. 36 CA
383, 384. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 213, 214. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 125, 126, 133. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 731, 732, 743.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 132, 133, 148. Cited. 41 CA 139, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43
CA 142. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 785. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 289.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 512. Trial court properly refused to instruct jury as requested by defendant on the issue of fraudulent
misrepresentation; no affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation is available under provision of statute prohibiting
sexual intercourse between a person who is between the ages of thirteen and fifteen and a person who is at least two years
older. 63 CA 536.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-72. Rape in the first degree: Class B felony. Section 53a-72 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 73; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 125; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-72a. Sexual assault in the third degree: Class D or C felony. (a) A
person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels
another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other
person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person
or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical
injury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with
another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the
degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class D felony or, if the victim of the
offense is under sixteen years of age, a class C felony.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 5; P.A. 80-346, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 33; P.A. 02-138, S. 8.)
History: P.A. 80-346 designated previous Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B) in Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a)
and added Subdiv. (2) re incest; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by amending Subsec. (a)(1)(B) to replace "which
reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person" with "which reasonably causes such other person to
fear physical injury to himself or herself" and amending Subsec. (a)(2) to replace "such person" with "the actor" or "him
or her" as appropriate; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class C felony if the victim is under
sixteen years of age.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 216, 218, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 618. Cited. 192 C. 154,
164. Cited. 194 C. 258, 271. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 352, 353. Cited. Id., 386, 394. Cited. 207 C. 403, 404.
Cited. 214 C. 89, 91. Cited. 224 C. 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Cited. 240 C. 743. Statute encompasses
adopted relatives. 258 C. 779.
Cited. 1 CA 724-726, 735. Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 15, 16. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see
205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. Id., 648, 649. Cited. 10 CA 591. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 35 CA
173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 741. Evidence was sufficient to support conviction and court properly instructed
jury on element of intent for conviction of sexual assault in the third degree. 81 CA 189.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Cited. 205 C. 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 388. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id.,
386, 391, 393. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 209 C. 416-418. Subdiv. (2) cited. 210 C. 244, 246, 247, 265, 266, 272, 274. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. 224 C. 397, 404. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 233 C. 502, 504, 512. Subdiv.
(1)(A) cited. Id., 502, 512, 514. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 237 C. 284-286. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 576. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited.
Id., 694. Court's failure to define "knowledge" or to explain how it pertains to charge of sexual assault in the third degree
did not violate defendant's due process rights where jury instructions, viewed as a whole, adequately informed jury of the
elements of the crime. 258 C. 779.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 734. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 724, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 10 CA
591, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 244, 245, 247.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 694, 695, 697-699. Subdiv. (2) cited.
20 CA 530, 532. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 23 CA 221, 226. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see
200 C. 400 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B)
cited. Id., 725, 726; 26 CA 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 29 CA 724, 725. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 281, 282,
287. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218, 220; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 743,
748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id., 743, 744, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C.
502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 36 CA 228, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 762, 763.
Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 39 CA 657, 658. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 287, 288, 294. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 43 CA 578. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 756.
Sec. 53a-72b. Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm: Class C or B
felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm when
such person commits sexual assault in the third degree as provided in section 53a-72a,
and in the commission of such offense, such person uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person
possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, rifle, shotgun or other firearm. No person
shall be convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and sexual assault in the third
degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and
prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm is a class C felony or, if the
victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person
found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which
two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and
a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together
constitute a sentence of ten years.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 10; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 51; P.A. 02-138, S. 9.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase the penalty from a class D to a class C felony, increase
from one year to two years the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence and add requirement that any person found guilty
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute
a sentence of ten years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the
offense as a class B felony if the victim is under sixteen years of age.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-73. Rape in the second degree: Class C felony. Section 53a-73 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 74; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
Sec. 53a-73a. Sexual assault in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor or
class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when: (1)
Such person intentionally subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) under
fifteen years of age, or (B) mentally defective or mentally incapacitated to the extent
that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual contact, or (C) physically
helpless, or (D) less than eighteen years old and the actor is such other person's guardian
or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such other person's welfare, or
(E) in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has
supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person; or (2) such person subjects
another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent; or (3) such person
engages in sexual contact with an animal or dead body; or (4) such person is a psychotherapist and subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) a patient of the actor and
the sexual contact occurs during the psychotherapy session, or (B) a patient or former
patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon
the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual contact occurs
by means of therapeutic deception; or (5) such person subjects another person to sexual
contact and accomplishes the sexual contact by means of false representation that the
sexual contact is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (6)
such person is a school employee and subjects another person to sexual contact who is
a student enrolled in a school in which the actor works or a school under the jurisdiction
of the local or regional board of education which employs the actor; or (7) such person
is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who provides intensive, ongoing instruction
and subjects another person to sexual contact who is a recipient of coaching or instruction
from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such coaching or
instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of age; or (8)
such person subjects another person to sexual contact and (A) the actor is twenty years
of age or older and stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over such
other person by virtue of the actor's professional, legal, occupational or volunteer status
and such other person's participation in a program or activity, and (B) such other person
is under eighteen years of age.
(b) Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor or, if the victim of
the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class D felony.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 6; P.A. 83-326, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 3; P.A. 94-221, S. 19; P.A. 02-106, S. 2; 02-138, S. 10; P.A. 04-130, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or
mentally incapacitated "to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual contact", redesignated as Subpara. (C) a
victim who is "physically helpless" and relettered the remaining subparagraphs; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (a) to add
Subdiv. (4) re sexual contact by a psychotherapist with a patient or former patient and Subdiv. (5) re sexual contact
accomplished by means of false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec.
(a) to add Subdiv. (6) concerning school employees and students; P.A. 02-106 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical
change in Subdiv. (1)(B) for purposes of gender neutrality and to add Subdiv. (7) re a coach or instructor subjecting another
person to sexual contact who is a recipient of such coaching or instruction and is a secondary school student receiving
such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting or under eighteen years of age; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec.
(a) to make technical changes and amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class D felony if the victim is under
sixteen years of age; P.A. 04-130 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (8) re actor twenty years of age or older who stands
in a position of power, authority or supervision over another person under eighteen years of age and subjects that other
person to sexual contact.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Proof of specific interest required under statute precludes this from being a lesser included
offense under Sec. 53-21. 186 C. 45, 49, 51-53. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 204 C. 683, 685. Cited. 205 C. 386, 394,
396. Cited. 210 C. 396, 397. Cited. Id., 582, 583. Cited. 211 C. 455, 458. Cited. 224 C. 1, 2.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 150. Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 11 CA 80, 81. Cited. Id., 102, 118. Cited. 14 CA
40, 41. Cited. 15 CA 251, 254, 278. Cited. Id., 289, 290. Cited. 18 CA 459, 460. Cited. 25 CA 270, 271; judgment reversed
in part, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Judgment of acquittal in State v. Sirimanochanh, (26 CA 625, 221 C. 917 and 224 C. 656)
reversed and case remanded to trial court with direction to render judgment reinstating conviction under this section. 31
CA 452, 454, 455. Cited. 34 CA 473, 474. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 458. Cited. Id., 715. Reiterated previous
holdings touching bare skin not required for sexual contact in the fourth degree. 59 CA 538.
It is undisputable that Connecticut recognizes a clear public policy against sexual misconduct and sexual harassment.
This public policy is evidenced in state criminal statutes, which provide that "a person is guilty of sexual assault in the
fourth degree when ... (2) such person subjects another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent ...."
Thus, arbitration award reinstating police officer who had engaged in sexual misconduct and harassment while on duty
clearly violates established public policy and must be vacated. 48 CS 574.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 183 C. 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. 192 C. 37, 39. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 154-156, 161, 163. Subdiv.
(1)(B) cited. 200 C. 440, 441. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 734, 735. Subdiv. (1)(C) cited. 205 C. 386, 388, 393, 399. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 386, 388, 409, 410. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 409. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211
C. 555, 582. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582. Subdiv. (1)(D) cited. 215 C. 653, 654. Subdiv. (1)(A): Defendant
waived claim that violation of this section is not a lesser included offense of violation of Sec. 53a-71(a)(1). Judgment of
appellate court in State v. Sirimanochanh, 26 CA 625, reversed and case remanded for determination of evidence sufficiency.
224 C. 656, 658; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 227 C. 207, 210, 211. Subdiv. (1)(A)
cited. 230 C. 43, 47, 48.
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 395, 396. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 395, 396. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 18 CA 297, 298. Subdiv.
(1)(E) cited. Id., 694, 698. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 19 CA 44, 45. Subdiv. (1)(D) cited. 20 CA 115, 117. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 365, 366. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 530, 532. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 26 CA 625, 627, 636, 637; judgment reversed, see
224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 674, 679. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 409,
410, 414. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 31 CA 452, 454. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 205, 207. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 34 CA 428,
429. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 38 CA 125, 126. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 116. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited.
Id., 289. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 512. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 613. Subdiv. (1)(A): This offense and the offense of risk
of injury to a child are not the same offense for double jeopardy. 49 CA 409.
Secs. 53a-74 to 53a-81. Rape in the second degree. Deviate sexual intercourse
in the first and second degree. Sexual contact in the first, second and third degree.
Adultery: Class A misdemeanor. Sections 53a-74 to 53a-81, inclusive, are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 75-82; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 126-129; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 79, 80; P.A. 75-619, S. 7; P.A. 91-19, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-82. Prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with
another person in return for a fee.
(b) Prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 83.)
Meaning of statutory language is clear and is sufficient to warn ordinary person of the prohibited conduct. 37 CS 506-
509, 511-513. Does not violate right to privacy which has never been extended to encompass prostitutes plying their trade
on the street. Id., 515-517.
Sec. 53a-83. Patronizing a prostitute: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of patronizing a prostitute when: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, he pays
a fee to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged
in sexual conduct with him; or (2) he pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person
pursuant to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will
engage in sexual conduct with him; or (3) he solicits or requests another person to engage
in sexual conduct with him in return for a fee.
(b) Patronizing a prostitute is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 84.)
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 4 CA 520, 530.
Subsec. (b):
Section may be harmonized with Sec. 18-100d re determining controlling sentence where prisoner serving concurrent
sentences for crimes committed both on or after October 1, 1994 and before October 1, 1994, with good time credit
applicable to pre-October 1, 1994 sentence under Sec. 18-7a(c). Determination of controlling sentence not a static concept.
261 C. 806.
Sec. 53a-83a. Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle when
he, while occupying a motor vehicle: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, pays a fee
to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged in
sexual conduct with him; or (2) pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person pursuant
to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will engage in
sexual conduct with him; or (3) solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual
conduct with him in return for a fee; or (4) engages in sexual conduct for which a fee
was paid or agreed to be paid.
(b) Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 93-265, S. 2; P.A. 97-279, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 97-279 amended Subsec. (b) to delete provision that subjected any motor vehicle used in the commission
of the offense to forfeiture to the state in accordance with Secs. 54-36j to 54-36l, inclusive.
Sec. 53a-84. Sex of parties immaterial. In any prosecution for prostitution or
patronizing a prostitute, the sex of the two parties or prospective parties to the sexual
conduct engaged in, contemplated or solicited is immaterial, and it shall be no defense
that: (1) Such persons were of the same sex; or (2) the person who received, agreed to
receive or solicited a fee was a male and the person who paid or agreed or offered to
pay such fee was a female.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 85.)
Sec. 53a-85. Promoting prostitution: Definitions. The following definitions are
applicable to sections 53a-86 to 53a-89, inclusive:
(1) A person "advances prostitution" when, acting other than as a prostitute or as a
patron thereof, he knowingly causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution,
procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons or premises for prostitution
purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house of prostitution or a prostitution
enterprise, or engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid or facilitate an act
or enterprise of prostitution.
(2) A person "profits from prostitution" when acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitution services, he accepts or receives
money or other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any person
whereby he participates or is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 86.)
Sec. 53a-86. Promoting prostitution in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A
person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree when he knowingly: (1)
Advances prostitution by compelling a person by force or intimidation to engage in
prostitution, or profits from coercive conduct by another; or (2) advances or profits from
prostitution of a person less than sixteen years old.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the first degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 87.)
Cited. 199 C. 47, 55.
Sentencing under both risk of injury and promoting prostitution statutes not a double jeopardy violation. 53 CA 627.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 185 C. 199, 200; 191 C. 453, 454.
Sec. 53a-87. Promoting prostitution in the second degree: Class C felony. (a)
A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree when he knowingly: (1)
Advances or profits from prostitution by managing, supervising, controlling or owning,
either alone or in association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business
or enterprise involving prostitution activity by two or more prostitutes; or (2) advances
or profits from prostitution of a person less than eighteen years old.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 88; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 81.)
History: 1972 act changed applicable age in Subsec. (a)(2) from nineteen to eighteen, reflecting change in age of
majority.
Cited. 199 C. 47, 55.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 732.
Sec. 53a-88. Promoting prostitution in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A
person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the third degree when he knowingly advances or profits from prostitution.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P. A. 828, S. 89.)
Sec. 53a-89. Permitting prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of permitting prostitution when, having possession or control of premises which
he knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he fails to make reasonable effort to
halt or abate such use.
(b) Permitting prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 90.)
Cited. 185 C. 199, 200.
Sec. 53a-90. Transferred to Chapter 961, Part II, Sec. 54-102a.
Sec. 53a-90a. Enticing a minor. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of enticing a
minor when such person uses an interactive computer service to knowingly persuade,
induce, entice or coerce any person under sixteen years of age to engage in prostitution
or sexual activity for which the actor may be charged with a criminal offense. For purposes of this section, "interactive computer service" means any information service,
system or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access
to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.
(b) Enticing a minor is a class D felony for a first offense, a class C felony for a
second offense and a class B felony for any subsequent offense.
(P.A. 99-113; P.A. 04-139, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 04-139 amended Subsec. (b) to increase penalty for a first offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class
D felony, for a second offense from a class D felony to a class C felony and for any subsequent offense from a class C
felony to a class B felony, effective July 1, 2004.
PART VII*
KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-27 and present part VII of chapter 952:
Cited. 155 C. 592. Evidence produced by this state was sufficient to show proof was evident that defendants were in
danger of being convicted of capital offense under this section, hence bail could be denied under section 8 of article I of
state constitution. 159 C. 285. Prosecution where necessary elements of two or more distinct offenses combined in same
act, when. 164 C. 95. Fraudulent restraint in kidnapping, defined. Id., 95. Restraint for sexual gratification within purview
of kidnapping statute. Id., 95. Cited. 166 C. 96. Cited. 169 C. 38. Cited. 206 C. 40, 55.
Cited. 24 CS 386.
Sec. 53a-91. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully
in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one
place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences
or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent. As used herein "without
consent" means, but is not limited to, (A) deception and (B) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control
or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.
(2) "Abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by
either (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (B)
using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation.
(3) "Relative" means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 92; P.A. 92-260, S. 35.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsecs. (1) and (2) to replace Subdiv. indicators "(a)" and "(b)" with "(A)" and "(B)",
respectively.
Language is clear and does not lend itself to any equivocal interpretation. 173 C. 165, 168. Cited. 191 C. 604, 617.
Cited. 200 C. 586, 590. Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 216 C. 647, 661. Cited. 219 C. 489, 492. Cited. 226 C. 618, 623.
Terms "restrained" and "abducted" interpreted to include frightening victim to remain in bedroom through repeated physical
and verbal abuse. 258 C. 510.
Cited. 20 CA 437-439. Cited. 55 CA 447.
Subsec. (1):
Cited. 177 C. 335, 342; 179 C. 328, 338; 180 C. 565, 566. Cited. 188 C. 406, 416. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254. Subpara. (a)
cited. 198 C. 147, 152, 153. Cited. Id., 430, 434. Cited. Id., 537, 542, 550. Cited. 202 C. 520, 539. Cited. 209 C. 733, 760.
Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 215 C. 173, 178, 180. Cited. Id., 716, 727. Cited. 219 C 489, 502, 503, 510. Cited. 225 C.
347, 350. Cited. 237 C. 284, 313, 314.
Cited. 5 CA 586, 590. Cited. 13 CA 667, 672. Cited. 17 CA 339, 340, 343. Cited. 19 CA 396, 400. Cited. 30 CA 281,
282. Cited. 31 CA 312, 330. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Subsec. (2):
Subdiv. (b): Cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Subdiv. (a): Cited. 177 C. 335, 342. Subdiv. (b): Cited. 177 C. 335, 336, 342; id.,
637, 639, 641; 178 C. 634, 635. Cited. 179 C. 328, 338. Cited. 182 C. 449, 460. Cited. 188 C. 406, 415. Cited. 199 C. 537,
542, 550. Cited. 200 C. 586, 590. Subdiv. (a) cited. Id., 586, 597. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id. Cited. 209 C. 733, 757, 760. Cited.
211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 215 C. 716, 727. Cited. 219 C. 489, 500, 501, 510. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id., 489, 501. Cited. 225 C.
347, 350. Subdiv. (B) cited. 36 CA 190, 196. Cited. 46 CA 486. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id.
To prove unlawful restraint, the state had to prove that defendant abducted alleged victim by restraining her with intent
to prevent her liberation by using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation. 81 CA 320.
Sec. 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is
guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and: (1) His
intent is to compel a third person (A) to pay or deliver money or property as ransom or (B)
to engage in other particular conduct or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or
(2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him
or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a
felony; or (C) terrorize him or a third person; or (D) interfere with the performance of
a government function.
(b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 93, 94; P.A. 73-137, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 36.)
History: P.A. 73-137 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) making kidnapping a first degree offense when abducted person
dies during abduction or before his return to safety and provisions in that Subsec. re circumstances which determine the
presumption of death and provisions in Subsec. (b) re imposition of death penalty and re sentence for Class A felony when
accused enters guilty plea and court and state's attorney consent; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to insert Subpara.
indicators and made other technical changes.
Cited. 173 C. 165-167. Cited. 197 C. 436, 461. Cited. Id., 588, 591. Cited. 198 C. 671, 673. Cited. 200 C. 268, 286.
Cited. 201 C. 276, 284. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673. Cited. 212 C. 31, 32. Cited. 225 C. 347, 349. Cited. 227 C. 677, 679. Cited.
235 C. 711, 713. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114.
Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. 39 CA 632, 633. Cited. 46 CA 691. Cited. Id., 741.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended.
173 C. 165, 168. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 165, 166, 168; 177 C. 335, 343. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 185 C. 339, 340, 354.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 346, 347. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 194 C. 114, 115. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 692, 694, 695. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 197 C. 436, 438. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 588-592. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148, 151. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. Id., 285, 287. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 405, 406. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. Id., 671, 672. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 199 C.
399, 400. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 200 C. 268, 286. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 586, 587, 591; 201 C. 517, 519; Id., 559, 560;
202 C. 259, 260; Id., 509, 510; 203 C. 385, 386. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 204 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 240, 242. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited.
Id., 714, 716. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 205 C. 132, 134. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 673-675. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 206 C. 40,
42, 43, 54. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 733, 735, 761. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 210 C.
110-112. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 199, 200. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 315, 316. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv.
(2)(B) cited. 212 C. 31, 32, 38-40. Subdiv. (2) cited. 213 C. 388, 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 422, 424. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. 214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 89, 91. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 215 C. 173, 174, 177, 178, 180, 181. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. Id., 716, 718, 719, 727; 216 C. 647, 649; 217 C. 243, 244, 248, 250. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; 219 C. 93, 96.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 160, 161. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; Id., 269, 271. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 283, 284. Subdiv.
(2)(C) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 489, 491, 492, 494-496, 500-503. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 489, 491, 494-496;
220 C. 270, 272. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 345, 347, 348. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 487, 489. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 698,
700; 221 C. 264, 265; 222 C. 556, 558. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 347, 348, 350.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 450, 452. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 519, 520. Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 618-620. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. 227 C. 1, 9, 11. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 153, 155. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 228 C. 582, 584,
588. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 229 C. 557, 558. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 231 C. 195, 196. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 403, 408. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 235 C. 145, 147. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to
be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 C. 284-287, 313, 314. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 694.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face.
Id., 784. Cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 242 C. 445. Where defendant also charged with sexual assault, restriction
of movement alone can be basis of kidnapping if defendant, by violent actions, restrained victim with intent to prevent
liberation. 262 C. 179.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 8 CA 177, 178. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 25 CA 428, 430. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 28 CA 195, 196.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 33 CA 457, 458. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 457, 458. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 34 CA 276, 277. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. 36 CA 190, 191, 196. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 216, 217. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 641, 642. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. Id., 718, 720. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 774, 775. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 37 CA 360, 369. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 464, 465. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 38 CA 777, 778, 785. Cited. 39 CA 579, 580. Subdiv. (2)(B)
cited. Id., 579, 600. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 41 CA 317, 318; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 445 et seq. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited.
43 CA 715. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 44 CA 307. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to
firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful
restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under
section. 55 CA 447. Subdiv. (2): Under kidnapping statute, the state had to prove that defendant had abducted and restrained
alleged victim with the intent to inflict physical injury or to sexually attack her. 81 CA 320.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 65.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 674.
Cited. 8 CA 177, 178.
Sec. 53a-92a. Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm: Class A felony:
One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree with
a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the first degree as provided in section 53a-92, and in the commission of said crime he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping
in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm upon the same
transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon
the same information.
(b) Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm is a class A felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 9.)
Cited. 198 C. 671, 673, 676, 678, 679. "Effect of enactment of statute (was) to link a more serious crime with a less
serious penalty"; equal protection rights violated. 200 C. 268, 286, 289. Cited. 204 C. 240, 257. Cited. 205 C. 262, 264.
Cited. Id., 673, 674. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673.
Cited. 40 CA 60, 61.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 679. Cited. 210 C. 110, 111. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
The statute "has created an irreconcilable conflict in the statutes governing mandatory minimum sentences for kidnapping in the first degree ... until the legislature takes corrective action the sentencing provisions of (this statute) govern all
prosecutions for kidnapping in the first degree"; statutory construction discussed. 198 C. 671, 676, 680. Cited. 200 C. 268,
287. Equal protection rights discussed. Id. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-93. Proceeding to determine sentence for kidnapping in first degree.
Section 53a-93 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 95; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-94. Kidnapping in the second degree: Class B felony: Three years not
suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts
another person.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony for which three years of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 96; P.A. 93-148, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re three-year nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 169 C. 242, 243. Cited. 171 C. 47, 48. Cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Cited. 177 C. 335, 336, 342; id., 637, 639, 641.
Cited. 178 C. 549, 550; id., 634, 635. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Cited. 186 C. 179, 180. Cited. 188 C. 406, 407; id., 697, 702,
713. Cited. 190 C. 822, 823. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 617. Cited. 196 C. 430, 431. Cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Cited. Id., 190,
191. Cited. 199 C. 537, 538. Cited. 200 C. 586, 606. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. Id., 520, 521, 523. Cited. 206 C. 40,
53. Cited. Id., 685, 687, 709. Cited. 208 C. 365, 366. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673. Cited. 213 C. 388, 396. Cited. 231 C. 195, 196.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 12 CA 268. Cited. Id., 613. Cited. 20 CA 437. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. 27 CA 786,
787. Cited. 35 CA 740, 744. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 46 CA 486. Cited. Id., 691.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600-602. Cited. 179 C. 328, 329, 338. Cited. 180 C. 565. Cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 460. Cited. 187 C. 681,
683. Cited. 188 C. 406, 415. Cited. 190 C. 327, 329. Cited. 191 C. 604, 605. Cited. 192 C. 166, 167. Cited. 197 C. 485,
486. Cited. 198 C. 314, 315. Cited. 199 C. 537, 550. Cited. 200 C. 586, 588. Cited. 202 C. 520, 523. Cited. 238 C. 784.
There is neither any time requirement for the restraint, nor any distance requirement for the asportation to constitute
the crime of kidnapping. 1 CA 697, 708. By its plain terms, subsec. gives fair warning to the public that if a person abducts
another he is guilty of that offense. 83 CA 142.
Sec. 53a-94a. Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm: Class B felony:
Three years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree
with a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the second degree, as provided in section
53a-94, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of or uses or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a
pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the second degree and kidnapping in the second degree with a
firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for
both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm is a class B felony for which
three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 10; P.A. 92-260, S. 37; P.A. 93-148, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one
year to three years the length of the nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 188 C. 697, 699, 713. Cited. 200 C. 523, 524. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673, 677-679.
Cited. 9 CA 648, 649. Cited. 46 CA 741.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 210 C. 110, 114. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-95. Unlawful restraint in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under
circumstances which expose such other person to a substantial risk of physical injury.
(b) Unlawful restraint in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 97; P.A. 92-260, S. 38.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "the latter" with "such other person".
Cited. 171 C. 395, 397. Cited. 182 C. 353, 354; id., 366, 367, 382. Cited. 187 C. 216, 217; id., 348, 349. Cited. 191 C.
604, 616, 617. Cited. 194 C. 297, 298. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254, 265. Cited. 197 C. 298, 299. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited.
198 C. 430. Cited. 199 C. 193, 194. Cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Cited. 201 C. 659, 660. Cited. 202 C. 676, 677. Cited. 205 C. 352,
353. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 223 C. 180, 182. Cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Cited. 226 C. 601,
603. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 237 C. 284, 309. Cited. 242 C. 689.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 375. Cited. 5 CA 424, 425. Cited. Id., 586, 587, 590. Cited. 6 CA 334, 335. Cited. 7 CA 701, 702.
Cited. 8 CA 620, 621. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Cited. 13
CA 554-556. Cited. 17 CA 234, 236. Cited. Id., 339, 340, 343. Specific intent required. Id. Cited. Id., 391, 392. Cited. Id.,
490, 491. Cited. 22 CA 477, 478. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 20,
21. Cited. Id., 312, 314. Cited. 36 CA 805, 807. Cited. 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 701, 702. Cited. 42 CA 78. Cited.
Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Cited. 43 CS 211, 212.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 174 C. 500, 501; 176 C. 227, 228. Cited. 179 C. 381, 382. Cited. 185 C. 211, 212. Cited. 186 C. 599, 600. Cited.
190 C. 104, 105. Cited. 197 C. 50-52. Cited. Id., 602, 603. Cited. 198 C. 430-432, 434, 435. Cited. Id., 598, 600. Cited.
Id., 617, 618. Cited. 205 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 61, 63. Cited. Id., 437, 439. Cited. Id., 528, 531. Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43,
53, 54. Cited. 209 C. 143, 145. Cited. 222 C. 87, 88. Cited. 227 C. 32, 49. Cited. Id., 153, 155. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114.
Cited. 241 C. 784. Cited. 242 C. 523.
Cited. 6 CA 697, 698. Cited. 8 CA 387, 388. Cited. Id., 491, 493. Cited. Id., 566, 567. Cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Cited. Id.,
208, 209. Cited. 13 CA 667, 668. Cited. 14 CA 710, 712. Cited. 18 CA 134, 137. Cited. Id., 730, 731. Cited. 19 CA 631,
633. Cited. 21 CA 244, 245. Cited. Id., 467, 468. Cited. 25 CA 725, 726. Cited 26 CA 574, 575. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited.
31 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 312, 329. Cited. 32 CA 178, 179. Cited. 38 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 777, 785. Cited. 39 CA 45,
46. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Cited. Id., 832, 833. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257, 279. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. Id., 817, 818. Cited.
42 CA 78. Cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 715. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint is not double jeopardy.
47 CA 117.
Sec. 53a-96. Unlawful restraint in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the second degree when he restrains another
person.
(b) Unlawful restraint in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 98.)
Cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 618. Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Cited. 206 C. 100, 102. Cited. 211 C. 672,
678. Cited. 224 C. 397, 400. Cited. 231 C. 195, 196.
Cited. 9 CA 656, 657. Cited. 19 CA 396, 397. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498.
Cited. 46 CA 486.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600. Cited. 197 C. 413, 415. Cited. Id., 602, 603.
Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 285.
Sec. 53a-97. Custodial interference in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A
person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree when he commits custodial
interference in the second degree as provided in section 53a-98: (1) Under circumstances
which expose the child or person taken or enticed from lawful custody or the child held
after a request by the lawful custodian for his return to a risk that his safety will be
endangered or his health materially impaired; or (2) by taking, enticing or detaining the
child or person out of this state.
(b) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 99; P.A. 81-280, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 39; P.A. 95-206, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a) by including in Subdiv. (1) risk to a child held after a request by the lawful
custodian for his return; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 95-206 amended Subsec. (a) by classifying
the detention of a child or person out of this state as a violation of custodial interference in the first degree.
Cited. 182 C. 353, 355. Cited. 226 C. 652, 661, 663, 666, 668. Joint custodian is not inherently immune from criminal
prosecution under section solely on basis of his or her status as a joint custodian. 251 C. 656.
Cited. 34 CS 219, 221.
Sec. 53a-98. Custodial interference in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree when: (1)
Being a relative of a child who is less than sixteen years old and intending to hold such
child permanently or for a protracted period and knowing that he has no legal right to
do so, he takes or entices such child from his lawful custodian; (2) knowing that he has
no legal right to do so, he takes or entices from lawful custody any incompetent person
or any person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution;
or (3) knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he holds, keeps or otherwise refuses
to return a child who is less than sixteen years old to such child's lawful custodian after
a request by such custodian for the return of such child.
(b) Custodial interference in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 100; P.A. 81-280, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) concerning the failure to return a child to his lawful
custodian after a request by the custodian for the child's return.
Cited. 226 C. 652, 661, 664, 666, 668.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 652, 664.
Sec. 53a-99. Substitution of children: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of
substitution of children when, having been temporarily entrusted with a child less than
one year old and, intending to deceive a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of
such child, he substitutes, produces or returns to such parent, guardian or custodian a
child other than the one entrusted.
(b) Substitution of children is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 101.)
PART VIII*
BURGLARY, CRIMINAL TRESPASS, ARSON,
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Burglary:
Annotations to former section 53-68:
Burglary must be charged to have been committed in night season. 16 C. 33. Larceny not merged in burglary. 24 C.
57. Taking of life to prevent a burglary justifiable. 31 C. 485. Error to charge that when building is left secure at night and
found early in morning broken open, presumption is that it was broken open at night. 35 C. 515. Entering with intent to
commit a felony and breaking out is burglary. 43 C. 493. Night season is when there is not enough daylight to discern
features of another. 47 C. 182; 108 C. 405. This crime is one involving moral turpitude. 121 C. 678. Cited. 132 C. 575;
147 C. 296; 153 C. 40. Definition of "nighttime" discussed. Id., 540, 542. Cited. 161 C. 283.
Cited. 23 CS 41; 25 CS 433; 26 CS 71; 27 CS 42. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective
sentence of not more than five years in reformatory for four counts of burglary under this section, in addition to counts of
breaking and entering, larceny and theft of motor vehicle, should stand. Id., 105-107.
Annotations to former section 53-69:
Evidence that person was armed when he emerged from house sufficient to prove that he was armed when burglary
was committed. 47 C. 181. Cited. 154 C. 302, 303; 160 C. 42.
Annotations to former section 53-71:
Essential elements of crime; evidence admissible. 96 C. 162; 97 C. 261; 146 C. 518. Cited. 153 C. 451. Burglars' tools
jettisoned by defendant while he was being observed by witness and found immediately on his apprehension at place of
crime, held properly admitted into evidence. 155 C. 463. Cited. 161 C. 371.
Discovery of burglar's tools sufficient to allow police to search without warrant. 25 CS 216. Cited. Id., 229; 27 CS
323. Requirement that accused prove lawful excuse for having burglar tools in his possession at night is unconstitutional
as defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty and burden of proof is on state. 28 CS 28.
Annotations to former section 53-73:
Cited. 153 C. 540, 541 (fn). Evidence that defendant, immediately after his niece's house was robbed, had bills on his
person in denomination of those stolen and a cut on his wrist, when entry had been made by breaking glass, and had been
seen on premises before the entry, held ample grounds for conviction on trial by jury. 155 C. 297. It must be established
that crime took place in daytime in order to convict defendant. 161 C. 283. Cited. Id., 303.
Cited. 4 CS 260; 27 CS 65. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective sentence of not
more than five years in reformatory for four counts of violations under this section, in addition to counts of burglary,
larceny and theft of a motor vehicle, should stand. Id., 105-107. Review of sentence. Id., 124-126. Cited. 29 CS 471.
Annotation to former section 53-74:
Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. No legal distinction
between direct or circumstantial evidence so far as its probative force is concerned. 158 C. 124.
Annotations to former section 53-75:
Cited. 153 C. 540, 541 (fn). Trial court properly determined as matter of law that breaking and entering locked fur
storage vault within store otherwise open to public was breaking and entering of building. 156 C. 391.
Cited. 27 CS 392.
Garage held to be a "building ... used as place for the custody of property" within meaning of this statute. 3 Conn. Cir.
Ct. 276. Conviction based on identification by witness who observed defendant after crime at request of police officers
upheld. Rulings in
U. S. v. Wade (388 U. S. 318) and
Gilbert v. California (388 U. S. 263) not retroactive. 5 Conn. Cir.
Ct. 172.
Annotations to former section 53-76:
If one confederate gets inside without breaking and entering and opens door to others, all are guilty of breaking and
entering. 125 C. 213. History of statutes concerning burglary. 132 C. 576. Statute may apply to building partly occupied
as dwelling if it is also occupied for custody of certain property. Id., 579. Cited. 143 C. 559; 149 C. 643, 644; 150 C. 489;
152 C. 627, 633; 153 C. 451; id., 540, 541 (fn). Defendant's appeal from admission in evidence of burglary tools found
immediately after he was observed disposing of them denied as trier of facts could have reasonably determined that articles
were in his possession. 155 C. 463. Jury could have inferred from circumstantial evidence that some part of defendant's
body had entered building. Codefendant's statement that he dropped defendant off at premises and half hour later picked
him up was admissible only as to codefendant. 156 C. 378. Motion to suppress evidence obtained after search of defendant's
person on his arrest for disorderly conduct denied. 157 C. 485. Cited. 158 C. 322; 159 C. 434; 161 C. 283; 371; 404. Cited.
162 C. 442. Cited. 165 C. 163. Cited. 166 C. 81, 83.
Discussion of maximum sentence. 17 CS 367. Cited. 19 CS 267; 22 CS 270; 23 CS 5; id., 41; id., 355; 25 CS 451, 454,
457; id., 489; 26 CS 464; 27 CS 42; id., 65; id., 149; id., 237; id., 244; 27 CS 271; 27 CS 285; id., 290; 27 CS 318; 322;
323; id., 341; id., 347; id., 392. Term of not less than three years nor more than four years on basis of fourth felony conviction
was fair and just after conviction under this section. Id., 371. Cited. 29 CS 471.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 553; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 275; 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 530.
Annotations to former section 53-77:
Cited. 19 CS 267. Defendant found guilty hereunder and sentenced to indefinite term in state reformatory resentenced
to term not to exceed two years. 28 CS 132.
In trial for offense under this statute, court held it not mandatory to order mistrial when, on poll of jury, one juror
announced verdict contrary to that announced by foreman. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 153.
Annotations to former section 53-78:
History and construction of this statute. 125 C. 214. Cited. 132 C. 575. Cited. 166 C. 81, 83.
Annotation to former section 53-80:
Cited. 27 CS 244.
Arson:
Annotations to former section 53-82:
Burning of schoolhouse is arson. 2 R. 516; but see 10 C. 145. A barn eighteen rods from dwelling house and separated
by highway not subject of arson at common law; 6 C. 48; but otherwise under Sec. 53-83. 109 C. 31. That building is
property of another must be alleged and proved. 12 C. 489. An unfinished dwelling not subject of arson at common law.
20 C. 247. House burned should be described as house occupied. 29 C. 344; 63 C. 331. Charge of burning with intent to
defraud insurance company. 105 C. 117; id., 328. State need not prove legal corporate existence of insurance company.
45 C. 273. Evidence reviewed and held sufficient to warrant conviction. 105 C. 117; id., 333. Proofs of loss submitted to
insurance company admissible though made by accused after fire. 105 C. 122. Motive need not be proved; and, while
malice is an essential ingredient of crime of arson, it does not require ill-will but merely deliberation and action without
justification or excuse; so, conviction sustained where accused set fire for excitement it would produce. 107 C. 631.
Dwelling is "burned" if the slightest portion is burned or charred as distinguished from being merely smoked or discolored.
Id., 633. Conviction of accessory to arson. 109 C. 394. Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction. 136 C. 201. Cited.
149 C. 25; 150 C. 169. In re latter case, conviction affirmed; proof of voluntariness of confession prerequisite to its
admissibility if made during illegal detention. 151 C. 246. See 371 U. S. 471.
Annotations to former section 53-83:
Evidence held sufficient to warrant conclusion that defendant set fire wilfully and maliciously. 137 C. 179; 149 C. 25;
150 C. 171; 156 C. 328. Cited. 163 C. 176.
Annotations to former section 53-85:
Plea of nolo contendere for attempted arson, which was subsequently nolled, held bar to prosecution of arson as violation
of double jeopardy. 25 CS 96. The two offenses need not be identical in nature, a similarity being sufficient. Id.
Annotation to former section 53-86:
State need not prove legal corporate existence of insurance company. 45 C. 273.
Trespass and injury to property:
Annotations to former section 53-45:
See Sec. 1-1 for definition of "public buildings". Complaint must set out with particularity the "injury". 62 C. 131.
"Wilfully" means in a spirit of wantonness or with an evil intent or guilty purpose. 71 C. 742. An amendatory act is
presumed not to change the existing law further than is expressly declared or necessarily implied. The word "deface" was
removed from statute and only the word "injury" left. Painting a swastika on building held to be an injury. 149 C. 577,
579. Reversed, 375 U. S. 85. (a) Cited. 153 C. 599.
Cited. 22 CS 203.
Annotation to former section 53-81:
Cited. 27 CS 244.
Evidence of witness who on trial contradicted his prior written statements and testimony by defendant held sufficient
to sustain judgment of defendant's guilt. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 423.
Annotations to former section 53-103:
Cited. 124 C. 313; 319 U. S. 147.
Conviction under this statute not admissible to impeach witness's credibility. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 389. Comparison of this
section and Sec. 53-108 in regard to phrase "without right" in former and absence in latter. Id., 524, 532. Whether proof
of scienter is essential is matter of legislative intent. No proof of specific intent to commit crime of trespass needed under
this section. Id. That defendant thought he had lawful right to be where he was does not negate his trespass; honest mistake
of law does not excuse him from consequences of his act. Id.
Annotation to former section 53-105:
Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536.
Annotation to former section 53-107:
Owner of garden upon which fowls of another trespassed is liable in damages for spreading poison thereon and killing
fowls; force used to repel such trespass must be reasonable; notice to owner of fowls of intent to spread poison no defense.
14 C. 1.
Annotations to former section 53-108:
It is no defense that defendant entered upon lands, etc., for purpose of fishing without guilty intent. 60 C. 229. Cited.
125 C. 214. Prima facie evidence discussed. 148 C. 481.
Comparison of this section and Sec. 53-103 in regard to presence of phrase "without right" in latter and its absence
here. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 524, 532.
Annotations to former section 53-124:
Former statute cited. 66 C. 568; 141 C. 731.
Annotations to former section 53-126:
Cited. 145 C. 124. Cited. 162 C. 53.
Cited. 23 CS 216, 218; 24 CS 378; 27 CS 347. Balance of sentence of defendant suspended by review division where
he had not been represented by counsel at time sentence was imposed and his damage to landlord's property was not more
than one hundred and twenty-five dollars. Id., 387.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 136; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 476.
Annotations to former section 53-127:
Cited. 72 C. 470; 73 C. 117.
Annotation to former section 53-197:
Cited. 23 CS 43.
Sec. 53a-100. Definitions. (a) The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Building" in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any watercraft, aircraft,
trailer, sleeping car, railroad car or other structure or vehicle or any building with a valid
certificate of occupancy. Where a building consists of separate units, such as, but not
limited to separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, any unit not occupied by the
actor is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate buildin