Sec. 53a-59c. Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of a pregnant woman resulting
in termination of pregnancy when such person commits assault in the first degree as
provided under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-59 and (1) the victim
of such assault is pregnant, and (2) such assault results in the termination of pregnancy
that does not result in a live birth.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative
defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the
offense, did not know that the victim was pregnant.
(c) Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy is a class A
felony.
(P.A. 03-21, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury
to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) with
intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person
or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than
by means of the discharge of a firearm; or (3) he recklessly causes serious physical
injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
(4) for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally
causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person
by administering to such person, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation
capable of producing the same; or (5) he is a parolee from a correctional institution and
with intent to cause physical injury to an employee or member of the Board of Pardons
and Paroles, he causes physical injury to such employee or member.
(b) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 61; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 18; P.A. 73-639, S. 20; P.A. 84-236, S. 4; P.A. 93-246, S. 3; July Sp. Sess.
P.A. 94-2, S. 5; P.A. 04-234, S, 2.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (6) in Subsec. (a) re physical injury to employee of department of correction or member
of parole board; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subdiv. (3) re physical injury to peace officer or fireman resulting from
intentional attempt to prevent such person from performing his duty, renumbering accordingly; P.A. 84-236 amended
Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (a) by changing "committed to" to "in the custody of" and adding phrase "confined in any institution
or facility of the department of correction"; P.A. 93-246 amended Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (a) to delete from the scope of
the offense a person who is in the custody of the commissioner of correction or confined in any institution or facility of
the department of correction and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee of the department of correction causes
physical injury to such employee; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to add "other than by means
of the discharge of a firearm" to reflect changes made to Sec. 53a-59 by same public act; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of
Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004.
Illegal confinement is no defense to assault on correctional officer. 169 C. 438, 441. Cited. 171 C. 264. Cited. 172 C.
275. Cited. 173 C. 254, 258, 259. Cited. 184 C. 157, 166; id., 520, 522. Cited. 193 C. 144, 145, 153. Cited. Id., 232, 243.
Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Cited. 198 C. 23, 24. Cited. 199 C. 146, 147, 153. Cited. 216 C. 647, 661, 664. Cited. 222 C. 331,
335. Cited. 231 C. 545, 546, 555, 556, 560, 562, 563. Cited. 237 C. 238, 239.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. Id., 612-615. Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Cited. Id., 320, 321.
336. Cited. Id., 679, 681. Cited. 13 CA 667, 671. Cited. 17 CA 200, 201. Cited. 20 CA 75, 76, 80. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14.
Cited. 32 CA 224, 239, 240. Cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Cited. 35 CA 138, 148. Cited. Id., 431, 432. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited.
37 CA 338, 346. Cited. 38 CA 598, 599. Cited. 46 CA 486. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 741.
Cited. 34 CS 531, 540, 541.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 171 C. 395, 397. Cited. 175 C. 155-157, 160, 164. Subdiv. (2) cited. 184 C. 520, 521. Subdiv. (3)
cited. 185 C. 63, 66, 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (5) cited. 190 C. 143, 144. Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C.
48, 56. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 126. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 119, 127.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 636. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 651, 653. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 405, 406. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 424, 425. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 322, 327. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 322, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. 201 C. 103, 104; Id., 289, 290; 202 C. 520, 523, 524; 204 C. 207, 208; Id., 714,
716. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C. 733, 736. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 151, 154. Subdiv. (2) cited. 219 C. 721, 722; 220 C. 385,
388; 221 C. 447, 449. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 556, 559. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 243, 244, 264. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
243, 245, 246, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. 226 C. 618, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 153, 155. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 711, 713.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 751, 753. Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 147, 149, 152. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 910. Subdiv. (5) cited. 230
C. 591, 593. Subdiv. (5) cited. 231 C. 545-549, 551-563. Cited. Id., 545, 556, 557, 559. Subdiv. (5) cited. 235 C. 748,
751. Subdiv. (5) cited. 237 C. 238, 239. Subdiv. (2) cited. 239 C. 481.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 1 CA 584, 585. Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 40, 49. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 40, 42, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 590, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 701, 702, 706. Subdiv. (2) cited. 7 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 95, 96. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 377, 378. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 35. Subdiv. (2) cited. 9 CA 161, 162, 167, 168; 10 CA 50, 51; Id., 330,
331, 336, 344; Id., 462, 463; Id., 643-645, 652; 11 CA 665, 666; 13 CA 386, 387; 14 CA 463, 464; id., 472-474; Id., 493,
494, 497; Id., 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 704, 710. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 226,
227. Subdiv. (2) cited. 19 CA 245, 246. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 576, 577. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited.
20 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 75, 76, 84. Subdiv. (3) cited. 22 CA 586, 587. Subdiv. (5) cited. 23 CA 83, 84. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 447-449. Cited. Id., 447, 450. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 502, 506. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 705, 706. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 705, 711. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 264, 266. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 563, 565; Id., 624, 625, 627. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 685, 686, 690. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 275, 278. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 565-567; 26
CA 114, 116; Id., 145, 146; Id., 242, 243. Subdiv. (3) cited. 27 CA 73, 88. Cited. Id., 322, 329, 330. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
322, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 290, 302. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 645, 646.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 262, 263. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 95, 96, 99; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 31 CA 58, 59. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 140, 141, 145. Subdiv. (5) cited. 32 CA 224-226, 237-243. Subdiv. (5)
cited. Id., 448, 449. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 647, 650. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 691. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 148, 151, 153. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 138, 148. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA
641, 642. Cited. Id., 805, 807. Subdiv. (2) cited. 37 CA 338, 339, 346, 347. Cited. Id., 338, 346, 347. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 338, 347. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 437, 438. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 247, 248. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
777, 786. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 868, 869, 876. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40 CA 757, 758.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 333-335, 338, 339, 341. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 517. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 565, 567. Cited. 43 CA 205. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 252. Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 125.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 307. Cited. 45 CA 591. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 46 CA 24. Cited.
Id., 741.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CS 494, 497. It is possible to prove assault in the second degree without necessarily proving risk
of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the second degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship to each
other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 231 C. 545, 556.
Sec. 53a-60a. Assault in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: One
year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a
firearm when he commits assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-60,
and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of assault
in the second degree and assault in the second degree with a firearm upon the same
transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon
the same information.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 5.)
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 9 CA 648, 649. Cited. 23 CA 502, 506. Cited. 45 CA 591.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 424, 425. Cited. 200 C. 642, 643, 650. Cited. 201 C. 368, 369. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-60b. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree: Class D felony: Two years not suspendable.
(a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally
retarded person in the second degree when such person commits assault in the second
degree under section 53a-60 or larceny in the second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3)
and (1) the victim of such assault or larceny has attained at least sixty years of age, is
blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim
of such assault or larceny is a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or larceny in the
second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3) and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled,
pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree upon the same incident of
assault or larceny, as the case may be, but such person may be charged and prosecuted
for all such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the second degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed
may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 18, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 29; P.A. 99-122, S. 2; 99-186, S. 15; P.A. 01-84, S. 6, 26.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to require that two years of sentence imposed must be served, effective July
1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault
of a victim sixty or older in the second degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the
second degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where
the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree" to "assault of an elderly,
blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the
offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as
Subsec. (d); P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add "or larceny", effective July 1, 2001; (Revisor's note: In 2005, the
Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 199 C. 146, 147, 153. Cited. 223 C. 243, 248. Cited. 230 C. 400, 402.
Cited. 5 CA 594, 595. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 420, 431. Cited. 33 CA 616.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 33 CA 616. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-60c. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: Three years
not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant
or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm when such person commits assault in the second degree with a firearm under section 53a-60a and (1) the victim
of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled,
as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person
with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with
mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or assault in the
second degree with a firearm and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or
mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm upon the same incident of
assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all of such offenses upon
the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony and any person found guilty under
this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which three years of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 3; P.A. 80-442, S. 19, 28; P.A. 99-122, S. 3; 99-186, S. 16.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that three years of sentence imposed shall not be suspended or
reduced, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in
the second degree with a firearm" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the second degree
with a firearm", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where
the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree with a firearm" to "assault
of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree with a firearm" where appearing, amended Subsec.
(a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative
defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering
former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate
affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Sec. 53a-60d. Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle when,
while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug
or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the
effect of such liquor or drug.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class D felony and the court
shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of
any person found guilty under this section for one year.
(P.A. 82-403, S. 2; P.A. 83-534, S. 9; P.A. 85-147, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 83-534 amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or
nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty for one year; P.A. 85-147 deleted "while intoxicated" from the
title of the offense and a provision that defined "intoxication" to include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both, and
replaced elements of offense of "when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes
serious physical injury to another person" with "when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor
or drug".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 219 C. 752, 757. Cited. 222 C. 672, 674. Cited. 224 C. 730, 731, 734. Cited. 226 C. 191, 201. Cited. 230 C. 572,
573. Nothing said in General Assembly proceeding concerning an amendment to this section to remedy an unrelated aspect
changed the rule of law; judgment of appellate court in State v. Leroy, 33 CA 232, reversed. 232 C. 1, 2, 5, 13, 14, 16.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 9 CA 686, 730. Cited. 16 CA 472, 475. Cited. 21 CA 138, 143, 144. Cited. 22 CA
142, 144, 159, 165-167, 169, 170. Cited. 23 CA 215, 216. Cited. Id., 720-722. Cited. 25 CA 282, 284, 293. Cited. 26 CA
805, 806, 808. Cited. 32 CA 553, 554, 556, 571. Cited. 33 CA 232, 233; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 34
CA 557, 564. Cited. Id., 655, 665. Cited. 36 CA 710, 713. Cited. 38 CA 282, 283. Cited. 40 CA 359, 360, 364, 365. Nothing
in Sec. 14-227a prohibits evidence of consciousness of guilt based on defendant's refusal to take a breath test being
considered in a prosecution under this section. 63 CA 433.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 232 C. 1, 2.
Cited. 16 CA 472, 473, 477. Cited. 32 CA 553, 554. Cited. 33 CA 232, 233; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1 et seq.
Cited. 34 CA 655, 666. Cited. 38 CA 282, 283.
Sec. 53a-61. Assault in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to
another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) he
recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or (3) with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon, a
dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.
(b) Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty
under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of one year which may not be suspended or reduced.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 62; P.A. 86-287, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 30.)
History: P.A. 86-287 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to electronic defense weapons; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec.
(b) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subsec. (a)(3) to reflect
preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1).
See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a).
Cited. 170 C. 162. Cited. 171 C. 264. Cited. 173 C. 254, 259. Cited. 184 C. 157, 158, 162. Cited. 189 C. 1, 7. Cited.
190 C. 428, 429. Cited. 194 C. 347, 349. Cited. Id., 408, 412. Cited. 196 C. 430, 431. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191. Cited. 200
C. 544, 545. Cited. 202 C. 520, 521, 524. Cited. Id., 629, 631. Cited. 205 C. 352. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. Id., 52, 53.
Cited. 222 C. 299, 302. Cited. Id., 331, 335. Cited. 227 C. 677, 680. Cited. 228 C. 487, 488. Cited. Id., 582, 584. Cited.
233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 78, 81.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 6 CA 189, 190. Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 9 CA 59, 60, 70.
Cited. Id., 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. 11 CA 499, 501. Cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Cited. Id.,
585, 587. Cited. 13 CA 708, 709. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 17 CA 234, 235. Cited. 20 CA 6, 8. Cited. Id., 75, 80.
Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. 24 CA 57, 58. Cited. Id., 556, 577. Cited. 25 CA 421, 422; judgment reversed, see 222 C.
299 et seq. Cited. Id., 472, 473. Cited. 26 CA 157, 162. Cited. Id., 439, 440. Cited. 27 CA 786, 787. Cited. 28 CA 581,
583, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. Id., 683, 684. Cited. 30 CA 346,
348. Cited. 31 CA 497, 502. Cited. 35 CA 107, 109. Cited. 36 CA 106, 108; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78 et seq. Cited.
37 CA 338, 348. Cited. Id., 733, 743. Cited. 39 CA 810, 811. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806, 828, 829. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited.
42 CA 810. Cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 282. Cited. 46 CA 131.
Cited. 37 CS 664, 665. Cited. 39 CS 347, 348. Cited. 41 CS 505, 508.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 177 C. 248; 180 C. 167, 168. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 557, 560. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 353, 355.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 184 C. 366. Subdiv. (3) cited. 185 C. 63, 76, 78, 79. Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 114, 115; 193 C. 48, 56.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 126, 127. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 195 C. 232,
243. Cited. 197 C. 115, 117. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. 202 C. 629, 635, 660. Subdiv. (1) cited.
206 C. 40, 43. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 657, 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 110, 112. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 672, 674.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 160, 161; 220 C. 487, 489; Subdiv. (2) cited. 222 C. 444, 447. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 41, 42.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28
CA 581, 590, reversed. 226 C. 601, 602, 606, 613. Cited. Id., 601, 602, 612. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 606, 613, 615.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 610, 612. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 813, 815.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 3 CA 374, 375. Cited. 5 CA 40, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 40, 41, 49, 50. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 40, 49, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 590, 591, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 407, 408. Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA
27, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 257, 258. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 545, 547; 10 CA 330, 336. Cited. 10 CA 709-712. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 499-502. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 655, 656; 13 CA 386, 387; Id., 667,
668. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 554, 555. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 75, 77, 86; Id., 101, 102. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 663,
664; 24 CA 518, 519; 26 CA 114, 116; Id., 259, 260. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 331, 332, 346, 348; 27 CA 322, 327, 330. Cited.
Id., 322, 329, 330. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 330. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 581, 585-588, 592;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 581, 586-588, 603; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et
seq. Cited. Id., 581, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited 29 CA 524, 525. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 704,
705. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 126. Subdiv. (2) cited. 35 CA 51, 59, 61, 65. Cited. 37 CA 338, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
338, 348. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 733, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 419, 420. Subdiv.
(1) cited Id., 832, 833. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 565, 567. Subdiv. (1) cited. 42 CA 445. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 768. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 591. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. This is not a cognizable offense
and therefore not a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the first degree. 56 CA 592.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CS 520, 521. Elements of Sec. 53a-64 are so consistent with elements of Subdiv. (2) that the court
is precluded by principles of double jeopardy from entering a finding of guilty as to both charges. 46 CS 130. Subdiv. (2):
Defendant's recklessly placing his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period
of time constituted "serious physical injury". Id. It is possible to prove assault in the third degree without necessarily
proving risk of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the third degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship
to each other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.
Sec. 53a-61a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or
mentally retarded person in the third degree when such person commits assault in the
third degree under section 53a-61 and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least
sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental retardation, as defined in
section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the third degree and assault of an
elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree upon
the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both
such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under this section
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which shall not be suspended
or reduced.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 31; P.A. 99-122, S. 4; 99-186, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence to
reflect preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault
of a victim sixty or older in the third degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the
third degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the
victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the third degree" to "assault of an elderly,
blind, disabled or pregnant person in the third degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense
an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as
Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses
established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence.
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Court, in sentencing a defendant convicted under this section, must impose a one-year mandatory nonsuspendable term
of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557-559.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421, 431. Cited. 16 CA 318, 319. Cited. 21 CA 248, 249. Cited. 29 CA
524, 525. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314. Cited. 32 CA 178, 179.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 12 CA 239, 240. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Secs. 53a-61b to 53a-61z. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 53a-61aa. Threatening in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of threatening in the first degree when such person (1) (A) threatens to commit
any crime involving the use of a hazardous substance with the intent to terrorize another
person, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit
such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, evacuation or inconvenience, or (2) (A) threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to cause
evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "hazardous substance" means any physical,
chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity,
concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or
incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health.
(c) Threatening in the first degree is a class D felony.
(Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 7, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 15; P.A. 03-22, S. 1.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to delete in Subdivs.
(1) and (2) provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence; P.A. 03-22 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing
elements of crime as Subdiv. (1), redesignating existing Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B), respectively, and
adding new Subdiv. (2) to restore provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to cause evacuation
of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and
threatening to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience.
Sec. 53a-62. Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A
person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such
person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent
serious physical injury, (2) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with
the intent to terrorize another person, or (3) such person threatens to commit such crime
of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.
(b) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 63; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 8, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 16.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing "threatening" with "threatening in the second degree"
where appearing and amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, delete Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit a crime
of violence with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public
transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and delete Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such
crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience, said provisions being reenacted as part of
Sec. 53a-61aa by same act, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re
a person, by physical threat, intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical
injury as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another
person and add Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing
such terror.
Cited. 175 C. 204, 205. Cited. 182 C. 585, 592; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a
defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of
which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 193 C. 602, 612. Cited. 195 C. 636. Cited.
201 C. 115, 116. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. 205 C. 262, 264. Cited. 207 C. 565, 567. Cited. 208 C. 689, 695. Cited.
209 C. 34, 38. Cited. Id., 52, 53. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 224 C. 494, 496. Cited. 227 C. 829, 832. Cited. 241 C. 413.
Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 289, 290. Cited. 8 CA 190, 191. Cited. Id., 496, 500, 504-506. Cited. 9 CA 161, 162.
Cited. 14 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 526, 527. Cited. 25 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 334, 336. Cited. 26 CA 481, 482, 487; judgment
reversed, see 224 C. 494 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. Id.,
708, 712. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498. Cited. 33 CA 103, 104. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Words of defendant's
threat to young victim, along with surrounding circumstances of the threat, were such that it was reasonable for jury to
infer that defendant had placed the victim in fear of "imminent" serious physical injury. 75 CA 103. Evidence was sufficient
to sustain conviction. 83 CA 489.
Cited. 37 CS 664, 665. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575. Cited. 43 CS 46, 52.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 566, 567. Cited. 175 C. 204, 205. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 182 C. 585, 588; part of ruling in State
v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to
a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 485, 486. Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 462, 468. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 689, 690. Cited. 226 C.
601, 603. Subdiv. (1) cited. 226 C. 601, 603, 606, 613. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28 CA 581, 590,
reversed. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 601, 606. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 613, 615. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 153, 155.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 707, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 403, 409.
Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser
included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647, 649. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 496, 504. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 13 CA 386, 387; Id., 438, 439. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 643, 644. Subdiv. (3) cited. 28 CA 581, 586, 592;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 581, 586, 603; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq.
Cited. Id., 581, 589, 590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 95, 96; judgment reversed,
see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 184, 186; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35
CA 262, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 276, 277. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 733, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 306, 307. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 306, 307, 313. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777, 785. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 617, 618. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA
515, 517. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 584, 585, 592. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 701, 702. Subdiv. (2) was not unconstitutionally
vague on its face. Statute's application to defendant's conduct was proper and did not interfere with his duty to protect his
child and statute was not vague as applied to facts of case. 81 CA 248. There is no indication that legislature did not intend
to create separate crimes prohibited by Secs. 53a-181 (a)(3) and Subdiv. (2). Id.
Sec. 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of
serious physical injury to another person.
(b) Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 64.)
Cited. 179 C. 617, 618. Cited. 194 C. 408, 412. Cited. 200 C. 607, 608. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 233 C. 502, 513.
Cited. 238 C. 313. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 163. Cited. 8 CA 496, 500, 501. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. 32 CA 84, 86. Cited. 33 CA
103, 104. Cited. Id., 743, 749; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. 43 CA 578. Cited.
44 CA 6. Under this section, jury has to consider objectively the nature and degree of the risk and defendant's subjective
awareness of that risk. 75 CA 432.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 348; id., 359, 360. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 227 C. 301, 320. Cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 237 C. 348, 352.
Cited. 3 CA 289, 290. Cited. 8 CA 153, 155. Cited. 10 CA 659, 661. Cited. 18 CA 477, 478. Cited. 24 CA 330, 331.
Cited. 26 CA 145, 146. Cited. 40 CA 515, 517. Cited. Id., 643, 645. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 354.
Sec. 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person.
(b) Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 65.)
Cited. 194 C. 408, 412.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 14 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 10, 12, 16, 20, 27. Cited. Id., 804. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited.
31 CA 497, 498, 502.
Cited. 35 CS 570, 573. Cited. 37 CS 661. Cited. 38 CS 619-621. Cited. 40 CA 643, 645. Defendant's recklessly placing
his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period of time constituted "serious
physical injury" in violation of the statute. 46 CS 130.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 223 C. 618, 625.
Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Cited. 24 CA 662, 665; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 618 et seq.
PART VI*
SEX OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-217:
Cited. 118 C. 505; 139 C. 247; 140 C. 610; 152 C. 197. Corroboration is not essential but in its absence court should
weigh complainant's credibility with care. 128 C. 126. Assault in this statute includes a touching; consent not a defense.
129 C. 603. Not required to plead over to complaint amended re date of alleged commission. 151 C. 189. Defendant could
put his character in issue but only as to sexual morality and decency, the specific traits involved in action. 157 C. 99. Cited.
160 C. 366; 161 C. 303.
Cited. 25 CS 433; 27 CS 44.
Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 45.
Annotations to former section 53-218:
Marriage in fact must be proved. 6 C. 446. Solicitation to commit adultery a crime. 7 C. 270. Testimony of more than
one act inadmissible under single charge of adultery. 10 C. 373. What evidence held inadmissible to prove marriage. 40
C. 145. Involves moral turpitude and is an infamous crime. 112 C. 274.
Although this statute specifies conduct is adulterous only if woman is married, in action for divorce from husband
based on adultery, marital status of other woman irrelevant. 22 CS 147.
Annotations to former section 53-219:
What constitutes offense of lascivious carriage. 5 D. 81. Meaning of "lascivious". 120 C. 166. Cited. 129 C. 603.
Cited. 9 CS 165; 23 CS 299. Meaning of lascivious conduct discussed. 24 CS 99.
History discussed. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 187 to 189. Statute was intended to apply only to conduct between persons of
different sexes. Id., 190. Fact that sexual activity is conducted privately behind locked doors between a willing male and
female is no defense. Id., 698. Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 57. In police investigation of defendant's conduct in violation of this
section, officer's observance of defendant through her bedroom window and subsequent arrest on speedy information held
no invasion of her constitutional rights. Disclosure of identity of informant was not required. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 35. Cited.
Id., 42.
Annotations to former section 53-224:
Definition of seduction. 27 C. 320; 76 C. 136.
Annotations to former section 53-226:
Cited. 125 C. 328. No justification for reading into the statutory crime of lewdness any unexpressed additional requirement of openness. 146 C. 365.
Cited. 23 CS 296.
Word "offering" means a mere offering of the body without physical contact. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 597, 598. Lewdness
includes immoral and degenerate conduct between persons of the same sex and the proposal or offer for lewdness as well
as the act itself is a crime. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 31, 32. There was no entrapment of defendant where officer did not solicit
commission of offense but merely offered the opportunity for its commission. Id., 32, 33. Scienter of defendants shown
by facts proved by testimony of police officers of repeated warnings and advice to defendants of prostitutes who frequented
their bar. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 594.
Annotations to former section 53-227:
Elements of crime. 82 C. 216. Cited. 113 C. 291; 128 C. 180.
Conviction under this statute is cause for revocation of license to practice medicine and surgery. 13 CS 144.
Annotations to former section 53-229:
Cited. 113 C. 291.
Cited. 9 CS 166.
Annotations to former section 53-230:
State must prove what facts. 17 C. 472; 38 C. 525; 96 C. 315. Term "house of ill-fame" synonymous with bawdy house.
33 C. 92. In prosecution for disorderly house, not necessary to show reputation of house. Id., 259. Evidence of character
for chastity may be rebutted by showing that accused kept a house of ill-fame. 33 C. 269. Term "house" means any building
kept for purpose named. 36 C. 79. What complaint not bad for duplicity. 38 C. 38; 66 C. 9. To sustain information for
keeping house "reputed" to be one of ill-fame, fact that it is such a house must be proved; 82 C. 111; 96 C. 315; statute is
valid. 83 C. 550; id., 56. Not necessary to prove that accused knew character of house; his knowledge is immaterial. 96
C. 316. Cited. 125 C. 328; 153 C. 149.
Single act of lewdness not enough to constitute lewdness under this statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 595.
Annotations to former section 53-231:
Bond must conform to statutory requirements. 9 C. 350. This section constitutional. 31 C. 574. See note to former
section 53-230, supra. Cited. 168 C. 74.
Annotations to former section 53-235:
Cited. 9 CS 166; 23 CS 296.
Annotations to former section 53-238:
Evidence showing constancy in accusation admissible. 8 C. 100; 44 C. 155; 47 C. 466; 93 C. 321. Conviction may be
had on uncorroborated testimony of a nine-year-old girl as to principal fact. 29 C. 389. Evidence as to general good character
of accused admissible. 33 C. 269. Jury must be satisfied that act was without consent of prosecutrix, but there is no rule
of law that she should make the utmost resistance. 45 C. 264; see also 72 C. 44. Rape may be committed on child under
ten years of age. 46 C. 362. Unnecessary to allege that prosecutrix was ten or more years of age. 50 C. 579. Resistance;
putting in fear. 72 C. 44. Intoxication or insanity of complainant; charges by her against other men; liberality in applying
rules, where only she and accused are witnesses. 80 C. 546. What constitutes abuse of minor; 81 C. 97; election between
counts; declarations of victim; id., 1; 93 C. 321; woman may be guilty of abuse of minor, as accessory; 82 C. 213; previous
unchastity or consent no defense; cross-examination of complainant. Id., 454. When husband and wife under age of sixteen
live together voluntarily, the former is not guilty of crime under this section. 113 C. 288, 294. Cited. 113 C. 786; 118 C.
505; 128 C. 324; 132 C. 278; id., 684; 154 C. 302, 303. Joint trial before jury of defendant and another for crimes of rape
against complainant at about the same time and place proper. 154 C. 517. Cited. 155 C. 593. Hospital record of complaining
witness' medical examination on day of rape admitted in evidence as business record pursuant to section 52-180. 158 C.
22, 461. Cited. 162 C. 317. Cited. 175 C. 512, 523.
In case lacking much of brutality, aggravation in assault and surprise attack on wholly innocent victim characteristic
of majority of cases, sentence of eight to twelve years on review reduced to five to twelve years. 22 CS 42. Cited. 22 CS
493; 27 CS 235; 29 CS 94, 187.
Annotation to former section 53-238:
Cited. 166 C. 96.
Annotations to former section 53-239:
Proof of rape will sustain complaint for assault with intent to rape. 7 C. 56. Person charged with rape may be convicted
of assault with intent to rape. 19 C. 392. Any language in complaint charging exertion of physical force sufficient without
use of words "with actual violence". 31 C. 213. This section is in affirmation of common law and a verdict of "attempt to
commit rape" sufficient. 70 C. 114. Various matters of evidence considered; reputation of accused and complainant. 84
C. 222. Is infamous crime within meaning of section 46-13. 128 C. 129. Corroboration of complainant's testimony not
essential to proof of guilt. 133 C. 600. Cited. 152 C. 703; 154 C. 517, 521. Cited. 162 C. 6.
Annotation to former section 53-241:
Statute applies in court where person is originally presented or in court to which he is bound over or appeals. 132 C. 685.
Annotations to chapter 952, part VI:
Cited. 192 C. 154, 158, 163. Secs. 53a-65 through 53a-90 cited. 202 C. 333, 340. Secs. 53a-65-53a-90 cited. 230 C.
43, 78.
Cited. 35 CA 173, 181.
Sec. 53a-65. Definitions. As used in this part, except section 53a-70b, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) "Actor" means a person accused of sexual assault.
(2) "Sexual intercourse" means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or
cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Its meaning is limited to persons not
married to each other. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal
intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal
opening of the victim's body.
(3) "Sexual contact" means any contact with the intimate parts of a person not
married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose
of degrading or humiliating such person or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor
with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor
or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person.
(4) "Mentally defective" means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect
which renders such person incapable of appraising the nature of such person's conduct.
(5) "Mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable
of appraising or controlling such person's conduct owing to the influence of a drug or
intoxicating substance administered to such person without such person's consent, or
owing to any other act committed upon such person without such person's consent.
(6) "Physically helpless" means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason
is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.
(7) "Use of force" means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual
physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.
(8) "Intimate parts" means the genital area, groin, anus, inner thighs, buttocks or
breasts.
(9) "Psychotherapist" means a physician, psychologist, nurse, substance abuse
counselor, social worker, clergyman, marital and family therapist, mental health service
provider or other person, whether or not licensed or certified by the state, who performs
or purports to perform psychotherapy.
(10) "Psychotherapy" means the professional treatment, assessment or counseling
of a mental or emotional illness, symptom or condition.
(11) "Emotionally dependent" means that the nature of the patient's or former patient's emotional condition and the nature of the treatment provided by the psychotherapist are such that the psychotherapist knows or has reason to know that the patient or
former patient is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact by or sexual intercourse
with the psychotherapist.
(12) "Therapeutic deception" means a representation by a psychotherapist that sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist is consistent with or part
of the patient's treatment.
(13) "School employee" means a teacher, substitute teacher, school administrator,
school superintendent, guidance counselor, psychologist, social worker, nurse, physician, school paraprofessional or coach employed by a local or regional board of education or a private elementary or secondary school or working in a public or private elementary or secondary school.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 66; P.A. 75-619, S. 1; P.A. 81-27, S. 2; P.A. 85-341, S. 1; P.A. 87-259; P.A. 92-260, S. 32; P.A.
93-340, S. 1; P.A. 94-221, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted definitions of "deviate sexual intercourse", "female" and "forcible compulsion", added
definitions of "actor", "use of force" and "intimate parts", redefined "sexual intercourse" in detail where previously defined
as having "its ordinary meaning" and made minor changes in wording of remaining definitions; P.A. 81-27 exempted
section 53a-70b from applicability of definitions in this section; P.A. 85-341 amended definition of sexual contact to
include "contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification
of the actor"; P.A. 87-259 amended definition of sexual contact to include contact made for the purpose of degrading or
humiliating the victim; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in the definition of sexual intercourse by repositioning
language; P.A. 93-340 added definitions of "psychotherapist", "psychotherapy", "emotionally dependent" and "therapeutic
deception"; P.A. 94-221 added the definition of "school employee".
Cited. 170 C. 111. Statute includes definition of sexual intercourse and provides that "penetration, however slight, is
sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio ...". It specifically omits cunnilingus, therefore
penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757, 765, 767. Cited. 187 C. 216,
220, 221. Cited. 191 C. 453, 463. Cited. 192 C. 154, 160, 161. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 210 C. 110, 127.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 112, 118. Cited. Id., 316, 322. Cited. 33 CA 133, 139. Cited. 35 CA 173, 174,
180. Smacking victim's buttocks considered to be sexual contact. 59 CA 538.
Former section 53-216 cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 45.
Subdiv. (2):
Court properly defined the term "cunnilingus" since statute contained no specific definitions. Penetration is not an
essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757, 763, 765. Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 194 C.
258, 271, 273. Cited. 198 C. 285, 289. Cited. Id., 617, 621. Cited. 201 C. 211, 215, 216. Cited. 202 C. 509, 514. Cited.
207 C. 646, 652. Cited. 209 C. 733, 740. Cited. 210 C. 110, 115, 117, 123-125, 127-129. Cited. 211 C. 18, 35. Cited. 224
C. 397, 412, 413, 415. Cited. 226 C. 618, 660. Penetration of the labia majora constitutes vaginal penetration. 252 C. 795.
Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when alleged victim is
compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the mouth. 256 C. 517.
Cited. 7 CA 489, 493. Cited. Id., 701, 709. Cited. 11 CA 102, 110, 117-119. Cited. Id., 316, 319. Cited. 14 CA 451,
455. Cited. 23 CA 712, 714. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 626; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.;
judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.; judgment reversed see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 33 CA 133, 139. Withdrawal
of consent communicated to the other person followed by a compelling use of force to continue sexual intercourse would
constitute sexual assault. 35 CA 173, 180, 181. Cited. 38 CA 56, 59-61. Cited. 41 CA 139, 141. Cited. Id., 287, 296. Cited.
43 CA 785. Applies least penetration doctrine. 50 CA 715.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 619. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 386, 410. Cited. 224 C. 397, 417.
Cited. Id., 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 725, 730. Cited. 8 CA 607, 613. Cited. 11 CA 102, 114. Cited. 15 CA 251, 278. Cited. 20 CA 694,
698. Cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 627,
636; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 224 C.
656 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 402, 408. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 291. Cited. 31 CA 452, 454.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Cited. 205 C. 386, 398.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 186 C. 757, 766. Subpara. (B) cited. 189 C. 611, 629. Subpara. (B) cited. 202 C. 509, 514; 205 C. 386, 391, 393.
Cited. 228 C. 552, 570.
Cited. 7 CA 489, 493. Cited. 11 CA 316, 319. Cited. 14 CA 40. Cited. Id., 451, 454. Cited. 16 CA 75, 79. Subpara. (B)
cited. 18 CA 694, 698. Cited. 21 CA 411, 419. Cited. 30 CA 281, 288.
Subdiv. (8):
Cited. 186 C. 757, 767. Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 619. Cited. 192 C. 154, 160. Cited. 207 C. 456, 463.
Cited. 11 CA 316, 321. Cited. 20 CA 694, 697. Cited. 25 CA 653, 657; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited.
26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 627; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 402, 408.
Sec. 53a-66. Lack of consent. Section 53a-66 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 67; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-67. Affirmative defenses. (a) In any prosecution for an offense under this
part based on the victim's being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this part, except an offense under section
53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, it shall be an affirmative defense
that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, living
together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal status
of their relationship.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 68; P.A. 75-619, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 3; P.A. 90-162.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed as affirmative defense the actor's belief that alleged
victim was above the specified age in cases where age is an element of offense unless victim is under fourteen, relettering
Subsec. (c) accordingly; P.A. 81-27 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70b;
P.A. 90-162 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a
or 53a-72b.
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 202 C. 86, 91.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388.
Subsec. (b):
Discussion of "cohabitation" and burden of producing evidence thereof for entitlement to a charge on the affirmative
defense under statute. 181 C. 426, 432-434. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191, 193, 195, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 739-741, 752. Cited.
233 C. 813, 850.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 730. Cited. 10 CA 709, 712, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 116. Sec. 53a-67(c) (Revised to 1972) cited. Id.
Cited. 25 CA 384, 389. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.
Secs. 53a-68 and 53a-69. Corroboration; exceptions. Time limitation for complaint. Sections 53a-68 and 53a-69 are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 69, 70; P.A. 74-131; P.A. 76-216; P.A. 87-223.)
Sec. 53a-70. Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony. (a) A person
is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another
person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or
a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a
third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person
or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such
other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older
than such person, or (3) commits sexual assault in the second degree as provided in
section 53a-71 and in the commission of such offense is aided by two or more other
persons actually present, or (4) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and
such other person is mentally incapacitated to the extent that such other person is unable
to consent to such sexual intercourse.
(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, sexual assault in
the first degree is a class B felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not
be suspended or reduced by the court or, if the victim of the offense is under ten years
of age, for which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced
by the court.
(2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the offense is a violation
of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the victim of the offense is under
sixteen years of age or the offense is a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of
this section. Any person found guilty under said subdivision (1) or (2) shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be
suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under ten years of age or of which
five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the
victim is under sixteen years of age.
(3) Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which
together constitute a sentence of at least ten years.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 71; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 19; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 78; P.A. 75-619, S. 3; P.A. 82-428, S. 2; P.A. 89-359;
P.A. 92-87, S. 3; P.A. 93-340, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 13; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 49; P.A. 00-161, S. 1; P.A. 02-138,
S. 5.)
History: 1971 act replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators in Subsec. (a) with numeric indicators; 1972 act changed
applicable age in Subsec. (a)(1) from twenty-one to eighteen reflecting lowered age of majority; P.A. 75-619 reworded
section to reflect changes in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, substituted sexual "assault" for sexual "misconduct" and made the
offense a Class B rather than Class D felony; P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that one year of sentence may
not be suspended or reduced by the court; P.A. 89-359 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (2) re engaging in sexual
intercourse with a person under thirteen years of age; P.A. 92-87 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re committing
sexual assault in the second degree while aided by two or more other persons actually present; P.A. 93-340 amended
Subsec. (a) by specifying in Subdiv. (2) that the actor be more than two years older than the other person; P.A. 95-142
amended Subsec. (b) to provide that ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if
the victim is under ten years of age; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one year to two years
the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence imposed when the victim is other than a victim under ten years of age and to
add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant
to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of at least ten years; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a) by adding
Subdiv. (4) re engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was formerly
classified as sexual assault in the second degree under Sec. 53a-71(a)(2) but was deleted from said section by same
public act; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re classification of offense and length of
nonsuspendable sentence as Subdiv. (1) and amending said Subdiv. to add exception re Subdiv. (2), adding new Subdiv.
(2) to classify the offense as a class A felony for a violation of Subsec. (a)(1) when the victim is under sixteen years of
age and for a violation of Subsec. (a)(2) and establish a nonsuspendable sentence for said violations of ten years if the
victim is under ten years of age and five years if the victim is under sixteen years of age and designating existing provisions
re minimum length of a combined sentence of imprisonment and special parole as Subdiv. (3).
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317; id., 398, 399. Repealed section 53a-72 cited. Id., 512, 513, 516. Cited. 182 C. 412, 413. Cited.
184 C. 258, 259. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52; id., 449, 450; id., 521, 522. Cited. 187 C. 216, 217, 218, 220, 221. Cited. 190 C.
20, 21. Cited. 191 C. 604, 615, 616. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 194 C. 114, 115. Cited. Id., 297, 298. Cited. Id., 692-
696, 698. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254. 265. Cited. 197 C. 280, 281. Cited. Id., 298, 299. "Does not include sexual intercourse
with a victim whom the assailant finds unconscious" but does not apply when assailant strangled victim into a state of
unconsciousness. 198 C. 53, 60, 61. Cited. Id., 190, 193. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 281, 282.
Cited. Id., 481, 494. Cited. Id., 693-695, 711. Cited. 200 C. 465, 466. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 659, 660. Cited.
202 C. 343, 344. Cited. Id., 676, 677. Cited. 204 C. 98, 99. Cited. Id., 441, 442. Cited. Id., 571, 572. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63.
Cited. 207 C. 646, 652. Cited. 209 C. 733, 735, 738-741, 743, 744, 747, 748, 750, 752-757. Cited. 210 C. 110, 117, 127,
128. Section not void for vagueness in context of circumstances of case. Id., 132-134, 136, 139, 143, 144. Cited. 211 C.
672, 674. Cited 212 C. 31, 33. Cited. 215 C. 257, 258. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, reversed. Id., 538,
542, 543. Cited. 219 C. 489, 491. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. Id., 345, 347, 348. Cited. 222 C. 556, 558. Cited. 223 C.
180-182. Cited. Id., 731, 733. Cited. 224 C. 397, 399, 403, 414. Cited. Id., 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452
et seq. Cited. 226 C. 601, 602, 610. Cited. Id., 618, 646. Cited. 227 C. 207, 209, 210. Cited. Id., 616, 623. Cited. Id., 677,
679. Cited. 228 C. 456, 458. Cited. 230 C. 43, 47. Cited. 235 C. 711, 713. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242
C. 409. Cited. Id., 689. Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when
alleged victim is compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the
mouth. 256 C. 517.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 345; id., 378, 379. Cited. Id., 724, 725, 735. Cited. 3 CA 148, 149. Cited. Id., 374, 375, 388. Cited.
Id., 650, 652. Cited. 5 CA 424, 425. Cited. Id., 556. Cited. Id., 586, 587, 589. Cited. 7 CA 257, 258, 261-263. Cited. Id.,
701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 44, 45. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 216, 218. Cited. Id., 345, 346. Cited. Id., 399. Cited. Id., 528,
529, 538. Cited. Id., 620, 621, 626. Cited. 10 CA 457, 458. Cited. Id., 520, 521. Cited. Id., 709, 711, 714. Court concluded
the absence of a marital relationship between defendant and victim is not an essential element. 11 CA 102, 112, 118. Cited.
Id., 236. Cited. Id., 238, 239. Cited. Id., 316, 319, 321. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 14 CA 333,
334. Cited. Id., 688, 693. Cited. 15 CA 251, 274. Cited. 16 CA 75, 76, 78, 80. Cited. 17 CA 391, 392. Cited. 18 CA 134,
135, 146. Cited. 19 CA 111, 116, 140, 142, 145. Cited. 20 CA 737, 738. Cited. 22 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 562, 563. Cited.
23 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 221, 222. Cited. Id., 564, 567; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 13,
14. Cited. Id., 24, 25. Cited. Id., 295, 296. Cited. 25 CA 334, 335. Cited. Id., 503, 505. Cited. Id., 653, 654; judgment
reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 151, 152. Cited. Id., 433, 434. Cited. Id., 674, 676, 678, 680. Cited. 28 CA
548, 551, 556. Cited. Id., 581, 583, 589, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 642, 643. Cited. 32
CA 773, 775. Cited. 34 CA 276, 278. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. Id., 754, 755. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. 38 CA
56, 60. Cited. Id., 777, 779. Cited. 39 CA 267, 268. Cited 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619, 620. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Cited. 44 CA 548. Cited. 46 CA 741. Intent or motive of sexual assault perpetrators, discussed. 47 CA 159. Age of victim
not an element of crime for which jury makes a factual determination but a sentencing factor determined by the courts. 74
CA 376. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual
intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447.
Because the necessary elements of this section and Sec. 53-21 are distinct, court's respective findings of not guilty and
guilty of these distinct crimes was not legally inconsistent. 78 CA 25.
Cited. 41 CS 229, 231, 232, 236. Cited 43 CS 46, 66, 67.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 179 C. 328, 329; 180 C. 101, 102; Id., 565. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 455. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 403. Cited. 186 C. 757, 758, 763, 766. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 372,
373. Cited. Id., 565, 566. Cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 697, 703, 713. Cited. 189 C. 106, 107; id., 611,
612, 625, 628-630; id., 631, 633. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 631, 645. Cited. 190 C. 104, 105, 108; id., 327, 329. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 440, 441. Cited. Id., 496, 498. Cited. 191 C. 604, 605. Subdiv. (1) cited. 192 C. 166, 167. Cited. 193 C. 457,
459. Cited. 194 C. 258, 259, 274. Cited. Id., 594, 595. Cited. Id., 692, 694, 696-698. Cited. 197 C. 50-52. Cited. Id., 485,
486. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54, 60. Cited. Id., 190, 191, 200. Cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 314, 315. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited.
Id., 430, 432. Cited. Id., 598, 600. Cited. Id., 617, 618. Cited. 199 C. 62, 63. Cited. Id., 399, 400. Cited. Id., 481, 482, 488.
Cited. 201 C. 559, 560. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 509-511, 514. Cited. 203 C. 385, 386. Cited. 204 C. 714, 716.
Cited. 206 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 132, 134, 151. Cited. Id., 437, 439. Cited. Id., 528, 531, 532. Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43.
Cited. 207 C. 646, 647. Cited. 209 C. 143-145. Cited. Id., 416-418. Cited. 210 C. 51, 53. Cited. Id., 110, 112, 115, 123,
127. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. Id., 359, 382. Cited. 211 C. 18, 20, 25. Cited. 212 C. 31-33. Cited. 213 C. 593, 602. Cited.
214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (2) Cited. Id., 717, 719. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, reversed. 215 C. 538, 540.
Cited. 216 C. 563, 565. Cited. 218 C. 447, 448. Cited. 219 C. 269, 271. Cited. Id., 283, 284. Cited. Id., 489, 510. Cited.
220 C. 400, 402. Cited. Id., 487, 489. Cited. Id., 698, 700. Cited. 221 C. 264, 265. Cited. 222 C. 87, 88. Cited. 223 C. 52,
53. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 450, 452. Cited. Id., 519, 520. Cited. 226 C. 601, 602, 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 601,
610, 611. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 611. Cited. Id., 618-620, 644. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 618, 644, 645, 649, 650. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 227 C. 616, 617, 619, 620, 624. Cited. Id., 616, 622. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 393, 395. Cited. Id., 456, 469.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 456, 469. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 456, 472. Cited. Id., 552, 554, 570. Cited. Id., 582, 584. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 756, 757. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 529, 530, 536. Cited. Id., 580, 581. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 580, 584, 586. Cited. 230 C. 43, 46, 47, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 195, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 707,
708. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 403, 409. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 145, 146. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 502, 517. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 659, 661. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 284-286. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 576. Cited. Id., 694. Cited. 241 C. 784. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 823. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 445. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 523. Medical treatment exception
to the hearsay rule applies to a child sexual assault victim's statements made to a social worker acting in the chain of
medical care if statements were made to obtain medical treatment and were pertinent to the treatment sought. 260 C. 1.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 346. Cited. Id., 724, 735. Cited. 4 CA 514. Cited. Id., 672. Cited. 7 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 489, 493.
Cited. Id., 653. Cited. 8 CA 35. Cited. Id., 148, 149. Cited. Id., 177, 178. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 528, 538, 539,
541. Cited. Id., 620, 625, 626. Cited. 9 CA 208, 209. Cited. Id., 340, 341. Cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Cited. Id., 709, 711, 712,
716, 717. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103, 110, 112. Cited. Id., 316, 320, 322, 323. Cited. Id., 673, 674. Cited. 13 CA 60, 61. Cited.
Id., 67. Cited. Id., 76, 85. Cited. 14 CA 40. Cited. Id., 451, 452. Cited. Id., 657, 658. Cited. Id., 688, 689, 692. Cited. Id.,
710, 712. Cited. 15 CA 222, 225. Cited. 16 CA 75, 80. Cited. 17 CA 525, 526. Cited. 18 CA 134, 135, 137. Cited. Id., 273,
274. Cited. Id., 643, 644. Cited. Id., 730. Cited. 19 CA 111, 116, 140; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id.,
618, 619. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. 20 CA 101, 102. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 737, 753. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412.
Cited. Id., 467, 468. Cited. 22 CA 329, 330. Cited. Id., 477, 478. Cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see
220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 243, 245, 251. Cited. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 653, 654; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et
seq. Cited. Id., 725, 726. Subdiv. (2) cited. 26 CA 81, 82. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 434,
436. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. 27 CA 279, 280. Cited. Id., 705, 706. Cited. 28 CA 91, 92. Cited. Id., 195, 196. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 360, 361, 363, 366; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 529 et seq. Cited. Id., 402, 404. Cited. Id., 581, 591;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 409, 414. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 724, 725. Cited. 30 CA 56. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 281, 282, 285, 287. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 915. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 178,
179. Cited. Id., 217, 218; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 217, 220; judgment reversed,
see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 485. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 773, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 184, 185;
judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Cited. Id., 457, 458. Cited. 34 CA 276, 278. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 173, 175.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 728-730. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 190, 191, 196, 202. Cited. Id., 216, 217.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 228, 229. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 56, 58.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 125, 126, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 231, 232. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
531, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777, 785, 790. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 45, 46. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 617, 618. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 832, 833. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 132. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 132, 133, 142,
146, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 233, 234. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 250, 252. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 204, 205. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 255, 257. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 287, 288, 296. Cited. Id., 317, 318. Cited. 42
CA 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 186; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 552.
Cited. Id., 680. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 715. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 785.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 457. Cited. Id., 548. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 66. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 116. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 756. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 810. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint
is not double jeopardy. 47 CA 117. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in commenting on testimony of state's expert
witness concerning inconsistencies in results of victim's rape kit tests, that court having also instructed jury to base findings
on recollection of all evidence presented; defendant's challenge to other aspects of instructions on scientific evidence were
not properly preserved for appellate review. Trial court properly admitted victim's written statement to police as constancy
of accusation evidence; defendant failed to establish that court abused its discretion or that he was prejudiced by admission
of that evidence, and his claim that victim's statement is admissible only if tape recorded was incorrect. 48 CA 135. Subdiv.
(1): Trier of fact reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant compelled victim to engage
in sexual intercourse by use of force. 52 CA 466. Subdiv. (1): Defendant could not succeed in argument that the evidence
did not support a guilty verdict under section; jury could reasonably have concluded that the facts and inferences established
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 55 CA 412. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. 57 CA 736. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 58 CA 585. Evidence was sufficient
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 CA 201.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 23 CA 564, 567; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq.
Sec. 53a-70a. Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony.
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree when such person
commits sexual assault in the first degree as provided in section 53a-70, and in the
commission of such offense (1) such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses
a deadly weapon, (2) with intent to disfigure the victim seriously and permanently, or
to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of the victim's body,
such person causes such injury to such victim, (3) under circumstances evincing an
extreme indifference to human life such person recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a risk of death to the victim, and thereby causes serious physical injury to such
victim, or (4) such person is aided by two or more other persons actually present. No
person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and aggravated sexual
assault in the first degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged
and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony or, if the victim
of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class A felony. Any person found guilty
under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of
the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, except that, if
such person committed sexual assault in the first degree by violating subdivision (1) of
subsection (a) of section 53a-70, and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of
age, twenty years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the
court. Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a period of special
parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 of at least five years.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 9; P.A. 80-442, S. 20, 28; P.A. 87-246; P.A. 92-87, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 50; P.A. 02-138,
S. 6.)
History: P.A. 80-442 substituted "deadly weapon" for "firearm" and reference to specific firearms where occurring
and increased portion of sentence which may not be suspended or reduced from one year to five years in Subsec. (b),
effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 87-246 changed the name of the offense from sexual assault in the first degree with a deadly
weapon to aggravated sexual assault in the first degree and amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (2) re disfiguring the
victim or destroying, amputating or disabling a member or organ of the victim and Subdiv. (3) re recklessly engaging in
conduct creating a risk of death to the victim and thereby causing serious physical injury to the victim; P.A. 92-87 amended
Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re commission of the offense while aided by two or more other persons actually present;
June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of twenty
years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class
A felony if the victim is under sixteen years of age, add exception re twenty-year nonsuspendable sentence if the violation
is of Sec. 53a-70(a)(1) and the victim is under sixteen years of age and replace provision that a person found guilty shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole "which together constitute a sentence of twenty
years" with provision that a person found guilty shall be sentenced to a period of special parole "of at least five years".
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 188 C. 697, 699, 713. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242, 257. Cited. 207
C. 412, 416. Cited. 210 C. 110, 117, 127. Cited. Id., 315-317. Cited. 211 C. 672, 674. Judgment of appellate court in State
v. Horne, 19 CA 111, reversed. 215 C. 538, 542, 543. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 118. Cited. 12 CA 179, 180, 187. Cited. 19 CA 111, 113, 116, 139, 140, 145;
judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 36 CA 805, 807. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Cited. 43 CS 211, 212.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43. Cited. 210 C. 110, 112, 115, 123, 128. Cited. Id., 315, 317. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 235
C. 502, 517. Five-week-old fetus constitutes a part of the mother's body and, therefore, is a "member" of her body for
purposes of subdiv. (2). 263 C. 524.
Cited. 19 CA 111, 142, 143; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 725, 726. For purposes of the
offense described in subdiv. (4), it is victim's objective and subjective awareness, and not perpetrator's physical proximity,
that controls the factual determination as to whether perpetrator is "actually present". 75 CA 578.
Sec. 53a-70b. Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B
felony. (a) For the purposes of this section:
(1) "Sexual intercourse" means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or
cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient
to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission
of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the
genital or anal opening of the victim's body; and
(2) "Use of force" means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual
physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.
(b) No spouse or cohabitor shall compel the other spouse or cohabitor to engage in
sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other spouse or cohabitor, or by the
threat of the use of force against such other spouse or cohabitor which reasonably causes
such other spouse or cohabitor to fear physical injury.
(c) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class
B felony.
(P.A. 81-27, S. 1.)
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 193, 195, 196, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 735, 738-741, 743-745, 747, 748,
750, 752-757. Cited. 210 C. 110, 125. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 10 CA 709, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 112. Cited. 31 CA 20, 21, 29. Cited. Id., 497, 498,
501, 503, 506. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 36 CA 718, 720. Cited. 41 CA 604, 620.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 497, 503. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 497, 506.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 209 C. 733, 735.
Cited. 10 CA 709-714. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498, 503,
506. Cited. 36 CA 718, 720. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.
Sec. 53a-71. Sexual assault in the second degree: Class C or B felony. (a) A
person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in
sexual intercourse with another person and: (1) Such other person is thirteen years of
age or older but under sixteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older
than such person; or (2) such other person is mentally defective to the extent that such
other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse; or (3) such other person is
physically helpless; or (4) such other person is less than eighteen years old and the actor
is such person's guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such
person's welfare; or (5) such other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital
or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such
other person; or (6) the actor is a psychotherapist and such other person is (A) a patient
of the actor and the sexual intercourse occurs during the psychotherapy session, (B) a
patient or former patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally
dependent upon the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual
intercourse occurs by means of therapeutic deception; or (7) the actor accomplishes the
sexual intercourse by means of false representation that the sexual intercourse is for a
bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (8) the actor is a school
employee and such other person is a student enrolled in a school in which the actor
works or a school under the jurisdiction of the local or regional board of education which
employs the actor; or (9) the actor is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who
provides intensive, ongoing instruction and such other person is a recipient of coaching
or instruction from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such
coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of
age; or (10) the actor is twenty years of age or older and stands in a position of power,
authority or supervision over such other person by virtue of the actor's professional,
legal, occupational or volunteer status and such other person's participation in a program
or activity, and such other person is under eighteen years of age.
(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony or, if the victim of the
offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person found guilty under
this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which nine months of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 72; P.A. 75-619, S. 4; P.A. 82-428, S. 3; P.A. 83-326, S. 1; P.A. 85-341, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 2;
P.A. 94-221, S. 18; P.A. 00-161, S. 2; P.A. 02-106, S. 1; 02-138, S. 7; P.A. 04-130, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 75-619 restated Subsec. (a) to conform with changes made in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, referred to sexual
"assault" rather than to sexual "misconduct" and made the offense a Class C felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor;
P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that nine months of sentence may not be suspended or reduced by the court;
P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated "to
the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse", redesignated as Subdiv. (3) a victim who is "physically
helpless" and renumbered the remaining Subdivs.; P.A. 85-341 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to increase the applicable
age from fifteen to sixteen years; P.A. 93-340 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to specify that the other person be thirteen
years of age or older and the actor be more than two years older than such person, added Subdiv. (6) re sexual intercourse
between a psychotherapist and a patient or former patient and added Subdiv. (7) re sexual intercourse accomplished by
false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (8) concerning
school employees and students; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by deleting provision re the act of engaging in sexual
intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was reclassified as sexual assault in the first degree
under Sec. 53a-70 by same public act, and by making a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 02-106
amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (9) re sexual intercourse between a coach or instructor and a person who is a recipient
of such coaching or instruction and is a secondary school student receiving such coaching or instruction in a secondary
school setting or under eighteen years of age; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class B felony
if the victim is under sixteen years of age; P.A. 04-130 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (10) re actor twenty years of
age or older who stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over another person under eighteen years of age
and engages in sexual intercourse with such other person.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 180 C. 54, 56. Cited. 185 C. 199, 200. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 73, 74, 91;
id., 348, 349. Cited. 189 C. 321, 325. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Cited. 199 C. 47, 55. Cited. 201 C. 211,
212, 214, 216. Cited. 207 C. 374, 378. Cited. 209 C. 225, 230. Cited. 211 C. 455, 457. Cited. 224 C. 1, 2. Cited. 228 C.
393, 396. P.A. 93-340, Sec. 2 cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 118. Cited. 13 CA 378, 379. Cited. 14 CA 688, 693. Cited. 15 CA 251, 254,
278. Cited. Id., 289, 290. Cited. 25 CA 270-272; judgment reversed in part, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 527, 534,
535. Cited. 33 CA 133, 134, 139. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. Id., 754, 756. Cited. 36 CA 383, 384. Cited. 38 CA 56,
60. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 45 CA 116. Term "years" in Subsec. (a)(1) means periods of 365 or 356 days, not calendar
years. Subsec. (a)(1) not void for vagueness as applied to defendant in this case despite lack of judicial gloss on meaning
of "years" and does not violate defendant's right to equal protection. 47 CA 68. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 57 CA 736. Pursuant to. Sec. 53-21 (2), risk of injury to or impairing the
morals of a child involves sexual contact with a child younger than the age of sixteen years "in a sexual and indecent
manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child ...." This section contains no such similar provision. Risk of
injury to a child, therefore, contains elements lacking in sexual assault in the second degree. 79 CA 591.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 175 C. 315, 324; 180 C. 167, 168; 181 C. 426, 427, 430. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 382, 383; 187 C.
73, 91; 188 C. 565, 566; id., 644, 645. Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 321, 327. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3): The terms
"responsibility" and "general supervision" discussed; dissent regarded construction of those terms by majority as much
narrower than origin warranted. Id., 321, 322, 324-328, 330-332. Subdiv. (1) cited. 190 C. 84, 85; 191 C. 453, 454, 463;
192 C. 154, 155, 163. Cited. Id., 154, 164. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 666, 667. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 481, 493, 494. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 440, 441. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 734, 735. Cited.
201 C. 211, 215. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 187, 189. Subdiv. (3) cited. 205 C. 386, 388. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 528, 531,
532. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 51, 53. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 244-246, 250, 265-268, 272, 274, 275. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
359, 362. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 185, 186. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 455, 462. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 215 C. 653, 654; 219 C. 283, 284; 220 C. 345-348, 360. Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 656, 658; judgment reversed,
see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 207, 210, 211. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 393, 396. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
552, 554. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610, 612, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 839, 840. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 230 C. 43, 46-48, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 321, 322. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 296. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
409. Court determined defendant was more than two years older than victim by calculating the difference in age based on
birthdates rather than calendar years. 248 C. 543. Statute not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate defendant's
right to equal protection under the law. Id. Statute does not require physical violence as element of the crime. 260 C. 486.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 46, 48. Cited. 8 CA 190, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 313. Subdiv. (4) cited. 9 CA 426-428.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 591, 592; 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 493, 496. Subdiv. (4) cited. 14 CA 244, 245.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 244, 245, 247. Subdiv. (1) cited. 15 CA 222, 224-227. Cited. Id., 222, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 17 CA
174, 175. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 186, 187. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 447, 448. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 525, 526. Subdiv. (1) cited.
18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 44, 45. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445, 446. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 646, 647. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 20 CA 40, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 115, 116. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 263, 264.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 288, 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 530, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 737, 738. Cited. Id., 737, 753. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 23 CA 241, 242; Id., 712, 713; 24 CA 146, 147; 25 CA 235, 238. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 243,
245, 251; 26 CA 625, 626, 635, 637; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq;
Id., 674, 676, 679, 680; Id., 758, 759. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 91, 92. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 527, 528, 531, 533, 534,
536, 539, 540. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 120, 121. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580
et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 773-775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 205, 206. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 46, 48. Cited. 36 CA
383, 384. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 213, 214. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 125, 126, 133. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 731, 732, 743.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 132, 133, 148. Cited. 41 CA 139, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43
CA 142. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 785. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 289.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 512. Trial court properly refused to instruct jury as requested by defendant on the issue of fraudulent
misrepresentation; no affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation is available under provision of statute prohibiting
sexual intercourse between a person who is between the ages of thirteen and fifteen and a person who is at least two years
older. 63 CA 536.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-72. Rape in the first degree: Class B felony. Section 53a-72 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 73; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 125; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-72a. Sexual assault in the third degree: Class D or C felony. (a) A
person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels
another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other
person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person
or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical
injury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with
another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the
degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class D felony or, if the victim of the
offense is under sixteen years of age, a class C felony.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 5; P.A. 80-346, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 33; P.A. 02-138, S. 8.)
History: P.A. 80-346 designated previous Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B) in Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a)
and added Subdiv. (2) re incest; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by amending Subsec. (a)(1)(B) to replace "which
reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person" with "which reasonably causes such other person to
fear physical injury to himself or herself" and amending Subsec. (a)(2) to replace "such person" with "the actor" or "him
or her" as appropriate; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class C felony if the victim is under
sixteen years of age.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 216, 218, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 618. Cited. 192 C. 154,
164. Cited. 194 C. 258, 271. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 352, 353. Cited. Id., 386, 394. Cited. 207 C. 403, 404.
Cited. 214 C. 89, 91. Cited. 224 C. 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Cited. 240 C. 743. Statute encompasses
adopted relatives. 258 C. 779.
Cited. 1 CA 724-726, 735. Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 15, 16. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see
205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. Id., 648, 649. Cited. 10 CA 591. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 35 CA
173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 741. Evidence was sufficient to support conviction and court properly instructed
jury on element of intent for conviction of sexual assault in the third degree. 81 CA 189.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Cited. 205 C. 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 388. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id.,
386, 391, 393. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 209 C. 416-418. Subdiv. (2) cited. 210 C. 244, 246, 247, 265, 266, 272, 274. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. 224 C. 397, 404. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 233 C. 502, 504, 512. Subdiv.
(1)(A) cited. Id., 502, 512, 514. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 237 C. 284-286. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 576. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited.
Id., 694. Court's failure to define "knowledge" or to explain how it pertains to charge of sexual assault in the third degree
did not violate defendant's due process rights where jury instructions, viewed as a whole, adequately informed jury of the
elements of the crime. 258 C. 779.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 734. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 724, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 10 CA
591, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 244, 245, 247.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 694, 695, 697-699. Subdiv. (2) cited.
20 CA 530, 532. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 23 CA 221, 226. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see
200 C. 400 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B)
cited. Id., 725, 726; 26 CA 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 29 CA 724, 725. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 281, 282,
287. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218, 220; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 743,
748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id., 743, 744, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C.
502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 36 CA 228, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 762, 763.
Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 39 CA 657, 658. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 287, 288, 294. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 43 CA 578. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 756.
Sec. 53a-72b. Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm: Class C or B
felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm when
such person commits sexual assault in the third degree as provided in section 53a-72a,
and in the commission of such offense, such person uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person
possesses a p