US Laws, Codes, Statutes & Cases

      Sec. 53a-43. Fines for violations. A fine for a violation shall be fixed by the court in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars. In the case of a violation defined in any other section of the general statutes, if the amount of the fine is expressly specified in the section that defines the offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance with such section.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 43.)

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.

      Sec. 53a-44. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain. If a person has gained money or property through the commission of any felony, misdemeanor or violation, upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense under section 53a-41, 53a-42 or 53a-43, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of the offense. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant's gain from the offense and, if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For purposes of this section, the term "gain" means the amount of money or the value of property derived.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 44; P.A. 92-260, S. 21.)

      History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in punctuation.

      Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.

      Sec. 53a-45. Murder: Penalty; waiver of jury trial; finding of lesser degree. (a) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.

      (b) If a person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a waives his right to a jury trial and elects to be tried by a court, the court shall be composed of three judges designated by the Chief Court Administrator or his designee, who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.

      (c) The court or jury before which any person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a is tried may find such person guilty of homicide in a lesser degree than that charged.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 45; P.A. 73-137, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 13, 28; P.A. 82-298, S. 4; P.A. 83-210, S. 2, 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 22.)

      History: P.A. 73-137 added reference to capital felonies in Subsec. (a) and substituted reference to Sec. 53a-46a for reference to Sec. 53a-46, deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed person indicted for murder to plead guilty with consent of court and state's attorney in which case court would sentence him as for a Class A felony, relettering former Subsecs. (c) and (d) accordingly; P.A. 80-442 specified punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a and deleted reference to death sentenced under Sec. 53a-46a in Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 82-298 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that court shall be composed of three judges designated by chief court administrator, who shall also name one such judge to preside, where previously one judge was the judge presiding at the session and the other two were designated by the chief justice of the supreme court; P.A. 83-210 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) by inserting "or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add exception for "murder under section 53a-54d", amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that such judges or a majority of them "shall determine the question of guilt or innocence and shall, as provided in said section 53a-46a, render judgment and impose sentence" with "shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly", and amended Subsec. (c) to replace "him" with "such person".

      See annotations to part IV.

      Cited. 187 C. 6, 28.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 201 C. 435, 438.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 180 C. 382, 404. Cited. 190 C. 639, 640. Cited. 198 C. 77, 90. Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 381.

      Subsec. (c):

      Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 399, 400, 402, 403, 407. Cited. 181 C. 187, 200; id., 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66, 71, 72. Cited. 187 C. 6, 28. Cited. 188 C. 542, 546. Cited. 190 C. 639, 652. Cited. 193 C. 695, 732. Cited. 195 C. 232, 243. Manslaughter is not lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 422, 427. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. Id., 368, 372. Cited. 206 C. 346, 359. Cited. 210 C. 78, 105. Cited. 212 C. 593, 607. Cited. 214 C. 57, 63. Cited. 225 C. 55, 65. Cited. 226 C. 237, 250. Cited. 231 C. 115, 140. Cited. 240 C. 727.

      Cited. 7 CA 180, 187. Cited. 17 CA 502, 521; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 40 CA 151, 164.

      Cited. 42 CS 426, 429.

      Subsec. (d):

      Cited. 206 C. 346, 359.

      Sec. 53a-46. Sentencing proceedings; appeal. Section 53a-46 is repealed.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 46; 1972, P.A. 56, S. 1; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)

      Sec. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence. (a) A person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony only if a hearing is held in accordance with the provisions of this section.

      (b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character, background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i). Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists. Such hearing shall be conducted (1) before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection (b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause, or (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.

      (c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material contained in any presentence report which may have been prepared. No presentence information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials. The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant.

      (d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been established by the evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating factors are such as do not constitute a defense or excuse for the capital felony of which the defendant has been convicted, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise constitute a basis for a sentence less than death.

      (e) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d).

      (f) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and (3) (A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i), the court shall sentence the defendant to death.

      (g) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exists, or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

      (h) The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e), that at the time of the offense (1) the defendant was under the age of eighteen years, or (2) the defendant was a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, or (3) the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (4) the defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 53a-10 for the offense, which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation in such offense was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (5) the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the course of commission of the offense of which the defendant was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.

      (i) The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following: (1) The defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a felony and the defendant had previously been convicted of the same felony; or (2) the defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state offenses and one or more federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed, which offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or (7) the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a; or (8) the defendant committed the offense set forth in subdivision (1) of section 53a-54b to avoid arrest for a criminal act or prevent detection of a criminal act or to hamper or prevent the victim from carrying out any act within the scope of the victim's official duties or to retaliate against the victim for the performance of the victim's official duties.

      (P.A. 73-137, S. 4; P.A. 80-332, S. 1; 80-442, S. 14, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 1; P.A. 93-306, S. 12; P.A. 95-19, S. 1; P.A. 01-151, S. 1, 2, 5.)

      History: P.A. 80-332 restated provisions and referred to mitigating or aggravating factors throughout, replacing references to factors set forth in Subsecs. (f) and (g); P.A. 80-442 referred to imposition of sentence in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(1) rather than to sentence for a Class A felony in Subsec. (e), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added a new Subsec. (d) to specify the procedure for the determination by a jury or court of the existence of a mitigating factor and to add a definition of mitigating factors, relettered the remaining Subsecs. and amended Subsec. (f) to replace "a sentence in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(1)" with "a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release"; P.A. 93-306 amended Subsec. (h) to add as an aggravating factor that the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon; P.A. 95-19 revised section to permit the jury or court to make findings as to whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors and require the court to sentence the defendant accordingly, while retaining provision that the existence of certain factors concerning the defendant will operate to automatically bar the imposition of the death sentence, and, more specifically, amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the separate hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates "that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists" rather than "that one or more mitigating factors exist" and make technical changes, amended Subsec. (c) to make technical changes, amended Subsec. (e) to require the jury or court to return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to "the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d)" rather than "the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor", amended Subsec. (f) to revise the circumstances that must be found for the court to impose the death sentence by requiring the court to sentence the defendant to death if the jury or court finds "that (1) none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and (3)(A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i)" rather than "that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist and that no mitigating factor exists", designated provisions of Subsec. (f) re the circumstances that must be found for the court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release as new Subsec. (g) and amended said Subsec. to require the court to impose said sentence if the jury or court finds "that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exists or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors" rather than "that none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exists or that one or more mitigating factors exist", redesignated former Subsec. (g) as new Subsec. (h) and amended said Subsec. to replace the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if the jury or court finds that "any mitigating factor exists" and that "the mitigating factors to be considered concerning the defendant shall include, but are not limited to" the five enumerated factors with the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if the jury or court finds any of the enumerated factors and deleted former Subdiv. (3) as a factor that would in and of itself bar the imposition of the death sentence the circumstance that at the time of the offense the defendant "was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution", renumbering Subdivs. (4) and (5) as Subdivs. (3) and (4), respectively, redesignated former Subsec. (h) re aggravating factors as new Subsec. (i) and amended said Subsec. to replace the provision requiring the court to impose the death sentence if no mitigating factor is present and the jury or court finds one of the enumerated factors with "The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following:"; P.A. 01-151 amended Subsec. (h) to add new Subdiv. (2) barring the imposition of the death sentence on a defendant who was a person with mental retardation, as defined in Sec. 1-1g, redesignate existing Subdivs. (2), (3) and (4) as Subdivs. (3), (4) and (5), and make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and amended Subsec. (i) to add Subdiv. (8) establishing as an aggravating factor the commission of the offense set forth in Sec. 53a-54b(1) to avoid arrest for a criminal act, prevent detection of a criminal act, hamper or prevent the victim carrying out the victim's official duties or retaliate against the victim for performance of the victim's official duties and make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.

      See Sec. 53a-35b re definition of "life imprisonment".

      See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.

      Former Sec. 53-10 unconstitutional. 164 C. 162. Cited. 197 C. 436, 440. Cited. 207 C. 374, 375, 382, 383, 390, 392, 393, 399. Cited. 209 C. 225, 227. Cited. 212 C. 258, 260, 264. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 225 C. 559, 562. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185, 189, 193, 229, 235, 236, 245, 252-254, 257-259, 268, 286. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 735, 748. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209, 211, 214, 236, 247, 252, 257, 260. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334, 335, 338. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409. Court upheld previous holding that statute does not require a capital sentencer to give mitigating force to any particular proven factor solely because that factor establishes something good about the defendant. Instead, statute leaves the decision as to whether a proven factor is mitigating in nature to sentencer's reasoned moral judgment. 264 C. 1. Once sentencer has found an aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no requirement that it go further and make an additional determination that the presence of that factor justifies imposition of the death penalty. Id.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 720. Cited. 32 CA 296, 308. Cited. 36 CA 364, 366.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 207 C. 374, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 278. Cited. 237 C. 332, 337. Cited. 238 C. 389. Term "judges" in the first sentence does not entitle defendant who elected to have a jury determine his sentence at the penalty phase hearing to have all three members of the panel before whom the guilt phase was conducted preside at such hearing. 264 C. 1.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 207 C. 374, 383-385, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 238, 266-271, 273. Cited. 235 C. 206, 257, 259. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334. Cited. 241 C. 57. The state may present evidence to rebut mitigation at the penalty phase that would not be admissible under normal rules of evidence. Under the statute, the state like the defendant only has to meet the relevancy standard for evidence to be allowed. 251 C. 579.

      Subsec. (d):

      Cited. 207 C. 374, 383, 386, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 281-284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 218, 229, 234, 251, 255. Cited. 238 C. 389. Mercy is a legitimate consideration only insofar as it is related to mitigating evidence. 264 C. 1. Requirement for capital sentencer to consider "all the facts and circumstances of the case" is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. Lack of remorse is not listed as a statutory aggravating factor, and so may not be relied upon as an aggravating factor, but because mitigating factors call upon jury to elect whether to exercise mercy, defendant's lack of remorse will be relevant generally to rebut defendant's claimed mitigating factors. 266 C. 171. Jury must make its determination of whether the proposed mitigating evidence is mitigating in nature considering all facts and circumstances of the case, but statute does not require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. Id.

      Subsec. (e):

      Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Imposition of death penalty premised on two unanimous findings by trier of fact that (1) existence of aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt by state; (2) existence of a mitigating factor not proved by defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. 207 C. 374, 382, 383, 386-388, 390, 392-394. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 239, 240, 243, 244. Cited. 235 C. 206, 215, 236, 247.

      Subsec. (f):

      Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 391. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237-240, 258, 285. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 235 C. 206, 219, 238, 245-247. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 389. Statute requires that jury determine that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors by any amount or degree. 266 C. 171. In light of the unique nature of death penalty, of the need for reliability and consistency and the nature of rendering a verdict requiring death penalty, jury must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors and therefore it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death sentence should be imposed. Id.

      Subsec. (g):

      Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 384. Cited. 212 C. 258, 262. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 183, 272, 284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 247, 251. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 229. Cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 828. Although trial court should generally use language of Subdiv. (2) in instructing jury on the statutory mitigating factor, it is not possible that court's minor misstatement, involving such a tenuous semantic distinction, could have misled jury. 269 C. 213. General thrust of statute as a whole persuades us that legislature intended to recognize as mitigating, per se, only those factors that tend to reduce defendant's moral culpability for the offense and make it unlikely that threat of execution would serve as effective deterrent. Id. "Mental capacity" as used in Subdiv. (2) is not open-ended term referring to any and all types of mental function, but refers specifically to defendant's ability, at time of the offense, to understand the wrongful nature and consequences of his conductLlegislature's intent in enactingsubsec. was to specify factual circumstances under which defendant's moral culpability for committing the offense is reduced. Id. In order to establish either prong of the mitigating factor of Subdiv. (2), defendant must show that his mental impairment had a causal nexus with the offense, thereby reducing his moral culpability. Id.

      Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 364, 366.

      Subsec. (h):

      Subdiv. (4) cited. 209 C. 225, 229. Subdiv. (4): Meaning of "especially cruel" must include intentional infliction of extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. 212 C. 258, 259, 265, 266, 270, 271. Cited. Id., 258, 262. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 258, 265. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (6) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 230 C. 183, 185, 190, 193, 242, 252, 255, 256, 258-262, 265, 274, 276, 278. Cited. Id., 183, 237, 259, 261. Subdiv. (4) cited. 235 C. 206, 214, 219, 220. Cited. Id., 206, 221, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Cited. 242 C. 409. "Same felony" means a felony that is the same in all material respects as the felony that is committed in this state during commission of the capital felony. That requirement is fully satisfied only if the two felonies share the same essential elements. 264 C. 1.

      Subsec. (i):

      To qualify as an aggravating factor that defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, victim must have suffered extreme pain and torture beyond that necessary to cause death. 253 C. 1. Subdiv. (6) does not apply to a capital felony committed during the course of a robbery. 261 C. 111. In order to establish the aggravating factor defined in Subdiv. (4), state must prove that defendant murdered both victims in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. 262 C. 537.

      Subdiv. (1): To ensure that prior felony conviction that is based on a constitutionally invalid guilty plea is not used as aggravant in a death penalty case, it is in the interests of justice that court hear evidence on whether the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made, and defendant bears burden of establishing the constitutional invalidity of prior plea. 48 CS 279.

      Sec. 53a-46b. Review of death sentence. (a) Any sentence of death imposed in accordance with the provisions of section 53a-46a shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rules. In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate said sentence and remand for imposition of a sentence in accordance with subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a.

      (b) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that: (1) The sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; or (2) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating factor specified in subsection (i) of section 53a-46a.

      (c) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal and, if an appeal is taken, the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall then render its decision on the legal errors claimed and the validity of the sentence.

      (P.A. 80-332, S. 2; P.A. 81-472, S. 151, 159; P.A. 85-366, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 23; P.A. 95-16, S. 3, 5; 95-19, S. 3.)

      History: P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 85-366 made a technical change to reflect changes made to Sec. 53a-46a by same public act; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes; P.A. 95-16 amended Subsec. (b) by deleting Subdiv. (3) that had required the Supreme Court to affirm the death sentence unless it determines the sentence to be excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, effective April 12, 1995; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change.

      Cited. 212 C. 258, 271. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on due process rights. 230 C. 183, 185, 188, 191, 193, 236, 239. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 234 C. 735, 737, 738, 746. Cited. 235 C. 206, 211, 212, 250. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 235 C. 206, 226, 227. Cited. 238 C. 389.

      Subsec. (b):

      Subdiv. (3): Class of similar cases to include all convictions of a capital felony after October 1, 1973, resulting from a trial or from a plea whether or not convictions were followed by imposition of death penalty. 225 C. 559, 560, 563. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 183, 258, 259, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited. 234 C. 735, 736, 740, 741, 759-763. Subdiv. (3): Prohibition against disproportionality discussed. Id., 735-738, 740-742, 745, 747, 748, 750, 752, 760-762. Cited. Id., 735, 763. Cited. 235 C. 206, 216, 227. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 220, 226, 228. Subdiv. (3) cited. 237 C. 332, 338. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3): Court concluded that statutory proportionality review scheme is constitutional and that it involves the precedent seeking method of comparative, rather than traditional, proportionality review. Id.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 237 C. 332, 336, 338. P.A. 95-16, Sec. 3(b) cited. Id.

      Sec. 53a-46c. Applicability of death penalty provisions in effect on and after October 1, 1980. The provisions of sections 53a-46a and 53a-46b in effect on and after October 1, 1980, shall be applicable to any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony under subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of section 53a-54b on or after June 13, 1983.

      (P.A. 83-327, S. 1, 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 24.)

      History: P.A. 92-260 replaced "on October 1, 1980" with "on and after October 1, 1980".

      Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185, 236. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.

      Sec. 53a-46d. Victim impact statement read in court prior to imposition of sentence for crime punishable by death. A victim impact statement prepared with the assistance of a victim advocate to be placed in court files in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 54-220 may be read in court prior to imposition of sentence upon a defendant found guilty of a crime punishable by death.

      (P.A. 00-200, S. 6; P.A. 03-179, S. 2; 03-278, S. 104.)

      History: P.A. 03-179 replaced "prepared by" with "prepared with the assistance of" and made a technical change; P.A. 03-278 made a technical change, effective July 9, 2003.

      Sec. 53a-47. Disposition of person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Confinement and examination. Release. Section 53a-47 is repealed.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 47; P.A. 75-476, S. 5, 6; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 2, 115, 127; P.A. 81-301, S. 2; P.A. 83-486, S. 2; P.A. 85-506, S. 31, 32.)

      Sec. 53a-48. Conspiracy. Renunciation. (a) A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.

      (b) It shall be a defense to a charge of conspiracy that the actor, after conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 48, 49; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 16.)

      History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (b) to remove reference to "affirmative" defense.

      See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.

      Cited. 169 C. 377, 380. Cited. Id., 517, 518. Cited. Id., 642, 643, 645. Generally may prosecute and sentence defendant for both conspiracy to commit offense and offense itself; Wharton's rule: An agreement by two persons to commit crime which necessarily requires participation of two persons cannot be prosecuted as conspiracy; rule currently valid only as presumption of legislative intent (dissent noted); exception to rule when more persons than required participate. 171 C. 105. Abuse of conspiracy charge to bring in otherwise improper evidence. Id. Cited. Id., 524, 528. Cited. 172 C. 74, 75. Cited. 174 C. 135, 136. Cited. Id., 338, 339, 344. Cited. Id., 376. Cited. 176 C. 131, 132. Cited. 177 C. 370, 371. Cited. 178 C. 67, 68; id., 163, 164; id., 649, 650. A defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under this section is before jury. Id., 704, 708. Cited. 180 C. 481, 482. Cited. 182 C. 262, 263; id., 595, 600. Cited. 184 C. 369, 370, 377, 378. Cited. 186 C. 426, 427; id., 648, 649; id., 696, 707. Cited. 187 C. 109, 111; id., 264, 265; id., 513, 514. Cited. 188 C. 515, 516, 529; id., 542, 543; id., 671, 675. Cited. 189 C. 201, 202; id., 337, 339. Cited. 190 C. 259, 260. Cited. 191 C. 360, 362. Cited. 194 C. 18, 20. Cited. Id., 361, 362. Cited. 195 C. 128, 129. Cited. Id., 183, 185. Cited. Id., 598, 604. Cited. 196 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 197 C. 201, 203. Cited. Id., 326, 327. Cited. Id., 413, 415. Cited. Id., 644, 656. "There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of recklessly or negligently causing a result," therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this statute and Sec. 53a-113 is not crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1-3, 5. Cited. Id., 14, 16. Cited. 200 C. 113, 114. Cited. Id., 310, 311, 314. Cited. 201 C. 489, 490, 496, 497, 501. Cited. 202 C. 520, 526, 527, 529. Cited. 204 C. 240, 241, 250, 257, 258. Cited. Id., 630, 636, 637. Cited. 207 C. 323, 324. Cited. 209 C. 1, 6. Cited. 210 C. 435, 438, 439. Cited. 211 C. 289, 293. Cited. 212 C. 195, 196, 199-203. Cited. Id., 387, 389. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. 213 C. 233-235. Conspiracy charge against a defendant is barred after acquittal of sole alleged coconspirator. Conspiracy statute as "bilateral" in nature discussed. Id., 243, 250. Cited. Id., 422, 424. Cited. Id., 708, 711, 721. Cited. 215 C. 716, 718. Cited. Id., 739, 743. Cited. 216 C. 801. Cited. 218 C. 349-351. Cited. Id., 432, 433, 435. Cited. 220 C. 602, 604, 606. Cited. Id., 765, 767, 771. Cited. 221 C. 447, 449. Cited. Id., 595, 598. Cited. 223 C. 243, 245, 248, 263. Cited. Id., 384, 386. Cited. 224 C. 322, 323. Cited. 225 C. 270, 271. Cited. Id., 347, 349. Cited. 227 C. 1, 3. Cited. Id., 32, 35. Cited. Id., 207, 210, 211. Cited. 235 C. 397, 398. Cited. Id., 679, 682, 683. Cited. Id., 748, 750. Cited. 236 C. 176, 178. Cited. Id., 514, 517. Cited. 237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 380. Cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 708. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. 242 C. 93.

      Cited. 1 CA 524. Cited. 3 CA 503. Cited. 5 CA 347, 348. Cited. Id., 491, 492, 494. Cited. Id., 599, 600, 604. Cited. 8 CA 119, 120. Cited. Id., 478, 480, 481, 490. Cited. Id., 667, 671. Cited. 9 CA 548, 549. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id., 147, 148. Cited. Id., 447, 448, 451, 453, 455. Cited. 11 CA 397-399. Cited. Id., 621, 623. Cited. 14 CA 205, 207. Cited. Id., 445-447. Cited. Id., 605, 607. Cited. Id., 807. Cited. 15 CA 122, 123, 125. Cited. 15 CA 328, 329. Cited. Id., 539, 540. Cited. 16 CA 18, 20, 33. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 17 CA 247, 248. Cited. Id., 648, 650. Cited. 19 CA 554, 555, 562- 564. Cited. Id., 640, 641. Cited. 21 CA 299, 301, 309, 311, 313. Cited. Id., 386, 387, 392, 403. Cited. Id., 519, 520. Cited. 22 CA 449, 450. Cited. Id., 567, 569, 577. Cited. 23 CA 502, 506. Cited. Id., 615, 617. Cited. Id., 667, 670. Cited. 24 CA 316, 318. Cited. Id., 493, 494. Cited. 26 CA 94, 100. Cited. Id., 667, 668. Cited. Id., 779, 780. Cited. 27 CA 596, 597. Cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Cited. Id., 126, 128, 134. Cited. Id., 416, 420. Cited. 29 CA 359, 361. Cited. Id., 843, 844. Cited. 30 CA 190-192. Cited. Id., 232, 241. Cited. Id., 550, 558. Cited. Id., 654, 655. Cited. Id., 712, 713. Cited. 32 CA 224, 226. Cited. 33 CA 253, 254. Cited. Id., 409, 410. Cited. 34 CA 751, 753. Cited. 35 CA 714, 716, 717. Cited. Id., 839, 841-843, 846, 848, 849. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited. Id., 190, 200. Cited. Id., 454, 455. Cited. Id., 556-558, 570, 571. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. Id., 672, 673. Cited. Id., 753, 755, 764. Cited. Id., 774, 775. Cited. 37 CA 219. Cited. Id., 456, 458; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 536, 538. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. Id., 777, 778, 800. Cited. Id., 868, 869. Cited. 39 CA 224, 226. Cited. Id., 333, 336, 342. Cited. Id., 526, 540. Cited. Id., 550, 553. Cited. 40 CA 515, 520. Cited. Id., 789, 791. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. Id., 147, 148. Cited. Id., 495, 498. Cited. 42 CA 472. Cited. Id., 500. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 687. Cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. Id., 252. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 44 CA 338. Cited. 45 CA 110. Cited. Id., 282. Cited. Id., 455. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 791. Elements of crime of conspiracy under sec. discussed. 63 CA 82. Statute is bilateral in nature in that conspiracy requires a showing that two or more coconspirators intended to engage in or cause conduct that constitutes a crime. 64 CA 384. Conviction and sentencing for multiple conspiracy offenses based on a single agreement is double jeopardy violation. 65 CA 788. Elements of crime of conspiracy discussed. 70 CA 393. There was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly entered into a conspiracy to possess a narcotic substance with intent to sell. 75 CA 223.

      Cited. 29 CS 344. Cited. 30 CS 211. Overt act is essential element of offense and must be alleged in information charging conspiracy. 35 CS 96, 97. Cited. 36 CS 603, 604; 37 CS 527, 528, 531; id., 853. Cited. 38 CS 301, 302, 308; id., 374, 375; id., 593, 594, 596.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 171 C. 524, 527, 529. Cited. 177 C. 243. Cited. 186 C. 696, 697. Cited. 187 C. 264, 271. Cited. 189 C. 752, 754. Cited. 192 C. 383-385. Cited. 195 C. 598, 599. Cited. 197 C. 644, 645, 654. Cited. 199 C. 389, 391. Cited. 200 C. 586, 587. Cited. 201 C. 289, 290, 298, 300. Cited. 202 C. 520, 528. Cited. 203 C. 420, 421. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242. Cited. 207 C. 118, 120. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81. Cited. Id., 619, 621. Cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Cited. Id., 195, 197, 200. Cited. Id., 485, 488. Cited. 213 C. 243, 244. Cited. 214 C. 122, 123. Cited. Id., 344, 347. Cited. 215 C. 570, 576. Cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Cited. 218 C. 151-153. Cited. 221 C. 595, 598. Cited. 223 C. 384, 386. Cited. Id., 635, 637, 638. Cited. 227 C. 32, 35, 41. Cited erroneously as Subsec. (1). Id., 363, 365. Cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 537, 538. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504. Cited. 239 C. 235. Cited. Id., 467. Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 727. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 296. Appellate court in State v. Torres, 41 CA 495 reversed trial court's judgment on grounds of insufficient evidence to convict, judgment of appellate court reversed. Id., 485. Evidence was sufficient to support conspiracy conviction. 253 C. 354. Where two defendants were tried separately and their respective juries were presented with separate, independent evidence of their agreement to commit the crime in question, acquittal of the defendant's coconspirator did not nullify defendant's conviction of the same charge. 257 C. 587.

      Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 9 CA 313, 314, 317. Cited. 10 CA 447, 452. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Cited. Id., 605, 609. Cited. Id., 688, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 416, 417. Cited. 16 CA 89, 90. Cited. Id., 245, 248. Cited. Id., 402, 403. Cited. 18 CA 134, 137. Cited. 19 CA 179-181, 186. Cited. Id., 195, 196. Cited. 20 CA 665, 666. Cited. 21 CA 386, 400. Cited. 22 CA 340, 341. Cited. 23 CA 502-504. Cited. Id., 602, 604. Cited. Id., 667, 669, 670. Cited. Id., 746, 747; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 595 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 493, 498. Cited. 25 CA 3, 4. Id., 21, 22. Cited. Id., 318, 319. Cited. 26 CA 94, 95, 99. Cited. Id., 279, 280. Cited. 27 CA 558, 560. Cited. 28 CA 126, 134. Cited. Id., 161, 162, 168. Cited. Id., 306-308. Cited. Id., 474, 475. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 29 CA 59, 60, 62. Cited. Id., 207, 211. Cited. Id., 843, 844, 858. Cited. 30 CA 232, 234. Cited. Id., 550, 551, 557. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371. Cited. 32 CA 842, 843. Cited. 33 CA 122, 123. Cited. Id., 339, 340; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 409, 410. Cited. Id., 647, 648, 650, 657. Cited. 34 CA 58, 59; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 96, 97; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. Id., 751, 753; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 740, 742. Cited. 36 CA 41, 42. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 454, 455. Cited. Id., 483, 484. Cited. Id., 488, 489. Cited. Id., 556, 557. Cited. Id., 672, 673. Cited. Id., 753, 755. Cited. 37 CA 156, 158. Cited. Id., 360, 361. Cited. Id., 456, 458; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176 et seq. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. 38 CA 434, 435. Cited. Id., 481, 483. Cited. Id., 536, 538. Cited. Id., 777, 778. Cited. 39 CA 63, 64. Cited. Id., 224, 226. Cited. Id., 242, 244. Cited. Id., 333, 336. Cited. Id., 526, 528. Cited. Id., 550, 553. Cited. Id., 579, 580, 599. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. 40 CA 47, 48. Cited. Id., 515, 516. Cited. Id., 526, 527, 533. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited. Id., 495. Cited. 42 CA 500. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 687. Cited. 43 CA 488. Cited. Id., 830. Cited. 44 CA 338. Cited. Id., 499. Cited. 45 CA 270. Cited. 46 CA 640. Conviction for conspiracy to sell a controlled substance within one thousand five hundred feet of a public housing project reversed where trial court instructed that jury must find that conspiracy occurred within one thousand five hundred feet of public housing project. The law is not concerned with where the plan was hatched, but with where conspirators proposed to carry out its unlawful purpose. 73 CA 386.

      Cited. 44 CS 490.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 40 CA 526, 532, 533.

      Sec. 53a-49. Criminal attempt: Sufficiency of conduct; renunciation as defense. (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.

      (b) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law: (1) Lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime; (2) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; (3) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; (4) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; (5) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (7) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime.

      (c) When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection (a) of this section, it shall be a defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 50; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 17; P.A. 92-260, S. 25.)

      History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (c) to remove reference to "affirmative" defense; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.

      See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.

      Cited. 169 C. 377, 380. Cited. Id., 581. Cited. 173 C. 254, 255. Cited. Id., 317, 318, 325. Cited. Id., 360, 362, 363. Cited. 174 C. 16, 17. Cited. Id., 142, 144. Cited. 175 C. 398, 399. Cited. 179 C. 1, 2. Cited. 180 C. 481, 482. Cited. 182 C. 207, 208; Id., 430, 432; Id., 595, 596, 598, 600. Cited. 183 C. 29, 30. Cited. 184 C. 157, 158. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164; Id., 199, 200. Cited. 186 C. 261, 262. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Cited. 189 C. 383, 385. Cited. 193 C. 70, 76. Cited. 193 C. 602, 603. Cited. 194 C. 233, 234. Cited. Id., 241, 242. Cited. Id., 408-410, 412. Cited. 195 C. 611, 612, 618. Cited. 196 C. 36, 38. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 198 C. 124, 126. Cited. 199 C. 14, 16. Cited. Id., 155, 159. Cited. Id., 591, 593. Cited. 200 C. 30, 31. Cited. 201 C. 174, 176. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 289, 294, 297, 300. Cited. Id., 605, 606. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 509, 510. Cited. Id., 520, 527, 529. Cited. 203 C. 445, 446. Cited. Id., 484, 486. Cited. 204 C. 630, 636, 637. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Cited. Id., 616, 617. Cited. 206 C. 213, 214. Cited. 207 C. 1, 10, 12. Cited. 209 C. 34, 41, 42, 44. Cited. 210 C. 519, 521. Cited. Id., 652, 689, 692. Cited. 214 C. 454, 457. Cited. 215 C. 695, 698. Cited. Id., 716, 718. Cited. 216 C. 585, 586, 602. Cited. Id., 647, 649, 661. Cited. 218 C. 747, 748. Cited. 220 C. 384, 385. Cited. Id., 765, 767, 768, 774. Cited. 221 C. 109, 112. Cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Cited. 222 C. 718, 719, 724. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 227 C. 301, 302, 311, 316, 318-320. Cited. 228 C. 384, 385. Cited. Id., 393, 395, 396. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. 231 C. 235, 237. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Cited. 235 C. 397, 398. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 469, 470. Cited. Id., 502, 503, 505, 516, 518. Cited. Id., 748, 750. Cited. 236 C. 266, 267. Cited. 237 C. 501. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 748. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 413. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 389. Cited. Id., 648.

      Cited. 1 CA 344, 345. Cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Cited. 6 CA 24, 25. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 257, 258. Cited. Id., 367, 370. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 351, 352. Cited. Id., 496, 497, 504, 506. Cited. Id., 545, 548. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. 9 CA 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Cited. Id., 587, 588. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. 12 CA 32, 33. Cited. Id., 163, 170. Cited. Id., 217. Cited. Id., 395, 396. Cited. Id., 604-606. Cited. Id., 685. Cited. 13 CA 69, 74, 75. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 704, 705, 712. Cited. 16 CA 38, 39. Cited. Id., 284, 285. Cited. 17 CA 359, 360. Cited. 19 CA 618, 619. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Cited. 21 CA 326. Cited. Id., 386, 387, 403. Cited. 22 CA 199, 201. Cited. Id., 340, 341. Cited. Id., 449, 450. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. Id., 624, 625, 627. Cited. Id., 697, 698. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106, 110. Cited. Id., 298, 300. Cited. Id., 334, 335. Cited. Id., 433, 434, 441. Cited. Id., 578, 579, 582. Cited. Id., 725, 726. Cited. 27 CA 73, 74 92. Cited. Id., 403, 404. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Cited. Id., 64, 66. Cited. Id., 469. Cited. 30 CA 26, 28, 29, 35. Cited. 30 CA 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371, 376. Cited. 33 CA 339, 350; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Cited. Id., 223, 224, 226. Cited. 35 CA 51, 53. Cited. Id., 138, 139, 148, 153. Cited. Id., 740, 743. Cited. 36 CA 161, 162. Cited. Id., 336, 337. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. Id., 805, 807. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Cited. 37 CA 62, 63; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501 et seq. Cited. Id., 733, 735. Cited. 38 CA 777, 779. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. 39 CA 1, 5. Cited. Id., 18, 19, 23. Cited. Id., 267, 268, 271. Cited. Id., 333, 335. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Cited. Id., 810, 811. Cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. Id., 483, 484. Cited. 41 CA 515, 517. Cited. Id., 751-753. Cited. 42 CA 472. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 252. Cited. Id., 599. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 70. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 476. Cited. 45 CA 390. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 734.

      Cited. 33 CS 599. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756. Cited. 38 CS 464, 465. Cited. 39 CS 347, 353.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 177 C. 140, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. 178 C. 689, 690, 694. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 430, 435. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 585, 587; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 585-588, 592, 594; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 61. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 303-305. Cited. 189 C. 303, 307, 309. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C. 822, 832. Cited. 194 C. 258, 272, 276. Cited. Id., 258, 259, 271, 272, 275. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 258, 272, 276, 277. Cited. 195 C. 651, 655. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54, 62. Cited. 199 C. 255, 257. Cited. 200 C. 30, 35. Cited. Id., 44, 45. Cited. Id., 607. Cited. 201 C. 289, 290. Cited. 202 C. 509, 514. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 520, 526. Cited. Id., 520, 528. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 528, 532. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 616, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 673-675. Subdiv. (2) cited. 207 C. 646, 647. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 202, 203. Cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 733, 736. Cited. 210 C. 652, 687. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 652, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18, 20, 25, 27. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 441, 442. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582, 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. 212 C. 31-33. Cited. Id., 50, 52. Cited. 216 C. 492, 493. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 585, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Subdiv. (2) cited. 220 C. 408. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 652, 653. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 765, 774. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 928. Cited. 221 C. 402, 403. Cited. Id., 915. Subdiv. (2) cited. 222 C. 556, 558. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 718, 721-726. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 718, 721, 722, 724. Cited. Id., 718, 722, 726. Subdiv. (2) cited. 224 C. 397, 399, 403, 414, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 524-526. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 616, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. 229 C. 60, 62. Cited. Id., 125, 127. Cited. Id., 839, 840. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433, 434; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 431, 440; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 235 C. 502, 505, 517. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 502, 515. Cited. 238 C. 313. Subdiv. (2) cited. 240 C. 395. Subdiv. (2) cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 502. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 802. Subdiv. (2) cited. 242 C. 485. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration was insufficient to support conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295.

      Cited. 1 CA 344, 346. Cited. 5 CA 586, 587, 589. Cited. 6 CA 164, 165. Cited. Id., 476, 477. Cited. 7 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 257, 260, 261. Subdiv. (2) cited. 8 CA 496, 505. Cited. Id., 545, 546. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 545, 547. Subdiv. (2) cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 462, 463. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 163, 164, 170. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 221, 222. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 12. Cited. Id., 69, 74. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 237, 238. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 222, 225; Id., 416, 417; Id., 704, 708. Cited. 21 CA 386, 401. Cited. 22 CA 449, 452. Subdiv. (2) cited. 23 CA 160, 161. Cited. Id., 663, 664. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 692, 693. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 27, 28, 35; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 264, 266, 267. Cited. Id., 624, 637-639. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 624, 639, 640. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 25 CA 104, 105, 110. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 104, 106, 110, 111. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 104, 110, 111. Cited. Id., 298, 305. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 433, 441-443. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 441-444. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 578, 582. Subdiv. (2) cited. 26 CA 52, 53. Cited. Id., 65, 66. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 114, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242-244. Cited. Id., 242, 244. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 433, 434. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 779, 780. Cited. Id., 73, 74. Cited. 27 CA 601, 602. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 290, 301, 302. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 306, 308. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 404. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 548, 549, 551, 556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 39, 60, 63-65. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 262, 263. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 9, 10. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 26, 29, 31. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 470, 471, 476. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 606, 607, 610, 611. Cited. 31 CA 120, 121. Cited. Id., 385, 386. Cited. 33 CA 339, 340, 350; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 368, 369. Subdiv. (1) Id., 647, 650. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 743, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 41, 42. Cited. Id., 161, 162. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. Id., 718, 720, 734. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 536, 537. Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 18, 19, 24. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 224, 226. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242, 244. Cited. Id., 333, 335. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 333, 340. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 333, 341. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 387, 388. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 624, 625, 627. Subdiv. (2) cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 287, 288, 294, 294, 296. Cited. 42 CA 264. Subdiv. (2) cited. 43 CA 488. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 578. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 619. Cited. Id., 680. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 785. Cited. 44 CA 6. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 499. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 756. Proof of prior plan or premeditation not necessary to establish criminal liability for attempted murder. 47 CA 401. Subdiv. (2) cited re testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 49 CA 486. Subdiv. (2) cited re showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient to support a charge of larceny. Id. Subdiv. (2): Defendant took substantial step in hiring an agent to commit an arson even though agent was not actually paid. To constitute a substantial step, consummation of the deed is not required. 59 CA 362. Statutory provisions codified common law distinction between the acts of solicitation and attempt and an attempt not a solicitation under Sec. 53a-179a. 65 CA 145. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. To be guilty of crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree defendant must be shown to have had the mental state required to commit assault in the first degree and fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646. Evidence which established that defendant arranged for sale of heroin to undercover police officer then left his residence and traveled in the direction of designated meeting place for the sale was sufficient to find defendant guilty of attempt to commit a crime, in particular, the sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug dependent in violation of Sec. 21a-278(b). 82 CA 111.

      Cited. 41 CS 229, 232. Cited. 43 CS 46, 64.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 182 C. 430, 435. Cited. 194 C. 258, 277. Cited. 205 C. 616, 617, 620. Cited. 209 C. 34, 41, 43. Cited. 211 C. 555, 587, 588.

      Cited. 15 CA 704, 706, 708, 709, 711-713, 715.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 200 C. 30, 35. Cited. 221 C. 915.

      Cited. 17 CA 128, 130. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.

      Sec. 53a-50. Effect of motivation on renunciation. For purposes of this part, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 51.)

      Cited. 182 C. 595, 600.

      Cited. 17 CA 128, 130. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.

      Sec. 53a-51. Classification of attempt and conspiracy. Attempt and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted or is an object of the conspiracy, except that an attempt or conspiracy to commit a class A felony is a class B felony.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 52.)

      Cited. 182 C. 595, 598, 600-602. Cited. 184 C. 369, 377. Cited. 195 C. 183, 185. Cited. 202 C. 520, 527. Cited. 204 C. 630, 637. Cited. 211 C. 18, 26. Cited. 213 C. 708, 713. Cited. 235 C. 502, 515, 517. Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree is subject to the minimum nonsuspendable sentence in Sec. 53a-134(b). 264 C. 593.

      Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 10 CA 447, 456. Cited. 21 CA 299, 309. Cited. 22 CA 567, 578. Cited. 29 CA 843, 859- 861. Cited. 33 CA 253, 261, 262. Cited. 36 CA 190, 205.

      Sec. 53a-52. Conviction; sentencing. Section 53a-52 is repealed.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 53; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)

      Secs. 53a-53 and 53a-54. Homicide defined. Murder defined; affirmative defenses; evidence of mental condition; classification. Sections 53a-53 and 53a-54 are repealed.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 54, 55; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)

      Sec. 53a-54a. Murder. (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.

      (b) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease, mental defect or other mental abnormality is admissible, in a prosecution under subsection (a) of this section, on the question of whether the defendant acted with intent to cause the death of another person.

      (c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.

      (P.A. 73-137, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 15, 28; P.A. 83-486, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 26.)

      History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(2), deleting reference to death penalty imposed as provided by Sec. 53a-46a for capital felony, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 83-486 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing "acted" with "committed the proscribed act or acts"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to add exception for murder under Sec. 53a-54d.

      See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.

      See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.

      Cited. 171 C. 241. Cited. 173 C. 414, 415. Cited. 176 C. 508, 509; 177 C. 1, 2, 8-10. Cited. 178 C. 450, 452, 460; Id., 626, 627. Cited. 179 C. 1, 2; Id., 431, 432. Cited. 180 C. 141, 142. Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. Id., 382, 383. Cited. Id., 589, 590. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66; Id., 388-390; Id., 497, 498; Id., 603, 604, 606. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Cited. 186 C. 261, 262; Id., 476, 477. Cited. 188 C. 626, 629, 642. Cited. 189 C. 303, 304, 308; Id., 346, 347. 190 C. 639, 642. Cited. 191 C. 233, 235; Id., 545, 546. Cited. 194 C. 408-411. Cited. Id., 416, 419. Cited. Id., 483. Cited. Id., 530, 560. Cited. 195 C. 475, 476. Cited. 196 C. 667, 676. Cited. 197 C. 60, 61. Cited. Id., 180, 181. Cited. Id., 337, 340. Cited. Id., 436, 438, 460. Cited. Id., 507, 509, 522. Cited. 198 C. 124, 126. Cited. Id., 209, 210. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 542, 543. Cited. Id., 560. Cited. Id., 573, 574. Cited. Id., 644, 646. Cited. 199 C. 102. Cited. Id., 155, 159. Cited. Id., 163, 164, 166, 178, 179. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. Id., 718, 720. Cited. 200 C. 553, 558. Cited. 201 C. 174, 175. Cited. Id., 190, 191, 198. Cited. Id., 276, 280. Cited. Id., 368, 369. Cited. Id., 605, 606. Cited. 202 C. 18, 19. Cited. Id., 75. Cited. Id., 86, 91. Cited. Id., 316, 317. Cited. 203 C. 212, 213. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242, 257. Cited. 205 C. 279, 280, 282. Cited. Id., 298, 300. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 616, 619. Cited. 206 C. 182, 183. Cited. Id., 213, 214. Cited. Id., 323, 325. Cited. Id., 346, 348, 349. Cited. Id., 512, 513. Cited. Id., 678. Cited. 207 C. 374, 377. Cited. Id., 646-648. Cited. 208 C. 125, 127, 145. Cited. 209 C. 225, 229, 239. Cited. Id., 290, 292. Cited. Id., 622, 623. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81, 106. Cited. Id., 304, 305. Cited. Id., 519, 521. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. Id., 652, 654, 696. Cited. 211 C. 215, 216. Cited. Id., 289, 292, 296, 316. Cited. Id., 441, 442. Cited. 212 C. 325, 326. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 612, 613. Cited. 213 C. 97, 98. Cited. Id., 243, 244, 255. Cited. Id., 388, 389. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 579, 580. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. Id., 708, 721. Cited. 214 C. 57, 59. Cited. Id., 77, 78, 82. Cited. Id., 118. Cited. Id., 454, 457. Cited. Id., 476, 477. Cited. Id., 493, 495. Cited. Id., 616, 617. Cited. 215 C. 231, 232, 253. Cited. Id., 277, 278, 281. Cited. 215 C. 570, 579, 580. Cited. Id., 646-648. Cited. Id., 695, 697. Cited. Id., 739, 742. Cited. 216 C. 139, 140, 142, 148, 149. Cited. Id., 188, 189. Cited. Id., 282, 296. Cited. Id., 301, 302. Cited. Id., 585, 602. Cited. Id., 699, 710, 718. Cited. 218 C. 349, 350. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. Id., 714, 717. Cited. 219 C. 16, 20. Cited. Id., 596, 597. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. Id., 270, 272. Cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 602-604, 606. Cited. Id., 765, 767, 771, 774. Cited. 221 C. 58, 59. Cited. Id., 93, 94. Cited. Id., 109, 111, 112. Cited. 222 C. 506, 510. Cited. 223 C. 273, 274. Cited. Id., 674, 675, 678. Cited. 224 C. 63, 64. Cited Id., 168, 171. Cited. Id., 372, 373, 378. Cited. 225 C. 55, 56, 74. Cited. Id., 114, 116, 120. Cited. Id., 524-526. Cited. Id., 609, 610. Cited. 226 C. 20, 28. Cited. Id., 237, 238. Cited. Id., 497, 499. Cited. 227 C. 231, 233. Cited. Id., 301, 302, 309-311, 316, 318-320. Cited. Id., 417, 419. Cited. Id., 456, 457, 476. Cited. Id., 566, 567. Cited. 228 C. 62, 76. Cited. Id., 118, 128. Cited. Id., 281, 282, 303. Cited. Id., 412, 414. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 328, 333. Cited. Id., 691, 694, 701. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited. Id., 115, 116. Cited. Id., 235, 237. Cited. 233 C. 44, 51. Cited. Id., 215, 216. Cited. 234 C. 139, 142. Cited. Id., 324, 334, 339, 350. Cited. Id., 381, 382. Cited. Id., 683, 684. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209. Cited. Id., 274, 275, 322. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 413, 414. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. 236 C. 189, 196. Failure of trial court to instruct jury on extreme emotional disturbance was error; judgment of appellate court affirming judgment of trial court in State v. Person, 36 CA 448 reversed, Id., 342, 351. Affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cited. Id. Cited. Id., 514, 516, 517. Cited. 237 C. 58, 59. Cited. Id., 339, 340. Cited. Id., 364, 368. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 694. Under appropriate circumstances defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, the same person; judgment of appellate court in State v. Williams, 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id., 588. Cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 727. Cited. Id., 743. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 605. Cited. Id., 666. Cited. 247 C. 318. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration was insufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295.

      Cited. 7 CA 180, 181, 184. Cited. Id., 223, 224. Cited. Id., 470, 472. Cited. 10 CA 357. Cited. 12 CA 32, 33. Cited. Id., 217. Cited. 17 CA 502, 504; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. Id., 602, 623. Cited. 19 CA 111, 144; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 440-442. Cited. Id., 609, 612. Cited. Id., 674, 675, 682. Cited. 22 CA 669, 670. Cited. 24 CA 115, 116. Cited. Id., 244, 245. Cited. Id., 692, 693. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Cited. Id., 433, 444. Cited. Id., 456, 461. Cited. 26 CA 259, 260, 262, 265. Cited. 27 CA 1-3. Cited. Id., 520, 521. Cited. 28 CA 416. Cited. Id., 548, 549, 556. Cited. Id., 425, 426. Cited. Id., 608, 609, 611. Cited. Id., 771, 772, 774. Cited. 29 CA 386, 388. Cited. Id., 452, 453. Cited. Id., 499, 501, 504. Cited. 30 CA 677, 679, 681. Cited. 32 CA 170, 172. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. Id., 763. Cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Cited. Id., 317, 318. Cited. 35 CA 438, 439, 444, 447. Cited. Id., 541, 543. Cited. Id., 762, 763. Cited. 36 CA 250, 251. Cited. Id., 345, 346. Cited. Id., 364, 365, 370, 371. Cited. Id., 448, 449; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342 et seq. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. Id., 506, 507. Cited. Id., 516, 517. Cited. Id., 556, 558. Cited. 37 CA 749, 750, 754. Cited. 38 CA 371, 374. Cited. Id., 434, 435. Cited. 39 CA 18, 19, 23; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Cited. Id., 242-244, 252. Cited. Id., 224-226, 236. Cited. Id., 632, 633. Cited. 40 CA 151, 163. Cited. Id., 318, 322. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. 41 CA 604, 613. Cited. Id., 809. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 549. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 70. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 476. Cited. Id., 790. Cited. 45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 261. Cited. Id., 584. Cited. 46 CA 216. Cited. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 578. Cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id., 684. Cited. Id., 734. Evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to conclude that defendant intended to cause victim's death. 55 CA 469. It is possible to commit attempted murder without creating risk of any physical injury to another person. 56 CA 592. Failure of trial court to inform defendant of intent requirement under statute not plain error. 65 CA 234.

      Cited. 40 CS 38. Cited. Id., 498, 500. Cited. 42 CS 10, 11. Cited. Id., 426, 427, 432. Cited. 43 CS 367, 370.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 172 C. 65, 69. "Extreme emotional disturbance" guidelines. 177 C. 1, 3, 4, 7. Cited. Id., 487, 489, 491, 512. Cited. 180 C. 171, 173, 177. Cited. 181 C. 268; Id., 284, 285; Id., 406, 408. Cited. 182 C. 66, 68; Id., 142, 168; Id., 388, 395; Id., 585, 587, 592; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.; Id., 603, 607. Cited. 184 C. 121, 122, 125. Cited. 186 C. 414, 415, 419, 422, 423; id., 574-576, 585, 586. Cited. 187 C. 6, 8. Cited. 189 C. 303, 304, 306. Cited. 190 C. 219, 233. Cited. 191 C. 27, 28. Cited. 192 C. 700. Cited. 193 C. 474, 475. Cited. Id., 646, 667. Cited. 194 C. 376, 380, 383, 387. Cited. Id., 392, 393. Cited. Id., 416, 418. Cited. Id., 530, 559. Cited. 195 C. 166, 167, 170. Cited. Id., 232, 233. Cited. Id., 651, 652, 655. Cited. 196 C. 557, 558. Cited. 197 C. 106-108. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. 198 C. 53, 62. Cited. Id., 77, 79. Cited. 199 C. 102, 104. Cited. 200 C. 224, 225. Cited. Id., 553-555, 560. Cited. Id., 607, 608. Cited. Id., 642, 643, 650. Cited. Id., 743, 744. Charge on this defense was inadequate under the circumstances. 201 C. 174-176, 179, 180. Cited. Id., 244, 245. Cited. Id., 368, 372, 373. Cited. Id., 534, 535. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 429, 430. Cited. 204 C. 207, 208. Cited. Id., 259, 260. Cited. 205 C. 370, 371. Cited. Id., 578. Cited. Id., 723, 724. Cited. 206 C. 229, 231, 239. Cited. Id., 300, 301. Cited. Id., 391, 392. Cited. 207 C. 374, 385. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. Id., 455, 456. Cited. 209 C. 596, 597. Cited. 210 C. 481, 483. Cited. Id., 619-621. Cited. 211 C. 441, 442. Cited. 212 C. 258, 259. Cited. Id., 351, 352. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. 213 C. 708, 710, 711. Cited. 214 C. 122, 123. Cited. Id., 146, 147, 149. Cited. Id., 161, 162. Cited. Id., 344, 347. Cited. Id., 540, 541. Cited. 215 C. 739, 740, 743. Cited. 216 C. 492, 493. Cited. Id., 585-587, 593. Cited. Id., 699, 701, 702, 708, 717. Cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Interpretation of section not to require reasonableness of a defendant's extreme emotional disturbance to be determined solely from his subjective viewpoint. Id., 648, 649, 651-655, 657, 658. Cited. 218 C. 349, 351, 383. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. Id., 714, 716. Cited. Id., 747, 748. Cited. Id., 766-768. Cited. 219 C. 16, 17, 19. Cited. Id., 234, 235. Cited. Id., 295, 296. Cited. 220 C. 285, 298. Cited. Id., 385, 388. Cited. Id., 408. Cited. 221 C. 128, 129. Cited. Id., 430, 431. Cited. 222 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 506, 508. Cited. Id., 718-720, 725, 726. Cited. 223 C. 41, 42, 44. Cited. Id., 127, 128. Cited. Id., 207, 209. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 384-386. Cited. Id., 411, 412. Cited. Id., 535, 537. Cited. Id., 635, 637. Cited. 224 C. 196, 197. Cited. Id., 325, 326. Cited. 225 C. 114, 116, 118, 122, 127. Cited. Id., 609, 610, 627. Cited. 226 C. 237, 253. Cited. 227 C. 301, 309. Cited. Id., 389, 391. Cited. Id., 448, 449. Cited. 228 C. 62, 63. Cited. Id., 118, 119. Cited. Id., 384, 385. Cited. 229 C. 328, 329. Cited. 230 C. 183, 223. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited. 232 C. 537, 538. Cited. 233 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 106, 108. Cited. Id., 174, 189. Cited. Id., 517. Cited. Id., 813, 815. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209, 251. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 413, 414. Cited. 236 C. 189, 191, 202. Cited. Id., 342, 343, 345, 356. Cited. Id., 388, 390. Cited. 237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 253. Cited. Id., 313. Cited. 239 C. 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 395. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 322. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. Id., 665. Cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 485. Cited. 243 C. 205. Term "death" as used in Penal Code includes irreversible cessation of functioning of brain. 244 C. 761. Section incorporates the doctrine of transferred intent and holds both a principal and an accomplice liable for death of an unintended victim. 253 C. 354. Re jury charge on extreme emotional disturbance, it was proper for trial court to refuse to instruct jury to consider defendant's unique mental and emotional characteristics and impact of those characteristics on defendant since the statute incorporates a standard that is objective as to its overview, but subjective as to the defendant's belief. 261 C. 336. Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set forth in section 53a-55(a)(1). 262 C. 453.

      Cited. 7 CA 180, 182. Cited. Id., 367, 370. Cited. Id., 457-459. Cited. 8 CA 496, 497, 504-506. Cited. Id., 147, 148; judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278 et seq. Cited. Id., 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Cited. 10 CA 697, 699. Cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Cited. Id., 628, 630. Cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Cited. 21 CA 801. Cited. 22 CA 199, 201. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 23 CA 692, 693. Cited. 24 CA 624, 625, 627. Cited. Id., 692, 693. Cited. 25 CA 433, 434. Cited. 26 CA 242-245. Cited. Id., 259, 260. Cited. 27 CA 73, 74, 92. Cited. Id., 403, 404. Cited. Id., 643, 644. Cited. 28 CA 231, 238. Cited. Id., 416. Cited. Id., 469. Cited. 29 CA 499, 501. Cited. 29 CA 573, 574. Cited. 30 CA 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 385, 386. Cited. 32 CA 438-440. Cited. Id., 687, 689. Cited. Id., 759, 761. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. Id., 122, 123. Cited. Id., 782, 783. Cited. 34 CA 58, 59, 93; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 96, 97; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 317, 318, 321. Cited. Id., 368, 369; see also 233 C. 517 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 153. Cited. Id., 374, 375; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413 et seq. Cited. Id., 541, 543. Cited. 36 CA 336, 337. Cited. Id., 364, 365. Cited. Id., 417, 418. Cited. Id., 516, 517. Cited. Id., 805, 806. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Cited. 37 CA 252, 253; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 388 et seq. Cited. Id., 404, 405, 414. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. Id., 749, 753. Cited. 38 CA 371, 374. Cited. 39 CA 18, 19, 24; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Cited. Id., 224, 238. Cited. 40 CA 47, 48. Cited. Id., 60, 61. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 470, 471. Cited. 41 CA 361, 362, 365-367. Cited. Id., 495. Cited. Id., 515, 517. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 43 CA 252. Cited. Id., 830. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 198. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 338. Cited. Id., 790. Cited. 45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 297. Cited. 46 CA 216. Cited. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 600. Cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id., 684. Statute sets forth a standard that is objective in its overview, but subjective as to defendant's belief. 48 CA 784. Trial court's instruction re extreme emotional disturbance defense was proper. 55 CA 469. Cited. 57 CA 734.

      Subsection must be read without the word "affirmative". The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense charged without imposing any burden on the defendant. 33 CS 28, 81. Unborn not included in definition of "person". 40 CS 498, 499. Cited re ineffective counsel claim. 46 CS 344.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 182 C. 603, 606. Evidence of mental capacity admissible when defendant is charged with commission of crime under which state must prove defendant acted recklessly. 195 C. 232, 240, 241. Cited. 218 C. 349, 351, 379.

      Cited. 17 CA 602, 623. Cited. 44 CA 70.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 180 C. 171, 173. Cited. 181 C. 151, 153. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151, 153. Cited. Id., 350, 352. Cited. 194 C. 376, 380, 383. Cited. Id., 392, 393. Cited. Id., 416, 418. Cited. Id., 530, 559, 560. Cited. 196 C. 655, 661, 662. Cited. 200 C. 721, 722. Cited. 201 C. 244, 245. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 401. Cited. 205 C. 616, 619. Cited. Id., 638-640. Cited. 214 C. 378, 385. Cited. 216 C. 282, 285, 294, 295. Cited. 218 C. 486, 488.

      Cited erroneously as Sec. 53a-54(c). 41 CA 530, 532.

      Sec. 53a-54b. Capital felony. A person is guilty of a capital felony who is convicted of any of the following: (1) Murder of a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal who is exercising authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Environmental Protection under the provisions of section 26-5, an employee of the Department of Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of such employee's or person's employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility, or any firefighter, while such victim was acting within the scope of such victim's duties; (2) murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same for pecuniary gain or murder committed by one who is hired by the defendant to commit the same for pecuniary gain; (3) murder committed by one who has previously been convicted of intentional murder or of murder committed in the course of commission of a felony; (4) murder committed by one who was, at the time of commission of the murder, under sentence of life imprisonment; (5) murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping or before such person is able to return or be returned to safety; (6) murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual assault in the first degree; (7) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction; or (8) murder of a person under sixteen years of age.

      (P.A. 73-137, S. 3; P.A. 77-604, S. 39, 84; 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 80-335; P.A. 85-144; P.A. 92-260, S. 27; P.A. 95-16, S. 4; P.A. 98-126, S. 1; P.A. 00-99, S. 120, 154; P.A. 01-84, S. 10, 26; 01-151, S. 3, 5.)

      History: P.A. 77-604 substituted "chief inspector or inspector in the division of criminal justice" for "county detective" in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-335 added Subdivs. (7) and (8) making murder in course of committing sexual assault in first degree and murder of two or more persons at same time a capital felony; P.A. 85-144 amended Subdiv. (6) by adding "economic" and deleting the proviso that the seller was not, at the time of such sale, a drug-dependent person; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subdivs. (1) and (3); P.A. 95-16 added Subdiv. (9) re murder of a person under sixteen years of age; P.A. 98-126 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace "an official of the Department of Correction authorized by the Commissioner of Correction to make arrests in a correctional institution or facility" with "an employee of the Department of Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of his employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility"; P.A. 00-99 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace reference to sheriff and deputy sheriff with provision re state marshal exercising statutory authority and judicial marshal in performance of duties, effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-84 replaced "fireman" with "firefighter" and made other technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 01-151 amended Subdiv. (1) to include the murder of a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Environmental Protection under the provisions of Sec. 26-5, deleted former Subdiv. (6) re the illegal sale, for economic gain, of cocaine, heroin or methadone to a person who dies as a direct result of the use of such cocaine, heroin or methadone, redesignating existing Subdivs. (7), (8) and (9) as Subdivs. (6), (7) and (8), and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.

      See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.

      See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.

      Cited. 194 C. 416, 418. Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. 199 C. 163, 174, 177, 178. Cited. 201 C. 276, 288. Cited. 211 C. 289, 296. Cited. 215 C. 570, 581. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 218 C. 486, 488. Cited. 230 C. 183, 188, 201, 236. Cited. 234 C. 324, 340, 341. Cited. Id., 735, 738. Cited. 235 C. 206. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id., 828. Cited. 240 C. 727. Cited. 241 C. 702. Cited. 242 C. 409. Murder in the course of kidnapping does not require ransom; murder in the course of sexual assault includes murder to prevent victim from becoming a witness; denial of a bill of particulars on aggravating factors did not deny fair hearing; meaning of "heinous" and "depraved" discussed; "heinous, cruel or depraved" as a unitary rather than three separate factors discussed; statute complies with the eighth and fourteenth amendments; statutory construction and precedent support conclusion that the burden of persuasion applies to both elements of mitigation; proportionality review still available in this case despite repeal of requirement. 251 C. 285.

      Cited. 32 CA 38, 40. Cited. 36 CA 364-366, 370, 377, 378. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. 43 CA 549. Cited. 45 CA 207.

      Cited 42 CS 426, 427.

      Subdiv. (1):

      Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Conviction for felony murder under Sec. 53a-54c cannot serve as the predicate murder for the crime of capital felony under this section; term "murder" in capital felony statute may be applied only to intentional murder. 241 C. 702. In order to satisfy the element that police officer had been "acting within the scope of his duties", the state was only required to prove that police officer was acting in the good faith discharge of his official duties when he stopped defendant and attempted to subdue him. 264 C. 1.

      Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.

      Subdiv. (2):

      Capital felony murder discussed. 199 C. 163, 164, 173, 174, 176, 178. Cited. 203 C. 420-422, 424. Cited. 215 C. 570, 576-578, 581-583. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 242 C. 409.

      Cited. 19 CA 111, 144; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.

      Subdiv. (3):

      Cited. 234 C. 324-326, 329, 331, 334, 336, 338, 339, 341, 343, 347, 349, 350. Cited. 238 C. 828.

      Cited. 41 CA 604, 616, 617. Cited. 45 CA 390.

      Subdiv. (4):

      Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342.

      Subdiv. (5):

      Cited. 197 C. 436, 439, 461. Cited. 213 C. 388, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 195, 200-202, 228. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 242 C. 409. Provision does not require that kidnapping be accompanied by a demand for ransom. 249 C. 645. Trial court properly instructed jury that its verdict of guilty on charge of intentional murder would provide the predicate for criminal liability under subsection. 263 C. 478.

      Cited. 36 CA 364, 378. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.

      Subdiv. (6):

      Cited. 230 C. 183, 201. Cited. 233 C. 174, 189. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 238 C. 828. State need only prove that the murder in a kidnap-murder or sexual-assault murder was aggravated in order to establish the aggravating factor. 269 C. 213.

      Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.

      Subdiv. (7):

      Cited. 205 C. 298, 299. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 229. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 242 C. 409. Double jeopardy clause not violated where defendant convicted for two counts of capital felony. Evidence indicated that the murders occurred in two sets, at distinctly separate times. 260 C. 339.

      Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.

      Subdiv. (8):

      Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. 206 C. 213, 214. Cited. 207 C. 374, 377. Cited. 208 C. 125, 127, 145. Cited. 209 C. 225, 230, 239. Cited. 212 C. 258, 259. Cited. 213 C. 708, 711. Cited. 216 C. 699, 701. Cited. 218 C. 349-351. Cited. 221 C. 430, 431. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 195. Cited. 233 C. 813, 815. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209. Only an intentional murder can be a predicate murder to capital felony charge under this section. 238 C. 828. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 93. Proper construction to be given to term "in the course of a single transaction" is that there need only be some nexus between murders, that the murders be connected by a common purpose or plan in order to be "in the course of a single transaction". Does not require murders to be at the same time in order to constitute "in the course of a single transaction". Temporal relationship between murders is not an absolute prerequisite to prosecution under subsection. 254 C. 578. Read together, Sec. 53a-54(a) and this subdiv. provide that conviction of intentional murder under doctrine of transferred intent may be the predicate for conviction of capital felony under this subdiv. when victim is under sixteen, regardless of defendant's subjective state of mind. 265 C. 35. Knowledge of the victim's age is not an element of this subdiv. Id. To limit applicability of subdiv. to cases in which state can prove that defendant knew or reasonably should have known the age of his victim would be both impracticable and inconsistent with the legislative intent. Id.

      Cited. 36 CA 364, 365, 377, 380. Cited. 38 CA 581, 582. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.

      Sec. 53a-54c. Felony murder. A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants, except that in any prosecution under this section, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant: (1) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and (2) was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any dangerous instrument; and (3) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon or instrument; and (4) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.

      (P.A. 74-186, S. 11, 12; P.A. 76-336, S. 21; P.A. 79-570, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 28.)

      History: P.A. 76-336 replaced rape in first degree, deviate sexual intercourse in first degree and sexual contact in first degree with sexual assault in first degree, sexual assault in first degree with firearm, sexual assault in third degree and sexual assault in third degree with firearm; P.A. 79-570 removed murder resulting from commission of or attempt to commit arson from purview of section; P.A. 92-260 replaced obsolete reference to offense of "sexual assault in the first degree with a firearm" with revised name of "aggravated sexual assault in the first degree"; (Revisor's note: In 1995 the indicators (A), (B), (C) and (D) were changed editorially by the Revisors to (1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively for consistency with statutory usage).

      See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.

      See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.

      Cited. 171 C. 683, 687. Cited. 176 C. 257, 258. Cited. 177 C. 677, 679. Cited. 178 C. 116, 118. Cited. 179 C. 78-80. Court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on lesser offenses of first degree burglary and first degree robbery since element of causation, which differentiates felony murder from the lesser offenses, was not sufficiently in dispute. 180 C. 599, 601, 602, 604. Cited. 181 C. 151, 153; id., 187, 188. Cited. 182 C. 419, 420; id., 580. Cited (1975 revision). 183 C. 299, 300, 311. Cited. 186 C. 1, 2, 7. Cited. 188 C. 542, 543, 545, 550. Cited. 189 C. 346, 347. Cited. 191 C. 636, 638-641, 644; id., 659-663. Cited. 193 C. 70, 72, 75. Cited. Id., 144, 145, 151. Cited. Id., 350, 352. Cited. 194 C. 223, 224. Cited. Id., 279, 285. Cited. Id., 416, 419. Cited. Id., 530, 559, 565. Cited. 195 C. 505, 506. Manslaughter is not a lesser included crime otherwise of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 423, 429. Cited. 197 C. 396, 397, 401. Cited. Id., 436, 438, 460. Cited. Id., 588, 591. Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. Id., 255, 256, 269. Cited. Id., 386, 387. Cited. Id., 397, 399. Cited. Id., 435, 436. Cited. Id., 506, 507, 515. Cited. Id., 517, 518, 537. Cited. Id., 638. Cited. Id., 644, 646. Cited. 199 C. 110, 111. Cited. 200 C. 323, 324, 336. Cited. Id., 721. Cited. 201 C. 34, 35, 37. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 399, 401, 416-418. Cited. Id., 462, 464, 465. Cited. 202 C. 18, 19, 21, 24, 26. Cited. Id., 39, 40. Cited. 203 C. 4-6. Cited. Id., 212, 213, 217, 239, 243. Cited. 204 C. 377-379, 385, 387. Cited. 205 C. 298, 300. Cited. Id., 485, 486. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 616, 619. Cited. Id., 638-640. Cited. 206 C. 157, 158. Cited. Id., 657, 667. Cited. 207 C. 1, 2, 12, 13. Cited. 208 C. 52, 54. Cited. 209 C. 34, 35. Cited. Id., 75, 76, 78. Cited. Id., 290-292. Cited. Id., 564, 565. Cited. Id., 636, 637. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81. Cited. Id., 652, 654, 696, 697. Cited. Id., 751, 752. Cited. 211 C. 289, 296. Cited. 212 C. 387, 389. Cited. 213 C. 388, 389. Cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Cited. Id., 454, 457. Cited. Id., 493-495, 501. Cited. 215 C. 695, 698. Cited. 216 C. 282-285, 293, 295-297. Cited. Id., 367, 368. Cited. Id., 699, 700, 708, 710, 715, 717-719, 726. Cited. 218 C. 85, 87. Cited. Id., 151, 152. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited. Id., 447, 448. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. 219 C. 743, 744. Cited. 220 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 385, 386, 388. Cited. Id., 417, 418, 420, 426, 428, 429, 431. Cited. 221 C. 315, 316. Cited. Id., 635-637. Cited. Id., 643, 644, 666, 668. Cited. Id., 685, 687. Cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Cited. 223 C. 299, 301. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. Id., 635, 637. Cited. Id., 834-836. Cited. 225 C. 270, 271, 277. Cited. Id., 347, 348, 350-352