Sec. 53a-40b. Additional term of imprisonment authorized for offense committed while on release. A person convicted of an offense committed while released
pursuant to sections 54-63a to 54-63g, inclusive, or sections 54-64a to 54-64c, inclusive,
other than a violation of section 53a-222, may be sentenced, in addition to the sentence
prescribed for the offense to (1) a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years if
the offense is a felony, or (2) a term of imprisonment of not more than one year if the
offense is a misdemeanor.
(P.A. 90-213, S. 54; P.A. 98-90, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 98-90 excepted convictions under Sec. 53a-222 from provisions of section.
Jury hearing not constitutionally required for enhanced sentence based on prior conviction; enhanced penalty provisions
do apply to defendant who committed second crime while released on written promise to appear. 62 CA 34.
Sec. 53a-40c. Psychological counseling required for person convicted of sexual
assault of a minor. Any person convicted of a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a,
53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a where the victim of the sexual assault was a person
ten years of age or under shall, in addition to any fine or term of imprisonment imposed,
be sentenced to undergo psychological counseling.
(P.A. 93-340, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-40d. Persistent offenders of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order or criminal
violation of a restraining order. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of
crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation
of a protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order is a person who (1) stands
convicted of assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening
under section 53a-62, harassment under section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal violation of a restraining order under section
53a-223b or criminal trespass under section 53a-107 or 53a-108, and (2) has, within the
five years preceding the commission of the present crime, been convicted of a capital
felony, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or
53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b,
53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216, assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening under section 53a-62, harassment under
section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal
violation of a restraining order under section 53a-223b, or criminal trespass under section
53a-107 or 53a-108 or has been released from incarceration with respect to such conviction, whichever is later.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving
assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective
order or criminal violation of a restraining order, and the court is of the opinion that
such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's
criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest,
the court shall, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section
53a-36 or section 53a-35a, as applicable, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of
misdemeanor or felony, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall
impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony, as authorized by section
53a-35a.
(P.A. 95-193, S. 2; P.A. 02-127, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 02-127 applied the provisions to criminal violation of a restraining order under Sec. 53a-223b and in
Subsec. (b) added references to Sec. 53a-35a, specified "felony" in the provision concerning the imposition of the sentence
of imprisonment authorized for the next more serious crime and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality.
Sec. 53a-40e. Standing criminal restraining order. (a) If any person is convicted
of a violation of section 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-60, 53a-60a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-70,
53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e, or of
attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a, against a family
or household member as defined in subdivision (2) of section 46b-38a, the court may,
in addition to imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a, if
the court is of the opinion that the history and character and the nature and circumstances
of the criminal conduct of such offender indicate that a standing criminal restraining
order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public, issue a standing criminal
restraining order which shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for
good cause shown.
(b) Such standing criminal restraining order may include but is not limited to enjoining the offender from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the
victim; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking
the victim; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim.
(c) Every standing criminal restraining order of the court made in accordance with
this section shall contain the following language: "This order shall remain in effect until
modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown. In accordance with section 53a-223a, violation of a standing criminal restraining order issued by the court pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less
than one year nor more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or
both."
(P.A. 96-228, S. 1; P.A. 98-15; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 41, 121; P.A. 99-186, S. 13.)
History: (Revisor's note: In Subsec. (c) the reference in public act 96-228 to "section 1 of this act" was deemed by the
Revisors to be a reference to section 2 of that act and therefore codified as "section 53a-110c"); P.A. 98-15 amended
Subsec. (a) to add references to Secs. 53a-181c, 53a-181d and 53a-181e; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change
in Subsec. (c), effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 99-186 amended Subsec.(a) to make provisions applicable to any person
convicted "of attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a".
See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.
Imposition of a standing criminal restraining order after defendant began serving his sentence did not constitute punishment or affect defendant's sentence and therefore, trial court had jurisdiction to impose it. 269 C. 107.
Order precluding defendant from having contact with his minor children is within scope of the statute. 81 CA 84.
Sec. 53a-40f. Persistent operating while under the influence felony offender.
Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent operating while under the influence felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d and (2) has, prior to the commission of the present crime and within the preceding
ten years, been convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection (a)
of section 14-227a or been convicted in any other state of an offense the essential elements of which are substantially the same as section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection
(a) of section 14-227a.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent operating while under the
influence felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that his history and character and
the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration
will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized
by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may
impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious
degree of felony.
(P.A. 97-291, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-41. Fines for felonies. A fine for the conviction of a felony shall be fixed
by the court as follows: (1) For a class A felony, an amount not to exceed twenty thousand
dollars; (2) for a class B felony, an amount not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars; (3)
for a class C felony, an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars; (4) for a class D
felony, an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars; (5) for an unclassified felony,
an amount in accordance with the fine specified in the section of the general statutes
that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 41; P.A. 92-256, S. 1; 92-260, S. 19; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)
History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A felony from ten to twenty thousand dollars, for a class
B felony from ten to fifteen thousand dollars, and for a class C felony from five to ten thousand dollars; P.A. 92-260
amended Subdiv. (3) to replace "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective
date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.
See Sec. 53a-35a re terms of imprisonment for felonies.
See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.
Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Failure of trial court to inform defendant of amount of fine not plain error. 65 CA 234.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728.
Sec. 53a-42. Fines for misdemeanors. A fine for the conviction of a misdemeanor
shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, an amount not to
exceed two thousand dollars; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed
one thousand dollars; (3) for a class C misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed five
hundred dollars; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, an amount in accordance with
the fine specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 42; P.A. 92-256, S. 2; 92-260, S. 20; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)
History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A misdemeanor from one to two thousand dollars; P.A.
92-260 replaced "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.
See Sec. 53a-36 re terms of imprisonment for misdemeanors.
See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.
Cited. 178 C. 145, 153; 180 C. 557, 561. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90.
Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660; judgment reversed in part, see 232
C. 345 et seq.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 722, 727.
Sec. 53a-43. Fines for violations. A fine for a violation shall be fixed by the court
in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars. In the case of a violation defined in
any other section of the general statutes, if the amount of the fine is expressly specified
in the section that defines the offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance
with such section.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 43.)
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
Sec. 53a-44. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain. If a person has gained
money or property through the commission of any felony, misdemeanor or violation,
upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense
under section 53a-41, 53a-42 or 53a-43, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount,
fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain from the
commission of the offense. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount
of the defendant's gain from the offense and, if the record does not contain sufficient
evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For
purposes of this section, the term "gain" means the amount of money or the value of
property derived.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 44; P.A. 92-260, S. 21.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in punctuation.
Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
Sec. 53a-45. Murder: Penalty; waiver of jury trial; finding of lesser degree.
(a) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section
53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.
(b) If a person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing
conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a waives his right to a jury
trial and elects to be tried by a court, the court shall be composed of three judges designated by the Chief Court Administrator or his designee, who shall name one such judge
to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide
all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.
(c) The court or jury before which any person indicted for murder or held to answer
for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a is tried may find such person guilty of homicide in a lesser degree than that charged.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 45; P.A. 73-137, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 13, 28; P.A. 82-298, S. 4; P.A. 83-210, S. 2, 5; P.A. 92-260,
S. 22.)
History: P.A. 73-137 added reference to capital felonies in Subsec. (a) and substituted reference to Sec. 53a-46a for
reference to Sec. 53a-46, deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed person indicted for murder to plead guilty with
consent of court and state's attorney in which case court would sentence him as for a Class A felony, relettering former
Subsecs. (c) and (d) accordingly; P.A. 80-442 specified punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a and deleted reference
to death sentenced under Sec. 53a-46a in Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 82-298 amended Subsec. (b) to provide
that court shall be composed of three judges designated by chief court administrator, who shall also name one such judge
to preside, where previously one judge was the judge presiding at the session and the other two were designated by the
chief justice of the supreme court; P.A. 83-210 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) by inserting "or held to answer for murder
after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add
exception for "murder under section 53a-54d", amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that such judges or a majority of
them "shall determine the question of guilt or innocence and shall, as provided in said section 53a-46a, render judgment
and impose sentence" with "shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render
judgment accordingly", and amended Subsec. (c) to replace "him" with "such person".
See annotations to part IV.
Cited. 187 C. 6, 28.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 201 C. 435, 438.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 180 C. 382, 404. Cited. 190 C. 639, 640. Cited. 198 C. 77, 90. Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 381.
Subsec. (c):
Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree
where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 399, 400, 402,
403, 407. Cited. 181 C. 187, 200; id., 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66, 71, 72. Cited. 187 C. 6, 28. Cited. 188 C. 542, 546. Cited.
190 C. 639, 652. Cited. 193 C. 695, 732. Cited. 195 C. 232, 243. Manslaughter is not lesser included offense of felony
murder. 196 C. 421, 422, 427. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. Id., 368, 372. Cited. 206 C. 346, 359. Cited. 210 C. 78, 105.
Cited. 212 C. 593, 607. Cited. 214 C. 57, 63. Cited. 225 C. 55, 65. Cited. 226 C. 237, 250. Cited. 231 C. 115, 140. Cited.
240 C. 727.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 187. Cited. 17 CA 502, 521; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 40 CA 151, 164.
Cited. 42 CS 426, 429.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 206 C. 346, 359.
Sec. 53a-46. Sentencing proceedings; appeal. Section 53a-46 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 46; 1972, P.A. 56, S. 1; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence. (a) A
person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony only if a hearing is
held in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is
convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the
trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to
determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character,
background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i). Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates
that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or
that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists. Such hearing shall be conducted (1)
before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled
for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty;
(B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection
(b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been
discharged by the court for good cause, or (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant
and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.
(c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material
contained in any presentence report which may have been prepared. No presentence
information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating
factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility
under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the
admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials.
The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the
hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of
the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The
burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be
on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant.
(d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's
character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant
to subsection (b) of this section, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first
determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background
or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been established by the
evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating factors are such as do not
constitute a defense or excuse for the capital felony of which the defendant has been
convicted, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to
extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise
constitute a basis for a sentence less than death.
(e) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting
forth its findings as to the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the existence
of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant
to subsection (d).
(f) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) none of the factors set
forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in
subsection (i) exist and (3) (A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating
factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i), the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
(g) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) any of the factors set
forth in subsection (h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection
(i) exists, or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist
and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set
forth in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors, the court shall
impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
(h) The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or,
if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e), that
at the time of the offense (1) the defendant was under the age of eighteen years, or (2)
the defendant was a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, or (3)
the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to
conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired
but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (4) the
defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 53a-10 for the offense,
which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation in such offense was
relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (5)
the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the
course of commission of the offense of which the defendant was convicted would cause,
or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.
(i) The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following: (1)
The defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted commission
of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a
felony and the defendant had previously been convicted of the same felony; or (2) the
defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state offenses and one or more
federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may
be imposed, which offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved
the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to
another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the defendant committed
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant
procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything
of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the
receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or (7) the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a; or
(8) the defendant committed the offense set forth in subdivision (1) of section 53a-54b
to avoid arrest for a criminal act or prevent detection of a criminal act or to hamper or
prevent the victim from carrying out any act within the scope of the victim's official
duties or to retaliate against the victim for the performance of the victim's official duties.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 4; P.A. 80-332, S. 1; 80-442, S. 14, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 1; P.A. 93-306, S. 12; P.A. 95-19, S. 1; P.A.
01-151, S. 1, 2, 5.)
History: P.A. 80-332 restated provisions and referred to mitigating or aggravating factors throughout, replacing references to factors set forth in Subsecs. (f) and (g); P.A. 80-442 referred to imposition of sentence in accordance with Sec.
53a-35a(1) rather than to sentence for a Class A felony in Subsec. (e), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added a new
Subsec. (d) to specify the procedure for the determination by a jury or court of the existence of a mitigating factor and to
add a definition of mitigating factors, relettered the remaining Subsecs. and amended Subsec. (f) to replace "a sentence in
accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(1)" with "a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release"; P.A. 93-306
amended Subsec. (h) to add as an aggravating factor that the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon;
P.A. 95-19 revised section to permit the jury or court to make findings as to whether any aggravating factor or factors
outweigh any mitigating factor or factors and require the court to sentence the defendant accordingly, while retaining
provision that the existence of certain factors concerning the defendant will operate to automatically bar the imposition of
the death sentence, and, more specifically, amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the separate hearing shall not be held if
the state stipulates "that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists" rather than "that one or more mitigating factors exist"
and make technical changes, amended Subsec. (c) to make technical changes, amended Subsec. (e) to require the jury or
court to return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to "the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the
existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors
outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d)" rather than "the existence of any
aggravating or mitigating factor", amended Subsec. (f) to revise the circumstances that must be found for the court to
impose the death sentence by requiring the court to sentence the defendant to death if the jury or court finds "that (1) none
of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist
and (3)(A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more
aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i)" rather than "that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist
and that no mitigating factor exists", designated provisions of Subsec. (f) re the circumstances that must be found for the
court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release as new Subsec. (g) and amended said
Subsec. to require the court to impose said sentence if the jury or court finds "that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection
(h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exists or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors
set forth in subsection (i) exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth
in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors" rather than "that none of the factors set forth in
subsection (h) exists or that one or more mitigating factors exist", redesignated former Subsec. (g) as new Subsec. (h) and
amended said Subsec. to replace the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if the jury or court finds
that "any mitigating factor exists" and that "the mitigating factors to be considered concerning the defendant shall include,
but are not limited to" the five enumerated factors with the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if
the jury or court finds any of the enumerated factors and deleted former Subdiv. (3) as a factor that would in and of itself
bar the imposition of the death sentence the circumstance that at the time of the offense the defendant "was under unusual
and substantial duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution", renumbering Subdivs. (4) and
(5) as Subdivs. (3) and (4), respectively, redesignated former Subsec. (h) re aggravating factors as new Subsec. (i) and
amended said Subsec. to replace the provision requiring the court to impose the death sentence if no mitigating factor is
present and the jury or court finds one of the enumerated factors with "The aggravating factors to be considered shall be
limited to the following:"; P.A. 01-151 amended Subsec. (h) to add new Subdiv. (2) barring the imposition of the death
sentence on a defendant who was a person with mental retardation, as defined in Sec. 1-1g, redesignate existing Subdivs.
(2), (3) and (4) as Subdivs. (3), (4) and (5), and make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and amended
Subsec. (i) to add Subdiv. (8) establishing as an aggravating factor the commission of the offense set forth in Sec. 53a-54b(1) to avoid arrest for a criminal act, prevent detection of a criminal act, hamper or prevent the victim carrying out the
victim's official duties or retaliate against the victim for performance of the victim's official duties and make a technical
change for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.
See Sec. 53a-35b re definition of "life imprisonment".
See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.
Former Sec. 53-10 unconstitutional. 164 C. 162. Cited. 197 C. 436, 440. Cited. 207 C. 374, 375, 382, 383, 390, 392,
393, 399. Cited. 209 C. 225, 227. Cited. 212 C. 258, 260, 264. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 225 C. 559, 562. Does not
violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185, 189, 193, 229,
235, 236, 245, 252-254, 257-259, 268, 286. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 735,
748. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209, 211, 214, 236, 247, 252, 257, 260. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334, 335, 338. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital
sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409. Court upheld previous
holding that statute does not require a capital sentencer to give mitigating force to any particular proven factor solely
because that factor establishes something good about the defendant. Instead, statute leaves the decision as to whether a
proven factor is mitigating in nature to sentencer's reasoned moral judgment. 264 C. 1. Once sentencer has found an
aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no requirement that it go further and make an additional
determination that the presence of that factor justifies imposition of the death penalty. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720. Cited. 32 CA 296, 308. Cited. 36 CA 364, 366.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 278. Cited. 237 C. 332, 337. Cited. 238 C. 389. Term "judges" in
the first sentence does not entitle defendant who elected to have a jury determine his sentence at the penalty phase hearing
to have all three members of the panel before whom the guilt phase was conducted preside at such hearing. 264 C. 1.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 383-385, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 238, 266-271, 273. Cited. 235 C. 206, 257, 259. Cited. 237
C. 332, 334. Cited. 241 C. 57. The state may present evidence to rebut mitigation at the penalty phase that would not be
admissible under normal rules of evidence. Under the statute, the state like the defendant only has to meet the relevancy
standard for evidence to be allowed. 251 C. 579.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 383, 386, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 281-284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 218, 229, 234, 251,
255. Cited. 238 C. 389. Mercy is a legitimate consideration only insofar as it is related to mitigating evidence. 264 C. 1.
Requirement for capital sentencer to consider "all the facts and circumstances of the case" is not unconstitutionally vague.
Id. Lack of remorse is not listed as a statutory aggravating factor, and so may not be relied upon as an aggravating factor,
but because mitigating factors call upon jury to elect whether to exercise mercy, defendant's lack of remorse will be relevant
generally to rebut defendant's claimed mitigating factors. 266 C. 171. Jury must make its determination of whether the
proposed mitigating evidence is mitigating in nature considering all facts and circumstances of the case, but statute does
not require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. Id.
Subsec. (e):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Imposition of death penalty premised on two unanimous findings by trier of fact that (1) existence
of aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt by state; (2) existence of a mitigating factor not proved by defendant
by a preponderance of the evidence. 207 C. 374, 382, 383, 386-388, 390, 392-394. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 239, 240, 243,
244. Cited. 235 C. 206, 215, 236, 247.
Subsec. (f):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 391. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 230 C. 183,
237-240, 258, 285. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 235 C. 206, 219, 238, 245-247. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Statute requires that jury determine that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors by any amount or degree. 266 C.
171. In light of the unique nature of death penalty, of the need for reliability and consistency and the nature of rendering
a verdict requiring death penalty, jury must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh
mitigating factors and therefore it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death sentence should be imposed. Id.
Subsec. (g):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 384. Cited. 212 C. 258, 262. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 183, 272, 284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 247, 251. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 229. Cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 828. Although trial court should generally use language of Subdiv. (2) in instructing jury on the
statutory mitigating factor, it is not possible that court's minor misstatement, involving such a tenuous semantic distinction,
could have misled jury. 269 C. 213. General thrust of statute as a whole persuades us that legislature intended to recognize
as mitigating, per se, only those factors that tend to reduce defendant's moral culpability for the offense and make it unlikely
that threat of execution would serve as effective deterrent. Id. "Mental capacity" as used in Subdiv. (2) is not open-ended
term referring to any and all types of mental function, but refers specifically to defendant's ability, at time of the offense,
to understand the wrongful nature and consequences of his conductLlegislature's intent in enactingsubsec. was to specify
factual circumstances under which defendant's moral culpability for committing the offense is reduced. Id. In order to
establish either prong of the mitigating factor of Subdiv. (2), defendant must show that his mental impairment had a causal
nexus with the offense, thereby reducing his moral culpability. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 364, 366.
Subsec. (h):
Subdiv. (4) cited. 209 C. 225, 229. Subdiv. (4): Meaning of "especially cruel" must include intentional infliction of
extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. 212 C. 258, 259, 265,
266, 270, 271. Cited. Id., 258, 262. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 258, 265. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (6)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 230 C. 183, 185, 190, 193, 242, 252, 255, 256, 258-262, 265, 274, 276, 278. Cited. Id., 183,
237, 259, 261. Subdiv. (4) cited. 235 C. 206, 214, 219, 220. Cited. Id., 206, 221, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id. Cited. 242 C. 409. "Same felony" means a felony that is the same in all material respects as the felony that
is committed in this state during commission of the capital felony. That requirement is fully satisfied only if the two felonies
share the same essential elements. 264 C. 1.
Subsec. (i):
To qualify as an aggravating factor that defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner, victim must have suffered extreme pain and torture beyond that necessary to cause death. 253 C. 1. Subdiv. (6)
does not apply to a capital felony committed during the course of a robbery. 261 C. 111. In order to establish the aggravating
factor defined in Subdiv. (4), state must prove that defendant murdered both victims in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner. 262 C. 537.
Subdiv. (1): To ensure that prior felony conviction that is based on a constitutionally invalid guilty plea is not used as
aggravant in a death penalty case, it is in the interests of justice that court hear evidence on whether the plea was voluntarily
and knowingly made, and defendant bears burden of establishing the constitutional invalidity of prior plea. 48 CS 279.
Sec. 53a-46b. Review of death sentence. (a) Any sentence of death imposed in
accordance with the provisions of section 53a-46a shall be reviewed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its rules. In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate said sentence and remand
for imposition of a sentence in accordance with subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a.
(b) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that:
(1) The sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; or
(2) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating factor specified in subsection (i) of section 53a-46a.
(c) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal and, if an appeal is
taken, the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall
then render its decision on the legal errors claimed and the validity of the sentence.
(P.A. 80-332, S. 2; P.A. 81-472, S. 151, 159; P.A. 85-366, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 23; P.A. 95-16, S. 3, 5; 95-19, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 85-366 made a technical change to reflect changes made to Sec.
53a-46a by same public act; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes; P.A. 95-16 amended Subsec. (b) by deleting Subdiv.
(3) that had required the Supreme Court to affirm the death sentence unless it determines the sentence to be excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, effective April 12, 1995; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change.
Cited. 212 C. 258, 271. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on due process rights.
230 C. 183, 185, 188, 191, 193, 236, 239. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 234 C. 735, 737, 738, 746. Cited. 235 C.
206, 211, 212, 250. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 235 C. 206, 226, 227. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (3): Class of similar cases to include all convictions of a capital felony after October 1, 1973, resulting from a
trial or from a plea whether or not convictions were followed by imposition of death penalty. 225 C. 559, 560, 563. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 230 C. 183, 258, 259, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited. 234 C. 735, 736, 740, 741, 759-763. Subdiv. (3): Prohibition against
disproportionality discussed. Id., 735-738, 740-742, 745, 747, 748, 750, 752, 760-762. Cited. Id., 735, 763. Cited. 235
C. 206, 216, 227. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 220, 226, 228. Subdiv. (3) cited. 237 C. 332, 338. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C.
389. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3): Court concluded that statutory proportionality review scheme is constitutional and
that it involves the precedent seeking method of comparative, rather than traditional, proportionality review. Id.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 237 C. 332, 336, 338. P.A. 95-16, Sec. 3(b) cited. Id.
Sec. 53a-46c. Applicability of death penalty provisions in effect on and after
October 1, 1980. The provisions of sections 53a-46a and 53a-46b in effect on and after
October 1, 1980, shall be applicable to any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty
to a capital felony under subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of section 53a-54b on or after
June 13, 1983.
(P.A. 83-327, S. 1, 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 24.)
History: P.A. 92-260 replaced "on October 1, 1980" with "on and after October 1, 1980".
Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185,
236. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Sec. 53a-46d. Victim impact statement read in court prior to imposition of
sentence for crime punishable by death. A victim impact statement prepared with the
assistance of a victim advocate to be placed in court files in accordance with subdivision
(2) of subsection (a) of section 54-220 may be read in court prior to imposition of
sentence upon a defendant found guilty of a crime punishable by death.
(P.A. 00-200, S. 6; P.A. 03-179, S. 2; 03-278, S. 104.)
History: P.A. 03-179 replaced "prepared by" with "prepared with the assistance of" and made a technical change; P.A.
03-278 made a technical change, effective July 9, 2003.
Sec. 53a-47. Disposition of person found not guilty by reason of mental disease
or defect. Confinement and examination. Release. Section 53a-47 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 47; P.A. 75-476, S. 5, 6; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 2, 115, 127; P.A. 81-301, S. 2; P.A. 83-486, S. 2; P.A.
85-506, S. 31, 32.)
PART III*
INCHOATE OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 54-197:
To constitute conspiracy there need be no formal agreement between the parties; conspiracy may be established by
proof of separate acts of individual conspirators with common purpose. 129 C. 540. Principles stated which prevent a
charge of conspiracy against certain participants in unlawful acts. 132 C. 335. Conspiracy is a distinct offense, entirely
independent of the unlawful act which is its purpose. 134 C. 183. Conspiracy may be inferred from activities of accused
persons. 138 C. 292. Where a prima facie case is made out, court is entitled to take into consideration the fact that defendant
failed to testify. 139 C. 229. Declaratory judgment that a violation would exist. 142 C. 53. Cited. 145 C. 124; 150 C. 230;
152 C. 167. No formal agreement need be proven; it is enough if there is a mutual purpose to do the forbidden act. 147 C.
296. Information charging a conspiracy may properly allege acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Information charged
that defendants conspired to commit larceny and in pursuance of the conspiracy stole copper wire worth $2000. Since
larceny statute made theft of property worth more than $50 a felony, effect of the information was to charge a conspiracy
to commit a felony. Not necessary for state to prove that the unlawful object of the conspiracy was ever successfully
accomplished or that any larceny was ever committed in any amount. Confessions made by two conspirators were not
admissible to prove guilt of third conspirator. Since court made that clear in instructions to jury, third conspirator could
not complain of admission of confessions in evidence. 149 C. 640. Fact that one or more persons jointly charged with the
commission of a crime pleaded guilty is not admissible, on trial of another person so charged, to establish that the crime
was committed. A plea of guilty is, in effect, a confession of guilt which, having been made by one of those charged with
the crime, can be no more than hearsay as to another who is so charged. The state must prove the whole case against any
accused. 150 C. 195. Where one of alleged coconspirators is acquitted, this does not necessarily make fatal convictions of
other coconspirators. 151 C. 592. Crime of conspiracy at common law is unlawful combination and accomplishment of
objectives of conspiracy is not material. 157 C. 330. Once defendant had been proved to be member of conspiracy, declarations of coconspirators in furtherance of conspiracy could be used against him. 158 C. 412. Warrant authorizing search
for "...paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197" was general warrant and therefore was illegal and did not
meet constitutional requirement that search warrant particularly describe things to be seized. 160 C. 28, 33-37. Admission of
evidence that defendant denied he knew coconspirators was reversible error when interrogation was made in absence of
defendant's counsel. 159 C. 608. Essence of crime of conspiracy is unlawful combination coupled with act done and not
accomplishment of act. 160 C. 140, 149. Common law conspiracy deemed a separate and distinct crime. 162 C. 215. Cited.
163 C. 231.
Cited. 8 CS 330; 22 CS 173; 27 CS 130, 131. Person convicted of violating act cannot be sent to Kentucky hospital by
petitioning review division of superior court. 25 CS 7. Cited. 27 CS 380; 28 CS 240. Conspiracy common law crime, when.
Id., 344. Cited. 29 CS 333. Cited. 30 CS 211.
Crime of conspiracy is a separate offense and does not merge in the act which is executed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 50, 51. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 548.
Annotations to former section 54-198:
Must be specific intent to commit crime and same overt act adopted to effectuate such intent. 141 C. 731. Cited. 143
C. 368; 156 C. 391.
Cited. 19 CS 267.
Sec. 53a-48. Conspiracy. Renunciation. (a) A person is guilty of conspiracy
when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one
or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one
of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.
(b) It shall be a defense to a charge of conspiracy that the actor, after conspiring to
commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 48, 49; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 16.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (b) to remove reference to "affirmative" defense.
See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.
Cited. 169 C. 377, 380. Cited. Id., 517, 518. Cited. Id., 642, 643, 645. Generally may prosecute and sentence defendant
for both conspiracy to commit offense and offense itself; Wharton's rule: An agreement by two persons to commit crime
which necessarily requires participation of two persons cannot be prosecuted as conspiracy; rule currently valid only as
presumption of legislative intent (dissent noted); exception to rule when more persons than required participate. 171 C.
105. Abuse of conspiracy charge to bring in otherwise improper evidence. Id. Cited. Id., 524, 528. Cited. 172 C. 74, 75.
Cited. 174 C. 135, 136. Cited. Id., 338, 339, 344. Cited. Id., 376. Cited. 176 C. 131, 132. Cited. 177 C. 370, 371. Cited.
178 C. 67, 68; id., 163, 164; id., 649, 650. A defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when
evidence under this section is before jury. Id., 704, 708. Cited. 180 C. 481, 482. Cited. 182 C. 262, 263; id., 595, 600.
Cited. 184 C. 369, 370, 377, 378. Cited. 186 C. 426, 427; id., 648, 649; id., 696, 707. Cited. 187 C. 109, 111; id., 264, 265;
id., 513, 514. Cited. 188 C. 515, 516, 529; id., 542, 543; id., 671, 675. Cited. 189 C. 201, 202; id., 337, 339. Cited. 190 C.
259, 260. Cited. 191 C. 360, 362. Cited. 194 C. 18, 20. Cited. Id., 361, 362. Cited. 195 C. 128, 129. Cited. Id., 183, 185.
Cited. Id., 598, 604. Cited. 196 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 197 C. 201, 203. Cited. Id., 326, 327. Cited. Id.,
413, 415. Cited. Id., 644, 656. "There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of
recklessly or negligently causing a result," therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this
statute and Sec. 53a-113 is not crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1-3, 5. Cited. Id., 14, 16. Cited. 200 C. 113, 114.
Cited. Id., 310, 311, 314. Cited. 201 C. 489, 490, 496, 497, 501. Cited. 202 C. 520, 526, 527, 529. Cited. 204 C. 240, 241,
250, 257, 258. Cited. Id., 630, 636, 637. Cited. 207 C. 323, 324. Cited. 209 C. 1, 6. Cited. 210 C. 435, 438, 439. Cited.
211 C. 289, 293. Cited. 212 C. 195, 196, 199-203. Cited. Id., 387, 389. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. 213 C. 233-235.
Conspiracy charge against a defendant is barred after acquittal of sole alleged coconspirator. Conspiracy statute as "bilateral" in nature discussed. Id., 243, 250. Cited. Id., 422, 424. Cited. Id., 708, 711, 721. Cited. 215 C. 716, 718. Cited. Id.,
739, 743. Cited. 216 C. 801. Cited. 218 C. 349-351. Cited. Id., 432, 433, 435. Cited. 220 C. 602, 604, 606. Cited. Id., 765,
767, 771. Cited. 221 C. 447, 449. Cited. Id., 595, 598. Cited. 223 C. 243, 245, 248, 263. Cited. Id., 384, 386. Cited. 224
C. 322, 323. Cited. 225 C. 270, 271. Cited. Id., 347, 349. Cited. 227 C. 1, 3. Cited. Id., 32, 35. Cited. Id., 207, 210, 211.
Cited. 235 C. 397, 398. Cited. Id., 679, 682, 683. Cited. Id., 748, 750. Cited. 236 C. 176, 178. Cited. Id., 514, 517. Cited.
237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 380. Cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 708. Cited. 241 C. 322.
Cited. 242 C. 93.
Cited. 1 CA 524. Cited. 3 CA 503. Cited. 5 CA 347, 348. Cited. Id., 491, 492, 494. Cited. Id., 599, 600, 604. Cited. 8
CA 119, 120. Cited. Id., 478, 480, 481, 490. Cited. Id., 667, 671. Cited. 9 CA 548, 549. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id.,
147, 148. Cited. Id., 447, 448, 451, 453, 455. Cited. 11 CA 397-399. Cited. Id., 621, 623. Cited. 14 CA 205, 207. Cited.
Id., 445-447. Cited. Id., 605, 607. Cited. Id., 807. Cited. 15 CA 122, 123, 125. Cited. 15 CA 328, 329. Cited. Id., 539, 540.
Cited. 16 CA 18, 20, 33. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 17 CA 247, 248. Cited. Id., 648, 650. Cited. 19 CA 554, 555, 562-
564. Cited. Id., 640, 641. Cited. 21 CA 299, 301, 309, 311, 313. Cited. Id., 386, 387, 392, 403. Cited. Id., 519, 520. Cited.
22 CA 449, 450. Cited. Id., 567, 569, 577. Cited. 23 CA 502, 506. Cited. Id., 615, 617. Cited. Id., 667, 670. Cited. 24 CA
316, 318. Cited. Id., 493, 494. Cited. 26 CA 94, 100. Cited. Id., 667, 668. Cited. Id., 779, 780. Cited. 27 CA 596, 597.
Cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Cited. Id., 126, 128, 134. Cited. Id., 416, 420. Cited. 29 CA 359, 361. Cited. Id., 843, 844. Cited. 30
CA 190-192. Cited. Id., 232, 241. Cited. Id., 550, 558. Cited. Id., 654, 655. Cited. Id., 712, 713. Cited. 32 CA 224, 226.
Cited. 33 CA 253, 254. Cited. Id., 409, 410. Cited. 34 CA 751, 753. Cited. 35 CA 714, 716, 717. Cited. Id., 839, 841-843,
846, 848, 849. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited. Id., 190, 200. Cited. Id., 454, 455. Cited. Id., 556-558, 570, 571. Cited. Id.,
631, 632. Cited. Id., 672, 673. Cited. Id., 753, 755, 764. Cited. Id., 774, 775. Cited. 37 CA 219. Cited. Id., 456, 458;
judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 536, 538. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. Id., 777,
778, 800. Cited. Id., 868, 869. Cited. 39 CA 224, 226. Cited. Id., 333, 336, 342. Cited. Id., 526, 540. Cited. Id., 550, 553.
Cited. 40 CA 515, 520. Cited. Id., 789, 791. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. Id., 147, 148. Cited. Id., 495, 498. Cited. 42 CA
472. Cited. Id., 500. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 687. Cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. Id., 252. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 44 CA 338.
Cited. 45 CA 110. Cited. Id., 282. Cited. Id., 455. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 791. Elements of crime of conspiracy under
sec. discussed. 63 CA 82. Statute is bilateral in nature in that conspiracy requires a showing that two or more coconspirators
intended to engage in or cause conduct that constitutes a crime. 64 CA 384. Conviction and sentencing for multiple
conspiracy offenses based on a single agreement is double jeopardy violation. 65 CA 788. Elements of crime of conspiracy
discussed. 70 CA 393. There was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly entered
into a conspiracy to possess a narcotic substance with intent to sell. 75 CA 223.
Cited. 29 CS 344. Cited. 30 CS 211. Overt act is essential element of offense and must be alleged in information charging
conspiracy. 35 CS 96, 97. Cited. 36 CS 603, 604; 37 CS 527, 528, 531; id., 853. Cited. 38 CS 301, 302, 308; id., 374, 375;
id., 593, 594, 596.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 171 C. 524, 527, 529. Cited. 177 C. 243. Cited. 186 C. 696, 697. Cited. 187 C. 264, 271. Cited. 189 C. 752, 754.
Cited. 192 C. 383-385. Cited. 195 C. 598, 599. Cited. 197 C. 644, 645, 654. Cited. 199 C. 389, 391. Cited. 200 C. 586,
587. Cited. 201 C. 289, 290, 298, 300. Cited. 202 C. 520, 528. Cited. 203 C. 420, 421. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242. Cited. 207
C. 118, 120. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81. Cited. Id., 619, 621. Cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Cited. Id., 195, 197, 200. Cited. Id., 485, 488.
Cited. 213 C. 243, 244. Cited. 214 C. 122, 123. Cited. Id., 344, 347. Cited. 215 C. 570, 576. Cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Cited.
218 C. 151-153. Cited. 221 C. 595, 598. Cited. 223 C. 384, 386. Cited. Id., 635, 637, 638. Cited. 227 C. 32, 35, 41. Cited
erroneously as Subsec. (1). Id., 363, 365. Cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433; judgment superseded by en banc
reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 537, 538. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504. Cited. 239 C. 235. Cited. Id., 467.
Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 727. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 296.
Appellate court in State v. Torres, 41 CA 495 reversed trial court's judgment on grounds of insufficient evidence to convict,
judgment of appellate court reversed. Id., 485. Evidence was sufficient to support conspiracy conviction. 253 C. 354.
Where two defendants were tried separately and their respective juries were presented with separate, independent evidence
of their agreement to commit the crime in question, acquittal of the defendant's coconspirator did not nullify defendant's
conviction of the same charge. 257 C. 587.
Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 9 CA 313, 314, 317. Cited. 10 CA 447, 452. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed,
see 212 C. 50 et seq. Cited. Id., 605, 609. Cited. Id., 688, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 416, 417. Cited. 16 CA 89, 90.
Cited. Id., 245, 248. Cited. Id., 402, 403. Cited. 18 CA 134, 137. Cited. 19 CA 179-181, 186. Cited. Id., 195, 196. Cited.
20 CA 665, 666. Cited. 21 CA 386, 400. Cited. 22 CA 340, 341. Cited. 23 CA 502-504. Cited. Id., 602, 604. Cited. Id.,
667, 669, 670. Cited. Id., 746, 747; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 595 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 493, 498. Cited. 25 CA 3, 4.
Id., 21, 22. Cited. Id., 318, 319. Cited. 26 CA 94, 95, 99. Cited. Id., 279, 280. Cited. 27 CA 558, 560. Cited. 28 CA 126,
134. Cited. Id., 161, 162, 168. Cited. Id., 306-308. Cited. Id., 474, 475. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited.
29 CA 59, 60, 62. Cited. Id., 207, 211. Cited. Id., 843, 844, 858. Cited. 30 CA 232, 234. Cited. Id., 550, 551, 557. Cited.
31 CA 370, 371. Cited. 32 CA 842, 843. Cited. 33 CA 122, 123. Cited. Id., 339, 340; judgment reversed on issues of
sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 409, 410. Cited. Id., 647, 648, 650, 657.
Cited. 34 CA 58, 59; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 96, 97; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et
seq. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. Id., 751, 753; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 740, 742. Cited. 36
CA 41, 42. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 454, 455. Cited. Id., 483, 484. Cited. Id., 488, 489. Cited. Id., 556, 557. Cited.
Id., 672, 673. Cited. Id., 753, 755. Cited. 37 CA 156, 158. Cited. Id., 360, 361. Cited. Id., 456, 458; judgment reversed,
see 236 C. 176 et seq. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. 38 CA 434, 435. Cited. Id., 481, 483. Cited. Id., 536, 538. Cited. Id.,
777, 778. Cited. 39 CA 63, 64. Cited. Id., 224, 226. Cited. Id., 242, 244. Cited. Id., 333, 336. Cited. Id., 526, 528. Cited.
Id., 550, 553. Cited. Id., 579, 580, 599. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. 40 CA 47, 48. Cited. Id., 515, 516. Cited. Id., 526, 527,
533. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited. Id., 495. Cited. 42 CA 500. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 687. Cited. 43 CA 488. Cited.
Id., 830. Cited. 44 CA 338. Cited. Id., 499. Cited. 45 CA 270. Cited. 46 CA 640. Conviction for conspiracy to sell a
controlled substance within one thousand five hundred feet of a public housing project reversed where trial court instructed
that jury must find that conspiracy occurred within one thousand five hundred feet of public housing project. The law is
not concerned with where the plan was hatched, but with where conspirators proposed to carry out its unlawful purpose.
73 CA 386.
Cited. 44 CS 490.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 40 CA 526, 532, 533.
Sec. 53a-49. Criminal attempt: Sufficiency of conduct; renunciation as defense. (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of
mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in
conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes
them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step
in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
(b) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subdivision (2)
of subsection (a) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal
purpose. Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly
corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter
of law: (1) Lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the
crime; (2) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to
the place contemplated for its commission; (3) reconnoitering the place contemplated
for the commission of the crime; (4) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure
in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; (5) possession of materials
to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such
unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;
(6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of
the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession,
collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;
(7) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the
crime.
(c) When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection (a) of this section, it shall be a defense that he abandoned his effort to commit
the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a
complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 50; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 17; P.A. 92-260, S. 25.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (c) to remove reference to "affirmative" defense; P.A. 92-260 made technical
changes.
See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.
Cited. 169 C. 377, 380. Cited. Id., 581. Cited. 173 C. 254, 255. Cited. Id., 317, 318, 325. Cited. Id., 360, 362, 363.
Cited. 174 C. 16, 17. Cited. Id., 142, 144. Cited. 175 C. 398, 399. Cited. 179 C. 1, 2. Cited. 180 C. 481, 482. Cited. 182
C. 207, 208; Id., 430, 432; Id., 595, 596, 598, 600. Cited. 183 C. 29, 30. Cited. 184 C. 157, 158. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164;
Id., 199, 200. Cited. 186 C. 261, 262. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Cited. 189 C. 383, 385. Cited. 193 C. 70, 76. Cited. 193 C.
602, 603. Cited. 194 C. 233, 234. Cited. Id., 241, 242. Cited. Id., 408-410, 412. Cited. 195 C. 611, 612, 618. Cited. 196
C. 36, 38. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 198 C. 124, 126. Cited. 199 C. 14, 16. Cited. Id., 155, 159. Cited. Id., 591, 593. Cited.
200 C. 30, 31. Cited. 201 C. 174, 176. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 289, 294, 297, 300. Cited. Id., 605, 606. Cited. 202
C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 509, 510. Cited. Id., 520, 527, 529. Cited. 203 C. 445, 446. Cited. Id., 484, 486. Cited. 204 C. 630,
636, 637. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Cited. Id., 616, 617. Cited. 206 C. 213, 214. Cited. 207 C. 1, 10, 12. Cited. 209 C. 34, 41,
42, 44. Cited. 210 C. 519, 521. Cited. Id., 652, 689, 692. Cited. 214 C. 454, 457. Cited. 215 C. 695, 698. Cited. Id., 716,
718. Cited. 216 C. 585, 586, 602. Cited. Id., 647, 649, 661. Cited. 218 C. 747, 748. Cited. 220 C. 384, 385. Cited. Id., 765,
767, 768, 774. Cited. 221 C. 109, 112. Cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Cited. 222 C. 718, 719, 724. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited.
227 C. 301, 302, 311, 316, 318-320. Cited. 228 C. 384, 385. Cited. Id., 393, 395, 396. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. 231
C. 235, 237. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Cited. 235 C. 397, 398. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 469, 470. Cited. Id., 502, 503,
505, 516, 518. Cited. Id., 748, 750. Cited. 236 C. 266, 267. Cited. 237 C. 501. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 748. Cited. 238
C. 389. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 413. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 389. Cited. Id., 648.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 345. Cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Cited. 6 CA 24, 25. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id.,
257, 258. Cited. Id., 367, 370. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 351, 352. Cited. Id., 496, 497, 504,
506. Cited. Id., 545, 548. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. 9 CA 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Cited. Id.,
587, 588. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. 12 CA 32, 33. Cited. Id., 163, 170. Cited. Id., 217. Cited. Id.,
395, 396. Cited. Id., 604-606. Cited. Id., 685. Cited. 13 CA 69, 74, 75. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 531, 532.
Cited. Id., 704, 705, 712. Cited. 16 CA 38, 39. Cited. Id., 284, 285. Cited. 17 CA 359, 360. Cited. 19 CA 618, 619. Cited.
Id., 631, 633. Cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Cited. 21 CA 326. Cited. Id., 386, 387, 403. Cited. 22 CA 199, 201. Cited. Id., 340,
341. Cited. Id., 449, 450. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. Id., 624, 625, 627. Cited.
Id., 697, 698. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106, 110. Cited. Id., 298, 300. Cited. Id., 334, 335. Cited. Id., 433, 434, 441. Cited. Id.,
578, 579, 582. Cited. Id., 725, 726. Cited. 27 CA 73, 74 92. Cited. Id., 403, 404. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 28 CA 34, 35.
Cited. Id., 64, 66. Cited. Id., 469. Cited. 30 CA 26, 28, 29, 35. Cited. 30 CA 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335
et seq. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371, 376. Cited. 33 CA 339, 350; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment
reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Cited.
Id., 223, 224, 226. Cited. 35 CA 51, 53. Cited. Id., 138, 139, 148, 153. Cited. Id., 740, 743. Cited. 36 CA 161, 162. Cited.
Id., 336, 337. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. Id., 805, 807. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Cited. 37 CA 62, 63;
judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501 et seq. Cited. Id., 733, 735. Cited. 38 CA 777, 779. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. 39 CA
1, 5. Cited. Id., 18, 19, 23. Cited. Id., 267, 268, 271. Cited. Id., 333, 335. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Cited. Id., 810, 811. Cited.
40 CA 60, 61. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. Id., 483, 484. Cited. 41 CA 515, 517. Cited. Id., 751-753. Cited. 42 CA 472.
Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 252. Cited. Id., 599. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 70. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 476. Cited. 45
CA 390. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 734.
Cited. 33 CS 599. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756. Cited. 38 CS 464, 465. Cited. 39 CS 347, 353.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 177 C. 140, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. 178 C. 689, 690, 694. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 430, 435.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 585, 587; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled
on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had
had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 585-588, 592, 594; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz,
in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly
added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 188 C. 574,
576. Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 61. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 303-305. Cited. 189 C. 303, 307, 309. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C.
822, 832. Cited. 194 C. 258, 272, 276. Cited. Id., 258, 259, 271, 272, 275. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 258, 272, 276, 277. Cited.
195 C. 651, 655. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54, 62. Cited. 199 C. 255, 257. Cited. 200 C. 30, 35. Cited. Id., 44, 45. Cited. Id., 607.
Cited. 201 C. 289, 290. Cited. 202 C. 509, 514. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 520, 526. Cited. Id., 520, 528. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205
C. 528, 532. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 616, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 673-675. Subdiv. (2) cited. 207 C. 646, 647. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 208 C. 202, 203. Cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 733, 736. Cited. 210 C. 652, 687. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 652, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18, 20, 25, 27. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 441, 442. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582, 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. 212 C. 31-33. Cited. Id., 50, 52. Cited. 216 C. 492, 493. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 585, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Subdiv. (2) cited. 220 C. 408. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 652, 653.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 765, 774. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 928. Cited. 221 C. 402, 403. Cited. Id., 915. Subdiv. (2) cited. 222
C. 556, 558. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 718, 721-726. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 718, 721, 722, 724. Cited. Id., 718, 722, 726.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 224 C. 397, 399, 403, 414, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 524-526. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 616, 619.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. 229 C. 60, 62. Cited. Id., 125, 127. Cited. Id., 839, 840. Cited. 232
C. 431, 433, 434; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 431, 440;
judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 235 C.
502, 505, 517. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 502, 515. Cited. 238 C. 313. Subdiv. (2) cited. 240 C. 395. Subdiv. (2) cited. 241 C.
322. Cited. Id., 502. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 802. Subdiv. (2) cited. 242 C. 485. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a
murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or
following act of perpetration was insufficient to support conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 346. Cited. 5 CA 586, 587, 589. Cited. 6 CA 164, 165. Cited. Id., 476, 477. Cited. 7 CA 149, 150.
Cited. Id., 257, 260, 261. Subdiv. (2) cited. 8 CA 496, 505. Cited. Id., 545, 546. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 545, 547. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 462, 463. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 163,
164, 170. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 221, 222. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 12. Cited. Id., 69, 74. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
237, 238. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 222, 225; Id., 416,
417; Id., 704, 708. Cited. 21 CA 386, 401. Cited. 22 CA 449, 452. Subdiv. (2) cited. 23 CA 160, 161. Cited. Id., 663, 664.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 692, 693. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 27, 28, 35; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 264, 266, 267. Cited. Id., 624, 637-639. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 624, 639, 640. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 25 CA
104, 105, 110. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 104, 106, 110, 111. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 104, 110, 111. Cited. Id., 298, 305. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 433, 441-443. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 441-444. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 578, 582. Subdiv. (2) cited. 26 CA
52, 53. Cited. Id., 65, 66. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 114, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242-244. Cited. Id., 242, 244. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 433, 434. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 779, 780. Cited. Id., 73, 74. Cited. 27 CA 601,
602. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 290, 301, 302. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 306, 308. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 404. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 548, 549, 551, 556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 39, 60, 63-65. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 262, 263. Subdiv. (2) cited.
30 CA 9, 10. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 26, 29, 31. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 470, 471, 476. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 606, 607, 610, 611. Cited. 31 CA 120, 121. Cited. Id., 385, 386. Cited. 33 CA 339, 340, 350; judgment
reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see
235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 368, 369. Subdiv. (1) Id., 647, 650. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 743, 748B; judgment
reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 41, 42.
Cited. Id., 161, 162. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. Id., 718, 720, 734. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 536, 537.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 18, 19, 24. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 224, 226. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242, 244. Cited.
Id., 333, 335. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 333, 340. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 333, 341. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40
CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 387, 388. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 624, 625, 627. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 287, 288, 294, 294, 296. Cited. 42 CA 264. Subdiv. (2) cited. 43 CA 488.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 578. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 619. Cited. Id., 680. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 785. Cited. 44 CA 6. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 499. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45
CA 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 756. Proof of prior plan or premeditation not necessary to establish criminal liability for
attempted murder. 47 CA 401. Subdiv. (2) cited re testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 49 CA 486. Subdiv. (2) cited re showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient
to support a charge of larceny. Id. Subdiv. (2): Defendant took substantial step in hiring an agent to commit an arson even
though agent was not actually paid. To constitute a substantial step, consummation of the deed is not required. 59 CA 362.
Statutory provisions codified common law distinction between the acts of solicitation and attempt and an attempt not a
solicitation under Sec. 53a-179a. 65 CA 145. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant
intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or
the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. To be guilty of crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree defendant must
be shown to have had the mental state required to commit assault in the first degree and fact that the wounds actually
inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to
inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646. Evidence which established that defendant arranged for sale of heroin to undercover
police officer then left his residence and traveled in the direction of designated meeting place for the sale was sufficient
to find defendant guilty of attempt to commit a crime, in particular, the sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug
dependent in violation of Sec. 21a-278(b). 82 CA 111.
Cited. 41 CS 229, 232. Cited. 43 CS 46, 64.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 430, 435. Cited. 194 C. 258, 277. Cited. 205 C. 616, 617, 620. Cited. 209 C. 34, 41, 43. Cited. 211 C.
555, 587, 588.
Cited. 15 CA 704, 706, 708, 709, 711-713, 715.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 200 C. 30, 35. Cited. 221 C. 915.
Cited. 17 CA 128, 130. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant
failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that
defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.
Sec. 53a-50. Effect of motivation on renunciation. For purposes of this part, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part,
by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more
difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if
it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal
effort to another but similar objective or victim.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 51.)
Cited. 182 C. 595, 600.
Cited. 17 CA 128, 130. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant
failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that
defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.
Sec. 53a-51. Classification of attempt and conspiracy. Attempt and conspiracy
are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted
or is an object of the conspiracy, except that an attempt or conspiracy to commit a class
A felony is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 52.)
Cited. 182 C. 595, 598, 600-602. Cited. 184 C. 369, 377. Cited. 195 C. 183, 185. Cited. 202 C. 520, 527. Cited. 204
C. 630, 637. Cited. 211 C. 18, 26. Cited. 213 C. 708, 713. Cited. 235 C. 502, 515, 517. Defendant guilty of conspiracy to
commit robbery in the first degree is subject to the minimum nonsuspendable sentence in Sec. 53a-134(b). 264 C. 593.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 10 CA 447, 456. Cited. 21 CA 299, 309. Cited. 22 CA 567, 578. Cited. 29 CA 843, 859-
861. Cited. 33 CA 253, 261, 262. Cited. 36 CA 190, 205.
Sec. 53a-52. Conviction; sentencing. Section 53a-52 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 53; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
PART IV*
HOMICIDE
*Annotations to former section 53-9:
Necessity of stating degree of crime in indictment; 38 C. 399; 47 C. 117; of alleging deliberation and premeditation
where it alleges first degree. 50 C. 198. Unlawful homicide perpetrated in commission of rape is in the first degree; 72 C.
729; so in commission of robbery or in attempt to rob. 110 C. 307; id., 559; 123 C. 670; 126 C. 59; 132 C. 44. Homicide
caused by driving automobile recklessly. 82 C. 671; 83 C. 437; 109 C. 491. What mental capacity necessary for first degree
murder; 57 C. 509; charge as to defense of insanity; 87 C. 7; 96 C. 242; burden of proof; id., 639; when court need not
charge as to it. 87 C. 285. Actual malice must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 43 C. 518; 64 C. 305; 78 C. 25. Malice
is implied, if homicide is willful, deliberate and premeditated; 46 C. 336; 109 C. 138; but not in the case of sufficient
provocation or uncontrollable passion. 74 C. 181. Malice is implied where an unlawful homicide is unattended by extenuating circumstances. 110 C. 307; id., 559. What constitutes malice; 64 C. 305; 74 C. 181; 128 C. 44; charge as to it; 79 C.
590; 84 C. 472; 87 C. 5; 98 C. 463; 103 C. 484; 106 C. 351; rebutted by reasonable belief that victim committed adultery
with accused's wife; 74 C. 177; 87 C. 5; 92 C. 71; evidence of statements by accused and feeling towards victim; 74 C.
177; 83 C. 261; 84 C. 472; 87 C. 5; 88 C. 177; malice presumed from circumstances of atrocity. 84 C. 152. Theft as motive.
79 C. 590; 90 C. 126. Intoxication admissible on question of deliberation; 40 C. 143; 41 C. 587; 49 C. 382; where indulged
in to nerve person to carry out preconceived plan; 48 C. 97; as bearing on malice; 64 C. 305; as a defense. 83 C. 165; 87
C. 291; 88 C. 208. Self-defense; 57 C. 313; 79 C. 590; 83 C. 261; 106 C. 455; 105 C. 349; or defense of home; 57 C. 313;
88 C. 360. Suicide of victim as a defense; her statements as to intent. 77 C. 267. Alibi. 84 C. 152; 98 C. 466. Charge as to
corpus delicti. 81 C. 22. See note re 152 C. 15, infra. Burden and amount of proof; reasonable doubt; 77 C. 267; 79 C. 590;
81 C. 22; 87 C. 573; 109 C. 139; as to malice. 78 C. 25. Homicide in general; nature and definition of degrees. 72 C. 729;
74 C. 180. When court should charge as to excuse, justification or extenuation. 84 C. 470; 87 C. 285; 98 C. 463; 103 C.
484. Murder in second degree; 87 C. 5; 128 C. 44; 131 C. 60; in case of poisoning; 19 C. 393. What facts will reduce crime
to manslaughter. 74 C. 180; 78 C. 18; 79 C. 590; 87 C. 585. Under indictment for murder accused cannot be found guilty
of any crime except murder in first or second degree or manslaughter. 132 C. 41. Bad prison food no justification. 38 C.
127. Effect of plea of not guilty; 87 C. 285; of plea of guilty; 78 C. 18; 88 C. 208. Confession or admissions by accused;
18 C. 180; 78 C. 18; 92 C. 65 et seq.; 103 C. 478; declarations before grand jury. 56 C. 413. Momentary absence of accused
from trial. 82 C. 59. Evidence equivalent to that of two witnesses; for jury to determine. 78 C. 18; 90 C. 126; 93 C. 246;
103 C. 467; 106 C. 714. Appeal as supersedeas; 82 C. 59; if decided before time set for execution by reprieve, supreme
court need not set another day. 81 C. 22. Clothes of victim as evidence; 82 C. 59; so empty cartridge shells found in
accused's room. 74 C. 649. Where four indicted together, charge that state had not made out a case as to three upheld. 87
C. 285. Abandonment of enterprise by one before murder. 47 C. 139; 97 C. 329; 110 C. 309. Evidence of other unconnected
crimes generally inadmissible; when such evidence is admissible. 92 C. 530; 97 C. 266; 103 C. 480; 120 C. 631. When
separate trials should be given persons jointly accused. 92 C. 62; 97 C. 323; 98 C. 461; 147 C. 194. Time required for
deliberation. 93 C. 246; 110 C. 561; 120 C. 629. Degree of murder is for jury; power of court to set aside. Id., 244; 106 C.
705. Admissibility of dying declarations. 90 C. 387; 93 C. 337. Mental tests of accused; expert testimony as to insanity;
reading medical textbooks. 96 C. 250. Conspiracy to steal; homicide in perpetration; abandonment of enterprise by some
of conspirators. 97 C. 329. Change of venue; alibi; testimony of accomplice. 98 C. 466; 105 C. 333. When witnesses should
be segregated. 103 C. 473. Premeditation is necessary for first degree murder. 106 C. 352. As to use and effect of verdict
of not guilty on ground of insanity, see 39 C. 595; 96 C. 243. Possession of a deadly weapon as bearing on existence of
malice. 109 C. 138; 110 C. 308. An inference of guilt may be drawn from failure of accused to take stand and deny facts
within his knowledge which tend to prove his guilt; 109 C. 144, 496; 108 C. 463; but failure of accused to take stand must
not be commented on. Id. In prosecution for homicide by reckless operation of an automobile, conduct of accused in
leaving victims lying in road without stopping, unexplained, supports an inference of guilt. 109 C. 494. Rule concerning
responsibility of conspirators to commit an unlawful act for a homicide by one of them in carrying it out. 126 C. 59; 132
C. 44, 45. Has not changed common-law definition of murder but provides more severe penalty when certain features are
present. 128 C. 44. Actual intent to kill not necessary in second degree murder. 131 C. 60. Jury may determine case under
original charge by finding accused guilty of a lesser offense where such a conviction is warranted and is the only one
warranted upon the evidence. 137 C. 114. Unskillful or improper treatment of wound by surgeons does not relieve defendant
of responsibility for his crime. Id. Distinction between murder and manslaughter is the presence of malice in the one and
its absence in the other. Court's charge held sufficient. 139 C. 89. Charge on intoxication and alcoholic psychosis sustained.
Id., 317. A killing in an attempted robbery is murder in the first degree even though killing itself is accidental. Id., 475.
Cited. 141 C. 656; 143 C. 167; 145 C. 60; 154 C. 272, 286. A wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder in the
first degree. 142 C. 117. Court refuses to adopt "Durham" rule. 146 C. 137. Assault with intent to rob within perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a robbery. Id., 227. Even if there is a confession, there must be extrinsic corroborative evidence
which will, when taken in connection with the confession, establish the corpus delicti in the mind of the trier beyond a
reasonable doubt. 147 C. 95. Standard to determine sanity or mental capacity of the defendant to commit murder. Id.
Adoption of Wigmore definition of "corpus delicti". Previous definitions overruled. 152 C. 15. Charge re what constitutes
malice upheld. 152 C. 81. History discussed; claim that guilty plea to second degree murder should have been taken before
three judges, that jury should have determined degree of homicide and that sentence should have been imposed by three
judges, disallowed. 153 C. 320 et seq. Absence of element of wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder in indictment for
murder in first degree justifies jury verdict of guilty of murder in second degree. 154 C. 624. Malice aforethought defined.
Id., 627. Court should have permitted defendant to change his plea where it appeared trial court's concern that defendant
be exposed to possible electrocution if found guilty on trial for first degree murder was prime basis for denial; defendant
must decide risk. 157 C. 492. Length of time necessary to form specific intent may be long or short. 158 C. 341. Voluntary
drunkenness, while no excuse for crime, may make person mentally incapable of intent of premeditation which is element
of murder in first degree. Id. Preconviction bail in capital cases is governed by section 8 of article first of constitution as
well as Sec. 54-53. Cited. 159 C. 264. Evidence produced by state was adequate to show defendants were in danger of
being convicted of capital offense under this section, hence bail could be denied under exception provided in section 8 of
article I of state constitution. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 347. Cited. 161 C. 219. Cited. 166 C. 630. Trial judges direction to jury
not coercive in context of circumstances in which given. 167 C. 408.
Where accused pleaded guilty to second degree murder, fact that court in imposing sentence did not consist of a presiding
judge and two other judges and that no witnesses were heard and that the degree of crime was not determined by a majority
of the judges did not invalidate the conviction. 20 CS 127. Cited. 26 CS 175.
Annotations to former section 53-10:
Failure of deceased to exercise due care not a defense. 110 C. 61. Act of accused need not be immediate cause of the
death. Id., 62. Cited. 139 C. 401; 141 C. 656; 150 C. 459; 152 C. 344; 154 C. 272, 275. Not retroactive. 142 C. 29.
Constitutionality of statute re recommendation for life imprisonment. 145 C. 60. Death penalty does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of eighth amendment to U. S. constitution and court will not vitiate legislative determination of punishment for crimes. 158 C. 341. Preconviction bail in capital cases is to be governed by Sec. 54-53 in light
of section 8 of article first of state constitution. 159 C. 264. Cited. 161 C. 219. Cited. 169 C. 13.
Annotations to former section 53-11:
Court had authority to impose consecutive life sentences for two second degree murders. 152 C. 600-602. Cited. 154
C. 622, 624.
Cited. 25 CS 473.
Annotation to former section 53-13:
The intentional inflicting of a wound from which death ensues within a year and a day may be either murder or manslaughter. 44 C. 540. If blow produces condition which results in death, this sufficient; reasonable doubt. 87 C. 573. By reckless
driving of automobile. 82 C. 671; 83 C. 457; 109 C. 491. One who engages with others in a common purpose to carry on
an activity in a reckless manner or with wanton disregard for the safety of others is guilty of involuntary manslaughter,
even though he is not present when the homicide occurs. 138 C. 281. Distinction between murder and manslaughter is the
presence of malice in the one and its absence in the other. 139 C. 89. Cited. 153 C. 325. Cited. 163 C. 305.
Cited. 22 CS 175; id., 497, 499; 23 CS 248; 25 CS 473; 26 CS 216; 27 CS 73. Sentence of not less than five nor more
than ten years in state prison confirmed by review division where defendant had in jealousy killed woman with whom he
lived after observing her with another man. Id., 353. Sentence of not less than five nor more than ten years should stand
where defendant entered a fight between his two companions, knocked victim to the ground and stabbed him with his
knife. Id., 370.
Annotations to former section 53-17:
What constitutes "gross negligence". 120 C. 234. Cited. 130 C. 147. Contributory negligence no defense to gross or
wilful misconduct or gross negligence. 154 C. 23. Age of accused not a criterion in determination of his gross or wilful
misconduct or his gross negligence. Id. Statute does not require actual contact between accused's vehicle and deceased or
vehicle in which deceased was riding. Id.
Cited. 25 CS 84; 26 CS 36; 27 CS 232.
Annotations to chapter 952, part IV:
Unconstitutionally broad discretion. 164 C. 162. Cited. 184 C. 597, 598.
Sec. 53a-54a et seq. cited. 45 CA 591.
Cited. 40 CS 498, 501.
Secs. 53a-53 and 53a-54. Homicide defined. Murder defined; affirmative defenses; evidence of mental condition; classification. Sections 53a-53 and 53a-54 are
repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 54, 55; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-54a. Murder. (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause
the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or
causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this
subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed
act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from
the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the
first degree or any other crime.
(b) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease, mental defect or
other mental abnormality is admissible, in a prosecution under subsection (a) of this
section, on the question of whether the defendant acted with intent to cause the death
of another person.
(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of
section 53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 15, 28; P.A. 83-486, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 26.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(2), deleting reference
to death penalty imposed as provided by Sec. 53a-46a for capital felony, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 83-486 amended
Subsec. (a) by replacing "acted" with "committed the proscribed act or acts"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to add
exception for murder under Sec. 53a-54d.
See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.
See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.
Cited. 171 C. 241. Cited. 173 C. 414, 415. Cited. 176 C. 508, 509; 177 C. 1, 2, 8-10. Cited. 178 C. 450, 452, 460; Id.,
626, 627. Cited. 179 C. 1, 2; Id., 431, 432. Cited. 180 C. 141, 142. Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant
indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of
mind required is different. Id., 382, 383. Cited. Id., 589, 590. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66; Id., 388-390; Id.,
497, 498; Id., 603, 604, 606. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Cited. 186 C. 261, 262; Id., 476, 477. Cited. 188 C. 626, 629, 642.
Cited. 189 C. 303, 304, 308; Id., 346, 347. 190 C. 639, 642. Cited. 191 C. 233, 235; Id., 545, 546. Cited. 194 C. 408-411.
Cited. Id., 416, 419. Cited. Id., 483. Cited. Id., 530, 560. Cited. 195 C. 475, 476. Cited. 196 C. 667, 676. Cited. 197 C. 60,
61. Cited. Id., 180, 181. Cited. Id., 337, 340. Cited. Id., 436, 438, 460. Cited. Id., 507, 509, 522. Cited. 198 C. 124, 126.
Cited. Id., 209, 210. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 542, 543. Cited. Id., 560. Cited. Id., 573, 574. Cited. Id., 644, 646.
Cited. 199 C. 102. Cited. Id., 155, 159. Cited. Id., 163, 164, 166, 178, 179. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. Id., 718, 720. Cited.
200 C. 553, 558. Cited. 201 C. 174, 175. Cited. Id., 190, 191, 198. Cited. Id., 276, 280. Cited. Id., 368, 369. Cited. Id., 605,
606. Cited. 202 C. 18, 19. Cited. Id., 75. Cited. Id., 86, 91. Cited. Id., 316, 317. Cited. 203 C. 212, 213. Cited. Id., 641,
642. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242, 257. Cited. 205 C. 279, 280, 282. Cited. Id., 298, 300. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 616,
619. Cited. 206 C. 182, 183. Cited. Id., 213, 214. Cited. Id., 323, 325. Cited. Id., 346, 348, 349. Cited. Id., 512, 513. Cited.
Id., 678. Cited. 207 C. 374, 377. Cited. Id., 646-648. Cited. 208 C. 125, 127, 145. Cited. 209 C. 225, 229, 239. Cited. Id.,
290, 292. Cited. Id., 622, 623. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81, 106. Cited. Id., 304, 305. Cited. Id., 519, 521. Cited. Id., 631, 632.
Cited. Id., 652, 654, 696. Cited. 211 C. 215, 216. Cited. Id., 289, 292, 296, 316. Cited. Id., 441, 442. Cited. 212 C. 325,
326. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 612, 613. Cited. 213 C. 97, 98. Cited. Id., 243, 244, 255. Cited. Id., 388, 389. Cited.
Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 579, 580. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. Id., 708, 721. Cited. 214 C. 57, 59. Cited. Id., 77, 78, 82.
Cited. Id., 118. Cited. Id., 454, 457. Cited. Id., 476, 477. Cited. Id., 493, 495. Cited. Id., 616, 617. Cited. 215 C. 231, 232,
253. Cited. Id., 277, 278, 281. Cited. 215 C. 570, 579, 580. Cited. Id., 646-648. Cited. Id., 695, 697. Cited. Id., 739, 742.
Cited. 216 C. 139, 140, 142, 148, 149. Cited. Id., 188, 189. Cited. Id., 282, 296. Cited. Id., 301, 302. Cited. Id., 585, 602.
Cited. Id., 699, 710, 718. Cited. 218 C. 349, 350. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. Id., 714, 717. Cited. 219 C. 16, 20. Cited. Id.,
596, 597. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. Id., 270, 272. Cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 602-604, 606.
Cited. Id., 765, 767, 771, 774. Cited. 221 C. 58, 59. Cited. Id., 93, 94. Cited. Id., 109, 111, 112. Cited. 222 C. 506, 510.
Cited. 223 C. 273, 274. Cited. Id., 674, 675, 678. Cited. 224 C. 63, 64. Cited Id., 168, 171. Cited. Id., 372, 373, 378. Cited.
225 C. 55, 56, 74. Cited. Id., 114, 116, 120. Cited. Id., 524-526. Cited. Id., 609, 610. Cited. 226 C. 20, 28. Cited. Id., 237,
238. Cited. Id., 497, 499. Cited. 227 C. 231, 233. Cited. Id., 301, 302, 309-311, 316, 318-320. Cited. Id., 417, 419. Cited.
Id., 456, 457, 476. Cited. Id., 566, 567. Cited. 228 C. 62, 76. Cited. Id., 118, 128. Cited. Id., 281, 282, 303. Cited. Id., 412,
414. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 328, 333. Cited. Id., 691, 694, 701. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited.
Id., 115, 116. Cited. Id., 235, 237. Cited. 233 C. 44, 51. Cited. Id., 215, 216. Cited. 234 C. 139, 142. Cited. Id., 324, 334,
339, 350. Cited. Id., 381, 382. Cited. Id., 683, 684. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209. Cited. Id., 274, 275, 322. Cited. Id., 397, 398.
Cited. Id., 413, 414. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. 236 C. 189, 196. Failure of trial court to instruct jury on extreme emotional
disturbance was error; judgment of appellate court affirming judgment of trial court in State v. Person, 36 CA 448 reversed,
Id., 342, 351. Affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cited. Id. Cited. Id., 514, 516, 517. Cited. 237 C. 58,
59. Cited. Id., 339, 340. Cited. Id., 364, 368. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 694. Under appropriate circumstances defendant
can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, the same person; judgment of appellate court
in State v. Williams, 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id., 588. Cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 481. Cited.
240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 727. Cited. Id., 743. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 605. Cited.
Id., 666. Cited. 247 C. 318. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional
facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration was insufficient to support
a conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 181, 184. Cited. Id., 223, 224. Cited. Id., 470, 472. Cited. 10 CA 357. Cited. 12 CA 32, 33. Cited. Id.,
217. Cited. 17 CA 502, 504; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. Id., 602, 623. Cited. 19 CA 111, 144; judgment
reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 440-442. Cited. Id., 609, 612. Cited. Id., 674, 675, 682. Cited. 22 CA 669, 670.
Cited. 24 CA 115, 116. Cited. Id., 244, 245. Cited. Id., 692, 693. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Cited. Id., 433, 444. Cited. Id.,
456, 461. Cited. 26 CA 259, 260, 262, 265. Cited. 27 CA 1-3. Cited. Id., 520, 521. Cited. 28 CA 416. Cited. Id., 548, 549,
556. Cited. Id., 425, 426. Cited. Id., 608, 609, 611. Cited. Id., 771, 772, 774. Cited. 29 CA 386, 388. Cited. Id., 452, 453.
Cited. Id., 499, 501, 504. Cited. 30 CA 677, 679, 681. Cited. 32 CA 170, 172. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. Id., 763. Cited.
34 CA 103, 104. Cited. Id., 317, 318. Cited. 35 CA 438, 439, 444, 447. Cited. Id., 541, 543. Cited. Id., 762, 763. Cited. 36
CA 250, 251. Cited. Id., 345, 346. Cited. Id., 364, 365, 370, 371. Cited. Id., 448, 449; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342
et seq. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. Id., 506, 507. Cited. Id., 516, 517. Cited. Id., 556, 558. Cited. 37 CA 749, 750, 754.
Cited. 38 CA 371, 374. Cited. Id., 434, 435. Cited. 39 CA 18, 19, 23; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Cited. Id.,
242-244, 252. Cited. Id., 224-226, 236. Cited. Id., 632, 633. Cited. 40 CA 151, 163. Cited. Id., 318, 322. Cited. Id., 387,
388. Cited. 41 CA 604, 613. Cited. Id., 809. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 549. Cited. 44
CA 6. Cited. Id., 70. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 476. Cited. Id., 790. Cited. 45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 261.
Cited. Id., 584. Cited. 46 CA 216. Cited. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 578. Cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id., 684. Cited. Id., 734. Evidence
was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to conclude that defendant intended to cause victim's death. 55 CA 469. It is
possible to commit attempted murder without creating risk of any physical injury to another person. 56 CA 592. Failure
of trial court to inform defendant of intent requirement under statute not plain error. 65 CA 234.
Cited. 40 CS 38. Cited. Id., 498, 500. Cited. 42 CS 10, 11. Cited. Id., 426, 427, 432. Cited. 43 CS 367, 370.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 172 C. 65, 69. "Extreme emotional disturbance" guidelines. 177 C. 1, 3, 4, 7. Cited. Id., 487, 489, 491, 512.
Cited. 180 C. 171, 173, 177. Cited. 181 C. 268; Id., 284, 285; Id., 406, 408. Cited. 182 C. 66, 68; Id., 142, 168; Id., 388,
395; Id., 585, 587, 592; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on
remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had
had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.; Id., 603, 607. Cited. 184 C. 121, 122, 125. Cited. 186 C. 414, 415, 419,
422, 423; id., 574-576, 585, 586. Cited. 187 C. 6, 8. Cited. 189 C. 303, 304, 306. Cited. 190 C. 219, 233. Cited. 191 C.
27, 28. Cited. 192 C. 700. Cited. 193 C. 474, 475. Cited. Id., 646, 667. Cited. 194 C. 376, 380, 383, 387. Cited. Id., 392,
393. Cited. Id., 416, 418. Cited. Id., 530, 559. Cited. 195 C. 166, 167, 170. Cited. Id., 232, 233. Cited. Id., 651, 652, 655.
Cited. 196 C. 557, 558. Cited. 197 C. 106-108. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. 198 C. 53, 62. Cited. Id., 77, 79. Cited. 199 C.
102, 104. Cited. 200 C. 224, 225. Cited. Id., 553-555, 560. Cited. Id., 607, 608. Cited. Id., 642, 643, 650. Cited. Id., 743,
744. Charge on this defense was inadequate under the circumstances. 201 C. 174-176, 179, 180. Cited. Id., 244, 245. Cited.
Id., 368, 372, 373. Cited. Id., 534, 535. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 429, 430. Cited. 204 C. 207, 208. Cited. Id., 259,
260. Cited. 205 C. 370, 371. Cited. Id., 578. Cited. Id., 723, 724. Cited. 206 C. 229, 231, 239. Cited. Id., 300, 301. Cited.
Id., 391, 392. Cited. 207 C. 374, 385. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. Id., 455, 456. Cited. 209 C. 596, 597. Cited. 210 C.
481, 483. Cited. Id., 619-621. Cited. 211 C. 441, 442. Cited. 212 C. 258, 259. Cited. Id., 351, 352. Cited. Id., 593, 594.
Cited. 213 C. 708, 710, 711. Cited. 214 C. 122, 123. Cited. Id., 146, 147, 149. Cited. Id., 161, 162. Cited. Id., 344, 347.
Cited. Id., 540, 541. Cited. 215 C. 739, 740, 743. Cited. 216 C. 492, 493. Cited. Id., 585-587, 593. Cited. Id., 699, 701,
702, 708, 717. Cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Interpretation of section not to require reasonableness of a defendant's extreme
emotional disturbance to be determined solely from his subjective viewpoint. Id., 648, 649, 651-655, 657, 658. Cited. 218
C. 349, 351, 383. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. Id., 714, 716. Cited. Id., 747, 748. Cited. Id., 766-768. Cited. 219 C. 16, 17,
19. Cited. Id., 234, 235. Cited. Id., 295, 296. Cited. 220 C. 285, 298. Cited. Id., 385, 388. Cited. Id., 408. Cited. 221 C.
128, 129. Cited. Id., 430, 431. Cited. 222 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 506, 508. Cited. Id., 718-720, 725, 726. Cited. 223 C. 41, 42,
44. Cited. Id., 127, 128. Cited. Id., 207, 209. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 384-386. Cited. Id., 411, 412. Cited. Id., 535,
537. Cited. Id., 635, 637. Cited. 224 C. 196, 197. Cited. Id., 325, 326. Cited. 225 C. 114, 116, 118, 122, 127. Cited. Id.,
609, 610, 627. Cited. 226 C. 237, 253. Cited. 227 C. 301, 309. Cited. Id., 389, 391. Cited. Id., 448, 449. Cited. 228 C. 62,
63. Cited. Id., 118, 119. Cited. Id., 384, 385. Cited. 229 C. 328, 329. Cited. 230 C. 183, 223. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited.
232 C. 537, 538. Cited. 233 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 106, 108. Cited. Id., 174, 189. Cited. Id., 517. Cited. Id., 813, 815. Cited.
235 C. 206, 209, 251. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 413, 414. Cited. 236 C. 189, 191, 202. Cited. Id., 342, 343, 345, 356.
Cited. Id., 388, 390. Cited. 237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 253. Cited. Id., 313. Cited. 239 C. 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id.,
395. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 322. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. Id., 665. Cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 485. Cited. 243 C. 205.
Term "death" as used in Penal Code includes irreversible cessation of functioning of brain. 244 C. 761. Section incorporates
the doctrine of transferred intent and holds both a principal and an accomplice liable for death of an unintended victim.
253 C. 354. Re jury charge on extreme emotional disturbance, it was proper for trial court to refuse to instruct jury to
consider defendant's unique mental and emotional characteristics and impact of those characteristics on defendant since
the statute incorporates a standard that is objective as to its overview, but subjective as to the defendant's belief. 261 C.
336. Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set forth in section 53a-55(a)(1). 262 C. 453.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 182. Cited. Id., 367, 370. Cited. Id., 457-459. Cited. 8 CA 496, 497, 504-506. Cited. Id., 147, 148;
judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278 et seq. Cited. Id., 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Cited. 10 CA 697,
699. Cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Cited. Id., 628, 630. Cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Cited. 21 CA 801. Cited. 22 CA 199, 201. Cited. Id.,
507, 508. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 23 CA 692, 693. Cited. 24 CA 624, 625, 627. Cited. Id., 692, 693. Cited. 25 CA 433,
434. Cited. 26 CA 242-245. Cited. Id., 259, 260. Cited. 27 CA 73, 74, 92. Cited. Id., 403, 404. Cited. Id., 643, 644. Cited.
28 CA 231, 238. Cited. Id., 416. Cited. Id., 469. Cited. 29 CA 499, 501. Cited. 29 CA 573, 574. Cited. 30 CA 406, 407;
judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 385, 386. Cited. 32 CA 438-440. Cited. Id., 687, 689. Cited. Id.,
759, 761. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. Id., 122, 123. Cited. Id., 782, 783. Cited. 34 CA 58, 59, 93; judgment reversed, see
232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 96, 97; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 317, 318, 321. Cited. Id., 368,
369; see also 233 C. 517 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 153. Cited. Id., 374, 375; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413 et
seq. Cited. Id., 541, 543. Cited. 36 CA 336, 337. Cited. Id., 364, 365. Cited. Id., 417, 418. Cited. Id., 516, 517. Cited. Id.,
805, 806. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Cited. 37 CA 252, 253; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 388 et seq. Cited. Id., 404, 405, 414.
Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. Id., 749, 753. Cited. 38 CA 371, 374. Cited. 39 CA 18, 19, 24; judgment reversed, see 237 C.
748 et seq. Cited. Id., 224, 238. Cited. 40 CA 47, 48. Cited. Id., 60, 61. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited.
Id., 470, 471. Cited. 41 CA 361, 362, 365-367. Cited. Id., 495. Cited. Id., 515, 517. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 555.
Cited. 43 CA 252. Cited. Id., 830. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 198. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 338. Cited. Id., 790. Cited.
45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 297. Cited. 46 CA 216. Cited. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 600. Cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id.,
684. Statute sets forth a standard that is objective in its overview, but subjective as to defendant's belief. 48 CA 784. Trial
court's instruction re extreme emotional disturbance defense was proper. 55 CA 469. Cited. 57 CA 734.
Subsection must be read without the word "affirmative". The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements of the offense charged without imposing any burden on the defendant. 33 CS 28, 81. Unborn not included in
definition of "person". 40 CS 498, 499. Cited re ineffective counsel claim. 46 CS 344.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 603, 606. Evidence of mental capacity admissible when defendant is charged with commission of crime
under which state must prove defendant acted recklessly. 195 C. 232, 240, 241. Cited. 218 C. 349, 351, 379.
Cited. 17 CA 602, 623. Cited. 44 CA 70.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 180 C. 171, 173. Cited. 181 C. 151, 153. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151, 153. Cited. Id., 350, 352. Cited. 194 C. 376,
380, 383. Cited. Id., 392, 393. Cited. Id., 416, 418. Cited. Id., 530, 559, 560. Cited. 196 C. 655, 661, 662. Cited. 200 C.
721, 722. Cited. 201 C. 244, 245. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 401. Cited. 205 C. 616, 619. Cited. Id., 638-640. Cited. 214 C. 378,
385. Cited. 216 C. 282, 285, 294, 295. Cited. 218 C. 486, 488.
Cited erroneously as Sec. 53a-54(c). 41 CA 530, 532.
Sec. 53a-54b. Capital felony. A person is guilty of a capital felony who is convicted of any of the following: (1) Murder of a member of the Division of State Police
within the Department of Public Safety or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal who is exercising
authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a constable who performs criminal law
enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, a conservation
officer or special conservation officer appointed by