Sec. 53a-56b. Manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class
C felony. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor
vehicle when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or any drug or both, he causes the death of another person as a consequence of the effect
of such liquor or drug.
(b) Manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class C felony and
the court shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating
privilege of any person found guilty under this section for one year.
(P.A. 82-403, S. 1; P.A. 83-534, S. 8; P.A. 85-147, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 83-534 amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or
nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty for one year; P.A. 85-147 deleted "while intoxicated" from the
title of the offense and a provision that defined "intoxication" to include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both, and
replaced elements of offense of "when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes the
death of another person" with "when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any
drug or both, he causes the death of another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 193 C. 632, 640. Cited. 213 C. 74, 76, 80. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 219 C. 752, 757. Cited. 229 C. 228,
230. There is no language in section to indicate expressly that legislature intended that a person convicted of second degree
manslaughter with a motor vehicle could not also be convicted of first degree manslaughter. 263 C. 390.
Cited. 5 CA 378, 379. Cited. 9 CA 686, 730. Cited. 11 CA 122, 123, 125-128, 130, 132. Cited. Id., 473, 481. Cited.
12 CA 129, 130. Cited. Id., 294, 295, 297, 298, 300-303. Cited. 16 CA 358, 360-363, 365, 366. Cited. 18 CA 223-225.
Cited. 21 CA 138, 139, 144, 145. Cited. 22 CA 108, 109. Cited. 23 CA 215, 216. Cited. Id., 720, 722. Cited. 29 CA 825,
831, 834. Cited. 34 CA 557, 564. Cited. Id., 655, 664. Cited. 36 CA 710, 713. Cited. 40 CA 359, 360.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 11 CA 122-124, 126. Sec. 53a-57 not a lesser included offense. Id., 473, 474, 481. Cited. 20 CA 495, 496. Cited.
21 CA 138, 139, 141, 143, 144. Cited. 29 CA 825, 831, 834.
Sec. 53a-57. Misconduct with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle when, with criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, he causes the death of another person.
(b) Misconduct with a motor vehicle is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 58; P.A. 76-16; P.A. 82-403, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 76-16 defined "intoxication" for purposes of section; P.A. 82-403 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting the
provision that a person is guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle when he causes the death of another person "in
consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle" and by deleting the definition of "intoxication".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 174 C. 112, 113, 116. Cited. Id., 118. Cited. 176 C. 445, 446; id., 451, 454, 455, 459. Cited. 188 C. 620, 621.
Cited. 202 C. 629, 638-640. Cited. 207 C. 336, 337. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 222 C. 444, 449. Cited. 229 C. 228, 230.
Cited. 3 CA 137, 138. Violation of Sec. 14-222a, negligent homicide with a motor vehicle, is a lesser included offense
of misconduct with a motor vehicle. 9 CA 686-689, 695, 710, 721, 723. Not a lesser included offense of Sec. 53a-56b(a).
11 CA 473, 474, 481, 482. Cited. 15 CA 392, 393. Cited. 16 CA 497, 507. Cited. 21 CA 138, 144. Cited. 22 CA 108, 111.
Cited. 23 CA 720. Cited. 28 CA 283, 284, 289. Cited. 29 CA 825, 826, 831, 833-835, 837, 839. Cited. 30 CA 428, 429.
Cited. 34 CA 655, 665. Conviction upheld where defendant became aware that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was
impaired, yet continued to operate the motor vehicle. 64 CA 631.
Cited. 35 CS 519, 521. Cited. 36 CS 527, 529.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 176 C. 451, 452, 454.
Cited. 3 CA 137, 138. Cited. 11 CA 473, 474. Cited. 20 CA 495, 497. Cited. 23 CA 720, 723. Cited. 29 CA 825, 826,
832. This subsec. and Sec. 14-223(b) contain multiple elements that are dissimilar, and the clear language of the statutes
themselves is sufficient for conclusion that they do not impose two punishments for the same act. 84 CA 351.
Sec. 53a-58. Criminally negligent homicide: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes
the death of another person, except where the defendant caused such death by a motor
vehicle.
(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 59.)
Cited. 174 C. 89, 95. Criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind
required is different. 180 C. 382, 403, 408. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 185 C. 63, 76, 78. Cited. 187 C. 6, 29. Cited.
195 C. 232, 242. Cited. 202 C. 520, 521, 525. Cited. Id., 629, 640, 641. Cited. 204 C. 410, 411, 426. Cited. Id., 429, 433.
Cited. 212 C. 593, 607, 608. Cited. 213 C. 579, 590, 592. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 223 C. 273, 275. Cited. 226 C.
237, 250. Cited. 227 C. 456, 476. Cited. 228 C. 118, 127. Trial court improperly refused to instruct jury on this lesser
included offense. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Ray, 30 CA 95, reversed. Id., 147, 149, 155. Cited. Id., 281, 303.
Cited. 238 C. 253.
Cited. 17 CA 502, 519; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited. 26 CA 448, 454. Cited.
28 CA 388, 389. Cited. Id., 771, 773. Cited. 30 CA 95, 99, 101, 103; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Cited. Id.,
232, 243. Cited. 32 CA 687, 695. Cited. 35 CA 438, 444.
Cited. 40 CS 498, 501.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 201 C. 174, 187-189. Cited. 202 C. 629, 639. Cited. 213 C. 579, 590. Cited. 214 C. 57, 61, 68. Cited. 223 C.
273, 275. Cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Cited. 231 C. 115, 137.
Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited. 34 CA 368, 382; see also 233 C. 517 et seq.
Sec. 53a-58a. Negligent homicide with a motor vehicle. Section 53a-58a is repealed.
(P.A. 73-639, S. 5; P.A. 81-26, S. 2.)
See Sec. 14-222a re negligent homicide with a motor vehicle.
PART V*
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-11:
Court had authority to impose consecutive life sentences for two second degree murders. 152 C. 600-602. Cited. 154
C. 622, 624.
Cited. 25 CS 473.
Annotations to former section 53-12:
Person charged with assault with intent to murder may be convicted of assault with intent to kill. 8 C. 498; 9 C. 260;
19 C. 392; 90 C. 383. A man who is assailed under such circumstances as to authorize a reasonable belief that the assault
is with design to take his life is justified in killing his assailant. 32 C. 83; 105 C. 349; 106 C. 455. Evidence of threats by
third party against party assaulted, inadmissible. 53 C. 536; but see 63 C. 47. Assault with intent to murder may be prosecuted
by information of state's attorney. 60 C. 92. What constitutes; ill-will towards victim; malice and intent. 84 C. 470; 106
C. 351. Specific intent necessary; insanity as a defense. 84 C. 81. Malice aforethought required, but intent need not be
premeditated. 106 C. 351. Definition of malice aforethought. Id. Reputation of deceased for violence, where accused claims
self-defense, is admissible only when such reputation was known to accused; and only when hostile demonstrations of
deceased would not have warranted extreme defensive measures except when considered in light of such knowledge. Id.,
456. Reputation may never be shown by proof of specific acts of violence; id., 457; nor to establish probability that deceased
was the aggressor. Id., 459. Cited. 140 C. 398; 149 C. 656; 154 C. 41, 42; id., 302, 303, 156 C. 341. Evidence of other
subsequent criminal acts committed by defendants against person whom they are charged with assaulting may be received
in evidence as admission by conduct. 159 C. 169. Cited. 167 C. 539. Cited. 178 C. 534, 536.
Annotations to former section 53-14:
Facts of assault held to justify inference of intention to maim and disfigure. 95 C. 145. General verdict of guilty where
information is under this statute and also charges aggravated assault under Sec. 53-16. Id. Failure to charge that verdict of
simple or aggravated assault was possible held no error when verdict of robbery by violence returned: lesser crime necessarily included in verdict as returned. 105 C. 765. There is a distinction between force used by a robber in removing property
from the person and the violence which aggravates a simple robbery and makes it robbery with violence. The latter force
may be exercised at any time, so long as it forms a part of the transaction in which the robbery is committed. 143 C. 368.
Cited. 140 C. 613; 149 C. 694; 152 C. 628; 153 C. 584; 155 C. 593. Plaintiff's plea of guilty entered knowingly, voluntarily
and on advice of counsel was waiver of defective bench warrant on which he was arrested as it was consent to jurisdiction
of the court. 157 C. 143. Jury could reasonably find violent intent required by this section where defendant committed
robbery with gun. History of section reviewed. 157 C. 464. Pretrial lineup identification of defendant by storeowner he
had robbed two hours before was proper evidence. 159 C. 143. Cited. 160 C. 37. Cited. 160 C. 85. Cited. Id., 519. Cited.
165 C. 104. Cited. 169 C. 38.
Cited. 22 CS 493; 23 CS 82; 24 CS 120; 305; 386; 26 CS 53; 77. Brutality of defendant in repeatedly clubbing his
victim with a tire iron justified sentence of court below as the least protection to which society is entitled. 27 CS 340.
Where seventeen-year-old defendant had robbed a grocery store and violently attacked its seventy-three-year-old proprietor, sentence of indefinite term at Connecticut Reformatory was affirmed as defendant had prior extensive juvenile record.
Id., 360. Cited. 28 CS 15; id., 196.
Annotation to former section 53-15:
Cited. 162 C. 6.
Annotations to former section 53-16:
Razor may be found to be a deadly or dangerous weapon. 95 C. 145; and so may a sawed-off billiard cue. 106 C. 352.
Accused entitled to instruction as to simple assault, when. 131 C. 135. Cited. 140 C. 398; 154 C. 41, 42; id., 302, 303.
Elements of crime discussed. 146 C. 527. Defendant who rushed three men to scene of assault, himself wrestled with police
officers and otherwise resisted their authority could reasonably have been found by trial jury to have abetted his son in
committing aggravated assault on one of the officers. 155 C. 531. Intent is a question of fact, determination of which should
stand unless conclusion drawn by trier is unreasonable. 157 C. 351. Subsequent assaults by defendant on his wife and
officers called in to protect her were admissible evidence where defense was self-defense and accidental injury. 158 C.
149. Cited. 165 C. 61. Cited. 167 C. 539.
Cited. 22 CS 208; 24 CS 355; 27 CS 430.
Razor found deadly and dangerous within meaning of statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 446, 448. Fact that assault was not
directed against actual victim does not excuse or mitigate crime. Id. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 652.
Annotation to former section 53-19:
Cited. 169 C. 38.
Annotations to former section 53-174:
An assault with "intent to drown and suffocate" not within this statute. 5 C. 330. A breach of the peace under this section
may be committed without assault or battery. 29 C. 72. Assailing party with scurrilous and abusive language is a "mocking"
under this section. 34 C. 279. Effect of provision concerning libelous publications. 90 C. 98. Elements necessary where
offense is tumultuous behavior. 75 C. 205. Interrupting a school under former statute. 26 C. 607; 28 C. 232; 82 C. 321.
Does not define breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it; it may be committed in other ways.
126 C. 5. Not necessary that information contain an allegation that publications were maliciously made if there is no
mention of privilege. 148 C. 208. Not necessary to prove a breach of the peace to support a conviction of libel. Id. Cited.
97 C. 138; 124 C. 557; 145 C. 124; 147 C. 704; 148 C. 77; 153 C. 208; 157 C. 226. Cited. 162 C. 383. Cited. 165 C. 288,
291, 294.
Annotations to former statute prohibiting acts calculated to intimidate: To threaten and use means to intimidate a
company against its will to abstain from keeping in its employ workmen of its own choice is within the prohibition of the
statute. 55 C. 70, 71; 92 C. 168. Statute as applied to strike. 77 C. 237; 79 C. 13; id., 416. Necessary allegations of
information; intimidation need not result. 80 C. 614; 81 C. 696. Notice by bricklayers' union to contractors and employers
that members would not work if nonunion men were employed held no violation of this statute on particular facts. 92 C.
168. Does not require proof of assault and battery. No specific intent is essential. It is sufficient that the acts intentionally
committed cause serious disquietude on the part of those in the vicinity. 140 C. 586. Cited. 142 C. 605.
Cited. 5 CS 507; 22 CS 361; 23 CS 294; id., 344; id., 455; 24 CS 354; 25 CS 483; 27 CS 128. "Peace" defined: It is
not the law that there is no breach of the peace unless public repose is disturbed. Numerous abusive and indecent telephone
calls held breach of the peace. (Now see Sec. 53a-183.) Where minor defendant was committed to reformatory for violation
of this section, there should have been presentence investigation and report as defendant could have been detained therein
for as much as two years. 26 CS 504, 505. Petitioner by habeas corpus petition challenged her commitment for indefinite
term for breach of peace, when section 17-360 provides maximum sentence of one year for this misdemeanor and sentence
ordered modified. 28 CS 9.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 200; id., 611; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 224, 227; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 68; id., 90; id., 413, 416; id., 476, 477;
id., 538. Abusive and threatening language uttered over telephone constituted violation. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 288. (Now see
Sec. 53-174a.) Defendant's contention that conduct involving one or two persons and occurring in an isolated place could
not constitute breach of the peace was without merit. Id., 648. Time is not an essential element of crime of breach of peace
unless date is material to the defense. Id., 649. Mere presence of defendant as inactive companion would not make him an
accessory to breach of peace. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 138. Breach of peace may be found if alleged offensive act is of such a
character that it naturally tends to cause serious disquietude on part of those in vicinity where act is likely to exercise its
malignity. Id., 423. "Provokes contention" does not require that blows be struck. Id., 550, 552. Statute provides its own
definition of "mocking". Id. Although defendant did not take part in assault, he is guilty under statute because everyone
is party to an offense who directly or indirectly counsels or procures any person to commit the offense or do any act forming
a part thereof. Id., 610, 613. Defendant properly charged with breach of peace when he violated curfew imposed by mayor
of New Haven when riotous conditions existed in the city. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22. Right to constitutional procedural safeguards
applicable to charges of misdemeanor. Id., 178. Evidence of defendant magazine salesman's forcible amorous assault on
complainant housewife in her home warranted his conviction of crime of breach of peace by assault. Id., 186. Statute does
not define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it and defendant garage owners
threatened assault on complaining witness in his shop warranted his conviction under it. Id., 298. Constitutionality of this
statute properly raised by demurrer upon ground it is unconstitutionally vague. Demurrer overruled as language used in
statute is plain and unambiguous and legislative intent clearly expressed. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 311; 517. Section does not
define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it. It may be committed in ways other
than those specified. Offensive acts must be of such character that they tend naturally to cause serious disquietude on part
of those in vicinity. Id., 583. Evidence of prior altercation between defendant and victim's son which led immediately to
attack on the father admissible on question of motive. Id., 607. There was sufficient evidence on which trial court found
defendant had committed assault and battery and appeal court cannot retry case. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 14. Defendant in resisting
an unlawful arrest was not guilty of breach of peace. Id., 42. Cited. Id., 90, 402, 403, 404, 405, 431.
Annotations to former section 53-207:
Cited. 23 CS 427, 428, 429.
Annotations to former section 54-117:
Averment "against statute" does not vitiate and may be rejected as surplusage. 3 D. 103. Assault with intent to kill, a
high crime and misdemeanor at common law. 3 C. 114; 5 C. 330. High crime and misdemeanor is an immoral and unlawful
act, not strictly a felony. 6 C. 217; id., 476. Nuisance does not constitute. 6 C. 418; but see 7 C. 431. Solicitation to commit
adultery a high crime and misdemeanor at common law. 7 C. 270. Escape from prison without prison breach or violence
an offense at common law. Id., 452. Attempt to steal offense at common law. 30 C. 500. Conspiracy a crime at common
law; and punishable under this statute. 69 C. 725; 75 C. 210; 77 C. 227; 86 C. 434; 124 C. 562; 126 C. 84; 127 C. 604. High
crime, felony, misdemeanor, defined. 86 C. 434; id., 627. Conspiracy to commit assault is high crime and misdemeanor. 86
C. 434. Conspiracy to commit crime is not merged in crime itself. 99 C. 114. Definition of merger; when merger exists;
is a doctrine of very limited application. 108 C. 215. Identity of offenses. Id., 214. Cited. 162 C. 2.
Cited. 29 CS 305. Obstructing justice offense restricted in application. 29 CS 305.
Sec. 53a-59. Assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a
third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (2) with intent
to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable
permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to
a third person; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human
life he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to another person,
and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or (4) with intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person and while aided by two or more other persons
actually present, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (5) with
intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person
or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.
(b) Assault in the first degree is a class B felony provided (1) any person found guilty
under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court
and (2) any person found guilty under subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or
reduced by the court if the victim of the offense is a person under ten years of age or if
the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in section 53a-146, and the actor knew
the victim was a witness.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 60; P.A. 80-442, S. 16, 28; P.A. 92-87, S. 1; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 3; P.A. 95-142, S. 12; P.A.
99-240, S. 13.)
History: P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (b) requiring at least five years' imprisonment for person found guilty
under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-87 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re causing serious
physical injury to another person while aided by two or more other persons actually present; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2
amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (5) re causing physical injury to another person or to a third person by means of
the discharge of a firearm; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (b) by adding Subdiv. (2) requiring the defendant to be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the
victim is under ten years of age; P.A. 99-240 amended Subsec. (b) to make the nonsuspendable sentence of Subdiv. (2)
applicable if the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in Sec. 53a-146, and the actor knew the victim was a witness.
Cited. 171 C. 264. Whether physical injury sustained by victim was "serious" was question of fact for the jury. 175 C.
204, 207. Cited. 191 C. 142. Cited. 193 C. 333, 334. Cited. 196 C. 18, 21. Cited. 200 C. 607, 608. Cited. 203 C. 484, 486,
488. Cited. 207 C. 233, 234. Cited. 209 C. 34, 38. Cited. 211 C. 441, 449. Cited. 215 C. 739, 743. Cited. 221 C. 402, 405.
Cited. 227 C. 301, 302, 312. Cited. 239 C. 467. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 389.
Cited. 3 CA 607, 623. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 11 CA 621, 623, 625. Cited. Id., 699,
700, 703, 706. Cited. 13 CA 139, 140. Cited. 14 CA 244, 245. Cited. Id., 309, 320. Cited. 17 CA 200, 201. Cited. 19 CA
654, 656. Cited. 20 CA 437, 438. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 21 CA 557, 565. Cited. 25 CA 171, 172. Cited. 34 CA 103,
116. Cited. 35 CA 107, 109, 110. Cited. Id., 609, 615. Cited. Id., 762, 763, 766. Cited. 36 CA 336, 337. Cited. 37 CA 180,
185. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 777, 779. Cited. 39 CA 333, 336. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. 42 CA 624. Cited. 43
CA 549. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. 46 CA 691. Assault statute provides for intent to be transferred and does not require that
defendant be aware of the presence of unintended victim. 84 CA 263.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 348.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 428, 429, 431. Cited. 172 C. 94, 95. Cited. Id., 275. Cited. 173 C. 254-256. Evidence victim
suffered various broken facial bones and spent eleven days in hospital was sufficient to show the "serious physical injury"
required for conviction. Id., 389. Cited. 174. C. 16, 17. Cited. Id., 604, 605. Subdiv. (3) cited. 175 C. 204, 205, 207; 176
C. 138, 139. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 116, 118; id., 448-450; 180 C. 481, 482; id., 557, 560. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 449,
451, 460, 467; id., 501. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 585, 586, 588, 594; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had
ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other
charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.; Subdiv. (1) cited. 183 C. 29, 30.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 184 C. 400, 402-404. Subdiv. (1) cited. 185 C. 63, 65. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 372,
373; 186 C. 1, 2, 7; id., 17, 18, 25; id., 654-657, 663, 664, 673; 187 C. 199, 200, 201, 214 (Diss. Op.); id., 681, 683; 189
C. 61; id., 303, 306, 310; 190 C. 219, 233. Subdiv. (3) cited. 191 C. 12, 13. Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C. 48, 51. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 474, 475. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 632-634, 639, 643. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 89, 90. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 119, 126. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 119, 127. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 195 C. 475, 476. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 651, 652, 655. Subdiv. (1) cited. 196 C. 395, 401. Cited. 197 C. 602, 603.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 602, 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 23, 24. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 23, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199
C. 155, 159. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 322, 327. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 322, 327, 328. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 322, 327, 329. Subdiv. (1) cited. 200 C. 642, 643, 650; 202 C. 259, 260; Id., 463, 464, 488. Subdiv. (3): Not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629, 631, 635. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 207, 208. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (1) cited. 205 C. 370, 371; Id., 673, 675. Subdiv. (3) cited. 208 C. 38-41. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C.
322, 323. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 619, 621. Subdiv. (3) cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 441, 443-445. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Subdiv. (1) cited. 213 C. 97, 98. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 122, 123; Id., 344, 347. Cited. Id., 717,
720. Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 188, 189; Id., 492, 493. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 585, 586, 592, 593, 602. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
647, 649; 217 C. 243, 244, 248, 250. Subdiv. (3) cited. 218 C. 747, 748. Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 16, 21. Cited. Id., 363,
365. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 363, 365, 367-370. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 220 C. 385, 388; Id., 408, 409; 221
C. 402, 403, 405; Id., 915. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 444, 447, 448. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
718, 720. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 450, 452, 455. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 524-526. Cited. 227 C. 301, 311, 312. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 301, 312, 315, 316, 318-320. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Assault statute cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 518, 519. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 711, 713. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 751, 752. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 751-753. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 234, 235. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 335, 336. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 178, 179. Subdiv. (3) cited. 230 C. 608, 610. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 231 C. 235, 237. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 473, 474. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
746. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 748, 750, 751. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 694. Subdiv. (1): Under appropriate circumstances a
defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, same person; judgment of appellate
court in State v. Williams, 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 239
C. 467. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 481. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 395. Subdiv. (1) cited. 241 C. 665. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 802. Subdiv. (3) cited. 242 C. 143. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 389. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 485. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 723. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 745. Subdiv. (3): Criminal conduct can arise by an omission to act when there is a legal
duty to do so and defendant who had established a familial relationship with victim's mother and her children, had assumed
responsibility for the welfare of the children and had taken care of the children as though he were their father, had a legal
duty to protect victim from abuse and breach of that duty exposed defendant to criminal liability. 245 C. 209. Subdiv. (5)
cited. 247 C. 662. Defendant was not without fair warning and his due process rights were not denied by court's holding
construing a common law duty to act under section. 260 C. 93. Evidence that child abuse victim had sustained obvious
injuries was sufficient to support defendant's conviction based on his failure to act. Id. Re double jeopardy claim, defendant
failed to meet his burden of proving that his conviction with regard to different injuries arose out of the same act. Id. This
section and Sec. 53-21 do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser included offenses and are not the
same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 1 CA 609, 616. Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 607, 608. Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 40,
42, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 590, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 124, 125, 140, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 124, 138, 140.
Cited. Id., 124, 138, 141. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 124, 140, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 469. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476, 477.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 309, 310. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 119, 120. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 176, 177. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
545, 547-549. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 545, 548, 549; Id., 631, 632. Subdiv. (3) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
169, 170; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 330, 331. Subdiv. (3) cited. 10 CA 103, 104.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 176, 177; Id., 302, 303; Id., 462-464; Id., 643, 645. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 643-645, 651. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 11 CA 499; Id., 621, 622, 625. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 699-702. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 217; Id., 655, 656; 13 CA
12; Id., 120, 121; Id., 237, 238. Id., 237, 238; Id., 687, 688; Id., 824. Subdiv. (3) cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
140; Id., 309, 310. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 493, 494, 496. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 511, 512; 15 CA 34, 35, 47. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 416, 417. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 531, 532, 534. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704, 706, 710, 711, 712, 715. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 16 CA 184, 186. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 206, 207. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 346, 347. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 390, 391.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 17 CA 391, 394. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 477, 478. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 174, 175. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 654, 656. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 688, 689,
716; 22 CA 199, 201. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 340, 341. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 610-613. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610-611;
23 CA 28, 29; Id., 315, 316; Id., 663, 664; Id., 692, 693; 24 CA 152, 153; Id., 264, 266; Id., 316, 318; Id., 556, 559; Id.,
563, 567-569; Id., 624, 625, 627; 25 CA 171, 173, 175. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 171, 173, 175; Id., 243, 245. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 275, 276, 278, 279. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 434; Id., 578, 579, 582; Id., 619-621. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 26 CA 52, 53; Id., 114, 116, 124; Id., 145, 146. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 331, 332, 337, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
367, 368; Id., 433, 434, 436; Id., 641, 642, 647, 653, 654; 27 CA 73, 74, 92, 93. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 73, 93. Cited. Id.,
322-324. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 324, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 322-327, 330, 332, 333. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 654, 655, 665. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 290, 291, 302, 304. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 290, 301, 302. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 402, 404, 413. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 825, 829,
830. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 833, 834; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 518 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 29 CA 59, 60, 62-64.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 262, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704, 705. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 744, 745. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA
9, 10. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 232, 234, 237, 239.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 359, 360. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 606, 607, 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 58, 59. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 553, 559. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 33 CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 122, 123. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 743, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C.
502 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 223, 224, 226, 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 261, 262,
271. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 691, 692. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 807, 808, 812. Subdiv. (1) cited.
35 CA 51, 53. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 51, 52, 59, 61, 63. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 138, 139. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 279, 280.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 609, 616. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 740, 743.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 41, 42. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 484. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 506,
507. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 576, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 697. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 805, 807.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 831, 852. Subdiv. (3) cited. 37 CA 21, 22. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 180-182, 184. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 464, 466. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 749, 752. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 777, 786. Subdiv. (3) cited. 39
CA 18, 19; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 18, 19, 23, 24. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 333, 335.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 563, 564. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 645, 646. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 387, 388, 395. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 484. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 515-517.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 624, 625. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 515, 517. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 565, 566. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
831, 832. Subdiv. (4) cited. 42 CA 307. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 371. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 205.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 488. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 578. Cited. 44 CA 6. Subdiv. (1) cited. id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. id., 26. Cited. Id., 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 499. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 45 CA 270. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 591. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 684. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 734. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id. Offenses described in Subdivs. (1) and (4) are two separate offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 53 CA 581. To
secure conviction for assault in the first degree under Subdiv. (1), state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person, did, in fact, cause serious physical injury to that
person and caused that injury by means of a dangerous instrument. 70 CA 232. There was sufficient evidence from which
jury reasonably could have found victim had suffered serious and permanent disfigurement and that defendant intended
to cause such serious and permanent disfigurement where defendant butted victim's face with his head, bit her face, struck
her on the head with a hairdryer, kicked her and attempted to choke her, resulting in scars to victim's face. 74 CA 633.
Defendant's actions in shaking infant with such violence as to cause injuries consistent with "shaken baby syndrome" was
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would observe and evinced extreme indifference to
human life. Id., 736. Subdiv. (2): Fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean
that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 219 C. 363, 365. Cited. 221 C. 402, 405.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 548.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CS 347, 353.
Sec. 53a-59a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable. (a)
A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded
person in the first degree, when such person commits assault in the first degree under
section 53a-59(a)(2), 53a-59(a)(3) or 53a-59(a)(5) and (1) the victim of such assault
has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in
section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental
retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an
elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree upon
the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both
such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the first degree is a class B felony and any person found guilty under this section shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed
may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 17, 28; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 4; P.A. 99-122, S. 1; 99-186, S. 14.)
History: P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (c) requiring five years' imprisonment for persons found guilty under
section provisions, effective July 1, 1981; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to Sec. 53a-59(a)(5); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the first degree" to "assault
of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the first degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to
add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor
is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental
retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a
victim sixty or older in the first degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the first degree"
where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added
new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did
not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors
recodified new Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Cited. 230 C. 608, 610.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Cited. 20 CA 467. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 35 CA 609, 615, 616.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 235 C. 502, 517.
Cited. 28 CA 402, 403. Cited. 40 CA 387, 388.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-59b. Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the
first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an employee of the
Department of Correction in the first degree when he is in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction or confined in any institution or facility of the Department of Correction and commits assault in the first degree under section 53a-59 and the victim of such
assault is an employee of the Department of Correction acting in the performance of
his duties.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an
employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree upon the same incident of
assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the
same information.
(c) Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree is a
class B felony. If any person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a violation of
this section which occurred while such person was confined in an institution or facility
of the Department of Correction, such term of imprisonment shall run consecutively to
the term for which the person was serving at the time of the assault.
(P.A. 93-246, S. 2.)
See Sec. 53a-167c re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction, employee or member of the Board of
Pardons and Paroles or probation officer.
Sec. 53a-59c. Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of a pregnant woman resulting
in termination of pregnancy when such person commits assault in the first degree as
provided under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-59 and (1) the victim
of such assault is pregnant, and (2) such assault results in the termination of pregnancy
that does not result in a live birth.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative
defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the
offense, did not know that the victim was pregnant.
(c) Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy is a class A
felony.
(P.A. 03-21, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury
to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) with
intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person
or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than
by means of the discharge of a firearm; or (3) he recklessly causes serious physical
injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
(4) for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally
causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person
by administering to such person, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation
capable of producing the same; or (5) he is a parolee from a correctional institution and
with intent to cause physical injury to an employee or member of the Board of Pardons
and Paroles, he causes physical injury to such employee or member.
(b) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 61; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 18; P.A. 73-639, S. 20; P.A. 84-236, S. 4; P.A. 93-246, S. 3; July Sp. Sess.
P.A. 94-2, S. 5; P.A. 04-234, S, 2.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (6) in Subsec. (a) re physical injury to employee of department of correction or member
of parole board; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subdiv. (3) re physical injury to peace officer or fireman resulting from
intentional attempt to prevent such person from performing his duty, renumbering accordingly; P.A. 84-236 amended
Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (a) by changing "committed to" to "in the custody of" and adding phrase "confined in any institution
or facility of the department of correction"; P.A. 93-246 amended Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (a) to delete from the scope of
the offense a person who is in the custody of the commissioner of correction or confined in any institution or facility of
the department of correction and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee of the department of correction causes
physical injury to such employee; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to add "other than by means
of the discharge of a firearm" to reflect changes made to Sec. 53a-59 by same public act; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of
Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004.
Illegal confinement is no defense to assault on correctional officer. 169 C. 438, 441. Cited. 171 C. 264. Cited. 172 C.
275. Cited. 173 C. 254, 258, 259. Cited. 184 C. 157, 166; id., 520, 522. Cited. 193 C. 144, 145, 153. Cited. Id., 232, 243.
Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Cited. 198 C. 23, 24. Cited. 199 C. 146, 147, 153. Cited. 216 C. 647, 661, 664. Cited. 222 C. 331,
335. Cited. 231 C. 545, 546, 555, 556, 560, 562, 563. Cited. 237 C. 238, 239.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. Id., 612-615. Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Cited. Id., 320, 321.
336. Cited. Id., 679, 681. Cited. 13 CA 667, 671. Cited. 17 CA 200, 201. Cited. 20 CA 75, 76, 80. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14.
Cited. 32 CA 224, 239, 240. Cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Cited. 35 CA 138, 148. Cited. Id., 431, 432. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited.
37 CA 338, 346. Cited. 38 CA 598, 599. Cited. 46 CA 486. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 741.
Cited. 34 CS 531, 540, 541.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 171 C. 395, 397. Cited. 175 C. 155-157, 160, 164. Subdiv. (2) cited. 184 C. 520, 521. Subdiv. (3)
cited. 185 C. 63, 66, 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (5) cited. 190 C. 143, 144. Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C.
48, 56. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 126. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 119, 127.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 636. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 651, 653. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 405, 406. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 424, 425. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 322, 327. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 322, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. 201 C. 103, 104; Id., 289, 290; 202 C. 520, 523, 524; 204 C. 207, 208; Id., 714,
716. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C. 733, 736. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 151, 154. Subdiv. (2) cited. 219 C. 721, 722; 220 C. 385,
388; 221 C. 447, 449. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 556, 559. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 243, 244, 264. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
243, 245, 246, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. 226 C. 618, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 153, 155. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 711, 713.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 751, 753. Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 147, 149, 152. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 910. Subdiv. (5) cited. 230
C. 591, 593. Subdiv. (5) cited. 231 C. 545-549, 551-563. Cited. Id., 545, 556, 557, 559. Subdiv. (5) cited. 235 C. 748,
751. Subdiv. (5) cited. 237 C. 238, 239. Subdiv. (2) cited. 239 C. 481.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 1 CA 584, 585. Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 40, 49. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 40, 42, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 590, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 701, 702, 706. Subdiv. (2) cited. 7 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 95, 96. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 377, 378. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 35. Subdiv. (2) cited. 9 CA 161, 162, 167, 168; 10 CA 50, 51; Id., 330,
331, 336, 344; Id., 462, 463; Id., 643-645, 652; 11 CA 665, 666; 13 CA 386, 387; 14 CA 463, 464; id., 472-474; Id., 493,
494, 497; Id., 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 704, 710. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 226,
227. Subdiv. (2) cited. 19 CA 245, 246. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 576, 577. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited.
20 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 75, 76, 84. Subdiv. (3) cited. 22 CA 586, 587. Subdiv. (5) cited. 23 CA 83, 84. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 447-449. Cited. Id., 447, 450. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 502, 506. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 705, 706. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 705, 711. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 264, 266. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 563, 565; Id., 624, 625, 627. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 685, 686, 690. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 275, 278. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 565-567; 26
CA 114, 116; Id., 145, 146; Id., 242, 243. Subdiv. (3) cited. 27 CA 73, 88. Cited. Id., 322, 329, 330. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
322, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 290, 302. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 645, 646.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 262, 263. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 95, 96, 99; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 31 CA 58, 59. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 140, 141, 145. Subdiv. (5) cited. 32 CA 224-226, 237-243. Subdiv. (5)
cited. Id., 448, 449. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 647, 650. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 691. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 148, 151, 153. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 138, 148. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA
641, 642. Cited. Id., 805, 807. Subdiv. (2) cited. 37 CA 338, 339, 346, 347. Cited. Id., 338, 346, 347. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 338, 347. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 437, 438. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 247, 248. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
777, 786. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 868, 869, 876. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40 CA 757, 758.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 333-335, 338, 339, 341. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 517. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 565, 567. Cited. 43 CA 205. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 252. Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 125.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 307. Cited. 45 CA 591. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 46 CA 24. Cited.
Id., 741.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CS 494, 497. It is possible to prove assault in the second degree without necessarily proving risk
of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the second degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship to each
other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 231 C. 545, 556.
Sec. 53a-60a. Assault in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: One
year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a
firearm when he commits assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-60,
and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of assault
in the second degree and assault in the second degree with a firearm upon the same
transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon
the same information.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 5.)
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 9 CA 648, 649. Cited. 23 CA 502, 506. Cited. 45 CA 591.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 424, 425. Cited. 200 C. 642, 643, 650. Cited. 201 C. 368, 369. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-60b. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree: Class D felony: Two years not suspendable.
(a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally
retarded person in the second degree when such person commits assault in the second
degree under section 53a-60 or larceny in the second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3)
and (1) the victim of such assault or larceny has attained at least sixty years of age, is
blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim
of such assault or larceny is a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or larceny in the
second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3) and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled,
pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree upon the same incident of
assault or larceny, as the case may be, but such person may be charged and prosecuted
for all such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the second degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed
may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 18, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 29; P.A. 99-122, S. 2; 99-186, S. 15; P.A. 01-84, S. 6, 26.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to require that two years of sentence imposed must be served, effective July
1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault
of a victim sixty or older in the second degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the
second degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where
the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree" to "assault of an elderly,
blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the
offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as
Subsec. (d); P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add "or larceny", effective July 1, 2001; (Revisor's note: In 2005, the
Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 199 C. 146, 147, 153. Cited. 223 C. 243, 248. Cited. 230 C. 400, 402.
Cited. 5 CA 594, 595. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 420, 431. Cited. 33 CA 616.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 33 CA 616. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-60c. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: Three years
not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant
or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm when such person commits assault in the second degree with a firearm under section 53a-60a and (1) the victim
of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled,
as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person
with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with
mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or assault in the
second degree with a firearm and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or
mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm upon the same incident of
assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all of such offenses upon
the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony and any person found guilty under
this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which three years of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 3; P.A. 80-442, S. 19, 28; P.A. 99-122, S. 3; 99-186, S. 16.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that three years of sentence imposed shall not be suspended or
reduced, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in
the second degree with a firearm" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the second degree
with a firearm", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where
the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree with a firearm" to "assault
of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree with a firearm" where appearing, amended Subsec.
(a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative
defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering
former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate
affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Sec. 53a-60d. Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle when,
while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug
or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the
effect of such liquor or drug.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class D felony and the court
shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of
any person found guilty under this section for one year.
(P.A. 82-403, S. 2; P.A. 83-534, S. 9; P.A. 85-147, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 83-534 amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or
nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty for one year; P.A. 85-147 deleted "while intoxicated" from the
title of the offense and a provision that defined "intoxication" to include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both, and
replaced elements of offense of "when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes
serious physical injury to another person" with "when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor
or drug".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 219 C. 752, 757. Cited. 222 C. 672, 674. Cited. 224 C. 730, 731, 734. Cited. 226 C. 191, 201. Cited. 230 C. 572,
573. Nothing said in General Assembly proceeding concerning an amendment to this section to remedy an unrelated aspect
changed the rule of law; judgment of appellate court in State v. Leroy, 33 CA 232, reversed. 232 C. 1, 2, 5, 13, 14, 16.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 9 CA 686, 730. Cited. 16 CA 472, 475. Cited. 21 CA 138, 143, 144. Cited. 22 CA
142, 144, 159, 165-167, 169, 170. Cited. 23 CA 215, 216. Cited. Id., 720-722. Cited. 25 CA 282, 284, 293. Cited. 26 CA
805, 806, 808. Cited. 32 CA 553, 554, 556, 571. Cited. 33 CA 232, 233; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 34
CA 557, 564. Cited. Id., 655, 665. Cited. 36 CA 710, 713. Cited. 38 CA 282, 283. Cited. 40 CA 359, 360, 364, 365. Nothing
in Sec. 14-227a prohibits evidence of consciousness of guilt based on defendant's refusal to take a breath test being
considered in a prosecution under this section. 63 CA 433.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 232 C. 1, 2.
Cited. 16 CA 472, 473, 477. Cited. 32 CA 553, 554. Cited. 33 CA 232, 233; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1 et seq.
Cited. 34 CA 655, 666. Cited. 38 CA 282, 283.
Sec. 53a-61. Assault in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to
another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) he
recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or (3) with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon, a
dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.
(b) Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty
under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of one year which may not be suspended or reduced.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 62; P.A. 86-287, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 30.)
History: P.A. 86-287 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to electronic defense weapons; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec.
(b) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subsec. (a)(3) to reflect
preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1).
See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a).
Cited. 170 C. 162. Cited. 171 C. 264. Cited. 173 C. 254, 259. Cited. 184 C. 157, 158, 162. Cited. 189 C. 1, 7. Cited.
190 C. 428, 429. Cited. 194 C. 347, 349. Cited. Id., 408, 412. Cited. 196 C. 430, 431. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191. Cited. 200
C. 544, 545. Cited. 202 C. 520, 521, 524. Cited. Id., 629, 631. Cited. 205 C. 352. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. Id., 52, 53.
Cited. 222 C. 299, 302. Cited. Id., 331, 335. Cited. 227 C. 677, 680. Cited. 228 C. 487, 488. Cited. Id., 582, 584. Cited.
233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 78, 81.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 6 CA 189, 190. Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 9 CA 59, 60, 70.
Cited. Id., 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. 11 CA 499, 501. Cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Cited. Id.,
585, 587. Cited. 13 CA 708, 709. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 17 CA 234, 235. Cited. 20 CA 6, 8. Cited. Id., 75, 80.
Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. 24 CA 57, 58. Cited. Id., 556, 577. Cited. 25 CA 421, 422; judgment reversed, see 222 C.
299 et seq. Cited. Id., 472, 473. Cited. 26 CA 157, 162. Cited. Id., 439, 440. Cited. 27 CA 786, 787. Cited. 28 CA 581,
583, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. Id., 683, 684. Cited. 30 CA 346,
348. Cited. 31 CA 497, 502. Cited. 35 CA 107, 109. Cited. 36 CA 106, 108; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78 et seq. Cited.
37 CA 338, 348. Cited. Id., 733, 743. Cited. 39 CA 810, 811. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806, 828, 829. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited.
42 CA 810. Cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 282. Cited. 46 CA 131.
Cited. 37 CS 664, 665. Cited. 39 CS 347, 348. Cited. 41 CS 505, 508.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 177 C. 248; 180 C. 167, 168. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 557, 560. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 353, 355.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 184 C. 366. Subdiv. (3) cited. 185 C. 63, 76, 78, 79. Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 114, 115; 193 C. 48, 56.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 126, 127. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 195 C. 232,
243. Cited. 197 C. 115, 117. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. 202 C. 629, 635, 660. Subdiv. (1) cited.
206 C. 40, 43. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 657, 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 110, 112. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 672, 674.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 160, 161; 220 C. 487, 489; Subdiv. (2) cited. 222 C. 444, 447. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 41, 42.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28
CA 581, 590, reversed. 226 C. 601, 602, 606, 613. Cited. Id., 601, 602, 612. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 606, 613, 615.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 610, 612. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 813, 815.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 3 CA 374, 375. Cited. 5 CA 40, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 40, 41, 49, 50. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 40, 49, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 590, 591, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 407, 408. Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA
27, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 257, 258. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 545, 547; 10 CA 330, 336. Cited. 10 CA 709-712. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 499-502. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 655, 656; 13 CA 386, 387; Id., 667,
668. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 554, 555. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 75, 77, 86; Id., 101, 102. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 663,
664; 24 CA 518, 519; 26 CA 114, 116; Id., 259, 260. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 331, 332, 346, 348; 27 CA 322, 327, 330. Cited.
Id., 322, 329, 330. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 330. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 581, 585-588, 592;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 581, 586-588, 603; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et
seq. Cited. Id., 581, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited 29 CA 524, 525. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 704,
705. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 126. Subdiv. (2) cited. 35 CA 51, 59, 61, 65. Cited. 37 CA 338, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
338, 348. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 733, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 419, 420. Subdiv.
(1) cited Id., 832, 833. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 565, 567. Subdiv. (1) cited. 42 CA 445. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 768. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 591. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. This is not a cognizable offense
and therefore not a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the first degree. 56 CA 592.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CS 520, 521. Elements of Sec. 53a-64 are so consistent with elements of Subdiv. (2) that the court
is precluded by principles of double jeopardy from entering a finding of guilty as to both charges. 46 CS 130. Subdiv. (2):
Defendant's recklessly placing his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period
of time constituted "serious physical injury". Id. It is possible to prove assault in the third degree without necessarily
proving risk of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the third degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship
to each other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.
Sec. 53a-61a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or
mentally retarded person in the third degree when such person commits assault in the
third degree under section 53a-61 and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least
sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental retardation, as defined in
section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the third degree and assault of an
elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree upon
the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both
such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under this section
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which shall not be suspended
or reduced.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 31; P.A. 99-122, S. 4; 99-186, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence to
reflect preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault
of a victim sixty or older in the third degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the
third degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the
victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the third degree" to "assault of an elderly,
blind, disabled or pregnant person in the third degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense
an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as
Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses
established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence.
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Court, in sentencing a defendant convicted under this section, must impose a one-year mandatory nonsuspendable term
of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557-559.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421, 431. Cited. 16 CA 318, 319. Cited. 21 CA 248, 249. Cited. 29 CA
524, 525. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314. Cited. 32 CA 178, 179.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 12 CA 239, 240. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Secs. 53a-61b to 53a-61z. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 53a-61aa. Threatening in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of threatening in the first degree when such person (1) (A) threatens to commit
any crime involving the use of a hazardous substance with the intent to terrorize another
person, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit
such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, evacuation or inconvenience, or (2) (A) threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to cause
evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "hazardous substance" means any physical,
chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity,
concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or
incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health.
(c) Threatening in the first degree is a class D felony.
(Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 7, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 15; P.A. 03-22, S. 1.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to delete in Subdivs.
(1) and (2) provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence; P.A. 03-22 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing
elements of crime as Subdiv. (1), redesignating existing Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B), respectively, and
adding new Subdiv. (2) to restore provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to cause evacuation
of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and
threatening to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience.
Sec. 53a-62. Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A
person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such
person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent
serious physical injury, (2) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with
the intent to terrorize another person, or (3) such person threatens to commit such crime
of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.
(b) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 63; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 8, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 16.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing "threatening" with "threatening in the second degree"
where appearing and amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, delete Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit a crime
of violence with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public
transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and delete Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such
crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience, said provisions being reenacted as part of
Sec. 53a-61aa by same act, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re
a person, by physical threat, intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical
injury as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another
person and add Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing
such terror.
Cited. 175 C. 204, 205. Cited. 182 C. 585, 592; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a
defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of
which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 193 C. 602, 612. Cited. 195 C. 636. Cited.
201 C. 115, 116. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. 205 C. 262, 264. Cited. 207 C. 565, 567. Cited. 208 C. 689, 695. Cited.
209 C. 34, 38. Cited. Id., 52, 53. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 224 C. 494, 496. Cited. 227 C. 829, 832. Cited. 241 C. 413.
Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 289, 290. Cited. 8 CA 190, 191. Cited. Id., 496, 500, 504-506. Cited. 9 CA 161, 162.
Cited. 14 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 526, 527. Cited. 25 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 334, 336. Cited. 26 CA 481, 482, 487; judgment
reversed, see 224 C. 494 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. Id.,
708, 712. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498. Cited. 33 CA 103, 104. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Words of defendant's
threat to young victim, along with surrounding circumstances of the threat, were such that it was reasonable for jury to
infer that defendant had placed the victim in fear of "imminent" serious physical injury. 75 CA 103. Evidence was sufficient
to sustain conviction. 83 CA 489.
Cited. 37 CS 664, 665. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575. Cited. 43 CS 46, 52.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 566, 567. Cited. 175 C. 204, 205. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 182 C. 585, 588; part of ruling in State
v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to
a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 485, 486. Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 462, 468. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 689, 690. Cited. 226 C.
601, 603. Subdiv. (1) cited. 226 C. 601, 603, 606, 613. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28 CA 581, 590,
reversed. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 601, 606. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 613, 615. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 153, 155.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 707, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 403, 409.
Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser
included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647, 649. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 496, 504. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 13 CA 386, 387; Id., 438, 439. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 643, 644. Subdiv. (3) cited. 28 CA 581, 586, 592;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 581, 586, 603; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq.
Cited. Id., 581, 589, 590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 95, 96; judgment reversed,
see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 184, 186; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35
CA 262, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 276, 277. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 733, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 306, 307. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 306, 307, 313. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777, 785. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 617, 618. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA
515, 517. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 584, 585, 592. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 701, 702. Subdiv. (2) was not unconstitutionally
vague on its face. Statute's application to defendant's conduct was proper and did not interfere with his duty to protect his
child and statute was not vague as applied to facts of case. 81 CA 248. There is no indication that legislature did not intend
to create separate crimes prohibited by Secs. 53a-181 (a)(3) and Subdiv. (2). Id.
Sec. 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of
serious physical injury to another person.
(b) Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 64.)
Cited. 179 C. 617, 618. Cited. 194 C. 408, 412. Cited. 200 C. 607, 608. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 233 C. 502, 513.
Cited. 238 C. 313. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 163. Cited. 8 CA 496, 500, 501. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. 32 CA 84, 86. Cited. 33 CA
103, 104. Cited. Id., 743, 749; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. 43 CA 578. Cited.
44 CA 6. Under this section, jury has to consider objectively the nature and degree of the risk and defendant's subjective
awareness of that risk. 75 CA 432.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 348; id., 359, 360. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 227 C. 301, 320. Cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 237 C. 348, 352.
Cited. 3 CA 289, 290. Cited. 8 CA 153, 155. Cited. 10 CA 659, 661. Cited. 18 CA 477, 478. Cited. 24 CA 330, 331.
Cited. 26 CA 145, 146. Cited. 40 CA 515, 517. Cited. Id., 643, 645. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 354.
Sec. 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person.
(b) Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 65.)
Cited. 194 C. 408, 412.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 14 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 10, 12, 16, 20, 27. Cited. Id., 804. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited.
31 CA 497, 498, 502.
Cited. 35 CS 570, 573. Cited. 37 CS 661. Cited. 38 CS 619-621. Cited. 40 CA 643, 645. Defendant's recklessly placing
his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period of time constituted "serious
physical injury" in violation of the statute. 46 CS 130.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 223 C. 618, 625.
Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Cited. 24 CA 662, 665; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 618 et seq.
PART VI*
SEX OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-217:
Cited. 118 C. 505; 139 C. 247; 140 C. 610; 152 C. 197. Corroboration is not essential but in its absence court should
weigh complainant's credibility with care. 128 C. 126. Assault in this statute includes a touching; consent not a defense.
129 C. 603. Not required to plead over to complaint amended re date of alleged commission. 151 C. 189. Defendant could
put his character in issue but only as to sexual morality and decency, the specific traits involved in action. 157 C. 99. Cited.
160 C. 366; 161 C. 303.
Cited. 25 CS 433; 27 CS 44.
Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 45.
Annotations to former section 53-218:
Marriage in fact must be proved. 6 C. 446. Solicitation to commit adultery a crime. 7 C. 270. Testimony of more than
one act inadmissible under single charge of adultery. 10 C. 373. What evidence held inadmissible to prove marriage. 40
C. 145. Involves moral turpitude and is an infamous crime. 112 C. 274.
Although this statute specifies conduct is adulterous only if woman is married, in action for divorce from husband
based on adultery, marital status of other woman irrelevant. 22 CS 147.
Annotations to former section 53-219:
What constitutes offense of lascivious carriage. 5 D. 81. Meaning of "lascivious". 120 C. 166. Cited. 129 C. 603.
Cited. 9 CS 165; 23 CS 299. Meaning of lascivious conduct discussed. 24 CS 99.
History discussed. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 187 to 189. Statute was intended to apply only to conduct between persons of
different sexes. Id., 190. Fact that sexual activity is conducted privately behind locked doors between a willing male and
female is no defense. Id., 698. Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 57. In police investigation of defendant's conduct in violation of this
section, officer's observance of defendant through her bedroom window and subsequent arrest on speedy information held
no invasion of her constitutional rights. Disclosure of identity of informant was not required. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 35. Cited.
Id., 42.
Annotations to former section 53-224:
Definition of seduction. 27 C. 320; 76 C. 136.
Annotations to former section 53-226:
Cited. 125 C. 328. No justification for reading into the statutory crime of lewdness any unexpressed additional requirement of openness. 146 C. 365.
Cited. 23 CS 296.
Word "offering" means a mere offering of the body without physical contact. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 597, 598. Lewdness
includes immoral and degenerate conduct between persons of the same sex and the proposal or offer for lewdness as well
as the act itself is a crime. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 31, 32. There was no entrapment of defendant where officer did not solicit
commission of offense but merely offered the opportunity for its commission. Id., 32, 33. Scienter of defendants shown
by facts proved by testimony of police officers of repeated warnings and advice to defendants of prostitutes who frequented
their bar. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 594.
Annotations to former section 53-227:
Elements of crime. 82 C. 216. Cited. 113 C. 291; 128 C. 180.
Conviction under this statute is cause for revocation of license to practice medicine and surgery. 13 CS 144.
Annotations to former section 53-229:
Cited. 113 C. 291.
Cited. 9 CS 166.
Annotations to former section 53-230:
State must prove what facts. 17 C. 472; 38 C. 525; 96 C. 315. Term "house of ill-fame" synonymous with bawdy house.
33 C. 92. In prosecution for disorderly house, not necessary to show reputation of house. Id., 259. Evidence of character
for chastity may be rebutted by showing that accused kept a house of ill-fame. 33 C. 269. Term "house" means any building
kept for purpose named. 36 C. 79. What complaint not bad for duplicity. 38 C. 38; 66 C. 9. To sustain information for
keeping house "reputed" to be one of ill-fame, fact that it is such a house must be proved; 82 C. 111; 96 C. 315; statute is
valid. 83 C. 550; id., 56. Not necessary to prove that accused knew character of house; his knowledge is immaterial. 96
C. 316. Cited. 125 C. 328; 153 C. 149.
Single act of lewdness not enough to constitute lewdness under this statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 595.
Annotations to former section 53-231:
Bond must conform to statutory requirements. 9 C. 350. This section constitutional. 31 C. 574. See note to former
section 53-230, supra. Cited. 168 C. 74.
Annotations to former section 53-235:
Cited. 9 CS 166; 23 CS 296.
Annotations to former section 53-238:
Evidence showing constancy in accusation admissible. 8 C. 100; 44 C. 155; 47 C. 466; 93 C. 321. Conviction may be
had on uncorroborated testimony of a nine-year-old girl as to principal fact. 29 C. 389. Evidence as to general good character
of accused admissible. 33 C. 269. Jury must be satisfied that act was without consent of prosecutrix, but there is no rule
of law that she should make the utmost resistance. 45 C. 264; see also 72 C. 44. Rape may be committed on child under
ten years of age. 46 C. 362. Unnecessary to allege that prosecutrix was ten or more years of age. 50 C. 579. Resistance;
putting in fear. 72 C. 44. Intoxication or insanity of complainant; charges by her against other men; liberality in applying
rules, where only she and accused are witnesses. 80 C. 546. What constitutes abuse of minor; 81 C. 97; election between
counts; declarations of victim; id., 1; 93 C. 321; woman may be guilty of abuse of minor, as accessory; 82 C. 213; previous
unchastity or consent no defense; cross-examination of complainant. Id., 454. When husband and wife under age of sixteen
live together voluntarily, the former is not guilty of crime under this section. 113 C. 288, 294. Cited. 113 C. 786; 118 C.
505; 128 C. 324; 132 C. 278; id., 684; 154 C. 302, 303. Joint trial before jury of defendant and another for crimes of rape
against complainant at about the same time and place proper. 154 C. 517. Cited. 155 C. 593. Hospital record of complaining
witness' medical examination on day of rape admitted in evidence as business record pursuant to section 52-180. 158 C.
22, 461. Cited. 162 C. 317. Cited. 175 C. 512, 523.
In case lacking much of brutality, aggravation in assault and surprise attack on wholly innocent victim characteristic
of majority of cases, sentence of eight to twelve years on review reduced to five to twelve years. 22 CS 42. Cited. 22 CS
493; 27 CS 235; 29 CS 94, 187.
Annotation to former section 53-238:
Cited. 166 C. 96.
Annotations to former section 53-239:
Proof of rape will sustain complaint for assault with intent to rape. 7 C. 56. Person charged with rape may be convicted
of assault with intent to rape. 19 C. 392. Any language in complaint charging exertion of physical force sufficient without
use of words "with actual violence". 31 C. 213. This section is in affirmation of common law and a verdict of "attempt to
commit rape" sufficient. 70 C. 114. Various matters of evidence considered; reputation of accused and complainant. 84
C. 222. Is infamous crime within meaning of section 46-13. 128 C. 129. Corroboration of complainant's testimony not
essential to proof of guilt. 133 C. 600. Cited. 152 C. 703; 154 C. 517, 521. Cited. 162 C. 6.
Annotation to former section 53-241:
Statute applies in court where person is originally presented or in court to which he is bound over or appeals. 132 C. 685.
Annotations to chapter 952, part VI:
Cited. 192 C. 154, 158, 163. Secs. 53a-65 through 53a-90 cited. 202 C. 333, 340. Secs. 53a-65-53a-90 cited. 230 C.
43, 78.
Cited. 35 CA 173, 181.
Sec. 53a-65. Definitions. As used in this part, except section 53a-70b, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) "Actor" means a person accused of sexual assault.
(2) "Sexual intercourse" means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or
cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Its meaning is limited to persons not
married to each other. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal
intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal
opening of the victim's body.
(3) "Sexual contact" means any contact with the intimate parts of a person not
married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose
of degrading or humiliating such person or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor
with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor
or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person.
(4) "Mentally defective" means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect
which renders such person incapable of appraising the nature of such person's conduct.
(5) "Mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable
of appraising or controlling such person's conduct owing to the influence of a drug or
intoxicating substance administered to such person without such person's consent, or
owing to any other act committed upon such person without such person's consent.
(6) "Physically helpless" means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason
is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.
(7) "Use of force" means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual
physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.
(8) "Intimate parts" means the genital area, groin, anus, inner thighs, buttocks or
breasts.
(9) "Psychotherapist" means a physician, psychologist, nurse, substance abuse
counselor, social worker, clergyman, marital and family therapist, mental health service
provider or other person, whether or not licensed or certified by the state, who performs
or purports to perform psychotherapy.
(10) "Psychotherapy" means the professional treatment, assessment or counseling
of a mental or emotional illness, symptom or condition.
(11) "Emotionally dependent" means that the nature of the patient's or former patient's emotional condition and the nature of the treatment provided by the psychotherapist are such that the psychotherapist knows or has reason to know that the patient or
former patient is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact by or sexual intercourse
with the psychotherapist.
(12) "Therapeutic deception" means a representation by a psychotherapist that sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist is consistent with or part
of the patient's treatment.
(13) "School employee" means a teacher, substitute teacher, school administrator,
school superintendent, guidance counselor, psychologist, social worker, nurse, physician, school paraprofessional or coach employed by a local or regional board of education or a private elementary or secondary school or working in a public or private elementary or secondary school.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 66; P.A. 75-619, S. 1; P.A. 81-27, S. 2; P.A. 85-341, S. 1; P.A. 87-259; P.A. 92-260, S. 32; P.A.
93-340, S. 1; P.A. 94-221, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted definitions of "deviate sexual intercourse", "female" and "forcible compulsion", added
definitions of "actor", "use of force" and "intimate parts", redefined "sexual intercourse" in detail where previously defined
as having "its ordinary meaning" and made minor changes in wording of remaining definitions; P.A. 81-27 exempted
section 53a-70b from applicability of definitions in this section; P.A. 85-341 amended definition of sexual contact to
include "contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification
of the actor"; P.A. 87-259 amended definition of sexual contact to include contact made for the purpose of degrading or
humiliating the victim; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in the definition of sexual intercourse by repositioning
language; P.A. 93-340 added definitions of "psychotherapist", "psychotherapy", "emotionally dependent" and "therapeutic
deception"; P.A. 94-221 added the definition of "school employee".
Cited. 170 C. 111. Statute includes definition of sexual intercourse and provides that "penetration, however slight, is
sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio ...". It specifically omits cunnilingus, therefore
penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757, 765, 767. Cited. 187 C. 216,
220, 221. Cited. 191 C. 453, 463. Cited. 192 C. 154, 160, 161. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 210 C. 110, 127.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 112, 118. Cited. Id., 316, 322. Cited. 33 CA 133, 139. Cited. 35 CA 173, 174,
180. Smacking victim's buttocks considered to be sexual contact. 59 CA 538.
Former section 53-216 cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 45.
Subdiv. (2):
Court properly defined the term "cunnilingus" since statute contained no specific definitions. Penetration is not an
essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757, 763, 765. Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 194 C.
258, 271, 273. Cited. 198 C. 285, 289. Cited. Id., 617, 621. Cited. 201 C. 211, 215, 216. Cited. 202 C. 509, 514. Cited.
207 C. 646, 652. Cited. 209 C. 733, 740. Cited. 210 C. 110, 115, 117, 123-125, 127-129. Cited. 211 C. 18, 35. Cited. 224
C. 397, 412, 413, 415. Cited. 226 C. 618, 660. Penetration of the labia majora constitutes vaginal penetration. 252 C. 795.
Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when alleged victim is
compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the mouth. 256 C. 517.
Cited. 7 CA 489, 493. Cited. Id., 701, 709. Cited. 11 CA 102, 110, 117-119. Cited. Id., 316, 319. Cited. 14 CA 451,
455. Cited. 23 CA 712, 714. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 626; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.;
judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.; judgment reversed see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 33 CA 133, 139. Withdrawal
of consent communicated to the other person followed by a compelling use of force to continue sexual intercourse would
constitute sexual assault. 35 CA 173, 180, 181. Cited. 38 CA 56, 59-61. Cited. 41 CA 139, 141. Cited. Id., 287, 296. Cited.
43 CA 785. Applies least penetration doctrine. 50 CA 715.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 619. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 386, 410. Cited. 224 C. 397, 417.
Cited. Id., 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 725, 730. Cited. 8 CA 607, 613. Cited. 11 CA 102, 114. Cited. 15 CA 251, 278. Cited. 20 CA 694,
698. Cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 627,
636; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 224 C.
656 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 402, 408. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 291. Cited. 31 CA 452, 454.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Cited. 205 C. 386, 398.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 186 C. 757, 766. Subpara. (B) cited. 189 C. 611, 629. Subpara. (B) cited. 202 C. 509, 514; 205 C. 386, 391, 393.
Cited. 228 C. 552, 570.
Cited. 7 CA 489, 493. Cited. 11 CA 316, 319. Cited. 14 CA 40. Cited. Id., 451, 454. Cited. 16 CA 75, 79. Subpara. (B)
cited. 18 CA 694, 698. Cited. 21 CA 411, 419. Cited. 30 CA 281, 288.
Subdiv. (8):
Cited. 186 C. 757, 767. Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 619. Cited. 192 C. 154, 160. Cited. 207 C. 456, 463.
Cited. 11 CA 316, 321. Cited. 20 CA 694, 697. Cited. 25 CA 653, 657; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited.
26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 627; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 402, 408.
Sec. 53a-66. Lack of consent. Section 53a-66 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 67; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-67. Affirmative defenses. (a) In any prosecution for an offense under this
part based on the victim's being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this part, except an offense under section
53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, it shall be an affirmative defense
that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, living
together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal status
of their relationship.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 68; P.A. 75-619, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 3; P.A. 90-162.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed as affirmative defense the actor's belief that alleged
victim was above the specified age in cases where age is an element of offense unless victim is under fourteen, relettering
Subsec. (c) accordingly; P.A. 81-27 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70b;
P.A. 90-162 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a
or 53a-72b.
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 202 C. 86, 91.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388.
Subsec. (b):
Discussion of "cohabitation" and burden of producing evidence thereof for entitlement to a charge on the affirmative
defense under statute. 181 C. 426, 432-434. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191, 193, 195, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 739-741, 752. Cited.
233 C. 813, 850.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 730. Cited. 10 CA 709, 712, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 116. Sec. 53a-67(c) (Revised to 1972) cited. Id.
Cited. 25 CA 384, 389. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.
Secs. 53a-68 and 53a-69. Corroboration; exceptions. Time limitation for complaint. Sections 53a-68 and 53a-69 are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 69, 70; P.A. 74-131; P.A. 76-216; P.A. 87-223.)
Sec. 53a-70. Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony. (a) A person
is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another
person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or
a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a
third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person
or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such
other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older
than such person, or (3) commits sexual assault in the second degree as provided in
section 53a-71 and in the commission of such offense is aided by two or more other
persons actually present, or (4) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and
such other person is mentally incapacitated to the extent that such other person is unable
to consent to such