Sec. 53a-57. Misconduct with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle when, with criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, he causes the death of another person.
(b) Misconduct with a motor vehicle is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 58; P.A. 76-16; P.A. 82-403, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 76-16 defined "intoxication" for purposes of section; P.A. 82-403 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting the
provision that a person is guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle when he causes the death of another person "in
consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle" and by deleting the definition of "intoxication".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 174 C. 112, 113, 116. Cited. Id., 118. Cited. 176 C. 445, 446; id., 451, 454, 455, 459. Cited. 188 C. 620, 621.
Cited. 202 C. 629, 638-640. Cited. 207 C. 336, 337. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 222 C. 444, 449. Cited. 229 C. 228, 230.
Cited. 3 CA 137, 138. Violation of Sec. 14-222a, negligent homicide with a motor vehicle, is a lesser included offense
of misconduct with a motor vehicle. 9 CA 686-689, 695, 710, 721, 723. Not a lesser included offense of Sec. 53a-56b(a).
11 CA 473, 474, 481, 482. Cited. 15 CA 392, 393. Cited. 16 CA 497, 507. Cited. 21 CA 138, 144. Cited. 22 CA 108, 111.
Cited. 23 CA 720. Cited. 28 CA 283, 284, 289. Cited. 29 CA 825, 826, 831, 833-835, 837, 839. Cited. 30 CA 428, 429.
Cited. 34 CA 655, 665. Conviction upheld where defendant became aware that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was
impaired, yet continued to operate the motor vehicle. 64 CA 631.
Cited. 35 CS 519, 521. Cited. 36 CS 527, 529.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 176 C. 451, 452, 454.
Cited. 3 CA 137, 138. Cited. 11 CA 473, 474. Cited. 20 CA 495, 497. Cited. 23 CA 720, 723. Cited. 29 CA 825, 826,
832. This subsec. and Sec. 14-223(b) contain multiple elements that are dissimilar, and the clear language of the statutes
themselves is sufficient for conclusion that they do not impose two punishments for the same act. 84 CA 351.
Sec. 53a-58. Criminally negligent homicide: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes
the death of another person, except where the defendant caused such death by a motor
vehicle.
(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 59.)
Cited. 174 C. 89, 95. Criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind
required is different. 180 C. 382, 403, 408. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 185 C. 63, 76, 78. Cited. 187 C. 6, 29. Cited.
195 C. 232, 242. Cited. 202 C. 520, 521, 525. Cited. Id., 629, 640, 641. Cited. 204 C. 410, 411, 426. Cited. Id., 429, 433.
Cited. 212 C. 593, 607, 608. Cited. 213 C. 579, 590, 592. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 223 C. 273, 275. Cited. 226 C.
237, 250. Cited. 227 C. 456, 476. Cited. 228 C. 118, 127. Trial court improperly refused to instruct jury on this lesser
included offense. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Ray, 30 CA 95, reversed. Id., 147, 149, 155. Cited. Id., 281, 303.
Cited. 238 C. 253.
Cited. 17 CA 502, 519; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited. 26 CA 448, 454. Cited.
28 CA 388, 389. Cited. Id., 771, 773. Cited. 30 CA 95, 99, 101, 103; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Cited. Id.,
232, 243. Cited. 32 CA 687, 695. Cited. 35 CA 438, 444.
Cited. 40 CS 498, 501.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 201 C. 174, 187-189. Cited. 202 C. 629, 639. Cited. 213 C. 579, 590. Cited. 214 C. 57, 61, 68. Cited. 223 C.
273, 275. Cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Cited. 231 C. 115, 137.
Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited. 34 CA 368, 382; see also 233 C. 517 et seq.
Sec. 53a-58a. Negligent homicide with a motor vehicle. Section 53a-58a is repealed.
(P.A. 73-639, S. 5; P.A. 81-26, S. 2.)
See Sec. 14-222a re negligent homicide with a motor vehicle.
PART V*
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-11:
Court had authority to impose consecutive life sentences for two second degree murders. 152 C. 600-602. Cited. 154
C. 622, 624.
Cited. 25 CS 473.
Annotations to former section 53-12:
Person charged with assault with intent to murder may be convicted of assault with intent to kill. 8 C. 498; 9 C. 260;
19 C. 392; 90 C. 383. A man who is assailed under such circumstances as to authorize a reasonable belief that the assault
is with design to take his life is justified in killing his assailant. 32 C. 83; 105 C. 349; 106 C. 455. Evidence of threats by
third party against party assaulted, inadmissible. 53 C. 536; but see 63 C. 47. Assault with intent to murder may be prosecuted
by information of state's attorney. 60 C. 92. What constitutes; ill-will towards victim; malice and intent. 84 C. 470; 106
C. 351. Specific intent necessary; insanity as a defense. 84 C. 81. Malice aforethought required, but intent need not be
premeditated. 106 C. 351. Definition of malice aforethought. Id. Reputation of deceased for violence, where accused claims
self-defense, is admissible only when such reputation was known to accused; and only when hostile demonstrations of
deceased would not have warranted extreme defensive measures except when considered in light of such knowledge. Id.,
456. Reputation may never be shown by proof of specific acts of violence; id., 457; nor to establish probability that deceased
was the aggressor. Id., 459. Cited. 140 C. 398; 149 C. 656; 154 C. 41, 42; id., 302, 303, 156 C. 341. Evidence of other
subsequent criminal acts committed by defendants against person whom they are charged with assaulting may be received
in evidence as admission by conduct. 159 C. 169. Cited. 167 C. 539. Cited. 178 C. 534, 536.
Annotations to former section 53-14:
Facts of assault held to justify inference of intention to maim and disfigure. 95 C. 145. General verdict of guilty where
information is under this statute and also charges aggravated assault under Sec. 53-16. Id. Failure to charge that verdict of
simple or aggravated assault was possible held no error when verdict of robbery by violence returned: lesser crime necessarily included in verdict as returned. 105 C. 765. There is a distinction between force used by a robber in removing property
from the person and the violence which aggravates a simple robbery and makes it robbery with violence. The latter force
may be exercised at any time, so long as it forms a part of the transaction in which the robbery is committed. 143 C. 368.
Cited. 140 C. 613; 149 C. 694; 152 C. 628; 153 C. 584; 155 C. 593. Plaintiff's plea of guilty entered knowingly, voluntarily
and on advice of counsel was waiver of defective bench warrant on which he was arrested as it was consent to jurisdiction
of the court. 157 C. 143. Jury could reasonably find violent intent required by this section where defendant committed
robbery with gun. History of section reviewed. 157 C. 464. Pretrial lineup identification of defendant by storeowner he
had robbed two hours before was proper evidence. 159 C. 143. Cited. 160 C. 37. Cited. 160 C. 85. Cited. Id., 519. Cited.
165 C. 104. Cited. 169 C. 38.
Cited. 22 CS 493; 23 CS 82; 24 CS 120; 305; 386; 26 CS 53; 77. Brutality of defendant in repeatedly clubbing his
victim with a tire iron justified sentence of court below as the least protection to which society is entitled. 27 CS 340.
Where seventeen-year-old defendant had robbed a grocery store and violently attacked its seventy-three-year-old proprietor, sentence of indefinite term at Connecticut Reformatory was affirmed as defendant had prior extensive juvenile record.
Id., 360. Cited. 28 CS 15; id., 196.
Annotation to former section 53-15:
Cited. 162 C. 6.
Annotations to former section 53-16:
Razor may be found to be a deadly or dangerous weapon. 95 C. 145; and so may a sawed-off billiard cue. 106 C. 352.
Accused entitled to instruction as to simple assault, when. 131 C. 135. Cited. 140 C. 398; 154 C. 41, 42; id., 302, 303.
Elements of crime discussed. 146 C. 527. Defendant who rushed three men to scene of assault, himself wrestled with police
officers and otherwise resisted their authority could reasonably have been found by trial jury to have abetted his son in
committing aggravated assault on one of the officers. 155 C. 531. Intent is a question of fact, determination of which should
stand unless conclusion drawn by trier is unreasonable. 157 C. 351. Subsequent assaults by defendant on his wife and
officers called in to protect her were admissible evidence where defense was self-defense and accidental injury. 158 C.
149. Cited. 165 C. 61. Cited. 167 C. 539.
Cited. 22 CS 208; 24 CS 355; 27 CS 430.
Razor found deadly and dangerous within meaning of statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 446, 448. Fact that assault was not
directed against actual victim does not excuse or mitigate crime. Id. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 652.
Annotation to former section 53-19:
Cited. 169 C. 38.
Annotations to former section 53-174:
An assault with "intent to drown and suffocate" not within this statute. 5 C. 330. A breach of the peace under this section
may be committed without assault or battery. 29 C. 72. Assailing party with scurrilous and abusive language is a "mocking"
under this section. 34 C. 279. Effect of provision concerning libelous publications. 90 C. 98. Elements necessary where
offense is tumultuous behavior. 75 C. 205. Interrupting a school under former statute. 26 C. 607; 28 C. 232; 82 C. 321.
Does not define breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it; it may be committed in other ways.
126 C. 5. Not necessary that information contain an allegation that publications were maliciously made if there is no
mention of privilege. 148 C. 208. Not necessary to prove a breach of the peace to support a conviction of libel. Id. Cited.
97 C. 138; 124 C. 557; 145 C. 124; 147 C. 704; 148 C. 77; 153 C. 208; 157 C. 226. Cited. 162 C. 383. Cited. 165 C. 288,
291, 294.
Annotations to former statute prohibiting acts calculated to intimidate: To threaten and use means to intimidate a
company against its will to abstain from keeping in its employ workmen of its own choice is within the prohibition of the
statute. 55 C. 70, 71; 92 C. 168. Statute as applied to strike. 77 C. 237; 79 C. 13; id., 416. Necessary allegations of
information; intimidation need not result. 80 C. 614; 81 C. 696. Notice by bricklayers' union to contractors and employers
that members would not work if nonunion men were employed held no violation of this statute on particular facts. 92 C.
168. Does not require proof of assault and battery. No specific intent is essential. It is sufficient that the acts intentionally
committed cause serious disquietude on the part of those in the vicinity. 140 C. 586. Cited. 142 C. 605.
Cited. 5 CS 507; 22 CS 361; 23 CS 294; id., 344; id., 455; 24 CS 354; 25 CS 483; 27 CS 128. "Peace" defined: It is
not the law that there is no breach of the peace unless public repose is disturbed. Numerous abusive and indecent telephone
calls held breach of the peace. (Now see Sec. 53a-183.) Where minor defendant was committed to reformatory for violation
of this section, there should have been presentence investigation and report as defendant could have been detained therein
for as much as two years. 26 CS 504, 505. Petitioner by habeas corpus petition challenged her commitment for indefinite
term for breach of peace, when section 17-360 provides maximum sentence of one year for this misdemeanor and sentence
ordered modified. 28 CS 9.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 200; id., 611; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 224, 227; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 68; id., 90; id., 413, 416; id., 476, 477;
id., 538. Abusive and threatening language uttered over telephone constituted violation. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 288. (Now see
Sec. 53-174a.) Defendant's contention that conduct involving one or two persons and occurring in an isolated place could
not constitute breach of the peace was without merit. Id., 648. Time is not an essential element of crime of breach of peace
unless date is material to the defense. Id., 649. Mere presence of defendant as inactive companion would not make him an
accessory to breach of peace. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 138. Breach of peace may be found if alleged offensive act is of such a
character that it naturally tends to cause serious disquietude on part of those in vicinity where act is likely to exercise its
malignity. Id., 423. "Provokes contention" does not require that blows be struck. Id., 550, 552. Statute provides its own
definition of "mocking". Id. Although defendant did not take part in assault, he is guilty under statute because everyone
is party to an offense who directly or indirectly counsels or procures any person to commit the offense or do any act forming
a part thereof. Id., 610, 613. Defendant properly charged with breach of peace when he violated curfew imposed by mayor
of New Haven when riotous conditions existed in the city. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22. Right to constitutional procedural safeguards
applicable to charges of misdemeanor. Id., 178. Evidence of defendant magazine salesman's forcible amorous assault on
complainant housewife in her home warranted his conviction of crime of breach of peace by assault. Id., 186. Statute does
not define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it and defendant garage owners
threatened assault on complaining witness in his shop warranted his conviction under it. Id., 298. Constitutionality of this
statute properly raised by demurrer upon ground it is unconstitutionally vague. Demurrer overruled as language used in
statute is plain and unambiguous and legislative intent clearly expressed. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 311; 517. Section does not
define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it. It may be committed in ways other
than those specified. Offensive acts must be of such character that they tend naturally to cause serious disquietude on part
of those in vicinity. Id., 583. Evidence of prior altercation between defendant and victim's son which led immediately to
attack on the father admissible on question of motive. Id., 607. There was sufficient evidence on which trial court found
defendant had committed assault and battery and appeal court cannot retry case. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 14. Defendant in resisting
an unlawful arrest was not guilty of breach of peace. Id., 42. Cited. Id., 90, 402, 403, 404, 405, 431.
Annotations to former section 53-207:
Cited. 23 CS 427, 428, 429.
Annotations to former section 54-117:
Averment "against statute" does not vitiate and may be rejected as surplusage. 3 D. 103. Assault with intent to kill, a
high crime and misdemeanor at common law. 3 C. 114; 5 C. 330. High crime and misdemeanor is an immoral and unlawful
act, not strictly a felony. 6 C. 217; id., 476. Nuisance does not constitute. 6 C. 418; but see 7 C. 431. Solicitation to commit
adultery a high crime and misdemeanor at common law. 7 C. 270. Escape from prison without prison breach or violence
an offense at common law. Id., 452. Attempt to steal offense at common law. 30 C. 500. Conspiracy a crime at common
law; and punishable under this statute. 69 C. 725; 75 C. 210; 77 C. 227; 86 C. 434; 124 C. 562; 126 C. 84; 127 C. 604. High
crime, felony, misdemeanor, defined. 86 C. 434; id., 627. Conspiracy to commit assault is high crime and misdemeanor. 86
C. 434. Conspiracy to commit crime is not merged in crime itself. 99 C. 114. Definition of merger; when merger exists;
is a doctrine of very limited application. 108 C. 215. Identity of offenses. Id., 214. Cited. 162 C. 2.
Cited. 29 CS 305. Obstructing justice offense restricted in application. 29 CS 305.
Sec. 53a-59. Assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a
third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (2) with intent
to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable
permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to
a third person; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human
life he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to another person,
and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or (4) with intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person and while aided by two or more other persons
actually present, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (5) with
intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person
or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.
(b) Assault in the first degree is a class B felony provided (1) any person found guilty
under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court
and (2) any person found guilty under subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or
reduced by the court if the victim of the offense is a person under ten years of age or if
the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in section 53a-146, and the actor knew
the victim was a witness.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 60; P.A. 80-442, S. 16, 28; P.A. 92-87, S. 1; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 3; P.A. 95-142, S. 12; P.A.
99-240, S. 13.)
History: P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (b) requiring at least five years' imprisonment for person found guilty
under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-87 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re causing serious
physical injury to another person while aided by two or more other persons actually present; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2
amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (5) re causing physical injury to another person or to a third person by means of
the discharge of a firearm; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (b) by adding Subdiv. (2) requiring the defendant to be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the
victim is under ten years of age; P.A. 99-240 amended Subsec. (b) to make the nonsuspendable sentence of Subdiv. (2)
applicable if the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in Sec. 53a-146, and the actor knew the victim was a witness.
Cited. 171 C. 264. Whether physical injury sustained by victim was "serious" was question of fact for the jury. 175 C.
204, 207. Cited. 191 C. 142. Cited. 193 C. 333, 334. Cited. 196 C. 18, 21. Cited. 200 C. 607, 608. Cited. 203 C. 484, 486,
488. Cited. 207 C. 233, 234. Cited. 209 C. 34, 38. Cited. 211 C. 441, 449. Cited. 215 C. 739, 743. Cited. 221 C. 402, 405.
Cited. 227 C. 301, 302, 312. Cited. 239 C. 467. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 389.
Cited. 3 CA 607, 623. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 11 CA 621, 623, 625. Cited. Id., 699,
700, 703, 706. Cited. 13 CA 139, 140. Cited. 14 CA 244, 245. Cited. Id., 309, 320. Cited. 17 CA 200, 201. Cited. 19 CA
654, 656. Cited. 20 CA 437, 438. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 21 CA 557, 565. Cited. 25 CA 171, 172. Cited. 34 CA 103,
116. Cited. 35 CA 107, 109, 110. Cited. Id., 609, 615. Cited. Id., 762, 763, 766. Cited. 36 CA 336, 337. Cited. 37 CA 180,
185. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 777, 779. Cited. 39 CA 333, 336. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. 42 CA 624. Cited. 43
CA 549. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. 46 CA 691. Assault statute provides for intent to be transferred and does not require that
defendant be aware of the presence of unintended victim. 84 CA 263.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 348.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 428, 429, 431. Cited. 172 C. 94, 95. Cited. Id., 275. Cited. 173 C. 254-256. Evidence victim
suffered various broken facial bones and spent eleven days in hospital was sufficient to show the "serious physical injury"
required for conviction. Id., 389. Cited. 174. C. 16, 17. Cited. Id., 604, 605. Subdiv. (3) cited. 175 C. 204, 205, 207; 176
C. 138, 139. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 116, 118; id., 448-450; 180 C. 481, 482; id., 557, 560. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 449,
451, 460, 467; id., 501. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 585, 586, 588, 594; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had
ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other
charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.; Subdiv. (1) cited. 183 C. 29, 30.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 184 C. 400, 402-404. Subdiv. (1) cited. 185 C. 63, 65. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 372,
373; 186 C. 1, 2, 7; id., 17, 18, 25; id., 654-657, 663, 664, 673; 187 C. 199, 200, 201, 214 (Diss. Op.); id., 681, 683; 189
C. 61; id., 303, 306, 310; 190 C. 219, 233. Subdiv. (3) cited. 191 C. 12, 13. Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C. 48, 51. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 474, 475. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 632-634, 639, 643. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 89, 90. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 119, 126. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 119, 127. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 195 C. 475, 476. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 651, 652, 655. Subdiv. (1) cited. 196 C. 395, 401. Cited. 197 C. 602, 603.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 602, 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 23, 24. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 23, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199
C. 155, 159. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 322, 327. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 322, 327, 328. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 322, 327, 329. Subdiv. (1) cited. 200 C. 642, 643, 650; 202 C. 259, 260; Id., 463, 464, 488. Subdiv. (3): Not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629, 631, 635. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 207, 208. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (1) cited. 205 C. 370, 371; Id., 673, 675. Subdiv. (3) cited. 208 C. 38-41. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C.
322, 323. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 619, 621. Subdiv. (3) cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 441, 443-445. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Subdiv. (1) cited. 213 C. 97, 98. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 122, 123; Id., 344, 347. Cited. Id., 717,
720. Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 188, 189; Id., 492, 493. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 585, 586, 592, 593, 602. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
647, 649; 217 C. 243, 244, 248, 250. Subdiv. (3) cited. 218 C. 747, 748. Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 16, 21. Cited. Id., 363,
365. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 363, 365, 367-370. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 220 C. 385, 388; Id., 408, 409; 221
C. 402, 403, 405; Id., 915. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 444, 447, 448. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
718, 720. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 450, 452, 455. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 524-526. Cited. 227 C. 301, 311, 312. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 301, 312, 315, 316, 318-320. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Assault statute cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 518, 519. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 711, 713. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 751, 752. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 751-753. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 234, 235. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 335, 336. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 178, 179. Subdiv. (3) cited. 230 C. 608, 610. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 231 C. 235, 237. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 473, 474. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
746. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 748, 750, 751. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 694. Subdiv. (1): Under appropriate circumstances a
defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, same person; judgment of appellate
court in State v. Williams, 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 239
C. 467. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 481. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 395. Subdiv. (1) cited. 241 C. 665. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 802. Subdiv. (3) cited. 242 C. 143. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 389. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 485. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 723. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 745. Subdiv. (3): Criminal conduct can arise by an omission to act when there is a legal
duty to do so and defendant who had established a familial relationship with victim's mother and her children, had assumed
responsibility for the welfare of the children and had taken care of the children as though he were their father, had a legal
duty to protect victim from abuse and breach of that duty exposed defendant to criminal liability. 245 C. 209. Subdiv. (5)
cited. 247 C. 662. Defendant was not without fair warning and his due process rights were not denied by court's holding
construing a common law duty to act under section. 260 C. 93. Evidence that child abuse victim had sustained obvious
injuries was sufficient to support defendant's conviction based on his failure to act. Id. Re double jeopardy claim, defendant
failed to meet his burden of proving that his conviction with regard to different injuries arose out of the same act. Id. This
section and Sec. 53-21 do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser included offenses and are not the
same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 1 CA 609, 616. Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 607, 608. Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 40,
42, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 590, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 124, 125, 140, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 124, 138, 140.
Cited. Id., 124, 138, 141. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 124, 140, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 469. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476, 477.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 309, 310. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 119, 120. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 176, 177. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
545, 547-549. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 545, 548, 549; Id., 631, 632. Subdiv. (3) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
169, 170; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 330, 331. Subdiv. (3) cited. 10 CA 103, 104.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 176, 177; Id., 302, 303; Id., 462-464; Id., 643, 645. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 643-645, 651. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 11 CA 499; Id., 621, 622, 625. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 699-702. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 217; Id., 655, 656; 13 CA
12; Id., 120, 121; Id., 237, 238. Id., 237, 238; Id., 687, 688; Id., 824. Subdiv. (3) cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
140; Id., 309, 310. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 493, 494, 496. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 511, 512; 15 CA 34, 35, 47. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 416, 417. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 531, 532, 534. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704, 706, 710, 711, 712, 715. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 16 CA 184, 186. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 206, 207. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 346, 347. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 390, 391.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 17 CA 391, 394. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 477, 478. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 174, 175. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 654, 656. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 688, 689,
716; 22 CA 199, 201. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 340, 341. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 610-613. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610-611;
23 CA 28, 29; Id., 315, 316; Id., 663, 664; Id., 692, 693; 24 CA 152, 153; Id., 264, 266; Id., 316, 318; Id., 556, 559; Id.,
563, 567-569; Id., 624, 625, 627; 25 CA 171, 173, 175. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 171, 173, 175; Id., 243, 245. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 275, 276, 278, 279. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 434; Id., 578, 579, 582; Id., 619-621. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 26 CA 52, 53; Id., 114, 116, 124; Id., 145, 146. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 331, 332, 337, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
367, 368; Id., 433, 434, 436; Id., 641, 642, 647, 653, 654; 27 CA 73, 74, 92, 93. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 73, 93. Cited. Id.,
322-324. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 324, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 322-327, 330, 332, 333. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 654, 655, 665. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 290, 291, 302, 304. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 290, 301, 302. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 402, 404, 413. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 825, 829,
830. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 833, 834; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 518 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 29 CA 59, 60, 62-64.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 262, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704, 705. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 744, 745. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA
9, 10. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 232, 234, 237, 239.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 359, 360. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 606, 607, 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 58, 59. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 553, 559. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 33 CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 122, 123. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 743, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C.
502 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 223, 224, 226, 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 261, 262,
271. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 691, 692. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 807, 808, 812. Subdiv. (1) cited.
35 CA 51, 53. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 51, 52, 59, 61, 63. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 138, 139. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 279, 280.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 609, 616. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 740, 743.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 41, 42. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 484. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 506,
507. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 576, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 697. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 805, 807.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 831, 852. Subdiv. (3) cited. 37 CA 21, 22. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 180-182, 184. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 464, 466. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 749, 752. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 777, 786. Subdiv. (3) cited. 39
CA 18, 19; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 18, 19, 23, 24. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 333, 335.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 563, 564. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 645, 646. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 387, 388, 395. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 484. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 515-517.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 624, 625. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 515, 517. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 565, 566. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
831, 832. Subdiv. (4) cited. 42 CA 307. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 371. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 205.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 488. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 578. Cited. 44 CA 6. Subdiv. (1) cited. id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. id., 26. Cited. Id., 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 499. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 45 CA 270. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 591. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 684. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 734. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id. Offenses described in Subdivs. (1) and (4) are two separate offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 53 CA 581. To
secure conviction for assault in the first degree under Subdiv. (1), state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person, did, in fact, cause serious physical injury to that
person and caused that injury by means of a dangerous instrument. 70 CA 232. There was sufficient evidence from which
jury reasonably could have found victim had suffered serious and permanent disfigurement and that defendant intended
to cause such serious and permanent disfigurement where defendant butted victim's face with his head, bit her face, struck
her on the head with a hairdryer, kicked her and attempted to choke her, resulting in scars to victim's face. 74 CA 633.
Defendant's actions in shaking infant with such violence as to cause injuries consistent with "shaken baby syndrome" was
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would observe and evinced extreme indifference to
human life. Id., 736. Subdiv. (2): Fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean
that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 219 C. 363, 365. Cited. 221 C. 402, 405.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 548.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CS 347, 353.
Sec. 53a-59a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable. (a)
A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded
person in the first degree, when such person commits assault in the first degree under
section 53a-59(a)(2), 53a-59(a)(3) or 53a-59(a)(5) and (1) the victim of such assault
has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in
section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental
retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an
elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree upon
the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both
such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the first degree is a class B felony and any person found guilty under this section shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed
may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 17, 28; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 4; P.A. 99-122, S. 1; 99-186, S. 14.)
History: P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (c) requiring five years' imprisonment for persons found guilty under
section provisions, effective July 1, 1981; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to Sec. 53a-59(a)(5); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the first degree" to "assault
of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the first degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to
add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor
is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental
retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a
victim sixty or older in the first degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the first degree"
where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added
new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did
not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors
recodified new Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Cited. 230 C. 608, 610.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Cited. 20 CA 467. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 35 CA 609, 615, 616.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 235 C. 502, 517.
Cited. 28 CA 402, 403. Cited. 40 CA 387, 388.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-59b. Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the
first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an employee of the
Department of Correction in the first degree when he is in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction or confined in any institution or facility of the Department of Correction and commits assault in the first degree under section 53a-59 and the victim of such
assault is an employee of the Department of Correction acting in the performance of
his duties.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an
employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree upon the same incident of
assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the
same information.
(c) Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree is a
class B felony. If any person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a violation of
this section which occurred while such person was confined in an institution or facility
of the Department of Correction, such term of imprisonment shall run consecutively to
the term for which the person was serving at the time of the assault.
(P.A. 93-246, S. 2.)
See Sec. 53a-167c re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction, employee or member of the Board of
Pardons and Paroles or probation officer.
Sec. 53a-59c. Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of a pregnant woman resulting
in termination of pregnancy when such person commits assault in the first degree as
provided under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-59 and (1) the victim
of such assault is pregnant, and (2) such assault results in the termination of pregnancy
that does not result in a live birth.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative
defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the
offense, did not know that the victim was pregnant.
(c) Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy is a class A
felony.
(P.A. 03-21, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury
to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) with
intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person
or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than
by means of the discharge of a firearm; or (3) he recklessly causes serious physical
injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
(4) for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally
causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person
by administering to such person, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation
capable of producing the same; or (5) he is a parolee from a correctional institution and
with intent to cause physical injury to an employee or member of the Board of Pardons
and Paroles, he causes physical injury to such employee or member.
(b) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 61; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 18; P.A. 73-639, S. 20; P.A. 84-236, S. 4; P.A. 93-246, S. 3; July Sp. Sess.
P.A. 94-2, S. 5; P.A. 04-234, S, 2.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (6) in Subsec. (a) re physical injury to employee of department of correction or member
of parole board; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subdiv. (3) re physical injury to peace officer or fireman resulting from
intentional attempt to prevent such person from performing his duty, renumbering accordingly; P.A. 84-236 amended
Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (a) by changing "committed to" to "in the custody of" and adding phrase "confined in any institution
or facility of the department of correction"; P.A. 93-246 amended Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (a) to delete from the scope of
the offense a person who is in the custody of the commissioner of correction or confined in any institution or facility of
the department of correction and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee of the department of correction causes
physical injury to such employee; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to add "other than by means
of the discharge of a firearm" to reflect changes made to Sec. 53a-59 by same public act; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of
Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004.
Illegal confinement is no defense to assault on correctional officer. 169 C. 438, 441. Cited. 171 C. 264. Cited. 172 C.
275. Cited. 173 C. 254, 258, 259. Cited. 184 C. 157, 166; id., 520, 522. Cited. 193 C. 144, 145, 153. Cited. Id., 232, 243.
Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Cited. 198 C. 23, 24. Cited. 199 C. 146, 147, 153. Cited. 216 C. 647, 661, 664. Cited. 222 C. 331,
335. Cited. 231 C. 545, 546, 555, 556, 560, 562, 563. Cited. 237 C. 238, 239.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. Id., 612-615. Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Cited. Id., 320, 321.
336. Cited. Id., 679, 681. Cited. 13 CA 667, 671. Cited. 17 CA 200, 201. Cited. 20 CA 75, 76, 80. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14.
Cited. 32 CA 224, 239, 240. Cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Cited. 35 CA 138, 148. Cited. Id., 431, 432. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited.
37 CA 338, 346. Cited. 38 CA 598, 599. Cited. 46 CA 486. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 741.
Cited. 34 CS 531, 540, 541.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 171 C. 395, 397. Cited. 175 C. 155-157, 160, 164. Subdiv. (2) cited. 184 C. 520, 521. Subdiv. (3)
cited. 185 C. 63, 66, 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (5) cited. 190 C. 143, 144. Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C.
48, 56. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 126. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 119, 127.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 636. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 651, 653. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 405, 406. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 424, 425. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 322, 327. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 322, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. 201 C. 103, 104; Id., 289, 290; 202 C. 520, 523, 524; 204 C. 207, 208; Id., 714,
716. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C. 733, 736. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 151, 154. Subdiv. (2) cited. 219 C. 721, 722; 220 C. 385,
388; 221 C. 447, 449. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 556, 559. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 243, 244, 264. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
243, 245, 246, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. 226 C. 618, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 153, 155. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 711, 713.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 751, 753. Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 147, 149, 152. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 910. Subdiv. (5) cited. 230
C. 591, 593. Subdiv. (5) cited. 231 C. 545-549, 551-563. Cited. Id., 545, 556, 557, 559. Subdiv. (5) cited. 235 C. 748,
751. Subdiv. (5) cited. 237 C. 238, 239. Subdiv. (2) cited. 239 C. 481.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 1 CA 584, 585. Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 40, 49. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 40, 42, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 590, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 701, 702, 706. Subdiv. (2) cited. 7 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 95, 96. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 377, 378. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 35. Subdiv. (2) cited. 9 CA 161, 162, 167, 168; 10 CA 50, 51; Id., 330,
331, 336, 344; Id., 462, 463; Id., 643-645, 652; 11 CA 665, 666; 13 CA 386, 387; 14 CA 463, 464; id., 472-474; Id., 493,
494, 497; Id., 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 704, 710. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 226,
227. Subdiv. (2) cited. 19 CA 245, 246. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 576, 577. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited.
20 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 75, 76, 84. Subdiv. (3) cited. 22 CA 586, 587. Subdiv. (5) cited. 23 CA 83, 84. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 447-449. Cited. Id., 447, 450. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 502, 506. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 705, 706. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 705, 711. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 264, 266. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 563, 565; Id., 624, 625, 627. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 685, 686, 690. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 275, 278. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 565-567; 26
CA 114, 116; Id., 145, 146; Id., 242, 243. Subdiv. (3) cited. 27 CA 73, 88. Cited. Id., 322, 329, 330. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
322, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 290, 302. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 645, 646.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 262, 263. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 95, 96, 99; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 31 CA 58, 59. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 140, 141, 145. Subdiv. (5) cited. 32 CA 224-226, 237-243. Subdiv. (5)
cited. Id., 448, 449. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 647, 650. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 691. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 148, 151, 153. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 138, 148. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA
641, 642. Cited. Id., 805, 807. Subdiv. (2) cited. 37 CA 338, 339, 346, 347. Cited. Id., 338, 346, 347. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 338, 347. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 437, 438. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 247, 248. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
777, 786. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 868, 869, 876. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40 CA 757, 758.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 333-335, 338, 339, 341. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 517. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 565, 567. Cited. 43 CA 205. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 252. Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 125.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 307. Cited. 45 CA 591. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 46 CA 24. Cited.
Id., 741.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CS 494, 497. It is possible to prove assault in the second degree without necessarily proving risk
of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the second degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship to each
other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 231 C. 545, 556.
Sec. 53a-60a. Assault in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: One
year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a
firearm when he commits assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-60,
and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of assault
in the second degree and assault in the second degree with a firearm upon the same
transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon
the same information.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 5.)
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 9 CA 648, 649. Cited. 23 CA 502, 506. Cited. 45 CA 591.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 424, 425. Cited. 200 C. 642, 643, 650. Cited. 201 C. 368, 369. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-60b. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree: Class D felony: Two years not suspendable.
(a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally
retarded person in the second degree when such person commits assault in the second
degree under section 53a-60 or larceny in the second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3)
and (1) the victim of such assault or larceny has attained at least sixty years of age, is
blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim
of such assault or larceny is a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or larceny in the
second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3) and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled,
pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree upon the same incident of
assault or larceny, as the case may be, but such person may be charged and prosecuted
for all such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the second degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed
may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 18, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 29; P.A. 99-122, S. 2; 99-186, S. 15; P.A. 01-84, S. 6, 26.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to require that two years of sentence imposed must be served, effective July
1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault
of a victim sixty or older in the second degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the
second degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where
the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree" to "assault of an elderly,
blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the
offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as
Subsec. (d); P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add "or larceny", effective July 1, 2001; (Revisor's note: In 2005, the
Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 199 C. 146, 147, 153. Cited. 223 C. 243, 248. Cited. 230 C. 400, 402.
Cited. 5 CA 594, 595. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 420, 431. Cited. 33 CA 616.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 33 CA 616. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-60c. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: Three years
not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant
or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm when such person commits assault in the second degree with a firearm under section 53a-60a and (1) the victim
of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled,
as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person
with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with
mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or assault in the
second degree with a firearm and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or
mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm upon the same incident of
assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all of such offenses upon
the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony and any person found guilty under
this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which three years of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 3; P.A. 80-442, S. 19, 28; P.A. 99-122, S. 3; 99-186, S. 16.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that three years of sentence imposed shall not be suspended or
reduced, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in
the second degree with a firearm" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the second degree
with a firearm", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where
the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree with a firearm" to "assault
of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree with a firearm" where appearing, amended Subsec.
(a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative
defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering
former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate
affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Sec. 53a-60d. Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle when,
while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug
or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the
effect of such liquor or drug.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class D felony and the court
shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of
any person found guilty under this section for one year.
(P.A. 82-403, S. 2; P.A. 83-534, S. 9; P.A. 85-147, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 83-534 amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or
nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty for one year; P.A. 85-147 deleted "while intoxicated" from the
title of the offense and a provision that defined "intoxication" to include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both, and
replaced elements of offense of "when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes
serious physical injury to another person" with "when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor
or drug".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 219 C. 752, 757. Cited. 222 C. 672, 674. Cited. 224 C. 730, 731, 734. Cited. 226 C. 191, 201. Cited. 230 C. 572,
573. Nothing said in General Assembly proceeding concerning an amendment to this section to remedy an unrelated aspect
changed the rule of law; judgment of appellate court in State v. Leroy, 33 CA 232, reversed. 232 C. 1, 2, 5, 13, 14, 16.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 9 CA 686, 730. Cited. 16 CA 472, 475. Cited. 21 CA 138, 143, 144. Cited. 22 CA
142, 144, 159, 165-167, 169, 170. Cited. 23 CA 215, 216. Cited. Id., 720-722. Cited. 25 CA 282, 284, 293. Cited. 26 CA
805, 806, 808. Cited. 32 CA 553, 554, 556, 571. Cited. 33 CA 232, 233; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 34
CA 557, 564. Cited. Id., 655, 665. Cited. 36 CA 710, 713. Cited. 38 CA 282, 283. Cited. 40 CA 359, 360, 364, 365. Nothing
in Sec. 14-227a prohibits evidence of consciousness of guilt based on defendant's refusal to take a breath test being
considered in a prosecution under this section. 63 CA 433.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 232 C. 1, 2.
Cited. 16 CA 472, 473, 477. Cited. 32 CA 553, 554. Cited. 33 CA 232, 233; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1 et seq.
Cited. 34 CA 655, 666. Cited. 38 CA 282, 283.
Sec. 53a-61. Assault in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to
another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) he
recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or (3) with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon, a
dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.
(b) Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty
under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of one year which may not be suspended or reduced.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 62; P.A. 86-287, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 30.)
History: P.A. 86-287 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to electronic defense weapons; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec.
(b) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subsec. (a)(3) to reflect
preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1).
See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a).
Cited. 170 C. 162. Cited. 171 C. 264. Cited. 173 C. 254, 259. Cited. 184 C. 157, 158, 162. Cited. 189 C. 1, 7. Cited.
190 C. 428, 429. Cited. 194 C. 347, 349. Cited. Id., 408, 412. Cited. 196 C. 430, 431. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191. Cited. 200
C. 544, 545. Cited. 202 C. 520, 521, 524. Cited. Id., 629, 631. Cited. 205 C. 352. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. Id., 52, 53.
Cited. 222 C. 299, 302. Cited. Id., 331, 335. Cited. 227 C. 677, 680. Cited. 228 C. 487, 488. Cited. Id., 582, 584. Cited.
233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 78, 81.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 6 CA 189, 190. Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 9 CA 59, 60, 70.
Cited. Id., 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. 11 CA 499, 501. Cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Cited. Id.,
585, 587. Cited. 13 CA 708, 709. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 17 CA 234, 235. Cited. 20 CA 6, 8. Cited. Id., 75, 80.
Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. 24 CA 57, 58. Cited. Id., 556, 577. Cited. 25 CA 421, 422; judgment reversed, see 222 C.
299 et seq. Cited. Id., 472, 473. Cited. 26 CA 157, 162. Cited. Id., 439, 440. Cited. 27 CA 786, 787. Cited. 28 CA 581,
583, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. Id., 683, 684. Cited. 30 CA 346,
348. Cited. 31 CA 497, 502. Cited. 35 CA 107, 109. Cited. 36 CA 106, 108; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78 et seq. Cited.
37 CA 338, 348. Cited. Id., 733, 743. Cited. 39 CA 810, 811. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806, 828, 829. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited.
42 CA 810. Cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 282. Cited. 46 CA 131.
Cited. 37 CS 664, 665. Cited. 39 CS 347, 348. Cited. 41 CS 505, 508.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 177 C. 248; 180 C. 167, 168. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 557, 560. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 353, 355.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 184 C. 366. Subdiv. (3) cited. 185 C. 63, 76, 78, 79. Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 114, 115; 193 C. 48, 56.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 126, 127. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 195 C. 232,
243. Cited. 197 C. 115, 117. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. 202 C. 629, 635, 660. Subdiv. (1) cited.
206 C. 40, 43. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 657, 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 110, 112. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 672, 674.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 160, 161; 220 C. 487, 489; Subdiv. (2) cited. 222 C. 444, 447. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 41, 42.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28
CA 581, 590, reversed. 226 C. 601, 602, 606, 613. Cited. Id., 601, 602, 612. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 606, 613, 615.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 610, 612. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 813, 815.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 3 CA 374, 375. Cited. 5 CA 40, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 40, 41, 49, 50. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 40, 49, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 590, 591, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 407, 408. Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA
27, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 257, 258. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 545, 547; 10 CA 330, 336. Cited. 10 CA 709-712. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 499-502. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 655, 656; 13 CA 386, 387; Id., 667,
668. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 554, 555. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 75, 77, 86; Id., 101, 102. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 663,
664; 24 CA 518, 519; 26 CA 114, 116; Id., 259, 260. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 331, 332, 346, 348; 27 CA 322, 327, 330. Cited.
Id., 322, 329, 330. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 330. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 581, 585-588, 592;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 581, 586-588, 603; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et
seq. Cited. Id., 581, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited 29 CA 524, 525. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 704,
705. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 126. Subdiv. (2) cited. 35 CA 51, 59, 61, 65. Cited. 37 CA 338, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
338, 348. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 733, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 419, 420. Subdiv.
(1) cited Id., 832, 833. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 565, 567. Subdiv. (1) cited. 42 CA 445. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 768. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 591. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. This is not a cognizable offense
and therefore not a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the first degree. 56 CA 592.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CS 520, 521. Elements of Sec. 53a-64 are so consistent with elements of Subdiv. (2) that the court
is precluded by principles of double jeopardy from entering a finding of guilty as to both charges. 46 CS 130. Subdiv. (2):
Defendant's recklessly placing his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period
of time constituted "serious physical injury". Id. It is possible to prove assault in the third degree without necessarily
proving risk of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the third degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship
to each other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.
Sec. 53a-61a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or
mentally retarded person in the third degree when such person commits assault in the
third degree under section 53a-61 and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least
sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental retardation, as defined in
section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the third degree and assault of an
elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree upon
the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both
such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under this section
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which shall not be suspended
or reduced.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 31; P.A. 99-122, S. 4; 99-186, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence to
reflect preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault
of a victim sixty or older in the third degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the
third degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the
victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the third degree" to "assault of an elderly,
blind, disabled or pregnant person in the third degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense
an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as
Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses
established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence.
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Court, in sentencing a defendant convicted under this section, must impose a one-year mandatory nonsuspendable term
of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557-559.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421, 431. Cited. 16 CA 318, 319. Cited. 21 CA 248, 249. Cited. 29 CA
524, 525. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314. Cited. 32 CA 178, 179.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 12 CA 239, 240. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Secs. 53a-61b to 53a-61z. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 53a-61aa. Threatening in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of threatening in the first degree when such person (1) (A) threatens to commit
any crime involving the use of a hazardous substance with the intent to terrorize another
person, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit
such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, evacuation or inconvenience, or (2) (A) threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to cause
evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "hazardous substance" means any physical,
chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity,
concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or
incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health.
(c) Threatening in the first degree is a class D felony.
(Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 7, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 15; P.A. 03-22, S. 1.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to delete in Subdivs.
(1) and (2) provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence; P.A. 03-22 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing
elements of crime as Subdiv. (1), redesignating existing Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B), respectively, and
adding new Subdiv. (2) to restore provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to cause evacuation
of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and
threatening to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience.
Sec. 53a-62. Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A
person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such
person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent
serious physical injury, (2) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with
the intent to terrorize another person, or (3) such person threatens to commit such crime
of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.
(b) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 63; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 8, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 16.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing "threatening" with "threatening in the second degree"
where appearing and amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, delete Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit a crime
of violence with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public
transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and delete Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such
crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience, said provisions being reenacted as part of
Sec. 53a-61aa by same act, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re
a person, by physical threat, intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical
injury as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another
person and add Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing
such terror.
Cited. 175 C. 204, 205. Cited. 182 C. 585, 592; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a
defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of
which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 193 C. 602, 612. Cited. 195 C. 636. Cited.
201 C. 115, 116. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. 205 C. 262, 264. Cited. 207 C. 565, 567. Cited. 208 C. 689, 695. Cited.
209 C. 34, 38. Cited. Id., 52, 53. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 224 C. 494, 496. Cited. 227 C. 829, 832. Cited. 241 C. 413.
Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 289, 290. Cited. 8 CA 190, 191. Cited. Id., 496, 500, 504-506. Cited. 9 CA 161, 162.
Cited. 14 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 526, 527. Cited. 25 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 334, 336. Cited. 26 CA 481, 482, 487; judgment
reversed, see 224 C. 494 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. Id.,
708, 712. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498. Cited. 33 CA 103, 104. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Words of defendant's
threat to young victim, along with surrounding circumstances of the threat, were such that it was reasonable for jury to
infer that defendant had placed the victim in fear of "imminent" serious physical injury. 75 CA 103. Evidence was sufficient
to sustain conviction. 83 CA 489.
Cited. 37 CS 664, 665. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575. Cited. 43 CS 46, 52.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 566, 567. Cited. 175 C. 204, 205. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 182 C. 585, 588; part of ruling in State
v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to
a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 485, 486. Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 462, 468. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 689, 690. Cited. 226 C.
601, 603. Subdiv. (1) cited. 226 C. 601, 603, 606, 613. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28 CA 581, 590,
reversed. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 601, 606. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 613, 615. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 153, 155.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 707, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 403, 409.
Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser
included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647, 649. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 496, 504. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 13 CA 386, 387; Id., 438, 439. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 643, 644. Subdiv. (3) cited. 28 CA 581, 586, 592;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 581, 586, 603; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq.
Cited. Id., 581, 589, 590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 95, 96; judgment reversed,
see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 184, 186; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35
CA 262, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 276, 277. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 733, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 306, 307. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 306, 307, 313. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777, 785. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 617, 618. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA
515, 517. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 584, 585, 592. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 701, 702. Subdiv. (2) was not unconstitutionally
vague on its face. Statute's application to defendant's conduct was proper and did not interfere with his duty to protect his
child and statute was not vague as applied to facts of case. 81 CA 248. There is no indication that legislature did not intend
to create separate crimes prohibited by Secs. 53a-181 (a)(3) and Subdiv. (2). Id.
Sec. 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of
serious physical injury to another person.
(b) Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 64.)
Cited. 179 C. 617, 618. Cited. 194 C. 408, 412. Cited. 200 C. 607, 608. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 233 C. 502, 513.
Cited. 238 C. 313. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 163. Cited. 8 CA 496, 500, 501. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. 32 CA 84, 86. Cited. 33 CA
103, 104. Cited. Id., 743, 749; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. 43 CA 578. Cited.
44 CA 6. Under this section, jury has to consider objectively the nature and degree of the risk and defendant's subjective
awareness of that risk. 75 CA 432.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 348; id., 359, 360. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 227 C. 301, 320. Cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 237 C. 348, 352.
Cited. 3 CA 289, 290. Cited. 8 CA 153, 155. Cited. 10 CA 659, 661. Cited. 18 CA 477, 478. Cited. 24 CA 330, 331.
Cited. 26 CA 145, 146. Cited. 40 CA 515, 517. Cited. Id., 643, 645. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 354.
Sec. 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person.
(b) Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 65.)
Cited. 194 C. 408, 412.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 14 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 10, 12, 16, 20, 27. Cited. Id., 804. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited.
31 CA 497, 498, 502.
Cited. 35 CS 570, 573. Cited. 37 CS 661. Cited. 38 CS 619-621. Cited. 40 CA 643, 645. Defendant's recklessly placing
his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period of time constituted "serious
physical injury" in violation of the statute. 46 CS 130.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 223 C. 618, 625.
Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Cited. 24 CA 662, 665; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 618 et seq.
PART VI*
SEX OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-217:
Cited. 118 C. 505; 139 C. 247; 140 C. 610; 152 C. 197. Corroboration is not essential but in its absence court should
weigh complainant's credibility with care. 128 C. 126. Assault in this statute includes a touching; consent not a defense.
129 C. 603. Not required to plead over to complaint amended re date of alleged commission. 151 C. 189. Defendant could
put his character in issue but only as to sexual morality and decency, the specific traits involved in action. 157 C. 99. Cited.
160 C. 366; 161 C. 303.
Cited. 25 CS 433; 27 CS 44.
Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 45.
Annotations to former section 53-218:
Marriage in fact must be proved. 6 C. 446. Solicitation to commit adultery a crime. 7 C. 270. Testimony of more than
one act inadmissible under single charge of adultery. 10 C. 373. What evidence held inadmissible to prove marriage. 40
C. 145. Involves moral turpitude and is an infamous crime. 112 C. 274.
Although this statute specifies conduct is adulterous only if woman is married, in action for divorce from husband
based on adultery, marital status of other woman irrelevant. 22 CS 147.
Annotations to former section 53-219:
What constitutes offense of lascivious carriage. 5 D. 81. Meaning of "lascivious". 120 C. 166. Cited. 129 C. 603.
Cited. 9 CS 165; 23 CS 299. Meaning of lascivious conduct discussed. 24 CS 99.
History discussed. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 187 to 189. Statute was intended to apply only to conduct between persons of
different sexes. Id., 190. Fact that sexual activity is conducted privately behind locked doors between a willing male and
female is no defense. Id., 698. Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 57. In police investigation of defendant's conduct in violation of this
section, officer's observance of defendant through her bedroom window and subsequent arrest on speedy information held
no invasion of her constitutional rights. Disclosure of identity of informant was not required. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 35. Cited.
Id., 42.
Annotations to former section 53-224:
Definition of seduction. 27 C. 320; 76 C. 136.
Annotations to former section 53-226:
Cited. 125 C. 328. No justification for reading into the statutory crime of lewdness any unexpressed additional requirement of openness. 146 C. 365.
Cited. 23 CS 296.
Word "offering" means a mere offering of the body without physical contact. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 597, 598. Lewdness
includes immoral and degenerate conduct between persons of the same sex and the proposal or offer for lewdness as well
as the act itself is a crime. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 31, 32. There was no entrapment of defendant where officer did not solicit
commission of offense but merely offered the opportunity for its commission. Id., 32, 33. Scienter of defendants shown
by facts proved by testimony of police officers of repeated warnings and advice to defendants of prostitutes who frequented
their bar. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 594.
Annotations to former section 53-227:
Elements of crime. 82 C. 216. Cited. 113 C. 291; 128 C. 180.
Conviction under this statute is cause for revocation of license to practice medicine and surgery. 13 CS 144.
Annotations to former section 53-229:
Cited. 113 C. 291.
Cited. 9 CS 166.
Annotations to former section 53-230:
State must prove what facts. 17 C. 472; 38 C. 525; 96 C. 315. Term "house of ill-fame" synonymous with bawdy house.
33 C. 92. In prosecution for disorderly house, not necessary to show reputation of house. Id., 259. Evidence of character
for chastity may be rebutted by showing that accused kept a house of ill-fame. 33 C. 269. Term "house" means any building
kept for purpose named. 36 C. 79. What complaint not bad for duplicity. 38 C. 38; 66 C. 9. To sustain information for
keeping house "reputed" to be one of ill-fame, fact that it is such a house must be proved; 82 C. 111; 96 C. 315; statute is
valid. 83 C. 550; id., 56. Not necessary to prove that accused knew character of house; his knowledge is immaterial. 96
C. 316. Cited. 125 C. 328; 153 C. 149.
Single act of lewdness not enough to constitute lewdness under this statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 595.
Annotations to former section 53-231:
Bond must conform to statutory requirements. 9 C. 350. This section constitutional. 31 C. 574. See note to former
section 53-230, supra. Cited. 168 C. 74.
Annotations to former section 53-235:
Cited. 9 CS 166; 23 CS 296.
Annotations to former section 53-238:
Evidence showing constancy in accusation admissible. 8 C. 100; 44 C. 155; 47 C. 466; 93 C. 321. Conviction may be
had on uncorroborated testimony of a nine-year-old girl as to principal fact. 29 C. 389. Evidence as to general good character
of accused admissible. 33 C. 269. Jury must be satisfied that act was without consent of prosecutrix, but there is no rule
of law that she should make the utmost resistance. 45 C. 264; see also 72 C. 44. Rape may be committed on child under
ten years of age. 46 C. 362. Unnecessary to allege that prosecutrix was ten or more years of age. 50 C. 579. Resistance;
putting in fear. 72 C. 44. Intoxication or insanity of complainant; charges by her against other men; liberality in applying
rules, where only she and accused are witnesses. 80 C. 546. What constitutes abuse of minor; 81 C. 97; election between
counts; declarations of victim; id., 1; 93 C. 321; woman may be guilty of abuse of minor, as accessory; 82 C. 213; previous
unchastity or consent no defense; cross-examination of complainant. Id., 454. When husband and wife under age of sixteen
live together voluntarily, the former is not guilty of crime under this section. 113 C. 288, 294. Cited. 113 C. 786; 118 C.
505; 128 C. 324; 132 C. 278; id., 684; 154 C. 302, 303. Joint trial before jury of defendant and another for crimes of rape
against complainant at about the same time and place proper. 154 C. 517. Cited. 155 C. 593. Hospital record of complaining
witness' medical examination on day of rape admitted in evidence as business record pursuant to section 52-180. 158 C.
22, 461. Cited. 162 C. 317. Cited. 175 C. 512, 523.
In case lacking much of brutality, aggravation in assault and surprise attack on wholly innocent victim characteristic
of majority of cases, sentence of eight to twelve years on review reduced to five to twelve years. 22 CS 42. Cited. 22 CS
493; 27 CS 235; 29 CS 94, 187.
Annotation to former section 53-238:
Cited. 166 C. 96.
Annotations to former section 53-239:
Proof of rape will sustain complaint for assault with intent to rape. 7 C. 56. Person charged with rape may be convicted
of assault with intent to rape. 19 C. 392. Any language in complaint charging exertion of physical force sufficient without
use of words "with actual violence". 31 C. 213. This section is in affirmation of common law and a verdict of "attempt to
commit rape" sufficient. 70 C. 114. Various matters of evidence considered; reputation of accused and complainant. 84
C. 222. Is infamous crime within meaning of section 46-13. 128 C. 129. Corroboration of complainant's testimony not
essential to proof of guilt. 133 C. 600. Cited. 152 C. 703; 154 C. 517, 521. Cited. 162 C. 6.
Annotation to former section 53-241:
Statute applies in court where person is originally presented or in court to which he is bound over or appeals. 132 C. 685.
Annotations to chapter 952, part VI:
Cited. 192 C. 154, 158, 163. Secs. 53a-65 through 53a-90 cited. 202 C. 333, 340. Secs. 53a-65-53a-90 cited. 230 C.
43, 78.
Cited. 35 CA 173, 181.
Sec. 53a-65. Definitions. As used in this part, except section 53a-70b, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) "Actor" means a person accused of sexual assault.
(2) "Sexual intercourse" means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or
cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Its meaning is limited to persons not
married to each other. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal
intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal
opening of the victim's body.
(3) "Sexual contact" means any contact with the intimate parts of a person not
married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose
of degrading or humiliating such person or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor
with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor
or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person.
(4) "Mentally defective" means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect
which renders such person incapable of appraising the nature of such person's conduct.
(5) "Mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable
of appraising or controlling such person's conduct owing to the influence of a drug or
intoxicating substance administered to such person without such person's consent, or
owing to any other act committed upon such person without such person's consent.
(6) "Physically helpless" means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason
is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.
(7) "Use of force" means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual
physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.
(8) "Intimate parts" means the genital area, groin, anus, inner thighs, buttocks or
breasts.
(9) "Psychotherapist" means a physician, psychologist, nurse, substance abuse
counselor, social worker, clergyman, marital and family therapist, mental health service
provider or other person, whether or not licensed or certified by the state, who performs
or purports to perform psychotherapy.
(10) "Psychotherapy" means the professional treatment, assessment or counseling
of a mental or emotional illness, symptom or condition.
(11) "Emotionally dependent" means that the nature of the patient's or former patient's emotional condition and the nature of the treatment provided by the psychotherapist are such that the psychotherapist knows or has reason to know that the patient or
former patient is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact by or sexual intercourse
with the psychotherapist.
(12) "Therapeutic deception" means a representation by a psychotherapist that sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist is consistent with or part
of the patient's treatment.
(13) "School employee" means a teacher, substitute teacher, school administrator,
school superintendent, guidance counselor, psychologist, social worker, nurse, physician, school paraprofessional or coach employed by a local or regional board of education or a private elementary or secondary school or working in a public or private elementary or secondary school.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 66; P.A. 75-619, S. 1; P.A. 81-27, S. 2; P.A. 85-341, S. 1; P.A. 87-259; P.A. 92-260, S. 32; P.A.
93-340, S. 1; P.A. 94-221, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted definitions of "deviate sexual intercourse", "female" and "forcible compulsion", added
definitions of "actor", "use of force" and "intimate parts", redefined "sexual intercourse" in detail where previously defined
as having "its ordinary meaning" and made minor changes in wording of remaining definitions; P.A. 81-27 exempted
section 53a-70b from applicability of definitions in this section; P.A. 85-341 amended definition of sexual contact to
include "contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification
of the actor"; P.A. 87-259 amended definition of sexual contact to include contact made for the purpose of degrading or
humiliating the victim; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in the definition of sexual intercourse by repositioning
language; P.A. 93-340 added definitions of "psychotherapist", "psychotherapy", "emotionally dependent" and "therapeutic
deception"; P.A. 94-221 added the definition of "school employee".
Cited. 170 C. 111. Statute includes definition of sexual intercourse and provides that "penetration, however slight, is
sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio ...". It specifically omits cunnilingus, therefore
penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757, 765, 767. Cited. 187 C. 216,
220, 221. Cited. 191 C. 453, 463. Cited. 192 C. 154, 160, 161. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 210 C. 110, 127.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 112, 118. Cited. Id., 316, 322. Cited. 33 CA 133, 139. Cited. 35 CA 173, 174,
180. Smacking victim's buttocks considered to be sexual contact. 59 CA 538.
Former section 53-216 cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 45.
Subdiv. (2):
Court properly defined the term "cunnilingus" since statute contained no specific definitions. Penetration is not an
essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757, 763, 765. Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 194 C.
258, 271, 273. Cited. 198 C. 285, 289. Cited. Id., 617, 621. Cited. 201 C. 211, 215, 216. Cited. 202 C. 509, 514. Cited.
207 C. 646, 652. Cited. 209 C. 733, 740. Cited. 210 C. 110, 115, 117, 123-125, 127-129. Cited. 211 C. 18, 35. Cited. 224
C. 397, 412, 413, 415. Cited. 226 C. 618, 660. Penetration of the labia majora constitutes vaginal penetration. 252 C. 795.
Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when alleged victim is
compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the mouth. 256 C. 517.
Cited. 7 CA 489, 493. Cited. Id., 701, 709. Cited. 11 CA 102, 110, 117-119. Cited. Id., 316, 319. Cited. 14 CA 451,
455. Cited. 23 CA 712, 714. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 626; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.;
judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.; judgment reversed see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 33 CA 133, 139. Withdrawal
of consent communicated to the other person followed by a compelling use of force to continue sexual intercourse would
constitute sexual assault. 35 CA 173, 180, 181. Cited. 38 CA 56, 59-61. Cited. 41 CA 139, 141. Cited. Id., 287, 296. Cited.
43 CA 785. Applies least penetration doctrine. 50 CA 715.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 619. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 386, 410. Cited. 224 C. 397, 417.
Cited. Id., 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 725, 730. Cited. 8 CA 607, 613. Cited. 11 CA 102, 114. Cited. 15 CA 251, 278. Cited. 20 CA 694,
698. Cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 627,
636; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 224 C.
656 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 402, 408. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 291. Cited. 31 CA 452, 454.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Cited. 205 C. 386, 398.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 186 C. 757, 766. Subpara. (B) cited. 189 C. 611, 629. Subpara. (B) cited. 202 C. 509, 514; 205 C. 386, 391, 393.
Cited. 228 C. 552, 570.
Cited. 7 CA 489, 493. Cited. 11 CA 316, 319. Cited. 14 CA 40. Cited. Id., 451, 454. Cited. 16 CA 75, 79. Subpara. (B)
cited. 18 CA 694, 698. Cited. 21 CA 411, 419. Cited. 30 CA 281, 288.
Subdiv. (8):
Cited. 186 C. 757, 767. Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 619. Cited. 192 C. 154, 160. Cited. 207 C. 456, 463.
Cited. 11 CA 316, 321. Cited. 20 CA 694, 697. Cited. 25 CA 653, 657; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited.
26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 627; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 402, 408.
Sec. 53a-66. Lack of consent. Section 53a-66 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 67; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-67. Affirmative defenses. (a) In any prosecution for an offense under this
part based on the victim's being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this part, except an offense under section
53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, it shall be an affirmative defense
that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, living
together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal status
of their relationship.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 68; P.A. 75-619, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 3; P.A. 90-162.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed as affirmative defense the actor's belief that alleged
victim was above the specified age in cases where age is an element of offense unless victim is under fourteen, relettering
Subsec. (c) accordingly; P.A. 81-27 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70b;
P.A. 90-162 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a
or 53a-72b.
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 202 C. 86, 91.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388.
Subsec. (b):
Discussion of "cohabitation" and burden of producing evidence thereof for entitlement to a charge on the affirmative
defense under statute. 181 C. 426, 432-434. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191, 193, 195, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 739-741, 752. Cited.
233 C. 813, 850.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 730. Cited. 10 CA 709, 712, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 116. Sec. 53a-67(c) (Revised to 1972) cited. Id.
Cited. 25 CA 384, 389. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.
Secs. 53a-68 and 53a-69. Corroboration; exceptions. Time limitation for complaint. Sections 53a-68 and 53a-69 are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 69, 70; P.A. 74-131; P.A. 76-216; P.A. 87-223.)
Sec. 53a-70. Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony. (a) A person
is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another
person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or
a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a
third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person
or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such
other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older
than such person, or (3) commits sexual assault in the second degree as provided in
section 53a-71 and in the commission of such offense is aided by two or more other
persons actually present, or (4) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and
such other person is mentally incapacitated to the extent that such other person is unable
to consent to such sexual intercourse.
(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, sexual assault in
the first degree is a class B felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not
be suspended or reduced by the court or, if the victim of the offense is under ten years
of age, for which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced
by the court.
(2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the offense is a violation
of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the victim of the offense is under
sixteen years of age or the offense is a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of
this section. Any person found guilty under said subdivision (1) or (2) shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be
suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under ten years of age or of which
five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the
victim is under sixteen years of age.
(3) Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which
together constitute a sentence of at least ten years.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 71; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 19; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 78; P.A. 75-619, S. 3; P.A. 82-428, S. 2; P.A. 89-359;
P.A. 92-87, S. 3; P.A. 93-340, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 13; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 49; P.A. 00-161, S. 1; P.A. 02-138,
S. 5.)
History: 1971 act replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators in Subsec. (a) with numeric indicators; 1972 act changed
applicable age in Subsec. (a)(1) from twenty-one to eighteen reflecting lowered age of majority; P.A. 75-619 reworded
section to reflect changes in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, substituted sexual "assault" for sexual "misconduct" and made the
offense a Class B rather than Class D felony; P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that one year of sentence may
not be suspended or reduced by the court; P.A. 89-359 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (2) re engaging in sexual
intercourse with a person under thirteen years of age; P.A. 92-87 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re committing
sexual assault in the second degree while aided by two or more other persons actually present; P.A. 93-340 amended
Subsec. (a) by specifying in Subdiv. (2) that the actor be more than two years older than the other person; P.A. 95-142
amended Subsec. (b) to provide that ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if
the victim is under ten years of age; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one year to two years
the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence imposed when the victim is other than a victim under ten years of age and to
add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant
to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of at least ten years; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a) by adding
Subdiv. (4) re engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was formerly
classified as sexual assault in the second degree under Sec. 53a-71(a)(2) but was deleted from said section by same
public act; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re classification of offense and length of
nonsuspendable sentence as Subdiv. (1) and amending said Subdiv. to add exception re Subdiv. (2), adding new Subdiv.
(2) to classify the offense as a class A felony for a violation of Subsec. (a)(1) when the victim is under sixteen years of
age and for a violation of Subsec. (a)(2) and establish a nonsuspendable sentence for said violations of ten years if the
victim is under ten years of age and five years if the victim is under sixteen years of age and designating existing provisions
re minimum length of a combined sentence of imprisonment and special parole as Subdiv. (3).
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317; id., 398, 399. Repealed section 53a-72 cited. Id., 512, 513, 516. Cited. 182 C. 412, 413. Cited.
184 C. 258, 259. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52; id., 449, 450; id., 521, 522. Cited. 187 C. 216, 217, 218, 220, 221. Cited. 190 C.
20, 21. Cited. 191 C. 604, 615, 616. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 194 C. 114, 115. Cited. Id., 297, 298. Cited. Id., 692-
696, 698. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254. 265. Cited. 197 C. 280, 281. Cited. Id., 298, 299. "Does not include sexual intercourse
with a victim whom the assailant finds unconscious" but does not apply when assailant strangled victim into a state of
unconsciousness. 198 C. 53, 60, 61. Cited. Id., 190, 193. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 281, 282.
Cited. Id., 481, 494. Cited. Id., 693-695, 711. Cited. 200 C. 465, 466. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 659, 660. Cited.
202 C. 343, 344. Cited. Id., 676, 677. Cited. 204 C. 98, 99. Cited. Id., 441, 442. Cited. Id., 571, 572. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63.
Cited. 207 C. 646, 652. Cited. 209 C. 733, 735, 738-741, 743, 744, 747, 748, 750, 752-757. Cited. 210 C. 110, 117, 127,
128. Section not void for vagueness in context of circumstances of case. Id., 132-134, 136, 139, 143, 144. Cited. 211 C.
672, 674. Cited 212 C. 31, 33. Cited. 215 C. 257, 258. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, reversed. Id., 538,
542, 543. Cited. 219 C. 489, 491. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. Id., 345, 347, 348. Cited. 222 C. 556, 558. Cited. 223 C.
180-182. Cited. Id., 731, 733. Cited. 224 C. 397, 399, 403, 414. Cited. Id., 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452
et seq. Cited. 226 C. 601, 602, 610. Cited. Id., 618, 646. Cited. 227 C. 207, 209, 210. Cited. Id., 616, 623. Cited. Id., 677,
679. Cited. 228 C. 456, 458. Cited. 230 C. 43, 47. Cited. 235 C. 711, 713. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242
C. 409. Cited. Id., 689. Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when
alleged victim is compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the
mouth. 256 C. 517.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 345; id., 378, 379. Cited. Id., 724, 725, 735. Cited. 3 CA 148, 149. Cited. Id., 374, 375, 388. Cited.
Id., 650, 652. Cited. 5 CA 424, 425. Cited. Id., 556. Cited. Id., 586, 587, 589. Cited. 7 CA 257, 258, 261-263. Cited. Id.,
701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 44, 45. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 216, 218. Cited. Id., 345, 346. Cited. Id., 399. Cited. Id., 528,
529, 538. Cited. Id., 620, 621, 626. Cited. 10 CA 457, 458. Cited. Id., 520, 521. Cited. Id., 709, 711, 714. Court concluded
the absence of a marital relationship between defendant and victim is not an essential element. 11 CA 102, 112, 118. Cited.
Id., 236. Cited. Id., 238, 239. Cited. Id., 316, 319, 321. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 14 CA 333,
334. Cited. Id., 688, 693. Cited. 15 CA 251, 274. Cited. 16 CA 75, 76, 78, 80. Cited. 17 CA 391, 392. Cited. 18 CA 134,
135, 146. Cited. 19 CA 111, 116, 140, 142, 145. Cited. 20 CA 737, 738. Cited. 22 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 562, 563. Cited.
23 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 221, 222. Cited. Id., 564, 567; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 13,
14. Cited. Id., 24, 25. Cited. Id., 295, 296. Cited. 25 CA 334, 335. Cited. Id., 503, 505. Cited. Id., 653, 654; judgment
reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 151, 152. Cited. Id., 433, 434. Cited. Id., 674, 676, 678, 680. Cited. 28 CA
548, 551, 556. Cited. Id., 581, 583, 589, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 642, 643. Cited. 32
CA 773, 775. Cited. 34 CA 276, 278. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. Id., 754, 755. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. 38 CA
56, 60. Cited. Id., 777, 779. Cited. 39 CA 267, 268. Cited 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619, 620. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Cited. 44 CA 548. Cited. 46 CA 741. Intent or motive of sexual assault perpetrators, discussed. 47 CA 159. Age of victim
not an element of crime for which jury makes a factual determination but a sentencing factor determined by the courts. 74
CA 376. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual
intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447.
Because the necessary elements of this section and Sec. 53-21 are distinct, court's respective findings of not guilty and
guilty of these distinct crimes was not legally inconsistent. 78 CA 25.
Cited. 41 CS 229, 231, 232, 236. Cited 43 CS 46, 66, 67.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 179 C. 328, 329; 180 C. 101, 102; Id., 565. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 455. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 403. Cited. 186 C. 757, 758, 763, 766. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 372,
373. Cited. Id., 565, 566. Cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 697, 703, 713. Cited. 189 C. 106, 107; id., 611,
612, 625, 628-630; id., 631, 633. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 631, 645. Cited. 190 C. 104, 105, 108; id., 327, 329. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 440, 441. Cited. Id., 496, 498. Cited. 191 C. 604, 605. Subdiv. (1) cited. 192 C. 166, 167. Cited. 193 C. 457,
459. Cited. 194 C. 258, 259, 274. Cited. Id., 594, 595. Cited. Id., 692, 694, 696-698. Cited. 197 C. 50-52. Cited. Id., 485,
486. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54, 60. Cited. Id., 190, 191, 200. Cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 314, 315. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited.
Id., 430, 432. Cited. Id., 598, 600. Cited. Id., 617, 618. Cited. 199 C. 62, 63. Cited. Id., 399, 400. Cited. Id., 481, 482, 488.
Cited. 201 C. 559, 560. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 509-511, 514. Cited. 203 C. 385, 386. Cited. 204 C. 714, 716.
Cited. 206 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 132, 134, 151. Cited. Id., 437, 439. Cited. Id., 528, 531, 532. Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43.
Cited. 207 C. 646, 647. Cited. 209 C. 143-145. Cited. Id., 416-418. Cited. 210 C. 51, 53. Cited. Id., 110, 112, 115, 123,
127. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. Id., 359, 382. Cited. 211 C. 18, 20, 25. Cited. 212 C. 31-33. Cited. 213 C. 593, 602. Cited.
214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (2) Cited. Id., 717, 719. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, reversed. 215 C. 538, 540.
Cited. 216 C. 563, 565. Cited. 218 C. 447, 448. Cited. 219 C. 269, 271. Cited. Id., 283, 284. Cited. Id., 489, 510. Cited.
220 C. 400, 402. Cited. Id., 487, 489. Cited. Id., 698, 700. Cited. 221 C. 264, 265. Cited. 222 C. 87, 88. Cited. 223 C. 52,
53. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 450, 452. Cited. Id., 519, 520. Cited. 226 C. 601, 602, 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 601,
610, 611. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 611. Cited. Id., 618-620, 644. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 618, 644, 645, 649, 650. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 227 C. 616, 617, 619, 620, 624. Cited. Id., 616, 622. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 393, 395. Cited. Id., 456, 469.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 456, 469. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 456, 472. Cited. Id., 552, 554, 570. Cited. Id., 582, 584. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 756, 757. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 529, 530, 536. Cited. Id., 580, 581. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 580, 584, 586. Cited. 230 C. 43, 46, 47, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 195, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 707,
708. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 403, 409. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 145, 146. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 502, 517. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 659, 661. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 284-286. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 576. Cited. Id., 694. Cited. 241 C. 784. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 823. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 445. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 523. Medical treatment exception
to the hearsay rule applies to a child sexual assault victim's statements made to a social worker acting in the chain of
medical care if statements were made to obtain medical treatment and were pertinent to the treatment sought. 260 C. 1.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 346. Cited. Id., 724, 735. Cited. 4 CA 514. Cited. Id., 672. Cited. 7 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 489, 493.
Cited. Id., 653. Cited. 8 CA 35. Cited. Id., 148, 149. Cited. Id., 177, 178. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 528, 538, 539,
541. Cited. Id., 620, 625, 626. Cited. 9 CA 208, 209. Cited. Id., 340, 341. Cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Cited. Id., 709, 711, 712,
716, 717. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103, 110, 112. Cited. Id., 316, 320, 322, 323. Cited. Id., 673, 674. Cited. 13 CA 60, 61. Cited.
Id., 67. Cited. Id., 76, 85. Cited. 14 CA 40. Cited. Id., 451, 452. Cited. Id., 657, 658. Cited. Id., 688, 689, 692. Cited. Id.,
710, 712. Cited. 15 CA 222, 225. Cited. 16 CA 75, 80. Cited. 17 CA 525, 526. Cited. 18 CA 134, 135, 137. Cited. Id., 273,
274. Cited. Id., 643, 644. Cited. Id., 730. Cited. 19 CA 111, 116, 140; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id.,
618, 619. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. 20 CA 101, 102. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 737, 753. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412.
Cited. Id., 467, 468. Cited. 22 CA 329, 330. Cited. Id., 477, 478. Cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see
220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 243, 245, 251. Cited. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 653, 654; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et
seq. Cited. Id., 725, 726. Subdiv. (2) cited. 26 CA 81, 82. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 434,
436. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. 27 CA 279, 280. Cited. Id., 705, 706. Cited. 28 CA 91, 92. Cited. Id., 195, 196. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 360, 361, 363, 366; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 529 et seq. Cited. Id., 402, 404. Cited. Id., 581, 591;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 409, 414. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 724, 725. Cited. 30 CA 56. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 281, 282, 285, 287. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 915. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 178,
179. Cited. Id., 217, 218; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 217, 220; judgment reversed,
see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 485. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 773, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 184, 185;
judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Cited. Id., 457, 458. Cited. 34 CA 276, 278. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 173, 175.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 728-730. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 190, 191, 196, 202. Cited. Id., 216, 217.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 228, 229. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 56, 58.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 125, 126, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 231, 232. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
531, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777, 785, 790. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 45, 46. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 617, 618. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 832, 833. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 132. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 132, 133, 142,
146, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 233, 234. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 250, 252. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 204, 205. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 255, 257. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 287, 288, 296. Cited. Id., 317, 318. Cited. 42
CA 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 186; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 552.
Cited. Id., 680. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 715. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 785.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 457. Cited. Id., 548. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 66. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 116. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 756. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 810. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint
is not double jeopardy. 47 CA 117. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in commenting on testimony of state's expert
witness concerning inconsistencies in results of victim's rape kit tests, that court having also instructed jury to base findings
on recollection of all evidence presented; defendant's challenge to other aspects of instructions on scientific evidence were
not properly preserved for appellate review. Trial court properly admitted victim's written statement to police as constancy
of accusation evidence; defendant failed to establish that court abused its discretion or that he was prejudiced by admission
of that evidence, and his claim that victim's statement is admissible only if tape recorded was incorrect. 48 CA 135. Subdiv.
(1): Trier of fact reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant compelled victim to engage
in sexual intercourse by use of force. 52 CA 466. Subdiv. (1): Defendant could not succeed in argument that the evidence
did not support a guilty verdict under section; jury could reasonably have concluded that the facts and inferences established
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 55 CA 412. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. 57 CA 736. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 58 CA 585. Evidence was sufficient
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 CA 201.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 23 CA 564, 567; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq.
Sec. 53a-70a. Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony.
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree when such person
commits sexual assault in the first degree as provided in section 53a-70, and in the
commission of such offense (1) such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses
a deadly weapon, (2) with intent to disfigure the victim seriously and permanently, or
to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of the victim's body,
such person causes such injury to such victim, (3) under circumstances evincing an
extreme indifference to human life such person recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a risk of death to the victim, and thereby causes serious physical injury to such
victim, or (4) such person is aided by two or more other persons actually present. No
person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and aggravated sexual
assault in the first degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged
and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony or, if the victim
of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class A felony. Any person found guilty
under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of
the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, except that, if
such person committed sexual assault in the first degree by violating subdivision (1) of
subsection (a) of section 53a-70, and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of
age, twenty years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the
court. Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a period of special
parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 of at least five years.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 9; P.A. 80-442, S. 20, 28; P.A. 87-246; P.A. 92-87, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 50; P.A. 02-138,
S. 6.)
History: P.A. 80-442 substituted "deadly weapon" for "firearm" and reference to specific firearms where occurring
and increased portion of sentence which may not be suspended or reduced from one year to five years in Subsec. (b),
effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 87-246 changed the name of the offense from sexual assault in the first degree with a deadly
weapon to aggravated sexual assault in the first degree and amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (2) re disfiguring the
victim or destroying, amputating or disabling a member or organ of the victim and Subdiv. (3) re recklessly engaging in
conduct creating a risk of death to the victim and thereby causing serious physical injury to the victim; P.A. 92-87 amended
Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re commission of the offense while aided by two or more other persons actually present;
June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of twenty
years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class
A felony if the victim is under sixteen years of age, add exception re twenty-year nonsuspendable sentence if the violation
is of Sec. 53a-70(a)(1) and the victim is under sixteen years of age and replace provision that a person found guilty shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole "which together constitute a sentence of twenty
years" with provision that a person found guilty shall be sentenced to a period of special parole "of at least five years".
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 188 C. 697, 699, 713. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242, 257. Cited. 207
C. 412, 416. Cited. 210 C. 110, 117, 127. Cited. Id., 315-317. Cited. 211 C. 672, 674. Judgment of appellate court in State
v. Horne, 19 CA 111, reversed. 215 C. 538, 542, 543. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 118. Cited. 12 CA 179, 180, 187. Cited. 19 CA 111, 113, 116, 139, 140, 145;
judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 36 CA 805, 807. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Cited. 43 CS 211, 212.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43. Cited. 210 C. 110, 112, 115, 123, 128. Cited. Id., 315, 317. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 235
C. 502, 517. Five-week-old fetus constitutes a part of the mother's body and, therefore, is a "member" of her body for
purposes of subdiv. (2). 263 C. 524.
Cited. 19 CA 111, 142, 143; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 725, 726. For purposes of the
offense described in subdiv. (4), it is victim's objective and subjective awareness, and not perpetrator's physical proximity,
that controls the factual determination as to whether perpetrator is "actually present". 75 CA 578.
Sec. 53a-70b. Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B
felony. (a) For the purposes of this section:
(1) "Sexual intercourse" means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or
cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient
to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission
of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the
genital or anal opening of the victim's body; and
(2) "Use of force" means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual
physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.
(b) No spouse or cohabitor shall compel the other spouse or cohabitor to engage in
sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other spouse or cohabitor, or by the
threat of the use of force against such other spouse or cohabitor which reasonably causes
such other spouse or cohabitor to fear physical injury.
(c) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class
B felony.
(P.A. 81-27, S. 1.)
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 193, 195, 196, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 735, 738-741, 743-745, 747, 748,
750, 752-757. Cited. 210 C. 110, 125. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 10 CA 709, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 112. Cited. 31 CA 20, 21, 29. Cited. Id., 497, 498,
501, 503, 506. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 36 CA 718, 720. Cited. 41 CA 604, 620.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 497, 503. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 497, 506.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 209 C. 733, 735.
Cited. 10 CA 709-714. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498, 503,
506. Cited. 36 CA 718, 720. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.
Sec. 53a-71. Sexual assault in the second degree: Class C or B felony. (a) A
person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in
sexual intercourse with another person and: (1) Such other person is thirteen years of
age or older but under sixteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older
than such person; or (2) such other person is mentally defective to the extent that such
other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse; or (3) such other person is
physically helpless; or (4) such other person is less than eighteen years old and the actor
is such person's guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such
person's welfare; or (5) such other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital
or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such
other person; or (6) the actor is a psychotherapist and such other person is (A) a patient
of the actor and the sexual intercourse occurs during the psychotherapy session, (B) a
patient or former patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally
dependent upon the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual
intercourse occurs by means of therapeutic deception; or (7) the actor accomplishes the
sexual intercourse by means of false representation that the sexual intercourse is for a
bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (8) the actor is a school
employee and such other person is a student enrolled in a school in which the actor
works or a school under the jurisdiction of the local or regional board of education which
employs the actor; or (9) the actor is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who
provides intensive, ongoing instruction and such other person is a recipient of coaching
or instruction from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such
coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of
age; or (10) the actor is twenty years of age or older and stands in a position of power,
authority or supervision over such other person by virtue of the actor's professional,
legal, occupational or volunteer status and such other person's participation in a program
or activity, and such other person is under eighteen years of age.
(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony or, if the victim of the
offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person found guilty under
this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which nine months of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 72; P.A. 75-619, S. 4; P.A. 82-428, S. 3; P.A. 83-326, S. 1; P.A. 85-341, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 2;
P.A. 94-221, S. 18; P.A. 00-161, S. 2; P.A. 02-106, S. 1; 02-138, S. 7; P.A. 04-130, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 75-619 restated Subsec. (a) to conform with changes made in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, referred to sexual
"assault" rather than to sexual "misconduct" and made the offense a Class C felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor;
P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that nine months of sentence may not be suspended or reduced by the court;
P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated "to
the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse", redesignated as Subdiv. (3) a victim who is "physically
helpless" and renumbered the remaining Subdivs.; P.A. 85-341 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to increase the applicable
age from fifteen to sixteen years; P.A. 93-340 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to specify that the other person be thirteen
years of age or older and the actor be more than two years older than such person, added Subdiv. (6) re sexual intercourse
between a psychotherapist and a patient or former patient and added Subdiv. (7) re sexual intercourse accomplished by
false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (8) concerning
school employees and students; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by deleting provision re the act of engaging in sexual
intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was reclassified as sexual assault in the first degree
under Sec. 53a-70 by same public act, and by making a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 02-106
amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (9) re sexual intercourse between a coach or instructor and a person who is a recipient
of such coaching or instruction and is a secondary school student receiving such coaching or instruction in a secondary
school setting or under eighteen years of age; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class B felony
if the victim is under sixteen years of age; P.A. 04-130 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (10) re actor twenty years of
age or older who stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over another person under eighteen years of age
and engages in sexual intercourse with such other person.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 180 C. 54, 56. Cited. 185 C. 199, 200. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 73, 74, 91;
id., 348, 349. Cited. 189 C. 321, 325. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Cited. 199 C. 47, 55. Cited. 201 C. 211,
212, 214, 216. Cited. 207 C. 374, 378. Cited. 209 C. 225, 230. Cited. 211 C. 455, 457. Cited. 224 C. 1, 2. Cited. 228 C.
393, 396. P.A. 93-340, Sec. 2 cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 118. Cited. 13 CA 378, 379. Cited. 14 CA 688, 693. Cited. 15 CA 251, 254,
278. Cited. Id., 289, 290. Cited. 25 CA 270-272; judgment reversed in part, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 527, 534,
535. Cited. 33 CA 133, 134, 139. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. Id., 754, 756. Cited. 36 CA 383, 384. Cited. 38 CA 56,
60. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 45 CA 116. Term "years" in Subsec. (a)(1) means periods of 365 or 356 days, not calendar
years. Subsec. (a)(1) not void for vagueness as applied to defendant in this case despite lack of judicial gloss on meaning
of "years" and does not violate defendant's right to equal protection. 47 CA 68. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 57 CA 736. Pursuant to. Sec. 53-21 (2), risk of injury to or impairing the
morals of a child involves sexual contact with a child younger than the age of sixteen years "in a sexual and indecent
manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child ...." This section contains no such similar provision. Risk of
injury to a child, therefore, contains elements lacking in sexual assault in the second degree. 79 CA 591.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 175 C. 315, 324; 180 C. 167, 168; 181 C. 426, 427, 430. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 382, 383; 187 C.
73, 91; 188 C. 565, 566; id., 644, 645. Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 321, 327. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3): The terms
"responsibility" and "general supervision" discussed; dissent regarded construction of those terms by majority as much
narrower than origin warranted. Id., 321, 322, 324-328, 330-332. Subdiv. (1) cited. 190 C. 84, 85; 191 C. 453, 454, 463;
192 C. 154, 155, 163. Cited. Id., 154, 164. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 666, 667. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 481, 493, 494. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 440, 441. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 734, 735. Cited.
201 C. 211, 215. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 187, 189. Subdiv. (3) cited. 205 C. 386, 388. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 528, 531,
532. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 51, 53. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 244-246, 250, 265-268, 272, 274, 275. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
359, 362. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 185, 186. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 455, 462. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 215 C. 653, 654; 219 C. 283, 284; 220 C. 345-348, 360. Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 656, 658; judgment reversed,
see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 207, 210, 211. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 393, 396. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
552, 554. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610, 612, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 839, 840. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 230 C. 43, 46-48, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 321, 322. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 296. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
409. Court determined defendant was more than two years older than victim by calculating the difference in age based on
birthdates rather than calendar years. 248 C. 543. Statute not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate defendant's
right to equal protection under the law. Id. Statute does not require physical violence as element of the crime. 260 C. 486.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 46, 48. Cited. 8 CA 190, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 313. Subdiv. (4) cited. 9 CA 426-428.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 591, 592; 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 493, 496. Subdiv. (4) cited. 14 CA 244, 245.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 244, 245, 247. Subdiv. (1) cited. 15 CA 222, 224-227. Cited. Id., 222, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 17 CA
174, 175. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 186, 187. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 447, 448. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 525, 526. Subdiv. (1) cited.
18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 44, 45. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445, 446. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 646, 647. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 20 CA 40, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 115, 116. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 263, 264.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 288, 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 530, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 737, 738. Cited. Id., 737, 753. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 23 CA 241, 242; Id., 712, 713; 24 CA 146, 147; 25 CA 235, 238. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 243,
245, 251; 26 CA 625, 626, 635, 637; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq;
Id., 674, 676, 679, 680; Id., 758, 759. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 91, 92. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 527, 528, 531, 533, 534,
536, 539, 540. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 120, 121. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580
et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 773-775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 205, 206. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 46, 48. Cited. 36 CA
383, 384. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 213, 214. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 125, 126, 133. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 731, 732, 743.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 132, 133, 148. Cited. 41 CA 139, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43
CA 142. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 785. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 289.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 512. Trial court properly refused to instruct jury as requested by defendant on the issue of fraudulent
misrepresentation; no affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation is available under provision of statute prohibiting
sexual intercourse between a person who is between the ages of thirteen and fifteen and a person who is at least two years
older. 63 CA 536.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-72. Rape in the first degree: Class B felony. Section 53a-72 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 73; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 125; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-72a. Sexual assault in the third degree: Class D or C felony. (a) A
person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels
another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other
person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person
or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical
injury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with
another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the
degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class D felony or, if the victim of the
offense is under sixteen years of age, a class C felony.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 5; P.A. 80-346, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 33; P.A. 02-138, S. 8.)
History: P.A. 80-346 designated previous Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B) in Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a)
and added Subdiv. (2) re incest; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by amending Subsec. (a)(1)(B) to replace "which
reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person" with "which reasonably causes such other person to
fear physical injury to himself or herself" and amending Subsec. (a)(2) to replace "such person" with "the actor" or "him
or her" as appropriate; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class C felony if the victim is under
sixteen years of age.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 216, 218, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 618. Cited. 192 C. 154,
164. Cited. 194 C. 258, 271. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 352, 353. Cited. Id., 386, 394. Cited. 207 C. 403, 404.
Cited. 214 C. 89, 91. Cited. 224 C. 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Cited. 240 C. 743. Statute encompasses
adopted relatives. 258 C. 779.
Cited. 1 CA 724-726, 735. Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 15, 16. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see
205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. Id., 648, 649. Cited. 10 CA 591. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 35 CA
173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 741. Evidence was sufficient to support conviction and court properly instructed
jury on element of intent for conviction of sexual assault in the third degree. 81 CA 189.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Cited. 205 C. 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 388. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id.,
386, 391, 393. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 209 C. 416-418. Subdiv. (2) cited. 210 C. 244, 246, 247, 265, 266, 272, 274. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. 224 C. 397, 404. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 233 C. 502, 504, 512. Subdiv.
(1)(A) cited. Id., 502, 512, 514. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 237 C. 284-286. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 576. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited.
Id., 694. Court's failure to define "knowledge" or to explain how it pertains to charge of sexual assault in the third degree
did not violate defendant's due process rights where jury instructions, viewed as a whole, adequately informed jury of the
elements of the crime. 258 C. 779.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 734. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 724, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 10 CA
591, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 244, 245, 247.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 694, 695, 697-699. Subdiv. (2) cited.
20 CA 530, 532. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 23 CA 221, 226. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see
200 C. 400 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B)
cited. Id., 725, 726; 26 CA 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 29 CA 724, 725. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 281, 282,
287. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218, 220; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 743,
748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id., 743, 744, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C.
502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 36 CA 228, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 762, 763.
Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 39 CA 657, 658. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 287, 288, 294. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 43 CA 578. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 756.
Sec. 53a-72b. Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm: Class C or B
felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm when
such person commits sexual assault in the third degree as provided in section 53a-72a,
and in the commission of such offense, such person uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person
possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, rifle, shotgun or other firearm. No person
shall be convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and sexual assault in the third
degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and
prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm is a class C felony or, if the
victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person
found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which
two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and
a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together
constitute a sentence of ten years.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 10; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 51; P.A. 02-138, S. 9.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase the penalty from a class D to a class C felony, increase
from one year to two years the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence and add requirement that any person found guilty
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute
a sentence of ten years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the
offense as a class B felony if the victim is under sixteen years of age.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-73. Rape in the second degree: Class C felony. Section 53a-73 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 74; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
Sec. 53a-73a. Sexual assault in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor or
class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when: (1)
Such person intentionally subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) under
fifteen years of age, or (B) mentally defective or mentally incapacitated to the extent
that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual contact, or (C) physically
helpless, or (D) less than eighteen years old and the actor is such other person's guardian
or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such other person's welfare, or
(E) in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has
supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person; or (2) such person subjects
another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent; or (3) such person
engages in sexual contact with an animal or dead body; or (4) such person is a psychotherapist and subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) a patient of the actor and
the sexual contact occurs during the psychotherapy session, or (B) a patient or former
patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon
the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual contact occurs
by means of therapeutic deception; or (5) such person subjects another person to sexual
contact and accomplishes the sexual contact by means of false representation that the
sexual contact is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (6)
such person is a school employee and subjects another person to sexual contact who is
a student enrolled in a school in which the actor works or a school under the jurisdiction
of the local or regional board of education which employs the actor; or (7) such person
is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who provides intensive, ongoing instruction
and subjects another person to sexual contact who is a recipient of coaching or instruction
from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such coaching or
instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of age; or (8)
such person subjects another person to sexual contact and (A) the actor is twenty years
of age or older and stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over such
other person by virtue of the actor's professional, legal, occupational or volunteer status
and such other person's participation in a program or activity, and (B) such other person
is under eighteen years of age.
(b) Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor or, if the victim of
the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class D felony.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 6; P.A. 83-326, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 3; P.A. 94-221, S. 19; P.A. 02-106, S. 2; 02-138, S. 10; P.A. 04-130, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or
mentally incapacitated "to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual contact", redesignated as Subpara. (C) a
victim who is "physically helpless" and relettered the remaining subparagraphs; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (a) to add
Subdiv. (4) re sexual contact by a psychotherapist with a patient or former patient and Subdiv. (5) re sexual contact
accomplished by means of false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec.
(a) to add Subdiv. (6) concerning school employees and students; P.A. 02-106 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical
change in Subdiv. (1)(B) for purposes of gender neutrality and to add Subdiv. (7) re a coach or instructor subjecting another
person to sexual contact who is a recipient of such coaching or instruction and is a secondary school student receiving
such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting or under eighteen years of age; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec.
(a) to make technical changes and amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class D felony if the victim is under
sixteen years of age; P.A. 04-130 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (8) re actor twenty years of age or older who stands
in a position of power, authority or supervision over another person under eighteen years of age and subjects that other
person to sexual contact.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Proof of specific interest required under statute precludes this from being a lesser included
offense under Sec. 53-21. 186 C. 45, 49, 51-53. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 204 C. 683, 685. Cited. 205 C. 386, 394,
396. Cited. 210 C. 396, 397. Cited. Id., 582, 583. Cited. 211 C. 455, 458. Cited. 224 C. 1, 2.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 150. Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 11 CA 80, 81. Cited. Id., 102, 118. Cited. 14 CA
40, 41. Cited. 15 CA 251, 254, 278. Cited. Id., 289, 290. Cited. 18 CA 459, 460. Cited. 25 CA 270, 271; judgment reversed
in part, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Judgment of acquittal in State v. Sirimanochanh, (26 CA 625, 221 C. 917 and 224 C. 656)
reversed and case remanded to trial court with direction to render judgment reinstating conviction under this section. 31
CA 452, 454, 455. Cited. 34 CA 473, 474. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 458. Cited. Id., 715. Reiterated previous
holdings touching bare skin not required for sexual contact in the fourth degree. 59 CA 538.
It is undisputable that Connecticut recognizes a clear public policy against sexual misconduct and sexual harassment.
This public policy is evidenced in state criminal statutes, which provide that "a person is guilty of sexual assault in the
fourth degree when ... (2) such person subjects another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent ...."
Thus, arbitration award reinstating police officer who had engaged in sexual misconduct and harassment while on duty
clearly violates established public policy and must be vacated. 48 CS 574.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 183 C. 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. 192 C. 37, 39. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 154-156, 161, 163. Subdiv.
(1)(B) cited. 200 C. 440, 441. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 734, 735. Subdiv. (1)(C) cited. 205 C. 386, 388, 393, 399. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 386, 388, 409, 410. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 409. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211
C. 555, 582. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582. Subdiv. (1)(D) cited. 215 C. 653, 654. Subdiv. (1)(A): Defendant
waived claim that violation of this section is not a lesser included offense of violation of Sec. 53a-71(a)(1). Judgment of
appellate court in State v. Sirimanochanh, 26 CA 625, reversed and case remanded for determination of evidence sufficiency.
224 C. 656, 658; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 227 C. 207, 210, 211. Subdiv. (1)(A)
cited. 230 C. 43, 47, 48.
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 395, 396. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 395, 396. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 18 CA 297, 298. Subdiv.
(1)(E) cited. Id., 694, 698. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 19 CA 44, 45. Subdiv. (1)(D) cited. 20 CA 115, 117. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 365, 366. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 530, 532. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 26 CA 625, 627, 636, 637; judgment reversed, see
224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 674, 679. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 409,
410, 414. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 31 CA 452, 454. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 205, 207. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 34 CA 428,
429. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 38 CA 125, 126. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 116. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited.
Id., 289. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 512. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 613. Subdiv. (1)(A): This offense and the offense of risk
of injury to a child are not the same offense for double jeopardy. 49 CA 409.
Secs. 53a-74 to 53a-81. Rape in the second degree. Deviate sexual intercourse
in the first and second degree. Sexual contact in the first, second and third degree.
Adultery: Class A misdemeanor. Sections 53a-74 to 53a-81, inclusive, are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 75-82; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 126-129; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 79, 80; P.A. 75-619, S. 7; P.A. 91-19, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-82. Prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with
another person in return for a fee.
(b) Prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 83.)
Meaning of statutory language is clear and is sufficient to warn ordinary person of the prohibited conduct. 37 CS 506-
509, 511-513. Does not violate right to privacy which has never been extended to encompass prostitutes plying their trade
on the street. Id., 515-517.
Sec. 53a-83. Patronizing a prostitute: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of patronizing a prostitute when: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, he pays
a fee to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged
in sexual conduct with him; or (2) he pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person
pursuant to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will
engage in sexual conduct with him; or (3) he solicits or requests another person to engage
in sexual conduct with him in return for a fee.
(b) Patronizing a prostitute is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 84.)
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 4 CA 520, 530.
Subsec. (b):
Section may be harmonized with Sec. 18-100d re determining controlling sentence where prisoner serving concurrent
sentences for crimes committed both on or after October 1, 1994 and before October 1, 1994, with good time credit
applicable to pre-October 1, 1994 sentence under Sec. 18-7a(c). Determination of controlling sentence not a static concept.
261 C. 806.
Sec. 53a-83a. Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle when
he, while occupying a motor vehicle: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, pays a fee
to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged in
sexual conduct with him; or (2) pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person pursuant
to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will engage in
sexual conduct with him; or (3) solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual
conduct with him in return for a fee; or (4) engages in sexual conduct for which a fee
was paid or agreed to be paid.
(b) Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 93-265, S. 2; P.A. 97-279, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 97-279 amended Subsec. (b) to delete provision that subjected any motor vehicle used in the commission
of the offense to forfeiture to the state in accordance with Secs. 54-36j to 54-36l, inclusive.
Sec. 53a-84. Sex of parties immaterial. In any prosecution for prostitution or
patronizing a prostitute, the sex of the two parties or prospective parties to the sexual
conduct engaged in, contemplated or solicited is immaterial, and it shall be no defense
that: (1) Such persons were of the same sex; or (2) the person who received, agreed to
receive or solicited a fee was a male and the person who paid or agreed or offered to
pay such fee was a female.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 85.)
Sec. 53a-85. Promoting prostitution: Definitions. The following definitions are
applicable to sections 53a-86 to 53a-89, inclusive:
(1) A person "advances prostitution" when, acting other than as a prostitute or as a
patron thereof, he knowingly causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution,
procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons or premises for prostitution
purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house of prostitution or a prostitution
enterprise, or engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid or facilitate an act
or enterprise of prostitution.
(2) A person "profits from prostitution" when acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitution services, he accepts or receives
money or other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any person
whereby he participates or is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 86.)
Sec. 53a-86. Promoting prostitution in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A
person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree when he knowingly: (1)
Advances prostitution by compelling a person by force or intimidation to engage in
prostitution, or profits from coercive conduct by another; or (2) advances or profits from
prostitution of a person less than sixteen years old.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the first degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 87.)
Cited. 199 C. 47, 55.
Sentencing under both risk of injury and promoting prostitution statutes not a double jeopardy violation. 53 CA 627.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 185 C. 199, 200; 191 C. 453, 454.
Sec. 53a-87. Promoting prostitution in the second degree: Class C felony. (a)
A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree when he knowingly: (1)
Advances or profits from prostitution by managing, supervising, controlling or owning,
either alone or in association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business
or enterprise involving prostitution activity by two or more prostitutes; or (2) advances
or profits from prostitution of a person less than eighteen years old.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 88; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 81.)
History: 1972 act changed applicable age in Subsec. (a)(2) from nineteen to eighteen, reflecting change in age of
majority.
Cited. 199 C. 47, 55.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 732.
Sec. 53a-88. Promoting prostitution in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A
person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the third degree when he knowingly advances or profits from prostitution.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P. A. 828, S. 89.)
Sec. 53a-89. Permitting prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of permitting prostitution when, having possession or control of premises which
he knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he fails to make reasonable effort to
halt or abate such use.
(b) Permitting prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 90.)
Cited. 185 C. 199, 200.
Sec. 53a-90. Transferred to Chapter 961, Part II, Sec. 54-102a.
Sec. 53a-90a. Enticing a minor. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of enticing a
minor when such person uses an interactive computer service to knowingly persuade,
induce, entice or coerce any person under sixteen years of age to engage in prostitution
or sexual activity for which the actor may be charged with a criminal offense. For purposes of this section, "interactive computer service" means any information service,
system or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access
to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.
(b) Enticing a minor is a class D felony for a first offense, a class C felony for a
second offense and a class B felony for any subsequent offense.
(P.A. 99-113; P.A. 04-139, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 04-139 amended Subsec. (b) to increase penalty for a first offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class
D felony, for a second offense from a class D felony to a class C felony and for any subsequent offense from a class C
felony to a class B felony, effective July 1, 2004.
PART VII*
KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-27 and present part VII of chapter 952:
Cited. 155 C. 592. Evidence produced by this state was sufficient to show proof was evident that defendants were in
danger of being convicted of capital offense under this section, hence bail could be denied under section 8 of article I of
state constitution. 159 C. 285. Prosecution where necessary elements of two or more distinct offenses combined in same
act, when. 164 C. 95. Fraudulent restraint in kidnapping, defined. Id., 95. Restraint for sexual gratification within purview
of kidnapping statute. Id., 95. Cited. 166 C. 96. Cited. 169 C. 38. Cited. 206 C. 40, 55.
Cited. 24 CS 386.
Sec. 53a-91. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully
in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one
place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences
or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent. As used herein "without
consent" means, but is not limited to, (A) deception and (B) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control
or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.
(2) "Abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by
either (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (B)
using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation.
(3) "Relative" means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 92; P.A. 92-260, S. 35.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsecs. (1) and (2) to replace Subdiv. indicators "(a)" and "(b)" with "(A)" and "(B)",
respectively.
Language is clear and does not lend itself to any equivocal interpretation. 173 C. 165, 168. Cited. 191 C. 604, 617.
Cited. 200 C. 586, 590. Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 216 C. 647, 661. Cited. 219 C. 489, 492. Cited. 226 C. 618, 623.
Terms "restrained" and "abducted" interpreted to include frightening victim to remain in bedroom through repeated physical
and verbal abuse. 258 C. 510.
Cited. 20 CA 437-439. Cited. 55 CA 447.
Subsec. (1):
Cited. 177 C. 335, 342; 179 C. 328, 338; 180 C. 565, 566. Cited. 188 C. 406, 416. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254. Subpara. (a)
cited. 198 C. 147, 152, 153. Cited. Id., 430, 434. Cited. Id., 537, 542, 550. Cited. 202 C. 520, 539. Cited. 209 C. 733, 760.
Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 215 C. 173, 178, 180. Cited. Id., 716, 727. Cited. 219 C 489, 502, 503, 510. Cited. 225 C.
347, 350. Cited. 237 C. 284, 313, 314.
Cited. 5 CA 586, 590. Cited. 13 CA 667, 672. Cited. 17 CA 339, 340, 343. Cited. 19 CA 396, 400. Cited. 30 CA 281,
282. Cited. 31 CA 312, 330. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Subsec. (2):
Subdiv. (b): Cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Subdiv. (a): Cited. 177 C. 335, 342. Subdiv. (b): Cited. 177 C. 335, 336, 342; id.,
637, 639, 641; 178 C. 634, 635. Cited. 179 C. 328, 338. Cited. 182 C. 449, 460. Cited. 188 C. 406, 415. Cited. 199 C. 537,
542, 550. Cited. 200 C. 586, 590. Subdiv. (a) cited. Id., 586, 597. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id. Cited. 209 C. 733, 757, 760. Cited.
211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 215 C. 716, 727. Cited. 219 C. 489, 500, 501, 510. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id., 489, 501. Cited. 225 C.
347, 350. Subdiv. (B) cited. 36 CA 190, 196. Cited. 46 CA 486. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id.
To prove unlawful restraint, the state had to prove that defendant abducted alleged victim by restraining her with intent
to prevent her liberation by using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation. 81 CA 320.
Sec. 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is
guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and: (1) His
intent is to compel a third person (A) to pay or deliver money or property as ransom or (B)
to engage in other particular conduct or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or
(2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him
or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a
felony; or (C) terrorize him or a third person; or (D) interfere with the performance of
a government function.
(b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 93, 94; P.A. 73-137, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 36.)
History: P.A. 73-137 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) making kidnapping a first degree offense when abducted person
dies during abduction or before his return to safety and provisions in that Subsec. re circumstances which determine the
presumption of death and provisions in Subsec. (b) re imposition of death penalty and re sentence for Class A felony when
accused enters guilty plea and court and state's attorney consent; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to insert Subpara.
indicators and made other technical changes.
Cited. 173 C. 165-167. Cited. 197 C. 436, 461. Cited. Id., 588, 591. Cited. 198 C. 671, 673. Cited. 200 C. 268, 286.
Cited. 201 C. 276, 284. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673. Cited. 212 C. 31, 32. Cited. 225 C. 347, 349. Cited. 227 C. 677, 679. Cited.
235 C. 711, 713. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114.
Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. 39 CA 632, 633. Cited. 46 CA 691. Cited. Id., 741.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended.
173 C. 165, 168. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 165, 166, 168; 177 C. 335, 343. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 185 C. 339, 340, 354.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 346, 347. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 194 C. 114, 115. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 692, 694, 695. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 197 C. 436, 438. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 588-592. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148, 151. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. Id., 285, 287. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 405, 406. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. Id., 671, 672. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 199 C.
399, 400. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 200 C. 268, 286. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 586, 587, 591; 201 C. 517, 519; Id., 559, 560;
202 C. 259, 260; Id., 509, 510; 203 C. 385, 386. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 204 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 240, 242. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited.
Id., 714, 716. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 205 C. 132, 134. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 673-675. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 206 C. 40,
42, 43, 54. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 733, 735, 761. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 210 C.
110-112. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 199, 200. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 315, 316. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv.
(2)(B) cited. 212 C. 31, 32, 38-40. Subdiv. (2) cited. 213 C. 388, 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 422, 424. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. 214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 89, 91. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 215 C. 173, 174, 177, 178, 180, 181. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. Id., 716, 718, 719, 727; 216 C. 647, 649; 217 C. 243, 244, 248, 250. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; 219 C. 93, 96.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 160, 161. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; Id., 269, 271. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 283, 284. Subdiv.
(2)(C) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 489, 491, 492, 494-496, 500-503. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 489, 491, 494-496;
220 C. 270, 272. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 345, 347, 348. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 487, 489. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 698,
700; 221 C. 264, 265; 222 C. 556, 558. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 347, 348, 350.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 450, 452. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 519, 520. Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 618-620. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. 227 C. 1, 9, 11. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 153, 155. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 228 C. 582, 584,
588. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 229 C. 557, 558. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 231 C. 195, 196. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 403, 408. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 235 C. 145, 147. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to
be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 C. 284-287, 313, 314. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 694.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face.
Id., 784. Cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 242 C. 445. Where defendant also charged with sexual assault, restriction
of movement alone can be basis of kidnapping if defendant, by violent actions, restrained victim with intent to prevent
liberation. 262 C. 179.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 8 CA 177, 178. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 25 CA 428, 430. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 28 CA 195, 196.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 33 CA 457, 458. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 457, 458. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 34 CA 276, 277. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. 36 CA 190, 191, 196. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 216, 217. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 641, 642. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. Id., 718, 720. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 774, 775. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 37 CA 360, 369. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 464, 465. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 38 CA 777, 778, 785. Cited. 39 CA 579, 580. Subdiv. (2)(B)
cited. Id., 579, 600. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 41 CA 317, 318; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 445 et seq. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited.
43 CA 715. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 44 CA 307. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to
firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful
restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under
section. 55 CA 447. Subdiv. (2): Under kidnapping statute, the state had to prove that defendant had abducted and restrained
alleged victim with the intent to inflict physical injury or to sexually attack her. 81 CA 320.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 65.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 674.
Cited. 8 CA 177, 178.
Sec. 53a-92a. Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm: Class A felony:
One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree with
a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the first degree as provided in section 53a-92, and in the commission of said crime he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping
in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm upon the same
transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon
the same information.
(b) Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm is a class A felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 9.)
Cited. 198 C. 671, 673, 676, 678, 679. "Effect of enactment of statute (was) to link a more serious crime with a less
serious penalty"; equal protection rights violated. 200 C. 268, 286, 289. Cited. 204 C. 240, 257. Cited. 205 C. 262, 264.
Cited. Id., 673, 674. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673.
Cited. 40 CA 60, 61.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 679. Cited. 210 C. 110, 111. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
The statute "has created an irreconcilable conflict in the statutes governing mandatory minimum sentences for kidnapping in the first degree ... until the legislature takes corrective action the sentencing provisions of (this statute) govern all
prosecutions for kidnapping in the first degree"; statutory construction discussed. 198 C. 671, 676, 680. Cited. 200 C. 268,
287. Equal protection rights discussed. Id. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-93. Proceeding to determine sentence for kidnapping in first degree.
Section 53a-93 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 95; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-94. Kidnapping in the second degree: Class B felony: Three years not
suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts
another person.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony for which three years of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 96; P.A. 93-148, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re three-year nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 169 C. 242, 243. Cited. 171 C. 47, 48. Cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Cited. 177 C. 335, 336, 342; id., 637, 639, 641.
Cited. 178 C. 549, 550; id., 634, 635. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Cited. 186 C. 179, 180. Cited. 188 C. 406, 407; id., 697, 702,
713. Cited. 190 C. 822, 823. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 617. Cited. 196 C. 430, 431. Cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Cited. Id., 190,
191. Cited. 199 C. 537, 538. Cited. 200 C. 586, 606. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. Id., 520, 521, 523. Cited. 206 C. 40,
53. Cited. Id., 685, 687, 709. Cited. 208 C. 365, 366. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673. Cited. 213 C. 388, 396. Cited. 231 C. 195, 196.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 12 CA 268. Cited. Id., 613. Cited. 20 CA 437. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. 27 CA 786,
787. Cited. 35 CA 740, 744. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 46 CA 486. Cited. Id., 691.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600-602. Cited. 179 C. 328, 329, 338. Cited. 180 C. 565. Cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 460. Cited. 187 C. 681,
683. Cited. 188 C. 406, 415. Cited. 190 C. 327, 329. Cited. 191 C. 604, 605. Cited. 192 C. 166, 167. Cited. 197 C. 485,
486. Cited. 198 C. 314, 315. Cited. 199 C. 537, 550. Cited. 200 C. 586, 588. Cited. 202 C. 520, 523. Cited. 238 C. 784.
There is neither any time requirement for the restraint, nor any distance requirement for the asportation to constitute
the crime of kidnapping. 1 CA 697, 708. By its plain terms, subsec. gives fair warning to the public that if a person abducts
another he is guilty of that offense. 83 CA 142.
Sec. 53a-94a. Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm: Class B felony:
Three years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree
with a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the second degree, as provided in section
53a-94, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of or uses or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a
pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the second degree and kidnapping in the second degree with a
firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for
both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm is a class B felony for which
three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 10; P.A. 92-260, S. 37; P.A. 93-148, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one
year to three years the length of the nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 188 C. 697, 699, 713. Cited. 200 C. 523, 524. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673, 677-679.
Cited. 9 CA 648, 649. Cited. 46 CA 741.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 210 C. 110, 114. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-95. Unlawful restraint in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under
circumstances which expose such other person to a substantial risk of physical injury.
(b) Unlawful restraint in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 97; P.A. 92-260, S. 38.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "the latter" with "such other person".
Cited. 171 C. 395, 397. Cited. 182 C. 353, 354; id., 366, 367, 382. Cited. 187 C. 216, 217; id., 348, 349. Cited. 191 C.
604, 616, 617. Cited. 194 C. 297, 298. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254, 265. Cited. 197 C. 298, 299. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited.
198 C. 430. Cited. 199 C. 193, 194. Cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Cited. 201 C. 659, 660. Cited. 202 C. 676, 677. Cited. 205 C. 352,
353. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 223 C. 180, 182. Cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Cited. 226 C. 601,
603. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 237 C. 284, 309. Cited. 242 C. 689.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 375. Cited. 5 CA 424, 425. Cited. Id., 586, 587, 590. Cited. 6 CA 334, 335. Cited. 7 CA 701, 702.
Cited. 8 CA 620, 621. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Cited. 13
CA 554-556. Cited. 17 CA 234, 236. Cited. Id., 339, 340, 343. Specific intent required. Id. Cited. Id., 391, 392. Cited. Id.,
490, 491. Cited. 22 CA 477, 478. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 20,
21. Cited. Id., 312, 314. Cited. 36 CA 805, 807. Cited. 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 701, 702. Cited. 42 CA 78. Cited.
Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Cited. 43 CS 211, 212.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 174 C. 500, 501; 176 C. 227, 228. Cited. 179 C. 381, 382. Cited. 185 C. 211, 212. Cited. 186 C. 599, 600. Cited.
190 C. 104, 105. Cited. 197 C. 50-52. Cited. Id., 602, 603. Cited. 198 C. 430-432, 434, 435. Cited. Id., 598, 600. Cited.
Id., 617, 618. Cited. 205 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 61, 63. Cited. Id., 437, 439. Cited. Id., 528, 531. Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43,
53, 54. Cited. 209 C. 143, 145. Cited. 222 C. 87, 88. Cited. 227 C. 32, 49. Cited. Id., 153, 155. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114.
Cited. 241 C. 784. Cited. 242 C. 523.
Cited. 6 CA 697, 698. Cited. 8 CA 387, 388. Cited. Id., 491, 493. Cited. Id., 566, 567. Cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Cited. Id.,
208, 209. Cited. 13 CA 667, 668. Cited. 14 CA 710, 712. Cited. 18 CA 134, 137. Cited. Id., 730, 731. Cited. 19 CA 631,
633. Cited. 21 CA 244, 245. Cited. Id., 467, 468. Cited. 25 CA 725, 726. Cited 26 CA 574, 575. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited.
31 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 312, 329. Cited. 32 CA 178, 179. Cited. 38 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 777, 785. Cited. 39 CA 45,
46. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Cited. Id., 832, 833. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257, 279. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. Id., 817, 818. Cited.
42 CA 78. Cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 715. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint is not double jeopardy.
47 CA 117.
Sec. 53a-96. Unlawful restraint in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the second degree when he restrains another
person.
(b) Unlawful restraint in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 98.)
Cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 618. Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Cited. 206 C. 100, 102. Cited. 211 C. 672,
678. Cited. 224 C. 397, 400. Cited. 231 C. 195, 196.
Cited. 9 CA 656, 657. Cited. 19 CA 396, 397. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498.
Cited. 46 CA 486.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600. Cited. 197 C. 413, 415. Cited. Id., 602, 603.
Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 285.
Sec. 53a-97. Custodial interference in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A
person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree when he commits custodial
interference in the second degree as provided in section 53a-98: (1) Under circumstances
which expose the child or person taken or enticed from lawful custody or the child held
after a request by the lawful custodian for his return to a risk that his safety will be
endangered or his health materially impaired; or (2) by taking, enticing or detaining the
child or person out of this state.
(b) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 99; P.A. 81-280, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 39; P.A. 95-206, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a) by including in Subdiv. (1) risk to a child held after a request by the lawful
custodian for his return; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 95-206 amended Subsec. (a) by classifying
the detention of a child or person out of this state as a violation of custodial interference in the first degree.
Cited. 182 C. 353, 355. Cited. 226 C. 652, 661, 663, 666, 668. Joint custodian is not inherently immune from criminal
prosecution under section solely on basis of his or her status as a joint custodian. 251 C. 656.
Cited. 34 CS 219, 221.
Sec. 53a-98. Custodial interference in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree when: (1)
Being a relative of a child who is less than sixteen years old and intending to hold such
child permanently or for a protracted period and knowing that he has no legal right to
do so, he takes or entices such child from his lawful custodian; (2) knowing that he has
no legal right to do so, he takes or entices from lawful custody any incompetent person
or any person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution;
or (3) knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he holds, keeps or otherwise refuses
to return a child who is less than sixteen years old to such child's lawful custodian after
a request by such custodian for the return of such child.
(b) Custodial interference in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 100; P.A. 81-280, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) concerning the failure to return a child to his lawful
custodian after a request by the custodian for the child's return.
Cited. 226 C. 652, 661, 664, 666, 668.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 652, 664.
Sec. 53a-99. Substitution of children: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of
substitution of children when, having been temporarily entrusted with a child less than
one year old and, intending to deceive a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of
such child, he substitutes, produces or returns to such parent, guardian or custodian a
child other than the one entrusted.
(b) Substitution of children is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 101.)
PART VIII*
BURGLARY, CRIMINAL TRESPASS, ARSON,
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Burglary:
Annotations to former section 53-68:
Burglary must be charged to have been committed in night season. 16 C. 33. Larceny not merged in burglary. 24 C.
57. Taking of life to prevent a burglary justifiable. 31 C. 485. Error to charge that when building is left secure at night and
found early in morning broken open, presumption is that it was broken open at night. 35 C. 515. Entering with intent to
commit a felony and breaking out is burglary. 43 C. 493. Night season is when there is not enough daylight to discern
features of another. 47 C. 182; 108 C. 405. This crime is one involving moral turpitude. 121 C. 678. Cited. 132 C. 575;
147 C. 296; 153 C. 40. Definition of "nighttime" discussed. Id., 540, 542. Cited. 161 C. 283.
Cited. 23 CS 41; 25 CS 433; 26 CS 71; 27 CS 42. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective
sentence of not more than five years in reformatory for four counts of burglary under this section, in addition to counts of
breaking and entering, larceny and theft of motor vehicle, should stand. Id., 105-107.
Annotations to former section 53-69:
Evidence that person was armed when he emerged from house sufficient to prove that he was armed when burglary
was committed. 47 C. 181. Cited. 154 C. 302, 303; 160 C. 42.
Annotations to former section 53-71:
Essential elements of crime; evidence admissible. 96 C. 162; 97 C. 261; 146 C. 518. Cited. 153 C. 451. Burglars' tools
jettisoned by defendant while he was being observed by witness and found immediately on his apprehension at place of
crime, held properly admitted into evidence. 155 C. 463. Cited. 161 C. 371.
Discovery of burglar's tools sufficient to allow police to search without warrant. 25 CS 216. Cited. Id., 229; 27 CS
323. Requirement that accused prove lawful excuse for having burglar tools in his possession at night is unconstitutional
as defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty and burden of proof is on state. 28 CS 28.
Annotations to former section 53-73:
Cited. 153 C. 540, 541 (fn). Evidence that defendant, immediately after his niece's house was robbed, had bills on his
person in denomination of those stolen and a cut on his wrist, when entry had been made by breaking glass, and had been
seen on premises before the entry, held ample grounds for conviction on trial by jury. 155 C. 297. It must be established
that crime took place in daytime in order to convict defendant. 161 C. 283. Cited. Id., 303.
Cited. 4 CS 260; 27 CS 65. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective sentence of not
more than five years in reformatory for four counts of violations under this section, in addition to counts of burglary,
larceny and theft of a motor vehicle, should stand. Id., 105-107. Review of sentence. Id., 124-126. Cited. 29 CS 471.
Annotation to former section 53-74:
Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. No legal distinction
between direct or circumstantial evidence so far as its probative force is concerned. 158 C. 124.
Annotations to former section 53-75:
Cited. 153 C. 540, 541 (fn). Trial court properly determined as matter of law that breaking and entering locked fur
storage vault within store otherwise open to public was breaking and entering of building. 156 C. 391.
Cited. 27 CS 392.
Garage held to be a "building ... used as place for the custody of property" within meaning of this statute. 3 Conn. Cir.
Ct. 276. Conviction based on identification by witness who observed defendant after crime at request of police officers
upheld. Rulings in
U. S. v. Wade (388 U. S. 318) and
Gilbert v. California (388 U. S. 263) not retroactive. 5 Conn. Cir.
Ct. 172.
Annotations to former section 53-76:
If one confederate gets inside without breaking and entering and opens door to others, all are guilty of breaking and
entering. 125 C. 213. History of statutes concerning burglary. 132 C. 576. Statute may apply to building partly occupied
as dwelling if it is also occupied for custody of certain property. Id., 579. Cited. 143 C. 559; 149 C. 643, 644; 150 C. 489;
152 C. 627, 633; 153 C. 451; id., 540, 541 (fn). Defendant's appeal from admission in evidence of burglary tools found
immediately after he was observed disposing of them denied as trier of facts could have reasonably determined that articles
were in his possession. 155 C. 463. Jury could have inferred from circumstantial evidence that some part of defendant's
body had entered building. Codefendant's statement that he dropped defendant off at premises and half hour later picked
him up was admissible only as to codefendant. 156 C. 378. Motion to suppress evidence obtained after search of defendant's
person on his arrest for disorderly conduct denied. 157 C. 485. Cited. 158 C. 322; 159 C. 434; 161 C. 283; 371; 404. Cited.
162 C. 442. Cited. 165 C. 163. Cited. 166 C. 81, 83.
Discussion of maximum sentence. 17 CS 367. Cited. 19 CS 267; 22 CS 270; 23 CS 5; id., 41; id., 355; 25 CS 451, 454,
457; id., 489; 26 CS 464; 27 CS 42; id., 65; id., 149; id., 237; id., 244; 27 CS 271; 27 CS 285; id., 290; 27 CS 318; 322;
323; id., 341; id., 347; id., 392. Term of not less than three years nor more than four years on basis of fourth felony conviction
was fair and just after conviction under this section. Id., 371. Cited. 29 CS 471.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 553; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 275; 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 530.
Annotations to former section 53-77:
Cited. 19 CS 267. Defendant found guilty hereunder and sentenced to indefinite term in state reformatory resentenced
to term not to exceed two years. 28 CS 132.
In trial for offense under this statute, court held it not mandatory to order mistrial when, on poll of jury, one juror
announced verdict contrary to that announced by foreman. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 153.
Annotations to former section 53-78:
History and construction of this statute. 125 C. 214. Cited. 132 C. 575. Cited. 166 C. 81, 83.
Annotation to former section 53-80:
Cited. 27 CS 244.
Arson:
Annotations to former section 53-82:
Burning of schoolhouse is arson. 2 R. 516; but see 10 C. 145. A barn eighteen rods from dwelling house and separated
by highway not subject of arson at common law; 6 C. 48; but otherwise under Sec. 53-83. 109 C. 31. That building is
property of another must be alleged and proved. 12 C. 489. An unfinished dwelling not subject of arson at common law.
20 C. 247. House burned should be described as house occupied. 29 C. 344; 63 C. 331. Charge of burning with intent to
defraud insurance company. 105 C. 117; id., 328. State need not prove legal corporate existence of insurance company.
45 C. 273. Evidence reviewed and held sufficient to warrant conviction. 105 C. 117; id., 333. Proofs of loss submitted to
insurance company admissible though made by accused after fire. 105 C. 122. Motive need not be proved; and, while
malice is an essential ingredient of crime of arson, it does not require ill-will but merely deliberation and action without
justification or excuse; so, conviction sustained where accused set fire for excitement it would produce. 107 C. 631.
Dwelling is "burned" if the slightest portion is burned or charred as distinguished from being merely smoked or discolored.
Id., 633. Conviction of accessory to arson. 109 C. 394. Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction. 136 C. 201. Cited.
149 C. 25; 150 C. 169. In re latter case, conviction affirmed; proof of voluntariness of confession prerequisite to its
admissibility if made during illegal detention. 151 C. 246. See 371 U. S. 471.
Annotations to former section 53-83:
Evidence held sufficient to warrant conclusion that defendant set fire wilfully and maliciously. 137 C. 179; 149 C. 25;
150 C. 171; 156 C. 328. Cited. 163 C. 176.
Annotations to former section 53-85:
Plea of nolo contendere for attempted arson, which was subsequently nolled, held bar to prosecution of arson as violation
of double jeopardy. 25 CS 96. The two offenses need not be identical in nature, a similarity being sufficient. Id.
Annotation to former section 53-86:
State need not prove legal corporate existence of insurance company. 45 C. 273.
Trespass and injury to property:
Annotations to former section 53-45:
See Sec. 1-1 for definition of "public buildings". Complaint must set out with particularity the "injury". 62 C. 131.
"Wilfully" means in a spirit of wantonness or with an evil intent or guilty purpose. 71 C. 742. An amendatory act is
presumed not to change the existing law further than is expressly declared or necessarily implied. The word "deface" was
removed from statute and only the word "injury" left. Painting a swastika on building held to be an injury. 149 C. 577,
579. Reversed, 375 U. S. 85. (a) Cited. 153 C. 599.
Cited. 22 CS 203.
Annotation to former section 53-81:
Cited. 27 CS 244.
Evidence of witness who on trial contradicted his prior written statements and testimony by defendant held sufficient
to sustain judgment of defendant's guilt. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 423.
Annotations to former section 53-103:
Cited. 124 C. 313; 319 U. S. 147.
Conviction under this statute not admissible to impeach witness's credibility. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 389. Comparison of this
section and Sec. 53-108 in regard to phrase "without right" in former and absence in latter. Id., 524, 532. Whether proof
of scienter is essential is matter of legislative intent. No proof of specific intent to commit crime of trespass needed under
this section. Id. That defendant thought he had lawful right to be where he was does not negate his trespass; honest mistake
of law does not excuse him from consequences of his act. Id.
Annotation to former section 53-105:
Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536.
Annotation to former section 53-107:
Owner of garden upon which fowls of another trespassed is liable in damages for spreading poison thereon and killing
fowls; force used to repel such trespass must be reasonable; notice to owner of fowls of intent to spread poison no defense.
14 C. 1.
Annotations to former section 53-108:
It is no defense that defendant entered upon lands, etc., for purpose of fishing without guilty intent. 60 C. 229. Cited.
125 C. 214. Prima facie evidence discussed. 148 C. 481.
Comparison of this section and Sec. 53-103 in regard to presence of phrase "without right" in latter and its absence
here. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 524, 532.
Annotations to former section 53-124:
Former statute cited. 66 C. 568; 141 C. 731.
Annotations to former section 53-126:
Cited. 145 C. 124. Cited. 162 C. 53.
Cited. 23 CS 216, 218; 24 CS 378; 27 CS 347. Balance of sentence of defendant suspended by review division where
he had not been represented by counsel at time sentence was imposed and his damage to landlord's property was not more
than one hundred and twenty-five dollars. Id., 387.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 136; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 476.
Annotations to former section 53-127:
Cited. 72 C. 470; 73 C. 117.
Annotation to former section 53-197:
Cited. 23 CS 43.
Sec. 53a-100. Definitions. (a) The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Building" in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any watercraft, aircraft,
trailer, sleeping car, railroad car or other structure or vehicle or any building with a valid
certificate of occupancy. Where a building consists of separate units, such as, but not
limited to separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, any unit not occupied by the
actor is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate building; (2) "dwelling"
means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether
or not a person is actually present; (3) "night" means the period between thirty minutes
after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise.
(b) The following definition is applicable to sections 53a-101 to 53a-106, inclusive:
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises, at the
time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when the actor is not
otherwise licensed or privileged to do so.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 102; P.A. 74-186, S. 10, 12; P.A. 79-570, S. 7; P.A. 92-260, S. 40.)
History: P.A. 74-186 included railroad cars in definition of "building"; P.A. 79-570 included buildings "with a valid
certificate of occupancy" in definition of "building"; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in definition of "building".
Cited. 191 C. 180, 184, 185. Cited. 195 C. 598, 601, 603, 606. Cited. Id., 611, 613. Cited. 209 C. 322, 342, 343. Cited.
210 C. 199, 203, 206. Cited. 216 C. 367, 379, 384.
"... failure of the court to define the phrase 'enters unlawfully,' misled the jury ...". 6 CA 24, 25, 28, 30, 31. Cited. 30
CA 95, 107; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 714, 723-726. Cited. 44 CA 62.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 542, 553. Subdiv. (2) cited. 209 C. 322, 342, 343. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 199, 205, 206.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 218 C. 273, 274, 277-280. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 708. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 523. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 119, 126. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 440, 443, 444. Cited. 34 CA 823, 824. Subdiv. (3) cited.
38 CA 231, 236. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 1, 4. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 488. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Although it is true that
the crime of burglary in the second degree requires the element of a "dwelling" as opposed to "building," our statutes
define "dwelling" as a type of building "which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a
person is actually present ...." 76 CA 779. An individual apartment, within an apartment home, while a dwelling, also is
a separate building. Id. Subdiv. (1): Under the ordinary definition of a "building", one's home is clearly a building. 78
CA 610.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 210 C. 199, 203, 206, 207. Cited. 216 C. 367, 379, 380.
Cited. 8 CA 528, 540. Cited. 19 CA 179, 188, 192. Cited. 24 CA 563, 571. Cited. 39 CA 1, 4. Cited. 42 CA 507.
Defendant's presence in an apartment that was not his own, his attempts to evade police and his flight were sufficient
evidence from which jury could infer that he had entered apartment unlawfully. 66 CA 357. Restaurant was not open to
the public at time defendant entered and management office was a separate area not open to public and defendant was not
licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon premises. 74 CA 607.
Sec. 53a-101. Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty
of burglary in the first degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with
intent to commit a crime therein and: (1) He is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon
or dangerous instrument, or (2) in the course of committing the offense, he intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone.
(b) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing" the offense if it occurs in
an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission.
(c) Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty
under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 103; P.A. 80-442, S. 21, 28.)
History: P.A. 80-442 specified in Subsec. (c) that five years of imposed sentence may not be suspended or reduced
when person is guilty under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981.
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 172 C. 74, 75. Cited. 174 C. 500, 506. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500, 509. Cited. 205 C. 456, 463,
467. Cited. 210 C. 199. Cited. 216 C. 563, 565. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 227 C. 32, 48. Cited.
229 C. 691, 694.
1 CA 724, 725, 735. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. 19 CA 245, 254, 255. Cited. 24 CA 563, 568. Cited.
29 CA 704, 705, 712. Cited. 30 CA 416, 418, 424. Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 714, 726. Cited. 46 CA 118. There
was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that defendants took steak knives to arm themselves during the burglary and
thus committed burglary in the first degree. 52 CA 149.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 170 C. 162. Cited. 174 C. 500, 501. Subdiv. (1) cited. 175 C. 398, 399. Subdiv. (1): Presence of a
tire iron used to break into an apartment is insufficient by itself to satisfy statutory definition in section 53a-3(7) to support
finding of attempted burglary in first degree; potential for injury considered only in conjunction with circumstances of
actual or threatened use. 177 C. 140, 141, 146. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 564, 565; 180 C. 481, 482; id., 557, 560. Subdiv.
(2): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599, 600. Cited. 182 C. 366, 367, 382. Subdiv. (1) cited. 185 C. 211,
212, Subdiv. (2) cited. 186 C. 599, 600. Subdiv. (1) cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 574, 576; 189 C. 383,
384, 398. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 611, 612. Cited. Id., 611, 625, 627, 628. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C. 104, 105. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 496, 497, 500, 505-509. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 496, 507, 509. Subdiv. (2) cited. 194 C. 241, 244. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 196 C. 157, 158, 169. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 225-227. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 413, 415. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C.
62, 63. Subdiv. (1) cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Cited. Id., 586, 596. Subdiv. (1) cited. 203 C. 159, 160. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C.
714, 716. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 485, 486. Cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210
C. 199, 200. Cited. Id., 199, 203, 205-207. Subdiv. (2) cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 282, 284. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (1) cited. 217 C. 419, 420; 219 C. 269, 271; 221 C. 430, 431. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.; Id.,
447, 449; Id., 685, 687. Subdiv. (1) cited. 223 C. 41, 42. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 243, 245, 257, 263, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 99, 301. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 524, 526. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 32, 48. Cited. Id., 616, 622. Subdiv. (1) cited.
228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 455, 457. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 802, 804.
Cited. 241 C. 702. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 784. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 445. Cited. Id., 523. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id. Utility room in rear of gas station convenience store in which defendant sexually assaulted and murdered
victim, being a separate room and structurally distinct from the convenience store that could be reached only through gas
station's garage bay area and not open to the public, reasonably could have been found to be a separate "building" under
statute. 252 C. 274.
Cited. 6 CA 667-669, 674, 675. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 667, 670, 675. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 667, 670, 675. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 697, 698. Cited. Id., 701, 706. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 631, 632. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 208, 209. Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 176. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA
662, 663. Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 554-556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 14 CA 67, 68. Subdiv. (1) cited. id., 657, 658. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 15 CA 342, 343. Subdiv. (2) cited. 16 CA 184, 186. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 318, 319. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 455, 456.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 391, 392. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 179-181, 187. Cited. Id., 179, 192. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 245-
247, 250, 253-255. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 244, 245. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 692, 693.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 556, 557, 559. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 556, 559. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 563, 565, 567, 569. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 563, 567, 569. Cited. Id., 563, 568. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 428-430. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 565-567. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 26 CA 641, 642. Subdiv. (2) cited. 27 CA 73, 75; Id., 786, 787; Id., 794, 795. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 402, 403.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 704, 705, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited.
31 CA 312, 313, 327. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35
CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 774, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited 38 CA 481, 482. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited.
39 CA 45, 50. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 45, 46, 51. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Cited. 41 CA 255, 273. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 255, 257, 276, 277. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 255, 270, 276. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 317, 318. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 817,
818, 825. Cited. Id., 817, 825. Subdiv. (2) cited. 42 CA 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 307. Cited. 45 CA 187. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 261. Direct evidence of an entry is not required when evidence is such that the trier of fact
reasonably could infer that something the defendant did inside the building could not have been done without first entering
the building. 78 CA 646.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 190 C. 496, 509.
Cited. 29 CA 704, 711.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. 19 CA 245, 255. Cited. 30 CA 416, 418.
Sec. 53a-102. Burglary in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is
guilty of burglary in the second degree when such person (1) enters or remains unlawfully
in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein, or (2) enters or remains
unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually
present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein.
(b) Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 104; P.A. 01-83, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 01-83 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, designate existing
provisions re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein as Subdiv. (1)
and add Subdiv. (2) re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime
is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein.
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. Id., 556, 567. Cited. 175 C. 315. Cited. 184 C. 258, 259. Instruction
characterizing burglary as a crime against the person likely to involve danger to life was not in error. 188 C. 542, 553.
Cited. Id., 715, 716. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited. 195 C. 611, 612. Cited. 197 C. 574, 575, 581. Cited. 198 C. 671, 672.
Cited. 204 C. 1-3. Cited. 205 C. 456, 463, 467. Cited. 215 C. 257, 259. Cited. 216 C. 273, 274. Cited. 220 C. 417, 426.
Cited. 229 C. 285, 287. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Cited. 242 C. 523. Cited. Id., 689.
Cited. 5 CA 113, 114. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 9 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 349-351. Cited. Id., 656, 657. Cited. 11 CA
575, 576, 583. Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 34, 57. Cited. 16 CA 333, 334. Cited. 19 CA
396, 397, 401. Cited. 20 CA 369, 370. Cited. Id., 586, 587. Cited. 23 CA 201, 202. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803, 812; judgment
reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 94, 103. Cited. Id., 370, 376. Cited. 34 CA 599, 600, 606. Cited. 35 CA 714,
726. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 231, 236. Cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited. 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 169, 170. Cited.
Id., 255, 277. The crime proscribed by section is complete once there has been an unlawful entering or remaining in a
dwelling, at night, with intent to commit a crime in that dwelling. 76 CA 779.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 181 C. 172, 173, 177. Cited. 182 C. 207, 208. Cited. 188 C. 542, 543. Cited. 189 C. 631, 633. Cited. 190 C. 440,
442. Cited. 199 C. 88, 89. Cited. 200 C. 523, 525, 538. Cited. 202 C. 676, 677. Cited. 204 C. 377, 378. Cited. 205 C. 456,
459. Cited. 214 C. 493, 495. Cited. 216 C. 699, 701. Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. 223 C. 635, 637, 638. Cited. 241 C. 784.
Cited. 1 CA 260, 262. Cited. 6 CA 697. Cited. 14 CA 710, 712, 715. Cited. 21 CA 260, 261. Cited. 23 CA 564, 565;
judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803; judgment reversed, see
229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 606, 607. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371, 376. Cited. 35 CA 262, 263. Cited 36 CA 774, 775.
Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 231, 232. Cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited. Id., 643, 645. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257. Cited. 42 CA
78. Defendant's right to fair trial and unanimous verdict not violated when court made it clear that the jury had to find
each element of crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt and there was ample evidence to support conviction under both
alternate theories of liability. 59 CA 305.
Sec. 53a-102a. Burglary in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony:
One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree with
a firearm when he commits burglary in the second degree as provided in section 53a-102, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the
use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of
burglary in the second degree and burglary in the second degree with a firearm upon
the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such
offenses upon the same information.
(b) Burglary in the second degree with a firearm is a class C felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 11; P.A. 76-435, S. 4, 68, 82; P.A. 92-260, S. 41.)
History: P.A. 76-435 made technical corrections, adding simple burglary in the second degree in Subsec. (a) and
specifying in Subsec. (b) that burglary in second degree with a firearm is a Class C, rather than Class B, felony; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 188 C. 697, 699. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited. 199 C. 255, 275.
Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-103. Burglary in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of burglary in the third degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with
intent to commit a crime therein.
(b) Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 105.)
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 173 C. 317, 318. Cited. 174 C. 253, 254. Cited. 176 C. 299, 300. Cited. 182 C. 52, 53; id.,
176, 177; id., 242, 243. Cited. 183 C. 225; id., 444, 445. Cited. 184 C. 95, 96; id., 215, 216; id., 369, 377. Cited. 186 C.
648, 649. Cited. 187 C. 6, 8; id., 292, 293; id., 444, 447. Cited. 189 C. 364; id., 717, 718. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited.
191 C. 146; id., 180, 182, 185. Cited. 193 C. 35-37. Cited. 194 C. 198, 199, 204, 205. Cited. Id., 210. Cited. Id., 213, 214.
Cited. Id., 361, 362. Cited. Id., 438, 439. Cited. Id., 623, 624. Cited. 196 C. 185. Cited. 197 C. 247, 261. Cited. 198 C. 1,
2. Cited. 199 C. 30-32. Cited. Id., 308, 309. Cited. 202 C. 615, 617. Cited. 216 C. 814. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275-277. Cited.
219 C. 489, 491. Cited. 220 C. 417, 418, 429. Cited. 223 C. 731, 733. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458, 459. Cited. 235 C. 679, 682.
Cited. 237 C. 390, 392. Cited. 239 C. 235. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 2 CA 537, 538. Cited. 3 CA 132, 133. Cited. Id., 359, 362. Cited. Id., 503. Cited. 5 CA 599, 600, 604. Cited. 6
CA 24, 25. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. 8 CA 478, 479, 481, 490. Cited. 9 CA 141, 142, 144. Cited. 10 CA 258, 259. Cited.
Id., 279, 280. Cited. Id., 447, 448, 451. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. 11 CA 805. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3, 19. Cited. Id., 196, 197.
Cited. Id., 375, 376, 383. Cited. 13 CA 214, 215. Cited. Id., 220, 221. Cited. 14 CA 119, 120, 126. Cited. Id., 526, 527.
Cited. 16 CA 184. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 18 CA 368, 369. Cited. 19 CA 48, 50, 52, 60. Cited. 20 CA 205, 207. Cited.
Id., 721, 722. Cited. 22 CA 440, 441. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited. Id., 151, 152. Cited. Id., 201, 202. Cited. 24 CA 295,
296. Cited. 25 CA 503, 505. Cited. 30 CA 190, 192. Cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq.
Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 405, 406, 409, 412, 420. Cited. Id., 714, 716, 726. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. Id.,
364, 372, 373. Cited. 37 CA 40, 42. Cited. Id., 228, 229, 231, 234. Cited. 38 CA 225, 226. Cited. Id., 481, 482. Cited. 39
CA 1, 2, 4. Cited. Id., 579, 580, 599. Cited. 42 CA 507. Cited. 44 CA 162. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Cited. 33 CS 706. Cited. Id., 750. Cited. 38 CS 407.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 177 C. 140, 147. Cited. 181 C. 254, 255. Cited. 184 C. 369, 370. Cited. 189 C. 461, 462. Cited. 191 C. 180, 181,
184. Cited. 194 C. 213, 216. Cited. Id., 665, 666, 672, 675. Cited. 197 C. 247, 248. Cited. 198 C. 369, 370. Cited. 212 C.
50, 52. Cited. 218 C. 447-449.
Cited. 4 CA 514. Cited. 6 CA 24, 25. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 75, 76. Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. Id., 528, 540.
Cited. 9 CA 121, 122. Cited. 10 CA 279, 280. Cited. Id., 503, 511. Cited. 13 CA 438, 439. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment
reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Cited. 15 CA 531, 532. Cited. 17 CA 490, 492. Cited. 22 CA 440, 443. Cited. 23 CA 151,
155. Cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 405, 412.
Cited. Id., 699, 700. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. 37 CA 40, 42. Cited. Id., 228, 229, 233. Cited. 38 CA 225, 226. Cited.
Id., 481, 482. Cited. 39 CA 579, 594. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 184 C. 369, 377.
Sec. 53a-103a. Burglary in the third degree with a firearm: Class D felony:
One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree with
a firearm when he commits burglary in the third degree as provided in section 53a-103,
and in the commission of such offense, he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of burglary
in the third degree and burglary in the third degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the
same information.
(b) Burglary in the third degree with a firearm is a class D felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 12.)
Cited. 177 C. 335, 336; id., 637, 639. Cited. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500.
Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 14 CA 710, 717. Cited. 28 CA 369, 370. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 219 C. 93, 95.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-104. Affirmative defense to burglary. It shall be an affirmative defense
to prosecution for burglary that the building was abandoned.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 106.)
Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Sec. 53a-105. Conviction for burglary and other offense authorized, when.
Section 53a-105 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 107; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
Sec. 53a-106. Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools when
he manufactures or has in his possession any tool, instrument or other thing adapted,
designed or commonly used for advancing or facilitating offenses involving unlawful
entry into premises, or offenses involving forcible breaking of safes or other containers
or depositories of property, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the commission of an offense of such
character.
(b) Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 108; P.A. 92-260, S. 42.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the name of the offense.
Cited. 181 C. 172, 180. Cited. 182 C. 242, 243, 250.
Cited. 5 CA 599, 600, 604. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 11 CA 805. Cited. 28 CA 369, 370. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726. Cited.
37 CA 228, 229.
Cited. 33 CS 706.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 182 C. 366, 367, 382.
Cited. 5 CA 599, 606.
Sec. 53a-107. Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a)
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when: (1) Knowing that such
person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains in a building
or any other premises after an order to leave or not to enter personally communicated
to such person by the owner of the premises or other authorized person; or (2) such
person enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a restraining
order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section
46b-38c, 54-1k or 54-82r by the Superior Court; or (3) such person enters or remains
in a building or any other premises in violation of a foreign order of protection, as
defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person, after notice and
an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, in a case involving the
use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person.
(b) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 109; P.A. 80-58; P.A. 91-381, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 43; P.A. 95-214, S. 4; P.A. 99-240, S. 5; P.A.
03-98, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 80-58 added Subdiv. (2) in Subsec. (a) specifying that entering or remaining in building or other premises
in violation of a restraining order is criminal trespass in the first degree; P.A. 91-381 amended Subsec. (a) by adding
"pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-38c" after "issued"; P.A. 92-260 made
technical changes in Subsec. (a) by replacing references to "such person" with "he" or "him" as appropriate; P.A. 95-214
amended Subsec. (a) to include in Subdiv. (2) a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-1k; P.A. 99-240 amended
Subsec. (a) to include in Subdiv. (2) a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-82r and to make provisions gender
neutral; P.A. 03-98 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re entry or remaining in a building or other premises in
violation of a foreign order of protection.
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 204 C. 441, 442.
Cited. 12 CA 172, 173, 175, 177, 178. Cited. 18 CA 303, 310. Cited. 19 CA 245, 254, 255. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606,
607. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726. Cited. 43 CA 1. Conviction reversed; evidence was insufficient to
convict defendant under section. 55 CA 475.
Word "owner" must be given broad meaning so statute serves its legislative purpose to protect any possessor of land
from unwanted intrusions; proof of title not essential element. 35 CS 555, 556, 558, 559. Cited. 37 CS 853.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 647, 649. Subdiv. (2) cited. 236 C. 342, 343.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 24, 25; 12 CA 258, 261. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 303, 304, 306; 19 CA 245, 249, 250, 253,
254. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 45, 46. Cited. 35 CA 262, 263, 267. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 262, 267. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 448, 449; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342 et seq.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 19 CA 245, 255.
Sec. 53a-108. Criminal trespass in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when, knowing that he
is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in a building.
(b) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 110.)
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 215 C. 257, 259. Section not applicable based on defendant's
knowledge. 245 C. 657.
Cited. 12 CA 375, 383, 384. Cited. 19 CA 245, 256. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606, 607. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 24 CA
489. Cited. 31 CA 370, 376. Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 558. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 24 CA 541, 542. Cited. 31 CA 370, 376.
Sec. 53a-109. Criminal trespass in the third degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a)
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when, knowing that he is not
licensed or privileged to do so: (1) He enters or remains in premises which are posted
in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders,
or fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, or which
belong to the state and are appurtenant to any state institution; or (2) he enters or remains
in any premises for the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing.
(b) Criminal trespass in the third degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 111; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 20; P.A. 92-260, S. 44.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (2) in Subsec. (a) specifying that person's entering or remaining in premises for purpose
of hunting, trapping or fishing although he knows he is not licensed or privileged to do so is criminal trespass in the third
degree; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes and deleted redundant language in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 20 CA 599, 606, 607. Cited. 24 CA 195, 203. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 558.
Subsec. (a):
Evidence that defendant entered building by not using main entrance but instead forcing open a locked door labeled
with a no trespassing sign was sufficient to support conviction under section. 83 CA 377.
Sec. 53a-110. Affirmative defenses to criminal trespass. It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution for criminal trespass that: (1) The building involved in the
offense was abandoned; or (2) the premises, at the time of the entry or remaining, were
open to the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access
to or remaining in the premises; or (3) the actor reasonably believed that the owner of
the premises, or a person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him
to enter or remain, or that he was licensed to do so.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 112.)
Cited. 202 C. 86, 91. Cited. 215 C. 82, 101. Cited. Id., 257, 273.
Cited. 18 CA 303, 311. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606-608. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 563.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 215 C. 257, 273.
Sec. 53a-110a. Simple trespass: Infraction. (a) A person is guilty of simple trespass when, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters any premises
without intent to harm any property.
(b) Simple trespass is an infraction.
(P.A. 83-276, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 45.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Cited. 12 CA 258-262. Cited. 20 CA 599-608. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. 30 CA 45, 46, 50. Cited. 31 CA 370, 378.
Sec. 53a-110b. Transferred to Part XXI, Sec. 53a-223.
Sec. 53a-110c. Transferred to Part XXI, Sec. 53a-223a.
Sec. 53a-110d. Simple trespass of railroad property: Infraction. (a) A person
is guilty of simple trespass of railroad property when, knowing that such person is not
licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains on railroad property without
lawful authority or the consent of the railroad carrier.
(b) Simple trespass of railroad property is an infraction.
(P.A. 00-149, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-111. Arson in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of
arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined
in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and (1) the building is inhabited
or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; or (2) any other person is injured, either directly or indirectly; or (3) such fire or
explosion was caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant
loss; or (4) at the scene of such fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected
to a substantial risk of bodily injury.
(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 113; P.A. 79-570, S. 3; P.A. 80-229, S. 1; P.A. 82-290, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 79-570 restated Subsec. (a) in greater detail, replacing general language re actor's awareness that person
is in or near building or his lack of knowledge or indifference as to whether another is in or near building; P.A. 80-229
clarified Subsec. (a), adding reference to "building" definition of Sec. 53a-100 and replacing reference to peace officer's
or firefighter's closeness to building with reference to their being at the scene of a fire or explosion; P.A. 82-290 amended
Subsec. (a) to include fire or explosion caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds.
See also annotations to part V.
Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 174 C. 135, 136. Cited. 178 C. 67, 68. Cited. 194 C. 279, 281, 283-286. Cited. 197 C. 158,
162-164. Cited. 198 C. 92, 105. Cited. 200 C. 685, 686, 693. Cited. 204 C. 4, 5. Cited. Id., 769, 770. Cited. 210 C. 519-
521. Cited. 216 C. 678, 679. Cited. 219 C. 605, 606. Cited. 220 C. 796, 798. Cited. 222 C. 469, 470. Cited. 227 C. 829,
832. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681, 683. Cited. 236 C. 31, 33. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 828.
Cited. 8 CA 581, 597. Cited. 12 CA 32, 34. Cited. 35 CA 527, 528. Cited. Id., 714, 715, 717, 724. Cited. 36 CA 454,
456-458. Cited. 40 CA 789, 791. Cited. 46 CA 350. Provisions applicable to firefighters on truck injured in accident en
route to fire. Injuries not required to be substantial or foreseeable. 59 CA 507.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 183 C. 1, 2, 5. Subdiv. (1) cited. 187 C. 109, 111. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 513, 514. Subdiv. (1) cited.
191 C. 412, 413. Cited. Id., 636, 638, 645. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 1, 2. Cited. 200 C. 30, 31. Trial court's failure to
consider a suspended sentence violated equal protection because it resulted in a harsher penalty for a defendant who acted
with less culpable intent and caused a less serious result than arson murder. Id., 268, 279, 280. Cited. 202 C. 93, 98. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 204 C. 377, 378. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 769, 775-777, 785. Subdiv. (1) cited. 205 C. 201, 202. Cited. 207 C. 118,
120. Subdiv. (1) cited. 213 C. 161, 162. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 161, 162; Id., 752, 753; 215 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (2) cited.
216 C. 585-587, 595; 218 C. 747, 748. Subdiv. (4) cited. 219 C. 605, 606, 608, 615, 618, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 605,
606, 608, 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 221 C. 713, 715. Subdiv. (4) cited. 227 C. 1, 2, 6-12. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 1, 2, 6-
12, 16. Subdiv. (3) cited. 229 C. 10-12. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681. Subdiv. (4) cited. 240 C. 708. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 241 C. 57. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Motive not an ultimate issue or element of Sec. 53a-111(a)(4), therefore state is
not collaterally estopped from admitting evidence of insurance despite earlier acquittal of Sec. 53a-111(a)(3). Evidence
supported finding that firefighters were exposed to risk of substantial injury. 243 C. 282.
Cited. 10 CA 147, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 343, 344. Cited. 28 CA 9, 11. Subdiv. (4) cited. 30 CA 164, 165, 168,
179; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 164, 168; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10 et seq.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 823-826, 829. Subdiv. (3) cited. 36 CA 454-456. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 753,
755, 762. Subdiv. (3) cited. 37 CA 360, 369. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 39 CA 800, 801, 803, 805. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 800, 805. Defendant was not deprived of right to fair trial for violation of section because evidence was
sufficient to establish that she possessed requisite intent. Although the prosecutor improperly asked defendant to comment
on other witnesses' veracity, the questioning occurred just once and was not prejudicial; prosecutor's closing statements,
even if found improper, were isolated and not prejudicial. 75 CA 163. Jury instructions were proper. Id.
Sec. 53a-112. Arson in the second degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty
of arson in the second degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as
defined in section 53a-100, (1) he starts a fire or causes an explosion and (A) such act
subjects another person to a substantial risk of bodily injury; or (B) such fire or explosion
was intended to conceal some other criminal act; or (C) such fire or explosion was
intended to subject another person to a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States; or
(2) a fire or explosion was caused by an individual hired by such person to start such
fire or cause such explosion.
(b) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 114; P.A. 79-570, S. 4; P.A. 80-229, S. 2; P.A. 82-290, S. 2; P.A. 84-4.)
History: P.A. 79-570 made second degree arson a Class B, rather than a Class C felony; P.A. 80-229 added reference
to building definition of Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting (1) intent to destroy or damage a
building of another (2) fires or explosions caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds and (3) subjecting
another building to risk of destruction or damage and adding (1) fires or explosions intended to conceal some criminal act
and (2) fires or explosions caused by person hired to set fire or cause explosion; P.A. 84-4 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec.
(a) by adding Subpara. (C) re a fire or explosion intended to subject another person to a deprivation of certain rights,
privileges or immunities.
See also annotations to part V.
Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 178 C. 67, 68. Cited. 189 C. 228, 230. Cited. 191 C. 636, 645. Cited. 194 C. 617-619. Cited.
195 C. 600, 601, 603-605. "... more reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended arsonists to be held culpable (under
the statute) for creating substantial risk to other buildings, regardless of how close such risks come to being fulfilled." 197
C. 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165. Cited. 198 C. 92, 105. Cited. 199 C. 389, 399. Cited. 204 C. 769, 776. Cited. 219 C. 605,
615, 616. Cited. 236 C. 375, 379.
Term "another person" includes firefighters. 8 CA 581, 582, 597. Cited. 17 CA 466, 469, 470.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 174 C. 73. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 189 C. 201, 202. Subdiv. (1)(B)(2) cited.
Id., 752, 754. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 195 C. 128, 129. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 598, 599. Cited. 197 C. 158, 159, 162.
Cited. 199 C. 14, 15. Cited. Id., 389, 390. Subdiv. (1) cited. 202 C. 93, 95, 99. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 215 C. 716, 719.
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 10 CA 422, 423. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 17 CA 466, 467. Cited. 28 CA 9, 11. Subdiv. (2): Holding
in State v. Schleifer, that solicitation of another to set a fire was insufficient to establish the crime of attempt to commit
arson, has been legislatively overruled by enactment of P.A. 82-290. 59 CA 362.
Sec. 53a-113. Arson in the third degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty
of arson in the third degree when he recklessly causes destruction or damage to a building, as defined in section 53a-100, of his own or of another by intentionally starting a
fire or causing an explosion.
(b) Arson in the third degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 115; P.A. 73-639, S. 6; P.A. 79-570, S. 5; P.A. 80-229, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 46.)
History: P.A. 73-639 specified applicability to destruction or damage of person's own building in Subsec. (a); P.A. 79-570 made third degree arson a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony; P.A. 80-229 added reference to building definition
in Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 177 C. 545, 546. Cited. 191 C. 636, 645. Cited. 194 C. 210. Cited. 197 C. 158, 164. Cited.
198 C. 92, 105. "There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of recklessly or
negligently causing a result"; therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this statute and Sec.
53a-48 is not a crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1, 2, 4, 5. Cited. 200 C. 268, 278, 279. Cited. 202 C. 520, 526.
Cited. 235 C. 679, 682.
Cited. 6 CA 680, 681. Cited. 22 CA 53, 54. Cited. 35 CA 714, 716.
Cited. 41 CS 525.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 235 C. 185, 189.
Cited. 10 CA 361, 362. Cited. 35 CA 94, 96, 103; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185 et seq.
Sec. 53a-114. Reckless burning: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of reckless
burning when he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own
property or another's, and thereby recklessly places a building, as defined in section
53a-100, of another in danger of destruction or damage.
(b) Reckless burning is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 116; P.A. 79-570, S. 6; P.A. 80-229, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 47.)
History: P.A. 79-570 made reckless burning a Class D felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor; P.A. 80-229 added
reference to building definition in Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 197 C. 158, 163, 164. Cited. 200 C. 268, 278, 279.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 41 CA 701, 703.
Sec. 53a-115. Criminal mischief in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause damage
to tangible property of another and having no reasonable ground to believe that such
person has a right to do so, such person damages tangible property of another in an
amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars, or (2) with intent to cause an
interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public and having no reasonable
ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers
with tangible property of a utility or mode of public transportation, power or communication, and thereby causes an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public,
or (3) with intent to cause damage to any electronic monitoring equipment owned or
leased by the state or its agent and required as a condition of probation or conditional
discharge pursuant to section 53a-30, as a condition of release pursuant to section 54-64a or as a condition of community release pursuant to section 18-100c, and having no
reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages
such electronic monitoring equipment and thereby causes an interruption in its ability
to function, or (4) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of service rendered
to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right
to do so, such person damages or tampers with (A) any tangible property owned by
the state, a municipality or a person for fire alarm or police alarm purposes, (B) any
telecommunication system operated by the state police or a municipal police department,
(C) any emergency medical or fire service dispatching system, (D) any fire suppression
equipment owned by the state, a municipality, a person or a fire district, or (E) any fire
hydrant or hydrant system owned by the state or a municipality, a person, a fire district
or a private water company.
(b) Criminal mischief in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 117; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 21; P.A. 83-330, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 48; P.A. 00-141, S. 4; P.A. 01-8.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (3) in Subsec. (a) re tampering with fire or police alarms; P.A. 83-330 amended Subdiv.
(3) of Subsec. (a) to designate damaging or tampering with fire or police alarms as Subpara. (A) and to add Subparas. (B)
to (E) re damaging or tampering with telecommunication systems, emergency medical or fire service dispatching systems,
fire suppression equipment and fire hydrants or hydrant systems; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A.
00-141 amended Subsec. (a) by making technical changes, adding new Subdiv. (3) re intentional damage to electronic
monitoring equipment and redesignating former Subdiv. (3) as Subdiv. (4); P.A. 01-8 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to include
damage to electronic monitoring equipment required as a condition of community release pursuant to Sec. 18-100c.
Cited. 197 C. 326, 327.
Cited. 46 CA 118.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 191 C. 412, 413. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 708.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 29 CA 59, 60.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CS 400.
Sec. 53a-116. Criminal mischief in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the second degree when: (1) With intent
to cause damage to tangible property of another and having no reasonable ground to
believe that he has a right to do so, he damages tangible property of another in an
amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars; or (2) with intent to cause an interruption
or impairment of service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to
believe that he has a right to do so, he damages or tampers with tangible property of a
public utility or mode of public transportation, power or communication, and thereby
causes a risk of interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public.
(b) Criminal mischief in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 118.)
Cited. 11 CA 805.
Cited. 38 CS 301, 302.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 236 C. 266, 267.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 680, 681.
Sec. 53a-117. Criminal mischief in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a)
A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the third degree when, having no reasonable
ground to believe that he has a right to do so, he: (1) Intentionally or recklessly (A)
damages tangible property of another, or (B) tampers with tangible property of another
and thereby causes such property to be placed in danger of damage; or (2) damages
tangible property of another by negligence involving the use of any potentially harmful
or destructive force or substance, such as, but not limited to, fire, explosives, flood,
avalanche, collapse of building, poison gas or radioactive material.
(b) Criminal mischief in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 119; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 22.)
History: 1971 act specified that use of harmful or destructive force or substance is "not limited to" fire, explosives, etc.
in Subsec. (a)(2).
Cited. 184 C. 157, 158. Cited. 190 C. 428, 429. Cited. 194 C. 347, 350. Cited. 229 C. 285, 287.
Cited. 1 CA 647, 651. Cited. 6 CA 334, 335. Cited. 9 CA 59, 60, 70. Cited. 13 CA 214, 215. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527.
Cited. Id., 804. Cited. 18 CA 303, 306. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 36 CA
364, 373.
Cited. 35 CS 587, 588, 595, 596; Id., 675, 677. Cited. 36 CS 89. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756. Cited. 38 CS 665, 666. Cited.
194 C. 347, 350.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 221 C. 788, 790. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 227 C. 153, 155. Subdiv. (2) cited. 236 C. 31, 53.
Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 39 CS 504, 508. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 1 CA 647, 652. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 7 CA 75, 76. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 17 CA 326, 327. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 24 CA 473, 474; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788 et seq. Cited.
29 CA 801, 803, 812; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 37 CA 733, 735. Subdiv. (1)(A)
cited. 38 CA 225, 226.
Sec. 53a-117a. Criminal mischief in the fourth degree: Class C misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the fourth degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe he has a right to do so, he intentionally or recklessly (1) damages
or tampers with any fire hydrant or hydrant system owned by the state or a municipality,
fire district or private water company, or (2) damages, tampers with or removes any
tangible property owned by the state, a municipality or a person for fire alarm, smoke
detection and alarm, fire suppressant or police alarm purposes.
(b) Criminal mischief in the fourth degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 83-330, S. 2; P.A. 84-546, S. 125, 173; P.A. 85-132.)
History: P.A. 84-546 changed "public alarm purposes" to "police alarm purposes"; P.A. 85-132 amended Subdiv. (2)
of Subsec. (a) by prohibiting removal of any of the specified property and by including property used for smoke detection
and alarm or fire suppressant purposes.
Cited. 20 CA 101, 102.
Secs. 53a-117b to 53a-117d. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 53a-117e. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the first degree:
Class D felony. (a) A tenant is guilty of criminal damage of a landlord's property in
the first degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that he has a right to do
so, he intentionally damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an
amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "tenant", "landlord" and "premises" shall have
the meanings set forth in section 47a-1.
(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a person under any other
provision of the general statutes.
(d) Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 96-74, S. 1; P.A. 98-107, S. 1, 6.)
History: P.A. 98-107 rephrased Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1998.
Sec. 53a-117f. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the second degree:
Class A misdemeanor. (a) A tenant is guilty of criminal damage of a landlord's property
in the second degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that a tenant has a
right to do so, such tenant (1) intentionally damages the tangible property of the landlord
of the premises in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars, or (2) recklessly
damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an amount exceeding
one thousand five hundred dollars.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "tenant", "landlord" and "premises" shall have
the meanings set forth in section 47a-1.
(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a person under any other
provision of the general statutes.
(d) Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the second degree is a class A
misdemeanor.
(P.A. 96-74, S. 2; P.A. 98-107, S. 2, 6; P.A. 00-196, S. 40.)
History: P.A. 98-107 amended Subsec. (a) to rephrase provisions and add provision re reckless damage of the tangible
property of the landlord in an amount exceeding fifteen hundred dollars, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 00-196 made technical
changes in Subsec. (a).
Sec. 53a-117g. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree:
Class B misdemeanor. (a) A tenant is guilty of criminal damage of a landlord's property
in the third degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that he has a right to
do so, he recklessly damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an
amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "tenant", "landlord" and "premises" shall have
the meanings set forth in section 47a-1.
(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a person under any other
provision of the general statutes.
(d) Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 98-107, S. 3, 6.)
History: P.A. 98-107 effective July 1, 1998.
Secs. 53a-117h to 53a-117j. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 53a-117k. Damage to railroad property in the first degree: Class D felony.
(a) A person is guilty of damage to railroad property in the first degree when: (1) With
intent to cause damage to railroad property and having no reasonable ground to believe
that such person has a right to do so, such person damages such property in an amount
exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars, or (2) with intent to cause an interruption
or impairment of railroad service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground
to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers with
railroad property and thereby causes an interruption or impairment of railroad service
rendered to the public.
(b) Damage to railroad property in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 00-149, S. 3.)
Sec. 53a-117l. Damage to railroad property in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of damage to railroad property in the second degree
when: (1) With intent to cause damage to railroad property and having no reasonable
ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages such
property in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars, or (2) with intent to cause
an interruption or impairment of railroad service rendered to the public and having no
reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages
or tampers with railroad property and thereby causes a risk of interruption or impairment
of railroad service rendered to the public.
(b) Damage to railroad property in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 00-149, S. 4.)
Sec. 53a-117m. Damage to railroad property in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of damage to railroad property in the third degree
when, having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such
person: (1) Intentionally or recklessly (A) damages railroad property, or (B) tampers
with railroad property and thereby causes such property to be placed in danger of damage, or (2) damages railroad property by negligence involving the use of any potentially
harmful or destructive force or substance including, but not limited to, fire, explosives,
flood, avalanche, collapse of building, poison gas or radioactive material.
(b) Damage to railroad property in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 00-149, S. 5.)
PART IX*
LARCENY, ROBBERY AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-28:
Violation of this statute necessarily involves an attempt to perpetrate a robbery. 146 C. 227. Cited. 160 C. 42. Cited.
162 C. 6.
Annotations to former section 53-40:
Words "such communication" mean a communication by spoken words as well as one transmitted on a piece of paper.
146 C. 605. Cited. 147 C. 704; 151 C. 547.
Sentence of three to seven years found proper by Review Division in view of heinous nature of crime and defendant's
poor juvenile record. 25 CS 5.
Annotations to former section 53-56:
Cited. 94 C. 701. Taking must be without excuse or color of right, i.e., felonious. 96 C. 421. See note to former Sec.
53-63, infra.
Annotations to former section 53-57:
Under information charging theft of motor vehicle, accused cannot be convicted of taking motor vehicle without permission. 113 C. 103. Burden of proving additional element to bring crime within provisions of this section rests on state. 153
C. 215 (Dictum). Evidence taken from stolen motor vehicle in possession of driver, after arrest of driver and detention of
vehicle, not admitted into evidence as removed without a search warrant, under rule in
Chimel v. California. 395 U. S.
752. 158 C. 641. Since larceny is continuing offense, operating stolen car in Connecticut is theft of that car in state regardless
of where defendant had first stolen it. 159 C. 201. Cited. 166 C. 289. Cited 169 C. 38.
Cited. 23 CS 5; 24 CS 310; id., 388; 27 CS 108; id., 220; id., 272. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism
it revealed, effective sentence if not more than five years in reformatory for one count of theft of motor vehicle under this
section, in addition to counts of burglary, breaking and entering and larceny, should stand. 27 CS 105-107.
Annotations to former section 53-58:
Offense not within provisions of Sec. 53-63. 77 C. 140. Cited. 95 C. 602. Burden of proving additional element to bring
crime within provisions of this section rests on state. 153 C. 215 (Dictum).
Annotations to former section 53-59:
Stealing horse in one state and bringing it into this state is punishable here. 3 C. 186. Value of horse of no consequence.
77 C. 140. Burden of proving additional element to bring crime within this section rests on state. 153 C. 215 (Dictum).
Annotation to former section 53-61:
Information charging theft of "chickens" sufficient. 85 C. 323.
Annotations to former section 53-63:
What description of property sufficient. 6 C. 103. Finder of goods knowing owner and not returning them guilty of
larceny; 9 C. 529; but finder must originally take with felonious intent. 22 C. 161. Larceny not merged in burglary. 24 C.
57. Jurisdiction of superior court when jury finds value of property to be less than fifteen dollars. 24 C. 316. Duplicity
cured by verdict. 28 C. 231. Bailee opening and converting part or all of package animo furandi is guilty of larceny. 29 C.
49. Bringing stolen goods into this state is larceny here. 33 C. 264. Dog not the subject of larceny at common law. 31 C.
128; 48 C. 336. Prosecution for stealing dog may be based on this statute. 127 C. 690. Theft of horse distinct offense; so
of bicycle. 77 C. 136. Larceny defined; 70 C. 269; nature and elements. 72 C. 643; 75 C. 55; 95 C. 38; id., 191; 96 C. 421.
Securing property by threat. 70 C. 398. Appropriation by one entrusted with possession; accepting with intent to appropriate.
79 C. 714; 96 C. 426. Embezzlement distinguished. 83 C. 449; 102 C. 659. Taking property lost or mislaid; subsequent
intent to appropriate. 89 C. 564. Does not apply to fixture unless it has been detached; lessee in possession as owner;
purpose of alleging value; effect of general verdict. 83 C. 286. Taking goods to secure claimed debt held not larceny. 95
C. 35. Securing property by fraud is larceny. Id., 193. Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536. Cited. 110 C.
411; 127 C. 400; 139 C. 626; 143 C. 559; 149 C. 643, 644, 648; 153 C. 555; 154 C. 259. Elements of larceny are (1)
wrongful taking and carrying away of personalty of another, (2) felonious intent to deprive owner of it permanently, (3)
lack of consent of owner. 140 C. 118. (a) Larceny of goods from trading stamp redemption center falls within the provisions
of this subsection. 153 C. 215. When principal is tricked into parting with possession by agent who, at time of his taking,
has felonious intent to convert the property to his own use, offense is larceny and not embezzlement. 154 C. 255. Statute
embraces common-law crime of larceny. Id. (b) Where larceny of goods falls within provisions of subsection (a), burden
of proving additional element essential to bring it into provisions of subsection (b) rests on state. 153 C. 215. Goods stolen
from trading stamp redemption center were not "goods offered or exposed for sale" within meaning of this subsection. Id.
Circumstantial evidence held ample for conviction. 155 C. 297. Cited. 156 C. 391; 158 C. 322; 159 C. 434; 161 C. 117.
Charge stating that it is unnecessary to prove breaking and entering for conviction of larceny upheld. 161 C. 117. Cited.
161 C. 371, 404. Cited. 162 C. 442. Cited. 165 C. 163.
Cited. 22 CS 198, 200; 23 CS 319; 24 CS 127; 26 CS 464; 27 CS 65; id., 149; id., 220; id., 237; id., 244; 27 CS 272.
Concealment includes all acts done which render discovery or identification of property more difficult. 24 CS 392. Where
maximum sentence that could have been imposed under this section would be aggregate of one hundred twenty days except
for reformatory commitment, sentence of not more than two years without parole possibility for nine months too severe.
27 CS 81. (a) Cited. 25 CS 454, 457; id., 489. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective
sentence of not more than five years in reformatory for one count of larceny under this section, in addition to counts of
burglary, breaking and entering and theft of motor vehicle, should stand. 27 CS 105-107. Cited. 27 CS 318, 322; id., 341;
id., 347. Sentence of defendant modified where codefendants had received lesser penalties and theft had been for benefit
of one codefendant. Id., 398. Cited. 28 CS 240; 357.
Proof of ownership of property or that it is property of another need not be offered prior to admission of property as
exhibit. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 50, 53. Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 553; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 116, 118, 119. Subsec. (b). Intent of defendant
not to pay for purchases he took out of supermarket through checkout operated by his wife may be established as inference
from proved facts and circumstances, especially that he had not paid for them. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 682. Evidence, though
conflicting, was adequate to support finding of trial court that defendant took goods of complainant store without paying
for same and without its consent. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 214. Cited. Id., 530. Carrying of merchandise through checkout counter
of cash-over-the-counter self-service store constituted exportation of the goods although immediately thereafter store's
security agent apprehended defendant. Id., 648. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 526, 527, 556. Cited. Id., 615.
Annotation to former section 53-64:
Cited. 133 C. 604.
Annotation to former section 53-105:
Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536.
Annotations to former section 53-354:
Collector of town taxes is a town officer or agent within meaning of this section. 73 C. 97. Former statute held not to
support a prosecution of officers of a corporation trustee for misappropriation acting as such officers for the corporation.
112 C. 39. Whether corporation may be prosecuted for embezzlement, quaere. 114 C. 359. Cited. 128 C. 158.
Annotations to former section 53-355:
Applies to national bank officer purloining special deposit. 34 C. 296. Whether this section applies to a consignee of
goods to be sold, quaere. 56 C. 500. Charge of embezzling "moneys" cannot be supported by proof of embezzling a chose
in action. 70 C. 265. Distinguished from larceny; claim collector as "agent"; retaining money to meet expenses of other
collections. 83 C. 449; 102 C. 659. Elements of crime; agency need not exist before receipt of goods embezzled. Id., 660.
Violation of this statute is distinguished from larceny in that latter is always characterized by a felonious taking. Id. Proof
of fraudulent conversion; wide latitude in receiving evidence of fraudulent intent. 112 C. 54. Essentials of proof. 114 C.
458. Broker selling stock as owner is not agent of purchaser. Id., 463. Intent of accused to restore stock taken does not
absolve him of guilt for unlawful appropriation. 115 C. 306. Defendant may be tried in any jurisdiction where any part of
the embezzlement was committed. 128 C. 157. Not embezzlement by agent when title to property is intentionally transferred
to defendant; may be obtaining under false pretenses. Id., 158. Possible for a person to embezzle from a corporation the
stock in which is wholly owned by him. 147 C. 589. In a prosecution for embezzlement the range of relevant evidence is
wide, especially as it bears on the essential element of an intent to defraud, which involves a state of mind and can generally
be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Id. Defendant bookkeeper of corporation whose checks she embezzled held
to be an agent within meaning of statute. History of statute reviewed. 156 C. 233.
Cited. 25 CS 354.
Annotations to former section 53-360:
What facts within this section. 12 C. 111. Particular kind of false pretense must be alleged. 27 C. 320. Mere naked
assertion may be false pretense. Id., 591. Evidence of pecuniary ability inadmissible to rebut motive. Id. False pretense
must be made before property is obtained. 43 C. 479. Distinguished from conspiracy to defraud. 75 C. 209. Conviction
under this statute forfeits privileges of an elector. 86 C. 624. Liability of bank to depositor in damages for his arrest under
this section when bank negligently returned check marked "no account". 131 C. 167. A mere promise to do an act, even
though the promisor has, at the time, no intention of keeping it, is not within the statute. 137 C. 140. Cited. 150 C. 197;
153 C. 599. Where one of alleged coconspirators to violate this section is acquitted, this does not necessarily make fatal
convictions of other coconspirators. 151 C. 592. Cited. 158 C. 266; 161 C. 43.
Court not empowered to decide whether extradition from Florida was illegal or not. 25 CS 141. Cited. 12 CS 44; 22
CS 345; 25 CS 347; id., 354; 27 CS 283. Sentencing for several crimes under this section modified on appeal. 27 CS 18.
Sentence in excess of jurisdiction of circuit court is not invalid in its entirety but only for period in excess of one year. 28
CS 424.
Statute violated when goods were obtained by postdated check. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 99. Subsequent return of goods did
not purge offense. Id. Not error to deny motion for new trial even if witness's testimony was false but it appears that result
reached on new trial would not be different. Id., 257. Court held that pretense must relate to an existing or past fact and
not to some future transaction. Id., 392. A false pretense is an untrue representation of some fact or circumstance calculated
to mislead. The representation may be by conduct as well as words. Id., 516. History discussed. Id., 517.
Annotations to former section 53-361:
States a rule for criminal prosecution and does not state a rule effective in a civil action under section 52-562. 136 C. 222.
Not an additional remedy in a civil action; refers solely to a criminal prosecution. 16 CS 160. Action for defamation
against bank for failure to honor checks discussed. 20 CS 115. Unless notice of dishonor was given, no statutory presumption
of intent to defraud can arise. Conviction for the crime is still possible, but more difficult. 23 CS 374. The trier could
consider defendant's check transactions immediately preceding and following the drawing and delivery of the check in
question as relevant not only to issue of intent but also to question of defendant's knowledge. Id.
Crime distinguished from false pretenses, Sec. 53-360. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 99. Must be evidence of intent to defraud. Id.,
349. Three elements in definition of offense. Id.
Annotations to former section 53-364:
An employee of selectmen to assist in care of paupers an "agent" within meaning of this section. 58 C. 104.
Accused, guilty of embezzlement, may be prosecuted as an agent of the state for a lesser crime under this section; state
held to be "public community". 6 CS 252.
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 387.
Annotations to present part IX of chapter 952:
Cited. 43 CA 801. Part IX of penal code cited. Id. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-118. Definitions generally. (a) The following definitions are applicable
to this part: (1) "Property" means any money, personal property, real property, thing in
action, evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind. Commodities of a
public utility nature such as gas, electricity, steam and water constitute property, but
the supplying of such a commodity to premises from an outside source by means of
wires, pipes, conduits or other equipment shall be deemed a rendition of a service rather
than a sale or delivery of property. (2) "Obtain" includes, but is not limited to, the
bringing about of a transfer or purported transfer of property or of a legal interest therein,
whether to the obtainer or another. (3) To "deprive" another of property means (A) to
withhold it or cause it to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a period
or under such circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is
lost to him, or (B) to dispose of the property in such manner or under such circumstances
as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such property. (4) To "appropriate"
property of another to oneself or a third person means (A) to exercise control over it,
or to aid a third person to exercise control over it, permanently or for so extended a
period or under such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of its economic value
or benefit, or (B) to dispose of the property for the benefit of oneself or a third person.
(5) An "owner" means any person who has a right to possession superior to that of a
taker, obtainer or withholder. (6) To "receive" means to acquire possession, control or
title, or to lend on the security of the property. (7) "Service" includes, but is not limited
to, labor, professional service, public utility and transportation service, the supplying
of hotel accommodations, restaurant services, entertainment, and the supplying of equipment for use. (8) "Check" means any check, draft or similar sight order for the payment
of money which is not postdated with respect to the time of issuance. (9) "Drawer" of
a check means a person whose name appears thereon as the primary obligor, whether
the actual signature be that of himself or of a person purportedly authorized to draw the
check in his behalf. (10) "Representative drawer" means a person who signs a check as
drawer in a representative capacity or as agent of the person whose name appears thereon
as the principal drawer or obligor. (11) A person "issues" a check when, as a drawer or
representative drawer thereof, he delivers it or causes it to be delivered to a person who
thereby acquires a right against the drawer with respect to such check. One who draws
a check with intent that it be so delivered is deemed to have issued it if the delivery
occurs. (12) A person "passes" a check when, being a payee, holder or bearer of a check
which previously has been or purports to have been drawn and issued by another, he
delivers it, for a purpose other than collection, to a third person who thereby acquires
a right with respect thereto. (13) "Funds" means money or credit. (14) A drawer has
"insufficient funds" with a drawee to cover a check when he has no funds or account
whatever, or funds in an amount less than that of the check; and a check dishonored for
"no account" shall also be deemed to have been dishonored for "insufficient funds".
(15) "Credit" means an arrangement or understanding with a bank or depository for the
payment of a check, draft or order in full on presentation.
(b) A person who has obtained possession of property by theft or other illegal means
shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person who takes,
obtains or withholds it from him by larcenous means.
(c) A joint or common owner of property shall not be deemed to have a right of
possession thereto superior to that of any other joint or common owner thereof.
(d) In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, a person in lawful possession of property shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person
having only a security interest therein, even if legal title lies with the holder of the
security interest pursuant to a conditional sale contract or other security agreement.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 120; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 23.)
History: 1971 act added Subdivs. (6) to (15) in Subsec. (a) defining "receive", "service", "check", "drawer", "representative drawer", "issues", "passes", "funds", "insufficient funds" and "credit".
Cited. 201 C. 489, 493. Cited. 233 C. 552, 553.
Cited. 19 CA 695, 696, 702. Cited. 43 CA 801. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Cited. 32 CS 650.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 186 C. 555, 568. Subdiv. (5) cited. 196 C. 225, 229. Subdiv. (3) cited. 212 C. 31, 45. Subdiv. (5)
cited. 223 C. 243, 252. Subdiv. (4)(A) cited. 233 C. 552, 556. Subdiv. (4)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 666.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Word "appropriate" as defined in Subdiv. (4) is not used in its ordinary sense. 255 C. 746.
Subdiv. (5) cited. 1 CA 642, 645. Subdiv. (4) cited. 11 CA 684, 687. Subdiv. (3) cited. 14 CA 272, 276. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 21 CA 386, 402. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 449, 454. Cited. 34 CA 751, 770; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et
seq. Subdiv. (4) cited. 35 CA 566, 567. Subdiv. (4)(B) cited. Id., 566, 567, 576, 577, 579. Subdiv. (4)(A) cited. Id., 566,
576, 578, 579. Subdiv. (5) cited. 43 CA 801. Subdiv. (6) cited. 45 CA 6. Subdiv. (5) cited. 46 CA 269. Subdiv. (1) cited.
47 CA 1. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5): In circumstance where owner of motor vehicle took such vehicle from bailee,
the bailee had a right of possession superior to that of owner and thus, for purposes of larceny statutes, bailee was the
"owner" and owner of motor vehicle was the "taker". 59 CA 135.
Subdiv. (10) cited. 35 CS 536, 540. Subdiv. (1): Applicability of a penal code definition to the products liability statute
may be inapposite. 40 CS 120, 122.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 45 CA 369.
Sec. 53a-119. Larceny defined. A person commits larceny when, with intent to
deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner. Larceny includes,
but is not limited to:
(1) Embezzlement. A person commits embezzlement when he wrongfully appropriates to himself or to another property of another in his care or custody.
(2) Obtaining property by false pretenses. A person obtains property by false pretenses when, by any false token, pretense or device, he obtains from another any property,
with intent to defraud him or any other person.
(3) Obtaining property by false promise. A person obtains property by false promise
when, pursuant to a scheme to defraud, he obtains property of another by means of a
representation, express or implied, that he or a third person will in the future engage in
particular conduct, and when he does not intend to engage in such conduct or does not
believe that the third person intends to engage in such conduct. In any prosecution for
larceny based upon a false promise, the defendant's intention or belief that the promise
would not be performed may not be established by or inferred from the fact alone that
such promise was not performed.
(4) Acquiring property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake. A person who comes
into control of property of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered
under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the recipient is
guilty of larceny if, with purpose to deprive the owner thereof, he fails to take reasonable
measures to restore the property to a person entitled to it.
(5) Extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces
another person to deliver such property to himself or a third person by means of instilling
in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: (A) Cause
physical injury to some person in the future; or (B) cause damage to property; or (C)
engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or (D) accuse some person of a crime or
cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; or (E) expose a secret or publicize
an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt
or ridicule; or (F) cause a strike, boycott or other collective labor group action injurious
to some person's business; except that such a threat shall not be deemed extortion when
the property is demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the
actor purports to act; or (G) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or
information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or (H) use or abuse his
position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official
duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect
some person adversely; or (I) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.
(6) Defrauding of public community. A person is guilty of defrauding a public
community who (A) authorizes, certifies, attests or files a claim for benefits or reimbursement from a local, state or federal agency which he knows is false; or (B) knowingly
accepts the benefits from a claim he knows is false; or (C) as an officer or agent of any
public community, with intent to prejudice it, appropriates its property to the use of any
person or draws any order upon its treasury or presents or aids in procuring to be allowed
any fraudulent claim against such community. For purposes of this subdivision such
order or claim shall be deemed to be property.
(7) Theft of services. A person is guilty of theft of services when: (A) With intent
to avoid payment for restaurant services rendered, or for services rendered to him as
a transient guest at a hotel, motel, inn, tourist cabin, rooming house or comparable
establishment, he avoids such payment by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, by
stealth, or by any misrepresentation of fact which he knows to be false; or (B)(i) with
intent to obtain railroad, subway, bus, air, taxi or any other public transportation service
without payment of the lawful charge therefor or to avoid payment of the lawful charge
for such transportation service which has been rendered to him, he obtains such service
or avoids payment therefor by force, intimidation, stealth, deception or mechanical tampering, or by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, or (ii) with intent to obtain the use
of equipment, including a motor vehicle, without payment of the lawful charge therefor,
or to avoid payment of the lawful charge for such use which has been permitted him,
he obtains such use or avoids such payment therefor by means of any false or fraudulent
representation, fraudulent concealment, false pretense or personation, trick, artifice or
device, including, but not limited to, a false representation as to his name, residence,
employment, or driver's license; or (C) obtaining or having control over labor in the
employ of another person, or of business, commercial or industrial equipment or facilities of another person, knowing that he is not entitled to the use thereof, and with intent
to derive a commercial or other substantial benefit for himself or a third person, he uses
or diverts to the use of himself or a third person such labor, equipment or facilities.
(8) Receiving stolen property. A person is guilty of larceny by receiving stolen
property if he receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property knowing that it has probably been stolen or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is
received, retained or disposed of with purpose to restore it to the owner. A person who
accepts or receives the use or benefit of a public utility commodity which customarily
passes through a meter, knowing such commodity (A) has been diverted therefrom, (B)
has not been correctly registered or (C) has not been registered at all by a meter, is guilty
of larceny by receiving stolen property.
(9) Shoplifting. A person is guilty of shoplifting who intentionally takes possession
of any goods, wares or merchandise offered or exposed for sale by any store or other
mercantile establishment with the intention of converting the same to his own use, without paying the purchase price thereof. A person intentionally concealing unpurchased
goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such store, shall be prima facie presumed to have so
concealed such article with the intention of converting the same to his own use without
paying the purchase price thereof.
(10) Conversion of a motor vehicle. A person is guilty of conversion of a motor
vehicle who, after renting or leasing a motor vehicle under an agreement in writing
which provides for the return of such vehicle to a particular place at a particular time,
fails to return the vehicle to such place within the time specified, and who thereafter
fails to return such vehicle to the agreed place or to any other place of business of the
lessor within one hundred twenty hours after the lessor shall have sent a written demand
to him for the return of the vehicle by registered mail addressed to him at his address
as shown in the written agreement or, in the absence of such address, to his last-known
address as recorded in the records of the motor vehicle department of the state in which
he is licensed to operate a motor vehicle. It shall be a complete defense to any civil
action arising out of or involving the arrest or detention of any person to whom such
demand was sent by registered mail that he failed to return the vehicle to any place of
business of the lessor within one hundred twenty hours after the mailing of such demand.
(11) Obtaining property through fraudulent use of an automated teller machine. A
person obtains property through fraudulent use of an automated teller machine when
such person obtains property by knowingly using in a fraudulent manner an automated
teller machine with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to
himself or a third person. In any prosecution for larceny based upon fraudulent use of
an automated teller machine, the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in the
town in which the machine was located. In any prosecution for larceny based upon more
than one instance of fraudulent use of an automated teller machine, (A) all such instances
in any six-month period may be combined and charged as one offense, with the value
of all property obtained thereby being accumulated, and (B) the crime shall be deemed
to have been committed in any of the towns in which a machine which was fraudulently
used was located. For the purposes of this subsection, "automated teller machine" means
an unmanned device at which banking transactions including, without limitation, deposits, withdrawals, advances, payments and transfers may be conducted, and includes,
without limitation, a satellite device and point of sale terminal as defined in section 36a-2.
(12) Library theft. A person is guilty of library theft when (A) he conceals on his
person or among his belongings a book or other archival library materials, belonging
to, or deposited in, a library facility with the intention of removing the same from the
library facility without authority or without authority removes a book or other archival
library materials from such library facility or (B) he mutilates a book or other archival
library materials belonging to, or deposited in, a library facility, so as to render it unusable
or reduce its value. The term "book or other archival library materials" includes any
book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, map, manuscript, document, letter, public record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual material in any
format, magnetic or other tape, electronic data-processing record, artifact or other documentary, written or printed material regardless of physical form or characteristics, or
any part thereof, belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of a library facility.
The term "library facility" includes any public library, any library of an educational
institution, organization or society, any museum, any repository of public records and
any archives.
(13) Conversion of leased property. (A) A person is guilty of conversion of leased
personal property who, with the intent of converting the same to his own use or that of
a third person, after renting or leasing such property under an agreement in writing
which provides for the return of such property to a particular place at a particular time,
sells, conveys, conceals or aids in concealing such property or any part thereof, and who
thereafter fails to return such property to the agreed place or to any other place of business
of the lessor within one hundred ninety-two hours after the lessor shall have sent a
written demand to him for the return of the property by registered or certified mail
addressed to him at his address as shown in the written agreement, unless a more recent
address is known to the lessor. (B) Any person, being in possession of personal property
other than wearing apparel, received upon a written lease, who, with intent to defraud,
sells, conveys, conceals or aids in concealing such property, or any part thereof, shall
be prima facie presumed to have done so with the intention of converting such property
to his own use. (C) A person who uses a false or fictitious name or address in obtaining
such leased personal property shall be prima facie presumed to have obtained such leased
personal property with the intent of converting the same to his own use or that of a third
person. (D) "Leased personal property", as used in this subdivision, means any personal
property received pursuant to a written contract, by which one owning such property,
the lessor, grants to another, the lessee, the right to possess, use and enjoy such personal
property for a specified period of time for a specified sum.
(14) Failure to pay prevailing rate of wages. A person is guilty of failing to pay the
prevailing rate of wages when he (A) files a certified payroll, in accordance with section
31-53 which he knows is false, in violation of section 53a-157a, and (B) fails to pay to
an employee or to an employee welfare fund the amount attested to in the certified
payroll with the intent to convert such amount to his own use or to the use of a third
party.
(15) Theft of utility service. A person is guilty of theft of utility service when he
intentionally obtains electric, gas, water, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service that is available only for compensation:
(A) By deception or threat or by false token, slug or other means including, but not limited
to, electronic or mechanical device or unauthorized use of a confidential identification or
authorization code or through fraudulent statements, to avoid payment for the service
by himself or another person; or (B) by tampering or making connection with or disconnecting the meter, pipe, cable, conduit, conductor, attachment or other equipment or by
manufacturing, modifying, altering, programming, reprogramming or possessing any
device, software or equipment or part or component thereof or by disguising the identity
or identification numbers of any device or equipment utilized by a supplier of electric,
gas, water, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna
television service, without the consent of such supplier, in order to avoid payment for
the service by himself or another person; or (C) with intent to avoid payment by himself
or another person for a prospective or already rendered service the charge or compensation for which is measured by a meter or other mechanical measuring device provided
by the supplier of the service, by tampering with such meter or device or by attempting
in any manner to prevent such meter or device from performing its measuring function,
without the consent of the supplier of the service. There shall be a rebuttable presumption
that the person to whom the service is billed has the intent to obtain the service and to
avoid making payment for the service if, without the consent of the supplier of the
service: (i) Any meter, pipe, cable, conduit, conductor, attachment or other equipment
has been tampered with or connected or disconnected, (ii) any device, software or equipment or part or component thereof has been modified, altered, programmed, reprogrammed or possessed, (iii) the identity or identification numbers of any device or equipment utilized by the supplier of the service have been disguised, or (iv) a meter or other
mechanical measuring device provided by the supplier of the service has been tampered
with or prevented from performing its measuring function. The presumption does not
apply if the person to whose service the condition applies has received such service for
less than thirty-one days or until the service supplier has made at least one meter or
service reading and provided a billing statement to the person as to whose service the
condition applies. The presumption does not apply with respect to wireless radio communications.
(16) Air bag fraud. A person is guilty of air bag fraud when such person, with intent
to defraud another person, obtains property from such other person or a third person by
knowingly installing or reinstalling any object in lieu of an air bag that was designed
in accordance with federal safety requirements as provided in 49 CFR 571.208, as
amended, and which is proper for the make, model and year of the vehicle, as part of
the vehicle inflatable restraint system.
(17) Theft of motor fuel. A person is guilty of theft of motor fuel when such person
(A) delivers or causes to be delivered motor fuel, as defined in section 14-327a, into
the fuel tank of a vehicle or into a portable container, or into both, on the premises of
a retail dealer, as defined in section 14-318, and (B) with the intent to appropriate such
motor fuel to himself or a third person, leaves such premises without paying the purchase
price for such motor fuel.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 121; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 24; 1972, P.A. 188, S. 1, 2; P.A. 73-639, S. 21; P.A. 75-225; P.A. 76-109;
P.A. 79-268; P.A. 81-224; 81-263, S. 1; P.A. 83-417, S. 1; P.A. 84-248, S. 1; 84-301, S. 1; 84-546, S. 161, 173; P.A. 85-339, S. 1; P.A. 91-162, S. 17, 18; P.A. 92-260, S. 49; P.A. 93-392, S. 5; P.A. 95-246, S. 1; P.A. 01-36; P.A. 03-201, S. 1;
03-278, S. 105.)
History: 1971 act deleted "Committing the crime of" preceding actual crimes in Subdivs. (6) to (8), specified actions
which constitute theft of services or receiving stolen property in Subdivs. (7) and (8), deleting references to those crimes
as defined in Secs. 53a-120 and 53a-126 respectively, and added Subdiv. (9) re shoplifting; 1972 act added Subpara. (B)
in Subdiv. (7)(2) re fraud in avoiding payment for use of equipment, including motor vehicles and added Subdiv. (10) re
conversion of motor vehicle; P.A. 73-639 revised Subdiv. (10) to clarify title of crime where previously crime described
was simply referred to as larceny; P.A. 75-225 deleted provision in Subdiv. (3) which required that finding be based on
evidence establishing that case facts and circumstances are "wholly consistent with guilty intent or belief and wholly
inconsistent with innocent intent or belief", and that evidence excludes "to a moral certainty every hypothesis except that
of the defendant's intention or belief that the promise would not be performed"; P.A. 76-109 applied provisions of Subdiv.
(7) to community antenna television service; P.A. 79-268 specified applicability of Subdiv. (7)(3) re "gas, electricity, water
and steam service" for consistency with Subdiv. (7)(5); P.A. 81-224 amended Subdiv. (8) to include receiving the use or
benefit of public utility services which have been diverted from or incorrectly registered on a meter as larceny by receiving
stolen property; P.A. 81-263 amended Subdiv. (6) by adding the provision that a person is guilty of defrauding a public
community who authorizes or files a false claim for benefits from a local, state or federal agency or accepts the benefits
from a false claim; P.A. 83-417 added Subdiv. (11) re obtaining property through fraudulent use of an automatic teller
machine; P.A. 84-248 added Subdiv. (12) defining crime of library theft and the Revisors editorially added a subdivision
catchline to conform with previously existing Subdivs.; P.A. 84-301 amended Subdiv. (11) by replacing "automatic" with
"automated", adding provisions re prosecution for larceny based upon more than one instance of fraudulent use, and adding
definition of "automated teller machine"; P.A. 84-546 made technical change in Subdiv. (12); P.A. 85-339 added Subdiv.
(13) re conversion of leased personal property; P.A. 91-162 amended Subdiv. (13) to delete refusal to return leased personal
property or failure to return leased personal property to a certain place within a certain time as elements of the offense of
conversion of leased personal property in order to protect consumers leasing personal property under consumer rent-to-own agreements, as defined in Sec. 42-240a, from being charged with the offense of conversion of leased personal property
upon their refusal or failure to return such property to the lessor; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subdiv. (6) and
made technical changes in Subpara. indicators in Subdivs. (6) to (8), inclusive; P.A. 93-392 added Subdiv. (14) re failure
to pay prevailing rate of wages; P.A. 95-246 amended Subdiv. (7) to delete Subpara. (C) re theft of gas, electricity, water,
steam, telecommunication or community antenna service, Subpara. (D) re tampering with a meter or measuring device to
avoid payment for service the charge or compensation of which is measured by such meter or device and Subpara. (E) re
tampering with the equipment of a supplier of gas, electricity, water, steam, telephone or community antenna television
service, relettering former Subpara. (F) as Subpara. (C), and added Subdiv. (15) re theft of utility service; (Revisors's note:
In 1999 the words in Subdiv. (8)(C) "as not been registered" were replaced editorially by the Revisors with "has not been
registered" to correct a clerical error); P.A. 01-36 added Subdiv. (16) re air bag fraud (Revisor's note: In Subdiv. (16), the
heading "Air bag fraud." was added editorially by the Revisors following "(16)" to conform the format of this new subdivision with the format of Subdivs. (1) to (15), inclusive, each of which was enacted with a descriptive heading); P.A. 03-201 added Subdiv. (17) re theft of motor fuel; P.A. 03-278 made technical changes in Subdiv. (11), effective July 9, 2003.
Annotations to former section 53-65:
Cited. 165 C. 163.
Cited. 31 CS 296. Cited. Id., 434.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 170 C. 463, 466. Inference based on possession of recently stolen property; meaning of "possession"; mere
presence of passenger in motor vehicle containing recently stolen goods is insufficient to support conviction. 171 C. 127.
Cited. 172 C. 571. Cited. 174 C. 338, 342. Cited. 176 C. 239, 242, 243. Cited. 178 C. 163, 164, 167; id., 689, 694. Cited
179 C. 576, 587. Cited. 180 C. 662, 663, 665, 675, 679. Cited. 181 C. 172, 173, 177; id., 254, 255; id., 299, 312; id., 388,
396. Cited. 182 C. 449, 460; id., 476, 477. Cited. 183 C. 299, 303; id., 386, 387. Cited. 185 C. 211, 212. Cited. 186 C. 1,
7; id., 426, 427; id., 555, 557, 571 (Diss. Op.), 572 (Diss. Op.). Cited. 188 C. 671, 674; id., 681, 682, 696. Cited. 189 C.
114, 115, 121; id., 383, 385. Cited. 190 C. 104, 105. Cited. 194 C. 198, 199, 204. Cited. Id., 223. Cited. 196 C. 115, 116.
Cited. Id., 225-227. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 197 C. 17, 18. Cited. Id., 201, 203. Cited. Id., 247, 261. Cited. 198 C. 1,
2, 20. Cited. 199 C. 207, 223. Cited. 200 C. 310, 312, 322. Cited. 200 C. 586, 587. Cited. 201 C. 489, 493. Cited. 209 C.
564, 575, 576. Cited. 210 C. 652, 687, 689. Cited. 211 C. 101, 102, 114. Cited. 212 C. 31, 45. Cited. 213 C. 422, 424.
Cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Cited. Id., 161, 163. Cited. Id., 717, 720. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 221 C. 685-687. Cited.
223 C. 243, 252. Cited. 224 C. 711, 713. Cited. 227 C. 611, 612. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433, 439; judgment superseded by en
banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 455, 458. Cited. Id., 740, 742. Cited. 233 C. 527, 528, 530. Cited.
Id., 552, 553. Cited. 235 C. 502, 505, 515. Cited. 241 C. 439. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 666. Statutory theft under Sec.
52-564 is synonymous with larceny as provided in section. 255 C. 20. Pursuant to section, a person commits larceny when,
with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes,
obtains or withholds such property from the owner. Id. Although lack of consent is not specifically enumerated as element
of larceny in the first degree, donative victim's inability to consent to a taking is a factor properly considered in the context
of traditional understanding of larceny statute. 256 C. 135.
Cited. 1 CA 642, 645. Cited. 3 CA 633, 634. Cited. 4 CA 544, 556. Cited. 5 CA 599, 604. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id.,
326, 334, 336. Cited. Id., 532, 533. Cited. 8 CA 125, 141. Cited. Id., 491, 493. Cited. 9 CA 121, 122. Cited. Id., 141, 142,
144. Cited. Id., 313, 314, 319. Cited. Id., 373, 377. Cited. 10 CA 447, 448. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Cited. Id., 161, 162,
164, 165, 167. Cited. 12 CA 1, 19, 24. Cited. Id., 163, 171. Cited. Id., 408, 410, 412. Cited. 13 CA 12. Cited. Id., 576, 577.
Cited. Id., 596, 601. Cited. 14 CA 472, 474. Cited. 15 CA 641, 642, 644, 645. Cited. 19 CA 111, 137, 138; judgment
reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 521, 530. Cited. Id., 695, 706. Cited. 20 CA 513, 514. Cited. Id., 665, 666.
Cited. 21 CA 431, 432. Cited. 25 CA 298, 304. Cited. Id., 646, 648. Cited. 26 CA 52, 53. Cited. 28 CA 469. Cited. Id.,
521, 527. Cited. 30 CA 190, 191. Cited. 31 CA 47, 48, 56. Cited. 33 CA 303, 309. Cited. Id., 339, 351. Cited. Id., 368,
369, 372, 377. Cited. Id., 603, 604. Cited. 34 CA 250, 251; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and
jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 599, 600. Cited. Id., 694, 695, 699, 700. Cited. Id., 751, 753; judgment
reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 566, 567. Cited. 37 CA 482, 488. Cited. Id., 589, 594. Cited. Id., 619, 621,
627. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 643, 645, 647. Cited. 39 CA 96, 97. Cited. Id., 579, 593. Cited. 41 CA 584, 585.
Cited. Id., 695, 696. Cited. 42 CA 599. Cited. 43 CA 499. Cited. Id., 801. Cited. 44 CA 294. Cited. 45 CA 6. Cited. Id.,
46. Cited. Id., 369. Cited. Id., 455. Cited. 46 CA 269. Cited. Id., 414. Cited. Id., 616. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 778. Cited.
47 CA 1. Section includes "theft of services" as larceny. 66 CA 740. Employers did not commit extortion when they sought
restitution of wages from employee who was found guilty of misappropriating the wages. 75 CA 319.
Cited. 32 CS 650. Cited. Id., 653. Cited. 34 CS 612, 616. Cited. 36 CS 570, 573. Cited. 37 CS 678, 684. Statutory
definition of larceny does not modify common law rule that proof of the identity of the owner of stolen property is not an
element of the crime of larceny. Id., 809, 812. Cited. Id., 853. Cited. 38 CS 1, 5; id., 593, 595. Cited. 39 CS 27, 30; id.,
363, 364.
Subsec. (1):
Cited. 178 C. 480, 481. Cited. 188 C. 681, 696. Cited. 199 C. 462, 464, 467, 471. Cited. 203 C. 682, 686. Cited. 208
C. 420, 421. Cited. 233 C. 552, 556.
Cited. 9 CA 365. Cited. 11 CA 684, 685, 687. Cited. 19 CA 521, 522. Cited. 35 CA 566, 576, 577. Cited. 46 CA 414.
Cited. 47 CA 1.
Subsec. (2):
Cited. 169 C. 581. Cited. 177 C. 243. Cited. 180 C. 662, 664, 665. Cited. 188 C. 681, 696. Cited. 194 C. 96, 97. Cited.
Id., 233, 239. Cited. 195 C. 421, 422. Cited. 198 C. 348, 350, 351. Cited. 242 C. 345.
Cited. 4 CA 69, 74. Cited. 11 CA 161, 166. Cited. 14 CA 88, 91, 102. Cited. 25 CA 298, 306. Cited. 28 CA 306-308.
Cited. Id., 521, 527.
Subsec. (3):
Cited. 178 C. 163, 167, 169-172; Id., 649, 650. Cited. 180 C. 662, 665. Cited. 188 C. 681, 696. Cited. 190 C. 541, 542, 549.
Subsec. (5):
Subdiv. (E) cited. 237 C. 501.
Cited. 7 CA 367, 372. Cited. 21 CA 386, 402. Subdiv. (H) cited. Id. Cited. 22 CA 449, 451, 454. Subdiv. (E) cited. 37
CA 62, 63; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501 et seq. Cited. 40 CA 151, 160. Extortion claim that failed to allege conspirators
threatened to bring lawsuit against defendants and to publicize their claims if they were not paid the money demanded
held legally insufficient. 62 CA 11.
Subsec. (6):
Cited. 233 C. 527, 528. Subdiv. (B) cited. Id., 527, 528. Subdiv. (C) cited. Id. Subdiv. (A) cited. Id., 527, 528, 530.
Cited. 7 CA 326, 331-334. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 326, 328, 332, 337, 338, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 272, 280.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 17 CA 486, 487. Cited. 27 CA 635, 641. Subdiv. (A) cited. 34 CA 694, 699, 700.
Also cited as 53a-119(6)(1). Id., Subdiv. (6)(C) cited. Id., 694, 705. Cited. 43 CA 499. Cited. 44 CA 187.
Subsec. (7):
Subdiv. (F): Charging in the conjunctive discussed; judgment of appellate court in State v. Wohler, 30 CA 571, 576,
reversed. 231 C. 411-413.
Subdiv. (4) cited. 10 CA 486, 493, 494. Cited. 11 CA 161, 167. Cited. 25 CA 298, 304. Subdiv. (F) cited. 30 CA 571,
572; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 411 et seq. Subdiv. (F) cited. 38 CA 277, 279.
For conviction of offense of theft of services rendered at hotel, motel, inn or comparable establishment, the state must
show that accused had been transient guest thereat. 34 CS 603, 604. Cited. 38 CS 1, 5. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id., 593, 595.
Subsec. (8):
Cited. 178 C. 416, 417, 419. Instruction on intent unnecessary under this statute. 181 C. 299, 300, 311, 315, 316. Cited.
186 C. 426, 427. Cited. 188 C. 325, 326, 328. Cited. 190 C. 191, 192, 199, 201, 207 (Diss. Op.), 211 (Diss. Op.). Mens
rea and scienter discussed. 192 C. 405, 407, 409, 411-413, 422, 423. Cited. 195 C. 421-423. Cited. 196 C. 115, 116. Cited.
200 C. 113, 116. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 1 CA 270. Cited. 5 CA 129, 130. Cited. 8 CA 13, 14. Cited. Id., 125, 126, 139. Cited. 11 CA 161, 165. Cited.
12 CA 408, 411, 412, 414. Cited. 15 CA 416, 417. Cited. Id., 641, 642, 645. Cited. 16 CA 402, 403. Cited. 25 CA 149,
150, 153. Cited. 26 CA 33, 34, 43, 44. Cited. 31 CA 614, 617. Cited. 37 CA 40, 41, 50, 51. Cited. 39 CA 96, 97, 103.
Cited. 43 CA 613. Cited. 45 CA 6. Cited. Id., 369.
Cited. 31 CS 510. Mental element required is knowledge or belief that the property probably has been stolen. There
must be more than mere suspicion or conjecture. Use of word "probably" as a specification of degree of certainty clarifies
law. 35 CS 531, 533, 534. Cited. 36 CS 603, 608.
Subsec. (9):
Cited. 13 CA 578, 583. Cited. 14 CA 88, 89, 91, 95, 102.
Cited. 37 CS 678.
Subsec. (10):
Cited. 39 CS 27, 30, 33.
Subsec. (13):
Subdiv. (A) cited. 29 CA 283, 289; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795 et seq.
Sec. 53a-119a. Shoplifting and library theft; detention, questioning, presumption of crime. (a) Any owner, authorized agent or authorized employee of a retail mercantile establishment, who observes any person concealing or attempting to conceal
goods displayed for sale therein, or the ownership of such goods, or transporting such
goods from such premises without payment therefor, may question such person as to
his name and address and, if such owner, agent or employee has reasonable grounds to
believe that the person so questioned was then attempting to commit or was committing
larceny of such goods on the premises of such establishment, may detain such person
for a time sufficient to summon a police officer to the premises. Any person so questioned
by such owner, authorized agent or authorized employee pursuant to the provisions of
this section shall promptly identify himself by name and address. No other information
shall be required of such person until a police officer has taken him into custody. For
the purposes of this subsection, "reasonable grounds" shall include knowledge that a
person has concealed unpurchased merchandise of such establishment while on the
premises or has altered or removed identifying labels on such merchandise while on the
premises or is leaving such premises with such unpurchased or concealed or altered
merchandise in his possession.
(b) Whenever an employee or authorized agent of a library facility, as defined in
subdivision (12) of section 53a-119, has reasonable grounds to believe that a person (1)
is removing or is attempting to remove, without authority, a book or other archival
library materials, as defined in said subdivision (12) of section 53a-119, from a library
facility or (2) is intentionally mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival
library materials, such employee or authorized agent may question such person as to
his name and address and may detain such person for a time sufficient to summon a
police officer to the premises. Any person so questioned by such employee or agent
shall promptly identify himself by name and address. For the purposes of this subsection,
reasonable grounds shall include knowledge that a person (A) has concealed a book or
other archival library materials while on the library facility premises or is removing
such book or material from the library facility premises without authority or (B) has
mutilated, defaced or destroyed a book or other archival library materials belonging to
or deposited in a library facility.
(c) In any civil action by a person detained under the provisions of subsection (a)
or (b) of this section against the person so detaining him or the principal or employer
of such person arising out of such questioning or detention by any such owner, agent
or employee, evidence that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the
plaintiff was, at the time in question, committing or attempting to commit larceny or
mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials shall create
a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was so committing or attempting to commit
larceny or mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials.
(P.A. 73-617, S. 2; P.A. 84-248, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 50.)
History: P.A. 84-248 inserted new Subsec. (b) authorizing employees or authorized agents of library facilities to detain
and question any person who, on reasonable grounds, is suspected of attempting to commit library theft, relettering former
Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), and adding provision re "mutilating, defacing or destroying library books or archival library
materials"; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsecs. (b) and (c).
Transgression of this statute results in merchants inability to assert statutory privilege in a civil proceeding but does
not require exclusion of evidence in a related criminal prosecution. 39 CS 392, 394-396.
Sec. 53a-119b. Using motor vehicle or vessel without owner's permission. Interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle. First offense: Class A misdemeanor.
Subsequent offense: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of using a motor vehicle
without the owner's permission when: (1) He operates or uses, or causes to be operated
or used, any motor vehicle unless he has the consent of the owner; or (2) he obtains the
consent of the owner to the use of his motor vehicle by fraud or fraudulent means,
statement or representations.
(b) A person is guilty of using a vessel, as defined in section 15-127, without the
owner's permission when: (1) He operates or uses, or causes to be operated or used,
any vessel unless he has the consent of the owner; or (2) he obtains the consent of the
owner to the use of his vessel by fraud or fraudulent means, statement or representations.
(c) A person is guilty of interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle when: (1)
He puts into motion the engine of any motor vehicle while it is standing without the
permission of the owner except that a property owner or his agent may remove any
motor vehicle left without authorization on such owner's property in accordance with
section 14-145; or (2) with intent and without right to do so, he damages any motor
vehicle or damages or removes any of its parts or components.
(d) Using a motor vehicle or a vessel without the owner's permission or interfering
or tampering with a motor vehicle is a class A misdemeanor for a first offense and a
class D felony for each subsequent offense.
(P.A. 73-639, S. 18; P.A. 80-292, S. 10; 80-341, S. 3; P.A. 81-351, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 80-292 replaced previous Subsec. (b) provision which made use of motor vehicle without owner's permission a Class B misdemeanor with new provisions specifying first such offense as Class A misdemeanor and subsequent
offenses as Class D felonies; P.A. 80-341 inserted new Subsec. (b) re use of vessel without owner's permission, relettering
and revising former Subsec. (b) as necessary to reflect its insertion; P.A. 81-351 inserted new Subsec. (c) on interfering
or tampering with a motor vehicle, relettering former Subsec. (c) accordingly.
Cited. 195 C. 567, 569. Cited. 231 C. 195, 209.
Cited. 14 CA 169, 170. Cited. 21 CA 645, 646. Cited. 25 CA 181, 184. Cited. 26 CA 165, 166. Cited. 27 CA 49, 50,
55. Cited. 32 CA 483, 487. Cited. 36 CA 364, 373. Cited. 37 CA 276, 278. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Cited. 37 CS 901. Cited. 43 CS 211.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 206 C. 657, 659.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 361, 362. Cited. 27 CA 49, 52, 53. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 613. Subdiv. (1) cited. 45 CA 369.
Subsec. (c):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 14 CA 119, 120, 123, 124, 127. Cited. 39 CA 1, 2, 5. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 613.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 45 CA 369.
Sec. 53a-120. Theft of services; service and credit card defined. Section 53a-120 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 122; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
See Sec. 53a-118 for definitions applicable to larceny, robbery and related offenses.
Sec. 53a-121. Value of property or services. (a) For the purposes of this part, the
value of property or services shall be ascertained as follows: (1) Except as otherwise
specified in this section, value means the market value of the property or services at the
time and place of the crime or, if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of
replacement of the property or services within a reasonable time after the crime. (2)
Whether or not they have been issued or delivered, written instruments, except those
having a readily ascertainable market value such as some public and corporate bonds
and securities, shall be evaluated as follows: (A) The value of an instrument constituting
evidence of debt, such as a check, draft or promissory note, shall be deemed the amount
due or collectible thereon, such figure ordinarily being the face amount of the indebtedness less any portion thereof which has been satisfied; (B) the value of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges or otherwise affects any valuable legal right,
privilege or obligation shall be deemed the greatest amount of economic loss which the
owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instrument.
(3) When the value of property or services cannot be satisfactorily ascertained pursuant
to the standards set forth in this section, its value shall be deemed to be an amount less
than fifty dollars.
(b) Amounts included in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of
conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 123.)
Cited. 182 C. 52, 53, 64, 65. Cited (Diss. Op.). Id., 397, 402. Cited. 191 C. 180, 190, 191. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 7 CA 326, 336. Cited. 9 CA 313, 319. Cited. 19 CA 521, 522. Cited. 25 CA 298, 307. Cited. 37 CA 62, 63;
judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501 et seq.
Evidence of trade-in value insufficient to establish market value or replacement cost for purposes of statute. 35 CS 531,
535, 536.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 176 C. 239, 242; 178 C. 416, 421. Subdiv. (1) cited. 181 C. 172, 182, 183; 182 C. 397-399, 401, 402.
Cited. 190 C. 191, 201, 205. Subdiv. (1) cited. 196 C. 225, 229, 230. Cited. Id., 166, 172. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 247, 262.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 396, 406. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 308, 313. Subdiv. (1) cited. 200 C. 113, 120. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 129, 132. Subdiv. (3) cited. 12 CA 408, 410. Cited. 33 CA 339, 351; judgment reversed in part,
see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 269.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 177 C. 243. Cited. 178 C. 649, 650. Cited. 199 C. 462, 464, 471. Cited. 228 C. 926. Cited. 232 C. 431, 435, 440;
judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 235 C. 502, 505, 508, 514-518. Cited. 241
C. 439.
Cited. 33 CA 339, 351-353; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency
of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 250, 254. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-122. Larceny in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty
of larceny in the first degree when he commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119,
and: (1) The property or service, regardless of its nature and value, is obtained by extortion, (2) the value of the property or service exceeds ten thousand dollars, (3) the property
consists of a motor vehicle, the value of which exceeds ten thousand dollars, or (4) the
property is obtained by defrauding a public community, and the value of such property
exceeds two thousand dollars.
(b) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any motor vehicle, construction equipment, agricultural tractor or farm implement or major component part of any
of the above. In any prosecution under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section,
evidence of (1) forcible entry, (2) forcible removal of ignition, or (3) alteration, mutilation or removal of a vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence (A)
that the person in control or possession of such motor vehicle knows or should have
known that such motor vehicle is stolen, and (B) that such person possesses such motor
vehicle with larcenous intent.
(c) Larceny in the first degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 124; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 25; P.A. 73-639, S. 7; P.A. 81-248, S. 1; 81-351, S. 3; P.A. 82-271, S. 1;
P.A. 86-275, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 51; P.A. 00-103, S. 1.)
History: 1971 act deleted detailed description of extortionist acts in Subsec. (a)(1), i.e. threat of physical injury, damage
to property, etc., and made first degree larceny a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony; P.A. 73-639 made first degree
larceny a Class B felony; P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 81-351 included property
consisting of a motor vehicle having a value exceeding two thousand dollars in the definition of larceny in the first degree
inserted new Subsec. (b) enumerating conditions constituting prima facie evidence of a larcenous intent in regard to motor
vehicles and relettered former Subsec. (b) accordingly; P.A. 82-271 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) by increasing from
two to ten thousand dollars the value of the property or service obtained and by adding Subdiv. (4) concerning defrauding
a public community; P.A. 86-275 amended Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a) to increase the value of a motor vehicle subject to
the section from in excess of two thousand dollars to in excess of ten thousand dollars; P.A. 92-260 made a technical
change in Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a) by rephrasing language; P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b)
and amended Subsec. (b) by defining "motor vehicle" and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of knowledge that
vehicle is stolen and possession of vehicle with larcenous intent.
Inference based on possession of recently stolen property (driver versus passenger of motor van containing stolen
property); meaning of "possession". 171 C. 119, 127. Mere presence of passenger in vehicle containing stolen goods is
insufficient to support conviction. Id., 127. Cited. 174 C. 253, 254. Cited. Id., 338, 339. Cited. 183 C. 383. Cited. 186 C.
648, 649. Cited. 188 C. 715, 722. Cited. 189 C. 717, 718. Cited. 190 C. 559, 560. Cited. 194 C. 361, 362. Cited. 196 C.
185. Cited. 197 C. 201, 203. Cited. Id., 247, 262. Cited. 199 C. 30, 32. Cited. Id., 207, 223, 224. Cited. 202 C. 86. Cited.
204 C. 52. Cited. 213 C. 233, 236. Cited. 224 C. 711, 713. Cited. 237 C. 501. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. Id., 439.
Cited. 3 CA 359, 362. Cited. 5 CA 113, 114. Cited. Id., 347, 348. Cited. 6 CA 164, 165. Cited. 7 CA 326, 331, 334,
336. Cited. Id., 532, 533. Cited. 9 CA 349, 351. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 14 CA 272, 278. Cited. 20 CA 810. Cited.
21 CA 431, 436. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 34 CA 599, 600. Cited. Id., 751, 766; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211
et seq. Cited. 36 CA 364, 374. Cited. 37 CA 40, 42, 50, 51. Cited. 45 CA 455.
Cited. 31 CS 501.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 169 C. 581; 176 C. 239, 242; 177 C. 243. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 427, 429. Subdiv. (2) cited. 178
C. 163, 164, 166, 169; id., 416, 417, 419; id., 480, 481; id., 649, 650; 180 C. 182; id., 662, 663, 665. 181 C. 172, 173, 177,
182; id., 254, 255; id., 299, 300, 311; 182 C. 52, 54, 62. Subdiv. (2) cited. 183 C. 225; 185 C. 211, 212; 188 C. 671, 674,
676; id., 681, 682; id., 715, 716; Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 114, 115. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 201, 202; id., 337, 339; id., 383,
385; 190 C. 541, 542; 192 C. 405, 407, 472. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 421, 422. Subdiv. (2) cited. 196 C. 225, 227, 228,
230. Subdiv. (3) cited. 197 C. 17, 18. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 247, 248. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 413, 415. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 629, 630. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 348, 350, 351. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 369, 370. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 14, 16.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 207, 208. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 420, 421. Subdiv. (3) cited. 214 C. 132, 133; Id., 717, 720. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 218 C. 151, 152; 219 C. 93, 95. Subdiv. (3) cited. 221 C. 685, 687. Subdiv. (3) cited. 227 C. 611, 612. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 232 C. 691, 693. Subdiv. (4) cited. 233 C. 527, 528, 530. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 552, 554. Cited. 235 C. 502, 517.
Cited. 242 C. 345. Subdiv. (2): Although lack of consent is not specifically enumerated as element of larceny in the first
degree, donative victim's inability to consent to a taking is a factor properly considered in the context of a traditional
understanding of larceny statute. 256 C. 135.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 3 CA 359, 360, 365. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 633, 634. Subdiv. (2) cited. 4 CA 251. Subdiv. (2) cited.
5 CA 129-131. Subdiv. (2) cited. 7 CA 292. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 326, 331-333. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 326, 328, 331-
333. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 445, 446. Subdiv. (3) cited. 8 CA 125, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 376, 377. Subdiv. (2) cited.
9 CA 121, 122. Cited. Id., 313, 319. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 365. Subdiv. (2) cited. 10 CA 447, 448, 451. Subdiv. (2) cited.
11 CA 684, 685, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 576, 577. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 416, 417. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 16 CA 402, 403. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 50, 51. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 359, 360. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 486, 487. Subdiv. (2) cited. 20 CA 354, 355. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 665, 666. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 386,
387. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 449, 450. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Subdiv. (3) cited. 25 CA 149, 150; Id., 181,
182; 26 CA 279, 280. Cited. 28 CA 306-308. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 306, 308. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 521, 522, 525-527,
530. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 521, 522, 525, 527, 530. Subdiv. (3) cited. 29 CA 394, 396. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 190, 191.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 614, 617. Subdiv. (2) cited. 33 CA 368, 369. Subdiv. (4) cited. 34 CA 694, 695, 699, 701, 702.
Cited. Id., 751, 753; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 751, 753, 758; judgment reversed,
see 233 C. 211 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 35 CA 566-568. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 740, 742. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 774,
775. Subdiv. (2) cited. 37 CA 40-42, 51. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 589, 594. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 619, 621. Cited. 38 CA
481, 482. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 643, 645, 653. Subdiv. (3) cited. 39 CA 96, 97, 103. Subdiv. (2) cited. 41 CA 695, 696.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 43 CA 499. Subdiv. (4) cited. 44 CA 187. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 476. Cited. 45 CA 455. Subdiv. (2) cited.
47 CA 1. Defendant's claim that evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of larceny in the first degree was
unavailing; the evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to sustaining verdict, was sufficient to support jury's
finding that value of victim's car exceeded $10,000, as required by statute, and it was not improper for trial court to permit
victim to testify as to his opinion of car's value at time of the crime. 81 CA 377.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 52, 62.
Sec. 53a-123. Larceny in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is
guilty of larceny in the second degree when he commits larceny, as defined in section
53a-119, and: (1) The property consists of a motor vehicle, the value of which exceeds
five thousand dollars, (2) the value of the property or service exceeds five thousand
dollars, (3) the property, regardless of its nature or value, is taken from the person of
another, (4) the property is obtained by defrauding a public community, and the value
of such property is two thousand dollars or less, or (5) the property, regardless of its
nature or value, is obtained by embezzlement, false pretenses or false promise and the
victim of such larceny is sixty years of age or older or is blind or physically disabled,
as defined in section 1-1f.
(b) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any motor vehicle, construction equipment, agricultural tractor or farm implement or major component part of any
of the above. In any prosecution under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section,
evidence of (1) forcible entry, (2) forcible removal of ignition, or (3) alteration, mutilation or removal of a vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence (A)
that the person in control or possession of such motor vehicle knows or should have
known that such motor vehicle is stolen, and (B) that such person possesses such motor
vehicle with larcenous intent.
(c) Larceny in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 125; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 26; P.A. 73-639, S. 8; P.A. 81-248, S. 2; 81-263, S. 2; 81-351, S. 4; 81-472, S. 152, 159; P.A. 82-271, S. 2; P.A. 86-275, S. 2; P.A. 97-180; P.A. 00-103, S. 2.)
History: 1971 act applied second degree larceny to cases where property is a motor vehicle and made second degree
larceny a Class D felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor; P.A. 73-639 specified that taking property, regardless of its
nature or value, from another's person is second degree larceny; P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed
conduct; P.A. 81-263 added Subdiv. (4) in Subsec. (a) re property obtained by defrauding a public community where the
value of the property is less than two thousand dollars; P.A. 81-351 amended the definition of larceny of a motor vehicle
to that with a value of two thousand dollars or less, inserted new Subsec. (b) enumerating conditions constituting prima
facie evidence of a larcenous intent in regard to motor vehicles and relettered former Subsec. (b) accordingly; P.A. 81-472 made technical corrections; P.A. 82-271 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) by increasing from five hundred dollars
to five thousand dollars the value of the property or service obtained and amended Subsec. (c) by changing the classification
from a class D to a class C felony; P.A. 86-275 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to increase the value of a motor vehicle
subject to the section from two thousand dollars or less to a value which exceeds five thousand dollars; P.A. 97-180 amended
Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (5) re property obtained by embezzlement, false pretenses or false promise from an aged, blind
or disabled victim; P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by defining
"motor vehicle" and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of knowledge that vehicle is stolen and possession of
vehicle with larcenous intent.
Cited. 173 C. 545. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Cited. 183 C. 386, 387. Cited. 188 C. 542, 543. Cited. 190 C. 559, 560.
Cited. 194 C. 438, 439. Cited. Id., C. 650, 651. Cited. 196 C. 305, 306. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 197 C. 166, 172. Cited.
Id., 201, 203. Cited. Id., 247, 262. Cited. Id., 309. Cited. 198 C. 1, 2, 20. Cited. 199 C. 30, 31. Cited. Id., 308, 309. Cited.
Id., 462, 464. Cited. 200 C. 113, 120. Cited. 202 C. 615, 617. Cited. 203 C. 484, 486. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. 213 C.
233, 234. Cited. Id., 233, 236. Cited. 216 C. 273, 274. Cited. 235 C. 679, 683. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 2 CA 537, 538. Cited. 5 CA 113, 114. Cited. 7 CA 326, 336. Cited. 8 CA 125, 141, 142. Cited. Id., 478, 481,
484, 487, 488. Cited. 9 CA 349, 350. Cited. 13 CA 420, 431. Cited. Id., 576. Cited. Id., 596, 597. Secs. 53a-122-53a-125b
cited. 14 CA 272, 278. Cited. Id., 472, 474. Cited. 16 CA 433, 435. Cited. 17 CA 460, 461. Cited. 19 CA 495, 497. Cited.
20 CA 271, 272. Cited. Id., 369, 370. Cited. 21 CA 248, 249. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 35 CA 566, 568. Cited. Id.,
714, 717. Cited. 39 CA 810, 811. Cited. 44 CA 187. Cited. Id., 294. Cited. 46 CA 691.
Requisites for accepting plea of guilty. 31 CS 501. Cited. 32 CS 650. Cited. 35 CS 531, 535. Cited. 38 CS 549.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 169 C. 247, 249. Cited. 174 C. 129, 130. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 129, 130, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178
C. 427, 429; id., 689, 690. Subdiv. (2) cited. 181 C. 299, 300. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 476, 477; 186 C. 426, 427. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 187 C. 264, 265, 271; 188 C. 325, 326; id., 671, 675, 676; 190 C. 191, 192, 199, 200; 191 C. 180, 181, 188.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 421-423. Subdiv. (2) cited. 196 C. 36, 37. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 36-38. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
115, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 203. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 490, 491. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C.
308, 312. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 113, 114, 116. Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 462, 468. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 206 C. 657, 659. Cited. 207 C. 118, 120. Subdiv. (1) cited. 208 C. 365, 366. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 652, 654.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 211 C. 101-103, 114, 115. Subdiv. (2) cited. 212 C. 223, 225, 237. Subdiv. (4) cited. 213 C. 233, 234,
236, 243. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 422, 424. Subdiv. (1) cited. 215 C. 716, 719. Subdiv. (3) cited. 219 C. 160, 161; 220 C.
487, 489. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 243, 248. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 552, 554. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 235 C. 67, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 784. Cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (3) cited. 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (3): Rational
basis exists for legislature to classify larceny from the person as a more serious offense than simple robbery and therefore
the classification did not violate defendant's right to equal protection of the laws. 246 C. 132. For defendant to be found
guilty of larceny in the third degree, state must prove that defendant committed larceny by defrauding a public community.
252 C. 229.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 1 CA 270. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 378, 379. Subdiv. (3): Larceny from the person requires an actual
trespass to the person of the victim and therefore taking a radio which was in the vicinity of the victim, but not on the
victim's person, did not constitute larceny under this section. 1 CA 642-644. Subdiv. (3) cited. 3 CA 126. Cited. 8 CA
125, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 125, 126, 139. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 478, 481, 485, 488. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 478, 488.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 491, 493. Subdiv. (3) cited. 11 CA 102, 103, 120. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 12 CA 239, 240. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408-410. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 685. Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 12. Subdiv.
92) cited. Id., 554-556. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 596, 601, 603. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 169, 170. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 272,
273, 275. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 472-474, 476, 477. Cited. Id., 493, 503. Subdiv. (3) cited. 20 CA 513, 514. Subdiv. (2)
cited. 24 CA 697, 698. Subdiv. (1) cited. 26 CA 52, 54. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 114, 116. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 279, 280.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 306-308. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 606, 607. Subdiv. (3) cited. 31 CA 47, 48, 51, 56-58. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 94, 103. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 312, 314. Subdiv. (3) cited. 32 CA 21, 23. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 468-470,
485, 487, 489. Subdiv. (2) cited. 34 CA 250, 251. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 699, 701. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 35 CA 740, 743. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 643, 650, 651. Cited. 39 CA 579, 580. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 579, 593.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 840, 841. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 21, 22. Subdiv. (3) cited. 41 CA 391, 393.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 584, 585. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 817, 818. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. 42 CA 810. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 46 CA 414. Cited. Id., 616. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Court found that money was "taken from the person of the
victim" in case in which victim was tricked into turning over her money to defendant. 56 CA 428.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CS 603, 604. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 603, 604; 37 CS 527, 528.
Sec. 53a-124. Larceny in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of larceny in the third degree when he commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119,
and: (1) The property consists of a motor vehicle, the value of which is five thousand
dollars or less; (2) the value of the property or service exceeds one thousand dollars;
(3) the property consists of a public record, writing or instrument kept, held or deposited
according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; or (4) the
property consists of a sample, culture, microorganism, specimen, record, recording,
document, drawing or any other article, material, device or substance which constitutes,
represents, evidences, reflects or records a secret scientific or technical process, invention or formula or any phase or part thereof. A process, invention or formula is "secret"
when it is not, and is not intended to be, available to anyone other than the owner thereof
or selected persons having access thereto for limited purposes with his consent, and
when it accords or may accord the owner an advantage over competitors or other persons
who do not have knowledge or the benefit thereof.
(b) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any motor vehicle, construction equipment, agricultural tractor or farm implement or major component part of any
of the above. In any prosecution under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section,
evidence of (1) forcible entry, (2) forcible removal of ignition, or (3) alteration, mutilation or removal of a vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence (A)
that the person in control or possession of such motor vehicle knows or should have
known that such motor vehicle is stolen, and (B) that such person possesses such motor
vehicle with larcenous intent.
(c) Larceny in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 126; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 27; P.A. 73-639, S. 9; P.A. 81-248, S. 3; P.A. 82-271, S. 3; P.A. 88-170;
P.A. 92-260, S. 52; P.A. 00-103, S. 3.)
History: 1971 act deleted former Subdiv. (5) in Subsec. (a) which classified obtaining property or service, regardless
of its nature or value, by extortion as third degree larceny; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subdiv. (4) in Subsec. (a) which
classified taking property from the person of another, regardless of its nature or value, as third degree larceny; P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 82-271 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) by increasing
from fifty dollars to one thousand dollars the value of the property or service obtained and amended Subsec. (c) by changing
the classification from a class B misdemeanor to a class D felony; P.A. 88-170 amended Subsec. (a) by adding property
consisting of a motor vehicle, the value of which is five thousand dollars or less and inserted new Subsec. (b) stating that
in any prosecution under Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a), evidence of forcible entry, forcible removal of ignition or alternation,
mutilation or removal of vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence of larcenous intent, relettering former
Subsec. (b) as (c); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs.
(a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by defining "motor vehicle" and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of
knowledge that vehicle is stolen and possession of vehicle with larcenous intent.
See Sec. 53a-212 re stealing a firearm.
Cited. 184 C. 95, 96; id., 258, 260; id., 434, 438. Cited. 185 C. 260, 261, 267. Cited. 187 C. 292, 293; id., 444, 447.
Cited. 189 C. 364. Cited. 190 C. 715, 717. Cited. 191 C. 180, 192. Cited. 194 C. 198, 204. Cited. Id., 233, 234. Cited. Id.,
623, 624. Cited. 197 C. 247, 262. Cited. 200 C. 586, 587. Cited. 207 C. 109, 110. Cited. 213 C. 233, 236. Cited. 232 C.
431, 439; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 3 CA 503. Cited. 7 CA 326, 336. Cited. 8 CA 13, 14, 21. Cited. Id., 342, 343. Cited. Id., 478, 480, 485, 487, 490.
Cited. Id., 667, 672, 672D. Cited. 9 CA 141, 142, 144. Cited. 10 CA 258, 259. Cited. 12 CA 196, 197. Cited. 14 CA 159,
160. Secs. 53a-122-53a-125b cited. Id., 272, 278. Cited. 18 CA 368, 369. Cited. 19 CA 48, 50. Cited. 20 CA 810. Cited.
23 CA 201, 202. Cited. 25 CA 298, 307. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 32 CA 476, 477. Cited. 33 CA 339, 351; judgment
reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see
235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 368, 369. Cited. 38 CA 643, 644, 651. Cited. 41 CA 751-753. Cited. 46 CA 691.
Cited. 36 CS 578, 581; id., 583; id., 603, 604. Cited. 37 CS 678, 679; id., 796, 797, 802. Cited. 184 C. 95, 96; id., 258,
260; id., 434, 438. Cited. 185 C. 260, 261, 267. Cited. 187 C. 292, 293; id., 444, 447. Cited. 189 C. 364. Cited. 190 C. 715,
717. Cited. 191 C. 180, 192.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 239 C. 235.
Cited. 38 CA 643, 651. Cited. 39 CA 579, 581. Cited. 46 CA 269.
Subsec. (a)(1):
Cited. 176 C. 239, 242. Cited. 178 C. 287, 288. Cited. 179 C. 576, 578. Cited. 182 C. 397, 400. Cited. 186 C. 222, 224.
Cited. 189 C. 461, 462. Cited. 190 C. 104, 105. Cited. 195 C. 567, 569. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 88, 89. Cited. 214 C. 132,
133. Cited. 221 C. 685, 687. Cited. 230 C. 351, 354.
Cited. 6 CA 697, 698. Cited. 8 CA 478, 488. Cited. 10 CA 486, 493. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3. Cited. 14 CA 256. Cited. 15
CA 122, 123. Cited. 19 CA 521, 522. Cited. 21 CA 431, 432. Cited. 26 CA 279, 280. Cited. 37 CA 219. Cited. Id., 482,
483. Cited. 38 CA 643, 647, 648, 650-652. Cited. 41 CA 695, 696. Cited. 43 CA 613.
Subsec. (a)(2):
Cited. 232 C. 433; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 740, 742. Cited.
235 C. 502, 504, 505, 514, 515. Cited. 241 C. 702.
Cited. 24 CA 697, 698. Cited. 25 CA 298, 300. Cited. 28 CA 306, 308. Cited. 33 CA 339, 340; judgment reversed in
part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502
et seq. Cited. Id., 603, 604, 608. Cited. 38 CA 643, 645, 647, 648, 650-652. Cited. 39 CA 579, 593. Cited. 46 CA 269.
Former subsec. (a)(4):
Cited. 169 C. 161.
Cited. 33 CS 669. Cited. Id., 706. Cited. 34 CS 603. Cited. Id., 656.
Sec. 53a-125. Larceny in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of larceny in the fourth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section
53a-119 and the value of the property or service exceeds five hundred dollars.
(b) Larceny in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 127; P.A. 81-248, S. 4; P.A. 82-271, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 82-271 amended Subsec. (a) by
increasing the value of the property or service obtained from fifty dollars or less to in excess of five hundred dollars and
amended Subsec. (b) by changing the classification from a class C to a class A misdemeanor.
Cited. 172 C. 571. Cited. 176 C. 239, 242. Cited. 178 C. 416, 421. Cited. 179 C. 576, 587. Cited 181 C. 388, 396-399.
Cited. 182 C. 242, 244. Cited. 194 C. 198, 199. Cited. 197 C. 247, 262. Cited. Id., 396, 406. Cited. 202 C. 443, 445. Cited.
209 C. 34, 38. Cited. 213 C. 233, 236. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 232 C. 431, 439; judgment superseded by en banc
reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 4 CA 514, 515. Cited. 5 CA 612, 613. Cited. 7 CA 326, 336. Cited. 9 CA 133, 134. Cited. 12 CA 1, 19. Cited.
14 CA 119, 120. Secs. 53a-122-53a-125b cited. Id., 272, 278. Cited. Id., 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 641, 642, 644. Cited. 20
CA 586, 587. Cited. 22 CA 440, 441. Cited. 26 CA 33, 34. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 33 CA 339, 355; judgment
reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see
235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 405, 406. Cited. 38 CA 20, 22. It is possible for defendant to be convicted of larceny for
taking property he owns and for depriving bailee of its superior right of possession and the amount of bailee's lien interest
in the motor vehicle; but the value of the theft is limited by amount of bailee's lien as secured by the property itself. 59
CA 135.
Cited. 34 CS 612. Cited. 35 CS 531, 536. Cited. 36 CS 603, 605, 607. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756; id., 853. Cited. 38 CS
593, 594. Cited. 39 CS 363, 364; id., 392.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 176 C. 239, 242. Cited. 232 C. 431, 434; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et
seq. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504, 515.
Cited. 3 CA 359, 365. Cited. 6 CA 164, 165. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. 11 CA 805. Cited. 14 CA 119, 125. Cited. 31 CA
312, 314. Cited. 33 CA 339, 355, 356; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of
sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 20, 22. Cited. Id., 643, 645.
Sec. 53a-125a. Larceny in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of larceny in the fifth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section
53a-119 and the value of the property or service exceeds two hundred fifty dollars.
(b) Larceny in the fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 82-271, S. 5.)
Cited. 201 C. 125, 126. Cited. 203 C. 682, 686. Cited. 210 C. 435, 438. Cited. 213 C. 233, 236. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 14 CA 205, 207. Secs. 53a-122-53a-125b cited. Id., 272, 278. Cited. 15 CA 197, 198. Cited. 19 CA 48, 50, 53.
Cited. 21 CA 331-333. Cited. 24 CA 556, 557, 559. Cited. Id., 563, 567. Cited. 25 CA 298, 304. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860.
Cited. 37 CA 228, 229. Cited. 46 CA 118. Defendant may be convicted of larceny in the fifth degree by illegal use of a
credit card. 75 CA 756.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 231 C. 411, 412.
Cited. 7 CA 75, 76. Cited. 30 CA 571, 572; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 411 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 277, 279.
Sec. 53a-125b. Larceny in the sixth degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of larceny in the sixth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section
53a-119 and the value of the property or service is two hundred fifty dollars or less.
(b) Larceny in the sixth degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 82-271, S. 6.)
Cited. 201 C. 559, 560. Cited. 202 C. 369, 371. Cited. 203 C. 682, 686. Cited. 208 C. 387, 388. Cited. 210 C. 435, 438.
Cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Cited. 213 C. 233, 236. Cited. 237 C. 613. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 3 CA 132, 133. Cited. 4 CA 676, 677. Cited. 5 CA 599, 600, 604. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id., 503, 504.
Cited. 13 CA 214, 215. Cited. Id., 438, 440. Cited. Id., 578, 579. Cited. 14 CA 88, 90, 91. Cited. Id., 205, 207. Cited. Id.,
272, 278. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited. 15 CA 197, 198. Cited. 17 CA 273, 274. Cited. 19 CA 48, 50, 51, 60. Cited. 23 CA
123, 125. Cited. 28 CA 195, 196. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 33 CA 432, 434. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229, 231. Cited. 39
CA 384, 386. Cited. 44 CA 125. Cited. 46 CA 778.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 214 C. 161, 163.
Cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Cited. 28 CA 469. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229. Cited. Id., 482, 488. Cited. 38 CA 643, 647. Cited.
39 CA 384, 386. Cited. 45 CA 6.
Sec. 53a-126. Larceny by receiving stolen property. Section 53a-126 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 128; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
See Sec. 53a-119 (8) re receipt of stolen property.
Sec. 53a-126a. Criminal trover in the first degree: Class D felony, first offense;
Class C felony, subsequent offense. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trover in the first
degree when he forcibly enters or forcibly removes the ignition of the motor vehicle of
another and uses the motor vehicle without the consent of such owner, and such use
results in damage to or diminishes the value of such motor vehicle or subjects such
owner to economic loss, fine or other penalty.
(b) Criminal trover in the first degree is a class D felony for a first offense and a
class C felony for each subsequent offense.
(P.A. 94-114, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-126b. Criminal trover in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of criminal trover in the second degree when, knowing that he is
not licensed or privileged to do so, he uses the personal property of another without the
consent of such owner, and such use results in damage to or diminishes the value of
such property or subjects such owner to economic loss, fine or other penalty.
(b) Criminal trover in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 94-114, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-127. Diversion from state of benefit of labor of employees: Class A
misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of diversion from the state of benefit of labor of
employees when he fraudulently procures for himself or another, from any employee
of the state or any department thereof, the benefit of any labor which the state or any
department thereof is entitled to receive from such employee during his hours of employment or fraudulently aids or assists in procuring or attempting to procure the benefit of
any such labor.
(b) Diversion from the state of benefit of labor of employees is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 129; P.A. 92-260, S. 53.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 194 C. 223.
Sec. 53a-127a. Unlawful entry into coin machine; possession of key to enter:
Class A misdemeanor. (a) No person shall, with intent to commit larceny: (1) Enter,
or force an entrance into, alter or insert any part of an instrument into any coin machine,
as defined in section 53a-143; or (2) knowingly possess a key or device, or a drawing,
print or mold thereof, adapted and designed to open or break into any such coin machine.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(1971, P.A. 753; P.A. 84-546, S. 126, 173; P.A. 92-260, S. 54.)
History: P.A. 84-546 made technical grammar change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).
Sec. 53a-127b. Fraudulent use of an automated teller machine: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of fraudulent use of an automated teller machine when,
with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or herself
or a third person, such person knowingly uses in a fraudulent manner an automated
teller machine for the purpose of obtaining property. For the purposes of this section,
"automated teller machine" means an unmanned device at which banking transactions
including, without limitation, deposits, withdrawals, advances, payments and transfers
may be conducted, and includes, without limitation, a satellite device and point of sale
terminal as defined in section 36a-2.
(b) In any prosecution under this section, the crime shall be deemed to have been
committed in the town in which the automated teller machine was located.
(c) Fraudulent use of an automated teller machine is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 83-417, S. 2; P.A. 84-301, S. 2; P.A. 03-278, S. 106.)
History: P.A. 84-301 replaced "automatic" with "automated" and added definition of "automated teller machine"; P.A.
03-278 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), effective July 9, 2003.
See Sec. 54-1d(b) re consolidation of offenses.
Sec. 53a-127c. Theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or
economic gain: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of theft of electric, gas, water,
steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain when he: (1) Engages in the business for profit
or economic gain of tampering or making connection with the equipment of a supplier
of an electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications
or community antenna television service which is not metered or otherwise measured,
in whole or in part, without the consent of such supplier, for the purpose of supplying
such service on one or more occasions to two or more households, or (2) engages in the
business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale to any person other than the
supplier of an electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service which is not metered or otherwise
measured, in whole or in part, any decoder, descrambler or other device, the principal
function of which defeats the electronic signal encryption jamming or individually addressed switching imposed by such supplier for the purpose of restricting the delivery
of such service to persons who pay for such service, or (3) without the consent of the
supplier of such service and with intent to defraud such supplier, engages in the business
for profit or economic gain of connecting or disconnecting the meters, pipes, cables,
conduits, conductors or attachments of such supplier or in any other manner tampers or
connects with such meters, pipes, cables, conduits, conductors or attachments. There
shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is engaged in the business for profit or
economic gain of offering for sale a decoder, descrambler or other device, equipment
or component in violation of subdivision (2) of this subsection if such person has five
or more decoders, descramblers or other devices in his possession or under his control.
(b) Theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain is a class
D felony.
(P.A. 84-496; P.A. 89-281, S. 2; P.A. 94-215, S. 1; P.A. 95-246, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 89-281 added theft of cable service and made provisions applicable to one engaging in business for
economic gain in Subsecs. (a) and (b); P.A. 94-215 substituted "electric, gas, water, steam" for "utility" where appearing
and amended Subsec. (a) to add "or other device" in Subdiv. (2), add Subdiv. (3) re connecting, disconnecting or tampering
with the meters, pipes, cables, conduits, conductors or attachments of a supplier without the consent of such supplier and
with intent to defraud such supplier, and add provision making it a rebuttable presumption that a person is engaged in the
business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale a decoder, descrambler or other device if he has five or more
decoders, descramblers or other devices in his possession or under his control; P.A. 95-246 included theft of "telecommunications" and "wireless radio communications" service and added "equipment or component" in provision re a rebuttable
presumption.
See Sec. 52-570f re civil action and relief authorized for theft of service.
Sec. 53a-127d. Cheating: Class D felony or class B misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of cheating when, in the course of playing or conducting any lawful gambling
game, he: (1) Knowingly uses an altered or counterfeit chip, token, tile, pull tab, wagering slip or check or knowingly marks, loads or tampers with any cards or dice or substitutes for cards or dice provided by the operator of a lawfully operated game of chance
any cards or dice that have been marked, loaded or tampered with; or (2) knowingly
uses any device, instrument, article or substance with intent to cheat or defraud or to
alter or affect the otherwise random results of any lawfully operated game of chance;
or (3) intentionally places, increases or attempts to increase a winning wager or decreases
or attempts to decrease a losing wager after that period of time during which the rules
of a lawfully operated game of chance permit a wager to be placed or after the results
of the game in which the wager has been placed become known.
(b) Cheating is a class D felony, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 98-193, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-127e. Possession of a cheating device: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of possession of a cheating device when, while on premises where lawful gambling is to be conducted, such person knowingly possesses or has under such person's
control: (1) Any altered or counterfeit chip, token, tile, pull tab, wagering slip or check
or any cards or dice that have been marked, loaded or tampered with; or (2) any device,
instrument or other thing adapted, designed or commonly used to facilitate the alteration
of the normal play or operation of a piece of gaming equipment or to facilitate the
unauthorized removal of any money or other contents from any gaming equipment; or
(3) any other device, instrument or thing which, under the circumstances in which it is
used or possessed, manifests an intent that it be used by the actor or another person to
alter the normal play or operation of a lawfully operated game of chance or to commit
cheating as provided in section 53a-127d or larceny as provided in section 53a-119.
(b) Possession of a cheating device is a class D felony.
(P.A. 98-193, S. 2; P.A. 01-84, S. 7, 26.)
History: P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and replace in
Subdiv. (2) "adopted" with "adapted", effective July 1, 2001.
Sec. 53a-127f. Possession of a shoplifting device: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A
person is guilty of possession of a shoplifting device when such person has in such
person's possession any device, instrument or other thing specifically designed or
adapted to advance or facilitate the offense of larceny by shoplifting, as defined in
subdivision (9) of section 53a-119, by defeating any antitheft or inventory control device, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use the same in the commission of
larceny by shoplifting.
(b) Possession of a shoplifting device is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 00-9.)
Sec. 53a-128. Issuing a bad check. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of issuing a
bad check when: (1) As a drawer or representative drawer, he issues a check knowing
that he or his principal, as the case may be, does not then have sufficient funds with the
drawee to cover it, and (A) he intends or believes at the time of issuance that payment
will be refused by the drawee upon presentation, and (B) payment is refused by the
drawee upon presentation; or (2) he passes a check knowing that the drawer thereof
does not then have sufficient funds with the drawee to cover it, and (A) he intends or
believes at the time the check is passed that payment will be refused by the drawee upon
presentation, and (B) payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation.
(b) For the purposes of this section, an issuer is presumed to know that the check
or order, other than a postdated check or order, would not be paid, if: (1) The issuer had
no account with the drawee at the time the check or order was issued; or (2) payment
was refused by the drawee for insufficient funds upon presentation within thirty days
after issue and the issuer failed to make good within eight days after receiving notice
of such refusal. For the purposes of this subsection, an issuer is presumed to have received notice of such refusal if the drawee or payee provides proof of mailing such
notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the issuer at his last known address.
(c) Issuing a bad check is: (1) A class D felony if the amount of the check was more
than one thousand dollars; (2) a class A misdemeanor if the amount of the check was
more than five hundred dollars but not more than one thousand dollars; (3) a class B
misdemeanor if the amount of the check was more than two hundred fifty dollars but
not more than five hundred dollars; or (4) a class C misdemeanor if the amount of the
check was two hundred fifty dollars or less.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 130; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 28; P.A. 80-109; P.A. 81-225; P.A. 83-137.)
History: 1971 act removed former Subsec. (a) containing applicable definitions, but see Sec. 53a-118(a); P.A. 80-109
amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re presumption that issuer has received notice of drawee's refusal to pay; P.A. 81-225 included proof of mailing by payee as acceptable in presuming that issuer has received notice; P.A. 83-137 amended
Subsec. (c) to reclassify the offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony or a class A, B or C misdemeanor
depending upon the amount of the check.
Cited. 202 C. 443, 444.
Cited. 20 CA 811.
Cited. 34 CS 584. Ability of court to order personal restitution in amount of bad corporate check when there is no
finding as to the ability of the defendant to pay or as to the extent of his gain. Restitution properly ordered against individual
defendant issuer of bad corporate check. 35 CS 536-538, 540.
Sec. 53a-128a. Credit card crimes. Definitions. As used in this section and sections 53a-128b to 53a-128i, inclusive:
(a) "Cardholder" or "holder of a card" means the person named on the face of a
credit card to whom or for whose benefit the credit card is issued by an issuer;
(b) "Credit card" means any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card,
as a credit plate, or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the
use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value on
credit;
(c) "Expired credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because the
term shown on it has elapsed;
(d) "Issuer" means the person which issues a credit card, or its agent duly authorized
for that purpose;
(e) "Participating party" means any person or any duly authorized agent of such
person, which is obligated by contract to acquire from another person providing money,
goods, services or anything else of value, a sales slip, sales draft or instrument for the
payment of money, evidencing a credit card transaction, and from whom, directly or
indirectly, the issuer is obligated by contract to acquire such sales slip, sales draft, instrument for the payment of money and the like;
(f) "Receives" or "receiving" means acquiring possession, custody or control;
(g) "Revoked credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because
permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issuer.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 29; P.A. 92-260, S. 55.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.
See Sec. 54-1d(b) re consolidation of offenses.
Subsec. (b):
A merchant account identification card and a telephone card are within meaning of "credit card". 246 C. 402.
Sec. 53a-128b. False statement to procure issuance of credit card. Any person
who makes or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, any false statement in
writing, knowing it to be false and with intent that it be relied on, respecting his identity
or that of any other person or his financial condition or that of any other person, for the
purpose of procuring the issuance of a credit card, violates this section and is subject
to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 30.)
Sec. 53a-128c. Credit card theft. Illegal transfer. Fraud. Forgery. (a) Any person who takes a credit card from the person, possession, custody or control of another
without the consent of the cardholder or of the issuer or who, with knowledge that it
has been so taken, receives the credit card with intent to use it or to sell it, or to transfer
it to any person other than the issuer or the cardholder is guilty of credit card theft and
is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i. Taking a credit
card without consent includes obtaining it by conduct defined or known as statutory
larceny, common law larceny by trespassory taking, common law larceny by trick, embezzlement, or obtaining property by false pretense, false promise or extortion.
(b) Any person who receives a credit card that he knows to have been lost, mislaid,
or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the cardholder, and who
retains possession, custody or control thereof with intent to use it or to sell it or to transfer
it to any person other than the issuer or the cardholder, is guilty of credit card theft and
is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(c) Any person other than the issuer who sells a credit card or any person who buys
a credit card from a person other than the issuer violates this subsection and is subject
to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(d) Any person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a
person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person,
obtains control over a credit card as security for debt violates this subsection and is
subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(e) Any person, other than the issuer, who, during any twelve-month period, receives credit cards issued in the names of two or more persons which he has reason to
know were taken or retained under circumstances which constitute credit card theft or
a violation of section 53a-128b or subsection (c) or (d) of this section violates this
subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i.
(f) Any person who, with intent to defraud a purported issuer, a participating party,
or a person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other
person, falsely makes or falsely embosses a purported credit card or utters such a credit
card is guilty of credit card forgery and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection
(b) of section 53a-128i. A person "falsely makes" a credit card when he makes or draws,
in whole or in part, a device or instrument which purports to be the credit card of a
named issuer but which is not such a credit card because the issuer did not authorize
the making or drawing, or when such person so alters a credit card which was validly
issued. A person "falsely embosses" a credit card when, without the authorization of
the named issuer, he completes a credit card by adding any of the matter, other than the
signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the credit card before
it can be used by a cardholder.
(g) Any person other than the cardholder or any person authorized by him who,
with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a person providing money,
goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, signs a credit card, violates
this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section
53a-128i.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 31.)
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 37 CS 527, 528.
Sec. 53a-128d. Illegal use of credit card. Presumption of knowledge of revocation. Any person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a person
providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, (1)
uses for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value a
credit card obtained or retained in violation of section 53a-128b or a credit card which
he knows is forged, expired or revoked, or (2) obtains money, goods, services or anything
else of value by representing without the consent of the cardholder that he is the holder
of a specified card or by representing that he is the holder of a card and such card has
not in fact been issued, or (3) uses a credit card obtained or retained in violation of
section 53a-128c or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked, as
authority or identification to cash or to attempt to cash or otherwise to negotiate or
transfer or to attempt to negotiate or transfer any check or other order for the payment
of money, whether or not negotiable, if such negotiation or transfer or attempt to negotiate or transfer would constitute a violation of section 53a-128 violates this subsection
and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i, if the value
of all money, goods, services and other things of value obtained in violation of this
subsection does not exceed five hundred dollars in any six-month period; and is subject
to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i, if such value does exceed
five hundred dollars in any such six-month period. Knowledge of revocation shall be
presumed to have been received by a cardholder four days after it has been mailed to
him, at the address set forth on the credit card or at his last-known address, by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested, and, if, the address is more than five hundred
miles from the place of mailing, by air mail. If the address is located outside the United
States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone or Canada, notice shall be presumed to have been received ten days after mailing by registered or certified mail.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 32.)
Cited. 204 C. 441, 444.
Review of legislative history of credit card crimes reveals no purpose or intent that enactment of the more specific
crime of illegal credit card use precludes state from charging defendant with the more general crime of larceny. 75 CA 756.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 37 CS 527, 528.
Sec. 53a-128e. Illegal furnishing of money, goods or services on credit card.
(a) Any person who is authorized by an issuer or a participating party to furnish money,
goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder, or any agent or employee of such person, who, with intent to defraud the issuer,
or participating party, the cardholder, or any other person furnishes money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card obtained or retained
in violation of section 53a-128c or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or
revoked, violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection
(a) of section 53a-128i, if the value of all money, goods, services and other things of
value furnished in violation of this subsection does not exceed five hundred dollars in
any six-month period; and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section
53a-128i if such value does exceed five hundred dollars in any such six-month period.
(b) Any person who is authorized by an issuer or a participating party to furnish
money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by
the cardholder, or any agent or employee of such person, who, with intent to defraud
the issuer, a participating party, the cardholder, or any other person fails to furnish
money, goods, services or anything else of value which he represents in writing to the
issuer or participating party that he has furnished violates this subsection and is subject
to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i, if the difference between
the value of all money, goods, services and anything else of value actually furnished
and the value represented to the issuer or participating party to have been furnished does
not exceed five hundred dollars in any six-month period; and is subject to the penalties
set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i if such difference does exceed five hundred
dollars in any such six-month period.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 33.)
Sec. 53a-128f. Unlawful completion or reproduction of credit card. Any person, other than the cardholder, having under his possession, custody or control two or
more incomplete credit cards, or possessing a purported distinctive element of a credit
card, with intent to complete such incomplete credit cards or to utilize such purported
distinctive element in the production or reproduction of any credit card, without the
consent of the issuer, or a person having under his possession, custody or control, with
knowledge of its character, a distinctive element of any credit card or any machinery,
plates or any contrivance designed to produce or reproduce instruments purporting to
be the credit cards of an issuer, or of any issuer in a group of issuers utilizing a common
distinctive element or elements in credit cards issued by all members of such group,
who has not consented to the production or reproduction of such cards, violates this
section and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i. A
credit card is "incomplete" if part of the matter other than the signature of the cardholder,
which an issuer, or any issuer in a group of issuers utilizing a common distinctive element
or elements in credit cards issued by all members of such group, requires to appear on
the credit card, before it can be used by a cardholder, has not yet been stamped, embossed,
imprinted or written on it. A "distinctive element" of a credit card is any material or
component used in the fabrication of credit cards, which, by virtue of such element's
chemical or physical composition, color or design, is unique to the credit cards issued
by a particular issuer or group of issuers utilizing a common distinctive element or
elements in credit cards issued by all members of such group.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 34; P.A. 92-260, S. 56.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.
Sec. 53a-128g. Receipt of money, goods or services obtained by illegal use of
credit card. Any person who receives money, goods, services or anything else of value
obtained in violation of section 53a-128d, knowing or believing the same to have been
so obtained, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection
(a) of section 53a-128i. Any person who obtains at a discount price a ticket issued by
an airline, railroad, steamship or other transportation company which was acquired in
violation of section 53a-128d without reasonable inquiry to ascertain that the person
from whom it was obtained had a legal right to possess it shall be presumed to know
that such ticket was acquired under circumstances constituting a violation of said section.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 35.)
Sec. 53a-128h. Certain defenses denied. In any prosecution for violation of sections 53a-128a to 53a-128i, inclusive, the state is not required to establish and it is no
defense: (1) That a person other than the defendant who violated said sections has not
been convicted, apprehended or identified; or (2) that some of the acts constituting the
violation did not occur in this state or were not a violation or elements of a violation
where they did occur.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 36.)
Sec. 53a-128i. Penalties for credit card crimes. (a) Any person who is subject
to the penalties of this subsection shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) Any person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection shall be guilty of
a class D felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 37.)
Sec. 53a-129. Misapplication of property: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of misapplication of property when, knowingly possessing personal property
of another pursuant to an agreement that the same will be returned to the owner at a
future time, he loans, leases, pledges, pawns or otherwise encumbers such property
without the consent of the owner thereof in such manner as to create a risk that the owner
will not be able to recover it or will suffer pecuniary loss.
(b) In any prosecution under this section, it shall be a defense that, at the time the
prosecution was commenced, (1) the defendant had recovered possession of the property, unencumbered as a result of the unlawful disposition, and (2) the owner had suffered
no material economic loss as a result of the unlawful disposition.
(c) Misapplication of property is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 131.)
Cited. 180 C. 662, 679. Cited. 194 C. 223.
Sec. 53a-129a. Identity theft defined. (a) A person commits identity theft when
such person intentionally obtains personal identifying information of another person
without the authorization of such other person and uses that information to obtain or
attempt to obtain, money, credit, goods, services, property or medical information in
the name of such other person without the consent of such other person.
(b) As used in this section, "personal identifying information" means any name,
number or other information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other
information, to identify a specific individual including, but not limited to, such individual's name, date of birth, mother's maiden name, motor vehicle operator's license number, Social Security number, employee identification number, employer or taxpayer
identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, health
insurance identification number, demand deposit account number, savings account number, credit card number, debit card number or unique biometric data such as fingerprint,
voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation.
(P.A. 99-99; P.A. 03-156, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 03-156 revised section to replace offense of identity theft with definition of identity theft by amending
Subsec. (a) to replace "A person is guilty of identity theft when" with "A person commits identity theft when", delete
requirement that the use of such information be "for any unlawful purpose" and include "money" and "property" among
items the person obtains or attempts to obtain, by designating definition of "personal identifying information" as new
Subsec. (b) and amending said definition to add provision that such information means "any name, number or other
information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual", include
such individual's name, date of birth, employer or taxpayer identification number, alien registration number, government
passport number, health insurance identification number, debit card number or unique biometric data such as fingerprint,
voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation and replace "demand deposit number" with "demand
deposit account number" and by deleting former Subsec. (b) classifying identity theft as a class D felony.
Sec. 53a-129b. Identity theft in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is
guilty of identity theft in the first degree when such person commits identity theft, as
defined in section 53a-129a, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or
property obtained exceeds ten thousand dollars.
(b) Identity theft in the first degree is a class B felony.
(P.A. 03-156, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-129c. Identity theft in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person
is guilty of identity theft in the second degree when such person commits identity theft,
as defined in section 53a-129a, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or
property obtained exceeds five thousand dollars.
(b) Identity theft in the second degree is a class C felony.
(P.A. 03-156, S. 3.)
Sec. 53a-129d. Identity theft in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of identity theft in the third degree when such person commits identity theft,
as defined in section 53a-129a.
(b) Identity theft in the third degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 03-156, S. 4.)
Sec. 53a-129e. Trafficking in personal identifying information: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of trafficking in personal identifying information when such
person sells, gives or otherwise transfers personal identifying information, as defined
in section 53a-129a, of another person to a third person knowing that such information
has been obtained without the authorization of such other person and that such third
person intends to use such information for an unlawful purpose.
(b) Trafficking in personal identifying information is a class D felony.
(P.A. 03-156, S. 5.)
Sec. 53a-130. Criminal impersonation: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of criminal impersonation when he: (1) Impersonates another and does an act in
such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another;
or (2) pretends to be a representative of some person or organization and does an act in
such pretended capacity with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another;
or (3) pretends to be a public servant other than a sworn member of an organized local
police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety,
or wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge or shield by which such
public servant is lawfully distinguished, with intent to induce another to submit to such
pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense.
(b) Criminal impersonation is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 132; P.A. 97-123, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 97-123 amended Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a) to exclude from the offense a person pretending to be "a sworn
member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety"
and include the wearing or display of a "shield".
Cited. 194 C. 213-215. Cited. Id., 233, 234. Cited. 207 C. 109, 110. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. 225 C. 650, 652.
Held not to be unconstitutionally vague. 2 CA 204, 209. Cited. 18 CA 694, 695. Cited. 32 CA 724, 726, 727. Cited. 40
CA 643, 667, 671. Does not require use of an official or real badge because statute's goal is to prohibit criminal impersonation
with intent of inducing another to submit to authority that he or she does not possess. 66 CA 819.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 194 C. 213, 220. Subdiv. (1): Statute as written does not prohibit giving a false name. Id., 213, 221, 222. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 233, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 146, 148. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 431,
433; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 502, 504.
Cited. 2 CA 204, 205, 209. Cited. 32 CA 724, 728. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 339, 340; judgment reversed in part, see
232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq.
Cited. 37 CA 589, 594. Subdiv. (3) cited. 40 CA 643, 645, 665, 669-671. Subdiv. (3) cited. 45 CA 303. Statute prohibits
impersonating another, not merely giving a false name. 60 CA 534.
Sec. 53a-130a. Impersonation of a police officer: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of impersonation of a police officer when he pretends to be a sworn member
of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, or wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge or
shield by which such police officer is lawfully distinguished, with intent to induce another person to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance
upon that pretense.
(b) Impersonation of a police officer is a class D felony.
(P.A. 97-123, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-131. Unlawfully concealing a will: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of unlawfully concealing a will when, with intent to defraud, he conceals,
secrets, suppresses, mutilates or destroys a will, codicil or other testamentary instrument.
(b) Unlawfully concealing a will is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 133.)
Sec. 53a-132. False entry by an officer or agent of a public community: Class
A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of false entry by an officer or agent of a public
community when (1) as an officer or agent of a public community, he makes any intentionally false entry on the books of the public community or (2) he intentionally attests
or certifies by placing his signature upon process that he has personally served the same,
when he has not done so.
(b) False entry by an officer or agent of a public community is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 134; P.A. 84-108, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 57.)
History: P.A. 84-108 inserted new Subsec. (b) providing that person who intentionally attests or certifies by signature
upon process that he has personally served process when he has not done so is guilty of false entry, relettering former
Subsec. (b) as (c); P.A. 92-260 combined former Subsecs. (a) and (b) and rephrased language, relettering former Subsec.
(c) as Subsec. (b), and amended relettered Subsec. (b) to make technical changes in the name of the offense.
Annotations to former section 53-364:
State has been held to be a "public community" and an employee has been held to be an "agent" within the meaning
of the statute. 159 C. 544, 577.
Sec. 53a-133. Robbery defined. A person commits robbery when, in the course
of committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon
another person for the purpose of: (1) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking
of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or (2) compelling
the owner of such property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in
other conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 135.)
See Sec. 53a-119 for definition of "larceny".
Annotation to former section 53-28:
Violation of this statute necessarily involves an attempt to perpetrate a robbery. 146 C. 227.
Annotations to former section 53-67:
Cited. 154 C. 37, 38; 157 C. 466.
Sentence of not less than seven nor more than twelve years for bank robber who was second offender was reasonable.
27 CS 119-121.
Annotations to present section:
Defendant's ability to carry out threat of immediate physical force is not essential element of robbery. 175 C. 569, 573.
Cited. 176 C. 239, 243. Cited. 178 C. 689, 694. Cited. 179 C. 576, 587. Cited. 180 C. 599, 601. Cited. 181 C. 388, 396.
Cited. 182 C. 430, 435; id., 449, 460. Cited (1975 revision). 183 C. 299, 303, 311. Cited. 185 C. 402, 410. Cited. 186 C.
555. 566, 571 (Diss. Op.). Cited. 189 C. 114, 115. Cited. 190 C. 822, 831. Cited. 195 C. 567, 573. Cited. 196 C. 122, 130.
Cited. Id., 395, 400. Cited. 199 C. 207, 223. Cited. 201 C. 289, 294, 295, 297-300. Cited. Id., 489, 493, 494. Cited. 202
C. 349, 353, 357, 361, 364. Cited. 206 C. 621, 622. Cited. Id., 657, 658, 667. Cited. 209 C. 564, 575. Cited. 210 C. 652,
687, 688. Cited. 211 C. 398, 400. Cited. 212 C. 31, 45. Cited. 216 C. 367, 388, 389. Cited. 219 C. 489, 498-500. Cited.
223 C. 243, 250. Cited. Id., 595, 596, 603. Cited. 225 C. 270, 277. Cited. Id., 347, 352. Cited. 230 C. 183, 262. Cited. 232
C. 455, 457. Cited. 233 C. 44, 52. Cited. 235 C. 748, 750. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. 242 C. 523. Cited. Id., 666. Use of
force considered to be in course of robbery or attempted robbery within meaning of statute if it occurs during continuous
sequence of events surrounding the taking or attempted taking, even though some time immediately before or after. 248
C. 472.
Cited. 1 CA 642, 645. Cited. 8 CA 545, 555. Cited. Id., 620, 625, 627. Cited. 9 CA 373, 377. Cited. 10 CA 330, 331.
Cited. Id., 474. Cited. 12 CA 163, 171. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421. Cited. 19 CA 111, 137; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538
et seq. Cited. Id., 554, 555, 559, 560, 563. Cited. Id., 695, 696, 702, 704, 705. Cited. 20 CA 513, 516-518. Cited. 21 CA
299, 308. Cited. 24 CA 27, 28, 34, 35; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 646, 648. Cited. 27 CA
601, 604. Cited. 28 CA 161, 165, 166. Cited. Id., 612, 616. Cited. Id., 721, 732. Cited. 31 CA 47, 48, 54, 56, 57. Cited. 32
CA 193, 194. Cited. 33 CA 184, 186; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Cited. Id., 311, 313. Cited. 34 CA 223,
231. Cited. 35 CA 699, 711, 712. Cited. Id., 839, 841, 844. Cited. 36 CA 401, 409. Cited. 38 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 581,
582, 586. Cited. 39 CA 63, 64. Cited. Id., 478, 479. Cited. Id., 579, 595. Cited. Id., 617, 618. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited.
Id., 255, 257. Cited. Id., 584, 585. Cited. 43 CA 801. Cited. 44 CA 307. Cited. 45 CA 6. Cited. 46 CA 616. Cited. Id., 691.
Cited. Id., 778. Term "purpose" is synonymous with the terms "object" and "intent". 51 CA 541. Completion of crime not
required for conviction under section. Id. Knife with a six-inch blade displayed by defendant during a robbery was capable
of causing death or serious physical injury and constituted a "dangerous instrument" and that defendant by his actions,
demands for the money and manner of carrying the knife, used or threatened to use it during the robbery. 82 CA 823.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 181 C. 388, 394. Cited. 202 C. 349, 356, 358, 362, 364. Cited. 210 C. 652, 688.
Cited. 8 CA 620, 622, 624-626. Cited. 19 CA 111, 112, 135, 136; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id.,
423, 424. Cited. Id., 695, 696, 704, 705. Cited. 20 CA 513, 516, 518. Cited. 24 CA 27, 34, 35; judgment reversed, see 220
C. 652 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 104, 111, 112. Cited. 27 CA 601, 604, 605. Cited. 28 CA 612, 616.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 202 C. 349, 361, 362, 364. Cited. 210 C. 652, 688. Cited. 216 C. 367, 368, 388, 389.
Cited. 8 CA 620, 624, 625. Cited. 19 CA 111, 112, 134-137; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 695,
696, 702-705. Cited. 20 CA 27, 30. Cited. Id., 513, 516, 518, 519. Cited. 24 CA 27, 34, 25; judgment reversed, see 220
C. 652 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106, 111, 112. Cited. 27 CA 601, 605.
Cited. 41 CS 525, 533.
Sec. 53a-134. Robbery in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty
of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the commission of the crime of
robbery as defined in section 53a-133 or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another
participant in the crime: (1) Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime; or (2) is armed with a deadly weapon; or (3) uses or threatens
the use of a dangerous instrument; or (4) displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or
other firearm, except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative
defense that such pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not
a weapon from which a shot could be discharged. Nothing contained in this subdivision
shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, robbery in
the second degree, robbery in the third degree or any other crime.
(b) Robbery in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty
under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 136; P.A. 75-411, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 22, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 58.)
History: P.A. 75-411 removed reference to dangerous instruments in Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) and added Subdivs. (3)
and (4); P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (b) specifying that five years of sentence imposed may not be suspended
or reduced, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to specify that "the crime" is "the crime of robbery
as defined in section 53a-133".
See also annotations to Part V.
Cited. 172 C. 74, 75. Cited. 175 C. 569, 571, 573. Cited. 182 C. 511, 513. Cited. 185 C. 473, 474. Cited. 186 C. 179,
180; id., 555, 571 (Diss. Op.). Cited. 190 C. 822, 831. Cited. 196 C. 305, 306. Cited. Id., 309, 311. Cited. Id., 430, 431.
Cited. 199 C. 47, 50. Cited. Id., 207, 223. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 377, 378. Cited. Id., 591, 593. Cited. 200 C. 310,
311, 314. Cited. Id., 465, 466. Cited. 201 C. 34, 38. Cited. 202 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 86, 91. Cited. 203 C. 494, 495. Cited.
204 C. 52. Cited. Id., 240, 241, 258. Cited. 212 C. 31, 45. Cited. 214 C. 454, 457. Cited. 218 C. 479, 481. Cited. 230 C.
109, 112. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 648.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 547. Cited. 9 CA 373, 377. Cited. 10 CA 659, 665. Cited. 11 CA 699, 700. Cited. Id., 709, 710. Cited.
12 CA 268, 269. Cited. Id., 655, 656. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 708. Cited. 14 CA 472, 474. Cited. 15 CA 34, 35.
Cited. 15 CA 197, 198. Cited. 19 CA 423, 426. Cited. 20 CA 521, 522. Cited. 22 CA 216, 219, 227. Cited. 28 CA 581,
589; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 32 CA 38, 40. Cited. 35 CA 201. Cited. Id., 839, 843. Cited. 36 CA
59, 60. Cited. Id., 448, 453; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. Id.,
868, 869. Cited. 39 CA 45. Cited. 40 CA 250, 260. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 801. Cited. 45 CA
32. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 691. Court cannot properly instruct jury of elements of section without first instructing
jury of elements of Sec. 53a-133. 51 CA 541. Sufficiency of evidence to convict defendant as a principal in robbery. Id.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2): "Miranda" warning not a ritualistic formula and words which convey its substance are sufficient. 167 C.
309. Cited. 169 C. 242, 243. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 683-685. Subdiv. (2) cited. 170 C. 332, 333. Subdiv. (2): Participation
of two persons not necessary, so Wharton's rule is inapplicable. 171 C. 105. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 395, 397. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (2) cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Subdiv.(2) cited. Id., 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. 174 C. 16, 18. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 129, 130. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 142-144. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 452, 459. Subdiv. (2) cited. 175 C. 250, 251.
Subdiv. (2): Requirement of weapon's operability is imposed by section 53a-3(6). Id., 569, 572. Subdiv. (4): Essential
element of subsection is defendant's representation of having a firearm, not the firearm's operability. Affirmative defense
of inoperability does not violate due process. 175 C. 569-576. Subdiv. (4) cited. 176 C. 239, 240, 242; id., 367, 368. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 177 C. 335, 336; id., 370, 371; id., 379, 380; id., 637, 639. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 116, 118. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 287, 288, 293. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 427, 429. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 564, 565; id., 634; id., 689, 690, 694; 179 C. 46,
47; id., 576-578, 586; 180 C. 557, 560. Subdiv. (1): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599, 601. Subdiv. (2)
cited. 181 C. 237, 238; id., 388, 390, 397, 399. Subdiv. (4) cited. 181 C. 237-239, 243. Cited. 181 C. 426, 428. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 182 C. 262, 263, 269, 270; id., 366, 367, 382. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 430-432, 435. Cited. Id., 430, 436. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 449, 451, 460, 467. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 533, 534, 543. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 595, 596, 598, 599, 602; 183
C. 280, 281; 185 C. 163, 164. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.; id., 260, 261, 267; id., 402, 404. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 473, 476. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 607. Subdiv. (1) cited. 186 C. 1, 2, 7. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 222, 224. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 261, 262; id.,
426, 427; id., 555, 566. Subdiv. (3) cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 406,
407, 414. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 432, 470; id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (3) cited. 189 C. 114, 115; id., 183, 184. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 268, 269, 271, 274; id., 337-339; id., 429, 430. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C. 822, 823, 831, 832. Subdiv. (4) cited. 191 C.
564, 565; id., 670, 671; 192 C. 618, 619, 625, 630. Subdiv. (3) cited. 193 C. 48, 51. Subdiv. (4) cited. 193 C. 238, 239.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 457, 459. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 526-528. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 602, 603. Subdiv. (3) cited. 194 C.
89, 90. Subdiv. (4) cited. 195 C. 183, 185. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 326, 327. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 444, 445, 449. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 552, 553. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 567, 568, 573, 575. Subdiv. (2) cited. 196 C. 36-38. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
115, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. 122, 123. Subdiv. (2) cited. 157, 158. Subdiv. (4): Essential element is the representation by
a defendant that he has a firearm, not the specific identifying characteristic of the weapon alleged in the information. Id.,
395, 396, 398-401. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 567, 568. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 685, 686, 688. Subdiv. (2) cited. 197 C. 106,
107. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 115, 117. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 413, 415. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 629, 630. Subdiv. (4) cited. 198
C. 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 203. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 314, 315. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 328, 329.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 490, 491. Subdiv. (3) cited. 198 C. 592, 593. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 680, 681. Subdiv. (4) cited. 199
C. 5, 6. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 47, 48. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 62, 63. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 146, 147. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.,
207, 208. Cited. Id., 207, 223. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 255, 257. Cited. Id., 473, 481. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 473, 474, 480.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 44, 45. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 310, 311, 314. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
310, 316. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 350, 351, 357, 359. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (3) cited. 201 C. 289, 290,
295, 299. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 333, 334. Subdiv. (4) cited. 202 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 259, 260. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 349, 350, 353, 354. Cited. 203 C. 81, 82. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 159, 160. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.,
445, 446. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 506, 508, 514, 517, 518. Subdiv. (2) cited. 204 C. 240, 241, 257. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.,
330, 331. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 377, 383. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 673, 674. Subdiv. (4) cited. 206 C. 40, 43. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 621, 622. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 657, 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. 207 C. 152, 154. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 323, 324.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 38-41. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 202, 203. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 365,
366. Subdiv. (3) cited. 209 C. 416-418. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 458, 459. Subdiv. (3) cited. 210 C. 199, 200. Subdiv. (3)
cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 398, 399. Subdiv. (4) cited. 212 C. 6, 8. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 31, 33, 45. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 387, 389, 390. Subdiv. (3) cited. 213 C. 422, 424, 432. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (4): Judgment
of appellate court in State v. Horne, 19 CA 111, reversed. 215 C. 538, 540, 542. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 698. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 216 C. 282, 284. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 801; 217 C. 419, 420. Subdiv. (1) cited.
218 C. 85, 87. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 151, 152. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 432-435. Subdiv. (4) cited. 219 C. 93, 95. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 269, 271. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.; Id., 489, 490, 496, 500, 510. Subdiv. (2) cited. 220 C. 385, 388; Id., 652,
653. Subdiv. (4) cited. 221 C. 447-449. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 643, 645. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Subdiv. (4)
cited. 223 C. 243, 245. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 243, 250. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 243, 258, 261. Subdiv. (2) cited. 299, 301.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 595, 596, 609. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 635, 637, 638. Subdiv. (4) cited. 224 C. 711, 713. Subdiv. (2)
cited. 225 C. 270, 271, 277. Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 601, 609. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 601, 609. Subdiv. (4) cited. 227 C.
363, 365. Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 384-386. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 686, 687. Subdiv. (4) cited. 232 C. 455, 457. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 691, 693. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 707, 709.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 44, 52. Subdiv. (4) cited. 235 C. 67, 68, 72, 77, 79. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 402, 403. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 748, 750. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 802, 804. Subdiv. (3) cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 342, 349.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 238 C. 784. Subdiv. (2) cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (3) cited. 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (2) cited. 241 C. 1.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 165. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 242 C. 93. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 125. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 296. Subdiv. (2) cited. 247 C. 662.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 1 CA 584, 585. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 642, 643, 644, 646. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 697, 698. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 2 CA 127, 128. Subdiv. (2) cited. 6 CA 247, 248, 250, 251. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 697, 698.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Subdiv. (3). cited. Id., 27, 28. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 95, 96. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 149, 150.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 217, 218. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445, 446, 452. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 445, 446, 452, 455. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 503, 504. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 528. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 715, 716. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 726, 727, 730, 733.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 8 CA 119, 120, 123. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 399, 400. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 454-456. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 467. Cited. Id., 491, 493. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 545, 546, 553, 555. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 545, 553. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 566, 567. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 667, 672, 672A, 672B, 672C, 672D. Subdiv. (2) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 275. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 313, 314. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 373, 374. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 587, 588. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 648, 649. Subdiv. (3) cited. 10 CA 50, 51. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 103, 104. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 330, 331, 336, 344. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 404, 405. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 474. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 624, 625.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 643, 650. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 659, 660, 666, 667. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 659-661, 664, 666. Cited.
Id., 659, 664. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 397-403. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
699-701. Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 163, 164. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 217. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 662, 663. Subdiv. (2) cited.
13 CA 76, 83, 86. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 554-556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 14 CA 67, 68. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 108, 109. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 463, 464. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 472, 474, 476. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 493, 494, 497. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
657, 658. Subdiv. (4) cited. 15 CA 161, 163. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 416, 417. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 502. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 539, 540. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 586. Subdiv. (2) cited. 16 CA 38, 39. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206,
207. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 284, 285; Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 390, 391. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 403. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17
CA 50, 51. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 359. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 490, 491. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 648, 650. Subdiv. (4) cited.
19 CA 111, 113, 116, 140; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 53 et seq. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 179, 180, 186. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 423, 424. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 554, 555, 558, 562-564. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 20 CA 27-
29. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 27, 29. Cited. Id., 212. Cited. Id., 467, 469. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 513, 514. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 643-645. Cited. Id., 643, 646. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 665, 666. Subdiv. (3) cited. 21 CA 48, 49. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.,
244, 245. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 299-301, 305-307, 309, 311, 313. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 299, 307. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 22 CA 98, 99; Id., 216 227. Cited. Id., 329, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 27, 28; judgment reversed, see
220 C. 652 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 152, 153. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 316-318, 320, 321, 324, 325. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 316-318, 320, 321, 325. Cited. Id., 316, 326. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 518, 519; Id., 729-731. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA
104, 106. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 255; Id., 565, 567; Id., 646-648; 26 CA 114, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242, 244. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 27 CA 601, 602. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 654, 655, 665. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 64, 66. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 161, 162, 165, 168, 169. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 402, 404, 405. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 444, 445. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 474, 475. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 581, 588; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.,
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 612-615, 617. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 645, 646. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 721, 722. Subdiv. (4) cited. 29 CA 207, 211. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 274, 276. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 421, 422.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 679-681. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 614, 615, 617, 618. Cited. Id.,
614, 617. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 660, 661. Subdiv. (4) cited. 32 CA 21, 23. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 193, 194. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 476, 477. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 143, 144, 147. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 184, 185. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 288,
289. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 311, 313. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 457, 458. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 468, 470, 476, 477, 481-483.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 468, 482. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 849, 850. Subdiv. (2) cited. 34 CA 223, 224, 226. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 261, 262. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (3) cited. 35 CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 740 742, 743. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 781, 782. Subdiv. (3): Robbery in the second degree pursuant to Sec.
53a-135(a)(1) is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree pursuant to this section. Id., 839, 841, 843-
846, 849. Subdiv. (4) cited. 36 CA 401, 405. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 556-558, 570. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 718, 720. Cited.
Id., 831, 832. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 37 CA 35, 36. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 219. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 482-
484, 486, 489, 491. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 482, 490. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 589, 594. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619, 621. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 672, 674, 689, 690. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 733, 735, 739. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 581,
582. Subdiv. (3) cited. 39 CA 45, 46, 53. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 45, 54. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 63, 64, 79, 81. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 82, 84, 86, 92, 93. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 82, 86, 92, 93. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 384, 386, 400-402. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 384, 400. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 478, 479. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 502, 503, 513, 514. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 579,
580, 595. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 617, 618. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 840, 841. Subdiv. (4) cited. 40 CA 21, 22. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 250, 252. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 328, 329. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 526, 527. Subdiv. (4) cited. 41 CA 47-49. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 391, 392. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 517. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 42 CA 472.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 669. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 810. Subdiv. (4) cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. Id., 801. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 44 CA 26. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 280. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 561. Subdiv. (3) cited. 45 CA 6. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 270. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 390. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 684. A showing that victim had
custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient to support a charge of larceny. 49 CA 486. Testimony of sole
witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Id. Subdiv. (3) requires that evidence show either actual use
of a dangerous instrument or its threatened use, demonstrated by either an actual display or words combined with an overt
display of the threatened instrument. 71 CA 585. Court's failure to instruct jury on the affirmative defense of inoperability
of gun involved in the incident at issue, as provided for in text of the statute relative to charge of robbery in the first
degree, constituted plain error and violated defendant's constitutional right to fair trial. Id., 865. Subdiv. (3) requires use
or threatened use of a dangerous instrument. 81 CA 367. Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under Subdiv.
(4). 83 CA 489.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 595, 599. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-135. Robbery in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is
guilty of robbery in the second degree when he commits robbery as defined in section
53a-133 and (1) he is aided by another person actually present; or (2) in the course of
the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom he or another participant
in the crime displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct
to be a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
(b) Robbery in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 137; P.A. 75-411, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 59.)
History: P.A. 75-411 clarified Subsec. (a)(2), including references to display of weapon and to actions in course of
commission of crime or in course of immediate flight from commission of crime; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add
"as defined in section 53a-133".
Cited. 171 C. 47, 48. Cited. Id., 105, 118. Cited. 174 C. 142, 143. Cited. 176 C. 270. Cited. 178 C. 287, 293. Cited. 179
c. 576, 587. Cited. 182 C. 207, 208. Cited. 183 C. 156, 157, 162. Cited. 185 C. 260, 264. Cited. 191 C. 506, 507. Cited.
197 C. 309. Cited. 198 C. 158, 165, 166. Cited. 201 C. 125, 132, 133. Cited. Id., 489, 490, 494, 501. Cited. 202 C. 224,
226. Cited. 203 C. 506, 518. Cited. 204 C. 630, 631. Cited. 210 C. 435, 436, 438. Cited. 224 C. 445, 447, 451, 452. Cited.
235 C. 469, 470.
Cited. 2 CA 11, 12. Cited. 12 CA 375, 376. Cited. 13 CA 420, 431. Cited. 14 CA 159, 160. Cited. Id., 205-207. Cited.
36 CA 401, 403, 409. Cited. 37 CA 35, 38. Cited. 39 CA 384, 401. Cited. 43 CA 801.
Subsec. (a):
(2): Cited. 169 C. 161. (2): Cited. 173 C. 545. (2): Cited. 174 C. 142, 143, 145. (1): Cited. Id., 142, 143, 145, 146. (2):
Cited. 176 C. 227, 228; id., 367, 368. (1): Cited. 179 C. 98. (2): Cited. Id., 381, 382. (1): Cited. 182 C. 476, 477. (2): Cited.
Id., 533, 543, 544; 183 C. 156, 162; 184 C. 366; 187 C. 602, 603. Cited. 190 C. 327, 329. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 241,
242. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 297, 298. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 677, 678. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 158, 160, 163-166.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 158, 164. Cited. Id., 158, 165. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 557, 558. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 350, 351,
358, 359. Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 125, 126, 129-132. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 489, 494. Subdiv. (2) cited. 203 C. 506, 518.
Cited. 209 C. 143-145. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 178, 179. Subdiv. (1) cited. 230 C. 608,
610. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 686, 688. Subdiv. (2) cited. 235 C. 67, 72, 77-79. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 145, 147. Cited. Id.,
502, 517.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 6 CA 247, 248, 250, 251. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 656, 657. Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 330, 336. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 239, 240. Subdiv. (1) cited. 16 CA 264, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 455, 456. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 17 CA 247, 248. Subdiv. (1) cited. 25 CA 428-430; 26 CA 779, 780. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 47, 48, 54, 56-
58. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 143, 144, 147. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 184, 188, 195. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 468, 470, 477, 480-
483. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 468, 482. Subdiv. (1): Robbery in second degree pursuant to this section is not a lesser included
offense of robbery in the first degree pursuant to Sec. 53a-134(a)(3). 35 CA 839, 841, 843-846, 848, 849. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 36 CA 774, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 35, 36, 38. Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CA 384, 401, 402. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41
CA 817, 818. Subdiv. (2) cited. 43 CA 801. Court's failure to instruct jury on the lesser included offense of robbery in the
second degree in violation of the statute where there was uncontroverted evidence from two state's witnesses that the gun
was inoperable constituted plain error and violated defendant's constitutional right to fair trial. 71 CA 865.
Sec. 53a-136. Robbery in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of robbery in the third degree when he commits robbery as defined in section 53a-133.
(b) Robbery in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 138; P.A. 92-260, S. 60.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add "as defined in section 53a-133".
Cited. 169 C. 247, 249. Cited. 171 C. 105, 118. Cited. 181 C. 388, 396-399. Cited. 185 C. 260, 264. Cited. 188 C. 591,
592. Cited. 190 C. 428, 429. Cited. 192 C. 618, 629. Cited. 197 C. 314. Cited. 198 C. 285, 287. Cited. 199 C. 557, 558.
Cited. 202 C. 224. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. 210 C. 435, 439. Cited. 218 C. 432, 434, 435. Cited.
219 C. 160, 161. Cited. 239 C. 235. Rational basis exists for legislature to classify larceny from the person as a more serious
offense than simple robbery and therefore the classification did not violate defendant's right to equal protection of the
laws. 246 C. 132.
Cited. 5 CA 500, 501. Cited. 7 CA 27, 28, 31. Cited. 8 CA 454, 455. Cited. Id., 620, 621. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421, 431.
Cited. Id., 596, 597, 601, 603. Cited. 14 CA 205, 207. Cited. 16 CA 318, 319. Cited. Id., 433, 435. Cited. 17 CA 226, 231.
Cited. 19 CA 423, 426. Cited. 20 CA 513, 514. Cited. Id., 643, 650. Cited. 21 CA 248, 249. Cited. Id., 291, 292. Cited. 22
CA 216, 217. Cited. 24 CA 316, 323. Cited. Id., 518, 524. Cited. 26 CA 114, 116. Cited. 27 CA 780, 781. Cited. 35 CA
839, 842, 848. Cited. 39 CA 579, 580, 600. Cited. Id., 810, 811. Cited. 40 CA 250, 260. Cited. 44 CA 307. Cited. 46 CA
616. Cited. Id., 778.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 185 C. 402, 404. Cited. 192 C. 618, 626. Cited. 201 C. 125, 133. Cited. Id., 559, 560. Cited. 211 C. 101, 103.
Cited. 220 C. 487, 489. Cited. 242 C. 523.
Cited. 8 CA 35, 36. Cited. 10 CA 330, 336. Cited. 13 CA 596, 601. Cited. 14 CA 493, 503. Cited. 35 CA 201. Cited.
38 CA 531, 532. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257. Cited. Id., 584, 585. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Cited. 33 CS 599. Cited. 37 CS 520, 521.
Sec. 53a-136a. Robbery involving occupied motor vehicle. Penalty. Any person
who commits robbery by taking a motor vehicle from the person of another knowing
that such motor vehicle is occupied by such other person shall be imprisoned for a term
of three years which shall not be suspended and shall be in addition and consecutive to
any term of imprisonment imposed for such offense.
(P.A. 93-204.)
Cited. 46 CA 691.
PART X*
FORGERY AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-346:
Writing must be introduced before any other evidence can be admitted. 1 R. 534. But it may be shown that accused
destroyed it or acknowledged the forgery. 2 R. 93. An order for groceries subject of forgery. 5 D. 254. Meaning of "utter";
venue where forged check is uttered in one county but drawn on a bank in another. 96 C. 432. Cited. 114 C. 178; 158 C. 266.
Cited. 22 CS 173; 25 CS 354; 27 CS 283. In civil action court construed term "falsely" to imply that paper is false, not
genuine, regardless of the truth or falsehood of statement it contains. 24 CS 498. An agent may commit forgery by making
or signing an instrument in disobedience of his instructions or by exceeding his authority. Id. Cited. 28 CS 15.
Annotations to former section 53-348:
Proof of passing counterfeit money inadmissible until money is produced. 1 R. 152; but see 2 R. 88. Prosecution for
counterfeiting when barred by statute of limitations. 1 R. 171. Possession at one time of several forged notes with intent
to pass them a single offense. 7 C. 414. Possession of unsigned bank note inadmissible to show knowledge in prosecution
for passing counterfeit coin. 9 C. 344. What evidence held admissible to show guilty knowledge. 19 C. 237. Legislative
history of section. 149 C. 37. Clear legislative intent to make counterfeiting of federal money or uttering of counterfeit
federal money a crime against the state and punishable in state courts. Id., 39. U. S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8, does not keep
matter solely within federal jurisdiction; both federal and state governments may deal with the matter, the former to protect
its currency, the latter to protect its citizens against fraud. Id., 41.
Annotations to present part X of chapter 952:
Secs. 53a-137 through 53a-145 cited. 11 CA 161, 162. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-137. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Written instrument" means any instrument or article containing written or
printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying,
conveying or recording information or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right,
privilege or identification, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person.
(2) "Complete written instrument" means one which purports to be a genuine written instrument fully drawn with respect to every essential feature thereof. An endorsement, attestation, acknowledgment or other similar signature or statement is deemed
both a complete written instrument in itself and a part of the main instrument in which
it is contained or to which it attaches.
(3) "Incomplete written instrument" means one which contains some matter by way
of content or authentication but which requires additional matter in order to render it a
complete written instrument.
(4) A person "falsely makes" a written instrument when he makes or draws a complete written instrument in its entirety, or an incomplete written instrument, which purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker or drawer, but which is not such
either because the ostensible maker or drawer is fictitious or because, if real, he did not
authorize the making or drawing thereof.
(5) A person "falsely completes" a written instrument when, by adding, inserting
or changing matter, he transforms an incomplete written instrument into a complete
one, without the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, so that such complete instrument
appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by
its ostensible maker or drawer.
(6) A person "falsely alters" a written instrument when, without the authority of
anyone entitled to grant it, he changes a written instrument, whether it be in complete
or incomplete form, by means of erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new matter,
transposition of matter, or in any other manner, so that such instrument in its thus altered
form appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized
by its ostensible maker or drawer.
(7) "Forged instrument" means a written instrument which has been falsely made,
completed or altered.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 139.)
Cited. 235 C. 502, 504.
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 165. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610.
Subsec. (1):
Cited. 37 CA 72, 79.
Subsec. (2):
Cited. 207 C. 555, 561, 563.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 611.
Subsec. (3):
Cited. 207 C. 555, 561.
Subsec. (4):
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166, 167.
Subsec. (5):
Cited. 207 C. 555, 561. Cited. 235 C. 502, 512.
Subsec. (7):
Cited. 34 CS 606, 611.
Sec. 53a-138. Forgery in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty
of forgery in the first degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he
falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses any written
instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which is calculated
to become or represent if completed: (1) Part of an issue of money, stamps, securities
or other valuable instruments issued by a government or governmental instrumentality;
or (2) part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments representing interests in or
claims against a corporate or other organization or its property.
(b) Forgery in the first degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 140; P.A. 76-292, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 76-292 made first degree forgery a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony.
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Cited. 37 CA 72, 80.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-139. Forgery in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of forgery in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure
another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses
any written instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which
is calculated to become or represent if completed: (1) A deed, will, codicil, contract,
assignment, commercial instrument or other instrument which does or may evidence,
create, transfer, terminate or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation or status;
or (2) a public record or an instrument filed or required or authorized by law to be filed
in or with a public office or public servant; or (3) a written instrument officially issued
or created by a public office, public servant or governmental instrumentality; or (4) a
prescription of a duly licensed physician or other person authorized to issue the same
for any drug or any instrument or device used in the taking or administering of drugs
for which a prescription is required by law.
(b) "Drugs" as used in this section includes all drugs except controlled drugs as
defined in section 21a-240.
(c) Forgery in the second degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 141; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 38; P.A. 76-292, S. 2.)
History: 1971 act removed exception re narcotic drugs in Subsec. (b); P.A. 76-292 made second degree forgery a Class
D felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor.
Cited. 201 C. 125, 126. Cited. 207 C. 555, 560. Defendant may be found guilty of forgery in the second degree if the
state establishes that defendant, with intent to deceive another, falsely made, possessed or altered a written instrument that
he or she knew to be forged. 252 C. 229.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Cited. 28 CA 521, 523, 530, 532. Cited. 37 CA 72, 80. Cited. 42
CA 790. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1). Cited. 169 C. 581. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 421, 423. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 158, 160. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 146, 148. Cited. 201 C. 125, 149, 151, 153. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 125, 149, 150.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 207 C. 555, 556, 559. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 469, 470.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 5 CA 473, 474. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 493, 494. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id. Cited. 28 CA 521, 523. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 72, 78. Subdiv. (1) cited. 42 CA 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-140. Forgery in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of forgery in the third degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure
another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument, or issues or possesses
any written instrument which he knows to be forged.
(b) Forgery in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 142; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 39.)
History: 1971 act referred to issuance of instrument which person knows to be forged rather than to alteration of such
an instrument.
Cited. 194 C. 233, 234. Cited. 204 C. 441, 444. Cited. 207 C. 109, 110. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433, 437; judgment superseded
by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 235 C. 469, 470.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Cited. 33 CA 339, 349; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431
et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 37 CA
72, 73, 78-80. Cited. Id., 437, 442. Cited. 42 CA 790. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. cited. 47 CA 1.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 194 C. 233, 238. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et
seq. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504, 509, 512.
Cited. 33 CA 339, 340, 349; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency
of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 437, 442. Cited. 42 CA 790.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610. Cited. Id., 656, 660.